By Robbin Laird

The 2019 International Fighter Conference in Berlin brought together military leaders and industry representatives from nations living in the shadow of authoritarian powers. Their presentations, focused on airpower strategies for self-defense against existential threats from Russia and China, now read like a prophetic warning of conflicts to come. What seemed like contingency planning in 2019 became brutal reality just three years later.

Ukraine: From Deterrence to Actual War

Lieutenant General Vasyl Chernenko’s 2019 presentation on “Peculiarities of Employment Fighter Aviation” described Ukraine’s experience with Russian hybrid warfare following the 2014 seizure of Crimea. He spoke of the “sabotage-terrorist nature of the enemy’s actions” and the need for Ukrainian fighter aircraft to confront Russian air defense systems moved forward into contested areas.

His analysis proved devastatingly prescient. When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukraine faced exactly the scenarios Chernenko had outlined but magnified exponentially. The limited pilot training and “very limited” readiness of Ukraine’s legacy MiG-29s and Su-27s that he described became critical vulnerabilities when facing the full weight of Russian airpower.

The general’s emphasis on the need for Western counter-insurgency capabilities and airpower support foreshadowed the massive international military aid effort that would emerge. His warning that any Western assistance would trigger Russian “fake news” campaigns proved accurate, as Moscow’s disinformation apparatus worked overtime to frame NATO support as escalatory aggression.

Most remarkably, Chernenko’s focus on Ukraine’s need to “buy time for partners and allies to plug into one’s defensive system” became the fundamental strategy that allowed Ukraine to survive the initial assault and mount an effective resistance.

Lithuania: The Information Warfare Frontline

Colonel Dainius Guzas’s presentation on “Developing Capability Against a Peer Opponent” highlighted Lithuania’s dual challenge: direct Russian threats and sophisticated political warfare designed to undermine NATO cohesion. His documentation of Russian airspace violations and “fake news” campaigns targeting Lithuanian confidence in NATO allies provided an early warning of hybrid warfare tactics that would intensify dramatically.

The Baltic Air Policing mission that Guzas described as Lithuania’s window into NATO interoperability became a crucial proving ground. When tensions escalated following Russia’s 2022 invasion, the experience gained through hosting diverse NATO air forces proved invaluable for rapid coalition operations.

Guzas’s emphasis on the political dimension of airpower or how Russian disinformation sought to weaponize every NATO flight over Baltic airspace presaged the information warfare that would accompany kinetic operations in Ukraine. His insights into how authoritarian powers use political warfare to complement military pressure became a template for understanding broader Russian strategy.

Taiwan: The Growing Shadow

The presentations from Colonel Li-Chiang Yuan and Dr. Yu-Jiu Wang on Taiwan’s defense challenges have only grown more relevant. Yuan’s description of the People’s Republic of China’s “encirclement challenge” through South China Sea militarization has accelerated dramatically since 2019.

His concept of “multiple deterrence” which is the need for integrating active defense, air defense, and resilient ground forces anticipated the “porcupine strategy” that has become central to Taiwan’s defense planning. The emphasis on operating aircraft from highways and dispersed locations, inspired by Finnish models, reflected an understanding that traditional airfields would be primary targets in any conflict.

Dr. Wang’s focus on AESA radar technologies and C2/ISR integration proved remarkably forward-looking. The technological capabilities he projected have become essential elements of the “deterrence in depth” strategy that Taiwan and its allies continue to develop as Chinese military pressure intensifies.

Malaysia: The Connectivity Imperative

Major General Dato’ Muhamad Norazilan Bin Aris’s emphasis on “Striking the Balance Between Affordability and Capability” highlighted challenges that have only grown more acute. His focus on Link 16 capabilities for better integration with partner air forces, particularly Australia, anticipated the growing importance of coalition interoperability in contested regions.

Malaysia’s two-theater defense requirements and emphasis on maritime domain awareness presaged the multi-domain challenges that have become central to Indo-Pacific strategy. The Royal Malaysian Air Force’s focus on light attack aircraft for multiple roles reflected budget constraints that many nations now face as defense spending struggles to keep pace with growing threats.

Lessons Validated by History

Several key insights from the 2019 conference have proven remarkably prescient:

• Self-Reliance as Foundation: Every presenter emphasized that nations in authoritarian neighborhoods must first be capable of self-defense to “buy time” for allied support. Ukraine’s initial resistance validated this principle entirely.
• Dispersal and Resilience: The emphasis on operating from multiple locations, dispersed basing, and highway operations proved essential when traditional infrastructure became primary targets.
• Political Warfare Integration: The recognition that military threats come wrapped in sophisticated information campaigns anticipated the hybrid nature of modern conflict.
• Coalition Connectivity: The focus on interoperability and Link 16 capabilities reflected an understanding that no nation could stand alone against peer adversaries.
• Technology as Equalizer: The emphasis on advanced radar systems, C2 integration, and networked operations presaged how smaller nations could leverage technology to offset numerical disadvantages.

The Prescient Warning

Perhaps most striking was the shared recognition among 2019 presenters that their nations faced “existential threats” requiring immediate attention, not distant contingency planning. While many in Western capitals still viewed major power competition as a manageable challenge, military leaders from frontline states understood the urgency of their situation.

