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During my current visit to Australia in support of the Williams Foundation seminar held on 27 September 2023, I had a chance to talk with one of the speakers at the conference Brigadier General (Retired) Ian Langford about the DSR and its impact.
During our discussion, Langford provided as clear a statement about how to understand the DSR, the strategic shift in Australian defence and the challenges going forward.
What follows is what he told me.
“The challenge that the ADF has been given from the government is how to transition from a defence force that was inherently designed around the principal task of generating military capabilities that are no longer relevant to the threat or to the changing strategic operating environment as well as the need to adapt to a new concept of joint warfighting, especially as it applies to the integration of space and cyber.
“It is reminiscent in some sense to what happened in the U.S. with the adoption of the National Security Act 1949 which reshaped the U.S. military from being service orientated to becoming ‘joint by design’.
“Historically, the ADF has been somewhat designed to fight as a service alongside an ally. The U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force and the USAF are more closely interrelated with each other than they appear to be with their own armies. Joint doctrine, common command and control systems, joint targeting networks and a unified operating concept are all necessary if the ADF is to be more joint and therefore more capable.
“The DSR has begun this transition.
“In the DSR, the use of a ‘deterrence by denial’ strategy requires the ADF to use geography to contextualise it future operational environment. Extended range and battlefield geometry, to include airbases, ports and logistical nodes are critical to this, as is increasing focus on key continental areas of concern to include critical infrastructure and manufacturing hubs; it is no longer appropriate to a simple 360-degree view terrestrial defense which the ADF does not have the capacity for anyway.
“In terms of the DSR impacts on the region, to quote a former Prime Minister, “Do we seek security in Asia, or from Asia? The answer to this question is not in the realm of military strategy, but rather exists in the national psyche; I still think this has not been resolved in terms of how Australians think about defense and security more broadly.
“Managing our economic security and national security will be a critical feature of Australian statecraft. It’s not a binary issue, because they ultimately must coexist.
He concluded with this thought: “If you read only the DSR, then you don’t get a complete picture of what national security requirements look like from a whole government perspective.
“The DSR only explains part of the security challenge Australia has in front of it; to put it simply, it is more than just military power.”
Featured Image: HMAS Toowoomba’s embarked MH-60R helicopter “Valkyrie” conducts a personnel transfer exercise on the forecastle during regional presence deployment.
The Royal Australian Navy is undertaking a regional presence deployment in Southeast and Northeast Asia. During the deployment, HMA Ships Brisbane, Stalwart, and Toowoomba will conduct training, exercises, and other engagements with Australia’s regional partners. Regional presence deployments demonstrate Australia’s commitment to, and engagement with, the region.
The deployments play a vital role in Australia’s long-term security and prosperity by protecting Australia’s interests, preserving a rules-based order, enhancing cooperation and relationships with regional partners and allies, and developing capability and interoperability.
During my current visit to Australia in support of the 27 September 2023 Willliams Foundation seminar, I have taken the opportunity to continue my discussions on the coming of maritime autonomous systems to the Australian forces.
First, I was able to talk with CDRE Darron Kavanagh, Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, about how to accelerate the effort to introduce maritime autonomous systems within the force.
Next, I spoke with Robert Dane about the progress with regard to one of those Australian systems, namely the Bluebottle USV. There I learned of the progress in the Australian use of his very interesting capability to fill the gap between a crewed ship and nothing as their video higlights.
And I talked with C2 Robotics about their work on building undersea capabilities which provide significant capabilities for a Royal Australian Navy undersea force in profound transition. Part of the answer to how the RAN will manage their submarine transition clearly needs to rely on the kind of capabilities being developed and built by C2 Robotics, located in Melbourne Australia.
At the recent Williams Foundation seminar on multi-domain strike, RADM Stephen Hughes, Head of Navy Capability, highlighted this possibility in his remarks. He noted that “to attain long range strike capabilities allows us to move from a strategy of defense to a strategy of deterrence through denial signifies a national shift that aims to hold an adversary at risk at greater range.”
For Australia to do this in maritime domain relies on their air and sea capability from their manned platforms, supplemented by a build out of maritime ISR-T enterprise capability seen in the capabilities being built at the Edinburgh airbase and in the air with the P-8/Triton combination in the current period and into the next few years.
