The Future of Large UAVs for Security and Military Operations: A Danish Perspective

06/09/2014

2014-06-09 Our new strategic partner, the Centre for Military Studies, Department of Political Science of the University of Copenhagen, published two pieces earlier this year addressing the question of the potential role of large unmanned aerial vehicles for Danish security and defense forces in the years ahead.

The reports provided an especially useful look at evaluating the actual performance of larger UAVs seen from the perspective of a smaller ally who needs to be concerned with both effectiveness of anything they buy and value proposition.

The reports shed important insights on both aspects: effectiveness and the value of larger UAVs. It is not a question of smaller UAVs, which the Danes have been using since 1958; it is a question of Predator or Global Hawk class drones.

Although Denmark is a small country, its forces are expeditionary in character. And when the Kingdom of Denmark is considered, the ISR and C2 coverage is a significant challenge as well.

Denmark’s territory is 16,639 sq. miles (43,094 km²). But the Kingdom of Denmark is of a different character entirely: 2,210,579 km² or 853,509 sq. miles.

And with the Arctic opening, ISR and C2 over a vast area is a significant consideration for the Danes. And the area in question is largely a maritime domain with little land-based infrastructure to provide ISR and C2 compensation for what can be generated from air, sea and space.

Clearly one issue to be sorted out is how Denmark which is responsible for security and defense for the Kingdom is going to pay the costs for such as the Arctic opens. Clearly, money needs to be generated from the various commercial ventures in the region and the increased revenue, which the Faroe Islands and Greenland will receive.

An illustration of one Global Hawk UAV refueling another (Credit Photo: Kent Rump, LA Times)
An illustration of one Global Hawk UAV refueling another (Credit Photo: Kent Rump, LA Times)

The reports take a hard look at the actual cost and performance of Predators and Global Hawks to determine their relevance to Denmark of procuring and operating a similar capability on their own. The authors of the reports do not buy into UAV-mania whereby unmanned is the future of airpower; rather they look at how large UAVs actually have fit into the kinds of operations Denmark needs to do.

The reports underscore that large UAVs are costly, manpower intensive to operate (notably when data exploitation is added in), crash at a significantly higher rate than manned assets, require significant training of the forces to use the UAVs, and have been successfully largely because they have operated in an air dominance environment.

The Danish experience with the Sagem UAV was also a benchmark for how not to acquire UAVs. The experience led Denmark to sell their systems to the Canadians, and to exit from the French provided assets. A main reason for the failure was buying a developmental system, but also significantly underestimating the importance of a trained cadre of UAV operators and users.

But what about UAVs for Denmark’s Arctic mission?

The problem here is the question of the durability of UAVs in such a harsh environment.

The conclusion is pretty clear-cut: Buying and operating large UAVs does not make a lot of sense for Denmark.

But working in a coalition is a better alternative.

Denmark is now participating in the NATO AGS system, and the authors of the report recommend leveraging this experience. There is also a clear interest in shaping a coalition consortium where data could be leased from Global Hawks, e.g.

Lt. General (Retired) Deptula, a major force in US ISR innovation, has argued for some time that the U.S. needs to shape a coalition enabled data sharing and leasing strategy. This way the costs of the platforms are amortized across a coalition without any individual coalition partner having to pay up front for the UAV.

The report is really about UAVs, but another consideration for the Danes might be looking at a package of ISR and C2 assets within which UAVs might operate.

Leasing assets from space such as with the RADARSAT, leveraging the ISR and C2 capabilities of the F-35 (if Denmark procures the aircraft), augmenting patrol craft capabilities, such as roll-on-roll off ISR and C2 packages on their C-130s, and leveraging a Nordic or Arctic coalition set of UAVs might make a lot of sense for Denmark.

The reports can be found here on the Centre for Military Studies website:

http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/publications/

The first report can be downloaded here as well:

Unmanned and Unarmed: On the Future use of Unmanned Aerial Systems in the Danish Armed Forces

The synopsis of the report follows:

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are being integrated into the military forces of Western states, including Denmark.  How should the Danish government proceed when considering investments in UAVs?  Although airpower and UAVs have substantially shaped the Western paradigm for the use of force, the American, British, French, and Danish experiences highlight difficulties developing, acquiring, and operating UAVs. The Danish government should consider the tasks that UAVs are best-suited to perform, the costs associated with the entire UAV system, and the operational, doctrinal, and other challenges that must be addressed to integrate UAV capabilities into the Danish armed forces.

These are not trivial considerations.

Larger UAVs are very complex systems with which the Danish armed forces have limited experience, and introducing radically new technology always comes with substantial risks.  Should Denmark decide to procure larger unmanned systems, such as Reapers or Global Hawks, it should cooperate with Allies to purchase, operate, and integrate these capabilities as smoothly as possible and mitigate these risks.

It should also establish a joint unit dedicated to house, train, educate, and operate UAVs within the armed forces, cooperate with domestic agencies that may desire the information that UAVs can provide, and consider shaping the domestic and international regulatory environment that will constrain UAV use for the foreseeable future.

An MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle launches for a night flight mission over southeastern Iraq, July 29, 2009. The aircraft serves in a surveillance and reconnaissance role but is also capable of firing two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (Credit: 407th Expeditionary Group Public Affairs, 8/15/09)
An MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle launches for a night flight mission over southeastern Iraq, July 29, 2009. The aircraft serves in a surveillance and reconnaissance role but is also capable of firing two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles (Credit: 407th Expeditionary Group Public Affairs, 8/15/09)

The key recommendations of the report for Denmark is as follows:

Preparing for a Decision

• Stand-up a dedicated UAV-unit in Danish Defence Command—perhaps dovetailing the “Future Fighter Aircraft” team, to consider the role of unmanned systems in Danish airpower.

• Maintain or increase participation (in terms of personnel) in NATO’s AGS system as it becomes operational to expand the Danish knowledge base.

• Follow UK and NATO attempts at certifying systems for wider use in civilian airspace to facilitate their peacetime and dual-use roles.

• Actively support efforts by national and international aviation authorities to establish solid regulations for the use of UAVs in civilian airspace.

• Engage potential partners for procurement and/or operations early and informally, but in detail.

• Piggyback to the widest possible extent on experiences and lessons of comparable partners and allies already operating UAVs.

• Considering modularity—more potential configurations—means more kinds of missions. This is currently how the manned Challenger system works. But modularity also incurs higher expenses and system risk.

• Continue tests and experiments—both in the Arctic and non-Arctic parts of the Kingdom—and involve potential partners in these to create the basis for discussing future joint requirements.

• Software and sensor-packages are crucial for the capability a system will be able to deliver. These are equally expensive and can account for a substantial part of the price of a system.

In Deciding

• Have a clear definition of tasks and consolidated concepts of operations ready.

• Ensure a clear command structure for procuring, certifying, manning, and operating the system.

• Engage other government agencies. UAVs can produce data for many potential users.

• Will Danish UAVs only be a military capability? With expected regulative changes, civilian governmental demand will rise, and with that also the potential for sharing expenses.

• Continue to seek partners and work for synchronicity in when and what to procure, even if it might mean compromising on system requirements or the defence planning process.

In Initial Operations

• Contemplate whether, for an initial start-up period, operations should be conducted from an experienced Allied user’s facilities to reduce risk and increase everyday access to knowledge and expertise (as the UK has done).

• Trained personnel, infrastructure, and organization must be in place and be robust at an early stage.

The report has a number of good insights: we are highlighting some of those insights below:

UAVs are costly:

By 2009, for instance, “more than a third of … Predator spy planes … [had] crashed.”30 Accident rates have been high for the entire US UAV fleet.

The Air Force in a 15-year period through Sept. 30 [2012] recorded 129 accidents involving its medium- and high-altitude drones: the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk. The figures include accidents that resulted in at least $500,000 in damage or destroyed aircraft during missions around the globe.

When compared to manned aircraft in the USAF fleet, Northrop’s Global Hawk and General Atomics’s Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles have had a combined 9.31 accidents for every 100,000 hours of flying. That’s the highest rate of any category of aircraft and more than triple the fleet-wide average of 3.03, according to military data compiled by Bloomberg…..

As these systems mature, their mishap rates will likely decline, but it is unlikely they will ever reach the level of comparable manned aircraft.

Why did Denmark fail in its efforts to integrate the SAGEM UAV?

There are several reasons for this highly publicized failure.

First, the system was still at a developmental stage, and very few operational experiences existed. The manufacturer, Sagem, had not completed its own system integration at the time. This led to high failure rates in many parts of the system and a critical lack of spare parts, which the producer could not meet.

Both issues increased the risks associated with the system, which were compounded by how the system was integrated and operated. First, the project was organized with unclear lines of communication and responsibility, which made decision-making and oversight complicated.

Secondly, it proved very difficult to recruit, train, and maintain a sufficient number of qualified personnel to operate the system. Accordingly, the unit responsible for operating Tårnfalken was never fully manned and lacked qualified personnel.75

There are several reasons for this, one being that the Army was responsible for defining the structure and number of positions in the unit, whereas the Air Force was responsible for recruiting and hiring personnel. Thus, no single command was solely responsible for properly manning the unit.

Because of the unreliable system, the aircraft would often be grounded due to technical failures, which disrupted the training and certification of the unit. At other times, the aircraft would be airworthy, but there would be no qualified staff available to operate it—again making it difficult to certify the system for operational use. The lack of skilled personnel and high numbers of accidents created a vicious circle, multiplying the significance of both problems.

