Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard

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10/13/2023

Maintenance Facility and the crew of the USS Hawaii (SSN 776).

Happy 248th Birthday Navy and Ha`oli La Hanau!

09.20.2023

Video by Dave Amodo Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility

This spring, we visited the shipyard and interviewed its commander.

May 26, 2023

As the U.S. Navy works its ability for distributed operations with integrated effects, how will the fleet be supported and sustained?

One answer to that question is the major challenge of rebuilding the fleet’s maintenance infrastructure.

Years of just-in-time maintenance, supporting wars of choice not wars of necessity, have highlighted the need to invest in the ability to turn U.S, Navy  ships out from maintenance in a timely manner and to have the requisite trained workforce to support enduring operations in a high tempo conflict.

Although increasingly recognized as a key priority, rebuilding the U.S. Navy’s maintenance infrastructure takes not only time and money, but the human capital to maintain a fleet built for enduring operations.

Unlike China, U.S. maintenance yards need to be redesigned and upgraded to support comprehensive and efficient operations of a modern combat fleet.

What is the U.S. Navy doing to right the ship, with regard to maintainability?

During my late April 2023 visit to Honolulu, I sat down with Captain Richard Jones, Commander of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNSY & IMF), to discuss how they are shaping a way ahead that both enhances near-term capabilities and looks ahead to meet the Pacific’s challenging strategic environment .

Simply put, the key metric of a shipyard is the speed at which ships under maintenance are returned to combat commanders. Shipyards must continually look for opportunities and methods to ramp up the maintenance period rate, particularly when considering the possibility of sustained conflict against a peer competitor.

With the recognition that shipyards must become more efficient, the Navy established the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) program office in May 2018. As the Navy has described this effort:

The Navy’s four public shipyards — Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY), Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY), Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PSNS&IMF), and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PHNSY&IMF) —  perform a vital role in national defense by executing maintenance on submarines and aircraft carriers in order to provide combat-ready ships to the fleet.

Originally designed and built in the 19th and 20th centuries to build sail- and conventionally-powered ships, the Navy’s public shipyards are not efficiently configured to maintain and modernize nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.

With the Navy’s needed focus on operations, the aging shipyards have been unable to adequately sustain and optimize their facilities, utilities, dry docks, equipment and information technology infrastructure. These inefficiencies and obsolete facilities result in higher maintenance costs, schedule risks and reliability issues.

To create the shipyards that our nation needs requires making significant investments to modernize dry docks, optimize industrial processes and modernize standard equipment to bring these critical industrial sites to modern standards.

To meet that mission, the Navy established the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program (SIOP) program office in May 2018. The SIOP Program Office (PMO 555) is under the Program Executive Office (PEO) Industrial Infrastructure (II), which was established in Fiscal Year 2022 as a Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command (NAVFAC) affiliated PEO and is responsible for the cost, schedule, and performance of SIOP. PEO II reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A).

The Navy will ensure that the optimization process fully integrates environmental considerations including natural and cultural resources, water and air quality, and more. During the development of individual shipyard plans, the Navy will develop alternatives for assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). The Navy will work with stakeholders as part of the decision-making process and will conduct all appropriate NEPA, natural resource and NHPA analyses; agency and government-to-government consultations and public engagement and obtain all required permits to ensure a proactive approach to environmental protection.

With the breadth and depth of needs, the SIOP program has a significant workload to deliver the critical warfighting infrastructure enabling a distributed fleet to operate effectively in crisis and combat situations.

A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on SIOP indicated the steps SIOP has taken to recapitalize its shipyards:

The Navy has taken several actions to improve its public shipyards in recent years. In 2018, the Navy began an effort to modernize and optimize its shipyards, known as the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Plan (SIOP). The Navy has also implemented some GAO recommendations in its efforts to improve shipyards, such as creating a program office to manage the SIOP. In addition, the Navy invested in shipyard infrastructure above the minimum level set by Congress. Finally, the average condition of facilities at Navy shipyards has improved at three of the four shipyards from 2016 to 2020.

In addition to the progress enumerated by GAO, SIOP has commenced the second phase of industrial modeling for all four shipyards to provide data for optimized workflows and has begun the project planning studies for Waterfront Production Facility (WPF) at Pearl Harbor. A task order has been awarded for construction of the new Dry Dock 5 at Pearl Harbor, and multiple Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM) projects to maintain the shipyards’ mission readiness have been executed.

SIOP will continue to “recapitalize the four public shipyards to optimize maintenance production by correcting infrastructure and equipment condition, configuration, capacity, and resiliency shortfalls,” according to Mr. Mark Edelson, the head of the program executive office, Industrial Infrastructure (PEO II). . “The happiest Fleet Commanders have the ships required to fulfill forward presence commitments.” PEO II has oversight of the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, which is a holistic plan that integrates all infrastructure and industrial plant equipment investments at the Navy’s four public shipyards to meet nuclear fleet maintenance requirements.

