Looking Ahead: The Role of Autonomous Systems in Pacific Defense

01/08/2024

It is clear that autonomous systems can provide significant enhancements for current operating forces.

As Commodore Darron Kavanagh, Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, has noted: “we have shown through various autonomous warrior exercises, that we can already make important contributions to mission threads which combat commanders need to build out now and even more so going forward.”

Put another way, combatant commanders can conduct mission rehearsals with their forces and can identify gaps to be closed.

But the traditional acquisition approach is not optimized for closing such gaps at speed through the use of disruptive technologies. The deployment and development of autonomous systems are part of the response to the question of how gaps can be closed or narrowed rapidly and without expensive solution sets.

In an interview I did in 2023 with a senior Naval commander, he identified the “gaps” problem. “Rehearsal of operations sheds light on our gaps. if you are rehearsing, you are writing mission orders down to the trigger puller, and the trigger puller will get these orders and go, I don’t know what you want me to do. Where do you want me to be? Who am I supposed to check in with? What do you want me to kill when I get there? What are my left and right limits? Do I have target engagement authority?

“This then allows a better process of writing effective mission orders. so that we’re actually telling the joint force what we want them to do and who’s got the lead at a specific operational point. By such an approach, we are learning. We’re driving requirements from the people who are actually out there trying to execute the mission, as opposed to the war gamers who were sitting on the staff trying to figure out what the trigger pullers should do.”

But how to close the gaps?

One way to do so has been suggested by LtGen (retired) Rudder, the former MARFORPAC commander.

“Current Navy testing has demonstrated USV speed in excess of 100 knots. Also demonstrated is that they can be armed with combat proven loitering munitions.

“This lethal combination of speed and weapons portends the ability to out maneuver surface fleets and strike them at distance. What makes unmanned vessels and munitions lethal is that they can sustain speeds above 100 knots and deliver fires at distance. Like a fighter aircraft, speed is essential for survivability”

One pairing which has been tested and suggest a way ahead to “close a gap” for the operational forces was suggested by Rudder.

“As the Navy continues to experiment with USV technology, the teaming of the MARTAC T38 and the AeroVironment Switchblade series of loitering munitions is proving that speed and lethality for surface vessels cannot be stopped by even the most sophisticated fleet of combatants.

“We should not accept slow moving unmanned systems when technology exists to maneuver beyond the human capability.

“Imagine the ability for commanders to have a number of UAVs and USVs that can maneuver at speed and be integrated into the Carrier Strike Group or Surface Action Group scheme of maneuver. The concept of operations could entail 20-30 loyal wingman USVs sprinting ahead and to the flanks of the Carrier Battle Group.

“With a few simple AI algorithms, they could be directed towards enemy combatants 1000 miles away. Autonomously communicating with each other while closing from multiple directions at 100 knots, they could deliver the combat proven Switchblades and within minutes the swarm could impact key areas of the enemy combatants that includes radars, weapons stations, and the bridge area.

“The results as one would imagine is not the sinking of ship, but the immediate blinding of the fire control system of the ship such as air defense radars for HHQ-9 and launch systems for the YJ-18.

“If we apply the Switchblade capabilities to counter an amphibious landing scenario, small landing craft, air cushioned craft, and amphibious assault vehicles could be individually addressed with the low-cost switchblade at range.

“Think of the thwarted mechanized assault on Kyiv and its application to a slow vulnerable assault in the water. A land-based defense armed with Switchblade combined with armed USVs maneuvering from multiple directions would create a dilemma for landing force that is counting on fire strikes on fixed sites such airfields and ports.

“The land and maritime combination of distributed T38s armed with switchblades could launch from multiple hide sites and maneuver through escort ship defenses and deliver switchblades from front, rear, and the flanks. Assuming some of the landing force makes it ashore, land-based switchblade teams would create additional kill zones.”

These systems are expanding the thought process of future operations with designs that include the boats themselves as weapons armed with an explosive capabilities and further work for larger anti-ship and ASW weapons.

The Navy is at an inflection point with several gap closing technologies ready to be fielded. The unique design of MARTAC fast craft and the combat proven Switchblade are demonstrating that Naval warfare as we know it would change overnight.