Their focus on defensive capabilities that could deter aggression without threatening authoritarian homelands proved particularly insightful. This distinction between defensive deterrence and offensive threat has become central to alliance strategies aimed at avoiding escalation while maintaining credible defense.

Looking Forward

The 2019 International Fighter Conference presentations now read as a strategic warning that was largely unheeded until events forced recognition of their accuracy. The military leaders who spoke in Berlin understood their operational environment with a clarity that broader policy communities would only achieve through bitter experience.

As we face continued challenges from authoritarian powers, the insights shared in 2019 remain relevant. The emphasis on self-reliance, coalition interoperability, dispersed operations, and integrated deterrence strategies continues to guide defense planning for nations on freedom’s frontlines.

The tragedy is not that these military professionals lacked foresight — their analysis was remarkably accurate. The tragedy is that it took actual war to validate warnings that were clearly articulated years before the shooting started.

The featured photo shows President Tsai Ing-wen and senior Taiwanese military staff during an exercise in southern county Changhua, not far from one of the island’s main airbases at Taichung. Photo: Facebook

Airpower When Directly Faced with the Authoritarian Powers: The International Fighter Conference 2019

The Emergence of the Multi-Polar Authoritarian World: Looking Back from 2024

By Robbin Laird

The comfortable world of middle power diplomacy is disappearing. For decades, countries like Brazil and Australia have thrived by maintaining strategic flexibility. They are trading with multiple partners, participating in diverse institutional frameworks, and avoiding definitive alignment with any single major power. This hedging strategy worked well within the relatively stable architecture of the post-Cold War liberal international order.

But as majorpower competition intensifies and competing visions of international order emerge, the middle ground that enabled such strategies is rapidly eroding.

The current moment presents democratic middle powers with an unprecedented challenge: they can no longer simply navigate between competing major powers but must actively choose between competing systems of international order. More fundamentally, they may need to become architects of new frameworks rather than mere consumers of existing ones.

The conventional wisdom often treats middle powers as inherently democratic entities, countries like South Korea, Japan, Australia, India, and Brazil that occupy the space between major powers and smaller states while maintaining democratic governance. This framing, while appealing, obscures important historical and contemporary realities.

Middle power status has never been inherently linked to democratic governance. During the Cold War, countries like Egypt under Nasser, Yugoslavia under Tito, and Indonesia under Sukarno operated as classic middle powers precisely because they could navigate between superpowers while maintaining non-democratic systems. Today, countries like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia continue to exercise middle power influence with varying degrees of democratic legitimacy.

The current clustering of democratic middle powers may reflect the particular circumstances of the post-Cold War liberal international order rather than any structural relationship between middle power status and democratic governance. This historical contingency becomes important when considering how these countries might adapt to a changing international system.

Even within the presumed democratic middle power category, the picture is more complex than it initially appears. India’s democratic credentials are increasingly contested among scholars, given concerns about press freedom, minority rights, and institutional erosion under Modi’s BJP. This complicates any simple equation between middle power status and democratic governance.

Brazil’s engagement with BRICS exemplifies the challenges facing democratic middle powers in the current international environment. President Lula’s approach to BRICS reflects a classic middle power strategy, namely, leveraging multilateral institutions to amplify influence and create alternatives to Western-dominated frameworks. The organization offers Brazil opportunities for South-South cooperation, economic partnership, and enhanced global influence.

However, BRICS increasingly presents Brazil with uncomfortable choices about international order. The organization includes authoritarian members (Russia and China) and increasingly authoritarian ones (potentially India), creating tensions with Brazil’s democratic identity. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea place Brazil in the difficult position of either implicitly endorsing authoritarian behavior or undermining the cohesion of an organization central to its middle power strategy.

The expansion of BRICS to include countries like Iran, Egypt, and the UAE further complicates Brazil’s position. While expansion increases the organization’s global reach and influence, it also dilutes whatever democratic character it might have possessed and potentially commits Brazil to defending an increasingly authoritarian bloc’s interests.

More fundamentally, BRICS is not merely an alternative forum for international cooperation. It represents an active challenge to key elements of the existing Western generated international order. Alternative payment systems, parallel legal frameworks, and explicit rejection of Western-led institutions suggest that sustained engagement with BRICS may require Brazil to choose sides in a broader competition between democratic and authoritarian models of international order.

Australia’s Strategic Quandary

Australia’s position illustrates the “middle power dilemma” with particular clarity. The country faces the challenge of maintaining an economic relationship with China which accounts for roughly 30% of Australia’s trade while preserving a strategic alliance with the United States as competition between these great powers intensifies.

Australia’s recent experience demonstrates how quickly traditional hedging strategies can collapse under great power pressure. China’s economic coercion following Australia’s calls for COVID-19 investigations, trade restrictions on Australian products, and broader pressure campaigns revealed the fragility of compartmentalized relationships. The assumption that economic and security relationships could be managed separately proved false when China explicitly used economic tools to pursue broader strategic objectives.