In my discussion with Captain Jones, he identified a number of attributes needed for mission success and how PHNSY & IMF is working to build these areas.

A key attribute – and one he emphasized – was having a skilled, capable and motivated workforce. He noted that for nearly a decade, the shipyard did not hire new staff, prior to the refocus on the great power competition. This led to a major hiring gap which meant they had an experienced but aging workforce. With the returned focus and renewed appreciation of the yards not to mention an increased workload, the shipyard began bringing many new hires onboard.

With this new workforce, the question became, “how to close the gap and ensure proper transfer of skills to the new hires while simultaneously taking in new types of learning and skills?” The new personnel brought new perspectives, approaches and techniques. Captain Jones indicated that they have been able to blend the old with the new to create a highly effective workforce.

He noted: “If you look at the people coming in, they see the work differently. We don’t accept every idea they propose, but we do we listen and take those ideas into account because they may have a great idea that nobody’s ever thought of before.”

New teaching approaches have helped as well. Captain Jones highlighted the use of virtual reality training. He gave two examples, welding and crane operations. With regard to welding skills, students wear a virtual welding hood that is a simulator.

“It actually feels like you’re holding welding rod. The computer system can tell how hard you’re pressing on it and if you’re pressing on it at the right angle,” Jones said. “When you’re looking through the hood, you see what you would see during an actual welding operation.”

He also described the crane operation training: “We have a rigging trainer for crane operators. When they have their virtual reality hood on, they are in the cab of the crane and have the same controls. When you’re wearing the virtual reality hood, sitting in the chair, it’s very life-like, similar to being in the crane. It really speeds up the training because it doesn’t take a physical crane off operations and it’s much safer because the trainees can make mistakes virtually and not damage anything.”

While the training the workforce receives is a cornerstone of the shipyard, it is also the workforce themselves both as individuals and as a team which is crucial to the success of the shipyard. Captain Jones underscored the workforce is motivated to join PHNSY & IMF. Not only do they have many more Apprentice Program applicants than available openings each year, but they are part of the local community through sports teams, teaching in colleges and universities, mentoring young scientists in STEM programs, and volunteerism.

The workforce also knows PHNSY & IMF has been and continues to be a vital asset to the Nation’s defense both in the past and today. One example is the significant role the shipyard played in World War II and in the following years, ensuring the Navy had the ships they needed to respond to any situation.

It is indeed gratifying to see a local community committed to the nation and its defense.

A second key attribute is to have the proper tooling and material for the repair process. Here the yard could use more investment in new tools and machinery, but the workers use a mix of the old and the new to good effect. As part of the SIOP program, assessments are underway to evaluate the various equipment throughout the shipyard so that upgrades can be made where needed.

Captain Jones noted, “Our machine shop actually uses some pre-World War II equipment. Some of these machines are extremely reliable and they almost never break down and are very good at doing certain things. For example, if we are only going to do single-type milling, it’s much faster to do it on the older machine. We have balance between the new and the old that seems to be working very well.”

A third key attribute also linked to the SIOP program is the process for redesign of the shipyard to support modern workflows to optimize the work process to speed up the ability to more rapidly do ship repairs. The need for these upgrades is linked to how the yard was established in 1908 and developed over time to meet the needs of that time.

SIOP has completed one phase of industrial modeling that shipyards can leverage to improve efficiency. Another phase of industrial modeling for Pearl Harbor and each of the other three shipyards has begun that will provide data for optimized workflows at the yards. This work will provide modeling data for workflows inside the facilities and will inform more detailed project level planning and design (P&D) for future SIOP construction projects.

Another element of this challenge is to enhance the digital backbone at the yard. When asked what Captain Jones would like to see in future investments, the digital backbone is clearly one capability which he felt needed to be enhanced.

Retired Adm. James Foggo emphasized the need for such investment in a 6 January 2023 article on the way ahead with regard to the SIOP. Foggo argued: “While improving the physical infrastructure of these facilities will be critical to success, it’s equally essential that we take this opportunity to build the digital infrastructure required to accelerate our readiness advantage.”

Captain Jones noted that they have established an innovation division within the shipyard which will facilitate the digital transition, such as using 3D printing and other technologies. “I think it’s a step in the right direction but we are still in the infancy stage.”

A fourth key attribute is simply adding more infrastructure capacity. The main effort of the yard is repair of submarines, but the yard does not have the dry docks it needs. The first SIOP related project is the construction of a new graving dry dock to accommodate for a now obsolete Dry Dock #3, which will be replaced by the new Dry Dock #5.

