CH-53K King Stallions at WTI-1-24

10/21/2023

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 perform preflight checks as part of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, Oct. 12, 2023.

The WTI course is an advanced, graduate-level, seven-week course hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron (MAWTS) 1, which provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications, to support Marine aviation training and readiness and to assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force.

10.12.2023

Video by Cpl. Rowdy Vanskike

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

In an April 26, 2023 interview with the CO of MAWTS-1 we discussed the King Stallion coming to the WTI courses at MAWTS-1.

Ever since 2018, MAWTS-1 has focused on the high-end fight component of the full spectrum of warfare. Force distribution is a key part of the survivability against a competitor who has significant firepower and can concentrate fires on relatively fixed positions.

The Marines have worked mobile basing for a long time, such as working forward refueling points and buying the Osprey and the F-35B which can operate off a wide variety of launch and landing points.

But in the past few years, the emphasis has been with regard to how to move more quickly from mobile operating bases and to do so in support of the joint force. This is a capability not only of interest to the Marines and the U.S. forces but core allies as well.

While during my latest visit to Australia where there is enhanced interest, for example, in the RAAF with agile air operations, I spoke with the CO of MAWTS-1, Colonel Eric Purcell about how MAWTS-1 was progressing with regard to training with regard to mobile basing.

He started by noting that given the close working relationship which the Marines had with the Australians, they were focused on training for such operations. Col Purcell mentioned that last November his team met in London with U.S, and partner commands similar to MAWTS-1 in the UK. The USAF and the U.S. Navy along with Canada, and Australia discussed joint learning and training perspectives.

According to Purcell: “At the meeting last November, we looked at a number of different ways in which we can work jointly on problems such as agile combat employment, distributed maritime operations, EABOs (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations) and F-35 integration. Canada has just recently formally joined the F-35 program, so they were not part of that discussion.”

As the Marines operate Ospreys. F-35s and now CH-53Ks, the Marines are bringing significantly capability to the evolving mobile basing function. In my book published last year on USMC transformation, I underscored the central role which mobile basing is playing in the current phase of USMC transformation. Col Purcell put it succinctly: “We are taking capability which we have had for some time, but focused on how we can move more rapidly from mobile base to mobile base. We have to find ways to make mobile bases, smaller, more distributed and persist for shorter periods of time.”

Another key aspect is that what has been a core competence of the USMC now is becoming a key capability for the wider joint and coalition force. Col Purcell put it this way: “I think the challenge for all of the forces, whether it’s the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the coalition forces is that the sustainment of distributed forces is challenging. How do we adapt our maintenance, logistical and sustainment systems that have been used to operating from austere bases, but now enhance the mobility of those austere bases?”

During my last two visits to MAWTS-1, I discussed with the ground artillery Marines the challenge of integrating their fires into a joint fires solution when emphasizing force distribution and mobility. I asked Col Purcell about progress in this area. He argued that the joint fires piece is a central challenge being worked. He noted that at the recent WTI 2-23 they were working this hard. One example was incorporating the simulated integration of the future USMC Nemesis ground launch system into joint naval fires.

Part of the enhanced capability for the Marines to support force mobility was the involvement of four CH-53Ks into WTI 2-23. Col Purcell indicated that “during the course we lifted 36K loads with the CH-53K which points to future capabilities. With regard to future capabilities, we can leverage the aircraft’s ability to hold 9 to 10,000 pounds of fuel off on each of the three hooks of the CH-53K. The ability of each of the hooks to carry a fuel bladder is a key advantage for force mobility. One could add that the changes in the cockpit allow for the management of such a load as well. This is a real game changer for us at a time when we and the joint force are emphasizing distributed force logistical support and sustainability.”

In short, MAWTS-1 continues its core mission of supporting the change which the Marines and the joint and coalition force need to pursue. In our 2013 book entitled, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific, we underscored what we saw as the integration being generated at MAWTS-1 a key driver of the kind of military change required to deal with Pacific threats. We still do.

