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In an interview with Prime Minister Abe, the Wall Street Journal summed the discussion up with this title for their article:
“Abe’s Strategy: Rearrange Region’s Power Balance.”
According to the article:
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe laid out an assertive foreign policy agenda, saying he hoped to accelerate maritime aid to Vietnam amid its territorial standoff with China and host Vladimir Putin this year despite the Russian president’s isolation from the West.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Bank of Japan Gov. Haruhiko Kuroda each sat down with Wall Street Journal Editor in Chief Gerard Baker, who offers his analysis of their conversations. Photo: Ko Sasaki for The Wall Street Journal
Beijing’s “unilateral drilling activities” for oil in waters claimed also by Hanoi have led to “heightening of tensions,” Mr. Abe told The Wall Street Journal in an interview Friday. “We will never tolerate the change of status quo by force or coercion,” added the Japanese leader, who has assiduously courted Southeast Asian leaders during the past year and offered himself as a counterweight to China’s muscle-flexing.
As part of his broader strategy to rearrange the region’s power balance, Mr. Abe also signaled a desire to keep alive his diplomatic overtures to Russia. He condemned Russia’s annexation of portions of Ukraine and noted that Japan has imposed sanctions in coordination with the U.S. and Europe. But he made clear that he also hoped to maintain the dialogue he has intensified through five summit meetings with Mr. Putin, more than Mr. Abe has had with any other head of state…..
Mr. Abe’s remarks came a day before tensions flared anew in Japan’s dispute with China over a small group of islands in the East China Sea as well as the surrounding airspace. Twice on Saturday, Chinese fighter jets flew perilously close to Japanese reconnaissance craft, leading both governments to file protests. Japan said China’s actions were “meant to intimidate,” while China said Japan had “carried out dangerous actions, in serious violation of international laws.”
The weekend exchange underscored a theme of Mr. Abe’s administration—that the region around Japan is increasingly dangerous, and that Tokyo has no choice but to embrace a more muscular foreign policy in response.
In our book on The Rebuilding American Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy, the entire second part of the book deals with Japan and the projected re-working of the Japanese-US working relationship in the Pacific. And the key role falls to Japan in re-shaping what they refer to as a “dynamic defense” strategy. Much of the work in this second part was done by our colleague Richard Weitz in carefully chronicling the path the Japanese have taken and are likely to take.
The bottom line is rather simple: the Japanese are reshaping their capabilities to provide for much more credible perimeter defense against the threats from North Korea and China.
The Japanese have published their 2014 budget documents which indicate their thinking about the way ahead; and those slides can be seen below:
In other words, Japanese national security strategy is in evolution.
In the most recent national security strategy, the Japanese government highlighted its latest iteration of what they called earlier “dynamic defense.”
In an earlier piece, I wrote about the Japanese defense white paper of 2012 and highlighted the following:
This is the first white paper released since they announced their decision to acquire the F-35, and provides a further elucidation upon the new defense policy announced in 2010.
The Japanese announced in that year, that they were shifting from a static island defense, which rested upon mobilization, to a “dynamic defense” which required more agile forces able to operate in the air and maritime regions bordering Japan.
Notably, the Japanese recognized the need for these “dynamic defense” forces to be interoperable with allies to provide for the kind of defense Japan and the allies needed in light of changing dynamics in the region.
As the White Paper puts it:
It is necessary that Japan’s future defense force acquire dynamism to proactively perform various types of operations in order to effectively fulfill the given roles of the defense force without basing on the “Basic Defense Force Concept” that place priority on “the existence of the defense force.”
To this end, the 2010 NDPG calls for the development of “Dynamic Defense Force” that has readiness, mobility, flexibility, sustainability, and versatility, and is reinforced by advanced technology based on the latest trends in the levels of military technology and intelligence capabilities. The concept of this “Dynamic Defense Force” focuses on fulfilling the roles of the defense force through SDF operations.
Rather than simply focusing upon a narrow understanding of the defense of Japan proper, the shift was being made to extended defense of Japan understood as an extended perimeter of defense.
Now the Japanese government has released a new National Security Strategy, which highlights an even more comprehensive look ahead built around what they call building a “comprehensive defense architecture.”
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force helicopter destroyer JS Kurama leads ships during a rehearsal for the 2009 fleet review. More than 8,000 civilians toured selected ships and viewed the rehearsal. Credit: USN, 10/21/09
Such an architecture is built on effective joint forces, a close working relationship with key allies, such as the United States, Australia and Japan and a proactive approach in which “Japan will maintain an improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.”
Clearly this approach is not just a briefing board document.
Recent events have demonstrated the Japanese engagement in the Philippine relief mission, including closely working with US forces in coming quickly to the aid of the Philippines and then moving out when no longer needed, and scrambling their Air Force in response to the Chinese unilateral declaration of an air defense identification zone.
The new strategy highlights the importance of Japan being a “proactive contributor to peace,” rather than just sitting back and hoping someone else takes care of their defense interests. The strategy focuses on the importance of protecting Japanese access to global supply chains and to natural resources, including energy.
And in so doing, protection of sea lines of communication is a key challenge facing Japan and its allies.
The document clearly underscores a Japanese approach to be more proactive but in a broader alliance context, within which the relationship with the United States. But message to the US: you need to be proactive as well.
And part of the SLOC issue involves the Arctic, which is part of an expanded Pacific in any case.
“The Arctic Sea is deemed to have enormous potential for developing new shipping routes and exploration of natural resources. While it is expected that states concerned work together under relevant international rules, such potential could provide new causes of friction among them.”
Japanese Air Self-Defense Force F-15J Eagles fly in formation during RED FLAG-Alaska 12-2 June 11, 2012, Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Credit: 354th Fighter Wing
The document makes it clear that Japan is not simply going to sit back and be intimated by North Korea and China. And Japan is not simply arguing in black in white terms, war or peace, but the necessity to be engaged in shaping a security environment which meets the interests of Japan and its allies.
“In addition to the issues and tensions arising from the shift in the balance of power, the Asia-Pacific region has become more prone to so-called “gray-zone” situations, situations that are neither pure peacetime nor contingencies over territorial sovereignty and interests.
There is a risk that these “gray-zone” situations could further develop into grave situations.”
And later in the document, the importance of being able to operate across the spectrum of security and defense is highlighted as well, including an ability to operate in such “gray zone” situations.
“Even in peacetime, Japan will maintain and improve a comprehensive architecture for responding seamlessly to an array of situations, ranging from armed attacks to large-scale natural disasters.”
What is underscored in the new strategy is the importance of blending military, security and political initiatives together in expanding effective Japanese alliance relationships.