“Our first major project is a new Dry Dock #3 replacement, also known as Dry Dock #5, which will be deep enough, wide enough, long enough for our current SSNs and any future one that’s in the books for planning. There is also a Waterfront Production Facility we are going to put next to it and a pier that we need. We have very little pier space here that meets the requirements,” said Jones.

“Then there is this optimization piece. If you look at the shipyard, our first dry dock built in 1919 has all the work shops were right along next to it. Then we built dry docks 2, 3 and 4. But most of the workshops are still located around the first dry dock. This is not optimal for our workflow, and we need to bring workers closer to where the work instead of spreading the work all over the yard. A lot of time is consumed in transit throughout the yard. We have 1,000 engineers out of 6,000 civilians roughly, the majority of whom are on the fourth floor of this building which is quite far from the waterfront. Moving them down right above the production shops is key element for optimization.”

We also discussed battle-damage repair as illustrated by the yard’s participation in the last RIMPAC exercise.  PHNSY Navy divers participated in simulated battle-damage repair on USS Denver.

As Edward Lundquist noted in an article on this event:

“Before going down on July 22, Denver made one more valuable contribution to the Fleet. Navy salvage and repair experts set explosive charges aboard the ship that enabled battle damage assessment (BDA) teams to respond to actual damage.

“According to Jamie Koehler a Naval Sea Systems Command spokesperson, the event exercised the capabilities and limitations of an expeditionary group of Reservist and Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) Sailors for emergent repair when paired with an emergent repair container capability.

“The event provided the opportunity to survey realistic blast damage and conduct planning to utilize the Emergent Repair Capability afforded by the Emergent Maintenance and Repair Container (EMARC) along with Surge Maintenance (SURGEMAIN) Navy Reservist Sailors to plan and execute emergent repair,” Koehler said.  “Divers were offered a realistic training environment to learn how to assess battle damage and how to effectively repair the ship.”

“The training simulated exactly how a ship would look after an attack or casualty and offered Mobile Diving Salvage Unit One and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard divers a chance to work as a team to assess, repair and return the vessel back to sea,” Koehler said.  “Opportunities like this also identify future manning requirements, equipment shortfalls, and medical response preparations that can be measured appropriately.”

“Battle Damage Assessment Training aboard ex-USS Denver

  • Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC) coordinated the availability of the EMARC containers.
  • Hawaii Regional Maintenance Center provided Sailors an Engineering Assessment team support to the repair planning effort.
  • SURGEMAIN provide Sailors and three Officers to support the assessment, planning and execution of repairs.
  • MDSU-1 conducted Battle Damage Assessments (BDA) and notified PHNSY of their findings. Their knowledge of salvage equipment and techniques were used to complete the BDA evolution.
  • PHNSY conducted Battle Damage Repair (BDR) and patch work to fix the damaged vessel based on MDSU-1’s recommendation. Our knowledge of patches and repair techniques were used to complete the BDR evolution.”

Let me conclude with a few final thoughts.

The challenge of ramping up the speed to deliver ships back to the operational fleet is a key part effective deterrence. It is also a challenge which requires strategic attention.

PHSNY & IMF is keenly aware of their strategic importance and the importance of meeting the key metric of  the speed at which ships under maintenance are returned to combat commanders.. They are actively working to address the key areas of people, process and environment to successfully meet the nation’s needs today and into the future.

NATO Flight Training Europe (NFTE) High Visibility Project

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According to a 12 October 2023 NATO Press Release:

Two initiatives were signed in the margins of the NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting this week (11-12 October 2023), demonstrating Allies’ commitment to work together to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence in the air domain.

On Wednesday (11 October 2023), Germany and the United Kingdom joined the NATO Flight Training Europe (NFTE) High Visibility Project, bringing the total number of participants to 12 (Belgium, Czechia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania, Spain, Türkiye, United Kingdom).

NFTE aims to ensure that sufficient state-of-the-art pilot training is available around Europe in a cost-efficient and interoperable manner. NFTE will leverage existing national and multinational facilities in Europe and, where necessary, expand or create new training capacity to address training requirements for different types of pilots.

These can include basic, intermediate, and advanced categories of training for fighter jet, helicopter, and transport pilots, as well as personnel who remotely pilot unmanned aircraft. This is a high priority, especially for many smaller European NATO Allies whose training requirements do not justify the creation of national training centres.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană said: “NATO’s strength comes from our unity, our posture, the related forces and capabilities, and from systematically training together and forging trusting relationships in the process.