In sum, a very complex and accident-ridden aircraft without sufficient service agreements and reliable spare-parts deliveries combined with a shortage of qualified staff and a complex project organization with unclear responsibility rendered it difficult to reach operational status. Together with the financial costs, this led to the ultimate termination of the project.

In analyzing the project, Rigsrevionen (The Danish Government Auditors), concluded that the Danish defence forces did not fully appreciate the complexity of operating an advanced UAV system or the resources and personnel required to operate it.

Operational Realities are Specific

UAVs have only recently matured as a military capability—and then only for the first mover (the United States), a nation that has spent over six decades working on the problem of integrating various advanced technologies into working systems.

Still, they have not been designed with longevity in mind.

As noted in the history of UAV use by the United States, Great Britain, France, and Denmark, UAVs are far more prone to accidents, equipment failure, communications glitches, and hostile fire than most manned aircraft—even when controlling for the maturity of the platform in its development cycle.

Aeronautical engineering can be complicated, and removing the man from the cockpit also removes the ability to instantaneously assess and adjust to environmental conditions and malfunctions.

These craft operate best in ideal conditions: fair weather that is neither too hot nor too cold, nor too windy, and where there is no enemy fire attempting to destroy it.

It must be accepted that when conditions are not ideal, UAVs will currently be lost at a rate that is disproportionate to that of manned aircraft performing the same sorts of missions.

The Utility of UAVs for Denmark

For all of the current types of international military operations undertaken by Danish armed forces, the ISR capabilities provided by UAVs are an important asset provided either indigenously or by allies; and that the capability provided by additional UAV systems would present a significant additional operational asset for the Danish armed forces…..

In addition to its international tasks, the Danish armed forces conduct a number of national operations. The 2013–2017 Defence Agreement mentions surveillance, the enforcement of Danish sovereignty, and search-and-rescue operations as significant. In addition to these tasks, the Danish military conducts a number of civilian tasks in cooperation with other government agencies.109

Significantly, and with increasing importance, these national operations include the Arctic region in the Danish Realm. Whereas the tasks are largely the same, the conditions in the Arctic and non-Arctic regions in the Danish Realm differ radically. The potential requirements for UAVs to be used in Denmark or in the Arctic therefore differ.

The relatively small Danish territory means that sea, air, and land are relatively well-monitored via air and naval presence as well as satellite and radar coverage. In turn, this makes it possible for stand-by naval and air assets to counter potential violations of Danish territory or sovereignty. These functions could be strengthened by introducing a range of UAVs to enhance situational awareness over Danish territory and supplement existing capabilities. Important to bear in mind, however, is that the current unmanned systems primarily provide ISR. A UAV therefore cannot enforce Danish sovereignty in the same manner as a manned navy or air asset.

Another important task for the Danish Navy and Air Force is search and rescue. The increased situational awareness provided by UAVs can be employed to search for ships and/or persons in distress on water and land. As with anti-piracy operations, UAV use in combination with ships and helicopters would increase capacity. The persistence of UAVs would also enable search operations of a longer duration and a wider geographic area. Their presence could help reduce response times and get personnel to the right location faster when coordinated with manned rescue platforms.

Depending on the system and number of platforms, unmanned systems can maintain a continuous, 24/7 operational presence. Combined with their sophisticated surveillance capabilities, this also makes them well suited to support other government agencies with broader responsibilities for public safety, security, and environmental protection. In case of an emergency in Denmark, UAVs could significantly supplement existing monitoring capabilities. Moreover, they can be used to monitor suspected polluters, smugglers, and other forms of unlawful or unwanted activity.

Numerous systems could increase the capability of Danish national operations. In October 2013, for instance, the Italian Air Force deployed its Reapers to the Mediterranean to increase its search and rescue capabilities in response to the loss of life of migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean Sea into Europe.110 A comparable system would increase Danish capabilities—but so too would a smaller, perhaps ship-launched, tactical system.

In the Arctic territories in the Danish realm, the Danish armed forces face very similar tasks but under very different circumstances. The Danish territory in the Arctic covers vast distances, which are imbued with very little physical infrastructure (civilian or military), very fragile, often not non-existing, communication facilities, and harsh environmental conditions.

Therefore, while there is a significant and widely acknowledged current and future demand for increased ISR capabilities in the Arctic, the region presents other and more significant challenges to the employment of unmanned systems than operations in the non-Arctic part of Danish territory.

First, a UAV system to be used in the Arctic would need to be able to overcome the challenges associated with the harsh climate, meaning a system able to cope with high winds and possessing a well-developed de-icing system. Many smaller systems are slow and built for a temperate climate, making them vulnerable to both wind and temperature.

This, secondly, makes it logical to consider a larger MALE or HALE system. One such system is the US Global Hawk, which the Canadian Forces have experimented with for Arctic operations.

Given its longer range, such a system would also make sense with respect to the vast territory. A larger system, on the other hand, requires substantial physical infrastructure and is expensive to procure and costly to maintain.

Thirdly, large long-range UAV systems are over-the-horizon systems, and operating them therefore requires satellite coverage with substantial bandwidth. Establishing such communications architecture, especially for real-time data transmission, requires substantial investments.

Real Costs and Personnel Demands

Should Denmark decide to acquire a MALE system like the Reaper or a strategic HALE UAV like the Global Hawk to patrol Arctic regions, it is important also to consider the issues of manpower, pricing, logistics, and organization.

UAVs may be “unmanned,” but they are manpower-intensive systems. For example, manning five Global Hawk airframes would require approximately 500 personnel.121 NATO’s organization for operating its AGS-system—also based on the Global Hawk—is approximately 600 people. Consequently, and based on a rough calculation, operating three HALE UAV units—the number of air frames Canada deemed necessary to be able to patrol Canadian territory 24/7—would require roughly 280 personnel.

While requiring fewer personnel to operate than a Global Hawk, a MALE tactical UAV such as the Reaper would also be manpower-intensive, especially if it is to provide continuous coverage.

Moreover, it is also necessary to consider the operational differences between the two systems. A Reaper would need to deploy (including ground-station crew and so forth) to Greenland in order to operate there, leaving it vulnerable to the local weather. A Global Hawk, on the other hand, could fly from Denmark (or other locations) and remain above hard weather. Furthermore, it covers substantially more ground, thus providing more coverage per airframe. Additionally, the systems are expensive both in acquisition and operating costs.

Determining the actual costs of such systems is inherently difficult. However, to name a couple of examples, France expects to pay $874,000,000 for 12 Reaper UAVs, the Dutch are in the process of acquiring four Reapers at a cost of “up to” €250,000,000, and a House of Commons report has referred to the cost of procuring and operating UK UAVs in Afghanistan from 2007 until December 2011 as amounting to £729,000,000…

It is important to note that approximately one-third of the staff needed is involved with processing the data produced by the system. These are highly trained personnel, and they must be recruited, educated, and trained before the system can be put to use….

It does not require a lot of personnel to fly and operate UAVs. It is the supporting personnel—and especially those needed for the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of data for intelligence—that increases requirements.

Exploitation of the data captured by the UAV is, after all, the primary purpose of acquiring them. Drawing again from the lessons associated with Tårnfalken, where the lack of highly specialized and well-trained personnel was deemed pivotal to the ultimate failure of the system,this underlines the pivotal significance of establishing a well-functioning, well-educated, and robust organization for operating the system.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

European Defense, the Arctic and the Future: An E-Book

We have just published an E-book version of our recent Special Report highlighting Danish perspectives on the Northern European security situation.

The report is based on exclusive interviews with Danish experts conducted in Copenhagen in May 2014.

In this Special Report, Second Line of Defense looks at the evolving defense and security situation in the Baltics and in the Arctic.

European Defense Special Report Cover

Russian actions in Crimea have returned direct defense to the European agenda, a fact not missed by the Northern European powers and the Baltic states.

Put bluntly, one Danish leader underscored:

The Ukraine situation has in fact put emphasis to our own region after having the luxury I would say for maybe ten or fifteen years to see security issues as largely being about national interests in a global setting such as in Afghanistan, Libya or wherever and now suddenly it is not as much a matter of national interest, it is actually a matter of national defense.

This report is divided into three parts in examining the dynamics of change in the region.

The first part is based on interviews conducted in Denmark in May 2014 and provides Danish perspectives on the evolving defense and security situation in their neighborhood.

The second part examines how the Crimean crisis is affecting broader global relations, and the direct defense of Europe, in particular.

The third part then focuses upon the Arctic opening and ways the developmental, safety and security dimensions intersect with Arctic defense.

Russian map making is having its impact on Northern Europe.  This report focuses on some aspects of that impact.

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/flipbooks/European%20Defense%20Report/EuropeanDefenseJune2014/

European Defense, the Arctic and the Future

06/08/2014

In this Special Report, Second Line of Defense looks at the evolving defense and security situation in the Baltics and in the Arctic.  Russian actions in Crimea have returned direct defense to the European agenda, a fact not missed by the Northern European powers and the Baltic states.

Put bluntly, one Danish leader underscored:

The Ukraine situation has in fact put emphasis to our own region after having the luxury I would say for maybe ten or fifteen years to see security issues as largely being about national interests in a global setting such as in Afghanistan, Libya or wherever and now suddenly it is not as much a matter of national interest, it is actually a matter of national defense.

This report is divided into three parts in examining the dynamics of change in the region.

The first part is based on interviews conducted in Denmark in May 2014 and provides Danish perspectives on the evolving defense and security situation in their neighborhood.

The second part examines how the Crimean crisis is affecting broader global relations, and the direct defense of Europe, in particular.

The third part then focuses upon the Arctic opening and ways the developmental, safety and security dimensions intersect with Arctic defense.