“Closing the gaps” needs to become an acquisition capability, not a long-range goal. As Kavanagh underscored: “We need to deliver lethality at the speed of relevance. But if I go after the conventional solution, and I’m just replacing something, that’s actually not a good use of my very finite resources. We need to be answering the operational commanders request to fill a gap in capability, even if it is a 30% solution compared to no solution on offer from the traditional acquisition process.”

These are not technologies looked at in terms of a traditional acquisition process which requires them to go through a long period of development to form a platform which can procured with a long-life use expectancy.

CDRE Kavanagh simply pointed out that maritime autonomous systems are NOT technologies to be understood in this manner.

“We build our platforms in a classical waterfall approach where you design, develop and build a platform over twenty years to make them excellent. But their ability to adapt quickly is very limited. This is where software intensive systems such as maritime autonomous systems are a useful complement to the conventional platforms. Maritime autonomous systems are built around software first approaches and we are able to do rapid readjustments of the code in a combat situation.”

And the legacy acquisition approach is not well aligned with the evolution of warfare.

Not only is the focus changing to what distributed combat clusters can combine to do in terms of combat effects but the payload impacts at a point of relevance is also becoming of increased salience to warfighting approaches.

Featured Image:ARABIAN GULF (Oct. 23, 2023) A Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System launches munitions from a MARTAC T-38 Devil Ray unmanned surface vehicle, attached to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Task Force 59, during Exercise Digital Talon in the Arabian Gulf, Oct. 23. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command recently completed Exercise Digital Talon, demonstrating the ability of unmanned platforms to pair with traditionally crewed ships in “manned-unmanned teaming” to identify and target hostile forces at sea. Then, using munitions launched from another unmanned platform, engaged and destroyed those targets. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Justin Stumberg)

 

USMC Sunsets the Blackjack, 2022

An unmanned aircraft system, the RQ-21A “Blackjack,” assigned to Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 3, conducts its final flight, Landing Zone Westfield, Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 24, 2022.

U.S. Marines with VMU-3 conducted the RQ-21A “Blackjack” final flight to recognize its four years of support to INDOPACOM, as VMU-3 transitions to the MQ-9A “Reaper.”

05.24.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Cody Purcell

Marine Corps Base Hawaii

Sustaining Emergency Communications for Homeland Security

01/07/2024

By Richard Weitz

Threats to the U.S. homeland will remain elevated into 2024.

The Gaza War will likely inspire transnational terrorism, the Strategic Posture Commission highlights the expanding long-range missile arsenal of America’s adversaries, and further severe weather emergencies and cyber attacks against critical U.S. networks seem likely.

U.S. policy makers must take measures now to thwart such threats while enhancing the resiliency of U.S. public safety infrastructure to manage those homeland crises that nevertheless occur.

Ensuring access to crisis communications systems during all kinds of emergencies—from terrorist incidents to natural disasters—is essential for this latter process.

One safeguard is to sustain widespread low-cost access to federal, state, and local emergency communications systems such as the National Public Warning System and the Emergency Alert System. These networks enable emergency responders to disseminate alerts during even severe crises.

An admirable effort toward that end is the AM for Every Vehicle Act, which is supported by large bipartisan coalitions in both branches of Congress. In the Senate, the bill almost passed last month by unanimous consent, except Sen. Rand Paul mistakenly depicted AM Radio as essentially an optional entertainment device.

For decades, AM radio has proven its reliability and resiliency as a form of communication during a disaster. For these reasons, police officers, fire fighters, and medical personnel have long relied on AM radio to disseminate critical messages.

Every former administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the national agency responsible for assisting with large-scale disasters and managing the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System for authenticating emergency messages, from the last four presidential administrations supports the bill, as do current members of the Federal Communications Commission.

The AM for Every Vehicle Act would mandate that all new passenger motor vehicles (i.e., not motorcycles) include equipment to access AM broadcasts at no additional charge to consumers, preserving free over-the-air radio in cars even as subscription fees and other charges are creating a “digital divide” with some novel communication technologies.

The bill would apply the same requirement to imported as well as domestically produced automobiles so as not to disadvantage U.S. manufactures.

