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Clearly, European and American equities are in play in the Middle East. The Iraq crisis is highly interactive with developments in the region.
Yet there has been little real discussion of how the US and Europe can address the crisis and to ensure that their equities are protected, until remedial action simply becomes too difficult.
In piece posted by Hames Stavridis on the Atlantic Council website today, the challenge is well identified and analyzed.
We will provide highlights here and encourage readers to go to the full posting:
Simply “ruling out” NATO operations in both Syria and Iraq is not in the best interest of the alliance.
This region of the world is spinning rapidly out of control, with dangerous implications for both Europe and the United States.
The alliance has enormous capability, but does it have the political will to lean into this dangerous situation?
Done in a measured and sensible way — with a focus on the Turkish border — would make sense.
NATO needs a quick shot of strong Turkish coffee to get its energy level up and make some decisions about engagement — because what’s emerging now is a clear and present danger along the southern flank of the alliance.
He underscores the centrality of European action as well:
The case for European engagement alongside the United States is quite clear, given the distinct dangers to Europe posed by the rise of a jihadist state. . . .
The most recent Defense Department report on Chinese military power describes a comprehensive and unrelenting buildup of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
The sheer magnitude of this buildup should, if continued, propel China to superpower status in a few decades. This buildup occurs despite Beijing’s improved relations with Taiwan and the Pentagon’s drawdown, which has led to the cancellation of various projects useful for countering Chinese military power. Overall, one recalls the observation of former U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown about the Soviet Union: when we build, they build, yet when we stop building, they keep going.
Spending
According to the Chinese government’s own declared figures, the PRC has the second-largest defense budget in the world, well ahead of that of Russia, Japan, or any European country.
Beijing has been annually announcing major increases in its defense spending during the past two decades. In March 2013, China declared it would spend $119.5 billion on defense, a 5.7 percent rise over the official figure for the previous year.
The Pentagon, using 2013 exchange rates and prices, estimates China’s 2013 defense budget at $145 billion, or 21 percent higher than the declared budget. The DoD figure for 2013 is also 12.2 percent higher than it offered for 2012, marking yet another double-digit rise in China’s annual defense spending.
The official Chinese defense budget figure excludes major spending categories, such as expenditures on nuclear arms, purchases of foreign weapons, and China’s military research and development.
There are also subjective factors such as how to assess purchasing power parity, China’s limited defense transparency, and how to differentiate between China’s civilian versus military sectors in a country that has many dual-used enterprises and still retains a partial command economy. In the past, this uncertainty led the Pentagon to give wide estimates for China’s actual defense spending.
The DoD now claims that U.S. intelligence has a better sense of how much China is spending on defense.
Capabilities
In any case, the magnitude of China’s military buildup is impressive. In terms of aggregate capabilities, the PLA continues to discard antiquated Soviet-era systems and replace them with more modern-generation weapons that allow China to project power at greater distances and with a greater impact. This buildup encompasses China’s air, sea, and ground forces and its long-range strike capabilities, which include ballistic and cruise missiles, cyber weapons, and outer space and electronic warfare systems.
The PLA Navy continues to make major acquisitions.
Opening ceremony of the Russia-China Naval Interaction 2014 joint exercises. May 20, 2014. Credit: RIA, Novosti
In 2013, the navy commissioned nine new stealthy Jiangdao-class (Type 056) corvettes armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. The vessels are designed for high maneuverability and close-to-shore combat. The PLAN is also upgrading the air defense capabilities of its guided-missile destroyers and frigates. The PLAN is deploying a new nuclear-powered attack (Type 095) and more strategic (Jin-class SSBN) submarines.
The Pentagon anticipates that Chia will commence its first SSBN deterrence patrols after it obtains its fourth Jin later this year. In addition to conducting further tests and training with the Soviet-built Liaoning aircraft carrier, the Pentagon believes that China will construct its own aircraft carriers and that the first one will become operational within the next decade.
The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) is already the third largest in the world and the largest Air Force in Asia.
According to the Pentagon, the PLAAF is aggressively modernizing “on a scale unprecedented in its history and is rapidly closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities.” The report’s authors expect that, in the next few years, the PLAAF will transition from a force with mostly third-generation combat planes to one in which fourth-generation planes predominate. For example, the PLAAF is developing two fifth-generation planes, the J-20 and J-31.
China is also negotiating the possible purchase of Russian Sukhoi-35 Flankers along with IRBIS-E passive electronically scanned array radar systems. China may also acquire Russia’s S-400 (“Triumf”) surface-to-air defense system, which is a more advanced version of the S-300s China bought from Russia in the 1990s. These would supplement China’s indigenous SAM system, the HQ-9. Although the PLAAF lacks a strategic bomber, China is upgrading the H-6 bomber fleet with a variant (H-6K) that has a new turbofan engine and longer-range cruise missiles, giving the PLAAF “a long-range stand-off offensive capability with precision-guided munitions.”
The PLA ground forces remain the most influential of the services in terms of the Army’s General Officers holding the most senior PRC military commands.