This carries particular importance at a time when we need to ensure the executability of our defence plans. NATO Flight Training Europe is an excellent example of this. This important multinational effort will help us develop a shared approach to training the next generations of aircrews.”

On Thursday (12 October 2023), 13 Allies (Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Türkiye) and invitee Sweden signed an agreement to cooperate on cross-border airspace.

This reflects the participating nations’ commitment to ensure that Allied civil and military authorities can collaborate on the use of air space for NATO training and exercises, and other air activities in several regions of Europe.

The use of larger volumes of national airspace by NATO requires close coordination between civil and military authorities to deliver airspace solutions in a safe and flexible manner.

As the recent Air Defender 23 exercise showed, NATO’s ability to train at scale in the air domain is a critical element of the Alliance’s overall deterrence and defence.

Mr Geoană said: “The solutions will be considered across several European regions and will deliver a flexible approach to airspace management. They will help the Alliance to strengthen NATO’s air and missile defense capabilities. Close collaboration will be required between civil and military users of our airspace […] T

of close collaboration between our military forces and our civilian aviation colleagues.” his has also set an excellent example of close collaboration between our military forces and our civilian aviation colleagues.”

Featured Photo: Left to right: NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoană with Ludivine Dedonder (Minister of Defence, Belgium), Boris Pistorius (Minister of Defence, Germany) and Grant Shapps (UK Secretary of State for Defence)

The DSR as a Strategic Shift: Brigadier General (Retired) Langford Provides a Clear Perspective

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By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia in support of the Williams Foundation seminar held on 27 September 2023, I had a chance to talk with one of the speakers at the conference Brigadier General (Retired) Ian Langford about the DSR and its impact.

During our discussion, Langford provided as clear a statement about how to understand the DSR, the strategic shift in Australian defence and the challenges going forward.

What follows is what he told me.

“The challenge that the ADF has been given from the government is how to transition from a defence force that was inherently designed around the principal task of generating military capabilities that are no longer relevant to the threat or to the changing strategic operating environment as well as the need to adapt to a new concept of joint warfighting, especially as it applies to the integration of space and cyber.

“It is reminiscent in some sense to what happened in the U.S. with the adoption of the National Security Act 1949 which reshaped the U.S. military from being service orientated to becoming ‘joint by design’.

“Historically, the ADF has been somewhat designed to fight as a service alongside an ally. The U.S. Navy, the Royal Australian Navy, the Royal Australian Air Force and the USAF are more closely interrelated with each other than they appear to be with their own armies. Joint doctrine, common command and control systems, joint targeting networks and a unified operating concept are all necessary if the ADF is to be more joint and therefore more capable.

“The DSR has begun this transition.

“In the DSR, the use of a ‘deterrence by denial’ strategy requires the ADF to use geography to contextualise it future operational environment. Extended range and battlefield geometry, to include airbases, ports and logistical nodes are critical to this, as is increasing focus on key continental areas of concern to include critical infrastructure and manufacturing hubs; it is no longer appropriate to a simple 360-degree view terrestrial defense which the ADF does not have the capacity for anyway.

“In terms of the DSR impacts on the region, to quote a former Prime Minister, “Do we seek security in Asia, or from Asia? The answer to this question is not in the realm of military strategy, but rather exists in the national psyche; I still think this has not been resolved in terms of how Australians think about defense and security more broadly.

“Managing our economic security and national security will be a critical feature of Australian statecraft. It’s not a binary issue, because they ultimately must coexist.

He concluded with this thought: “If you read only the DSR, then you don’t get a complete picture of what national security requirements look like from a whole government perspective.

“The DSR only explains part of the security challenge Australia has in front of it; to put it simply, it is more than just military power.”

Featured Image: HMAS Toowoomba’s embarked MH-60R helicopter “Valkyrie” conducts a personnel transfer exercise on the forecastle during regional presence deployment.

The Royal Australian Navy is undertaking a regional presence deployment in Southeast and Northeast Asia. During the deployment, HMA Ships Brisbane, Stalwart, and Toowoomba will conduct training, exercises, and other engagements with Australia’s regional partners. Regional presence deployments demonstrate Australia’s commitment to, and engagement with, the region.

The deployments play a vital role in Australia’s long-term security and prosperity by protecting Australia’s interests, preserving a rules-based order, enhancing cooperation and relationships with regional partners and allies, and developing capability and interoperability.

Credit: Australian Department of Defence

25 September 2023

C2 Robotics and Crafting New Undersea Operational Capabilities for Defence and Security

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10/11/2023

By Robbin Laird

During my current visit to Australia in support of the 27 September 2023 Willliams Foundation seminar, I have taken the opportunity to continue my discussions on the coming of maritime autonomous systems to the Australian forces.