But coming in that period and hopefully seeing significant growth in its contribution will be the new generation of uncrewed maritime systems. RADM Hughes noted: “Maritime strike operations are not limited to ship launched long range fires, or air launched long range fires, but include mines, autonomous systems, electronic attack, and any other lethal effect launched from or conducted in the maritime domain.”
The first prototype of the Speartooth undergoing trials in Jervis Bay. Credit: C2Robotics
With regard to the maritime autonomous systems part, RADM Hughes underscored: “Navy is working with industry is exploring solutions through the Autonomous Warrior series of experimental exercises. Programs, such C2 Robotics Speartooth and the Anduril Ghost Shark will have the ability to strike deep against an adversary and able to deploy mines and other guided weapons by sovereign Australian capabilities.”
The Speartooth LUUV is described on the C2Robotics website as follows: “Speartooth is a Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (LUUV) designed for long range, long duration undersea operations. It brings a combination of highly advanced capabilities together with a modular, rapidly reconfigurable design specifically focused on manufacturing scalability and a revolutionary cost point that enables high volume production and deployment.”
Obviously, such a program is shrouded in significant performance and mission secrecy as behooves the domain of undersea warfare, but the company highlights the following features of the craft: large flexible payload bays, common command and control, direct propeller propulsion and variable buoyancy propulsion.
I had a chance to talk with Thomas Loveard, a founder and CTO of the company, and with my colleague Marcus Hellyer, who is a strategic advisor to the company. According to the website: “Tom Loveard holds a PhD in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. In 2003 he co-founded Sentient Vision Systems, where he led the development of autonomous detection solutions including the award-winning MTI and ViDAR systems. He joined AVTA in 2016 as the CTO, where he championed the development of the world’s best micro gimbal and cutting-edge targeting gimbal systems.”
I hope to visit their facilities in Melbourne on my next visit to Australia but was glad to have the opportunity to begin my discussions with them about their approach and their core platform.
As I have made very clear in my writing about maritime autonomous systems, these are very different from crewed platforms, and are best understood as complements to the crewed force. And they provide important capabilities, to use the Ocius terminology, between crewed assets and nothing. And really until the operational forces begin incorporating maritime autonomous systems within their kill web concepts of operations, we will not see the kind of effect they can have for a smaller navy like the RAN.
But it will be significant indeed. The Australian government is doing a surface fleet review and frankly if this is not done with an eye to the operational mix of crewed and uncrewed systems, they need to go back to the drawing board. Moreover, with the pressure on the Department of Defence’s acquisition budget, any near-term additions to the shopping list will most likely need to be small, affordable systems rather than major platforms.
Loveard pointed out that the company is focused on undersea systems in the autonomous domain and building at a price point where we can buy and deploy many of them. I would note that one key difference when discussing maritime autonomous systems is to understand that they are not designed like crewed platforms in terms of being part of a relatively small build of platforms, but are designed to be built and operate in numbers.
Loveard also underscores that the company was working on the navigation and targeting capabilities of their systems in terms of not having to use more traditional methods using GPS or using radio frequencies as well.
One of the key aspects of maritime autonomous systems is to understand them in terms of the payload revolution which is re-shaping operational forces. What payloads can you project to the relevant operational area rather than which platforms do you send is a key consideration of what I have referred to as the kill web operating force,
And the Speartooth is clearly built around the payload revolution. Indeed, if one looks at traditional naval platforms the % of payload to the operating area is around 30%. After all, you have to provide for and protect the crew. It is very different with maritime autonomous systems where the priority is upon your ability to deliver the relevant payload to the operational area. This means that % wise, the payloads are a much more significant part of the weapon system.
Hellyer added the important point that Speartooth is designed to be a long-range system. This means that it can deploy from various points on Australian territory to provide capability for the ADF. The ability to leverage Australian geography is a key point in shaping the way ahead for Australian defence, and being able to do so without using traditional bases is a key element to be able to do so. Hellyer also noted that Speartooth can be launched from virtually any boat ramp, freeing it from major infrastructure requirements, or even a ‘mother ship’.
