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During my visit to the DSEI conference in London In September 2023, I spent a significant part of my time looking at a real revolution in ship building, maritime automated systems, and the payload revolution underlying the kill web.
I did this in large part by the opportunity to talk with Danish colleagues about their progress in building a next generation modular vessel. A key aspect of this effort was the opportunity to conduct a follow up interview with Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen who is Executive Director, Navy Programs, Defence Command, Denmark.
Since we last talked, the Danish government has gone ahead with the design and preparation for the first in class of the new modular ships.
In our last discussions, he described how the modular concept is being worked: “A key focus is upon the desired effects to be created, and the missions to be supported by the desired maritime payloads, rather than upon the platforms as the primary focus. The effects focus means that air and land capabilities which are integratable with maritime platforms is a key focus of attention as well in thinking about the operational ecosystem.
“Rear Admiral Mikkelsen underscored the importance of the following in my interview with him at the Euronaval meeting in October 2022: “What effects do we need to achieve? And how will sensors and the weapons as payloads on the fleet and in the force create those effects? How will autonomous systems play a role? How and where in our battlespace?”
The first ship in the new “mothership” class is a Multi Role Patrol Ship designed to operate in the Baltic and the North Sea. It is being built with a clear eye to building out other types of ships all able to operate common payloads to enable both operational flexibilities, and the possibility of a new approach to the arsenal of democracy.
With the modules being built around the standard 20- and 40-foot container dimensions, Mikkelsen argued that Denmark along with e.g. its Nordic allies, for example, could build modules in common which could be swapped across a wider fleet of modular ships.
This allows not only collaborative production across an allied production base but allows for rapid specialization by a particular ship on a mission by swapping in the relevant modules. And these modules could clearly be shared by nations in the area of operation.
If a similar concept is implemented in relation to future naval home guard vessels , the modules would be standardized and available for the kinds of missions which the Home Guard would most likely perform.
Autonomous systems will operate from these modules or in the case of UAVs from the decks of these ships. The first module ships built by Denmark used modules that met Danish specs; this generation will be built using the standard specs built around standard 20- 40-foot dimensions.
This can trigger a global shift in standardization which allied negotiators have rarely achieved. Standardization of modules and systems to be placed in 20- or 40-foot containers can provide a significant opening to shaping an allied arsenal of democracy, of a kind that simply does not exist now. “Standardization and adaptability could become a reality to a much larger degree than we traditionally have thought about”, Mikkelsen said.
Another way to look at the build approach is to understand the focus is upon significantly enhancing the % of the ship which can deliver security and defense loads as compared to a traditional combat ship.
By building a wide-beam ship, which is being continued from the flex class and the trend nowadays, there is the opportunity with modular standardization to enhance significantly the payloads carried on the particular ship within the overall approach to building a mothership class of ships.
Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen argued that the approach allows an ability to deal with the spectrum of security and military operations which underlay maritime deterrence.
“In terms of payloads, we are looking at the mix of capabilities needed in peacetime and through the process of fighting a war. We need to create adaptability on the platform; we need to plan for payload innovation and the ability to upgrade rapidly the capability of the ship as a means to operate the relevant payloads to the operation needed.
“By working with standardized modules one can design weapons, sensors, and systems to be carrier in those modules. They can be handled in ports around the world, and racked and stacked. This allows nations to share payloads and to support one another in a crisis.”
The ship is a “mother ship” not just because it is operating with flexible payloads but because it is being built to take full advantage of the autonomous system revolution. It will be able to operate UAVs, USVs, UUVs, and other AI enabled elements.
And according to Mikkelsen: “We will focus as well on how we might be able to operate the ship itself remotely in terms of extreme danger as well.”
Note: A video recently produced by Naval News concerning the future Multi Role Patrol Ship of the Royal Danish Navy highlights some key aspects of the first ship of the new class. I have clipped some screenshots to highlight how to visualize the new ship and its approach to modularity.
Here is an interview by Naval News with Rear Admiral Torben Mikkelsen which focuses on the new ship.
What is the relationship among multi-domain strike capabilities, warfighting and deterrence?
Multi-domain strike capabilities can only be done with foundational capabilities which enhance one’s viability in warfighting, and by being able to do so to enhance the adversary perceptions of their risk calculus. They need to believe that continuing a conflict is not worth the effort because they can not easily defeat you or intimidate you into capitulating to their demands.