This approach is highlighted in the discussion of how to deal with SLOC defense.
In particular, sea lanes of communication, stretching from the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden to the surrounding waters of Japan, passing through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea, are critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East.
In this regard, Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.
Japan will play a central role in the reshaping of Pacific defense in response to the challenges of the second nuclear age, China and the Arctic opening. This is not the early post-war Japan.
This is a Japan which correctly recognizes the 21st century is not the 20th.
In effect, since the end of the Cold War, Japan is evolving through two clear phases with regard to defense and security policy and is about to enter a third. The first phase was extended homeland defense, where the focus was primarily on defending the homeland from direct threats to the homeland. A more classic understanding of defense was in play, whereby force had to be projected forward to threaten Japan and as this threat materialized, defenses need to be fortified.
It was defense versus emergent direct threats to Japan.
Life changed. Technology made warfare more dynamic, and the nature of power projection has changed.
The reach from tactical assets can have strategic consequences, the speed of operations has accelerated and operations highlighting the impact of “shock and awe” high speed operations made it clear that relatively static defenses were really not defenses at all.
At the same time, globalization accelerated, and with it the global significance of maritime and air routes and their security for the viability of the Japanese way of life. When terrorists crashed directly into the World Trade Center, Japanese got the point.
No man was an island, and neither was an island economy simply protected by having a global policy of shopkeepers.
More was required to defend the Japanese way of life.
The Evolution of Japanese Defense and Security; Credit: Second Line of Defense
The emergence of the Chinese colossus and the greater reach of the Korean crisis into a direct threat to Japan, and the resurgence of Russia, its nuclear weapons and its military forces, all posed the question of threats able to reach Japan rapidly and with significant effect.
A static defense made no sense; a “dynamic defense” became crucial. This meant greater reach of Japanese systems, better integration of those systems within the Japanese forces themselves, more investments in C2 and ISR, and a long-term strategy of re-working the U.S.-Japanese military relationship to have much greater reach and presence.
The “dynamic defense” phase carries with it the seeds for the next phase – the shaping of a twin anchor policy of having reach in the Arctic and the Indian Ocean.
Obviously, such reach is beyond the capabilities of the Japanese themselves, and requires close integration with the United States and other allies. And such reach requires much greater C2, ISR and weapons integration across the Japanese and allied force structure.
The great strength of U.S.-Japan alliance rests not only on a linage of mutual respect for sea operations, and now shared technology, but also Japan also creates a North/South Combat Axis for operations.
Instead of leaving the United States with a Hawaiian-centric strategy with the need to focus on going to West Pac East-West, the Japanese contribution is a very strong (or at least growing again) as a maritime ally which can, in partnership with the United States, help the US go North-South from Japanese Bases to cover an operational area ranging from Pacific Arctic to the Indian Ocean.
And U.S. systems are a key part of the Japanese approach. Clearly, at the top of the list is building out from the Aegis global partnership to include Ospreys and F-35s as centerpiece items. Japanese F-35s would be part of the Pacific fleet of US and allied F-35s and Japan is where the first F-35s are coming in 2015 and by 2020 there could be as many as 5 squadrons of F-35s, USMC, USAF, and Japanese.
This will clearly be the center of excellence for the fledgling F-35 enterprise.
And added to this, the Japanese will build their F-35s in rebuilt Mitsubishi facilities, thus becoming the third final assembly line for F-35s, with Fort Worth, and Cameri, Italy, the other two.
The cross domain synergy among these new systems combined with Japanese integration with their legacy systems are the building blocks for the new “comprehensive defense architecture.”
And to conclude: there is a fundamental difference from PRC and Japanese goals and context. The PRC is an authoritarian regime seeking to reshape international rules to their benefit; Japan is a democracy embedded in alliances seeking to see that international rules are crafted and created which support globalization, not domination.
There is no moral equivalence here.
Rather than asserting that there is a “global commons,” the US and its allies are working to ensure that there will be a functioning global commons in the decades ahead.
This is not about conceptual dominance, but about realpolitik.
2014-05-27 This past Sunday, elections were held throughout Europe for the European Parliament.
The result was a significant anti-establishment vote, and an increase in popular support for the European right wing.
Nowhere was this more dramatic than in France where the governing party received 13% of the vote as opposed the Front Nationale’s nearly 25% of the vote.
EU leaders meeting in Brussels on Tuesday (27 May) are still digesting the result of EU elections, which saw anti-establishment parties winning in Britain, France, Belgium, Greece, and Denmark and making gains in several other countries.
Commenting on the outcome, which saw the far-right National Front scoop most of the French votes on Sunday, President Francois Hollande said it reflects “distrust in Europe and a fear of decline”.
He seemed to have drawn few personal consequences from the vote, however, which put his Socialist party in third place on a bruising 13.9 percent.
Instead, he blamed Europe, for having become “incomprehensible”, and weak economic growth. “At tomorrow’s Council, I’ll reiterate that growth, jobs and investment must be the priority,” he said in a brief address on national TV on Monday evening.
As a British colleague commented that the results meant that the EU itself was now funding a significant anti-European effort as the new right wing deputies would atke their salaries and benefits and direct them at the EU itself!
And indeed within the European parliament, there will no be a significant anti-EU coalition, which can clearly have an impact on institutions already struggling to govern Europe.
Marine Le Pen’s Front National party came first in three exit polls with more than 25% of the vote. Photograph: Remy De La Mauviniere/AP
This comes in the context of a continuing Euro crisis, which itself raises fundamental questions about the strategic direction of Europe and the Crimean Crisis which is a clear dampening down on any thought of EU expansion Eastward.
The elections, although not definitive statement in their own regards, are clearly part of a European crisis. Reform within Europe is clearly necessary, no matter what the European political class wishes to believe.
Without reform, the crisis will deepen and the Euro skeptics strengthened. It is no longer about “saving” European construction done to date; it is about revamping it.
The Economist provided the following explanation of what the elections might mean:
Brussels is now bracing itself for an almighty bout of arm-wrestling.
On the one side are the parliamentarians, particularly the Spitzenkandidaten themselves.
Ignoring the will of the people, they argue, would be a travesty for European democracy.
Neither Jean-Claude Juncker, whose centre-right European People’s Party came first, nor Martin Schulz, his centre-left counterpart, commands a majority of seats.
But both are vigorously asserting their claims to the presidency and cobbling together possible coalitions in the new Parliament.