Russian map making is having its impact on Northern Europe.  This report focuses on some aspects of that impact.

Looking Back on the Libyan Trap Mission: Battle Hardened Marines Drive Innovation

2014-06-08

It has taken time for the Osprey as a tiltrotar aircraft to change the way the USMC operates.

Several years ago when interviewing an Osprey pilot about his initial experiences in Iraq, the officer cited an incident where the troops in the back did not want to get off of the Osprey because in their view “we are not there yet.”  What they were referring to was a trip of 20 minutes should have taken considerably more time for the troops to reach their destination.

What this simple incident highlights is that the shift from a rotorcraft enabled ground force and a tiltrotar one is a significant one, and the USMC is the only military force in the world, which has undergone the transition.

A rotorcraft enabled ground force is operating within the operational box of the rotorcraft range as well as the operating bases to support the operations of the helicopter.  At sea this meant that the USN-USMC team operated within a 200 square mile operational area with a three-ship task force.

The MV-22 B Executed the TRAP mission 45 minutes faster than the next available platform.  And the combat experience was an important step in shaping GCE innovation for the way ahead.
The MV-22 B Executed the TRAP mission 45 minutes faster than the next available platform. And the combat experience was an important step in shaping GCE innovation for the way ahead. 

With the tilt-rotor and fast jet combination, the capability to disperse and aggregate force over a much larger area has become a reality.  At sea, this has meant that the USN-USMC team can now operate with a disaggregated three-ship task force covering more than 1000 miles in operational reach. On land, rather than focusing on a FOB defined AOR, one can think much more broadly about the Area of Interest.

Not surprisingly with the Marines, the big change came in combat.  With the USS Kearsarge off of  (ironically enough) the shores of Tripoli, the ACE began to deliver unique resupply capabilities to the Kearsarge, which allowed the Harriers to triple their sortie generation rates.  By being able to fly directly to Sigonella rapidly and back the Ospreys kept the Harriers in the air much longer than anticipated.

And the TRAP mission over Libya saw the Marines execute the mission at least 45 minutes faster than the next available platform and did so very rapidly after having received the go order.

We interviewed Marines involved in the Trap mission and its was clear that to these Marines there was growing awareness of what the Osprey could provide to the MAGTF.

As Maj. B.J. Debardelebe, one of the Osprey aviators involved with the TRAP mission highlighted:

We made the judgment that we had to accelerate the mission. We moved towards our top speed as the pilot was moving to a new location on the ground. The pilot on the ground indicated that “they’re still going at us, and things are getting worse.” And he is clearly on the move.

We had the grid of the plane crash site and we got a new grid and realized that it was much further away from where the original crash site was. So he’d been on the move the whole time.  If I had been flying a SEA KNIGHT, by the time I had gotten the new information with regard to the shift in the grid, and flown for the 40 minutes under those conditions, I would have been relatively exhausted by the time I got there because you’re holding the controls, and you’re getting shaken the whole time.

On the Osprey, I am on autopilot. So I can take a sip of water, I’m assessing everything, and I’m listening to what’s going on very clearly. The V22s very quiet in airplane mode so we can hear the radios very well, but if I was in a SEA KNIGHT the noise would make it difficult to hear. The grunts in the back were able to look at a moving map that they can look at to have both SAs when we’re getting closer and closer to coast line

And so in that flight task now they’re relaxed and comfortable instead of them shaking in the back because usually with all the shaking makes you groggy you sleep, so you have to wake them up when you land. So they’re in the back at least relaxed and calm before we drop them off.

This innovation under fire has led to further and significant changes in USMC thinking and operations with regard to an Osprey enabled Ground Combat Element. 

The changes associated with SP-MAGTF CR as well as with the experiments under way enabling greater connectivity and situational awareness for the infantry riding on the Osprey are simply the latest demonstrations.

Going back to this moment in USMC innovation history, we are reprinting a piece written by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones from 2nd MAW about the USMC Aviator of the year for 2012, Major Grunke.

MARINE CORPS AIR STATION CHERRY POINT, N.C. – The magnitude of the moment came to him over the radio, in a hoarse whisper.

Maj. J. Eric Grunke sat in the cockpit of an AV-8B Harrier at just past midnight, March 22, 2011, thousands of feet above the Mediterranean Sea, and speeding toward the Libyan coastline.

Grunke was serving as a Harrier pilot assigned to the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit on the third day of Operation Odyssey Dawn, an international effort to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 to protect the Libyan people from Col. Moammar Gadhafi’s regime.

Tonight, Grunke was on a rescue mission.

Whispering into his radio from a hiding place on the ground was Air Force Maj. Kenneth Harney. His Air Force F-15 Strike Eagle had just crashed in the open desert near the Libyan city of Benghazi.

Maj. J. Eric Grunke, pictured here at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., April 24, has been named Marine Corps Aviator of the Year by the Marine Corps Aviation Association. The MCAA gives the award to the pilot who makes the most outstanding contribution to Marine aviation over that past year. Credit: 2nd MAW
Maj. J. Eric Grunke, pictured here at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, N.C., April 24, has been named Marine Corps Aviator of the Year by the Marine Corps Aviation Association. The MCAA gives the award to the pilot who makes the most outstanding contribution to Marine aviation over that past year. Credit: 2nd MAW 

The 26th MEU’s Marines aboard the USS Kearsarge launched a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel, or TRAP, mission to rescue the pilot. Grunke was to provide close air support to protect the downed pilot until help arrived.

Due in part to his actions in Libya, particularly on that day, the Marine Corps Aviation Association named Grunke the Marine Aviator of the Year, recognizing him as the pilot who made the most outstanding contribution to Marine aviation over that past year.

Grunke’s contribution came in the form of a dynamic mission over a short amount of time where he dropped two 500-pound bombs on tactical vehicles pursuing the downed pilot and identified a suitable landing zone for the MV-22B Osprey that would make the pickup. Just about three hours prior to all of this, Grunke had been aboard the USS Kearsarge preparing for another night of enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya.

“We were preparing for another armed reconnaissance mission where we would go out and look for targets,” Grunke said. “Word started to filter in that, potentially, an F-15 had crashed. We weren’t sure why, whether it was enemy air fire or a malfunction or what, so we started to determine, okay we’re going to have to launch the TRAP package to go rescue the pilot and his [weapons systems officer] – it was a two-seat F-15E.”

The weapons systems officer, Air Force Capt. Tyler Stark, ejected with Harney as the jet went down but was quickly rescued by friendly rebel sympathizers. Harney, however, was on the run.

“The pilot … had hit the ground, he was alive, he was on his radio, he was trying to get away from up to five or six tactical vehicles [that were] pursuing after him, and he was just trying to get out of the open desert and away,” said Grunke.

The Marines aboard the USS Kearsarge launched the full TRAP package to rescue him – two AV-8B Harriers, two MV-22B Ospreys, and two CH-53E Super Stallions. A Marine Corps KC-130J Hercules joined the fight to provide aerial refueling.

“When we launch the TRAP, it’s an all or none kind of thing,” Grunke said.

Lt. Col. Shawn Hermley, who commanded the Harrier detachment assigned to the 26th MEU, said Grunke recently certified as an airborne forward air controller and was uniquely qualified to execute the rescue mission.

“I told him if we do this, I want you out there in the lead,” Hermley said.

After Grunke took off from the deck of the USS Kearsarge, he spoke to the command and control center and learned deadly force was authorized to protect the downed pilot.

He said that was all he needed to know, as his AV-8B Harrier was equipped with two 500-pound laser-guided bombs.

At the helm of the attack jet, speeding toward the Libyan desert en route to save a fellow service member from certain danger, Grunke switched over to the downed pilot’s radio frequency.

Libyans inspect the wreckage of an Air Force F-15 after it crashed in on March 22, 2011. Imagine the propaganda value if the pilot had been captured.(AP)
Libyans inspect the wreckage of an Air Force F-15 after it crashed in on March 22, 2011. Imagine the propaganda value if the pilot had been captured.(AP)

“I just start listening to gain an idea of what’s going on down there, and I can hear him, wind rustling and him whispering into his radio,” Grunke said. “At that point it all became real to me, listening to the guy whispering on the radio. This is no longer North Carolina, this is no longer practice – that’s really a guy down there scared for his life.”

Grunke arrived overhead and took over as on-scene commander, relieving an Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon. The downed pilot radioed that he was fleeing vehicles with searchlights. He could hear barking dogs and gunfire.

“Within five minutes of being on station, I’m able to get my targeting pod sensor on this pursuing vehicle,” Grunke said. “I tell the pilot, ‘Okay, I can see the guys … I’ve got two 500-pound bombs, do you need them?’ He says, ‘Yes, yes I do.’”

As he maneuvered to a point where he could release and guide the munitions to the pursuing vehicle, Grunke heard the airman make one more request.

“He comes up and actually crying on the radio he says, ‘tell my wife I love her.’ And again, just underlying the realness of the situation I said, ‘don’t worry, I’m going to have a bomb on the deck in one minute,’” Grunke said. “I released one bomb, and I’m able to guide it for 50 seconds or so, all the way to a direct impact.”

Hermley described Grunke’s attack on the vehicle as “impressive.” He said looking through the Harrier’s targeting pod is a lot like looking through a drinking straw.

“The dropping of the bomb isn’t the hard part, it’s an attack we do all the time,” Hermley said. “But he was going after a moving target, and one that was tracking toward his friendly. Any pilot in our detachment could drop a bomb, but doing it under pretty high stress circumstances, with that pilot talking to him, fearing for his life, [Grunke’s] actions on the TRAP were monumental.”