But I would argue that strategically enabled multi-domain strike also requires political-military leadership which understands how to engage in war termination. And I would argue being able to do effective war termination rests on the adversary’s understanding of the robustness of our ability to continue a campaign. And this rests as well on a viable distributed force structure whose continued ability to punish an adversary suggests that war termination is in their interest as well as ours.
The presentations of General Wilsbach at the March and September Williams Foundation seminars provide several insights which suggest the relationships among multi-domain strike, war fighting and deterrence.
From General Wilsbach’s video presentation to the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar.
At the March seminar, the General argued the following: “The message of cost imposition is simple on its surface but has layers to consider. First and foremost, we all understand that no one wins if a conflict with China breaks out in the Indo-Pacific. That would be the worst-case scenario for every nation that calls the region home and is the last thing any of us want.
“So if an aggressor chooses to cross that line, they are already willing to bear considerable cost. That’s why the deterrence must be credible and convincing. You cannot leave room for doubt that the cost could be tolerable.
“To do that, you need to know who should receive that message. In authoritarian regimes, it must reach the few people at the top who hold all the decision- making authority. They may never bear the cost personally, but their power relies on the fear and submission of those who will….
“Denial, cost, resilience. Ideally, our deterrence actions should convey all three messages simultaneously. If I were an adversary planner, seeing capable forces across multiple, like- minded nations committed to action, able to deny my goals at overwhelming cost to me, and resilient enough to weather any of my attacks, that would keep me up at night. Integrated deterrence requires integration, readiness, and willingness, but it also needs one more thing—belief.”
In the September seminar, Wilsbach focused then on how multi-domain strike empowered deterrent capabilities. He underscored in his video presentation the following:
“There are many reasons to lean into multi domain operations, but I want to focus on one in particular, multi domain operations allow us to overwhelm and trip the adversary. Historically, warfare carries certain constants.
“One of the most important of these is gaining and maintaining the initiative. A combatant seizes the initiative, not through advanced technologies or superior training, but because they hit the adversary hard enough to knock them off balance, then hit them repeatedly to maintain an enduring advantage. pressure generated by synchronizing operations in time and space creates the opportunities where technology and training can make a difference.”
To be able to do multi-domain operations requires a warfighting ecosystem which reflects and embodies effective warfighting and deterrent capabilities, of the sort no adversary could miss. Of course, the failure to build such an ecosystem will mean that multi-domain strike will not be feasible or viable. The adversary understands this and targets force integration across a distributed battlespace, and works to enhance antagonisms among allies in a way to undercut the kind of integration which is both possible and necessary.
Wilsbach emphasized three key elements of the warfighting ecosystem which enables multi-domain strike and deterrence.
“The three angles of attack I’ve covered today, optimizing internal Air Force capabilities, joint integration, and allied and partner integration are areas we need to push. If we want to execute multi domain operations.
“All three will fail, however, if we don’t leverage our decisive angle, our airmen and aviators, our people are the best in the world, something our competitors recognize as they tried to copy our methods and attempt to hire our former members to train their forces….”
He concluded with a fundamental warning regarding the importance of shaping multi-domain strike capabilities throughout an integrated joint and coalition force as a core enabler of warfighting and deterrence.
“As I conclude allow me to make one more pass to stress the importance of multi-domain strike, Seizing and maintaining the initiative remains a key tenant of success in conflict. And you can only do that by hitting your adversary from every angle. The modern battlefield has one overarching rule–overwhelm or be overwhelmed.”
It will do little if one crafts the force for effective strike and does not work to ensure that the enterprise does not go Winchester much more rapidly than the duration of conflict.
This is a major problem and at the first Williams Foundation seminar of 2023, the challenges of building a 21st century arsenal of democracy were discussed at length.
The simple fact is that the United States and all of its allies have NOT built magazine depth. Each has had almost just in time delivery of weapons systems with very very limited supply. This is true for both precision and non-precision weapons.
And then there is the key problem of having weapons mixes which allow the force to be able to operate throughout a prolonged operation. And almost assuredly this will not happen with the weapons production paradigm of the past twenty years.
In a 2020 visit to Fallon at NAWDC, I discussed this problem ironically with the Navy Captain who is the acknowledged expert on TLAMS, the very weapon prioritized by the DSR. He warned against over reliance on such weapons alone.
“A key point really would revolve around the weapons enterprise itself and how the fleet will be empowered by new ways to build out weapons arsenals and provide for adequate stockpiles for the force. That was the subject of conversation with Captain Edward Hill, the oldest Captain in the USN at sixty years of age. Because he goes back to the Cold War operating Navy, he can bring forward that experience to the return to the contested environment challenges facing the weapons enterprise.