Loveard underscored with regard to the payload flexibility of the system that is a completely open architecture system. “We want our system to be rapidly adaptable to new payloads or evolving payloads and to be able to translate that into immediate capabilities rather than to take years of work adapting the platform to new technological realities.”
I emphasized during the 27 September seminar write up, the growing importance of counter-ISR. Clearly, payloads can be developed to allow something like the Speartooth to be a part of counter-ISR operations, as well as ISR and kinetic payloads as well. Moreover, the fact that potentially thousands of Speartooth vessels can ‘hide in plain sight’ to use C2 Robotic’s term, i.e., be stored in shipping containers in commercial facilities and be launched from thousands of locations, immensely complicates an adversary’s ISR problem.
But to get to that future, the force needs to being to employ such capabilities and use these new assets. For only then will they evolve and develop. For unlike crewed platforms, these platforms are built around software which is driven in its development by domain knowledge shaped by operational use and continuous feedback from users. If they are thought of as traditional defence science projects, they will just remain that.
The featured photo: The second prototype being launched from an early version of the Speartooth launch system.
During my current trip to Australia in support of the Williams Foundation 27 September 2023, I had a chance to talk with my colleague Dr. Andrew Carr of Australian National University. He is a regular interlocutor for me on strategic issues affecting Australia and the broader alliance.
With the main issue in Australia being the impact of the DSR on shaping a way ahead, Dr. Carr argued that underlying the DSR and the shift to deal with the China threat, there was a process change underlying thinking about the way ahead for Australian defence.
He argued that the basic approach of higher-level defence thinking in Australia since the 1970s has been very pragmatic and assessing change and adjusting Australian engagement in response to the particular crisis or event. Government’s commissioned Defence White Papers if and when needed, and the link between strategy and force structure has not always been well-maintained. Instead, the focus has been on correlating what Australian capabilities are available with crafting a response package to today’s events.
This has allowed Australia to be flexible and to think about if not through events and how to protect Australian interests. But now with a clear focus on the region and a direct threat to Australia in the form of the Chinese along with the broader association of 21st century authoritarian powers, this is no longer adequate.
What now does Australia do to defend itself and protect itself in its own region?
How does it work with and manage allies?
How does Australia manage threats and work through how the broader society deals with the comprehensive Chinese challenge?
Dr. Carr argued that the defence processes are having to become more scenario focused and threat focused.
How does Australia built relevant forces in light of core scenarios of the threats and crises to be anticipated?
Australia cannot do everything. What will the government pare down and focus upon within the defence force?
And how will this thinking correlate with broader considerations for security and economic development of Australia?
In other words, because Australia is facing enduring challenges, Dr. Carr asks: “Does the past practices of pragmatism and ad hoc strategic planning, such as irregular Defence White papers’ still make sense?”
Such a shift poses three major challenges.
The first is within the defence establishment. Carr underscored that today’s ADF has been built around a balanced force structure approach and sharing of resources. A threat based or scenario-based approach will prioritize some forces compared to others.
How will defence adjust to a culture of a threat-based force?
The second challenge faces the political class. A threat-based focus will require a discipline in the political class to manage defence in a way it really did not need to do in the age of pragmatic responses. We show up to a crisis and convince ourselves, our allies and, hopefully, our adversaries that we are contributing meaningfully to the crisis. And then we go home.
But now home is precisely the center of the defence challenge.
How to avoid the infamous ‘tyranny of dissonance’ as Michael Evans put it, where defence plans said one thing, but our political class often asked the ADF to do something else?
And the third challenge is to strategic thinking.
How do we build an effective strategy for a world in profound change and in many ways chaos? Strategy has been shaped since the 1990s around the end of the Soviet era, global terrorism and wars of choice and the hidden hand of supporting a “rules-based order.”
But in the context of profound change within the allied world, the growing impact of authoritarian powers and the end of the globalization of the past thirty years, what is our strategy?
As Carr warned: “We’re locking in now to a process that is making bets about what the future will look like, so that we can shape policy in an orderly way. Will such an approach deliver real benefits in coherence and focus tomorrow, and will these offset the inevitable costs to our ability to adapt and innovate in response to what’s happening today?”