AM radio has long been the most widely used means for the local, state, territorial, and federal authorities to communicate with the public in times of emergency. It is particularly valuable for rural areas where broadband Internet and other communication resources may be less accessible.

Communicating messages across geographic and political boundaries is challenging. Each emergency responder entity in the United States determines the technical and functional requirements for its communications equipment. An advantage of AM radio is that it is already widely available.

Furthermore, its signals travel wide distances and can traverse mountains, buildings, forests, and other obstacles that can impede other direct line-of-sight media.

Another unique feature of the nation’s some 4,000 AM radio stations is that FEMA has arranged for them to broadcast emergency messages to one another, generating wide-area coverage and inherent redundancies against the loss of any single station.

Additionally, AM radio remains especially popular among some groups of listeners, such as Hispanic communities and older people who might shun smart phones and other novel technologies. In any case, the principle of simplicity of use is valuable for all emergency communications systems.

Much of the disarray in the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and other severe storms resulted from the toppling of communication towers and the limited availability of cars in flooded areas. FEMA has since taken steps to ensure that AM broadcasting stations have enhanced resiliency against common challenges such as loss of power or flooding.

During the recent fires in Maui, while the cell phones and sirens stopped working, the first responders could still use radios to disseminate life-saving information. Meanwhile, even when electric networks are down, automobiles can generate their own power for radios and other functions.

The AM for Every Vehicle Act would also authorize the Government Accountability Office to assess if alternative technologies could replicate the effectiveness and long distance of AM radio broadcasts for the purpose of communicating with the public in emergencies.

Existing emergency communications technologies should not be abandoned before superior systems are widely available and proven their effectiveness. Retaining existing networks while progressively incorporating new technologies is a prudent solution.

Given the threats we will face in 2024 and beyond, sustaining access to vital public safety technologies is critical for ensuring that communities remain safe and well-informed during crises.

Featured Image Credit: Photo 171226304 | Homeland Security © Artur Szczybylo | Dreamstime.com

The Fifth-Generation Air Combat Paradigm: From Re-Norming to Re-crafting Air Warfare Capabilities

01/05/2024

By Robbin Laird

When I first dealt with fifth generation aircraft, I focused on how the F-22 and a relatively expansive global enterprise of F-35s would re-norm airpower, or re-set the baseline for what would be expected from the fighter element of the air combat enterprise.

This was above all the question of how integrated sensors on the F-35 would enable both collaboration across the enterprise and the emergence and spread of a new sensor-shooter relationship in which the fighter’s role was not primarily first kill but location of targets for the multi-domain enterprise to deliver the kill.

Or in other words, the shift was from the fighter as the tip of the spear in a kill chain to becoming a key node in a multi-domain kill web.

I published an article in 2009 which laid out my perspective on the re-norming of 21st century air and military operations which anticipated what is now in front of us, namely the opportunity to leverage the global F-35 enterprise as we expand in the autonomous systems domain, add new weapons, and introduce the new bomber.

This is what I wrote:

“The man-machine attributes and computational capabilities of the F–35 provide a significant opportunity to evolve the robotic elements within airspace to provide for data storage, transmission, collection, weapon emplacement, and loitering strike elements, all of which can be directed by the manned aircraft as the centerpiece of a manned-robotic strike or situational awareness wolf pack.

“Rather than focusing on robotic vehicles as self-contained units with proprietary interfaces and ground stations, the F–35 can be useful in generating common linkages and solutions to combine into a core wolf pack capability.”

But rather than enjoying this significant change in the first decade of the 21st century, we are only now approaching the possibilities. Fighting the land wars and investing in those wars, atrophied the fifth-generation revolution but it is now being relaunched.

We have lost a lot of time and investments in strategic failures and we need to recover before the world of multi-polar authoritarianism changes the global rules to their advantage.

We are in a period where changes in autonomous capabilities, C2 and sensors can accelerate change in military operations and create a variety of ways to deliver a kill web force. But if we fail this time, no less than our liberties are at stake.

I spent more than a decade after my time working with Secretary Wynne and dealing with the launch of fifth generation aircraft to engaging in the standup of the F-35 global enterprise. My first book detailing my engagement was published in 2023 and entitled: My Fifth Generation Journey: 2004-2018.