“Clearly, building adequate stockpiles of weapons is crucial. But also important is working a new weapons mix to ensure that one is not forced by necessity to rely on the most expensive weapons, and the ones that will almost always have a stockpiling issue, but to have a much more cost-effective weapons set of options.
“As Captain Hill put it: “We need to get beyond golden bee-bee solution. We need to have a weapons barge come with the battle group that has an affordable weapons mix. We need $50,000 weapons; not just million-dollar weapons. We should have weapons to overwhelm an adversary with Joe’s garage weapons and not having to use the golden bee-bees as the only option.”[1]
So simply buying TLAMS from the United States is not an answer to how the ADF will have adequate stockpiles of weapons in a crisis and in prolonged conflict. It is an input to a re-think but not a substitute for a rethink.
If we are to have really an arsenal of democracy, we need to move beyond single production line production models. The United States needs to get on with sharing a production line for TLAMS in Australia. This is not just for Australia but the United States and various Pacific allies. It is about redundancy; it is about security of supply; and it is getting on with the key barrier the United States continues to have which is its bureaucratic interpretation of security requirements.
And the Australian contribution could be significant to the collective allied rethink and redesign of a weapons enterprise. Namely, we need a new approach to building weapons and to do so in terms of something like standardization on the 155mm-artillery shell.
I talked with a senior USAF officer earlier this year about this challenge and the opportunity to rebuild a weapons enterprise around standardization and multi-national production lines. This is what he had to say: “I want an 80% solution that is built about around two important criteria– the weapon or the cost per round, so I can buy a ton of them by the 1000s. And I can make them very easily. And I can keep up with wartime usage. So I don’t have the problems like we have in Ukraine, where I’ve expended all of them.”
Australia is clearly focused on addressing these problems but it is early days.
In the presentation by Ian Langford, formerly a senior Australian Army officer, and now with Lockheed Martin, he provided a slide which the way ahead for Australia in this area:
How multi-domain strike fits into an evolving Australian deterrence strategy was provided by BRIG Langford at the March 2022 Williams Foundation Seminar.
“Certainly, the ADF as a force for a medium power faces the challenge of deterrence of larger powers in the region. Here he noted:” To quote a former prime minister of Singapore, “How does a small fish in a pond of big fish become a poison shrimp?” How do we provide the kind of deterrence functions in a period where we are always at risk of being out escalated and how do you provide those shaping, or pre conflict, or competition effects? and are credible?”
“BRIG Langford underscored the importance of decision superiority in shaping favorable outcomes. “It is about being able to generate relative tempo and superiority at certain points in the conflict that enable victory going forward.”
And one could add – making sure that the ADF force elements are able to deliver such strikes with the right weapons, in the right numbers and the right places.
AVM Gerry van Leeuwen, Head of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance, provided the overview on the projected way ahead for the ADF in the weapons area. His group is within Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group within the Department. In his role, he is primarily responsible for the acquisition, sustainment, and disposal of all guided weapons and explosive ordinance for Defence and the delivery of associated joint force (effector) capability outcomes.
The AVM started by noting that the strategic direction of the effort is to shape a joint acquisition approach to the weapons area. And with the appointment of a three-star overseeing the effort, Air Marshal Phillips, structural change with the Department is under way to achieve this objective.
He noted that the services will continue to sponsor weapons acquisition projects but the overall types and quantities acquired will be shaped by the new joint approach.
In particular, he underscored, that the DSR highlighted the “need for long range strike, increased war, stock or inventory and the development of domestic manufacturing capabilities.”
AVM Gerry van Leeuwen, Head of the Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordinance, presenting at the Williams Foundation seminar on 27 September 2023.
With regard to long-range strike, “we need to attack targets at greater range and hold our adversaries at risk at increased distance.” An example of the focus is upon the Army. “Our army has been challenged to reach beyond a notional 50-to-100-kilometer range and to beyond 500 kilometers in time and then out beyond 1000 kilometers.”
AVM van Leeuwen underscored that the Ukraine war demonstrated the need to be able to enhance war stocks. He also noted the need to diversify sources of production in supply in this intriguing comment: “To use an analogy, it looks like everyone’s in the same buffet line. And if you’re the back of the queue, you better not be too hungry. We’re currently working with the U.S. on creative ways to accelerate FMS orders, and especially with regard to long range strike weapons.