Flight Line Maintenance at MAWTS-1: WTI-1-24

Currently, MAWTS-1 is conducting its latest WTI course.

These photos show flight line maintenance during the course.

The current course includes the new King Stallion it is training regime.

The King Stallion is the third major new air systesm introduced into the USMC since 2007, the first being the Osprey and the second the F-35B.

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, executes an external lift of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-24 at Auxiliary Airfield II, near Yuma, Arizona, Oct. 3, 2023. WTI is an advanced, graduate-level course for selected pilots and enlisted aircrew providing standardized advanced tactical training and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Elizabeth Gallagher)

Poland After the Elections: What Happens Next?

By Robert Czulda

Last Sunday, millions of Poles voted for a new parliament for a four-year term.

These elections had record-breaking turnout (74.38%) and attracted the attention of global media like no other recent election.

Although Western liberal media immediately declared a great victory for the opposition in Poland, the new political landscape is more complicated than such judgements would suggest.

A new distribution of seats in the Polish bicameral parliament creates an almost deadlock situation, which will practically make governance more difficult. It’s not even known who will become the prime minister.

PiS (Law and Justice), which has been the ruling party since 2015, and is ideologically right-wing but economically left-leaning, won the election. In total, PiS received 35.38% of the votes (in 2019, they got 43.59%), which gives them 42.17% of all Sejm mandates (194). The second is KO (Citizens’ Coalition) with 157 mandates, while the third, Trzecia Droga (Third Road), obtained 65 mandates.

PiS has the most votes, but it no longer has a parliamentary majority, and its ability to form a coalition with other parties is very limited.

However, PiS does not want to lose power and is offering the PSL (Polish People’s Party), which is an agrarian party, a coalition.

However, the PSL, at least for now, remains on the opposition side. If the PSL changes its stance and accepts the offer, the current government will retain power.

It is also legally possible to form a minority government, but its effectiveness would be minimal.

Currently, this is the most likely scenario.

An alternative option is the formation of a coalition government of opposition parties that have already begun negotiating a potential division of power.

However, such a government would be constrained by a power of the President.

Until August 2025, the right-wing President Andrzej Duda will remain in office, but he cannot run for re-election.

Duda has closely collaborated with the PiS government. Thus it is expected that he would be willing to veto any laws that deviate from the previous government’s program.

This also applies to military matters, as Duda has emphasized a crucial role of military modernization since the beginning of his term. Overriding a presidential veto in Poland requires a 3/5 majority vote.

This means that Poland is expected to face months of political chaos and severe struggle for power.

More elections  – in early 2024 – cannot be ruled out.

The final distribution of mandates has created an impasse in that no one party has a stable majority that would enable effective governance.

However, what if re-elections do not ultimately take place, and the opposition assumes power?

Fundamental problems remain in obtaining a clear majority which means there will be an ongoing need to consider opinions and interests of coalition partners and face the risk of the President’s veto.

The President will no longer be required to be loyal to PiS and can act more independently to pursue his individual goals.

For now, the opposition pledged not to abandon arms procurements made by the PiS government.

Currently, Poland is undertaking significant investments in its armed forces.

From 2021 to 2035, the state budget is expected to include USD 154 billion on defense, with additional off-budget expenditures expected to reach up to USD 75 billion between 2021 and 2027.

This entails increasing expenditures (3% of GDP) and a planned rise in debt up to USD 19 billion annually between 2025 and 2027.

However, many of these planned purchases have not yet been financed, and there are no executive agreements, which raises questions about their future.

The opposition, particularly left-wing coalition partners, may be tempted to reduce defense spending.

It is speculated that the new (opposition) government could try to cancel some agreements with South Korea, including civil ones (a future of the Polish nuclear energy program, which also involves the U.S. companies, is in serious doubt).

The most controversial modernization projects include an agreed purchase of 48 FA-50 light combat aircraft and up to 672 K9 155 mm self-propelled howitzers.