Now I am focusing on the next phase of airpower evolution which I believe leverages the  fifth-generation paradigm but by expanding it significantly with the new elements empowering a kill web sensor-shooter distributed force.

To start this next phase, I thought it made the most sense to talk with the man who launched my initial work on fifth generation aircraft, Secretary Mike Wynne. I did so in a meeting and phone conference with him in December 2023.

I asked him what he considered the fifth-generation paradigm to consist of.

Secretary Wynne: “The fifth-generation concept really combines low observability, speed, and networking capability. We continue to push into low observability and networking capability. And we’ve expanded the networking and targeting enterprise thereby essentially introducing the kill web.”

He went back to the origin in his mind of the fifth-generation paradigm:

“The concept was born during NATO exercises during the 1980’s when USAF F-15s working the Dutch F-16s combined the long-range F 15 targeting radar system with the F-16 weapons range. In that war game we basically extended the targeting range for the F-16 and established a rudimentary kill web whereby we employed the F-15s as a targeting device and then the F-16s as a shooter device using information from the F-15.

“But every fighter pilot wanted to be his own weapon systems manager and the Dutch for that war game understood that the F-15 radar could see farther than they could, and therefore farther than the red forces as well. The F-15 could pass targets to them, and they could then employ it, in the absence of seeing the target, they remained unseen by red forces, and so they could employ the passed target to arm and fire their weapons. This was taking Beyond Visual Range to a new level, at the time.

“The paradigm can really then be characterized as better management of the air dominance that was available. And really a constructed innovation of a network enabled engagement whereby we can put the right capability to the best effect while minimizing detection. As well, that’s really increasing the probability for a successful mission.”

He noted that the F-22 was designed primarily as an air dominance fighter and became that element of the fifth-generation dyad, with the F-22 being the faster and larger plane flying at different attitudes from the F-35. But the F-22 unlike the F-35 was not designed primarily as a networked platform, as the concept of network was still aborning.

I noted that compared to when he was in the Pentagon, we simply did not anticipate the numbers of nations who would become F-35 air forces. We started with eight founding partners and now there are 17 nations in the F-35 program. And I think one major challenge is to leverage this opportunity.

Secretary Wynne: “The acceptance of the F-35 by multiple air forces creates an opportunity, but not a reality for introducing the concept of network warfare. This opportunity is not platform driven, and can as well combine different platforms in the war fighter world, but having similar configurations may allow faster force integration.

“In networked warfare, concepts of Identification of Friend and Foe (IFF) must be revamped, as having forces with the same weapons platform, or one that could be mimicked is worrisome.

“Our dominance and trust in cyber is growing still. In a desired engagement, where the engaged Blue forces have been integrated, having the information flow from lots of sensors to lots of weapons controllers will be a tremendous force multiplier.

“Knowing such an engagement could be in colleague with ground or naval integrated networks expands this multiplier, and may allow weapons to target matching, such that minimizing expendables lengthens by minutes or hours of available time on target.

“I used the terminology ‘every weapon a sensor, and some sensors a weapon’ to push for an integrated, and information-based war plan. Now, as we are seeing in Ukraine the span of war concepts is from before WW l to tomorrow, but with limited application of such a concept terminology.

“The flow of information to appropriate weapon systems is seen to be hampered by factors of command and connectivity. Soon, I can see every projectile a sensor to reduce needs for bomb damage assessment. We are entering a period where expending munitions can be a crucial logistics element in the fight.

“The global F-35 enterprise is an unparalleled partnership opportunity. It provides us with an opportunity for multi-domain integration from space to air to ground with the integration of at sea assets as well.

“But we have to work the challenges of protecting the network and preventing adversary entrance into the network to affect our behavior and capabilities. But we need to do this in any case for the entire force, not just the F-35 element.”

Wynne highlighted the importance which the F-35 can provide for time urgent battle damage assessment as they operate which furthers enhances the more effective use of the overall force’s available weapons. With sensors able to see battle damage as sensor rich platforms move into the battlespace, more effective weapons use is possible as we have seen with how the Ukrainians have used their drones in attacking and assessing Russian targets.