On the other side are the governments, and particularly the British one. David Cameron finds both the idea of Spitzenkandidaten, and the politics of the two frontrunners, unpalatably federalist. Angela Merkel, the German premier, has tentatively backed Mr Juncker, while leaving the door open to non-Spitzenkandidaten alternatives more acceptable to the likes of Mr Cameron. Ms Merkel, Mr Cameron and the 26 other heads of state are meeting for dinner on May 27th to discuss their next steps.
How this arm-wrestling goes will answer some weighty questions about the state of contemporary European politics.
How much influence does Britain—edging towards the exit door, especially after the result of the election—still wield in Brussels?
Does the Parliament now have the ability to strong-arm the governments?
Can an effective, centrist “grand coalition” be forged, capable of out-voting the growing extremes of left and right?
Can the divergent interests and priorities of euro zone “ins” and “outs” still be reconciled?
The new Commission, and its president, are expected to be in place by the autumn.
A hot, scratchy summer awaits.
The reaction of the Chancellor of Germany to the impact of the election was to underscore its seriousness.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel said: “A strong message is needed that we are shaping Europe so it becomes more functional, to better respond to the needs of people.”
She also underlined France’s key symbolic and political place in the EU, after French voters caused an earthquake by giving the lion’s share of their ballots to Marine Le Pen’s anti-EU, populist National Front party.
“France is defining for the EU and the eurozone. As Germans we have the utmost interest that France is on a successful track.
I will do whatever I can for France to be on a growth track, otherwise it is not possible for the eurozone to regain its stability.”
U.S. Marines, French counterparts, and the American Battle Monuments Commission will host the Belleau Wood Memorial Day Ceremony at Aisne-Marne American Cemetery in Belleau, France. The ceremony on May 25, 2014, commemorates its 96th anniversary as well as the long-term friendship between France and the United States while honoring the sacrifices made by U.S. and French troops during the battle.
This year’s participants from the United States will include: Commandant of the Marine Corps Gen. James Amos; personnel from the 6th Marine Regiment, 2d Marine Division (2D MARDIV) band; a Wounded Warrior Regiment; and personnel from U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe and Africa (MARFOREUR/AF).
United States Marines and their French counterparts gathered at Aisne-Marne American Cemetery May 25 to celebrate Memorial Day, and to mark the 96th anniversary of the historic Battle of Belleau Wood. The event was held in the memorial cemetery which lies adjacent to the historic grounds of Belleau Wood and featured the laying of wreathes, a firing of volleys, the playing of “TAPS,” raising of the American and French national colors, and a concert by the French and Marine Corps military bands. The mayor of the village of Bellau along with other military officers and officials representing the U.S. and France were present along with hundreds of locals and visitors from around the world. Participating units from the U.S. Marines included 5th Marine Regiment, the Wounded Warrior Regiment and Marine Forces Europe and Africa. French units that participated in the ceremony included the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment and the Musique Principale des Troupes de Marines. Credit: USMC Forces Europe and Africa
French participation will include: Chief of Staff of the Army General Bertrand Ract-Madoux; Préfect of Aisne, M. Hervé Bouchaert; the mayor and deputy of Chateau Thierry, M. Jaques Krabal; the mayor of Belleau, Mme. Nadia Crapart; the French troupes de Marine Military Band; and 3ème Régiment d’Artillerie de Marine (3ème RAMa) in addition to others.
The commemoration will be held in the memorial cemetery that lies outside the historic grounds of Belleau Wood and will feature the laying of wreathes, a firing of volleys, the playing of taps, raising of the American and French national colors, and a concert by the 2D MARDIV band.
The American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC) is the guardian of America’s overseas commemorative cemeteries and memorials that honors the service, achievements and sacrifices of U.S. Armed Forces. Established by the American Federal Government in 1923, the ABMC designs, constructs, operates and maintains permanent American cemeteries in foreign countries and maintains U.S. military memorials, monuments and markers where American armed forces have served overseas since April 6, 1917.
For those who are not Marines, the meaning and importance of at Belleau Wood for the USMC was highlighted during a speech by Lt Col Hank Detering (USMC- Ret) given at the time of honoring the USMC birthday last November.
Excerpts from that speech follow:
I would like to tell our guests why we are gathered here today, and perhaps give everyone a brief history lesson. Marines around the globe are celebrating our birthday, as we have done since the days of General LeJeune.
No other US service places such a strong emphasis on history and tradition.
One of the first things we learn in boot camp is that we are the guardians of our corps’ accomplishments.
It is our responsibility, our sacred duty, to uphold the reputation, the traditions, the honor, and the accomplishments, of all Marines who came before us.
This is what sets us apart from all our sister services.
It makes us fierce warriors, it has given us a special place in the hearts of our nation, and it has accounted for our continued survival when others would prefer to see us go away…..
We all know about the Marines at Belleau Wood.
Americans were going into battle against the unstoppable German Army, and everywhere people asked, with as much hope as curiosity, “Can these Americans fight?”
It was our Marine Corps that provided the answer, a resounding “YES!”
We know the story about the retreating French Major, who ordered the Marines to turn around,
And the Marine Captain who replied, “Retreat hell, we just got here.”
And we all remember GySgt Dan Daly’s immortal words, “Come on you sons of bitches. Do you want to live forever?”
Our Marine riflemen were dropping Germans at 700 yards.
The Germans were astonished.
The effectiveness of the rifle fire broke up their attack.
We crossed the wheat fields at Chateau-Thierry, held for 19 days, and repulsed 5 German counter attacks.
Marines took over 4000 casualties, 55% of the Brigade, 1087 men on the first day alone.
When the Captains fell they were replaced by Lieutenants.
When the Lieutenants fell they were replaced by Sergeants.
Sergeants by Corporals, Corporals by Privates.
Marines captured over 12,000 German soldiers, while the Germans captured only 25 Marines.
How do you account for it?
The explanation was simple, Marines don’t surrender, they win or they die.
For Germany, it was the turning point of the war, it was as close to Paris they would ever get.
And as they left France in defeat the Germans gave the Marines a new nick-name, “teuffelhunden” — Devil Dogs”
Now, here is a little history that you probably don’t know.
Black Jack Pershing was in command of the US forces headed for Europe.
He did not like Marines, was offended by our “First to Fight” motto, and decided that “this thing in Europe” would be an “all-Army affair.”
Our Commandant went over Pershing’s head to the secretary of war who sent two Marine Regiments to France, the 4th Brigade, 8000 men, a mere 1% of the European force.
So, Pershing assigned the Marines, he did not want, to the rear to build warehouses and unload ships.
The Marines did as they were told, and in their spare time they practiced their marksmanship.