Poland is almost certain to abandon a plan to establish armed forces with a size of 300,000 personnel. This was one of the flagship programs of the PiS government.

The new government (if formed by the current opposition) will seek to improve relations with the European Union, primarily with Germany.

Therefore, one can expect a return to arms deals with European suppliers and certain reductions in orders from the United States, although Polish commentators generally agree that the new government in Warsaw will not want to spoil its relationship with the Americans.

One should anticipate reduced procurements of the AH-64E assault helicopters and a cancellation of a plan to buy the S-70i helicopters.

Even without such radical moves, the United States will no longer have such a loyal and a steadfast ally.

“New” Poland under the opposition’s rule will speak more often with a European (German) voice than an American one.

There is a widespread awareness in Poland that the armed forces have to be further strengthened.

This impression is a result of two fundamental factors.

Firstly, Russia has not been defeated in Ukraine and continues to present aggressive intentions. Particularly concerning are recent announcements of the Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Russian parliament, who stated that in 2024, military expenditures are supposed to increase by 68% to roughly USD 110 billion (6% of Russian GDP).

Secondly, the situation in the Middle East is becoming increasingly unstable. At some point, this may necessitate direct involvement by the United States. In the event of a deteriorating situation in the Indo-Pacific region (where China might attempt to exploit the issue), Poland may be compelled to defend itself independently.

Although there are many open questions in post-election Poland, two things are certain.

Firstly, even with a change of government, Poland will not undergo any abrupt changes in its foreign and security policy. The friendly stance towards NATO and the West will be maintained.

Secondly, Poland continues to be a strong and healthy democracy.

Despite the opposition’s hysterical claims in recent years that PiS is an authoritarian regime that will not relinquish power and might attempt a military coup in case of an electoral defeat (sic!), none of such scenarios have materialized.

Photo Credit: Poland’s President Andrzej Duda during a press statement after meetings with European Council and Commissions presidents in Brussels, Belgium, 07 February 2022.

Shutterstock: Stock Photo ID: 2120178674

Pacific Defender Exercise

10/20/2023

Multinational Humanitarian Disaster Relief Exercise in San Jose Ca, Aug 2023. 20 plus countries in the Indo-Pacific Region come together to train on communications efforts during and after a Humanitarian event.

Hosted by USINDOPACOM from Hawaii, this annual event serves as a catalyst for joint training and networking amongst the participants.

09.01.2023

Video by Justin Fairley

2D Audiovisual Squadron

REPMUS 23

10/19/2023

Exercises REPMUS 23 and Dynamic Messenger 23 took place in Tróia and Sesimbra, Portugal in September 2023. They focused on integrating new maritime unmanned systems into NATO operations, and featured the ability of autonomous underwater vehicles to operate effectively together.

REPMUS (Robotic Experimentation and Prototyping augmented by Maritime Unmanned Systems) is an annual sea trial that focuses on technology development and interoperability. REPMUS is led by host country Portugal.

Fifteen NATO Allies, along with partner Ireland and NATO invitee Sweden, were involved in the exercise.

Exercise Dynamic Messenger 23 focused on integrating maritime unmanned systems into NATO’s military operations.

This exercise gathered more than 2,000 civilian and military personnel, giving all involved a chance to familiarise themselves with the cutting edge of unmanned systems in the maritime domain. Fourteen NATO Allies took part, as well as NATO invitee Sweden.

September 18, 2023

NATOCHANNEL

We are publishing a new book next year entitled The Coming of Maritime Autonomous Systems.

 

The DSR Introduces Change: But How to Shape a Realistic Force Re-Design?

10/17/2023

By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia is support of the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar, I was able to meet with Dr. Stephan Frühling, Professor at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University.

Professor Stephan Frühling teaches and researches at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of The Australian National University and has widely published on Australian defence policy, defence planning and strategy, nuclear weapons and NATO.

We discussed four key aspects of the impact of the Defence Strategic Review and the process associated with it.