The Australian response which was to deepen security ties with the United States through AUKUS while attempting to rebuild economic relationships with China represents a more sophisticated form of hedging.

However, this approach faces inherent limitations as major power competition intensifies. China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Taiwan tensions, and broader competition with the United States make it increasingly difficult for Australia to maintain relationships with both powers without compromising core interests.

Australia’s engagement with alternative frameworks such as the Quad, regional partnerships with Japan and India, and enhanced ASEAN relationships suggests recognition that traditional bilateral hedging may be insufficient. However, these multilateral approaches still operate within the basic framework of choosing between competing major power systems rather than creating genuine alternatives.

The Limits of Hedging in an Era of Systemic Competition

The fundamental challenge facing democratic middle powers is that traditional hedging strategies assume a degree of systemic stability that no longer exists. Hedging works when great powers compete within a shared framework of international order, allowing middle powers to benefit from multiple relationships while avoiding definitive alignment.

Contemporary major power competition is different. China and Russia are not simply challenging American hegemony within the existing international system. They are actively working to reshape or replace key elements of that system. The Belt and Road Initiative, alternative payment systems like SPFS and CIPS, expanded BRICS membership, and various regional security arrangements represent not just parallel institutions but efforts to create alternative frameworks that could eventually supplant existing ones.

This systemic competition creates several challenges for middle power hedging strategies:

• Institutional Incompatibility: As alternative institutions develop their own rules, standards, and expectations, participation in multiple frameworks becomes increasingly difficult. Countries may face pressure to choose between competing trade rules, legal frameworks, or security arrangements.
• Ideological Pressure: Major power competition increasingly involves competing models of governance and international order. Middle powers find it difficult to maintain relationships with both democratic and authoritarian powers without implicit endorsement of competing political systems.
• Economic Weaponization: The use of economic tools for strategic purposes, such as demonstrated by China’s pressure on Australia or Western sanctions on Russia, makes it harder to compartmentalize economic and security relationships.
• Technological Fragmentation: Competition over technology standards, supply chains, and digital governance creates pressure for countries to choose between competing technological ecosystems.

The Imperative for Democratic Innovation

The erosion of traditional hedging strategies creates both challenges and opportunities for democratic middle powers. While the comfortable ambiguity of the post-Cold War period is disappearing, the current moment also presents possibilities for institutional innovation and leadership that may not have existed under more stable conditions.

Rather than simply choosing between American-led and Chinese-led systems, democratic middle powers might need to become architects of new frameworks that reflect contemporary democratic values while addressing legitimate criticisms of the existing international order. This would require moving beyond the traditional middle power role of diplomatic facilitation toward more active institutional entrepreneurship.

What would democratic institutional entrepreneurship look like in practice?

This approach would require democratic middle powers to work together more systematically than they have historically. Countries with different regional priorities, economic interests, and strategic relationships would need to develop joint initiatives and shared frameworks, something that has proven difficult in the past.

The Brazil-Australia Paradigm

Brazil and Australia, despite their different regions and relationships, face remarkably similar challenges that illustrate the broader middle power dilemma. Both countries have prospered under the existing international order while maintaining some distance from American leadership. Both face pressure to choose between economic relationships with China and strategic relationships with the United States. Both are exploring alternative institutional frameworks while trying to maintain democratic credentials.

Their different approaches to these challenges — Brazil’s BRICS engagement versus Australia’s alliance deepening — suggest different strategies for addressing the same fundamental problem. However, both approaches face limitations that point toward the need for more innovative solutions.

A collaborative approach between countries like Brazil and Australia might offer possibilities that neither could achieve alone. Their different regional perspectives, economic relationships, and institutional memberships could provide the foundation for new frameworks that transcend traditional regional or ideological boundaries.

Such collaboration would require both countries to move beyond their comfort zones and accept greater responsibility for global governance outcomes. It would mean investing serious political capital in institutional innovation rather than simply managing existing relationships. Most importantly, it would require recognition that the comfortable world of middle power hedging is disappearing and that new approaches are necessary for maintaining both national interests and democratic values.

The comfortable world of middle power diplomacy is ending. The strategies that enabled countries like Brazil and Australia to prosper while maintaining strategic flexibility are becoming increasingly difficult to sustain as major power competition intensifies and competing visions of international order emerge.

The response to this challenge will likely determine not only the future of individual middle powers but the broader trajectory of international order. Democratic middle powers can continue attempting to hedge between competing major powers, but this approach faces inherent limitations as systemic competition intensifies. They can choose sides in the emerging competition between democratic and authoritarian models, but this risks reducing them to junior partners in major power conflicts.

Alternatively, they can attempt to become architects of new frameworks that transcend traditional great power competition while maintaining commitment to democratic values and international law. This approach is more demanding and uncertain than traditional middle power strategies, but it may be the only way to preserve both national interests and democratic principles in an increasingly complex international environment.

The question is not whether the current moment represents a crisis for middle powers for it clearly does. The question is whether democratic middle powers will respond to this crisis with institutional innovation and leadership, or whether they will find themselves forced to choose between unsatisfactory alternatives created by others. The answer to this question will likely shape the future of international order for the period ahead.