Pershing scorned trench warfare and believed that the Americans could break the war wide open.
But, he was adamant that his troops not fight under foreign officers, so Americans were slow to enter the fray.
Eventually, as the Germans advanced toward Paris, the Americans were committed.
Pershing placed the Marines where they would be of little consequence, or so he thought.
It was a decision he would forever regret.
On June 6th, 1918, the headlines back home read, “US Marines Smash Huns, gain glory in brisk fight on the Marne.”
The next day, “Marines win hot battle, sweep enemy from heights near Thierry.”
And on the third day, “Our Marines attack, gain mile at Veuillay, resume drive at night, foe losing heavily.”
Then, on July 10th, President Woodrow Wilson reported to the United States Senate that the Marines had “turned the tide of battle” and that Belleau Wood had “begun the route that was to save Europe and the World.”
Folks at home thought there was nothing on the Western Front but Marines and dead Germans.
America had begun its love affair with her Marines.
Before 1918, few people had ever heard of the United States Marines.
After Belleau Wood, people all over the world knew about them.
Marines were no longer a shipboard gendarmerie.
We had demonstrated that the Marines could respond with trained troops, and more quickly, than any other branch of the US military.
Not only would our boots be first on the ground in America’s future wars,
The word “MARINE” would be synonymous with the word “victory.”
Other great battles lay ahead,
Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima in WW II.
The Pusan Perimeter and the Chosin Reservoir in Korea,
Hue City and Khe Sanh in Viet Nam,
Anbar Province and Fallujah in Iraq, and Helmand Province in Afghanistan, but Belleau Wood may still be the most significant battle ever fought by the Marine Corps.
The election in Ukraine may provide Ukraine with a legitimate government to represent its interests in dealing with the Russians.
But the clear absence of a mandate from the eastern regions of the Ukraine, and the Russian engagement in those regions, ensure that the question of the future of eastern Ukraine is not decided.
As The Financial Times highlights the challenge by quoting a Ukrainian political analyst:
The card played by Russia will be to point out that the presidential election did not, de facto, take place in Donbass, so the newly-elected president does not represent this region.
And in another FT piece the reality of the election was underscored in these words:
The election barely happened in Ukraine’s two easternmost regions, disrupted by the separatists, and the worsening situation in Slovyansk is a reminder that last month’s seizure of towns by anti-Kiev rebels unleashed forces that may be difficult to bring under control.
Many towns not seized by separatists are instead loosely controlled by armed pro-Ukrainian militias.
There are at least two other chits in the game, which are shaping the overall impact of what the Russian gains might be, as well.
The first is the importance of Ukraine to Russian military production.
Putin as energy czar working a global strategy. Credit Photo: The New York Times.
The problem for Ukraine is that their contribution to the Russian military industrial complex largely comes from the region at greatest risk to be broken off from the country. Playing a leverage card based on the impact of Ukrainian industrial contributions to the Russian military might be a short-sided effort indeed!
In addition, the map writing efforts in Ukraine have already netted the Russians major energy gains and those gains directly come at the expense of the Ukrainians.
In other words, the strength of the Russian resources in energy has gone up; and the ability of Ukraine to be more independent in energy has gone down.
This article highlights findings, which examine each of these aspects of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship, first, the military-industrial aspect and then the energy dimension.
The Ukrainian Role in the Russian Military Industrial Complex
In an examination of Russian options in Ukraine provided by the Royal United Services Institute in London, the authors highlighted the role of Ukraine within Russian defense industrial production.
According to an April 2014 analysis, Igor Sutyagin and Michael Clarke included an assessment of the role of Ukraine in Russian military industrial production within their overall look at Russian options in Ukraine.
Some 30 per cent of Ukrainian military exports to Russia are unique and cannot currently be substituted by Russian production. Russia’s heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (the SS-18 ICBMs) are designed and produced by the Yuzhmash combine in Dnepropetrovsk. SS-18s are regularly checked and maintained by Yuzhmash specialists.
Two other strategic missile systems – the SS-25 (RT-2PM Topol) and the SS-19 (UR-100 NUTTKh) – are designed and produced by Russian-based enterprises, but use guidance systems designed and produced in Ukraine by the Kharkiv-based Khartron Scientific-Industrial Combine.
The SS-18, SS-19 and SS-25 currently make up some 51 per cent of Russia’s overall strategic nuclear-weapons inventory and over 80 per cent of that of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces specifically.
In addition, some 20 per cent of the natural uranium currently consumed by Russia’s nuclear industry, both for civilian and military purposes, comes from Zholti Vody in Ukraine.
Since Soviet days, Russia’s ship-building program has heavily depended on gas-turbine engines and gears produced in Mykolaiv, Ukraine. While Russian industry has learned how to build large gas-turbine engines since then, it cannot yet master manufacturing the gears for them and Russia requires Ukrainian-produced gears for 60 per cent of the surface combatants planned for its navy.
The Russian air force is also critically dependent on the Ukrainian defense industry. Ukrainian enterprises produce the R-27 (the AA-10 Alamo) medium-range air-to-air missile (AAM), as well as the seekers for the R-73 (AA-11 Archer) short-range AAM – which, between them, represent the majority of anti-air missiles operated by Russian fighters.
Many of the auxiliary systems – from hydraulics to drogue parachutes – for the Russian Su-27, Su-30 and Su-35 fighters, as well as for Russia’s newest Su-34, are also produced in Ukraine.
In Zaporizhia, the Motor-Sich plant has a major role in Russian aviation. Motor-Sich produces jet engines for a variety of Russian transport jet aircraft, including the An-124 Ruslan, the largest Russian transport aircraft, as well as for some combat and training aircraft. The plant also produces engines for all Russian combat and transport helicopters, as well as auxiliary power units for all Russian helicopters and many types of combat and transport aircraft.
Russia has made a vast effort to reduce its dependence upon Motor-Sich engines, but the evidence is that it cannot produce enough engines to meet its own demand – to say nothing of an ambitious rearmament program, which looks as if it will require at least 3,000 helicopter engines in a two-to-three year period to equip Russian forces.
Russia’s dependence on Motor-Sich also has the effect of restricting its own military and aviation exports. For the period 2013–16, Russia has secured contracts for the delivery of over 260 new helicopters around the world, all of which are equipped with either main or auxiliary engines supplied by the Ukrainian company.
On 28 March, the state-owned company that controls all Ukrainian armaments and military-related production – Ukroboronprom – announced a freeze on all future supplies to Russia. The effects of this freeze on Russian military production as well as its export potential will certainly be felt in the medium term, if not immediately.