But to get the full use of an F-35 global enterprise and one which could lay an effective foundation for the autonomous, weapons and fighter enhancements which are on the way, it is necessary to attenuate the information sharing limitations of current security arrangements.

As Billie Flynn noted after attending the most recent international fighter conference:

“Flynn emphasized that the F-35 global enterprise was gaining momentum in ways that most European political leaders simply did not anticipate. But he saw a divide between the AUKUS three – the U.S., Australia, and the UK – and the rest of the F-35 global enterprise with regard to the kind of collaboration which the jet clearly empowers.”

Wynne returned to the evolution of warfare.

“The next decade is shockingly already here. Concerns for escalation in warfare has turned the engagement ethics back nearly to feudal times. The current survivor from modern warfare is information warfare that is employed thus far to weaken resolve on both sides of each fight.

“The use of drones as sensors and shooters also highlights the move to less expensive autonomous systems. We have also learned that information for shooters and defenders is key. As for altering the nature of warfare, it has highlighted that owning the skies is more important than ever, with the asymmetric approach to warfare cost coming from overhead.”

I asked him a final question: what would he be prioritizing now in terms of new systems?

Secretary Wynne: “Creating a network-based kill web will start with the OODA loop of long ago. Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. With each level of approval or review adding 10 minutes into the process. The broader the mission set, the more applicable the networked kill web is to success. Artificial intelligence can hasten, but might not eliminate the process. We as well are witnessing the schism in the ethics of warfare. Boundaries are both recognized and ignored purposefully.

“Applied to Air Combat, the mission set initially could be to dominate the air. With this mission set the next generation has clear guidance, and low visibility, speed and range will be key.

“Sensors will be pulling target sets from space and surrounding domains. The integration with the other domains could reduce the rate of weapons and cost expenditure, but not so much in the end game where maneuverability, and partnering may well set the mark.

“Applied this to the simpler mission of penetration and destroy becomes a different mission set which might follow quickly.  Integration in the air and space domain will then be valuable. Here, persistence will be key, and that means low visibility, range, payload, and safe refuel will become valuable elements.

“Our Air Forces as a coalition are prepared, but must be trained together on the kill web, and ready for a vicious fight. Sir Winston’s quote comes to mind. ‘Air Superiority is the ultimate expression of military power.’ Presently we might add Space and Cyber superiority as well, to make the full mission set.

“We are seeing a proliferation of weapon systems. By weapon systems, I mean the bullet, the shell, the rocket, and the bomb which can be delivered by a variety of weapons carriers. Notably in this regard are autonomous systems, which challenge one’s ability to control them to ensure that you are getting the effect which is desired. Swamping a target with swarming capabilities is fine as long as that it brings a desired outcome. Not so good if it doesn’t.

“My other concern is to ensure that we build an air combat system which delivers the promised air superiority. We should be investing significantly into figuring out what that mission success looks like in the evolving warfare environment.”

Credit Featured Image:  Photo 88649569 | Warfare © ibreakstock | Dreamstime.com

The PARADE Anti-Drone System and the Paris Olympic Games

01/04/2024

By Pierre Tran

Paris – A parliamentary report on counter-drone systems is due to appear this month, pointing up shortfalls in the military Parade program, critical for the 2024 Olympic Games in the French capital, senator Cédric Pérrin said Dec. 14, 2023.

“I take the view that our anti-drone campaign, particularly Parade, does not meet the requirements – we have some real holes in the racket,” he told the Association of Defense Journalists, a press club.

Senators Loic Hervé, Rashid Temal and Philippe Paul are working on the report, looking into the French capability for counter-unmanned aerial vehicles (C-UAV), particularly the Parade program in the light of the Olympic Games, said Perrin, chair of the senate armed forces, defense and foreign affairs committee.

The report will be published toward the end of January, he said, which was late, but with recommendations and just enough time for any alternative solutions.

The French capital will be host for the Olympic Games, July 26-August 11, and the authorities are determined to provide security for the sports fans from all over the world, with at least 600,000 spectators expected to attend the opening ceremony on the six-kilometer route along the banks of the Seine river.

Perrin, who called for the use of French rather than foreign kit, said he has been concerned about late delivery of Parade, which failed to be deployed at the Paris air show in the summer and the rugby world cup tournament in the autumn.