My own sense is that we are in era of profound change, different from the three historical eras I have already lived through. We need to consider the nature of that era rather than simply go on auto-pilot from the past twenty hears, or think that our war games really capture in any way the nature of the new historical era.
The USMC has introduced three major air platforms in the past twenty years. The Osprey was introduced during the land wars, but introduced during the Obama Administration’s “pivot to the Pacific.” But with the Trump Administration’s emphasis on the “great power competition” in 2018 it began its enhanced role in the Pacific which has seen the introduction of the CMV-22B.
I have written about that in my book The Role of the Osprey in the Pivot to the Pacific.
Next the USMC introduced the F-35B and it played a key role in the ability of the U.S. military with partners to build out fifth generation capability during the era of the land wars. But not until the “great power competition” shift did the U.S. really focus once again on the fifth-generation transition.
Indeed, in my view this only is beginning again and the focus on how to effectively integrate and support a global fleet of U.S. and allied F-35s (what I call F-35 2.0) is only underway now.
I wrote about this in my book My Fifth-Generation Journey: 2004-2018.
But the CH-53K is being introduced in the new strategic context, in the era of “great power competition” and peer conflict. Hence, it is being introduced when its capabilities including its digital backbone need to be considered from the standpoint of the strategic context within which it is being introduced.
It is also being introduced in a context where there have been two strategic events which have also underscored that the logistical and sustainment approach used during the land wars is simply irrelevant. The pandemic undercut civilian and military supply chains and underscored their fragility. The conflict with China has also underscored the importance of secure supply chains rather than just-in time delivery from global suppliers wherever they are located and whatever their politics.
The war in Ukraine should not have been a shock and was logically implied in earlier Russian actions. We wrote about this in our book, The Obama Administration Confronts Global Change.
But what this war has overwhelmingly demonstrated is the lack of depth in the supplies to support military operations.
Not only has just-in time delivery and the absence of investment in supplies and equipment stockpiles been shown to have failed, the investments in building supply depth have still to be made in a coherent or strategic manner.
Enter the CH-53K. Here is an aircraft whose digital backbone can be leveraged to build predictive maintenance and an ability to shape effective knowledge of the supplies needed at the tactical edge to ensure that the CH-53Ks onboard the Navy ships it is supporting in distributed maritime operations can have the operational levels needed.
But how to ensure that the government, the prime contractor and the supply chain can do this?
To date, the best way to do that has been through a system called performance-based logistics. This is a system in which the government and the contractor work a partnership to incentivize the contractor to deliver best value supply chain support to the government. It has been based largely on the model of the land-wars in terms of operating at a pace necessary for peacetime deployments or support for warehouses abroad to support land operations.
It has not been re-shaped to do what the Israelis have thought necessary with their CH-53Ks, namely an ability to surge to support in time of conflict. Or put another way, if peacetime ops are not the norm, but surge operations to various levels is, how do we reshape PBLs to meet the new strategic norm?
I continued my conversation with Pierre Garant concerning the CH-53K and sustainability along these lines.
According to Garant: “The purpose of a PBL is to incentivize long-term production of the supplies for the aircraft. It allows the company working with the government on a PBL to build effective longer-term relationships with suppliers to have money flowing to ensure production of every key element needed to supply the operational fleet of aircraft.
He argued that “you’re building resiliency, and you’re building to anticipate obsolescence issues and to get ahead of the game with regard to problems and challenges to ensure supply chain effectiveness. Given the key role as well of government depots they are key partners in this entire effort.
“As we talked about last time, with the data coming off of the aircraft, we can generate big data to shape a realistic assessment ongoing of the performance of parts which can could then be used and translated in better management of the supply chain and to do so to get at those surge issues you mentioned.”
In my view, the traditional PBL approach has largely been an accounting approach to improve efficiency in the use of supply dollars. In a new PBL approach, the need to surge would be part of the consideration in funding the PBL. The legacy PBL has laid a solid foundation but we cannot assume that peacetime ops is the norm to define a PBL; we need to build in surge considerations in an era of great competition.