The authors cautioned that leveraging this dependence might be more than risky. Most of these plants are in south and eastern Ukraine, the very areas most at risk for Ukrainian territorial integrity.
Russia Expands Its Energy Resources: Ukraine Dependency Goes Up
Ukraine was working towards exploitation of its offshore energy reserves in the Crimean region. Plans were underway to leverage these resources to reduce their overall energy dependencies.
Ukraine has been eager to see its offshore gas deposits developed in order to cut its dependence on Russian supplies, a growing priority as the countries have failed the past three years to agree on lower prices……
Ukraine produced domestically about 20 Bcm/year of gas last year, but plans to boost output as shale gas and Black Sea projects gain traction. Indeed, Kiev last year predicted the country would begin exporting its natural gas to Europe in four to five years and would become a net exporter of energy by 2025. In the Black Sea, Skifska is the biggest single gas target in the area which itself is estimated to hold over 3 Tcf of reserves.
Source: Platts, Chernomornaftogaz
The seizure of Crimea and with it the ownership of the Black Sea offshore reserves have eliminated Ukrainian hopes for both exports and energy independence.
An article by John Daly of oilprice.com highlighted the impact of the Crimean take-over on Ukraine and its energy policy.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea has totally upended Kiev’s plans for Black Sea and Sea of Azov offshore oil and natural gas production.
Before the peninsula’s March 16 independence referendum, followed two days later by Russian annexation, Ukraine’s state-owned Chornomornaftogaz (“Chernomorneftegaz” in Russian) owned 17 hydrocarbon fields, including 11 natural gas fields, four gas condensate fields, and two oil fields, along with 13 offshore platforms in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov.
Among foreign companies interested in Crimea’s offshore hydrocarbon assets were ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell and Petrom.
Pre-annexation, Chornomornaftohaz also held a 100 percent interest in five offshore license blocs – Vostochno-Kazantipskoe in the Sea of Azov and Odesskoe, Bezymiannoe, Subbotina and Palasa in the Black Sea. Crimea was third in Ukrainian natural gas production after the Kharkov and Poltava regions.
After the referendum, the Crimean Parliament nationalized both Chornomornaftohaz and state-owned Ukrtransgaz, which owned the national gas transmission network belonging to Ukraine’s state-owned Naftogaz company. It then chartered a new company, the Crimean republican enterprise (PKK) “Chernomorneftegaz.” The Crimean Parliament also claimed the peninsula’s “continental shelf and exclusive economic zone” in the Black Sea.
As William Broad in a New York Times article entitled appropriately “In Taking Crimea, Putin Gains a Sea of Fuel Reserves,” the impact of map re-writing was highlighted:
When Russia seized Crimea in March, it acquired not just the Crimean landmass but also a maritime zone more than three times its size with the rights to underwater resources potentially worth trillions of dollars.
Russia portrayed the takeover as reclamation of its rightful territory, drawing no attention to the oil and gas rush that had recently been heating up in the Black Sea. But the move also extended Russia’s maritime boundaries, quietly giving Russia dominion over vast oil and gas reserves while dealing a crippling blow to Ukraine’s hopes for energy independence.
Russia did so under an international accord that gives nations sovereignty over areas up to 230 miles from their shorelines. It had tried, unsuccessfully, to gain access to energy resources in the same territory in a pact with Ukraine less than two years earlier.
When one adds this to the recent signature of a long-negotiated deal with China on energy, the expansion of Russian Arctic activity where they are 50% stakeholders in the Arctic treasure house, the seizure of Crimea seems almost a business takeover.
And given the significant German dependence on Russian energy, the expansion of the energy “warehouse stores”, by itself puts Putin in a good position to deal with the West.
Vladimir Putin has pursued an agenda to expand his role within Russia and Russia’s role within the world since at least 2005. The roll back of EU and NATO expansion is clearly part of the agenda, but rebuilding Russia’s ability to be a key player in the Middle East and the Mediterranean is certainly another.
And throughout this period, he has clearly underscored that the Arctic opening is a key event during which Russia, as the largest stakeholder, will prepare itself to play a key role.
At the same time, it must be realized that Russia remains very economically dependent upon energy exports and exploitation of raw materials. It has not really made a significant transition to a 21st century economy.
And it must be realized as well that within Russia, Putin is not Stalin, and certainly not in the dominant position which outsiders might assume.
This has meant that for Putin playing a foreign policy and defense card is a key element of solidifying his position at home while pursuing the strategic objectives, which he has clearly identified.
With the elections in Ukraine, which the Russians have clearly positioned themselves to influence, the next phase of the Ukrainian crisis will unfold.
But what certainly is clear is that the West can not hope for easy solutions or inevitable reversals in Russian policies which they find “unacceptable.”
What the events of the past few months clearly should demonstrate is that a strategic adjustment is long overdue. Simply coming up with a way to facilitate the Russian role in Western policies on the grounds of building multiple sum policies for the future of the “global commons” as the way ahead is clearly wrong headed. Cooperation may be desirable but cannot be assumed. And everyone is not playing by the same rules or using the same playbook.
One of the greatest failures of Western strategic thinking and of the strategic class is to assume progress for the inevitability of globalization when history does not operate that way. There is no inevitability of progress; there is the certainty of conflict, entropy, collapse and development.
The 21st century is not one of the making of thought of Condorcet but of one where progress can be forged only in the midst of conflict and for the democracies this always is a challenge to manage an effective way ahead where dictators and authoritarian regimes persist in setting global agenda items.
As Putin rewrites the map and inserts his interpretation of Russian interests into the Western calculus, Western states need to rethink and rework a number of core agenda items to ensure that Putin and like-minded Russians understand that aggression has a significant cost.
Simply generating sanctions as a substitute for more fundamental shifts in policy will be seen as a short-term and short-sighted solution that will go away as vested interests in the West succeed in their rollback.
To be effective, key Western states need to take hard decisions and to shape new strategic realities, which the Russians will themselves need to adjust to in order not be marginalized in the global competition.
Re-set German Energy Policy
For the Germans, this means having a deliberate and clear energy policy, which diminishes significantly their dependency on the Russians.
To do so will require taking on tough issues whether they be nuclear energy, the role of shale, or becoming a key player with the Nordic states in the Arctic opening.