According to the Pentagon, the Army is seeking “the ability to deploy campaign-level forces across long-distances quickly.” To this end, China has begun testing a new Y-20 military transport plane that can fly Army units farther and more quickly than China’s current fleet of Russian-made Il-76 strategic airlift planes.
Other ground-force improvements include more capable attack helicopters with precision-guided missions, improved command-and-control systems, better air-ground coordination, and “transforming from a motorized to a mechanized force.”
Shaping a SLOC Avoidance Strategy: Credit Graphic: DOD
In addition to procurement of the Jin-class submarines, which carry the 7,400-km range JL-2 submarine ballistic missile, the PRC is taking other measures to enhance China’s nuclear deterrent.
For example, it is developing a more effective command and control systems that will give Chinese commanders more secure means to launch multiple strategic missiles simultaneously. To increase survivability, China is working on the Dong Feng-41 (DF-41), a new road-mobile ICBM that might carry as many as 10 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). The DF-41 could replace the road-mobile DF-31A. Another PRC line of effort is to increase the ability of Chinese ballistic missiles to overcome adversary missile defense systems, such as those the United States is constructing with Japan, by improving the missile’s penetration aids and other means.
A major PLA procurement priority, involving “unlimited resources,” is developing more and better unmanned systems, such as reconnaissance drones.
Last year alone the PLA revealed four drone R&D programs, including three capable of carrying weapons and one (“the Lijian”) that would become China’s first stealth drone. Another priority is expanding the number and capabilities of the PLA’s cruise missiles at a time when U.S. R&D regarding defending against such weapons, or developing better U.S cruise missiles, is lagging outside the U.S. Navy. The Second Artillery command is also acquiring yet another conventionally armed medium-range ballistic missile. China is also developing offensive cyber and electronic warfare systems designed to attack adversary C4ISR systems with non-kinetic means.
Not only has each PLA service improved its major weapons systems, but the PLA has been improving its capacity to integrate these service contributions.
The Chinese military has been making its C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) enablers more reliable, survivable, interoperable, and integrated. For example, China tested its first rapid launch vehicle, the Kuaizhou (“quick vessel”), last year, and is developing another space launch vehicle, the LM-11, for rapidly deploying or replacing small satellites over areas of sudden interest, such as where natural disasters are occurring or where potential combat operations might occur.
China has already successfully tested the capacity to destroy satellites, and may want the means to rapidly replace its own satellites should it engage in an anti-satellite war with the United States, whose military is more reliant on space-based networks.
Operations
In terms of operations, the PLA continues to operate at ever-greater distances from Chinese territory.
Many of these developments are for benign purposes, such as combating pirates or providing humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR). But PLAN warships can increasingly be found in the waters of the East and South China Seas, where Beijing has territorial disputes. For example, the Liaoning carrier, which entered service in September 2012, deployed to the East China and South China Seas in November 2013. Whereas Beijing previously lacked military means to enforce its claims, this is no longer the case.
The Chinese armed forces are also engaging in larger and more complex exercises and training “under realistic combat scenarios.”
One major exercise last October, titled “Maneuver-5,” included warships from all three PLAN fleets in the Philippine Sea. It was the largest PLAN open-ocean exercise ever. Last fall’s “Mission Action” exercise series involved six weeks of large multi-service drills along China’s southern and southeastern coasts. In terms of foreign exercises, Russia is the PLA’s most frequent exercise partner. The Russian military joined three of the seven bilateral and multilateral exercises that China anticipated in last year. .
China’s acquisition policies and operational practices make evident that the PLA would try to exploit the U.S. military’s heavy reliance on global communications and information support networks by developing means to attack them.
For example, the PLA would like to be able to impose a temporary “information blockade” on U.S. military forces. By impeding their access to cyber and outer space systems, the PLA would hope to degrade the U.S. Military ability to resist a Chinese military seizure of Taiwan or some other objective, presenting Washington with a fait accompli. The report relates that China has already been conducting many cyber attacks against DoD systems, presumably to probe U.S. defenses in preparation for actual battlefield operations as well as to acquire U.S. military secrets that might assist Chinese defense industries.
Impact
U.S. officials are not concerned about of any single Chinese weapon system or exercise, but by the comprehensive and sustained nature of China’s military buildup, which is having destabilizing effect in the Asia-Pacific region.
For example, the Pentagon notes that China’s growing military power has been associated with a more assertive stance regarding Beijing’s territorial disputes with Japan, the Philippines, and other countries.
The Pentagon believes that the PLA still focuses its development efforts on winning short-duration high-intensity wars in regions near China.
Like Russia, however, the Chinese have shown skill in applying coercion through means (e.g., using paramilitary naval forces such as maritime law enforcement ships) and at a level (e.g., harassment operations and creeping encroachments) that would not trigger a military response from the targeted country or the United States.