“And not surprisingly, those weapons are the same weapons in high demand by the U.S., given our common interest in the Indo-PAC region. But our relationship is strong and collegiate. The U.S. seems willing to work with us in that regard, but I would caution that if they sell advanced weapons to Australia, we sure as hell better be prepared to use them.”
This in turn leads the challenge of logistics and sustainment. “Increased inventory brings with it logistical challenges like storage and distribution, maintenance, repair and overhaul, given the shelf life associated with limitations associated with energetics and environmental degradation.”
AVM van Leeuwen then turned to the knotty challenge of Australian domestic weapons production. He noted that Australia is not starting from scratch. “We already manufacture a range of munitions from small arms to aerial bombs, and we do have manufacturing capabilities already in place.”
But with regard to building on these capabilities and expanding domestic production capabilities, they are adopting a “crawl, walk, run approach.”
“Our decision to build a domestic manufacturing capability is in part in order to build enhanced regional resilience in supply chains, especially when supply lines across the Pacific are degraded or denied in a time of conflict. But in the longer term, we will build a stronger sovereign industrial base here in Australia on an assumption that we’re working to a readiness window of 2026 or 2027.”
He added: “We need to look at production rates beyond our domestic consumption and offer access back into the global supply chain that will involve certification, quality and security requirements. The industry needs to be prepared and be ready.”
He mentioned three areas where the focus will be in the short to midterm: On the Standard Missile families; on the Kongsberg Naval Strike Missile; and with regard to 155mm artillery shells.[2]
He then focused on the comprehensive nature of the challenge Australia faces in the weapons area: “As a DSR priority, we have been allocated an additional $1.5 billion over the forward estimates to make a total provision of $2.5 billion for domestic manufacturing war stock. Perhaps it’s the risk is not so much about the amount allocated but our ability to spend it and realize the ambitious plan over the next five years.
“Another challenge we face is workforce. The job market is heavily contested and people with the right qualifications for certain jobs are increasingly hard to find. Attracting the required workforce to realize the ambition of domestic manufacture will be a significant challenge and represents significant risk to our overall success. People have choices and the cost of living is weighing heavily on the minds of Australians.”
“The selection of sites where domestic manufacture will factor into things like population demographics and logistics, for example, transport lines and distribution hubs.”
Featured Graphic is from Ian Langford’s presentation.
[1] Robbin F. Laird, Robbin, Training for the High-End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s (pp. 82-83), Kindle Edition.)
One can conceive of multi-domain strike over an extended operational area by building on a virtual revolution in the relationships among ISR, counter-ISR and C2. The dynamics of change involving ISR, Counter-ISR and C2 is obviously a major subject on its own but it is a central one to understand how a distributed force will generate multi-domain strike in areas of tactical and strategic interest.
The intersection of these subjects has been one which the Williams Foundation has addressed in some of the presentations in past seminars.
For example, then AIRCDRE Phillips who is now Air Marshal Phillips, Chief of Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance, noted in a 2019 Williams Foundation Seminar: “Earlier we built a dedicated single network connection for a specific task, such as providing targeting information to the platforms involved in a specific operation…With the new technologies and capabilities, we are now reusing networks for multiple purposes and making sure that they can adapt to the changing con-ops as well.”
“We are seeing integration of the networks and the integration of the information management services and then the dual nature of the applications on top of those integrations. Rather than building a single purpose intel common operating picture, we are now capable of building an integrated intelligence and battlespace management common operating picture for the use of the combat forces engaged in operations.”
In other words, “we are building an adaptable network of networks. In traditional networks, when data is brought in from a dedicated system, it needs to be repurposed for other tasks as needed.”
Put in other terms, the “networked” force was built around platforms that would use networked information to create desired and often scripted events. But the C2 and ISR revolution we are now facing is reversing the logic of platforms to infrastructure; it is now about how flexible C2 and ISR interactive systems can inform the force elements to shape interactive combat operations on the fly.
That is, the new capabilities are enabling tactical decision making at the edge and posing real challenges to traditional understandings of how information interacts with decision making.
It is about learning how to fight effectively at the speed of light in order to achieve combat dominance. And these new capabilities are providing a real impact on force development, concepts of operations and force training as well.
At the 27 September 2023 seminar, the enablement of the force to cross-operate, to do third-party targeting (which is a hallmark of fifth generation aircraft by the way) and to be able to use ISR to deceive the enemy as well as to guide operation actions to deliver meaningful strike for the desired “proportional effect” was the assumption underlying the notion of expanding the way ahead for multi-domain strike. Or put in other words, the dynamics of change involving ISR, Counter-ISR and C2 are part of the multi-domain strike enterprise.