Concerns over Parade meeting technical requirements and its program delay led to the need to “sound the alarm,” he said.

Parade to the Olympics

“There is no doubt Parade will be operational and deployed” for the Olympic Games, said Tony Valin, director of the counter-drone unit at CS group, a joint prime contractor on the program.

The first six-strong batch of Parade has been delivered to the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) procurement office, he said, and certification was underway, with qualification due “by the end of the year.”

The program delay was due to difficulties in the supply chain, with late delivery of electronic components from subcontractors and the Covid lockdowns, he said. The program was large and the timing “exceptionally short.”

The DGA awarded the Parade contract in 2022 to CS group and Thales, which led a consortium of small and medium French companies including CerbAir, Exavision, and MC2 Technologies, and a Dutch 3-D radar supplier, Robin. The system draws on artificial intelligence, Valin said.

Parade will be deployed at the games, along with a similar, lighter CS counter-drone system, dubbed Radiant. The police force has ordered two Radiant systems for the world-class sports event.

Parade had European content, with some 90 percent French, while U.K. suppliers were excluded due to Brexit, Valin said. The program was restricted to “European” candidates, ruling out British companies, much as firms from the U.S., Israel and other nations outside the European Union were disallowed. The maximum value of the project was €350 million for a prospective order for 50 systems.

There is an order for a first batch of six Parade, with options for a further nine, bringing that to 15 in the 2024-2030 military budget law.

The total program value of €350 million was for 11 years, with the initial order worth €33 million, Thales said in statement April 29 2022.

“The first Parade systems will be delivered to the DGA in less than a year from launch of the program,” the company said.

Meanwhile, Perrin said there have been several counter-drone exercises over the year, which have not shown satisfactory performance, and the system was only “working partially.”

The senator has asked questions in parliament and has latterly talked to the press, in a bid to alert the authorities.

Thales and CS had invited Perrin to see the Parade deployed– but not operated – in the Stade de France stadium, in the northern suburbs of the capital, but conflict of planning meant the senator had not been able to see the system, Valin said.

Parade is designed for deployment, intended to detect, identify, and neutralize mini and micro drones in a safe way. Protection of large crowds at public events and infrastructure are key parts of the mission.

The detection and classification elements of Parade consist of a radar with an “instrumented range” of five km and 360° coverage, a system for picking up radio frequencies directing drones, and an electro-optical camera for visual identification.

The aim is to detect and distinguish between a bird or a drone, ranging between 100gm-25kg, and send a jamming signal, including GPS, to divert or force the UAV to land.

At the heart of the system is the CS group’s Boreade command and control system, which works for the Parade and Radiant counter-UAV systems.

The delay on Parade has raised questions in parliament.

“We have a three-month delay due to problems of supply and industrial qualification of subsystems,” Emmanuel Chiva, the DGA head, told parliamentarians in early May, in response to Perrin’s question, FOB website reported June 9.

France has seen the number of drones rise to 2.5 million in 2021 from 400,000 in 2017, Agence France-Presse reported.

Elsewhere in the counter-UAV market, DroneShield, an Australian-U.S. company, said in a Dec. 19 statement it had launched DroneSentry-C2 Tactical (DroneSentry-C2T), a rugged, tablet-based version of its command and control system for counter-UAV, DroneSentry-C2.

If proof were needed that the Paris Olympic Games is drawing wider interest, there is the latest novel from British writer Stephen Clarke – Merde at the Paris Olympics – a humorous tale of a French group seeking to get the quintessential French sport pétanque – bowling – on the list of Olympic games.

MQW-9 Comes to Camp Pendleton

01/03/2024

A U.S. Air Force MQ-9 Reaper, assigned to the 432nd Wing/432nd Air Expeditionary Wing lands on Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California, August 22, 2023.

The landing of this particular MQ-9, a remotely piloted aircraft, marks the first time that an Air Force MQ-9 has landed on the Marine Corps base.

08.22.2023

Video by Senior Airman Ariel OShea

432nd Wing Public Affairs

The U.S. Strategy “Deficit”: The Dominance of Political Messaging

01/01/2024

This article was first published on April 26, 2012 about the Obama Administration. We leave it to our readers to ascertain whether we are in a better position currently.