First, I was able to talk with CDRE Darron Kavanagh, Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, about how to accelerate the effort to introduce maritime autonomous systems within the force.

Next, I spoke with Robert Dane about the progress with regard to one of those Australian systems, namely the Bluebottle USV. There I learned of the progress in the Australian use of his very interesting capability to fill the gap between a crewed ship and nothing as their video higlights.

And I talked with C2 Robotics about their work on building undersea capabilities which provide significant capabilities for a Royal Australian Navy undersea force in profound transition. Part of the answer to how the RAN will manage their submarine transition clearly needs to rely on the kind of capabilities being developed and built by C2 Robotics, located in Melbourne Australia.

At the recent Williams Foundation seminar on multi-domain strike, RADM Stephen Hughes, Head of Navy Capability, highlighted this possibility in his remarks.  He noted that “to attain long range strike capabilities allows us to move from a strategy of defense to a strategy of deterrence through denial signifies a national shift that aims to hold an adversary at risk at greater range.”

For Australia to do this in maritime domain relies on their air and sea capability from their manned platforms, supplemented by a build out of maritime ISR-T enterprise capability seen in the capabilities being built at the Edinburgh airbase and in the air with the P-8/Triton combination in the current period and into the next few years.

But coming in that period and hopefully seeing significant growth in its contribution will be the new generation of uncrewed maritime systems. RADM Hughes noted: “Maritime strike operations are not limited to ship launched long range fires, or air launched long range fires, but include mines, autonomous systems, electronic attack, and any other lethal effect launched from or conducted in the maritime domain.”

The first prototype of the Speartooth undergoing trials in Jervis Bay. Credit: C2Robotics

With regard to the maritime autonomous systems part, RADM Hughes underscored: “Navy is working with industry is exploring solutions through the Autonomous Warrior series of experimental exercises. Programs, such C2 Robotics Speartooth and the Anduril Ghost Shark will have the ability to strike deep against an adversary and able to deploy mines and other guided weapons by sovereign Australian capabilities.”

The Speartooth LUUV is described on the C2Robotics website as follows: “Speartooth is a Large Uncrewed Underwater Vehicle (LUUV) designed for long range, long duration undersea operations. It brings a combination of highly advanced capabilities together with a modular, rapidly reconfigurable design specifically focused on manufacturing scalability and a revolutionary cost point that enables high volume production and deployment.”

Obviously, such a program is shrouded in significant performance and mission secrecy as behooves the domain of undersea warfare, but the company highlights the following features of the craft: large flexible payload bays, common command and control, direct propeller propulsion and variable buoyancy propulsion.

I had a chance to talk with Thomas Loveard, a founder and CTO of the company, and with my colleague Marcus Hellyer, who is a strategic advisor to the company. According to the website: “Tom Loveard holds a PhD in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning. In 2003 he co-founded Sentient Vision Systems, where he led the development of autonomous detection solutions including the award-winning MTI and ViDAR systems. He joined AVTA in 2016 as the CTO, where he championed the development of the world’s best micro gimbal and cutting-edge targeting gimbal systems.”

I hope to visit their facilities in Melbourne on my next visit to Australia but was glad to have the opportunity to begin my discussions with them about their approach and their core platform.

As I have made very clear in my writing about maritime autonomous systems, these are very different from crewed platforms, and are best understood as complements to the crewed force. And they provide important capabilities, to use the Ocius terminology, between crewed assets and nothing. And really until the operational forces begin incorporating maritime autonomous systems within their kill web concepts of operations, we will not see the kind of effect they can have for a smaller navy like the RAN.

But it will be significant indeed. The Australian government is doing a surface fleet review and frankly if this is not done with an eye to the operational mix of crewed and uncrewed systems, they need to go back to the drawing board. Moreover, with the pressure on the Department of Defence’s acquisition budget, any near-term additions to the shopping list will most likely need to be small, affordable systems rather than major platforms.

Loveard pointed out that the company is focused on undersea systems in the autonomous domain and building at a price point where we can buy and deploy many of them. I would note that one key difference when discussing maritime autonomous systems is to understand that they are not designed like crewed platforms in terms of being part of a relatively small build of platforms, but are designed to be built and operate in numbers.

Loveard also underscores that the company was working on the navigation and targeting capabilities of their systems in terms of not having to use more traditional methods using GPS or using radio frequencies as well.

One of the key aspects of maritime autonomous systems is to understand them in terms of the payload revolution which is re-shaping operational forces. What payloads can you project to the relevant operational area rather than which platforms do you send is a key consideration of what I have referred to as the kill web operating force,

And the Speartooth is clearly built around the payload revolution. Indeed, if one looks at traditional naval platforms the % of payload to the operating area is around 30%. After all, you have to provide for and protect the crew. It is very different with maritime autonomous systems where the priority is upon your ability to deliver the relevant payload to the operational area. This means that % wise, the payloads are a much more significant part of the weapon system.