As Caroline Mükusch wrote in 2011 with regard to German energy policy:
Germany is, in terms of oil and gas, an energy dependent country as it is importing 80 percent of its energy resources. Almost 50 percent of oil and gas are coming from the Commonwealth of Independent States, primarily Russia; 30 percent from Norway and Great Britain; 15 percent from Africa and 5 percent from the Middle East (see Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe (2009): Energierohstoffe 2009, Hannover: BGR, p. 34. )
Obviously, a 50 percent dependency on Russia – despite all special relations – is no energy security at all. While some top political leaders in Germany appear to believe in Germany’s special relationship with Russia to secure its energy supply, Russia, most recently at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, made it very clear that it plays according to the rules of geopolitics, interests and power.
What happens, if Russia turns its energy supply to Germany off or more likely follows its own interests in determining the most desirable energy partners, in dynamic circumstances?
Re-set the French Sale of the Mistral to the Russians
The Russians are the throes of buying 2-4 ships from the French. These ships are sold as basic entities which then the Russians will arm and equip.
But these amphibious ships will include ice-hardened versions, which certainly the Nordics and the Balts understand where they will be used, and as these countries focus on deepening their joint defense, adding new capabilities to the Russians who are precisely the threat makes little sense.
Amphibious ships have gone from the category of being useful to becoming central to 21st century operations. Their role expands as the focus of much military action is upon the exercise of influence in a dynamic and fluid global environment.
The incomplete forward section of the Sevastopol, seen at Saint-Nazaire in mid-April. Sevastapol is the second of two Mistral-class ships to be delivered to Russia, with the option of two more. (Courtesy of Leo Van Ginderen)
Amphibious ships and the evolving aviation capabilities operating from these ships allows the military to operate in a variety of settings from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, to engaging in support of allies for their own military operations, or to asserting the national interest in the face of adversarial conflict.
In a recent piece in Defense News, Paris-based correspondent, Pierre Tran, has focused on the challenge for the French of reversing course on the Mistral sale.
As Tran notes:
French defense officials are exploring ideas to avoid delivering a second helicopter carrier to Russia, including looking for an alternative client for the Sevastopol, analysts and an industry executive said.
A highly discreet review is being held as armed strife rises in eastern Ukraine and top US officials call for NATO allies to boost defense spending and act as a counterweight to Russia.
Although clearly a French problem, it is in the interest of the US and other Western allies to sort out a way to shift course on the Mistral sale as part of a comprehensive response.
Tran added:
A French naval expert said a hold on the second ship would show President Vladimir Putin that Europe could harden its position and perhaps re-arm its forces.
This message would be strengthened if a solution could be found, be it through NATO or the EU, to have this ship reinforcing European navies, the expert said.
Also, Brazil is seen as a possible client for the Sevastapol, as the regional power bought the French Navy’s retired Foch carrier and renamed it the Sao Paulo.
Re-set US Space Policy
In many ways, US space policy and its dependence on the Russians is the functional equivalent of the Mistral challenge.
Energomash company employees stand near RD-180 engines prepared for shipment to the United States in a shop at the Energomash, leading Russian rocket engine company, in Moscow, Thursday, June 6, 2002. Energomash and U.S. company Pratt & Whitney have created a joint venture to build and test the RD-180 engine. The engine has successfully flown twice as the first stage engine of Lockheed Martin’s Atlas 3 rocket. Credit Photo: US News and World Report
Dependency is significant in terms of the engines used by one of the two key rockets used by the Pentagon, and indeed in the views of many experts, the better of the two rockets.
Also, with the retirement of the Space Shuttle, only the Soyuz is available currently for moving humans to the Space Station.And with the Russians in a central place in Space Station policy, the Russians can play havoc with the US equity in the Space Station.
Reversing course is doable but costly. But in the presence of Russian map making, it is essential.
And past decisions such as NOT building a domestic variant of the RD-180 engine, not pursuing an effective alternative to the Space Shuttle, and not working with the Europeans on ATV as a player in an alternative Space Station policy are all parts of taking a relaxed view of Russian involvement in a number of strategic areas for US space policy.
Such a relaxed view, which really was done because of the absence of US effort and investment, will only aid and abet further Russian map making.
Re-Set of Baltic Defense
The Nordics are clearly very concerned with indirect as well as direct threats which the Russians can generate to the Baltic states. Sweden is increasing its defense budget after a period of decline, and is focused specifically on the direct defense of the Baltic states.
In discussions in Denmark, Danish officials underscored that a number of core building blocks are in place for Baltic defense, such as the Baltic air policing effort, but these building blocks need to be brought together into a more cohesive ability to defend the Baltic republics and reassure their leadership and publics that no indirect strategy of pressure will be acceptable to the core European states directly affected by such a strategy.
There is clearly concern with being in a position to counter an indirect Russian strategy in the Baltics, which is viewed as the most pressing need and requirement.
And clearly for the Danes and the Norwegians, a key element of the broader security and defense challenge is the Arctic. The Arctic is emerging as the major safety, security and defense challenge facing Norwegian and Danish security and defense forces, and the Russians as the largest stakeholders in the development of the Arctic are clearly key players.
And such a reality is a good way to end this discussion.
For conflict and collaboration is at the heart of dealing with the Russians.
One the one hand, reinforcing Baltic defense in effective ways can shape Russian understanding of what the Nordics can do backed by other NATO states.
On the other hand, it is not simply a zero sum confrontation, for Arctic development really requires a long-term cooperation strategy.
As one Danish official put it: “The Russians are really mortgaging their long term interests with short term policies. And we need to demonstrate to them that this is true.”
2014-05-14 In March 2014, the Sir Richard Willliams Foundation held a one-day seminar examining the future of air combat.
Senior RAAF personnel, MOD personnel, two USMC aviators and the head of the Joint Strike Fighter program were among the presenters.
The report addressed the overall impact of fifth generation aircraft on the Royal Australian Air Force, and upon the Australian Defence Force.
The step change in capability the F-35 will bring was a recurring theme throughout the seminar presentations.
Speakers consistently pointed to the aircraft’s advanced sensors, LPI communications, low observability, improved situational awareness, and other advanced systems as the key attributes that differentiate the F-35 from its predecessors.
To emphasize the advances in sensors and other systems, AIRMSHL Brown explained how the classic Hornet which was developed in the 1970s is a very different aircraft today to the one the RAAF initially acquired.
In the last decade the Hornet has undergone a massive mid-life upgrade program which has seen it equipped with a more capable APG-73 radar, Link 16 and ARC-210 comms suite, enhanced cockpit displays, an advanced electronic warfare suite, a helmet mounted cueing system with new high PK active and high off-bore sight air-to-air missiles, and precision guided and stand-off air-to-surface weapons.
He related a recent experience he had when flying an upgraded Hornet in a training mission.