By Richard Weitz

The second keynote speaker at the 2012 U.S. Army War College annual strategy conference, James Locher, former President of the Project for National Security Reform and a former senior U.S. government official in multiple U.S. administrations, sounded the alarm about the U.S. strategy deficit and urged the audience and other national security elites to make fixing the problem an urgent priority.

Entitling his presentation, “Are We Strategically Inept,” Locher offered considerable evidence to support the assertion that the United States does not have a genuine national security strategy and may not have had a real grand strategy since the Cold War.

Locher defines a grand strategy as the art and science of employing all instruments of national power and influence — not just military tools — to accomplish national objectives.

Citing the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq to illustrate how poor strategic thinking has seriously harmed U.S. national security in the past. Locher considered this problem especially dangerous given the complexity of contemporary U.S. security challenges and the diminished U.S financial position.  These two elements make it imperative  to make the best use of resources to achieve U.S. national security goals.

Although he recognized that certain needed reforms might initially require some additional funding, Locher considered such well-targeted spending an essential investment.

He recounted how Richard Rumelt describes four elements of a bad strategy in his book Good Strategy/Bad Strategy: fluffy language concealing the absence of genuine strategic concepts, the failure to specify key challenges, stating goals without describing how they will be achieved, and listing impractical or unimportant strategic objectives.

Rather than thinking about the global strategic game, and certainly not thinking about the means necessary to play on the board, today’s processes emphasize messaging, not strategy. Credit Image: Bigstock

Rumelt, Locher, and others have found these problems in the published postwar U.S. National Security Strategies as well as in other core U.S. national security documents.

In Locher’s view, the various versions of the “National Security strategy of the United States” simply provide a lengthy list of U.S. goals and objectives without describing actual plans to achieve them, clear priorities, or how to resolve hard choices — there is no indication of what the United States will not do or of a comprehensive road map for how the country will achieve its stated goals.

Not only does the 2010 National Security Strategy read more like a strategic communications document than a genuine strategy, but it was actually written by the Strategic Communications Directorate of the National Security Staff rather than the NSC Strategy Directorate.

It therefore articulates political messages without explaining how to achieve the stated objectives.

Furthermore, the 2010 document speaks of “strengthening national capacity through a whole-of-government approach” and commits the Administration to pursue twelve major goals for transforming the U.S. national security system to better meet 21st-century challenges.

In Locher’s view, the Administration has not implemented any of these ideas.

Congress has now had to intervene to mandate that the President produce within nine months an implementation plan for achieving this whole-of-government vision. Although he praised this step, Locher cautioned that the Congress is generally not well structured to address these strategy problems.

Its committee system ensures that the separate U.S. government departments and agencies have champions, but does not provide a committee that oversees and supports interagency bodies and activities. This condition contributes to departmental stovepiping.

It also means that neither the executive nor the legislative branch is currently organized to support inter-agency activities—in the space between the president and the departments—adequately.

According to Locher, when General Jim Jones became National Security Advisor in 2009, he intended to make the National Security Council and its staff “strategic” so that they would advance the Administration’s priorities by shaping events rather than reacting to them. But when he left office, Jones acknowledged that the National Security Staff remained more in this tactical rather than strategic mode.

Ambassador Mary Yates, appointed to head the Strategy Directorate, found that she could not interest senior directors to discuss strategy in their areas of responsibility.

Locher cited as other evidence of inept U.S. national security strategy the fact that the President does not offer strategic guidance. Unlike the Pentagon, where there is a Defense Planning Guidance to direct resource allocation, the President does not formally communicate desired national outcomes and mission priorities to departments and agencies.

In addition, the U.S, Government does not have a Quadrennial National Security Review to inform the departmental quadrennial reviews.

Furthermore, Locher explained how resource decisions are not aligned with strategic ones. The U.S. Government lacks an integrated national security budget.

Instead, it only has a collection of agency budgets. The leaders of the Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) acknowledge that they are operating in a strategic vacuum, with the absence of presidential guidance regarding national priorities and few formal connections with the National Security Staff.