Grunke dropped one more bomb on another vehicle pursing the pilot, finally delivering the message to the assailants on the ground to leave Harney alone.

“At that point I gave my sole attention to trying to locate a suitable landing zone for the Ospreys that launched from the ship a few minutes after I did,” Grunke said.

Noticing a road not far from the creek bed where Harney was hiding, Grunke generated a coordinate for the location and passed it over the radio to the Osprey pilots.

The Osprey, complete with a rescue team of Recon Marines, landed less than 50 meters from the pilot’s hiding place.

“They found him very quickly, to the point where he just ran in the back of the aircraft as soon as it landed,” Hermley said. “The Marines barely even had the chance to get out.”

Grunke said he shook Harney’s hand back aboard the USS Kearsarge, making a great ending for an extraordinary mission.

Hermley said Grunke’s role in the TRAP mission was pivotal. He not only defended the downed pilot from aggressors, he provided invaluable reconnaissance to the rest of the rescue force.

“The hardest part of a mission like that is knowing where the survivor is, and in this instance he had moved about three miles,” Hermley said.

“Fortunately for us, every MEU practices a TRAP, because it’s a ballet. You’re working off of a moving platform – the boat, and you have to have everything moving at the right time,” Hermley said. “The key to the TRAP is ‘how fast can you execute it?’ We had assets airborne within the hour.”

Hermley said as Marines, and especially as part of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force aboard a MEU, everyone involved knows they have to react quickly to a mission they hadn’t planned on.

“[The Marine Corps Aviator of the Year award] was well deserved. The highlight for him was his performance and execution of that TRAP. He quite possibly saved that pilot’s life,” Hermley said. “But there was a lot of stuff behind the scenes as well. He was one of my best advisers; he worked a lot of long hours figuring out the best way to execute that mission in Libya.”

“It was obvious that we had made a huge difference in liberating this area specifically, a stark contrast from night one where [the Libyan people] were essentially under [Gadhafi’s] thumb. I could see visible results of what we did,” Grunke said. “Night one, [Gadhafi’s forces] were essentially on the footsteps of Benghazi. Night by night by night, we just continuously pushed this line back.”

Grunke described the operation in Libya as the chance of a lifetime for an AV-8B Harrier pilot.

“Pinnacle of my career, really, for an attack pilot to be the forward edge, the tip of the spear, to be operating from amphibious shipping; it was absolutely the pinnacle of what I’ve done so far,” Grunke said. “I am so privileged and humbled to be receiving this award, especially since it will be awarded as Marine aviation celebrates its centennial.”

Published 4/24/12

In the video above, one of the Osprey pilots involved in the successful rescue of an F-15 pilot downed in Libya discusses the operation.

In an interview conducted at the New River Air Station, Maj. B.J. “Narco” Debardeleben discussed the mission.

Credit: Second Line of Defense

Admiral Wang on Baltic and Arctic Defense: A Danish Perspective

2014-06-02 By Robbin Laird

Earlier, I had the chance to interview Admiral Wang on Arctic issues.

In that interview, the Admiral provided an overview on the various states involved in Arctic security and focused on the key challenges facing the Kingdom of Denmark, which is to say managing the relationships among Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

In this interview conducted at his office in Copenhagen, the Admiral focused on the impact of the Ukrainian events on Danish thinking about Baltic defense and residually upon the Arctic.

The Admiral is now in charge of the integrated Danish military colleges and is focused on shaping a more integrated inter-service perspective, which will allow Denmark to shape the kind of 21st century force needed for Danish defense.

The new position was described in a press release earlier this year:

The command of the three academies was handed over to rear admiral Nils Wang, Commander of the Royal Danish Defence College, at ceremonies on January 6. 

The move to consolidate the three institutions under Royal Danish Defence College is a consequence of the latest Danish defence agreement.

We have now reached another milestone in the defence agreement and in our plans for the educational field.

With the merger a foundation is laid for an even better link between the craftsmanship and professionalism of the three military services on the one hand and the research and development to support it on the other hand, says rear admiral Nils Wang.

The establishment of new relations both internally between the academies and the Royal Danish Defence College as well as between the three services and the new Royal Danish Defence College will have a major focus in the near future, says Nils Wang.

Question: How do see the way ahead for building a more integrated Danish force?

Admiral Wang: Being a small country with a small defense force, the most important thing is that you are actually able to plug and play with something bigger.

That is the first consideration.

You’ll always have is to be able to answer the question: who will be my strategic partners?

That can then vary from scenario to scenario, but you really have to focus your attention on the coalition and your potential role within that coalition.

Question: In other words, you need to make certain that you have built a modular force?

Lt. Cmdr. Boudewijn Boots, commanding officer of HNLMS Evertsen (F805), watches a Danishhelicopter from the ship's bridge as it prepares to come alongside during Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2013. Now in its 41st year, BALTOPS is an annual, multinational exercise to enhance maritime capabilities and interoperability with partner nations to promote maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea.  US Navy Media Content Services, 6/10/13
Lt. Cmdr. Boudewijn Boots, commanding officer of HNLMS Evertsen (F805), watches a Danishhelicopter from the ship’s bridge as it prepares to come alongside during Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2013. Now in its 41st year, BALTOPS is an annual, multinational exercise to enhance maritime capabilities and interoperability with partner nations to promote maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea. US Navy Media Content Services, 6/10/13

Admiral Wang: Modular but also a plug and play capability as well.

We need to have hardware that is flexible, compatible and with the ability to operate on the same frequencies, use the same spare parts, and having the same flight systems, etc.

Also important is what I would call the “software” issue or our way of thinking about operations.

This is where education is a vital part of the equation.

Question: How do the demands of Baltic or Arctic Defense affect this approach?

Admiral Wang: When you’re talking about Baltic dependence or Arctic dependence, these are two different scenarios where you will have to employ equipment and personnel in very different cooperative framework or coalition dynamics.

I think that the Ukraine crisis has drawn attention to the fact that the three Baltic states took a very bold decision ten years ago.  They applied for a NATO membership, and NATO accepted them.

That is a commitment that goes both ways, and when you have a scenario like the one that we are experiencing right now with Russia and their intervention in Ukraine, I think it’s very, very important for NATO to send a message that the three Baltic states are NATO members and we are prepared to defend them in a clear manner.

That is why Denmark is deploying F-16s to the Baltic states, and the reason why we can deploy F-16s to the Baltic states without any problem as a routine operation, is basically because we have made it the entire Danish defense force, including our fighter air craft deployable over the last ten, fifteen years.

Question: Clearly, the main issue for the Arctic is development and security, but defense issues could be raised as well.

How do you see these possibilities?

Admiral Wang: As you know from our earlier discussions, I see the safety and security dimensions of Arctic development as the most pressing.

But clearly, conflict can develop, most likely as a result of spill over from other issues.

It would most likely be triggered by something that happens anywhere else. 

It could be the Ukraine crisis but it can also be a US, Chinese confrontation in the South China Sea that suddenly sets a new agenda in the Arctic. If that is the case, then I think the Arctic would turn into an Article Five scenario, as the Arctic area is an area that is included in the NATO treaty. In the Arctic there are five coastal states and four of them are actually members of NATO.

 The Finnish ship FNS Pohjama (01), right, sails next to the Royal Danish Navy ship HDMS Absalon (L16) during exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2013. Navy Media Content Services, 6/11/13.

The Finnish ship FNS Pohjama (01), right, sails next to the Royal Danish Navy ship HDMS Absalon (L16) during exercise Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 2013. Navy Media Content Services, 6/11/13.

There you suddenly have a game changer.

However, in the most likely situation, what you need are capabilities such as: largely coast guard functions which is search and rescue, oil spill management, and surveillance so that you actually know what is going on out there.

The convergence between Baltic Defense and Arctic Defense is clearly around shaping flexible forces, which have the ability to plug and play with others.

Question: How does the Ukrainian situation refocus European attention?

Admiral Wang: The Ukraine situation has in fact put emphasis to our own region after having the luxury I would say for maybe ten or fifteen years to see security issues as largely being about national interests in a global setting such as in Afghanistan, Libya or wherever and now suddenly it is not as much a matter of national interest, it is actually a matter of national defense.

I’m sure that the European politicians will need to consider seriously whether they are investing enough money on defense forces. We have had a long period where you can actually take money from the defense forces and put it into other areas because of the absence of concern for direct defense.

There is an interesting potential linkage between the Ukraine and the Arctic.

Russia might have won a tactical victory but I think Russia might suffer a strategic defeat.

Because of the annexation of Crimea and the Russian intervention in Ukraine, the European politicians will have to address how to free themselves from energy imports from Russia, and if they do so this will have a clear impact on Russian interests.

Question: How might the Ukraine crisis affect Scandinavian cooperation?

The fleet replenishment oiler USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189), left, transfers fuel to the Royal Danish navy command and support ship HDMS Esbern Snare (L17) in the Mediterranean Sea March 26, 2014. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jared King/Released)
The fleet replenishment oiler USNS John Lenthall (T-AO 189), left, transfers fuel to the Royal Danish navy command and support ship HDMS Esbern Snare (L17) in the Mediterranean Sea March 26, 2014. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jared King/Released)

Admiral Wang: For many years, there has been talk of greater Scandinavian cooperation. The problem has been that the Nordic countries might share values, but we do not always, at least not in the past, share the same perception of security issues.

You have Denmark and Norway being NATO members but two very different NATO members.  Denmark has the expeditionary extreme and Norway has focused more on territorial defense.

The Swedes are very EU-centric and has put their eggs in the EU Battle Group basket.