First, Frühling underscored that the DSR has recognized the need for a new approach to planning and shaping force structure development or at least new to the practices of the Department of Defence. The document speaks of net assessment planning, a term which he introduced in one of his books.

What the Department means in using this term is threat-based planning in which force structure development decisions are made in direct response to adversary capabilities and likely operations against Australia. That the review calls for government-endorsed planning scenarios is important in this context, and implementation of this change is underway within the Department but it is early days with regard to judging the outcome of this process shift within DoD.

Second, even with the issuance of the DSR, what strategy Australia will pursue to achieve deterrence and defence is not actually spelled out in the document. What is clear from AUSMIN communiques since 2020 and the increased cooperation with the U.S.—and now also Japan—on the Force Posture Initiative is that the government has committed itself to working with the American-led effort in Indo-Pacific deterrence and defence. But the DSR only acknowledges this in passing, in relation to the development of the bare bases.  It also means that government struggles to articulate to the public how AUKUS fits within the broader Australian defence policy settings.

Third, this raises a fundamental question according to Frühling.

How do you craft Australian force structure design without understanding explicitly what the U.S. will do in the same conflict?

There will be operations Australia will want to be able to undertake self-reliantly; but what these would entail and what the demands will be on Australian forces will ultimately arise from within the context of overall, US-led theatre strategy.  This is something that Australia’s defence planning process, or U.S.-Australia alliance discussions, are yet to come to terms with.

Frühling argued that shaping a practical way ahead could well be driven by the Australians and Americans working practical details of how their forces will work together in the years ahead.

In other words, rather than white papers or Australian DoD planning documents, perhaps we should look at how the ADF and Indo-PACOM work a way ahead. Of course, the U.S. is itself in the throes of fundamental change with regard to its force structure.

What Frühling was suggesting that this could be a two-way street between shaping the way ahead with regard to the ADF and with regard to the U.S. and other allied forces, perhaps most notably the Japanese.

Frühling underscored: “One can’t do the DSR planning without knowing the broader context of what the U.S. is doing.”

The fourth key element we discussed was the focus of Australian defence policy. Frühling argued: “The DSR prioritizes deterrence by denial. With such a focus, the success of our strategy hinges on actually being able to credibly deny whatever the Chinese want to do.

“And I just don’t think that we are in such a position to do so.”

In a major conflict, Australia will need to carefully manage risks of attrition; setting the expectation that every Chinese operation would need to be denied by the ADF would not be helpful.

We discussed an approach we both felt was more credible: crafting, shaping and enhancing a defence in depth strategy. Frühling emphasized: “This is a much more realistic concept. It focuses on preparedness, resilience and national build out of sovereign capabilities to sustain our ability to stay in the fight.”

Ironically, I would add, that from an American point of view that might be the key contribution of Australia, not projecting power away from Australian territory. It will be interesting to see what happens as the ADF is restructured and the U.S. forces work through the fundamental changes associated with force distribution.

I would argue that Australia will certainly have its impact on the American military leadership located in Hawaii thinks about the way ahead. It is a two-way street.

Virtual Reality Training at Osan Air Base

10/16/2023

U.S. Air Force defenders from the 51st Security Forces Squadron standardization and evaluations flight, ensure base security through virtual reality training at Osan Air Base, Republic of Korea, Sept. 28, 2023.

This team ensures defenders in the squadron have the knowledge and capability to defend the base from any and all threats, enabling others to execute Osan’s mission as the Air Force’s most forward-deployed permanently-based wing.

OSAN AIR BASE, 41, SOUTH KOREA

09.22.2023

Video by Senior Airman Aaron Edwards and Tech. Sgt. Zachariah Lopez 51st Fighter Wing

European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI)

10/13/2023

Signing ceremony – Allies join Airspace Management (AER) and public opening remarks by NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 12 October 2023.

Natochannel

See also, the following:

Germany and the European Sky Shield Initiative: A July 2023 Update

European Sky Shield Initiative Update