For example, last year China declared an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea as a means of bolstering its territorial claims there against Tokyo.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (center) talks with members of the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force in Beijing. China has been increasingly assertive in Asia, and many U.S. allies want the U.S. to have a strong presence in the region as a counter balancing force. Credit: National Public Radio
The PLA’s ballistic missiles, cyber capabilities, and other instruments of deterrence and disruption are giving the PLA formidable anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities against the U.S. military.
For example, the PLA is developing space-based reconnaissance and communications systems and over-the-horizon radar capabilities that can better identify and track U.S. forces at greater distances from the Chinese shore. This longer warning time and more accurate tracking capacity could make U.S. Navy warships more vulnerable to China’s CSS-5 Mod 5 (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile, which China is arming with a 1,500-km range and a maneuverable warhead.
The cross-strait military balance continues to shift against Taiwan, which is facing more than one thousand PLA short-range missiles and aircraft as well as the Chinese efforts described above to use A2/AD capabilities to impede U.S. military intervention on Taipei’s behalf.
The Pentagon also expects the Chinese Navy to acquire improved amphibious assault capabilities to address a longstanding shortfall in Beijing’s capabilities, though the PLA could also use civilian ships and planes to move soldiers to Taiwan should Beijing decide to go beyond a missile blockade or other measures short of direct PLA military occupation. Taiwan desperately needs a more modern air combat plane like the F-35 to counter China’s growing capabilities.
The author wishes to thank Justin Blaszczyk, Josepaolo Huelgas, Brittany Mannings, Liz Skokan, Lii Inn Tan, and Daniel Urchick for their research assistance on this article.
The Russian seizure of Crimea, and its nearby gas and oil fields, shocked Western Europe and the US.
Subsequent ongoing violent political upheaval in Eastern Ukraine with parallel threat of Russian military intervention dramatically heightened attention of many governments.
Potential for violence that might disrupt energy transmission through Ukraine to Western Europe generated turbulence in global financial markets. The global price of oil edged up, at a time when most commercial users of oil and its byproducts had anticipated falling oil prices.
(Most commercials in June took short positions in world oil trading, leaving only smaller speculators and individual investors betting that prices would rise. The commercials assumed the political dynamics in Ukraine would calm down, whereas the speculators assumed fighting would grow and draw in Russia, Western Europe and the US.)
As violent events continued in East Ukraine, the US Government insisted that Russia was stimulating that violence, and led another US-European push to impose greater sanctions on both individual Russians and the Russian economy.
Officials in Washington and some European capitals failed to recognize that while Putin did want Crimea, he would not likely want to annex all of the Ukraine, or even Eastern Ukraine, because that would just bring the heavy debt burdens of the Ukraine onto Russian shoulders.
Instead, Putin had made clear from the outset that he wanted greater devolution of power from Kiev to local governments in a “federated” Ukraine.
The public argument was a need to protect ethnic Russians that constituted a significant share of residents in Eastern Ukraine.
Putin’s underlying objective was clearly to weaken the central government and leave a politically fragmented, partially dysfunctional Ukraine as a strategic non-NATO buffer and reliable provider of food for Russia in the years ahead, regardless of Russian relations with the West. Putin also wanted “safe passage” for Russian security forces to access Transniestria in Moldova through Odessa (denying the West future security utilization of Odessa).
Even before violence spread, at the time of the fall of Yanukovych, Zbig Brzezinski suggested “Finlandization” (neutralization) of Ukraine might be the best option to reduce likelihood of confrontation Russia and the West.
As events have now developed, Ukraine looks likely to evolve into a looser federation with complex mixed economic and cultural relations with both Russia and Western Europe – in effect, Finlandized.
As a leader of Russia, Putin created circumstances that favored this outcome.
He successfully used threat of military force and groups of unofficial, unflagged special forces to generate fear among Ukrainians and crippling of the Ukraine central government and its military. Had he sent Russian forces formally across the border, he would have again faced a potential blowback from mothers of Russian boys killed in combat, as had happened in the past with regard to the conflict in Chechnya.
It is highly doubtful that he was prepared for deaths of his Russian boys, and definitely not ready to confront US military responses that might have ended with humiliation for Putin.
As for Syria, Putin had already succeeded in redirecting US intervention, in the process causing Obama to appear to be backing down from the “red line” he had previously set.
Strategically, Putin kept Syria in play for the IRGC and its aid to Hamas and Hezbollah, while strengthening relations with the Tehran leadership.
When Iraq burst into flames as ISIS spread out and ignited broader Sunni-Shia and tribal conflicts inside Iraq, Riyadh and Tehran (and some diplomacy by the US) sought to stabilize Iraq, to avoid direct confrontation between the Saudis and Iran, which neither wanted at this moment in history.
Putin inserted himself by encouraging Iraq PM Maliki to stay strong at the very moment Riyadh and Tehran (and the US) wanted Maliki to step down, allowing the formation of a new government, which would be more inclusive of Sunni interests.
Clearly, Putin saw opportunity in continued turmoil in Iraq, drawing in greater cooperation between Moscow and both Riyadh and Tehran.
In this complex process of responses to ISIS, the planned successful withdrawal of the US military from Iraq and Afghanistan were turned into what appeared to be a botched exit, after years of warfare and countless deaths.
All of this confusion and continuing violence, with Putin chalking up points of success, rattled leadership among some neighboring European countries, notably the Baltic States, Poland, Sweden and Finland.
Separately, Denmark (for Greenland), Norway, Sweden and Finland had grown increasingly concerned about future exploitation of the Arctic, particularly its energy and raw material resources. A slowly budding alliance among these countries with the US, Canada, and UK was forming with security concerns in mind when future confrontations with Russia might be expected.
The Northern European governments and Poland are increasingly worried about perceived Russian manipulation of events in its interaction with the US, and fear for the future security of their own region and interests.
Some NATO member governments became motivated to seek revitalization of NATO, but many other European NATO members showed great reluctance to rise to the occasion, both because economic and fiscal priorities lay elsewhere, and because they did not wish to disturb substantial, growing business relations with Russia.
Germany in particular had already allowed the once admired Bundeswehr to deteriorate into a dysfunctional, poorly armed militia, and was not politically ready to reconsider rebuilding a security presence in world affairs.
Instead, Germany had de facto already “pivoted to the East”, committing its industry and capital to enhanced relations with Russia, and across Russia to China.
For Germany, NATO had become an old boys club, pleasant to attend, but of no vital interest to Germany’s economic thrust Eastwards, away from a gradually deteriorating Eurozone neighborhood.
The US, of course, pleaded with NATO members to bring their defense spending up to NATO target levels, in light of what might be perceived as potentially growing hostility between Russia and the West. Bordering Russia, Estonia and Lithuania (a conduit to Kaliningrad), along with Poland argued vigorously for reenergizing NATO.
Sweden, long politically averse to direct entanglement with NATO, began seeking ways to interact militarily with NATO.
All the while, Germany’s politics remained unchanged.
When the US sought coordinated Western sanctions on Russia, divisions in NATO widened, bringing some benefit to Moscow but little to Washington.
Meanwhile, Chinese political and military leaders observed incremental moves by Putin bringing strategic gains to Russia through exploitation of Washington’s hesitance and conflicted political and diplomatic responses.
China pursued a string of limited “provocations” with neighboring governments, particularly Vietnam, Philippines, and Japan over disputed territorial rights. China also unilaterally introduced its new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) which was criticized by the US and Japan. Apart from a sortie of two US bombers into the ADIZ area, the ADIZ incremental step outward of China’s declared perimeter was soon forgotten by press, media, and Congress.
China made a temporary move of an oil exploration platform into waters in dispute between China and Vietnam, accompanied by conscious efforts to create “incidents” by attempted ramming of Vietnamese sea vessels. China proceeded to begin building an artificial island on reefs near the Philippines, over the objections of Manila, as both an operational and surveillance facility.
Strong PLA declarations about the China’s rights to the Senkakus generated apprehension in Tokyo, and the Japanese PM Abe urged President Obama to state that Washington would interpret aggression on the Senkakus as calling into effect the US-Japan mutual defense arrangements.
Clearly China does not want direct conflict with the US, but the PLA seems to see advantage in keeping alive a level of fear and hostility between the PLA and the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF).
China appears to have concluded that the US will tolerate Chinese bullying of neighbors if US military is not at risk, and Washington remains preoccupied with domestic politics.
While the Obama Administration is not noted for generating “strategic visions” of the US role in world affairs, the Department of Defense (DOD) and its military independently continue to analyze, trying to anticipate challenges that lie ahead in future years and decades.
A recent DOD report on China’s PLA does warn of rapid expansion of Chinese military capabilities on land and sea, and in the air. However, DOD also recognizes that the PLA is not capable of direct conflict with the US military at this moment in history.
In this context, DOD analysts have concluded that the PLA seeks focus of its development efforts on preparing for, and winning short-duration, high intensity wars in regions close to China. DOD also believes Chinese, like Russians, are showing growing attention to means and tactics that would not trigger a full military response from the US.
A pattern is developing among some increasingly antagonistic nations of careful, but aggressive tactics to enlarge areas of influence, in a slow reconfiguration of global security zones.
No doubt Iran and the GCC leadership must be learning from the chess-like incremental steps being played out by Russia and China.
Markets, like well-intentioned politicians in many nations, are yet not awakened to where this all may lead.
2014-06-30 Recently CrowdStrike released a report on recent Chinese cyber espionage activities.
Monday, June 9, 2014, CrowdStrike publicly released a report on a group called Putter Panda, a cyber espionage actor that conducts operations from Shanghai, China, likely on behalf of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 3rd Department 12th Bureau Unit 61486.
Putter Panda is a determined adversary group, conducting intelligence-gathering operations targeting the Government, Defense, Research, and Technology sectors in the United States, with specific targeting of space, aerospace, and communications.
In the introduction to the report, George Kurtz, President/CEO and Co-Founder of CrowdStrike provided the following overview to the report:
In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice charged five Chinese nationals for economic espionage against U.S. corporations. The five known state actors are officers in Unit 61398 of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In response, the Chinese government stated that the claims were “absurd” and based on “fabricated facts”.
China then went even further, stating “The Chinese government, the Chinese military and their relevant personnel have never engaged or participated in cyber theft of trade secrets.”
We believe that organizations, be they governments or corporations, global or domestic, must keep up the pressure and hold China accountable until lasting change is achieved. Not only did the U.S. Government offer in its criminal indictment the foundation of evidence designed to prove China’s culpability in electronic espionage, but also illustrated that the charges are only the tip of a very large iceberg. Those reading the indictment should not conclude that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) hacking campaign is limited to five soldiers in one military unit, or that they solely target the United States government and corporations.
Rather, China’s decade-long economic espionage campaign is massive and unrelenting.
Through widespread espionage campaigns, Chinese threat actors are targeting companies and governments in every part of the globe.
At CrowdStrike, we see evidence of this activity first-hand as our services team conducts Incident Response investigations and responds to security breaches at some of the largest organizations around the world. We have first-hand insight into the billions of dollars of intellectual property systematically leaving many of the largest corporations – often times unbeknownst to their executives and boards of directors.
The campaign that is the subject of this report further points to espionage activity outside of Unit 61398, and reveals the activities of Unit 61486. Unit 61486 is the 12th Bureau of the PLA’s 3rd General Staff Department (GSD) and is headquartered in Shanghai, China. The CrowdStrike Intelligence team has been tracking this particular unit since 2012, under the codename PUTTER PANDA, and has documented activity dating back to 2007.
The report identifies Chen Ping, aka cpyy, and the primary location of Unit 61486.
This particular unit is believed to hack into victim companies throughout the world in order to steal corporate trade secrets, primarily relating to the satellite, aerospace and communication industries. With revenues totaling $189.2 billion
in 2013, the satellite industry is a prime target for espionage campaigns that result in the theft of high-stakes intellectual property. While the gains from electronic theft are hard to quantify, stolen information undoubtedly results in an improved competitive edge, reduced research and development timetables, and insight into strategy and vulnerabilities of the targeted organization.
Parts of the PUTTER PANDA toolset and tradecraft have been previously documented, both by CrowdStrike, and in open source, where they are referred to as the MSUpdater group. This report contains details on the tactics, tools, and techniques used by PUTTER PANDA, and provides indicators and signatures that can be leveraged by organizations to protect themselves against this activity. Our Global Intelligence Team actively tracks and reports on more than 70 espionage groups, approximately half of which operate out of China and are believed to be tied to the Chinese government.
This report is part of our extensive intelligence library and was made available to our intelligence subscribers in April 2014, prior to the US Government’s criminal indictment and China’s subsequent refusal to engage in a constructive dialog.
Targeted economic espionage campaigns compromise technological advantage, diminish global competition, and ultimately have no geographic borders.
We believe the U.S. Government indictments and global acknowledgment and awareness are important steps in the right direction. In support of these efforts, we are making this report available to the public to continue the dialog around this ever-present threat.
For a related PRC activity see the following Special Report:
The National Computer Quality Supervising Center: A Core Chinese Dual Use Technology Capability
China’s NCTC has been established and organized to promote national industrial electronic information scientific and technical development.
The NCTC, through its own public documentation, is explicitly set up as a dual-use information technology industry support organization.
The NCTC provides national professional test services for products such as computers, computer peripherals, computer network equipment, fiscal cash registers, second generation identity card reading (verification) equipment, computer room equipment and engineering, printed circuit boards, electronic components, integrated network cabling, software, IC card and equipment, RFID and equipment, and computer energy savings.
No overarching organization comparable to the NCTC is known to exist in the US or in any other major Western IT industrial state.
The NCTC is an integral component of the Chinese government policy-driven infrastructure for IT equipment design and testing, which has resulted in an increasingly innovative industry that has expanded China’s share of the global telecommunications and IT equipment market.
The deals for the fighter jets, which were expedited due to the “emergency situation in the country,” are worth up to $500 million, BBC News reported.
A statement on the Iraqi Defense Ministry’s website on Saturday confirmed that five Su-24 jets had been delivered and stationed at various air bases, saying the jets would boost the “combat capability of the Air Force and the armed forces to eliminate terrorism.”
Russia’s delivery of the jets seems to be the latest sign of its growing influence in the Middle East.
During a visit to Damascus on Saturday, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov called on the U.S. and Europe to jump in and help fight the rising tide of terrorism in the region, urging the West to follow Russia’s example of “not standing idly” by while terrorist groups seize control of more and more cities in Syria and Iraq, The Associated Press reported.
According to another Arab source, Asharq Al-Awsat:
Hakim Al-Zamili, a member of the Security and Defense Committee in Iraqi’s parliament, told Asharq Al-Awsat the country’s decision to buy the Russian fighter aircraft was motivated by a number of reasons. “One of which was the fact they were used aircraft, which meant they did not fall under the controls applied to the import of new weapons which take a long time to deliver,” he said.
He added that Iraq had used such aircraft during previous wars with “Iran and the US where they proved their effectiveness,” and that a number of Iraqi pilots were already familiar with the aircraft, which could be deployed immediately without the need to train the pilots.
Zamili, a prominent member of the Shi’ite Sadrist Movement, added that the aircraft were relatively cheap because they were used by the Russian Air Force in the 2008 war against Georgia, “and are, therefore, still active.”
In reply to a question about a 4.2-billion-dollar contract signed with Russia in 2013, which caused controversy and prompted allegations of corruption, Zamili said: “That contract still exists, and Iraq received many weapons and equipment to fight terrorism under the contract.”
He added that the deal “was reviewed from a number of angles and agreement was reached to implement it, and accordingly, arms have been arriving but they did not include Sukhoi aircraft.”
Iraq had also signed contracts with the US to buy F-16 fighter aircraft, he said, “however, their delivery was delayed and the US does not seem to be keen to supply Iraq with specific types of heavy weapons.”
And moves in Iraq, Iran, Syria and elsewhere are enhancing the Russian ability to play out a role in the Gulf states as well.
Action has its own impact, and moving pieces on the global chess board makes you a player.
In a piece published recently by the editor of Russia Direct, Yuri Barmin looks at the evolving Russian-Saudi relationship.
At a time when the White House is considering sending military aid to Baghdad, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov is visiting Saudi Arabia – a longtime U.S. ally in the region and key stakeholder in the Iraqi crisis.
Russia has been looking to play a bigger role in the Middle East, but Moscow’s inability to win over the Gulf – the key to influencing the Middle East – has continuously prevented it from replacing the United States as a reliable partner to the regional powers.
Against this backdrop, Lavrov’s visit to Saudi Arabia has presented Moscow with an opportunity to prove to the Gulf countries that it is in fact the Kremlin, and not the White House, that nowadays holds sway over a troubled Syria and disobedient Iran.
Meanwhile back in Washington……
Editor”s Note:
Asharq Al-Awsat (Arabic: الشرق الاوسط, meaning “The Middle East”) is an Arabic international newspaper headquartered in London. A pioneer of the “off-shore” model in the Arabic press, the paper is often noted for its distinctive green-tinted pages.[2]
The New York Times in 2005 called Asharq Al-Awsat “one of the oldest and most influential in the region”.
Although published under the name of a private company, the Saudi Research and Marketing Group, the paper was founded with the approval of the Saudi royal family and government ministers, and is noted for its support of the Saudi government.[2] The newspaper is owned by Faisal bin Salman, a member of the Saudi royal family.
Launched in London in 1978, and printed in 12 locations internationally,the paper is often billed as “the leading Arab daily newspaper”,and calls itself “the premier pan-Arab daily newspaper”based on the fact that past estimates of its circulation have given it the largest circulation of the off-shore Pan-Arab dailies, a category including its chief competitor Al-Hayat.
However, reliable estimates are available only from the early 2000s, before rival Al-Hayat launched a massive effort to increase circulation in Saudi Arabia.
Asharq Al-Awsat covers events through a network of bureaus and correspondents throughout the Arab World, Europe, United States, and Asia. The paper also has copyright syndications with the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Global Viewpoint, permitting it to publish Arabic translations of columnists like Thomas Friedman and David Ignatius.
2014-06-30 The French Air Force has replaced the Mirage 2000 that crashed in Niger earlier this month with another aircraft, bringing its fighter aircraft detachment for Mali up to full strength again.
The new Mirage 2000, from Escadron de Chasse 1/33 ‘Navarre’, arrived at Base Aerienne 172 at N’Djamena International Airport in Chad on June 22, according to the French ministry of defence.
The aircraft forms part of a detachment supporting France’s Operational Serval in Mali.
France sent soldiers to the country in January last year to wrest it from Islamist groups who had seized most of the north of the country. Around 1 600 French troops are still engaged in operations.
The Mirage 2000 joins two other Mirage 2000Ds and three Rafales.
The French Air Force detachment previously operated from Bamako in Mali but moved to N’Djamena on December 22, 2013, reports Air Forces Daily.
The Mirage 2000D that crashed was lost on June 9 when it experienced a technical failure whist returning to N’Djamena from an Operation Serval mission over Mali. The crew were forced to eject and were retrieved safely.
France also has two General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles flying from Niamey in Niger in support of Operation Serval.
They began flying from Niamey on January 15 and are operated by Escadron de Drones 1/33 ‘Belfort’, which also flies the Harfang UAV over Mali.
Various Gazelle, Puma and Tiger helicopters also support Operation Serval.
Reprinted with permission of our partner defenceWeb:
2014-06-20 On June 12, 2014, Second Line of Defense visited the USS America at the Ingalls Huntington shipyard in Pascagoula Mississippi.
The ship is to leave mid July for its initial homeport of San Diego and will travel around South America and visit along the way.
In addition to VIP visitors who will come to the ship by air or port visits, VMX-22, the experimental USMC aviation squadron will land its Ospreys on board and operate with the ship up to two months prior to the commissioning which will occur October 11, 2014.
Captain Hall, the CO of the ship, is quoted on the commissioning website as follows:
USS AMERICA (LHA 6) will be the fourth U. S. Navy vessel named after our country and will showcase the strength, resolve and commitment of a great nation.
She is characterized as an aviation-centric amphibious assault ship designed to operate the U. S. Marine Corps next generation of aircraft, the MV-22 Osprey and F-35B Joint Strike Fighter and to support the Marines across the full spectrum of military operations.
AMERICA’S motto: “Bello Vel Pace Paratus”, translates to “Prepared in War or Peace”, representing the capability of this awesome warship to strike mightily in wartime, be a deterrent in peacetime, and to lead humanitarian and disaster response efforts in times of need. AMERICA will be a flagship for 21st century operations.
Captain Robert Hall, Jr., Commanding Officer of the USS America, and the Ship’s Sponsor, Lynne Pace at the Christening Ceremony for the USS America, October 2012.. Credit: SLD
The wife of the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Pace) was the ship’s sponsor and provided modesty and grace to the ceremony. She recognized the achievements of the past USS America and the veterans of the ship in the audience.
She also delivered one of the best lines of the day:
“I know you (the crew of the former USS America) would love the name to go to an aircraft carrier, but this ship is mini-aircraft carrier….”
The Commandant focused upon the meaning of the ship within overall national strategy.
He underscored that having the kind of forward presence, which the ship would provide, was crucial for influencing events and giving the President options to deal with crises. He cited the famous operations at the beginning of the Afghan war whereby the USN-USMC team went deep into Afghanistan from large deck amphibs and set up Camp Rhino.
The clear implication was that with the increased capability which new aviation will provide for this class of ship, one could expect more of this type of operational dynamic.
The Vice CNO (Admiral Mark Ferguson) who is a surface warrior focused on the importance of adding a surface ship of such size and capability to the fleet. He emphasized that global presence was built upon such capability being inherent within the fleet, and able to support the USN-USMC team.
In short, the day provided an opening on the era of innovation, which this ship will bring to the USN-USMC team, the joint commander, and to coalition operations.
Although it is called an LHA (Landing Helicopter Assault) ship it is not. It is moving far beyond what a helo amphibious ship can provide for operations and for assault from the sea.
And it is the lead ship in driving a new cycle of innovation for the USN-USMC team.
The USS America as viewed from the park directly facing the shipyard in Mississippi. Credit: Second Line of Defense
The Captain is an experienced CRUDES officer. For those of us not raised in the USN, this means an officer with Cruiser-Destroyer surface fleet background. And for Navy folks he would be described as a “black shoe” as opposed to a “brown shoe.” Again for those of us who have not served in the USN this refers coming from the surface ship community rather than the aviation community.
He has served as the chief engineer on a Spruance class destroyer and most recently was a Captain of a DDG. And in his last deployment with the DDG, he deployed with the USS Kearsarge as well in the Indian Ocean.
It is important to remember that Admiral Halsey, when he went into the hospital before the Battle of Midway recommended that his surface ship Commander (a “black shoe” in Navy parlance) Admiral Spruance take command of Task Force 16, the USS Enterprise and USS Hornet battle group. Admiral Nimitz CINCPAC, a submariner, accepted Halsey’s recommendation. He leaned on the ability of Spruance to maneuver the ships, to attack and withdraw as a key element of operational dominance. We are seeing once again a merging of the communities.
SLD: How would you describe the USS America?
Captain Hall: The USS America is a warship. It’s an amphibious class ship, but it’s a warship like any other and so mixing the communities together brings some core strengths together. I’ll have a lot of amphibious experience on the America with my crew and my expertise in the surface navy will help us to integrate much better as a team.
The USS America flight deck works synergistically with the two decks below it to shape the ops tempo for amphibious assault. Credit: Second Line of Defense
SLD: What are some of the core capabilities of the ship?
Captain Hall: We are a large deck amphibious ship, just as the Kearsarge. But we are an aviation-centric large deck amphibious ship and we’ve been designed specifically without a well deck so we can support the USMC’s next generation of aircraft.
We can get out there with a much larger hanger bay with two high-hat areas to support maintenance on the much larger MV-22s. The maintenance requirements for the F-35 are met and we have the capability to expand when required for future development. With our added fuel, ordnance, maintenance capability, supply and support capacity, we can sustain the aviation capability much longer on station…..
SLD: The ship is built to evolve over time with growth capabilities?
Captain Hall: We are configured to grow. We have excess space and six large generators onboard for power generation.
Looking at the ship from the outside, it is clearly large but the flight deck looks very similar to the LHA it is replacing.
But looks can be deceiving. Visiting the ship is a whole different experience.
The ship has three synergistic decks, which work together to support flight deck operations.
Unlike a traditional large deck amphibious ship where maintenance has to be done topside, maintenance is done in a hangar deck below the flight deck.
And below that deck is the intermediate area, where large workspaces exist to support operations with weapons, logistics and sustainment activities.
There are four aviation elevators on board, each of which can carry up to 12,000 pounds.
This graphic focuses upon the USS America deck synergy and the workflow thereby facilitated. Credit: Second Line of Defense
There is space to maintain and sustain the Osprey and the other aviation assets, and prepares for the coming of the F-35B as the ISR C2 asset taking the assault force to another level of capability.
After touring the ship, Captain Hall discussed the ship and its role moving forward.
The ship has several capabilities, which allow us to stay on station longer than a traditional LHA and to much better support the Ospreys and the F-35Bs which will be the hallmark of USMC aviation to enable long range amphibious assault. These aircraft are larger than their predecessors.
They need more space for maintenance and this ship provides it.
One of four aviation elevators aboard the USS America each capable of lifting 12,000 pounds. Credit Second Line of Defense
We have two high-hat areas to support the maintenance, one of them located behind the aft flight deck elevator to allow movement through the hangar.
We have significantly greater capacity to store spare parts, ordnance and fuel as well.
We can carry more than twice as much JP-5 than a traditional LHA.
Question: You are preparing to leave for your homeport. What are the plans in route?
Captain Hall: Our primary focus will be on training, flexing ship systems and partner nation engagement as we travel around South American to the Pacific. We’re going to bring some MV-22s as well as some SH-60 helicopters on board and be able to start working with the Marines on a smaller scale than we would with the full MEU on board.
Question: How would you describe the below deck support to the flight deck?
Captain Hall: I like the synergistic description.
The flight deck is about the size of a legacy LHA. But that is where the comparison ends. By removing the well deck, we have a hangar deck with significant capacity to both repair aircraft and to move them to the flight deck to enhance ops tempo.
With the Ospreys, we will be able to get the Marines into an objective area rapidly and at significant distances. And when the F-35B comes the support to the amphibious strike force is significantly enhanced.
View of hanger deck USS America. Credit: Second Line of Defense
And we will be able to operate at much greater range from the objective area.
With the concern about littoral defenses, this ship allows us the option to operate off shore to affect events in the littoral.
This is a major advantage for a 21st century USN-USMC team in meeting the challenges of 21st century littoral operatons.
Question: What about the crew? Are there many first time amphibious sailors on board?
Captain Hall: I’ve got a fantastic crew on board AMERICA. It is a mixture of veterans with new sailors. As far as the background of the experienced crew, they come from almost every community and platform to include carriers and amphibious ships.
The young Sailors know that this is an awesome warship and they’re excited to sail on her. They also know that it has different capabilities than earlier LHAs.
The crew and the Marines are pretty excited to get underway and see how well the ship is going to perform.
And I’m pretty excited to see the innovative approaches and ideas AMERICA facilitates with regard to amphibious ops and warfighting in general.
06/27/2014 On June 27, 2014, the VMX-22 or Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron Twenty-Two had its change of command at New River Marine Corps Air Station.
The squadron began with the introduction of the Osprey into Iraq.
It has migrated under Col. Orr to build upon the success and maturity of the Osprey, to work on a variety of innovations, notably upon exercises with the ground forces in shaping new force insertion approaches.
This process will continue with the new CO of VMX-22, Col. Robert L. Rauenhorst.
Indeed, his first major effort will be working with the new navy ship the USS America in integrating aviation assets aboard that ship.
In the video, the Deputy Commandant of Aviation, General Jon Davis discusses the accomplishments of VMX-22 under Col. Orr’s leadership and he looks forward to the way ahead for the squadron as it plays a key role in USMC aviation and MAGTF innovation.
Col. Orr and Col. Rauenhorst preparing for the change of command. Credit Photo: Second Line of Defense
The squadron is moving to Yuma to more closely be able to work with MAWTS-1 and the prospect of these two innovative squadrons working together to shape a way ahead is a key element enabling 21st century USMC innovation.
The video is not perfect for was shot by using a hand held video rather than by using a tripod-stabilized camera.
But this was due to the nature of the ceremony and the activity on the hangar floor in holding the ceremony, which was not being held outside because of the weather experienced in the afternoon.
But the video does highlight the perspective of the new DCA, who himself was a former Commanding General for the 2nd Marine Air Wing where VMX-22 currently resides.
General “Dog” Davis highlighted the centrality of working digital interoperability for the ground combat element and the air combat element.
He emphasized that Col. Orr and the squadron has started to bring the tiltrotar enabled assault force into a digital interoperable age.
“It is those devil dogs coming off of the back of those Ospreys which are a key strike element which the USMC brings to the fight.”
“We need to get them the information they need at the pointy end of the spear.”
General Davis highlighted the key role of Col. Orr’s leadership in assembling a team of doers and providing realistic guidance and tough feedback to senior USMC leaders.
And the Second Line of Defense team can attest from visits to VMX-22 this time and in the past, that the General was not overstating either the leadership role of Col. Orr or the commitment of the team to take on tough tasks and to push the envelope of innovation.
We have an interview upcoming with now ex-CO and the new CO of VMX-22 which we will publish in the near future.