Then there is Finland that has maintained there skepticism towards Russia and maintained a territorial security approach like during the Cold War.

Nonetheless, both the Baltic and Arctic issues might well create a situation where you have more common ground for the Nordic countries to build cooperation in practical ways.

The Ukraine incident actually also could accelerate the establishment of missile defense in Europe as well. If the upcoming NATO summit in Wales were to push the missile defense agenda forward that could demonstrate to the Russians that they do no longer have a say on this issue and that there are costs to their actions.

Question: How do you view the way ahead with regard to Baltic defense?

Admiral Wang: We have shaped a number of solid building blocks with the Baltic states all ready, but I think we need to bring these efforts together into a more comprehensive defense strategy so that the Russians understand how integrated the Balts are into NATO defense and also into the defense policies of the Nordic states.

Two examples of the building blocks, which I have in mind, are the BALTOPS exercises and the integration of the Baltic Brigades into a Danish division.

We could easily expand these efforts into more joint and integrated training activities, which apart from good training also could be part of the trip wire that NATO needs to establish along the Alliance borders in the Baltic region.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Centre for Military Studies: A New Strategic Partner

2014-06-06 The SLD team welcomes its new strategic partner, the Centre for Military Studies of the University of Copenhagen.

The Centre for Military Studies is Part of the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen. The Centre currently is focusing on the following research areas:

  • The Arctic, Global Commons and Maritime Strategy
  • Small State Strategy, European Armed Forces in a time of Austerity and the Danish Defence Model
  • The Use and Utility of Force in Future Operations

Centre

On the Centre’s website the Centre is described as follows:

The Centre for Military Studies is a university research center focusing on policy-relevant research and research-based information and innovation that identify options for Denmark’s defense and security policy in a globalized world. Research at the Centre is thus a means to identify policy options in a complex, interconnected security environment. We work closely with the Danish Ministry of Defence, the Danish Armed Forces and the political level to investigate issues and develop ideas and options.

We believe that democracies make better decisions, but only if the facts are presented to public and policy-makers in ways that clearly identify choices and risks. Therefore, we carefully consider the means by which we communicate our findings and the ways in which we facilitate dialogue. We use considerable resources to inform the public and policy-makers on our findings and comment on current affairs.

The Centre seeks to bridge the inherently global nature of security issues and security actors and the national Danish foreign, security and defense policy discourse. It does so by utilizing Scandinavian traditions for a meaningful dialogue between industry, civil-society, parliament, officials and the armed forces. The Centre is a go-to-place for dialogue and policy-options. The Centre harnesses concepts, trends and evidence into tools for understanding and acting on Danish defense and security issues.

http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/

We will be highlighting the work of the Centre and talking with its team on a regular basis.

Danish perspectives on European and Arctic security and defense are important to the thought leadership necessary for 21st century defense and security.

In addition to highlighting the Centre’s published work, we will publish a period update on its activities and on the perspective from Copenhagen with its Director, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen.

We have forged several international partnerships through which we exchange contents, and perspectives.

Among our international partners are the following:

Australia

RAAF Airpower Development Center

http://airpower.airforce.gov.au/

The Kokoda Foundation

http://www.kokodafoundation.org/

The Williams Foundation

http://www.williamsfoundation.org.au/

Canada

Front Line Defence

http://www.frontline-defence.com/

Denmark

Risk Intelligence

http://www.riskintelligence.eu/

The Centre for Military Studies

http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/

France

Operationnels SLDS

http://www.operationnels.com

India

India Strategic

http://www.indiastrategic.in/

South Africa

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/

Turkey

C4Defence

http://www.c4defence.com/en

United Kingdom

Defence Analysis

http://defenceanalysis.com/about.htm

Sally B

http://www.sallyb.org.uk/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Shaping Arctic Defense: Leveraging the Grid

06/07/2014

2014-06-07 By Robbin Laird

The Arctic opening is a significant global event.

There are a number of key stakeholders in the opening up of the Arctic, with both convergent and conflictual elements at play.

Any time conflict is part of the equation, defense capabilities come into play, and they come into play in reinforcing so-called soft power as well. 21st century military power is clearly interwoven with 21st century security and diplomacy. It is not to be understood primarily as the sledgehammer but as a key contextual element integrated within diplomacy and security efforts to protect national operational sovereignty.

Because each of the key five stakeholders in the Arctic all have different perspectives as well with regard to even something as simple as “collaboration,” conflict can be built into a cooperative process.

But defense in the Arctic is a contextual capability.

To develop the Arctic requires shaping infrastructure for communications and situational awareness in an area with limited “traditional” infrastructure. It is about leveraging air breathing and space systems, and crafting appropriate land based towers and systems, which can create a grid for development and safety operations.

Shaping and Crafting an Arctic Grid

This is not a task for a year, but for the decade ahead. In an interview, which I did with Chris McLean and Richard Bray of Frontline Defence during a visit to Ottowa, we discussed the importance of shaping an Arctic grid.

Question: If one conceptualizes that a core challenge facing Canadian sovereignty is to provide for security and defense in the context of the Arctic opening, then major acquisitions should be made over time, and build out to that direction. 

In effect, the grid covering from Northern Europe to the Northern Pacific and over the Arctic – built with allied collaboration – is clearly a key challenge but also one which could focus Canadian force development and also defense and security investments.  It could also guide a way to think about public-private partnerships in the region, and tapping into the ongoing development of various Canadian civilian capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic opening.

Bray:  That makes a great deal of sense, and could focus our attention on the ISR and C2 streams, which we need to build out over time.

I’m not convinced we understand what the data from surveillance platforms and other tools will be like, the challenges that such a data stream will present to the operator, or the opportunities it will present to the commander.  It’s like being given access to a giant database without the software tools to extract meaning.

As it gathers and sifts more data (and faster), will it be like antilock brakes, allowing you stay 30 feet closer to the vehicle ahead of you? Or will it allow you to complete the mission in a completely different way?

These kinds of assets allow you to get yourself deeper and faster into a situation.  So, if the speed of engagement and the amount of data being acquired could quickly become overwhelming without effective software.

The challenge will be to have the data, to verify the data against cyber spoofing, and to integrate enough of the data in order to have the kind of decision-making necessary in a fluid environment.

Several key building blocks need to come together to shape a real Arctic grid which then can be leveraged for the diversity of inter-related missions. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense
Several key building blocks need to come together to shape a real Arctic grid which then can be leveraged for the diversity of inter-related missions. Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense

Bray and I continued to focus on the grid in a later piece on Front Line Defence.

A key requirement for Canada will be to shape a grid to cover the full geography, including her Arctic interests. If one conceptualizes that a core challenge facing Canadian sovereignty is to provide for security and defense in the context of the Arctic opening, then major acquisitions should be made over time, and built out to that direction.

In effect, the grid covering from Northern Europe to the Northern Pacific and over the Arctic – built with allied collaboration – is clearly a key challenge but also one which could focus Canadian force development and also defense and security investments. It could also guide a way to think about public-private partnerships in the region, and tapping into the ongoing development of various Canadian civilian capabilities that are relevant to the Arctic opening.

And in a recent discussion with Danish Rear Admiral (Retired) Henrik Kudsk, this experienced Arctic operator, highlighted the importance of building the grid:

Question: What is the most basic need to operate in the Arctic in the decade ahead as the Arctic opening proceeds?

Kudsk: Clearly, the most basic need is to build out ISR and, in effect, build out a communications and sensor grid to provide for the kind domain awareness most central to development, safety and security in the region.

And this is doable, because compared to other regions; there is significantly less traffic and human habitation.  This makes it easier to identify the anomalies and threats, which need to be monitored.

You have a pristine environment up there where human activity is relatively visible, when compared to the rest of the world, where you can disappear in a crowd. But you still need systems, which can help you, see over vast distances and in difficult communications conditions.

For example, I believe that leasing capability from the Canadian Radarsat system might make sense for Denmark as we build out the grid, which we will need to operate in the region as it opens up.

There are major challenges for communication systems in the region as well.

Today, most systems are designed to operate always on and always connected.  This is impossible in the Arctic where you have only windows where you can communicate, not a constant capability to do so.

Defining the Challenges

An exercise sponsored by Denmark last year highlighted the shortfalls facing Arctic safety and security and the need to shape an operational grid.

Search and Rescue Exercise Greenland Sea 13 ran from Sept. 2 to Sept. 6, and was hosted by Denmark near Ella Island off Greenland’s east coast. There were several international participants in the exercise, including Canada, Iceland, the US, and the Norwegians with their Joint Rescue Coordination Center at Bodoe. The scenario focused on a real world problem, namely a cruise ship in distress with the need to both search and rescue passengers and crew.

According to the Danish report:

The scenario involved a medium-sized cruise ship the “ARCTIC VICTORY” (simulated by HDMS VAEDDEREN) with 250 passengers and crew, which first went missing in the Greenland Sea and later ran aground in King Oscar’s Fiord off Ella Island, followed by an explosion and resulting fires on board. For this exercise, operations were minimized during the night due to insufficient EXCON personnel for 24-hour operations.

Mitchell Zuckoff, an author embedded with the Joint Recovery Mission – Greenland, signals to helicopter pilot Tom Andreassen, of Air Greenland, where to land near the nunatak on a glacier near Koge Bay, Greenland, Aug. 16, 2013. Andreassen, along with another aircrew, evacuated the expedition team from the glacier due to an approaching piteraq storm with hurricane force winds forecasted to impact the campsite. U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jetta H. Disco.
Mitchell Zuckoff, an author embedded with the Joint Recovery Mission – Greenland, signals to helicopter pilot Tom Andreassen, of Air Greenland, where to land near the nunatak on a glacier near Koge Bay, Greenland, Aug. 16, 2013. Andreassen, along with another aircrew, evacuated the expedition team from the glacier due to an approaching piteraq storm with hurricane force winds forecasted to impact the campsite. U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jetta H. Disco.