Hellyer added the important point that Speartooth is designed to be a long-range system. This means that it can deploy from various points on Australian territory to provide capability for the ADF. The ability to leverage Australian geography is a key point in shaping the way ahead for Australian defence, and being able to do so without using traditional bases is a key element to be able to do so. Hellyer also noted that Speartooth can be launched from virtually any boat ramp, freeing it from major infrastructure requirements, or even a ‘mother ship’.

Loveard underscored with regard to the payload flexibility of the system that is a completely open architecture system. “We want our system to be rapidly adaptable to new payloads or evolving payloads and to be able to translate that into immediate capabilities rather than to take years of work adapting the platform to new technological realities.”

I emphasized during the 27 September seminar write up, the growing importance of counter-ISR. Clearly, payloads can be developed to allow something like the Speartooth to be a part of counter-ISR operations, as well as ISR and kinetic payloads as well. Moreover, the fact that potentially thousands of Speartooth vessels can ‘hide in plain sight’ to use C2 Robotic’s term, i.e., be stored in shipping containers in commercial facilities and be launched from thousands of locations, immensely complicates an adversary’s ISR problem.

But to get to that future, the force needs to being to employ such capabilities and use these new assets. For only then will they evolve and develop. For unlike crewed platforms, these platforms are built around software which is driven in its development by domain knowledge shaped by operational use and continuous feedback from users. If they are thought of as traditional defence science projects, they will just remain that.

The featured photo: The second prototype being launched from an early version of the  Speartooth launch system.

A Process Shift in Australian Defence and Its Implications: The Perspective of Dr. Andrew Carr

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10/10/2023

By Robbin Laird

During my current trip to Australia in support of the Williams Foundation 27 September 2023, I had a chance to talk with my colleague Dr. Andrew Carr of Australian National University. He is a regular interlocutor for me on strategic issues affecting Australia and the broader alliance.

With the main issue in Australia being the impact of the DSR on shaping a way ahead, Dr. Carr argued that underlying the DSR and the shift to deal with the China threat, there was a process change underlying thinking about the way ahead for Australian defence.

He argued that the basic approach of higher-level defence thinking in Australia since the 1970s has been very pragmatic and assessing change and adjusting Australian engagement in response to the particular crisis or event. Government’s commissioned Defence White Papers if and when needed, and the link between strategy and force structure has not always been well-maintained. Instead, the focus has been on correlating what Australian capabilities are available with crafting a response package to today’s events.

This has allowed Australia to be flexible and to think about if not through events and how to protect Australian interests. But now with a clear focus on the region and a direct threat to Australia in the form of the Chinese along with the broader association of 21st century authoritarian powers, this is no longer adequate.

What now does Australia do to defend itself and protect itself in its own region?

How does it work with and manage allies?

How does Australia manage threats and work through how the broader society deals with the comprehensive Chinese challenge?

Dr. Carr argued that the defence processes are having to become more scenario focused and threat focused.

How does Australia built relevant forces in light of core scenarios of the threats and crises to be anticipated?

Australia cannot do everything. What will the government pare down and focus upon within the defence force?

And how will this thinking correlate with broader considerations for security and economic development of Australia?

In other words, because Australia is facing enduring challenges, Dr. Carr asks: “Does the past practices of pragmatism and ad hoc strategic planning, such as irregular Defence White papers’ still make sense?”

Such a shift poses three major challenges.

The first is within the defence establishment. Carr underscored that today’s ADF has been built around a balanced force structure approach and sharing of resources. A threat based or scenario-based approach will prioritize some forces compared to others.

How will defence adjust to a culture of a threat-based force?

The second challenge faces the political class.  A threat-based focus will require a discipline in the political class to manage defence in a way it really did not need to do in the age of pragmatic responses. We show up to a crisis and convince ourselves, our allies and, hopefully, our adversaries that we are contributing meaningfully to the crisis. And then we go home.

But now home is precisely the center of the defence challenge.

How to avoid the infamous ‘tyranny of dissonance’ as Michael Evans put it, where defence plans said one thing, but our political class often asked the ADF to do something else?

And the third challenge is to strategic thinking.

How do we build an effective strategy for a world in profound change and in many ways chaos? Strategy has been shaped since the 1990s around the end of the Soviet era, global terrorism and wars of choice and the hidden hand of supporting a “rules-based order.”

But in the context of profound change within the allied world, the growing impact of authoritarian powers and the end of the globalization of the past thirty years, what is our strategy?