Despite being in a dominant position against a relatively new Hornet pilot, he was ‘killed’ by an over the shoulder ASRAAM missile shot which had been ‘spiked’ and uncaged by the pilot’s helmet mounted cueing system.
He remembers that event as a “technological development that had fundamentally changed my mind as to what was offensive and what was defensive.”
Held on the sidelines of the RAAF 2014 Airpower Conference in Canberra, the William Foundation seminar sought to identify the many opportunities and complex issues that ‘5th generation’ air combat capabilities will bring to the Royal Australian Air Force and to those of Australia’s allies and regional partners.
RAAF Fighter Pilot Matthew Harper offered a clear insight by comparing his experiences in flying the 4th generation classic Hornet and the 4.5 generation Super Hornet in the RAAF, and the 5th generation F-22 Raptor while on exchange with the USAF.
He told the audience that, despite the advances which have made the classic Hornet “one of the best 4th generation aircraft out there”, the aircraft is still very limited.
He spoke of the mechanically scanned radar which needs to be “driven by the pilot” and which is restricted in the number of targets it can see and track, and of the limitations of the Link 16 network and the compromises that need to be made when “everyone wants to use it”.
He also explained that the Hornet is “not low-observable in any way”, that its mission computers are at 100 per cent capacity, and that sensor performance is very sensitive to the operator’s skill levels.
Sensor fusion for a Hornet pilot essentially means looking at multiple displays, each one displaying a different sensor picture which may not be up-to-date due to Link 16 limitations, and often means having to make a best-guess decision based on poor situational awareness. He said with the Hornet, in the decade ahead “it’s increasingly obvious we don’t have the systems capability to offer a meaningful contribution to the fight.”
With the Super Hornet, RAAF Fighter Pilot Harper said the improvements brought by the AESA radar, integrated electronic warfare features, some low observable enhancements, the advanced mission computer, and better sensor fusion which provides greater ability to manage complex EW & targeting, have made a “fantastic jet” even better.
He said the improvements were “designed to a sensible point which made financial sense”, and would mean the Super Hornet is survivable and upgradeable into the 2020s.
But he said the Super Hornet was still limited by being confined to a Link 16 network which isn’t LPI, and despite the better sensors the lack of real sensor fusion “adds a layer of complexity” which can result in task saturation.
“It’s still very challenging to determine what the best way is to track an adversary and maintain SA against advanced threats,” he said
By comparison, SQNLDR Harper said the 5th generation F-22 was built from the ground up to optimize its capabilities, and that there is a real impression that the platform was “built in collaboration with engineers, scientists, fighter pilots, and warriors.”
He said the most important feature of 5th generation is its integrated avionics, and that “all the sensors are built into the jet” and are all controlled by a central core processor, which means the pilot doesn’t need to manipulate them.
He explained that the cockpit displays promote an “evolved level of pilot interaction with the platform,” and that the HMI is “incredibly intuitive – It wasn’t long at all to go from the previous mindset, to looking at the displays and working with the picture to set up a work flow.”
RAAF Fighter Pilot Harper said the fusion is the “key enabler” for 5th gen.
He said because the sensors require little or no manipulation means it “frees up huge amount of brain space for the pilot.”
He said all the relevant information is presented in sync “not just your own aircraft, but with the entire formation.”
LtCol Berke described the fusion offered by 5th gen platforms as “an overwhelming advancement in breadth and depth in terms of the spectrum in which it operates.” He said it’s unlikely we fully understand what that breadth and depth will allow pilots to do yet due to the vast differences to the capabilities offered by legacy platforms.
“It’s not just a matter of being able to function in a wide array of information – if we can’t fight in a particular spectrum, whether it’s RF, IR, laser, EO, the F-35 has the ability with the agility on the platform to live in whatever spectrum it thinks it needs to be in…..”
The key messages from the seminar were that 5th gen is here to stay, that it will mean a whole new way of doing business for the RAAF, that the F-35 will require a number of key enabler capabilities in order to maximize its potential, and that it has the potential to make not just the RAAF but key elements of the whole ADF better.
RAAF Air Commander AVM Mel Hupfeld, representing CAF in the closing Q&A session, wondered whether enough thought had gone into the key enablers.
He said the RAAF was currently “trying to ask the right questions and then find the means of answering them.”
Attending as a delegate, the RAAF’s Director Air Combat Transition Office (DACTO), GPCAPT Phill Gordon offered that he thought the ADF’s “capability development process is particularly stove-piped along platform lines, so we’re trying to break down those barriers.”
To this end, he said the Chief of Air Force was currently writing an air combat capability intent “that will talk about how he wants the air combat force to work with everything else, and that will be a guiding document.”
In the Canadian defense magazine, Front Line Defence, there is a look at the evolution of exercises and training ranges base don’t the work of the Second Line of Defense team.
The core point underscored by the article is as follows:
It is clearly understood by the US and allied forces in the Pacific that collaborative efforts and effective joint forces do not happen by chance; you train to gain your tactical and strategic advantages.
And this training will occur on the Pacific ranges going from the Arctic to Australia.
The Russian actions in Ukraine have reminded Europe of the direct defense of Europe challenge. And part of Europe is clearly the Arctic and securing their Arctic interests during the Arctic opening.
And a key element of managing that opening is safety, security and defense, with the Russians as a key player, either in working the problem collectively or positioning for dominance.
The Ukraine events have gotten the attention of the Nordic states with regard to the second might be more important in the near and mid-term than the former. Indeed, discussions in Denmark have highlighted growing concern with how best to deal with both Baltic and Arctic security and defense.
We will publish interviews with some Danish experts on how to understand the challenges seen from the Nordics in the next few weeks.
Russia’s actions in Ukraine could cause problems for international cooperation in the Arctic, says Iceland’s prime minister. Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson said Russia’s strong-arm tactics in its former satellite could make it harder for the eight nations on the Arctic Council to reach agreements at a time when the region faces a series of critical issues.
“This has a ripple effect, even though the actual events are far from the Arctic,” said Gunnlaugsson, in Edmonton on a trade mission. “Clearly, it has made many players in the Arctic quite worried about developments and whether they might be a sign of what is to come.”
What the Ukrainian dynamics have underscored is the need for practical actions to bolster Baltic security and defense as well as that of the Arctic.
From the Nordic standpoint, one simply has to look at the map, to understand the relationship of Russia to both Baltic and Arctic concerns.
With regard to the Arctic, a key concern for Denmark clearly is the development of Greenland and the defense and security of the country as well.
What makes Greenland a tricky issue is that Denmark is responsible for security and defense, yet Greenland is quasi-independent, and clearly aspires to see development and the enrichment of what is essentially a poor country.