I have had the privilege to work with military officers throughout the Western world for more than 30 years. If there is one constant, it has been their concern with the ready force. Long-range thinking is important, but you have to “fight tonight with the force you have.”
Preparedness and availability of the ready force is what deterrence is built on; not the dreams of force planners and politicians. When one faces real world conflict, rather than war games, with your life on the line, how ready and sustainable the force is becomes your only priority.
Not surprisingly at the 27 September 2023, Air Commodore Nick Osborne, Director General Preparedness within the RAAF, underscored how important a focus on preparedness of the current force really is for deterrence. His recent command was of the Surveillance and Response Group which is a key element for providing for the direct defence of Australia and is a group that has undergone fundamental transformation over the past few years, as it has added among other capabilities the P-8 and now will add the Triton.
Air Commodore Nick Osborne, Director General Preparedness within the RAAF, speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar 27 September 2023.
He noted that preparedness has been largely understood with the following formula: Platform x Training x Aim Point x Sustainability. But he argued that “We now have a different understanding of Preparedness, and what it means to us. It’s about what we do, and how well we do it, and to whom.”
“For many years, preparedness was synonymous with readiness. And it was as simplistic as having an aircraft or a platform ready to go in a certain mode. It was very platform centric, and it didn’t clearly state what the target was, or what we had to do to the target.”
“Now we have a whole new concept of preparedness in the last couple of years. It’s not just about having a capability or platform ready to go at a certain time. But it must be ready to go at a certain time to do something to a certain standard against an adversary of a certain skill, and to continue to do so for a certain length of time.
“But a few years ago, we tended to look at preparedness as if we were playing a game of football. We didn’t really know who we were playing against, how good they were, or when the game would occur. And in fact, we weren’t even sure whether we were playing rugby, soccer, AFL or League. Now we’ve got a bit more clarity.
“We’ve got a different understanding of preparedness and what it means to us. It’s not just about platforms, but it’s about what we do, how will we do it and to whom.
“In a world marked by evolving geopolitical landscapes, and technological advancements, our ability to anticipate, adapt and accelerate air warfare has become the lynchpin of our national security. Air power remains the pillar of our defense strategy. Long gone are the days when a strong army alone could guarantee victory. Today, the ability to project airpower swiftly and decisively has become a cornerstone of military superiority.
“And we live in an age where battle space extends beyond what we can see and is reaching into the digital realm.
“To maintain our edge and safeguard our interests, we have to be prepared for the challenges that lie ahead and be equipped with cutting edge strike capabilities to counter our emerging threats. And enhanced preparedness actually refers to our ability to rapidly and effectively respond to a wide range of potential threats and contingencies that will occur in modern warfare.
“It encompasses a multifaceted effect, and that approach includes readiness, technological advancements, training, strategic partnerships, and the capacity to adapt quickly. And of course, strike is one of those areas in which we have to be very proficient.”
After the seminar, I had a chance to sit down with Air Commodore Osborne and correlate his presentation on preparedness with the challenges of being commander of the SRG. I have visited the SRG in the past, and it is a place where various parts of the surveillance capabilities of the Air Force and the ADF has been bundled. Over the past decade, the SRG has evolved into a more integrated capability and with the addition of the P-8 and Triton and the ISR enterprise built at the Edinburgh Air Base in South Australia is shaping new integrated data management capabilities.
But takes time: You cannot simply take the force you have and plop into some future force structure design and presto bingo have a new force structure. It is about taking the force you have and having practical, doable steps forward in force transformation. That takes time, commitment, money, leadership and manpower and does not occur over night.
I have written three books on three different new combat air systems for the USMC, the Osprey, the CH-53K and the F-35B, and all have together transformed the force, but to do so has requires operational experience, training and force structure redesign.
The ADF has gone and is going down a similar path. The DSR will not create a new effective force unless the practical steps are taken to allow the ADF to find its way ahead in terms of real operational capabilities, missions, training and new approaches to sustainability and preparedness.
Osborne gave an example of the new working relationship between the Australian Army and Air Force where they are working to shape how to more effectively shape and execute agile operations in areas such as Northern Australia.