As Carr warned: “We’re locking in now to a process that is making bets about what the future will look like, so that we can shape policy in an orderly way. Will such an approach deliver real benefits in coherence and focus tomorrow, and will these offset the inevitable costs to our ability to adapt and innovate in response to what’s happening today?”

My own sense is that we are in era of profound change, different from the three historical eras I have already lived through. We need to consider the nature of that era rather than simply go on auto-pilot from the past twenty hears, or think that our war games really capture in any way the nature of the new historical era.

The CH-53K in the New Strategic Era: The Case of the Sustainment Enterprise

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10/09/2023

By Robbin Laird

The USMC has introduced three major air platforms in the past twenty years. The Osprey was introduced during the land wars, but introduced during the Obama Administration’s “pivot to the Pacific.” But with the Trump Administration’s emphasis on the “great power competition” in 2018 it began its enhanced role in the Pacific which has seen the introduction of the CMV-22B.

I have written about that in my book The Role of the Osprey in the Pivot to the Pacific.

Next the USMC introduced the F-35B and it played a key role in the ability of the U.S. military with partners to build out fifth generation capability during the era of the land wars. But not until the “great power competition” shift did the U.S. really focus once again on the fifth-generation transition.

Indeed, in my view this only is beginning again and the focus on how to effectively integrate and support a global fleet of U.S. and allied F-35s (what I call F-35 2.0) is only underway now.

I wrote about this in my book My Fifth-Generation Journey: 2004-2018.

But the CH-53K is being introduced in the new strategic context, in the era of “great power competition” and peer conflict. Hence, it is being introduced when its capabilities including its digital backbone need to be considered from the standpoint of the strategic context within which it is being introduced.

It is also being introduced in a context where there have been two strategic events which have also underscored that the logistical and sustainment approach used during the land wars is simply irrelevant. The pandemic undercut civilian and military supply chains and underscored their fragility. The conflict with China has also underscored the importance of secure supply chains rather than just-in time delivery from global suppliers wherever they are located and whatever their politics.

The war in Ukraine should not have been a shock and was logically implied in earlier Russian actions. We wrote about this in our book, The Obama Administration Confronts Global Change.

But what this war has overwhelmingly demonstrated is the lack of depth in the supplies to support military operations.

Not only has just-in time delivery and the absence of investment in supplies and equipment stockpiles been shown to have failed, the investments in building supply depth have still to be made in a coherent or strategic manner.

Enter the CH-53K. Here is an aircraft whose digital backbone can be leveraged to build predictive maintenance and an ability to shape effective knowledge of the supplies needed at the tactical edge to ensure that the CH-53Ks onboard the Navy ships it is supporting in distributed maritime operations can have the operational levels needed.

But how to ensure that the government, the prime contractor and the supply chain can do this?

To date, the best way to do that has been through a system called performance-based logistics. This is a system in which the government and the contractor work a partnership to incentivize the contractor to deliver best value supply chain support to the government. It has been based largely on the model of the land-wars in terms of operating at a pace necessary for peacetime deployments or support for warehouses abroad to support land operations.

It has not been re-shaped to do what the Israelis have thought necessary with their CH-53Ks, namely an ability to surge to support in time of conflict. Or put another way, if peacetime ops are not the norm, but surge operations to various levels is, how do we reshape PBLs to meet the new strategic norm?

I continued my conversation with Pierre Garant concerning the CH-53K and sustainability along these lines.

According to Garant: “The purpose of a PBL is to incentivize long-term production of the supplies for the aircraft. It allows the company working with the government on a PBL to build effective longer-term relationships with suppliers to have money flowing to ensure production of every key element needed to supply the operational fleet of aircraft.

He argued that “you’re building resiliency, and you’re building to anticipate obsolescence issues and to get ahead of the game with regard to problems and challenges to ensure supply chain effectiveness. Given the key role as well of government depots they are key partners in this entire effort.

“As we talked about last time, with the data coming off of the aircraft, we can generate big data to shape a realistic assessment ongoing of the performance of parts which can could then be used and translated in better management of the supply chain and to do so to get at those surge issues you mentioned.”

In my view, the traditional PBL approach has largely been an accounting approach to improve efficiency in the use of supply dollars. In a new PBL approach, the need to surge would be part of the consideration in funding the PBL. The legacy PBL has laid a solid foundation but we cannot assume that peacetime ops is the norm to define a PBL; we need to build in surge considerations in an era of great competition.

Credit Graphic: Performance Based Lositics Contracting-Does It Work?