A small population, which lives in the perimeter of the country, largely occupies Greenland and yet the opening of the country to mining is bringing with it significant outside influence, which can clearly disrupt the security and defense situation for Greenland as well.
Certainly, one of the outside powers which concerns Denmark most is China, and its engagement in the opening of Greenland.
A recent conference held by the Centre for Military Affairs in Copenhagen focused on the Chinese challenge in the Arctic.
As one contributor to the conference put it:
In Greenland, big scale mining in need of foreign investments are not only seen as a possibility for obtaining economic growth and the maintenance of welfare systems in Greenland, but also as one of the few possibilities for obtaining a sustainable economy, which is a prerequisite for obtaining political independence that is the promise on the Self-Government Act adopted in 2009 by the Greenlandic and the Danish parliaments after a Greenlandic referendum in which about 75 percent of the voters voted yes.
This could, of course, cause alarm in Denmark, and raise questions concerning whether Denmark, eventually, will lose the current arrangement with Greenland as part of the Danish community of the realm – if Greenland decides for independence.
So, the issue of China’s Arctic aspiration in the Danish political debate is clearly intertwined with the issue of the future of the Danish-Greenlandic relationship.
But more broadly, there is the defense challenge, which is a Danish, NATO, and a US challenge.
Greenlanders live in the more temperate coastal areas; the rest of its two million sq km are covered in ice.
The US has had a presence in Greenland and took primary responsibility for the defense of Greenland throughout the Cold War. Yet the uncertainties of US policy, more generally and in the Arctic, as well as the dynamics of the Danish-Greenland relationship create an open-ended problem of how the security and defense of Greenland will be conducted in the period of the Arctic opening.
In an excellent overview to the challenge for the development and defense of Greenland, Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, the head of the Centre for Military Studies, provided a way to conceptualize the problem.
The problem really is about the development of Greenland, the role of the local government in that development, the relationship between Denmark and Greenland in combining greater autonomy for Greenland while providing for defense and security and what role the US will have in the overall process.
In other words, the challenge will be to sort out in PRACTICAL terms how Greenland will be defended in the presence of greater outside powers influence through the mining companies, the dynamics of change between Denmark and Greenland, and the uncertainty about US policies and capabilities for Greenland defense and Arctic operations.
And in such a situation certainly, the Russians will play a role with a significant possibility of driving wedges among the players. The sort of game they have played in Georgia and Ukraine or Syria for that matter would seem to fit a Russian opportunity in the High North.
According to Rasmussen:
The military remains a Danish responsibility after the 2009 self-rule legislation. The Danish military presence in the Arctic is of a different nature than the American one, however. The Danish military presence relates to the internal affairs of the territory rather than to the geopolitical position of Greenland.
The United States military is stationed in Greenland for purely geopolitical reasons, and the bulk of the US forces left when these concerns could be dealt with differently and at lower cost. The Danish military presence was and has remained primarily a naval presence. The Royal Danish Navy is also the national coast guard and naval operations in the Arctic were primarily coast guard operations like Search and Rescue (SAR) and fishing inspection.
Apart from this the air force operated a few platforms for logistics and surveillance and the army operate the SIRIUS PATROL – a ranger unit that patrols the Northern territories by sled. The increasingly independent-minded government in Nuuk has been making demands of the Danish military in ways, which would never have been done of the US military.
With prospect of more traffic in the territorial waters and the need to more inspections following from prospecting etc. the call from greater resources have been heard from the military40 and politicians in Greenland, like the Greenlandic MP Sara Olsvig who argued that an increased defence presence was needed because ‘the minerals – including radioactive material – must be secured’
‘Greenland is a part of the Kingdom which will play an important global role in the future,’ defence minister Nick Hækkerup noted in 2012. Minister Hækkerup added that he believed operations in the Arctic would be ‘one of the areas were we will use more money in years to come’.
Rasmussen added that:
A key interest of the United States in Greenland will be the stability that allows access and which prevents Greenland from being a problem in Canada-US relations. As Natalia Loukacheva notes, the most important security relationship between the Inuit in Nunavut and Greenland is not with Ottawa or Copenhagen but with Washington.
For Canada and Denmark the risk of decoupling is part of the geopolitics of the Arctic. Perhaps one reason why the State Department did not grant the ambassador his wish for an office in Nuuk was that the United States might be more interested in Greenland remaining a part of the Kingdom of Denmark, if Greenland independence would create problems within the Canadian federation, this would lead to demands for more independence to Nunavut. The fact that military forces in the Arctic have come from the outside has made it obvious for the Inuit to focus on human security concerns, the fact that military forces has been non-indigenous have reflected the fact that the areas have been governed from the outside and with a geopolitical importance that attracted foreign forces.
The ambition of independence puts these geopolitical questions on Greenland’s political agenda for the first time.
The geopolitics of Greenland dictates that Greenland can only be a sovereign, independent country by providing for stability and control over its own territory in a way that ensures the United States of access and that the access of potentially hostile powers can be confidently denied. This is an issue anyone arguing for the independence of Greenland from the Kingdom of Denmark will have to be able to address.
And in another Danish paper which considers the evolving Greenland agenda, Admiral Nils Wang, one of Denmark’s leading Arctic experts and head of the Royal Danish Defence College, argues along with one of his colleagues, that the quest for sovereignty by Greenland will occur in a tough period where pressure from the outside is going up dramatically.
As a result, Greenland might well consider working with Denmark closely on sorting out security and defense arrangements as the Arctic opening unfolds.
In the paper, Dr. Damien Degeorges and Rear Admiral Nils Wang argue the following:
Greenland achieved self-rule in 2009, just as the Arctic was starting to draw global attention. This was by no means the beginning of the state-building process, but an important step on a long journey towards increased sovereignty and independence.
The big challenge for Greenland is to achieve economic independence and become a respected sovereign actor in the international system, capable of standing up to other regional actors such as Norway, Canada, Russia and the United States. After nearly 300 years of economic and political dependency on Denmark, economic independence now seems to be achievable within a foreseeable future.
However, the growing international interest for the Arctic in general is compounding the challenges for Greenland’s small population and its plans to develop a robust state apparatus, with the necessary institutional volume.
In short, working the specifics of how the Greenland defense and security challenge is worked with Denmark, the Nordics, the United States and other Europeans is a key part of the future of Western defense and security.
It is not simply about an abstract Arctic security problem.
It is integral to the evolution of Europe and of NATO in the years ahead as wealth and influence shift North within Europe as a whole.
For my own presentation to the Centre for Military Studies on May 22, 2014 see the following:
