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2014-04-04 Second Line of Defense recently visited Australia and talked with a number of Australian military and scientists about the evolving approach to shaping capabilities for the defense of Australia and the emergence of a new allied approach to Pacific defense.
The new tanker and Wedgetail are certainly part of the effort, as well as the coming of the F-35 to Australia as part of a broader F-35 Pacific fleet, both US and allied. But a less visible element is hypersonics and the potential for the weapons revolution.
As we know from our time with Dr. Mark Lewis, the longest-serving Chief Scientist in Air Force history and now head of IDA’s Science and Technology Policy Institute, which supports the White House Office of Science & Technology Policy and the National Science Foundation, that hypersonics will be a game changer.
A hypersonic rocket launches skyward during a March 22, 2010 test launch from the Woomera Test Range in Australia. The fight was part of the joint U.S.-Australian HiRise project to test and develop hypersonic vehicles for future aircraft transportation. Credit: Australia Defense Science and Technology Organisation
Modern warfare is about doing things quickly. It’s about achieving fast effects, getting results quickly. If you want to affect something quickly, I can think of basically three options.
The first option is that you have ubiquitous presence. That means you’ve got an asset anywhere you need it. That asset might be unmanned, and frankly, that’s a lot of what remotely piloted aircraft are enabling for us – having small assets available and re-locatable at a moment’s notice. Of course, ubiquitous presence is only good in a limited area; we obviously can’t have ubiquitous presence at every location around the globe, but that’s one part of the solution that is already changing warfare.
The second option for doing things quickly is to operate at the speed of light. For my aerodynamics friends, the speed of light is about a million times faster than the speed of sound. Operating at light speed means using directed energy systems and/or cyber systems, which are among the other things that Mr. Wynne championed when he was Secretary of the Air Force. And of course, there’s a lot of development underway right now in directed energy systems, and lots of corresponding questions about how we ultimately would deploy them, as well as how we would ultimately use cyber systems.
If you don’t have the first two available, or if they cannot deliver the desired result, a third option is that you get to where you want to go as fast as you possibly can. That’s the advantage of hypersonics. This could be to perform reconnaissance of some sort, do some sensing, or to deliver weapons on a target. In order to do that, we need to master the technology required to fly at hypersonic speeds.
Hypersonics would also give us a degree of invulnerability. We know that the application of stealth technologies has been a tremendous game-changer, but that stealth advantage won’t last forever. I would argue that the next step beyond stealth is speed.
With the emergence of the second nuclear age, and competitors shaping extended reach for their missiles in their forces in the Pacific, even a continent “down under” is part of the 21t century defense challenge. Clearly, some Aussies get this, and see hypersonics as part of that challenge and an opportunity as well.
The recent Chinese tests reminded folks that this is a highly competitive world, and a dedicated effort to roll out hypersonic capabilities (with Russia, India, China and the US clearly in the mix) will be part of the future of warfare, whether one wants it or not.
Australia has a small but cutting edge team of hypersonic researchers, and with the test ranges to play out the evolving technologies, and with significant global working relationships, Australia is at the cutting edge of hypersonic research.
Research can clearly yield possible capabilities for space as well, with an ability to launch rapidly ISR and C2 capabilities for Australia and as part of the effort to overcome the tyranny of distance to deal with longer range threats and challenges as well.
SLD had a chance to sit down with a team of Australian hypersonics researchers to discuss the Aussie hypersonic effort and its progress.
The effort was discussed with Dr. Allan Paull and members of the hypersonics team close to Brisbane. Dr. Paull made it clear that the team was small but effective.
“We combine the skills of several disciplines but each member of the team takes ownership of the entire effort and provides inputs to each and every aspect of the enterprise. We are not organized around a model of deep pocket experts who stay within the confines of their specialty; we interact across the enterprise to push the research effort forward.”
Dr. Paull emphasized that the hypersonic effort required progress in several technologies at the same time, materials, propulsion, computation, etc.
Visiting the workroom of the DSTO where two hypersonic vehicles are being worked on certainly reinforced the point that several moving parts are being worked toward the next hypersonic test point.
The key takeaway from the discussion with Dr. Paull was rather straightforward:
“By 2015 we will have finished our current round of tests, and by that time there is little question but that the basic scamjet technology works and can be leveraged moving forward.”
Australia has worked with the USAF in building out a HiFire set of test vehicles.
The objectives of the program are two fold:
To develop the science and technology for hypersonic flight with air breathing propulsion;
Complete a horizontal flight of a scramjet-powered vehicle for a duration of 30 seconds.
An interesting aspect of the Aussie effort has been to build an engine, which can reach hypersonic speeds but fits into the center of a vehicle.
The team is working a number of innovations to achieve this result. Such an engine if proven out would be a major step forward in making practical use of scamjet technology.
The HiFire uses a high angle of attack profile as well which adds a potential of maneuverability to speed.
Much has been achieved by Australia working with its partners in hypersonic research in less than a decade. But the importance of this effort, and the need to be on the cutting edge is clear.
For an overview on hypersonic research in Australia which summed up progress towards the end of the last decade and published by NATO see the following:
2014-03-31 Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary, United States Air Force
The Crimean crisis and the PRC pushing out in the Pacific are two reminders that the world is not of our own making.
The defense of Europe and Pacific defense require capabilities to deter and prevail, where global reach and dominance is a sine qua non of playing the game.
The Air Force of today has been shaped to reflect the requirement for more efficient conduct of the wars of the past decade, and not the next. Rather than looking at Putin’s actions as that of a romantic ideologue of the 19th century, they are part of the reality of the 21st century.
Though we all quest for the congenial society of the “global commons” which interestingly remains the quest of our State department, others are muscling in on either territory or territorial waters desiring to restore empires of old or simply rewriting the map to their advantage. They are trying to shape a “global commons” to their advantage; not simply sending representatives to the UN to debate the subject.
The heritage of the USAF has not been to be in a holding pattern while others remake the map. The tradition has been to hold hostage any geographic location in the world to protect US interests.
This was the mantra of General Curtis Lemay as he formed Strategic Air Command with its rigid rule set; and later of President Ronald Reagan as he realized that weakness was what led to war, while strength underwrote deterrence.
As a nation we realized that this notion could lead to our providing an umbrella for growth around the world; and under that umbrella; Governments and Treaty Councils would become more interested in growing their economies then growing their defenses. This was built on the ability of the US to demonstrate leadership within which global military reach was a reality, not an aspiration.
The Challenge
The United States, for now, seems to have temporarily forgotten the history of the rise and fall of Nations.
Trips to the Mayan Villages or the Roman Ruins show that ferocity beats acquiescence in hoping for a better future.
It would appear that in the midst of the current administration’s desire to be liked around the world, it is finding that weakness is either tolerated or taken advantage. Likes and dislikes factor into geo-politics as part of alliance structures, but for the US to lead those alliances it needs to reinforce its support with effective military global reach.
A U.S. Air Force F-15C Eagle aircraft is prepared for a training mission at Siauliai Air Base, Lithuania, March 10, 2014. The 48th Fighter Wing at Royal Air Force Lakenheath, England, sent six aircraft and more than 50 personnel to augment the four aircraft and approximately 150 airmen supporting the NATO Baltic air policing mission. The U.S. Air Force assumed command of the NATO Baltic air policing mission for a four-month rotation from January to May of 2014. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Dana J. Butler/Released)
First Georgia and now Crimea reminds us that the defense of Europe is not a done deal, but a continuing effort. And if we are pivoting to the Pacific and part of the alliance structure to defend Europe, global reach by definition is crucial, not simply parking regional capabilities for wars against relatively backward militaries.
No matter what happens on the global stage, some have difficulty recognizing the reality of a brutal world.
We hear the echoes as Secretary of State Kerry calls Global Warming our greatest enemy; and President Obama chides the Russian Government for not measuring up to his projected standards of appropriate conduct. As The Washington Post put it, Putin apparently missed the memo on how his actions were simply so 19th century.
The question is clearly on the table for the Baltics and Poland: how will the US and European nations actually move to defend them rapidly if necessary?
In fact, shaping an exercise program to do so would make more sense than the US subsidizing the Russian energy czars by giving Ukraine extra money to pay for the increased price of Russian imported natural gas.
Air Force Modernization to Enhance Global Reach
The Chief of Staff of the USAF is seeing his modernization plan, one held on abeyance to pay in part for the Afghan war, a war we are now exiting or being tossed out, facing significant difficulties in getting either budgets or strategic attention.
Strategic attention is in short supply in today’s Washington.
The debates focus more on insider positioning than on dealing with the intrusions of global reality. It is not about playing on the chess board with pawns and no Queens.
General Welsh has called for a new strategic plan, the first in nine years, and asked that the theme be ‘Strategic Agility’.
Being one of the co-authors of the previous plan, I would suggest he focus on the ‘existential defense’ and global reach as the key themes underwriting the strategic necessity of his new strategic plan.
Having an Air Force which can operate globally and hold key adversaries at risk is not a nice to have luxury but a key underpinning of ensuring that the global commons which operates is one which meets the US and its allies interests, and not those to the adversary’s of our way of life.
As one CNO extolled; America needs to build a force prepared for the existential fight; and all other wars are therefore a lesser-included case. This concept has been left fallow; as we concluded that the existential case was far too low probability to fund; and the weapons for the lesser-included wars far less expensive.
For the Air Force; this meant King Air’s as platforms; and for other services rules of engagement that promoted a fair fight; and led to placing our warriors in legal limbo for decisions made under fire.
Is this the way we want to fight the existential fight?
Current events would argue for refocusing our attention on what are proper ways to modernize the military. In part it is about money; in part it is about the priorities within which money is to be spent. It is also about the opportunity to leverage what our allies are investing in and how to cross our modernization strategies with theirs.
It is not just about money, but it is about focusing on effective outcomes to force modernization.
A hypersonic rocket launches skyward during a March 22, 2010 test launch from the Woomera Test Range in Australia. The fight was part of the joint U.S.-Australian HiRise project to test and develop hypersonic vehicles for future aircraft transportation. Credit: Australia Defense Science and Technology Organisation
We have written previously about the ‘Offensive Enterprise’ and the ‘Defensive Enterprise’; we historically separated offense and defense whereby Batteries of Nike Missiles and F-106 Air Defenders served simply the defensive enterprise.
But America’s strength lies in the ‘Offensive Enterprise’ where we put our forces at risk; but the world understood the effectiveness of reprisals.
With the conjunction of the fifth generation revolution with new missile defense sensors and shooters a new approach is possible.
But first we must start with where we are. This is a position of structural weakness: in which leading from behind is confused with global leadership.
We are in a situation where the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs says he doesn’t want to put our Airman, Navy in this case, at risk; and demurs on providing a Syrian ‘No Fly Zone’ but days later the Israelis show this as weakness in Command as they fly in and destroy a questionable weapons depot.
We had capability but didn’t want to use it. This might be seen as a difference between existential; and choice. It certainly was by many of our allies; causing the Administration to rush to the podiums with support for treaty allies; and force allocation decisions that are still being realized; but continues to leave some with questions of intent.
Now the President asks NATO to beef up its defenses; and stand with America. What does that mean in the absence of a clear strategic plan and commitment to funding that plan?
Ending wars is one thing; failing to prepare for the ones already hitting you in the face is another.
This is not about the future, it is about the reality of the present being recognized as an attempt by adversaries to shape the future.
In this continuing saga; the budget shrinks the Navy; collapses the Army; and now has fostered a description of ‘Pipe Dreaming’ by the principal Airman.
What are we missing when assembling a deterrent force for an existential opponent; or for the next war not of our choice?
We can take some guidance from our constitution, which has in the preamble ‘We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.’
Given this charge, we need to alert our Congress, as did General George Washington, of the need to fund properly the requirements; and get on with the business of defense. It would appear that Gen Welsh; in declaring the current defense plan a ‘Pipe Dream’ is doing his best to alert the present day Congress of this outcome.
While he is sounding the alarm, his investment decisions are becoming evident in what funding he has asked for. Though recognizing that the out years are swelling beyond what might be allowed, he is also following some internal dictums.
A KC-135 Stratotanker from Altus Air Force Base, Okla., refuels a B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber from Whiteman AFB, Mo., during a refueling training mission, Aug. 29, 2012. 9th Air Mobility Wing, 8/29/12
These are steering the Air Force structure away from non-stealthy platforms and towards straightforward air dominant platforms shaped by a global force of fifth generation aircraft. He has asked for investment funds for the sixth generation air dominance platform; and is turning more and more into disciplinary constructs that while tolerant of social needs recognize that attention to duty is a primary requirement for service in a fighting force.
Gen. Welsh has stipulated his top three investments for the future in the Air Domain as the F-35, the Long Range Strike Platform and the Range extending Tanker. There are undoubtedly corollaries in the Space and Cyber Domain; but these have been expressed often.
We could add a fourth: new weapons for the air fleet; both Offensive and Defensive.. Hypersonics appears to be a crucial and breakthrough technology, which can reshape the impact of weapons, but we are flying a fifth generation aircraft with third and fourth generation weapons. And this is not about simply US investment dollars.
We can get to a weapons revolution by leveraging the global enterprise of the F-35 and our allies building new weapons for the global fleet as well as leveraging allied investments as well. For example, our working relationship with Australia allows us to accelerate our joint hypersonics research both more cost effectively and in terms of capability as well.
Though it is hard to surprise your competitors in this period of sharp and intrusive cyber attacks, our Airmen have always surprised with their training competence; and so also in the future war, as our coalition members learn about the intrinsic value of the F-35 beyond its value as a Fighter and understand through exercises and realities its value as a Battle Management Platform.
Without a doubt, as we embrace the concept of coalition warfare, we have built and are distributing an interoperable Battle Management platform that connects available shooters with available targets; and with intense training will surprise even our own leadership.
In a response to pressure, Gen. Welsh interrupted the Air Force ‘Top Gun’ program, stranding many and concerning allies. This has been restarted, and the hope is, the time was used in the best way to learn the new systems are not the old systems.
Setting in Motion Additional Innovations
As Churchill said plaintively; ‘Now that we are out of money, it is time to think.’
Clearly, we need as well to think about a more effective acquisition process to take advantage of where we are; and yet allow for full integration of the ‘call to the future’.
In the 1950’s there was a similar alarm rung; and the response was the century series airplanes, evolving in design over a period of years and yet forming the backbone of our fighting forces.
This type of concept has been gifted to the Air Force by an attentive Congress with the preservation of the F-22 tooling which could form the underpinning of the 21st century series.
To accelerate the notion of the sixth generation; let’s shape an approach which leverages what we have as we shape new capabilities.
The ADVENT engine is a joint project of GE and the U.S. Air Force.
As we build out the F-35 global fleet, we could start complementing that fleet with a sixth generation derived from the F-22; perhaps an F-24. This process could start with a short solicitation for interest by competent parties for the derivative of the F-22 fighter, promising two successful winners. Let’s presume for the moment that the two successful bidders were in fact the Phantom Works and the Skunk Works; not to eliminate; but to presume. With that, let’s give to each an aging F-22; and ask that they formulate concepts for a follow-on air dominant fighter while maximizing the use of the presented airframe and attendant tooling.
This would be similar to the JAST in the 90’s; but more similar to the ping pong designs from the century series. In a previous article, I underscored several available improvements for the air fleet.
Research has not stopped on the avionics package, nor on the propulsion system, nor on the target acquisition systems; and from various suppliers. The integration of a range extending fuel tank is also in the works. Concepts of new weapons are easily transferred.
In a period of not more than three years; and for a fixed sum provided to each; let’s fly off the result.
The Long Range Strike System is already in the process but in a similar fashion could and should be accelerated. There is a strong desire to structure things to avoid budget clog; but the degree of difficulty of these planned platforms will balance themselves. Right now our allies want every F-35 that that our forces can’t afford. Funny how having a competitor close by focuses the mind and the budget. We will have more training possibilities with allies than we can attend.
That said, lets not forget to train while we deter.
A key advantage which can be drawn from the threat from North Korea is to revamp our airpower approach.
We can put the Fifth Gen F-22 and F-35 on the Korean Peninsula, withdrawing our vulnerable fourth generation aircraft, and train with our allies while they roll out of their fourth generation aircraft. With this force in place and training together–train as you fight is not an issue. The template for re-shaping global reach with an allied enabled F-35 fleet will be shaped in the next decade, and we need to shape additive capabilities as we build out a modernized USAF.
And this is not just about the USAF and its acquisitions.
It is about leveraging those of our allies as well.
Four F/A-18A Hornets from No. 3 Squadron (SQN) perform a mock air to air refuelling pass with a No. 33 SQN KC-30A Multi Role Tanker Transport aircraft. This flight demonstration was performed during the Centenary of Military Aviation Air Show at RAAF Williams – Point Cook, (held in early March 2014) commemorating 100 years of military aviation in Australia. Credit: RAAF
A key case in point is the new tanker built by Airbus. There are seven nations that have ordered the MRTT from Airbus; and there are more in the pipeline. Because it was designed to American standards, and was a semifinal winner; it can refuel all comers. When the KC-46 becomes fully operational, these will interchange nicely in all engagements. When one talks of Global Reach and Power, tankers are clearly a key enabler. Accelerating the KC-46 is one thought; but what might be quicker is to interoperate with all the allies; some of who are already adding multirole to the tanking mission.
Some in Congress are waking up to the incongruity of ‘Lead from Behind’ and the geopolitical actions that are resulting.
Let’s plan a defense strategy that gives future administrations solid options.
Better to have respect; and then be liked by adversaries which have map rewriting agendas in the heads, in their strategic planning and supported by reshaping their militaries to execute the map re-writing mission.
For the Air Force, the new strategy might be a watershed opportunity to truly pay attention to the purpose of the Air Force. For in its essence the ‘Strategic Agility’ best be prepared for all contingencies; not efficiently; but effectively.
Whether ‘Vigilance; Reach; or Power’ these systems are first deterrence; and when deterrence fails; they better be there to win and win in a most unfair way. This underscores the mission of the Air Force.
Yes we want the Air Force to be ready to support a lesser-included war fighting case as well as humanitarian actions, but not at the prior assessed price of failing to deter and defeat in a war ‘not of our choice’.
The World America Built by Robert Kagan became one of the most talked about political books of the year 2011; influencing Barack Obama’s 2012 State of the Union address and shaping the thought of both the Obama and Romney presidential campaigns.
A response to those who anticipate—or even long for—a post-American world order by showing what a decline in America’s influence would truly mean for the United States and the rest of the world.
As we are now learning how fast the decay can set in, and rapidly assess what America needs to restore. The Air Force can serve in the lead role for all the services as the aggregate Defense strategy turns to the future and ensures that the United States is not operating in a global commons redesigned by nations committed to extending so called 19th century visions into the 21st.
2014-03-30 During the visit of the Second Line of Defense team to New River on February 10, 2014, we had a chance to sit down with Lt. Col. Boniface to discuss his most recent experience as the ACE Commander of the 26th MEU, which has just returned from the Middle East.
Lt. Col. Boniface is no stranger to readers of Second Line of Defense, and he has provided us with insights with regard to the evolution of the ACE over the past few years.
A key focus of discussions with Boniface in the past and in the current one are the changes, which the evolution of the ACE has introduced to the ARG-MEU.
A major theme has been with regard to shifting a helo centric ARG-MEU thinking in terms of a 200 mile box of operations to one transformed by the Osprey into operating over a 1000 miles.
This has led to the deployment of three ship formations no longer within a 200-mile area but over more than a 1000-mile area. This leads in turn to a major challenge of re-supplying the ARG-MEU. And the problem seen here is being replicated by the USMC need to pursue a distributed laydown strategy in the Pacific.
Sustainability over distance is a key challenge as the geography covered expands and the ACE assets can operate over those greater distances as well.
Marines and Sailors assigned to Maritime Raid Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), embark from the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), at sea, on MV-22B Ospreys assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 266 (Reinforced), for a simulated night raid, Feb. 09, 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Kyle N. Runnels/Released)
Lt. Col. Boniface highlighted two key challenges.
The first is simply the challenge to the Military Sealift Command to support a disbursed ARG-MEU.
The second is having a responsive and effective parts availability pool to support the deployed but dispersed ARG-MEU. This is an especially important challenge for the Osprey because of relatively limited locations within which parts are available to be flown or delivered to the ARG-MEU on deployment.
Put another way, the deployment of the ARG-MEU is not constrained by Osprey operations, but the effectiveness of the logistics or sustainment operations.The carriers get supplied every week; the ARG-MEUs only every 10-14 days. This disparity no longer makes sense given the reality of ARG-MEU operations under the influence of the Osprey.
In effect, there is a tactical limitation posed by sustainment, which can have strategic consequences.
An additional challenge is the load being placed on the USMC Ospreys by resupply to the Navy ships.
About 20 percent of my flight hours on the MEU were used to help the ARG-MEU to do resupply.
We need to get into a different way of thinking to release the Ospreys from this mission.
We need to think through a different rhythm or approach to sustainment from the at sea replenishment system.
SLD: “You were talking about the CV versus the MEU. The MEU historically has been really defined by the box that you described. It’s a helo-defined box, more or less. And, and so as the Osprey now you can operate at a much wider circumference and is much more useful to the joint force with the special purpose MAGTF people are interested from the joint force and the Navy itself is looking at Ospreys for resupplying. What that tends to mean is that your hermetically sealed Gator Navy makes no sense.Lt. Col. Boniface: That is exactly what I’m saying. And as we transform the ARG-MEU with the F-35B, the CH-53K, the new Cobra and Huey, we need to significantly rethink the logistics support structure for the deployed fleet. We have gotten out of the helo mindset with regard to operations; but not with regard to sustainment approaches.
Another problem identified by Lt. Col. Boniface is the constraint of having very few supply locations from which Osprey parts can be generated to the deployed force.
Lt. Col. Boniface: We have gotten to the point where it is a very reliable aircraft, but it needs parts to fly. We are at a transition point whereby the flow of parts to the fleet needs to be significantly improved from what will need to become a global supply chain to the aircraft which is being deployed widely now in the Pacific, Europe and the Middle East, and will now be bought by several allies. This really raises the benchmark on global supply of parts to the aircraft on deployment.
It’s not about the plane anymore. It’s about the entire logistics enterprise that sustains operational effectiveness
For earlier interviews with Lt. Col. Boniface see the following:
In the mid-1980s when I worked at the Institute for Defense Analyses, I established a working group on Germany and we looked long and hard at the potential for German reunification to emerge from the dynamics of the 1980s. When the opportunity emerged in the late 1980s, through the leadership from the administration of President Bush and Chancellor Kohl, as well as the Soviet administration, reunification became possible.
I wrote a number of books in the 1980s on Europe and the Soviet Union, including a book looking at the German reunification issue and the Soviet Union.
The book entitled The Soviets, Germany and the New Europewas published by Westview Press in 1991 and the book looked at how the Soviets dealt with the European security in the 1980s and eventually the Russian leadership accepted reunification as the lesser of multiple evils as the Soviet Union faced collapse.
It should never be forgotten that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany are twined events.
In the conclusion to the book I wrote the following:
Throughout 1990, not only did the Gorbachev administration have to deal with the German unification process and the explosion of political change in Eastern Europe, but it had to deal with the explosions of tensions within the USSR as well.
Suddenly the Russian leadership was faced with the twin pressures of Westernization moving East (to the GDR and to Eastern Europe) and the pressures to create a new Russian and/or Soviet development model as well.
This book closes with the signing of the Soviet-German treaty of December 1990, but this treaty and the process, which led to its conclusion, are clearly not the beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning.
With the annexation of Crimea, the Putin Administration is writing a new chapter in the story of European security and the return of Russia in global affairs.
And the linkages here are real and clear. The President of Russia was a German expert and who witnessed the collapse of East Germany and the Soviet Union. This is not some 19th century history for Vladimir Putin; it is part of the living present and shaping his approach to the future.
A clear step in the process of moving beyond German unification to setting in motion a counter-reaction was the Georgian crisis and the ability of Russia to reassert its role within European security and to roll back a NATO expansion approach seen as out of control.
A good friend, who participated in my German working group in the 1980s, was the late Ron Asmus. We discussed many things European and Russian over the years, and certainly saw a major challenge for Europe was the need to deal with the power vacuum created between Western Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Ron’s answer and that of the Administration within which he would eventually serve was to expand the EU and NATO to encompass the states in the in-between regions.
The point of German unification by the partners of Germany was not about enhancing the wealth of Germany. It was about enabling a people to play their proper role in history. The actions of Putin clearly challenge them, and to correct the Secretary of State, this is not about the 19th century it is about the decade ahead.
He was an enthusiastic supporter for NATO expansion; I was not.
From my perspective, the question always to be answered is when the Russians strike against some state in the future what will Western Europe do and what will the US do CONCRETELY?
The danger is always that agreements in principle are simply that unless one has a clear path to defend those principles.
With Ukraine, we do not; and with regard to Poland and the Baltic states we better clearly sort that out, now and not in the future. For the annexation of Crimea has returned attention to the question of European security and the expansion of the challenges associated with the Arctic dimension to European security will only augment the challenges.
NATO can think about so-called out of area issues; but the primary concern is to defend the NATO area and to stop any threats to map re-writing. The challenge is that the map will most likely be rewritten by the Euro Crisis itself and with the dynamics of change in the Middle East as well as the Arctic.
And although the United States is certainly a player in sorting out solutions, it is not the only and perhaps not even the most important player.
We have heard for years about the coming of European defense; and the forging of a unified Germany certainly highlights the emergence of the state in Europe most DIRECTLY concerned with the defense of Poland and of the Baltic states. Germany is the leading state in Europe concerned with these issues, and needs to not just be INVOLVED in defense but to actually LEAD in providing for a European defense RESPONSE to the return of Russia.
Shortly before he died, Ron took a hard look at a problem, which he believed pushed the European defense challenge directly back on the plate of European development, namely the Georgian crisis.
In my last meeting with Ron, before I learned of his death, he dealt with why he saw the Georgian crisis as what I referred to in my book on the Soviets and Germany as the inevitability of new chapters being written on the Russia-German security relationship, which was not ending simply by an initial reunification of Germany. History was moving again; not receiving a plaque for ending of the Cold War.
In the discussion, which occurred in March 2010, this is what Asmus argued:
Robbin Laird: My final question is what is the longer-term significance of this kind of snapshot that you’ve taken of a moment in European security history? What do you think the longer-term consequences might be of the inability to really deal with this issue in a way that fully reinforces western values?
Ronald Asmus: 2010 is the 20th anniversary of the signing of Charter of Paris, and Charter of Paris was signed of course shortly after the Iron Curtain had come down, when there was a sense of a new unified democratic Europe, cooperative security. The Charter of Paris is supposed to establish a new set of rules of the game for how European security was going to function. 20 years later, there’s no longer any agreement on them.
Russia believes that we used those rules to facilitate a geopolitical moves against it. It no longer, I would argue, accepts the fundamental premises of the Charter of Paris, even though it’s signed up to them a dozen if not dozens of times over the last 20 years, and the key question now is: Do we fight for those values?
Because the Charter of Paris said “No spheres of influence, the right of countries to choose their own alliances, equal security for all countries big and small,” and we wrote them because we had concluded that the 20th Century had taught us that spheres of influence were a bag thing. They led to conflict and not to security. We wanted to move beyond them.
But it’s now all coming back. So do we acquiesce to Russian demands to legitimate a sphere of influence? Finlandization has come back as a phrase and a conflict that you hear whispered in quarters across Europe, or do we fight for or do we hold firm in somewhat up come up with a policy that tries to get the Russians to go back to those principles?
And I think that is the key question because today there is no more agreement on the rules of the game in European security. We talk the talk of cooperative security, but we’re sliding back into geopolitical competition. Institutions like NATO and EU are weak. The consensus that drove EU and NATO enlargement in the outreach to Russia is fragmenting. The OSCE is paralyzed because of the lack of agreement on what it’s all about.
So we’ve all moved on, and we’re all focused on the problems beyond Europe – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East. But I think you’re starting to see the first cracks and fissures in the foundation of European security and stability, and part of my book is a plea to focus on those and to come up with the policies to repair them before they get worse and before Europe really faces a much more serious risk of instability.
Unfortunately, this was pretty good forecast of where we are now.
When Germany was reunified, it was expected to play a key role in the reshaping of Europe into a global power. The soft power side of European influence is clearly threatened with the deepening of the Euro Crisis and with a shrewd chess player like Putin playing on that crisis to redraw the European map, not just once but twice in the past few years.
German leadership has insisted that there is no military solution in Ukraine, but that only misses the core point. Hard power – including that provided by Germany – is essential to ensure that map rewriting stops with Crimea. Germany has the capacity by itself or working with NATO or working with “Europeans” who have talked more about European defense than having created it to reinforce the defense of Poland and the Baltic states.
It can be understood why Germany did not want to participate in the Libyan operation. But if there is no deployable and useable Germany military capability to defend its interests in Poland and the Baltics, then this is really the end of NATO. If the largest and wealthiest country in Europe cannot invest in the air and naval power, which can reinforce Poland and the Baltics, then we really are at a dramatic turning point in European history.
With regard to the current crisis, Germany, Norway, Denmark, France and the UK could undertake the reinforcement of the Baltic States by exercising an integrated air-naval force to make clear to the Russians, that the inclusion of the Baltic states is not a candidate for Russian map makers. And exercises now can be used as templates for doing their own version of something like the Bold Alligator exercises but in delivering support to the Baltic states when it might matter. And this process could encourage the kind of cross cutting integration and modernization of European forces which are central in the period ahead.
And working Norwegian, Danish, UK, French and German integration to support the Balts can prepare the ground for dealing with the Arctic as well, an area of increasing significance in the decade ahead.
With regard to Poland, the integration of air and missile defense systems within and around Europe and the ability to rapidly deploy airpower could be emphasized. Here again Europe can take a leading role with the USAF and USN in a support role. Clearly, a state like Italy can play a major role here with Germany, France, and the UK as well.
By highlighting a European leadership role, Putin would get the point, that it is not just about beating the US on the chessboard or his judgments about the relative weakness of any particular administration. By a small number of European states working more closely together, the US role can be augmented as a force multiplier capability, rather than a force that needs to show up every time to deter the Russians.
Putin is clearly playing a game of chess here. No credible response by Germany to defend Europe’s interest will be a statement beyond that of Crimea taking back the “gift” of Crimea to Ukraine made in 1954 by then leader of the Soviet Union, soon to be UN-shoe pounding Nikita Khrushchev.
The point of German unification by the partners of Germany was not about enhancing the wealth of Germany; it was about enabling a people to play their proper role in history.
Putin’s actions clearly challenge them, and to correct the Secretary of State, this is not about the 19th century it is about the decade ahead.
Another key element of a proper response to the Russian gambit has been suggested by VICE ADMIRAL (Retired) SABATIÉ-GARAT a former French naval officer with many years of diplomatic experience dealing with the EU and NATO:
Putin is playing chess, but seating on a worm-eaten chair. Despite his fifteen years long stronghold on Russia, V. Putin didn’t really succeed in transforming Russia in a prosperous economy, attracting enough for its “near abroad”.
Russia is more or less behaving like a big emirate, with most of its oil and gas revenues fleeing abroad, and struggling with highly inefficient companies like Gazprom. Therefore V. Putin needs external successes, with Duma’s standing ovations.
But he needs as well European know-how in many fields, without hurting his nationalist pride. Here is what EU needs to understand. The way Russia has been left aside from the very beginning of the Syrian affair, and then pointed at as defending a bloodthirsty despot, was politically correct for European public opinion. It was neither realistic nor efficient keeping in mind that nobody wants Islamic extremists funded by Saudi Arabia and Qatar to rule Syria, and knowing that, due to its long presence in Syria, Russia is the only player to be in a position to find out an acceptable political solution while preserving its own interests in the region.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian crisis, like the 2008 Georgian crisis was, has not been included in a comprehensive bargain leading to a real strategic dialogue.
Thus at every crack of his worm-eaten chair, V. Putin is tempted by a new chess move, easily disguised in a helpful answer to oppressed Russian minorities.
But at each new move the chess game is evolving towards a more dangerous poker game. Without a clear strategic vision and a common will to implement it, EU won’t be able to prevent the next move, be it in the Donbas or in the Baltic countries.
Editor’s Note: The new German defense minister seems especially interested in reinforcing the German defense role and the government appears to be moving up their game.
According to a piece in the EU Observer by Andrew Rettman published on March 31, 2014:
Germany has said its air force is ready to increase security on Nato’s border with Russia, despite Moscow’s promise not to escalate the crisis in Ukraine.
A German defence ministry spokeswoman told the Reuters news agency on Sunday (30 March) “the army could take part in flights to patrol airspace with Awacs machines [surveillance planes] over Romania and Poland as well as training flights in the framework of a Nato air policing mission over Baltic states”.
The statement comes after Denmark and the US in the past few weeks agreed to send more than a dozen extra F-16 fighter jets to the region.
It also comes after the Pentagon, on Friday, told Nato’s military chief, US general Philip Breedlove, to return from Washington to the Nato HQ in Brussels.
Its spokesman said the move “does not foreshadow imminent military action in Ukraine”. But he added that “lack of transparency” and “growing uncertainty” over Russia’s mobilisation of tens of thousands of troops on Ukrainian borders merits caution.
Russia has not made any explicit threats to former Communist or former Soviet countries in the Nato alliance.
But Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s speech on 18 March, in which he promised to protect ethnic Russians abroad, has raised concerns he could stir up trouble among Russian minorities in Baltic states.
A clear statement of the new phase of the Russian relationship to the West was made in a recent article by Fyodor Lukyanov, Ogonyok magazine and published on Mar 26, 2014:
This reluctance of the West to stare the facts in the face is because, ever since the late 1980s, Europe and U.S. have become used to Moscow always leaving room for compromise, no matter how loudly it initially protested. And relations themselves with the West have always been valued and worth protecting.
That was the case even at moments of heightened tension — for example, in 1999, when Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov ordered his plane above the Atlantic to turn back on news of the bombing of Yugoslavia, and in 2008, when Russian tanks rolled through the Roksky tunnel to protect South Ossetia from Tbilisi’s attempts to “restore constitutional order.”
Now Russia is acting regardless of the costs, which renders the previous model of relations with its leading Western partners obsolete. But that means its relations with the East, too, need to change, since the global system is closely interconnected…..
Let’s start with the main world power — the United States. All this conflict has confirmed the old adage: If you don’t want to engage in foreign policy, it will engage with you. Barack Obama’s administration reacted sluggishly to the Ukrainian crisis, and for a long time limited itself to general exhortations and gestures by keen promoters of democratic values, such as Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland….
Europe is in the opposite position. It has already demonstrated to the world its total political failure as an international player, and its economic interdependence with Russia is great. The Old World may be among the main losers from the crisis. Under pressure from the U.S., which is annoyed by the EU’s incapacity, it may have to impose sanctions against Moscow that are mutually disadvantageous and harmful to sections of its own economy, while also picking up the tab for saving Ukraine from collapse.
The EU’s ambitions of self-sufficiency are likely to be buried eventually as it returns under the wing of the U.S., which will consolidate the arrangements on transatlantic trade and investment partnership on its own terms. Especially at risk is Germany, for which the Ukrainian crisis marked not only the country’s debut as a political leader, but also its role as Europe’s frontman.
The mere fact that a power of this caliber, used to a shadow role, was forced to act as the mouthpiece of the anti-Russian campaign shows that the EU mechanism works very inefficiently.
Following my visit to Australia, I had a chance to talk with Lt. General. Robling, the Commanding Officer for the USMC in the Pacific. Soon the Marines are coming for their first rotational force training with the Aussies for the next six months.
Undoubtedly, there will be images in the next few weeks of Marines coming ashore, and training with the Aussies.
But much like a piece I wrote after the Bold Alligator 2012, exercise, these images, although true, do not reflect the true measure of change in Pacific defense.
The key point is that Aussie modernization and that of the USN-USMC team in the Pacific are going on at the same time.