Digital Maintenance in the Shift to Distributed Maritime Operations

Preparedness and Fighting with the Force You Have Now

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Preparedness and Fighting with the Force You Have Now
10/08/2023

By Robbin Laird

I have had the privilege to work with military officers throughout the Western world for more than 30 years. If there is one constant, it has been their concern with the ready force. Long-range thinking is important, but you have to “fight tonight with the force you have.”

Preparedness and availability of the ready force is what deterrence is built on; not the dreams of force planners and politicians. When one faces real world conflict, rather than war games, with your life on the line, how ready and sustainable the force is becomes your only priority.

Not surprisingly at the 27 September 2023, Air Commodore Nick Osborne, Director General Preparedness within the RAAF, underscored how important a focus on preparedness of the current force really is for deterrence. His recent command was of the Surveillance and Response Group which is a key element for providing for the direct defence of Australia and is a group that has undergone fundamental transformation over the past few years, as it has added among other capabilities the P-8 and now will add the Triton.

Air Commodore Nick Osborne, Director General Preparedness within the RAAF, speaking at the Williams Foundation seminar 27 September 2023.

He noted that preparedness has been largely understood with the following formula: Platform x Training x Aim Point x Sustainability. But he argued that “We now have a different understanding of Preparedness, and what it means to us. It’s about what we do, and how well we do it, and to whom.”

“For many years, preparedness was synonymous with readiness. And it was as simplistic as having an aircraft or a platform ready to go in a certain mode. It was very platform centric, and it didn’t clearly state what the target was, or what we had to do to the target.”

“Now we have a whole new concept of preparedness in the last couple of years. It’s not just about having a capability or platform ready to go at a certain time. But it must be ready to go at a certain time to do something to a certain standard against an adversary of a certain skill, and to continue to do so for a certain length of time.

“But a few years ago, we tended to look at preparedness as if we were playing a game of football. We didn’t really know who we were playing against, how good they were, or when the game would occur. And in fact, we weren’t even sure whether we were playing rugby, soccer, AFL or League. Now we’ve got a bit more clarity.

“We’ve got a different understanding of preparedness and what it means to us. It’s not just about platforms, but it’s about what we do, how will we do it and to whom.

“In a world marked by evolving geopolitical landscapes, and technological advancements, our ability to anticipate, adapt and accelerate air warfare has become the lynchpin of our national security. Air power remains the pillar of our defense strategy. Long gone are the days when a strong army alone could guarantee victory. Today, the ability to project airpower swiftly and decisively has become a cornerstone of military superiority.

“And we live in an age where battle space extends beyond what we can see and is reaching into the digital realm.

“To maintain our edge and safeguard our interests, we have to be prepared for the challenges that lie ahead and be equipped with cutting edge strike capabilities to counter our emerging threats. And enhanced preparedness actually refers to our ability to rapidly and effectively respond to a wide range of potential threats and contingencies that will occur in modern warfare.

“It encompasses a multifaceted effect, and that approach includes readiness, technological advancements, training, strategic partnerships, and the capacity to adapt quickly. And of course, strike is one of those areas in which we have to be very proficient.”

After the seminar, I had a chance to sit down with Air Commodore Osborne and correlate his presentation on preparedness with the challenges of being commander of the SRG. I have visited the SRG in the past, and it is a place where various parts of the surveillance capabilities of the Air Force and the ADF has been bundled. Over the past decade, the SRG has evolved into a more integrated capability and with the addition of the P-8 and Triton and the ISR enterprise built at the Edinburgh Air Base in South Australia is shaping new integrated data management capabilities.

But takes time: You cannot simply take the force you have and plop into some future force structure design and presto bingo have a new force structure. It is about taking the force you have and having practical, doable steps forward in force transformation. That takes time, commitment, money, leadership and manpower and does not occur over night.

I have written three books on three different new combat air systems for the USMC, the Osprey, the CH-53K and the F-35B, and all have together transformed the force, but to do so has requires operational experience, training and force structure redesign.

The ADF has gone and is going down a similar path. The DSR will not create a new effective force unless the practical steps are taken to allow the ADF to find its way ahead in terms of real operational capabilities, missions, training and new approaches to sustainability and preparedness.

Osborne gave an example of the new working relationship between the Australian Army and Air Force where they are working to shape how to more effectively shape and execute agile operations in areas such as Northern Australia.

And I would add that will require new training, new ops approaches, and new effectors and some new equipment. It is about force mobility on the Australian landscape and probably using a new generation of UAVs as the platforms launched into the key defence area for Australia which Osborne indicated in a slide which he used during his presentation and which is the featured graphic at the beginning of this article.

But put bluntly, 80% of the force you have now will be in your force structure in 20 years short of it being destroyed in conflict. So what is the plan to leverage the current force – which has made great progress in many areas of modernization in the past decade – and the force the writers of the DSR want?