And I would add that will require new training, new ops approaches, and new effectors and some new equipment. It is about force mobility on the Australian landscape and probably using a new generation of UAVs as the platforms launched into the key defence area for Australia which Osborne indicated in a slide which he used during his presentation and which is the featured graphic at the beginning of this article.
But put bluntly, 80% of the force you have now will be in your force structure in 20 years short of it being destroyed in conflict. So what is the plan to leverage the current force – which has made great progress in many areas of modernization in the past decade – and the force the writers of the DSR want?
During my visit to the DSEI conference in London In September 2023, I spent a significant part of my time looking at a real revolution in ship building, maritime automated systems, and the payload revolution underlying the kill web.
I did this in large part by the opportunity to talk with Danish colleagues about their progress in building a next generation modular vessel. A key aspect of this effort was the opportunity to conduct a follow up interview with Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen who is Executive Director, Navy Programs, Defence Command, Denmark.
Since we last talked, the Danish government has gone ahead with the design and preparation for the first in class of the new modular ships.
In our last discussions, he described how the modular concept is being worked: “A key focus is upon the desired effects to be created, and the missions to be supported by the desired maritime payloads, rather than upon the platforms as the primary focus. The effects focus means that air and land capabilities which are integratable with maritime platforms is a key focus of attention as well in thinking about the operational ecosystem.
“Rear Admiral Mikkelsen underscored the importance of the following in my interview with him at the Euronaval meeting in October 2022: “What effects do we need to achieve? And how will sensors and the weapons as payloads on the fleet and in the force create those effects? How will autonomous systems play a role? How and where in our battlespace?”
The first ship in the new “mothership” class is a Multi Role Patrol Ship designed to operate in the Baltic and the North Sea. It is being built with a clear eye to building out other types of ships all able to operate common payloads to enable both operational flexibilities, and the possibility of a new approach to the arsenal of democracy.
With the modules being built around the standard 20- and 40-foot container dimensions, Mikkelsen argued that Denmark along with e.g. its Nordic allies, for example, could build modules in common which could be swapped across a wider fleet of modular ships.
This allows not only collaborative production across an allied production base but allows for rapid specialization by a particular ship on a mission by swapping in the relevant modules. And these modules could clearly be shared by nations in the area of operation.
If a similar concept is implemented in relation to future naval home guard vessels , the modules would be standardized and available for the kinds of missions which the Home Guard would most likely perform.
Autonomous systems will operate from these modules or in the case of UAVs from the decks of these ships. The first module ships built by Denmark used modules that met Danish specs; this generation will be built using the standard specs built around standard 20- 40-foot dimensions.
This can trigger a global shift in standardization which allied negotiators have rarely achieved. Standardization of modules and systems to be placed in 20- or 40-foot containers can provide a significant opening to shaping an allied arsenal of democracy, of a kind that simply does not exist now. “Standardization and adaptability could become a reality to a much larger degree than we traditionally have thought about”, Mikkelsen said.
Another way to look at the build approach is to understand the focus is upon significantly enhancing the % of the ship which can deliver security and defense loads as compared to a traditional combat ship.
By building a wide-beam ship, which is being continued from the flex class and the trend nowadays, there is the opportunity with modular standardization to enhance significantly the payloads carried on the particular ship within the overall approach to building a mothership class of ships.
Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen argued that the approach allows an ability to deal with the spectrum of security and military operations which underlay maritime deterrence.
“In terms of payloads, we are looking at the mix of capabilities needed in peacetime and through the process of fighting a war. We need to create adaptability on the platform; we need to plan for payload innovation and the ability to upgrade rapidly the capability of the ship as a means to operate the relevant payloads to the operation needed.
“By working with standardized modules one can design weapons, sensors, and systems to be carrier in those modules. They can be handled in ports around the world, and racked and stacked. This allows nations to share payloads and to support one another in a crisis.”
The ship is a “mother ship” not just because it is operating with flexible payloads but because it is being built to take full advantage of the autonomous system revolution. It will be able to operate UAVs, USVs, UUVs, and other AI enabled elements.
And according to Mikkelsen: “We will focus as well on how we might be able to operate the ship itself remotely in terms of extreme danger as well.”