And this convergence of trends is shaping a 21st century approach to Pacific defense.
When I talked with General Carlisle, he outlined what a deterrence in depth strategy in the Pacific to ensure that the US national command authority has options to deal with threats in the region and allies can have confidence in the viability of a vibrant US combat force across the Pacific.
It is clear that the Aussie modernization intersecting with that of the USN-USMC team is at the heart of such a strategy.
U.S. Marine Sgt. Robert W. Walker, center, explains the capabilities of the miniature deployable assistance water purification system to U.S. Marine Lt. Gen. Terry G. Robling at a disaster site in Biang, Brunei Darussalam, June 19 as part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief and Military Medicine Exercise (AHMX). The disaster site is the location of the field training exercise portion of the multilateral exercise, which provides a platform for regional partner nations to address shared security challenges, strengthen defense cooperation, enhance interoperability and promote stability in the region. Robling is the commanding general of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. Walker is an engineer equipment electrical systems technician with 9th Engineer Support Battalion, 3rd Marine Logistics Group, III Marine Expeditionary Force. 6/19/13
The Aussies are modernizing their air and naval forces – C-17s, KC-30A tankers, the Wegetail AEW and C platform, the F-35 along with new capabilities for the frigates, new amphibious ships and new Aegis ships – and are working to integrate those forces for the extended defense of Australia.
The USN-USMC team is shaping a10-year effort, known as the distributed laydown, within which shaping a rotational force to Australia is a key element. The Marines have already brought the Osprey to the Pacific, are coming next year with the F-35B and the Navy is coming this year with the USS America, and all of these platforms will interact through exercises with the Aussies to shape interactive modernization strategies.
During a week of meetings with the MARFORPAC staff prior to the Australian trip, the nature of the distributed laydown was discussed at length. It is a work in progress over the next decade, which is being shaped by opportunities and challenges, as much as by strategic intent.
The distributed laydown started as a real estate move FROM Okinawa TO Guam but it clear that under the press of events and with the emergence of partnering opportunities the distributed laydown has become something quite different. It is about re-shaping and re-configuring the USMC-USN presence within an overall strategy for the joint force and enabling coalition capabilities as well.
The distributed laydown fits the geography of the Pacific and the evolving partnership dynamics in the region. The Pacific is vast; with many nations and many islands. The tragic events involving the missing Malaysian airliner illustrates better than words the vastness of the Pacific and its impacts on operations.
The expeditionary quality of the USMC – which is evolving under the impact of new aviation and amphibious capabilities – is an excellent fit for the island quality of the region. The USMC is building out four major areas to operate FROM (Japan, Guam, Hawaii and, on a rotational basis, and fifth, also on a rotational basis, the Philippines).
But as one member of the MARORPAC staff put it to me: “We go from our basic locations TO a partner or area to train. We are mandated by the Commandant to train our forces, and in practical terms in the Pacific, this means we move within the region to do so. And we are not training forces; we train WITH forces to shape congruent capabilities.”
USS America is part of a cluster of innovation involving the Opsrey, the F-35B and the CH-53K. Credit Photo: Ingalls
The basic template around which USMC training activities operate is at the intersection of three key dynamics: the required training for the USMC unit; meeting select PACOM Theater campaign priorities; and the partner nation’s focus or desires for the mutually training exercise or opportunity.
This template remains the same throughout the distributed laydown but it is implemented differently as an ability to operate from multiple locations allows the Marines to broaden their opportunities and shape more meaningful partnership opportunities.
The training regime is translated into a series of exercises executed throughout the year with partner forces. These exercises are central lynchpins in shaping effective working relationships in the region, which provide the foundation for any deterrence in depth strategy.
Nature abhors a vacuum and if you are not present you are absent.
And by building out core working relationships, there is not a significant power void, which can be filled in by powers trying to reshape the rules of the game, and to perhaps impose a new order in the Pacific.
According to Lt. General Robling: “It is not about building relationships in the region. It is about collective security in the region. It is about building real capabilities and capacity with partners and allies. It is not about simply showing up.”
He highlighted that the Aussies are a good example of an ally building out its capabilities as the US does so and working out a very interactive and mutually reinforcing defense structure. He emphasized that the impact of a fleet of F-35s being shaped by Japanese, Singaporean, South Korean and Aussies with those of the USAF, USMC and USN will be a key element of shaping interactive capabilities.
The USMC is a very cost effective force within the overall defense budget spending over all less than 10% of the defense budget. 2/3s of the USMC force is deployed to the Pacific. And in the Pacific the USMC spends $50 million per year on its exercises and of that 50% of the cost is for lift. It is clear that this touchstone for an ongoing commitment and deepening of partner working relationships needs to be fully supported and enhanced in the years to come and not be part of salami cutting approach to cutting defense expenditures.
Filling power vacuums by ongoing presence is a lot more effective than having to rush in later to deal with a crisis generated by collapse or someone else trying to force their will in the region.
An MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262, refuels mid-air en route to the Singapore Air Show, Feb. 6, 2014. Three Ospreys from VMM-262 and two KC-130J Super Hercules planes of VMGR-152, part of the 1st Marine Air Wing, III Marine Expeditionary Force, based out of Okinawa, Japan, are participating in the Singapore Air Show 2014.III MEF, 2/6/14
Another way to look at the distributed laydown is to compare the before and after of the process. A key aspect of understanding the after is that it is a work in progress and is bound to change in the fluid decade ahead as needs become redefined and new partnership opportunities identified.
The Marines have been directed through International Agreements, spanning two different US administrations to execute force-positioning moves. This is political, but it’s not partisan.
The U.S. Secretary of Defense has mandated that at least 22,000 Marines in PACOM remain west of the International dateline in the distributed Marine Air Ground Task Force or MAGTF Laydown and he, congress, and the American people are not interested in a non-functional concept for a USMC force.
And, the Obama White House has directed the USMC to make to shift as well of forces from Okinawa to Guam and to a new working relationship with the Australians.
Beyond what is directed, the Marines need to maintain a ready-force in the face of existing training area encroachments, plus they have the requirement for training areas near the new force laydown locations
Within the distributed laydown, the Marines must retain the ability rapidly to respond to crises across the range of demands, from Major Combat operation in NE Asia to low-end humanitarian assistance and disaster relief or HA/DR wherever it occurs.
Each location for the Marines is in transition as well. From Okinawa and Iwakuni, the Marines can locally train in Japan, Korea and the Philippines, as well as respond with “Fight Tonight” capabilities if necessary.
From Guam, the Marines can train locally in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to the north, the Federated States of Micronesia to the south, and Palau and the Philippines to the west. Guam and CNMI provide the Marines something they do not have anywhere else in the Pacific: A location on U.S. soil where they can train unilaterally or with partner nations.
In broad terms, prior to the distributed laydown (ca. 2011), the Marines are located in Japan (25,000 in Mainland Japan and Okinawa), Hawaii (approximately 6,000) and on the West Coast (approximately 45,000 in California and Arizona). With the projected end of the distributed laydown process (ca. 2025), there will be a projected force distribution as follows: Mainland Japan and Okinawa (15,000), Guam (approximately 4700), Hawaii (approximately 8800), West Coast (approximately 43,000) and a rotational force in Northwest Australia of approximately 2500).
But this is clearly a work in progress.
What it is NOT is simply moving Marines from Okinawa to Guam. There are additive elements as well, mainly from USMC aviation assets as the USMC delivers new capabilities to the Pacific in the decade ahead.
Lt. General Robling underscored the clear cross cutting relationship between USN-USMC modernization and those of the core allies. He noted with regard to the US-Australian evolving relationship the following:
The two allies see a mutually beneficial relationship. The intersection of Australian training ranges with those we are modernizing in Guam is a key element of working cross cutting modernizations.
This will allow us to work with a set of allies in the region as well within the Guam context to facilitate mutual modernizations of the allies as well.
We are not just building our bilateral relationships; we are facilitating multi-national collaboration AMONG our allies as well.
This is a clear force multiplier.
A key aspect of this working relationship in progress is the ability of the coalition forces to exercise together, and to shape convergent concepts of operations. In the case of the F-35 it is not about parallel air modernization: it is about reshaping joint capabilities for the ground, air and naval forces. Indeed, the Pacific fleet of F-35s will emerge as a force do to exercises in Guam and other locations in the Pacific.
It is about what allies are bringing to the effort; not just the US bringing the capability and allies providing territory. It is about allies modernizing 21st century naval and air capabilities highlight interactive with the US modernization approach as well.
The Aussie Wedgetail is a player in a 21st century aerospace combat cloud for the Pacific. Royal Australian Air Force personnel prepare the E-7A Wedgetail for a Red Flag exercise, June 11, 2012. Credit: Joint Base Elemendorft-Richardson. 6/11/12
A good example of the change is the Aussies deploying Wedgetail, a more advanced system than the USAF currently has available. This aircraft represents the next generation of AWACS and is the E-10 the USAF did not buy.
As Lt. General Robling put it:
“My good friend Hawk Carlisle will tell you that we would wish to have Wedgetail in our force. This is a high-end capability, which the Australians are bringing to their own force and to the coalition as well.”
An important element of the shift is that the US, clearly the most important player in an allied system of Pacific defense, is becoming a facilitator as well as enabler of allied capabilities. The image of the shift was well illustrated by this comment from a PACAF staffer involved in the exercise process:
“Our role as a facilitator is growing in broadening the engagement opportunities for allies to work together. A good image of the change is that an Aussie Wedgetail was doing to Command and Control for Japanese and South Korean jets at the recent Red Flag exercise. For the first time, South Korean jets crossed through Japanese air space to come to fly with the participants in Red Flag.”
In short, the distributed laydown over the decade ahead is a foundational element in shaping a more effective deterrence in depth approach.
And one, which is inextricably intertwined in reshaping with US allies an effective Pacific, defense approach for the 21st century.
Editor’s Note: There are two more pieces to come further developing the themes in this article. The first is a comprehensive overview of the distributed laydown built on extensive discussions with the MARFORPAC staff and Lt. General Robling. The second is the complete interview with the MARFORPAC commander from which some snipets were introduced for use in this article.
The international consequences of Russia’s reincorporation of the Crimean peninsula are still unfolding.
The leaders of the G-7 industrialized nations, meeting at the Hague, Netherlands, abandoned their participation in the G-8 summit, scheduled to take place in June, in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi, where Russia hosted the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games.
Yet, despite much hot air from the West, and some modest sanctions imposed on Putin’s inner circle, the overall reaction of global financial markets has been surprisingly muted to the crisis over Crimea and the potential Russian threat to the Ukraine.
But the key question remains. Is this relative calm the result of wishful thinking, or are there real reasons of concern?
Mohamed El-Erian attempted to answer this question in “The Financial Times.” El-Erian chairs Persident Barack Obams’s global development council and is now chief economic adviser to Allianz, the Munich based German multinational financial services company.
The main security threat to Ukraine since independence has been that Russia will seek to incorporate all or some parts of its territory. A now the expected has happened. And now what? Credit Image: Bigstock
Allianz Asset Management is the parent company of the US fixed income specialist, the California based Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO). El-Erian was CEO of PIMCO until he announced his surprise resignation in January after disagreements with Bill Gross, PIMCO’s founder. El-Erian left PIMCO in mid-March.
El-Erain has a habit of leaving companies before the boom busts: He headed Harvard University’s US$32 billion Endowment Management Company for two years, posting a return of 23% in one year, before he returned to PIMCO in September 2007, a year before the financial crisis hit, and Harvard’s endowment shrank by 27.3%.
El-Erian warns that the “tranquil response masks rising geopolitical risk.”
He says that the markets have brushed aside concerns over Putin’s ambitions just as they have over Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela and Thailand, which they regard as marginal to the global economy, trade and financial networks,
They also believe that the economic situation is improving in North America and in Europe, and they have faith in the power of central banks to insulate them from political and economic risk.
But such complacency is dangerous.
The West may well accept Putin’s annexation of the Crimea. And Putin may curb his ambitions in the Ukraine.
Yet underlying geopolitical tensions are building up towards a tipping point.
El-Erian believes markets are “underpricing” geopolitical risk.
For some of our earlier pieces on Ukraine and the Crimea see the following:
The visit to South Africa last week by Brazilian defense minister Celso Amorim has resulted in defense ties between the two countries being strengthened, with cooperation in the fields of training and technology, particularly regarding air-to-air missiles.
During his four-day visit to Africa between March 19 and 22, Amorim visited Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.
Whilst in South Africa he stopped by Denel Dynamics’ facilities in Centurion, where the company is developing the fifth generation A-Darter short-range air-to-air missile (AAM) in conjunction with Brazil.
In Brazil, A-Darter development is managed by the Brazilian Air Force’s Combat Aircraft Programme Coordinating Committee (Copac). Currently, Brazil has nine personnel at the company’s headquarters on the outskirts of Pretoria, which have the task of monitoring the project, the Brazilian defense ministry said.
The A-Darter Missile. Credit: defenceWEb
The A-Darter is in its final stage of development, a stage that includes the preparation of manufacturing equipment. Components for the 12 km range missile are manufactured in South Africa and Brazil, with extensive technology transfer and integration between the industries of the two countries.
Brazilian participation in the project involves Avibras, Mectron and Opto Eletronica. Mectron makes all Brazil’s missiles (MAA-1/B Piranha air-to-air missile, MAR-1 anti-radar missile and MSS-1.2 anti-armour missile).
Avibras is assisting with development of the A-Darter’s rocket motor and Opto Eletronica is participating in the development of the A-Darter’s seeker head. On the South African side, responsibility lies with state-owned company Denel, through its subsidiary Denel Dynamics.
According to Brazilian and South African engineers working on the project, the missile’s development will be completed in the second half of 2015, the Brazilian defense ministry said.
Testing has already been done on SAAF Gripen C/Ds, which should accelerate the integration of the weapon onto Brazilian Gripen NGs when these are delivered from 2018.
Since 2006, when the contract for the missile’s development was signed, Brazil has sent 64 military and civilian professionals to South Africa, mostly engineers, to participate directly in the project. “This is the kind of South-South cooperation that we seek”, said Amorim during his visit to Denel, where he saw the prototype of the A-Darter.
The A-Darter missile was specifically mentioned during a bilateral meeting held between Amorim and South African defense minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula on March 20 in Pretoria, where it was hailed as an example of successful partnership.
“The South-South cooperation is a priority in our foreign policy,” said Mapisa-Nqakula, who also stressed the importance of sharing information and conducting joint military exercises.