Locher also complained that U.S. strategic thinking is myopic.

The National Security Staff is driven by its inbox and cannot find time to think long term or make use of foresight to anticipate developments.

In addition, the U.S. national security system does not have a rigorous process for executing strategy. This process normally involves several steps such as translating a strategy into operational terms, aligning organization to strategy, and linking strategy to the budget process.

Locher then identified several obstacles to better U.S. national security strategy making.

First, senior U.S. national security leaders are not interested in strategy.

Not only do they fail to drive the system to produce strategy,but they do not protect the time of the National Security Staff to formulate strategy. Instead, they frequently direct the Staff to engage in immediate problem solving.

General Jones cited excessive White House demands for immediate responses to the 24/7 news cycle as one reason his shop was unable to develop long-range strategy.

Second, independent of White House preferences, the organizational culture of the National Security Staff has moved away from strategic thinking.

Thanks to the immediacy of information technology and the demands of the 24-hour news cycle, the “tyranny of the inbox” has reached epic proportions at the National Security Staff.

Third, the United States does not identify and develop individuals, either civilian or military personnel, with the skills and insights to be capable strategies.

Individuals have little incentive to develop their strategic skills given the low priority with which they are valued across the government.

Fourth, the National Security Staff focuses mostly on policy making rather than strategy making, resourcing, planning, and assessment.

Pockets of excellent strategy work exist; such as in the Pentagon, but these fragmented and unmanaged processes reside in departmental stovepipes that do not have a “whole-of-government” perspective.

Blowing in the wind is an outcome, not a strategy. Credit Image: Bigstock

As a result, there is no comprehensive interagency process for strategy. In addition, the ten strategy documents mandated by Congress, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, are disjointed internally and from one another because they are not arranged according to a logical end-to-end set of processes.

Fifth, the National Security Staff lacks the capacity (include the personnel) to support strategic planning and anticipatory government. Its strategy office remains especially understaffed and distracted by immediate policy concerns.

Locher feared that, even if the United States had a grand strategy today, we could not employ it because of flawed U.S. government structures and processes.

Acknowledging that these problems will take considerable time to overcome, he offered the following recommendations, many drawn from the experience of private sector managers, for reducing them:

Focus the National Security Staff on grand strategy, high policy, and strategic management by decentralizing issue management to subordinate interagency organizations, where more expertise and time are available.

Make maintaining a highly capable and robust strategy directorate within the NSC a higher priority.

Require that one quarter of the personnel seconded from departments and agencies to the National Security Staff be highly qualified strategists; each National Security Staff directorate should have at least one qualified strategist, while the Staff should complete a short course in strategy, foresight, and anticipatory governance.

Create a Center for Strategic Assessment and Analysis in the Executive Office of the President to ensure that the NSC focus sufficient attention on anticipating and preparing for the future; its three primary roles would be to continually scan the horizon; assess relationships among political, social, technological, economic, and  security situations; and evaluate the possible future ramifications of various policy alternatives.

Design and employ well-articulated, end-to-end processes, including strategy making, for the entire U.S. national security system rather than just by department or agency by:

Institute a Quadrennial National Security Review at the beginning of an administration and require all department and agency quadrennial reviews to be synchronized with the National Review.

Require the President to issue annual National Security Planning Guidance to all national security departments and agencies.

Produce an integrated national security budget aligned with the objectives of the National Security Review and National Security Planning Guidance.

Locher cited examples from both private businesses (e.g., the creation of horizontal teams) and certain U.S. national security successes (improved U.S. counterinsurgency tactics in Iraq) to demonstrate how these reforms could achieve superior results.

VMFA-211 Operates on USS Tripoli

12/29/2023

F-35B Lightning II aircraft attached to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211 conduct flight operations on the flight deck aboard amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA 7), April 2. VMFA-211 is embarked aboard Tripoli as part of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Lightning carrier concept demonstration.

The Lightning carrier concept demonstration shows Tripoli and other amphibious assault ships are capable of operating as dedicated fixed-wing strike platforms when needed, capable of bringing fifth generation Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing aircraft wherever they are required.

04.02.2022

Video by Petty Officer 1st Class Peter Burghart

USS Tripoli (LHA 7)