The exercise setup called for a multitude of tasks in the operational response, including maritime search and rescue; fire fighting at sea; evacuation by sea and air; deployment of emergency medical personnel, fire and rescue personnel, and police registration personnel; use of a specialized search team with cameras and listening equipment to locate missing persons below deck; triage and emergency medical treatment by doctors and paramedics at sea and on shore; establishing a reception facility for evacuees on land, establishing guard duty to protect evacuees against the possibility of attacks by polar bears; continuous updating of the SAR service’s Persons On Board (POB) list and the police’s Disaster Involved Registry (DIR) with identities and medical status of evacuees, etc, etc.

All in all, the intent was to closely simulate the many challenges of coordinating a multinational search and rescue effort in the high Arctic.

Although the report highlighted successes, the evident shortfalls were significant. Because situational awareness is difficult, communications episodic and the ability to reach the right point to make a difference with the right rescue means, the challenge to do “normal” S and R is formidable.The exercise demonstrated how difficult it is to do “routine” S and R. The gaps in the ability of the nations to work together, the absence of enough S and R platforms, the real shortfall in SA, and the pot holes associated with communication were all highlighted in the after action report.

And a recent US assessment of the challenges facing the USCG dealing with Alaska and the Arctic highlighted similar shortfalls.

According to Heath C. Roscoe, Paul F. Campagna, and David McNult:

The authors developed a list of probable incidents/events from Coast Guard SAR historical documents the may require a U.S. safety response in the future. Although not all-encompassing, the 10 potential scenarios are listed most to least likely. The wide array demonstrates the fragility of the Arctic and the scenarios serve as driving factors as the United States considers future capacities and capabilities:

  • Medical Evacuation/nonmaritime medical transports (currently 3 percent of all SAR cases)
  • SAR operation small maritime vessel (fishing/recreational)
  • small oil spill/discharge in the Chukchi or Beaufort seas
  • downed aircraft (small passenger) SAR mission
  • vessel runs aground, caught in ice, or sinks
  • emergency barge resupply for North Slope community
  • large oil spill from drilling operation
  • large oil spill from tanker operating in Arctic
  • mass rescue operation (MRO) downed jetliner
  • MRO cruise ships/ferries.

Despite assuming a lower position on the list due to probability of occurrence, MROs would be nearly impossible to carry out given currently assessed response shortfalls.

For example, if an MRO or large oil spill incident occurred on the North Slope of Alaska, the closest Federal SAR and oil spill response is 820 miles away in Kodiak.

Current oil spill response capabilities include four Spilled Oil Recover Systems equipped on 225-foot buoy tenders home ported in Alaska at Kodiak, Sitka, Cordova, and Homer; an aerial dispersant delivery system staged in Anchorage as a backup to commercial venders; and Federal on-scene coordinators located in Juneau, Anchorage, and Valdez with incident management expertise and limited prepositioned oil response equipment.

Given these sparse and widely dispersed assets, the long-term environmental impacts of a spill in the Arctic Ocean could prove cataclysmic.

ISR capabilities, communications systems, search and rescue assets, unmanned and manned systems of various sorts, appropriate ships and finding ways to connect these assets in a very difficult region to do connectivity is the challenge facing developmental, safety, security or defense activities.

Defense as a Contextual Capability

The shaping of the grid will be done primarily for developmental, safety and security issues. But shaping a grid will lay down a foundation on which appropriate defense systems can operate to protect the sovereignty of key states and their national territories.

Given the importance of the High North, for Russian nuclear operations, the growth in military traffic through the Northern passages, inevitable sovereignty disputes, the high probability the Russians will build flexible forces at the top of the world in order to influence events either in Europe or Asia, defense or military considerations are built into the Arctic opening.

An element of the Russian defense capability, which might be deployed for Arctic missions, could be the venerable Mig-31.

According to the TTU French defense newsletter in its May 12, 2014 edition.

It appears that command of the air and space forces is about to extend the MiG 31, which was to be withdrawn from the fleet in 2028…..

As new tensions appear in the Arctic, as a result of climate change, Moscow has rediscovered the capability advantages of the MiG 31 and could, as a deterrent, redeploy its 12 squadrons of Foxhounds, as they are known in NATO nomenclature, near the North Pole.

This would be not only to protect its strategic resources, since 90 per cent of Russian oil is found there, but also to seat its authority over new navigation routes which, by offering shorter journeys, will draw maritime traffic towards Russiaʼs north coasts and offer Moscow an unprecedented means of geostrategic pressure.

In addition, as part of a large-scale air defense exercise involving 100 aircraft, some MiG 31s intercepted a cruise missile launched from a Tu-95MS strategic bomber above the Telemba military ground.

But given the central importance of the kind of cooperation necessary to provide for development, safety and security in the Arctic, the region will not be primarily defined by defense systems, but the Grid will enable them and participate in security missions in any case.

And with the addition of new capabilities, such as fighters, the question will be how do they contribute to and live off the grid while doing their missions? An advantage of an ISR-enabled fighter is obvious: it can live off and contribute to the grid.

Also, training and operational missions will allow the pilots to provide real time information back to military, security and various policy officials about anomalies or threats, which may need to be dealt with. According to Ed Timperlake, “The advantage of a man in the loop generated by fighter operations is to contribute rapidly available information and judgments about what an overall Arctic policy process might need to deal with in the near term.”

My own look at what I would consider to be an Arctic-enabled fighter can be seen in the briefing slides below. Key elements would include, being ISR and communications capable with an ability to operate as an airborne command center to support both security and defense operations.

Earlier, I discussed the nature of an Arctic enabled fighter with a Canadian Air Force pilot with significant Arctic experience. In that piece, published by Front Line Defence, I looked at the F-35 and the Artic mission sets.

I started with the assumption that building an Arctic C2 and ISR grid to cover Canada’s needs across the High North is a central and strategic task.

Over time, the F-35 will clearly become a potential contributor to this effort. Norway has bought the F-35 and is shaping its fleet with the Arctic in mind. The U.S., Japan, and most probably Denmark are among the allied states that will operate F-35s with Arctic security and defence in mind.

There are two key considerations. The first is the emergence of a 21st century fleet. Pacific allies are buying the F-35 and will be looking to shape integration.

The second is the nature of the combat systems. The F-35 systems make it a C2 and ISR aircraft, notably when the planes are considered as a deployed grid able to cover significant space. For instance, in the 2011 Northern Edge exercise, its radar mapped the maritime surface of 500 square miles. According to a report released by the Joint Program Office at the time: F-35 combat systems “searched the entire 50,000 square-mile Gulf of Alaska operating area for surface vessels, and accurately detected and tracked them in minimal time.”

During recent interviews with General Hostage (the Air Combat Commander), General Jacoby (the NORAD/NORTHCOM commander), Lt. General Jouas (the 7th USAF Commander), Lt. General Robling (MARFORPAC), and most recently with General Hawk Carlisle (the AFPAC commander), I was able to discuss the emerging role of the F-35 fleet and how it figured into their considerations for the future of air operations. Each, in one way or another, emphasized the key role the combat systems of the fleet would play in cueing up other military and security assets for the full spectrum of missions.

Communication linkages is a ­crucial aspect, not only for combat but for security operations as well. Recently, in the Philippines, the USMC brought its Osprey and KC-130J package as the initial force in shaping relief efforts. But the only communications they had was the Commanding Officer’s Blackberry. The Marines emphasized that their F-35Bs will have the mapping, ISR and communications capability crucial to their full range of operations – something they do not have now.

Billie Flynn, former Canadian Air Force fighter pilot, is now an F-35 test pilot with Lockheed Martin. Flynn started flying the CF-18 some 30 years ago and retired after commanding 441 squadron and leading the Canadian task force involved in Kosovo.

Given the importance of CFB Cold Lake in any Arctic strategy, Flynn’s operational experience is suggestive of the way ahead if F-35s become the mainstay Canadian aircraft. “Because the F-35 is clean in design and operation, it goes further and stays longer in the airspace. This allows it to patrol the Arctic without the same level of tanker support that the CF-18 requires. It can stay over the Arctic area of operation to be able to see at distance,” he says.

“It will allow the Canadian Air Force to patrol areas with fighter aircraft in way they could not do before. As the CO of 441, to fly out of Cold Lake for Arctic ­sovereignty missions required a significant logistical support just to operate in the areas crucial for the mission. With 18,000 pounds of fuel on board the F-35, the pilots will operate longer and at greater range than with the CF-18.”

We then discussed impacts of combat systems for the Arctic sovereignty mission set. “Stealth allows the F-35 to patrol with impunity. The combination of 360° multi-spectral sensor, sensor fusion shared information among members of the network allows the F-35 to serve as a key node to a much broader grid than anyone would have thought possible with a tactical fighter,” he asserts.

Flynn believes that patrolling and guarding Canadian resources in the Arctic will be done on a order of magnitude more effectively with the F-35 than any legacy fighter platform. “The F-35 sees in depth and breadth and across many electronic spectrums as well. It can see hundreds of miles around itself and does so in a moving space as it operates. The pilot is in a shared sensor space – he is not operating as a unit of a squadron defined by wingmen.”

Thinking forward to the Arctic Grid concept, a key challenge will be to factor in the F-35 as a fleet (Canadian and allied) in shaping the other ISR and C2 elements.

“You will not use the F-35 as a classic tactical aircraft,” explains Flynn. “It will be part of the grid you are talking about. As the Canadian military determines how to deal with its evolving Arctic mission, it will be crucial to understand the F-35 fleet impact and to then sort out what else is needed and how other systems can be most effectively used. It is a definitional asset, not simply an additive platform. It is a foundational element for reshaping the approach to Arctic sovereignty.”

Re-working the Defense of Greenland

A clear example of working though new relationships among the elements of the grid and defense assets will be in shaping a new approach to Greenland defense.

The Russian actions in Ukraine have reminded Europe of the direct defense of Europe challenge.  And part of Europe is clearly the Arctic and securing their Arctic interests during the Arctic opening.

And a key element of managing that opening is safety, security and defense, with the Russians as a key player, either in working the problem collectively or positioning for dominance.

The Ukraine events have gotten the attention of the Nordic states with regard to the second might be more important in the near and mid-term than the former.  Indeed, discussions in Denmark have highlighted growing concern with how best to deal with both Baltic and Arctic security and defense.

A recent comment by the Prime Minister of Iceland highlights the concerns:

Russia’s actions in Ukraine could cause problems for international cooperation in the Arctic, says Iceland’s prime minister. Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson said Russia’s strong-arm tactics in its former satellite could make it harder for the eight nations on the Arctic Council to reach agreements at a time when the region faces a series of critical issues.

This has a ripple effect, even though the actual events are far from the Arctic,” said Gunnlaugsson, in Edmonton on a trade mission. “Clearly, it has made many players in the Arctic quite worried about developments and whether they might be a sign of what is to come.”

What the Ukrainian dynamics have underscored is the need for practical actions to bolster Baltic security and defense as well as that of the Arctic.

From the Nordic standpoint, one simply has to look at the map, to understand the relationship of Russia to both Baltic and Arctic concerns.

Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense
Credit Graphic: Second Line of Defense 

With regard to the Arctic, a key concern for Denmark clearly is the development of Greenland and the defense and security of the country as well.

What makes Greenland a tricky issue is that Denmark is responsible for security and defense, yet Greenland is quasi-independent, and clearly aspires to see development and the enrichment of what is essentially a poor country.

A small population, which lives in the perimeter of the country, largely occupies Greenland and yet the opening of the country to mining is bringing with it significant outside influence, which can clearly disrupt the security and defense situation for Greenland as well.

The HMDS Knud Rasmussen, a Royal Danish Navy patrol vessel, transits off the bow of the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Juniper, homeported in Newport, R.I., during a towing exercise while underway off Greenland's west coast Friday, Sept. 7, 2012. The exercise was conducted as part of an Arctic deployment to enhance interoperability with international forces and to provide the experience of working and responding to incidents in the harsh Arctic environment. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Cynthia Oldham)
The HMDS Knud Rasmussen, a Royal Danish Navy patrol vessel, transits off the bow of the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Juniper, homeported in Newport, R.I., during a towing exercise while underway off Greenland’s west coast Friday, Sept. 7, 2012. The exercise was conducted as part of an Arctic deployment to enhance interoperability with international forces and to provide the experience of working and responding to incidents in the harsh Arctic environment. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Cynthia Oldham)

Certainly, one of the outside powers which concerns Denmark most is China, and its engagement in the opening of Greenland.

A recent conference held by the Centre for Military Affairs in Copenhagen focused on the Chinese challenge in the Arctic.

As one contributor to the conference put it:

In Greenland, big scale mining in need of foreign investments are not only seen as a possibility for obtaining economic growth and the maintenance of welfare systems in Greenland, but also as one of the few possibilities for obtaining a sustainable economy, which is a prerequisite for obtaining political independence that is the promise on the Self-Government Act adopted in 2009 by the Greenlandic and the Danish parliaments after a Greenlandic referendum in which about 75 percent of the voters voted yes.

This could, of course, cause alarm in Denmark, and raise questions concerning whether Denmark, eventually, will lose the current arrangement with Greenland as part of the Danish community of the realm – if Greenland decides for independence.

So, the issue of China’s Arctic aspiration in the Danish political debate is clearly intertwined with the issue of the future of the Danish-Greenlandic relationship.

Conference_report_China’s_Arctic_aspirations

But more broadly, there is the defense challenge, which is a Danish, NATO, and a US challenge.

Greenlanders live in the more temperate coastal areas; the rest of its two million sq km are covered in ice.

The US has had a presence in Greenland and took primary responsibility for the defense of Greenland throughout the Cold War.  Yet the uncertainties of US policy, more generally and in the Arctic, as well as the dynamics of the Danish-Greenland relationship create an open-ended problem of how the security and defense of Greenland will be conducted in the period of the Arctic opening.

A Royal Canadian Air Force CH-149 Cormorant helicopter lifts off and heads out to Eielson Airfield during a search and rescue exercise in Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Oct. 31, 2013. (Photo: Master Cpl. Patrick Blanchard, Canadian Forces Combat Camera)
A Royal Canadian Air Force CH-149 Cormorant helicopter lifts off and heads out to Eielson Airfield during a search and rescue exercise in Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Oct. 31, 2013. (Photo: Master Cpl. Patrick Blanchard, Canadian Forces Combat Camera)

In an interview in 2011 with Admiral Wang, now the head of the

The Admiral highlighted the possibility of Canadian, US, and Danish defense collaboration at the Thule Air based turning into an Arctic hub.

Russia has a very clear strategy closely connected with their approach towards energy policy.  They were building significant resources for their Arctic strategy.  He noted that the Russians bought two of the Mistral class helo carriers for deployment by the Northern Fleet and would be ice hardened.

The Russians had reorganized existing forces to create two new Arctic brigades, which made a strategic point.

The United States had a strategy but few resources.  Indeed, the strategy was signed the last month of President Bush’s Administration.  There is a series resource gap on the US side, and the allied countries in the Arctic look to the US to have resources, including C4ISR capabilities.

A possibility was to shape a hub in Northern Greenland at the Thule air base to provide for such capabilities.

In an excellent overview to the challenge for the development and defense of Greenland, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the head of the Centre for Military Studies, provided a way to conceptualize the problem.

The problem really is about the development of Greenland, the role of the local government in that development, the relationship between Denmark and Greenland in combining greater autonomy for Greenland while providing for defense and security and what role the US will have in the overall process.

In other words, the challenge will be to sort out in PRACTICAL terms how Greenland will be defended in the presence of greater outside powers influence through the mining companies, the dynamics of change between Denmark and Greenland, and the uncertainty about US policies and capabilities for Greenland defense and Arctic operations.

And in such a situation certainly, the Russians will play a role with a significant possibility of driving wedges among the players. The sort of game they have played in Georgia and Ukraine or Syria for that matter would seem to fit a Russian opportunity in the High North.

The sun peeks through the clouds reflecting on the iceberg-laden waters near Koge Bay, Greenland, Aug. 5, 2013. Despite the Arctic waters, the air temperature averaged 50 degrees throughout the day. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jetta H. Disco)
The sun peeks through the clouds reflecting on the iceberg-laden waters near Koge Bay, Greenland, Aug. 5, 2013. Despite the Arctic waters, the air temperature averaged 50 degrees throughout the day. (U.S. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jetta H. Disco)

According to Rasmussen:

The military remains a Danish responsibility after the 2009 self-rule legislation. The Danish military presence in the Arctic is of a different nature than the American one, however. The Danish military presence relates to the internal affairs of the territory rather than to the geopolitical position of Greenland.

The United States military is stationed in Greenland for purely geopolitical reasons, and the bulk of the US forces left when these concerns could be dealt with differently and at lower cost. The Danish military presence was and has remained primarily a naval presence. The Royal Danish Navy is also the national coast guard and naval operations in the Arctic were primarily coast guard operations like Search and Rescue (SAR) and fishing inspection.

Apart from this the air force operated a few platforms for logistics and surveillance and the army operate the SIRIUS PATROL – a ranger unit that patrols the Northern territories by sled. The increasingly independent-minded government in Nuuk has been making demands of the Danish military in ways, which would never have been done of the US military.

With prospect of more traffic in the territorial waters and the need to more inspections following from prospecting etc. the call from greater resources have been heard from the military40 and politicians in Greenland, like the Greenlandic MP Sara Olsvig who argued that an increased defence presence was needed because ‘the minerals – including radioactive material – must be secured’

‘Greenland is a part of the Kingdom which will play an important global role in the future,’ defence minister Nick Hækkerup noted in 2012. Minister Hækkerup added that he believed operations in the Arctic would be ‘one of the areas were we will use more money in years to come’.

Rasmussen added that:

A key interest of the United States in Greenland will be the stability that allows access and which prevents Greenland from being a problem in Canada-US relations. As Natalia Loukacheva notes, the most important security relationship between the Inuit in Nunavut and Greenland is not with Ottawa or Copenhagen but with Washington.

For Canada and Denmark the risk of decoupling is part of the geopolitics of the Arctic. Perhaps one reason why the State Department did not grant the ambassador his wish for an office in Nuuk was that the United States might be more interested in Greenland remaining a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, if Greenland independence would create problems within the Canadian federation, this would lead to demands for more independence to Nunavut. The fact that military forces in the Arctic have come from the outside has made it obvious for the Inuit to focus on human security concerns, the fact that military forces has been non-indigenous have reflected the fact that the areas have been governed from the outside and with a geopolitical importance that attracted foreign forces.

The ambition of independence puts these geopolitical questions on Greenland’s political agenda for the first time.

The geopolitics of Greenland dictates that Greenland can only be a sovereign, independent country by providing for stability and control over its own territory in a way that ensures the United States of access and that the access of potentially hostile powers can be confidently denied. This is an issue anyone arguing for the independence of Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark will have to be able to address.

Greenland_Geopolitics_Globalisation_and_Geopolitics_in_the_New_North

And in another Danish paper which considers the evolving Greenland agenda, Admiral Nils Wang, one of Denmark’s leading Arctic experts and head of the Royal Danish Defence College, argues along with one of his colleagues, that the quest for sovereignty by Greenland will occur in a tough period where pressure from the outside is going up dramatically.

As a result, Greenland might well consider working with Denmark closely on sorting out security and defense arrangements as the Arctic opening unfolds.

In the paper, Dr. Damien Degeorges and Rear Admiral Nils Wang argue the following:

Greenland achieved self-rule in 2009, just as the Arctic was starting to draw global attention. This was by no means the beginning of the state-building process, but an important step on a long journey towards increased sovereignty and independence.

The big challenge for Greenland is to achieve economic independence and become a respected sovereign actor in the international system, capable of standing up to other regional actors such as Norway, Canada, Russia and the United States. After nearly 300 years of economic and political dependency on Denmark, economic independence now seems to be achievable within a foreseeable future.

However, the growing international interest for the Arctic in general is compounding the challenges for Greenland’s small population and its plans to develop a robust state apparatus, with the necessary institutional volume.

Greenland and the New Arctic.

In short, working the specifics of how the Greenland defense and security challenge is worked with Denmark, the Nordics, the United States and other Europeans is a key part of the future of Western defense and security.

It is not simply about an abstract Arctic security problem.

It is integral to the evolution of Europe and of NATO in the years ahead as wealth and influence shift North within Europe as a whole.

This is the fourth of a four-part series:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-arctic-opening-co-opetition-in-the-high-north/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-russian-dynamic-in-the-arctic-strategic-positioning/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-russian-approach-to-the-high-north-shaping-a-way-ahead/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/shaping-arctic-defense-leveraging-the-grid/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Russian Pivot: Posing Some Questions

06/06/2014

2014-06-06

In the most recent Russia Direct Monthly Memo (#11 June 2014), Vassily Kashin, Senior Research Fellow at the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies focuses on what he terms “Russia Reorients to the Orient.”

The Ukrainian crisis marks an important moment in Russian-Chinese relations, catalyzing the creation of a unique collaborative relationship between the two countries. Throughout the crisis, China has been careful not to express its direct support for any side. Despite the restraint of the country’s official statements,

China’s steps in forging closer practical ties with Russia, as well as Chinese media coverage of the Ukrainian situation, have left no doubt that Beijing’s sympathies lie strongly with Moscow.

Varying degrees of support for Russia’s position have been expressed by other BRICS nations, including in some cases, condemnation of the sanctions against

Moscow. But Brazil, India, and South Africa do not have highly developed external economic relations with Russia and, consequently, their ability to provide real support under economic pressure from the West is limited.

Among Russia’s major trade partners, only China has sided with the Kremlin, acquiring in the process a unique opportunity to address a backlog of bilateral economic and trade issues on its own terms.

According the author, Russia is reorienting Russian commodity exports towards China in the wake of Western actions which could well lead to lower energy dependency of the West on Russia.

But interestingly, in the article, the author includes a graphic, which shows that the twin pillars of Russian trade actually are China and Germany, with the former at 89 billion dollars for 2013 and the latter at 77 billion dollars for the same period.

Russian Trade Partners. Credit: Russia Direct
Russian Trade Partners. Credit: Russia Direct

Whether Russia “rebalances” or not really depends on what the European Union actually does. The Chinese move can be part of Putin’s global game or a strategic shift.

Certainly, Russian military cooperation is greater with China than Europe, although the Mistral deal remains in place in France.

By 2011, military-technical cooperation between Russia and China had successfully overcome the dip of the mid-2000s. As of today, the annual volume of Russian arms exports to China is worth around $2 billion, comparable to that of the 1990s. China is the second largest market for Russian arms (after India).

In contrast to finished products, which dominated Russian exports in the 1990s, today Russia mainly supplies China with engines and other high tech components for Chinese weaponry, and also carries out research and development work for the Chinese…..

It also seems that joint space exploration will get a boost. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Russian space technology was widely transferred to the Chinese. This allowed China to achieve a breakthrough in the development of its space industry and become the third country in the world, after the U.S. and Russia, to have its own manned space program.

After that, cooperation declined somewhat, but now the talk is of activating the partnership, especially in the field of planetary exploration in the solar system, in which Russia possesses a rich legacy from the Soviet period.

More practical areas of cooperation are also on the table, including the proposed transfer to the Chinese of technologies to build space nuclear reactors. Such systems can be used for both research space stations and radar reconnaissance satellites.

The author warns that there are “risks” to cooperation with China and suggests that the Russians will be vigilant in their evolving relationship. In spite of this, the US pivot to the Pacific is failing but the Russian one is succeeding in the view of the author.

While the U.S. pivot to China has been largely unsuccessful, Russia’s pivot to China shows promise of building the foundation for the nation’s long-term economic development.

Nonetheless, it is difficult to ignore the conflict of interests in China’s global aspirations with those of the Russians.

Cover for Russia Direct Monthly Memo (#11 June 2014).
Cover for Russia Direct Monthly Memo (#11 June 2014).

The PRC sees itself as an ascendant global civilization with global economic reach, growing military power and shaping a vibrant global presence over the next thirty years. Russia is viewed as a commodity supplier, which is a descending, not ascendant power, and useful tactical ally in dealing with the US and the West. The Russians are useful in dealing with American and European speed bumps on the way to global ascendancy for the Great Han civilization.

And it is clear that one global area of ascendant significance is an area for significant competition, namely the Arctic. And here Russian views on Chinese threats to Siberia and the Russian Arctic are clear and more akin to 19th Tsarist views than to a 21st century “collaborative” soft power “mutually beneficial” project.

In an earlier piece, we looked at Russian strategies in the High North by reviewing Marlene Laruelle’s recent book entitled Russia’s Arctic Strategies and the Future of the Far North. In that piece we looked at the Russian “policy culture” with regard to the Arctic clearly and highlighted that it is rooted in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the return of Russia. It is part of Putin’s reassertion of the role of Russia in the world, the most recent manifestation of which has been the incorporation of Crimea and the expansion of Russian energy resources.

The Russian state’s renewed interest in the Arctic is also part of a larger context – the reassertion of patriotism as a tool fostering political legitimacy….From the Kremlin’s viewpoint, the return to a great power status materializes via Russia’s reassertion of its role in the international arena, and via the revival of sectors that classically define a great power, such as the military-industry complex, in particular aviation and the navy. This Soviet style “great power” model goes hand-in-hand with the domestic legitimacy strategies put in place by Putin since the start of the 2000s. (p. 9)

The author also highlights the Russian effort to shape a brand with the Arctic context. “The creation of this Arctic brand is part of a more general reflection on the question of nation-building. In Russia the general feeling is that formerly the Soviet Union, and now the Russian Federation, has systematically lost the information war….The Russian official narrative (with regard to the Arctic) has evolved toward a celebration of the Arctic region as a space of international cooperation. (p. 13).

Clearly, this “branding” effort of Russia the collaborative and cooperative reflects some fundamental underlying realities, namely the need for significant cooperation for the development and security of the Arctic. And Russian efforts to do so are real and part of the fabric of the Arctic opening.

At the same time, the “policy culture” is not defined by the collaborative dynamic: it is part of the more nationalistic dynamic. A key element of this nationalistic dynamic is that rooted in the demographic pressures in Russia, the declining numbers and the significance of the Arctic region to what many Russians believe is a key element of a nationalistic revival.

In an interesting section of the book entitled “The Nationalist Reading of the Arctic: Russia’s New Lebensraum,” the author underscores a core aspect of current Russian thinking, with deep roots in the Russian past. Russian authors have also highlighted the “lost” Alaskan and Californian territories and the “idea of a former Russian Empire stretching from Finland to California fuels nationalist resentment, focused as it is on the importance of geography in the assertion of Russian great power” (page 42).

There is a strong “white” racial element of the narrative as well, as the Russians with the largest Arctic population (3/4 of the total) and this population are Russians, not indigenous people.

There is also a strong statement of concern about the “yellow peril” from China to Siberia as well.

Whereas Russia was withdrawing into itself territorially for the first time in a millennium, the Arctic seems to revive an expansive, and no longer retractive, vision of the country: a potential new space is opening up to it.

This reading of the Arctic is particularly operative in military circles, which see this region as being Russia’s most important “reserve of space. (page 49).

Clearly, such perspectives provides an important brake on Russian-Chinese collaboration, and a similar look at Chinese cultural and policy attitudes towards the Russians would also highlight significant gaps that will fuel tensions.

In short, there may well be a pivot associated with the Ukraine crisis, but how profound will depend on whether Germany shifts course with regard to Russia or not. And the cultural gaps, and different sense of global destinies between Moscow and Beijing, will fuel conflict in the period ahead, as well as collaboration when useful.

For recent related pieces see the following:

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-upcoming-bric-meeting-in-brazil-the-changing-global-context/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/china-and-its-neighbors-trying-to-reshape-the-neighborhood/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-russian-approach-to-the-high-north-shaping-a-way-ahead/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/beijings-and-moscows-natural-gas-breakthrough-expands-energy-partnership/

http://sldinfo.wpstage.net/the-russian-dynamic-in-the-arctic-strategic-positioning/