Note: A video recently produced by Naval News concerning the future Multi Role Patrol Ship of the Royal Danish Navy highlights some key aspects of the first ship of the new class. I have clipped some screenshots to highlight how to visualize the new ship and its approach to modularity.
Here is an interview by Naval News with Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen which focuses on the new ship.
What is the relationship among multi-domain strike capabilities, warfighting and deterrence?
Multi-domain strike capabilities can only be done with foundational capabilities which enhance one’s viability in warfighting, and by being able to do so to enhance the adversary perceptions of their risk calculus. They need to believe that continuing a conflict is not worth the effort because they can not easily defeat you or intimidate you into capitulating to their demands.
But I would argue that strategically enabled multi-domain strike also requires political-military leadership which understands how to engage in war termination. And I would argue being able to do effective war termination rests on the adversary’s understanding of the robustness of our ability to continue a campaign. And this rests as well on a viable distributed force structure whose continued ability to punish an adversary suggests that war termination is in their interest as well as ours.
The presentations of General Wilsbach at the March and September Williams Foundation seminars provide several insights which suggest the relationships among multi-domain strike, war fighting and deterrence.
From General Wilsbach’s video presentation to the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar.
At the March seminar, the General argued the following: “The message of cost imposition is simple on its surface but has layers to consider. First and foremost, we all understand that no one wins if a conflict with China breaks out in the Indo-Pacific. That would be the worst-case scenario for every nation that calls the region home and is the last thing any of us want.
“So if an aggressor chooses to cross that line, they are already willing to bear considerable cost. That’s why the deterrence must be credible and convincing. You cannot leave room for doubt that the cost could be tolerable.
“To do that, you need to know who should receive that message. In authoritarian regimes, it must reach the few people at the top who hold all the decision- making authority. They may never bear the cost personally, but their power relies on the fear and submission of those who will….
“Denial, cost, resilience. Ideally, our deterrence actions should convey all three messages simultaneously. If I were an adversary planner, seeing capable forces across multiple, like- minded nations committed to action, able to deny my goals at overwhelming cost to me, and resilient enough to weather any of my attacks, that would keep me up at night. Integrated deterrence requires integration, readiness, and willingness, but it also needs one more thing—belief.”
In the September seminar, Wilsbach focused then on how multi-domain strike empowered deterrent capabilities. He underscored in his video presentation the following:
“There are many reasons to lean into multi domain operations, but I want to focus on one in particular, multi domain operations allow us to overwhelm and trip the adversary. Historically, warfare carries certain constants.
“One of the most important of these is gaining and maintaining the initiative. A combatant seizes the initiative, not through advanced technologies or superior training, but because they hit the adversary hard enough to knock them off balance, then hit them repeatedly to maintain an enduring advantage. pressure generated by synchronizing operations in time and space creates the opportunities where technology and training can make a difference.”
To be able to do multi-domain operations requires a warfighting ecosystem which reflects and embodies effective warfighting and deterrent capabilities, of the sort no adversary could miss. Of course, the failure to build such an ecosystem will mean that multi-domain strike will not be feasible or viable. The adversary understands this and targets force integration across a distributed battlespace, and works to enhance antagonisms among allies in a way to undercut the kind of integration which is both possible and necessary.
Wilsbach emphasized three key elements of the warfighting ecosystem which enables multi-domain strike and deterrence.
“The three angles of attack I’ve covered today, optimizing internal Air Force capabilities, joint integration, and allied and partner integration are areas we need to push. If we want to execute multi domain operations.
“All three will fail, however, if we don’t leverage our decisive angle, our airmen and aviators, our people are the best in the world, something our competitors recognize as they tried to copy our methods and attempt to hire our former members to train their forces….”
He concluded with a fundamental warning regarding the importance of shaping multi-domain strike capabilities throughout an integrated joint and coalition force as a core enabler of warfighting and deterrence.
“As I conclude allow me to make one more pass to stress the importance of multi-domain strike, Seizing and maintaining the initiative remains a key tenant of success in conflict. And you can only do that by hitting your adversary from every angle. The modern battlefield has one overarching rule–overwhelm or be overwhelmed.”