In a statement to the press, the ministers mentioned the willingness of Brazil and South Africa to strengthen the relationship between the defence industries of both countries. One possibility in this field is the joint development of a new air-to-air missile with a range of up to 100 km.
The Brazilian defence ministry said that South Africa and Brazil maintain strong defence ties, including officer training and joint military exercises.
Amorim said that Brazil and South Africa are “ideal partners in defense,” as they have similar geopolitical visions, an independent political stance in the world, are at similar stages of development, and also have common challenges and needs in the technological field.
The bilateral defense relationship between Brazil and South Africa was formalised in 2003 with the signing of the Agreement on Cooperation in Defence Related Matters by former ministers of defense from both countries.
Further evidence of defense cooperation will be when the Brazilian and Indian navies steam into Simon’s Town in October for the trilateral maritime exercise Ibsamar.
South Africa will also participate in exercise Atlasur with the Argentinean, Uruguayan and Brazilian navies.
Republished with the permission of our partner defenceWeb:
During the visit of the Second Line of Defense team to New River on February 10, 2014, we had a chance to sit down with Lt. Col. Ennis to discuss his experience with the Osprey, and preparing for operational innovations, such as CASEVAC.
We also discussed his preparation for working with the CH-53K program.
Lt. Col. Ennis During SLD Interview at New River, February 10, 2014. Credit: SLD
Lt. Col. Ennis has been with the Osprey program for a considerable period of time, from 2003. He was part of VMX-22 and worked with the introduction of the Osprey into USMC operations. He is becoming the government’s flight test director.
He will be bringing his Osprey experience to the K test program and he noted that one area where the MV-22 is very good and the CH-53 is not is with regard to brownout situations.
The Osprey has a good capability to land in a brownout situation whereas the CH-53Es currently would rather encounter the enemy than deal with a brownout situation.
They would rather land right next to a compound that has a known enemy as opposed to land in open desert.
He also described his experience of going from test pilot to operational experience in Afghanistan and its importance to the evolution of the aircraft itself.
They are a lot of things the test community is working on that are not necessarily the focus of the actual fleet which is deployed.
This gap needs to be closed.
During his time in Afghanistan last year, he was involved in shaping a MEDEVAC role for the Osprey.
Clearly, the advantage of the Osprey over current Army rotorcraft is the ability to operate over a much broader range without the significant Forward Operating Base infrastructure required by the Army medevac approach.
He described that in a situation where there are many troops and FOBs, the current US Army approach works well and operates largely in a 40 nautical mile radius.
When forces are dispersed and one does not have a large support infrastructure, the situation is different and the Osprey can perform the MEDEVAC mission over a much larger area without a significant FOB infrastructure.
We put Ospreys in two different locations to cover an operating area. The two can cover the area in between if they pick up from one location and drop to the other.
We went out to something like 160 nautical miles because if you can fly between point A and point B, it is basically a big ellipse which works out to a distance of 160 nautical miles.
The Osprey can be fitted nicely with the MEDEVAC gear as well.
If you put every litter in the back it can hold 12 patients, but that is not ideal.
You would prefer six so that you can have the medical staff and support gear spaced out.
Normally, you would strap the gurneys to the floor, rather than use litters, because at that point you can work all around the patients.
Outfitted for a MEDEVAC operation the seats fold up and the litters stack up against the walls.
Notably, the USMC prepared for the possible use of the Osprey in the MEDEVAC role for the very beginning of its deployment history.
Chief Petty Officer Richard B. Guerrero, a Chief Hospital Corpsmen with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263 (Reinforced), 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, cares for a patient aboard an MV-22B Osprey during an emergency medical evacuation June 25, 2009. The Sailor sustained head and hip injuries and was experiencing chest pains after falling while aboard USS Bataan (LHD 5). This is the first time the Osprey has been used to conduct an emergency evacuation from a U.S. Naval ship. (Official USMC photo)
Now, the possibility should become a reality to transform the capabilities for MEDEVAC operations intra-theater.
Editor’s Note: For the Video Above:
02/23/2014: U.S. Marines and Navy Corpsmen with 2nd Marine Aircraft (Forward) conduct a casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) rehearsal from Helmand Province, Afghanistan on March 31, 2013. The rehearsal was executed in order to train and prepare Marines and Sailors for a real CASEVAC scenario.
The Osprey provides significant advantages versus helos for medevac missions. The Ospreys reach and range allow it to operate from a single base and cover territory, which several Forward Operating Bases would be needed to execute the same mission. And the LZ flexibility of the plane provides greater security than does a helo.
Credit:2nd MAW Forward:3/31/13
An earlier piece focused on how the Marines have been preparing for this role since the initial deployment of the aircraft:
Already in 2008, the Marines had incorporated the MV-22 into battlefield medical evacuation. The manual adds the training for the MV-22 to the range of capabilities, which can support the medical evacuation mission.
Tilt-rotor aircraft that takes off and lands vertically but flies like a plane. This aircraft is designed to eventually replace the CH-46.
– When configured for litter racks, able to carry 12 litters or 24 ambulatory casualties.
NOTE: The Marine Corps does not have dedicated CASEVAC aircraft. Any of its aircraft can be utilized as a “lift of opportunity” upon completion of its primary mission.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS: Field Medical Training Battalion Camp Lejeune
In short, you get the new technology into play, use it, and train to the mission.
That is key method whereby innovation occurs for a combat force.
The story below highlights the first medical evacuation conducted by the Osprey from Sea:
MV-22 Ospreys Conduct First-Ever Medical Evacuation 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit Courtesy Story Thursday, June 6, 2009
USS BATAAN, at Sea — The 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit made history by using two MV-22B Ospreys, assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263, to conduct a ship-to-shore emergency medical evacuation of a Sailor from USS Bataan, June 25.
This is the first time the aircraft has been used to conduct such a mission from the sea.
At approximately 4:30 p.m., two Ospreys were returning to Bataan after a routine mission when the pilots were notified of an emergency situation. The aircraft were ordered to return to the ship at maximum speed.
After landing aboard Bataan, the patient and team of medical personnel were brought aboard the aircraft and lifted off at 4:50 p.m. from Bataan’s flight deck. The aircraft travelled 147 nautical miles in 37 minutes to a regional airport where an ambulance was used to transfer the Sailor to a hospital for further treatment.
The Sailor sustained head and hip injuries as well as chest pains after falling. The Sailor is in stable condition in the U.S. Central Command area awaiting further transfer.
“Everybody from the ship made this very easy for us,” said Maj. Brett A. Hart, assistant operations officer for VMM 263 and one of the pilots on the mission. “It was an all-hands effort and everybody gave their utmost to ensure the safety of this Sailor.”
Hart, who has had experience in conducting MEDEVACS in other aircraft like the CH-46E Sea Knight, said the biggest difference with using the Osprey was the rapid speed with which the mission was executed.
“By virtue of having this aircraft, we were able to do it much faster and farther,” he said. “This is a fine example of why we have an aircraft like this.”
The 22nd MEU deployed, May 15, aboard ships from the Bataan Amphibious Ready Group and is currently deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations.
The 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit is a multi-purpose force of more than 2,200 Marines and Sailors. Led by Col. Gareth F. Brandl, the 22nd MEU is composed of its Ground Combat Element, Battalion Landing Team, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment; Aviation Combat Element, VMM-263; Logistics Combat Element, Combat Logistics Battalion 22; and its Command Element.