With the sensor revolution, not only are sensors much smaller but they proliferate through the operational force. If one operates a dedicated ISR platform, the range of tasks which that platform can do now compare to the past is truly amazing. The case of the Triton is a case in point of what it can see, what it can sense, what it can communicate and what it can target. And sensors can operate from a variety of platforms as integral elements of dedicated modular payloads, as we are seeing on the new maritime autonomous systems.
But it it not only seeing the battlespace writ large, it is the ability of the tactical combat force or cluster to have at its service incredible ISR assets given the dynamics of change associated with sensor sets. And associated with this is the ability of decentralized C2 to operate a force with mission command which by being distributed enhances its survivability but can reach out to other platforms and work with such platforms to deliver the multi-domain strike which the seminar has focused upon.
But not discussed at the seminar is the other aspect of the ISR revolution, what might be called counter ISR. In an interview I did earlier this year with a senior commander in the Pacific, he underscored the importance of counter-ISR in providing operational deception giving the force greater ability not only to survive but to find the choke points where multi-domain strike could have its most decisive impact.
The mix of C2, ISR and counter-ISR was described by this senior commander as follows: “The higher headquarters may have access to better information and when it does it needs to have the ability to reach out to the tactical level to tell them to do or not do something associated with the larger political and strategic picture.”
He felt that they were making significant progress in commanding a distributed force, which is a core element of shaping a force capable of deterrence in the Pacific. “We are capable of commanding from various locations and can be able to see and understand how to command in the battlespace dozens of ships, hundreds of aircraft, thousands of personnel. We are capable of seeing, understanding, and deciding what is going on in the battlespace, and tracking the enemy force using exquisite means way beyond a grease pencil and a radio call. We can and do so through links and sensor from the sea floor to the heavens.”
Holding all this together is not only assured command and control but the tissue of ISR systems enabling distributed fleet operations and adding the key element of deception through various counter-ISR systems as well. In effect, fleet distribution built on a kill web effects infrastructure is being combined with what me be called a wake-a-mole operational capability. You can’t target me, if you can’t find me.
The force is being distributed for survivability, but the joint force has focused considerably attention on a core capability which many cubical commandos have ignored – namely the ability of the force to become very difficult to target when on distributed operations.
In my discussion with this commander, he indicated that one of highest priorities for ongoing development and funding is what he calls “counter-ISR” capabilities. As he put it: “That is why counter-ISR is the number one priority for me, to deny the adversary with to high confidence in his targeting capabilities. I need to deceive them and to make a needle look like a needle in a haystack of needles. It is important to have the capability to look like a black hole in the middle of nothing.”
This particular interview put together the relationships among C2, ISR and counter ISR for a distributed maritime force quite succinctly. And at the seminar, a number of the presentations provided insights with regard to the dynamics of change in the ISR and C2 areas.
Jake Campbell, Northrop Grumman Australia, at the last seminar discussed the importance of having layered ISR to allow for both the strategic and technical operational visibility necessary to make rapid, timely and effective decision making, notably for a distributed force but which would allow for strategic C2 as well.
In his presentation to the 27 September seminar, he highlighted the challenges of providing the kind of ISR which is needed in a contested environment for net-enabled weapons.
Actually, Jake was the only speaker who use this term but the multi-domain strike being discussed was built around net-enabled weapons or put in other terms third party targeting where a weapon launched for land, sea, or air could then be targeted from somewhere else. And that clearly is only going to work if you have accurate targeting information that comes from your ISR capabilities and a correct decision made by the shooter.
Jake Campbell presents at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar.
He argued: “Within the ADF we really need to get our minds around the problem of doing such targeting in a degraded environment.”
He noted: “The ability to generate a 24/7 target quality information, perhaps over some weeks, so that operational commanders have flexibility to generate a strike at the time and place of choosing is going to be challenging, but it’s the demand. And as you’re getting closer to those strikes, you have to have the ability to maintain what I call a chain of custody.”
“You’re going to need to have eyes on that target with high fidelity target quality information and have the ability to communicate that to the weapons when they are fired.”
Triton is a key capability which Northrop Grumman is working with the RAAF for the ADF ISR and T capabilities. Campbell noted Triton has can provide data outside of the adversaries weapons engagement zone but also provide a range of data which will allow the ADF to make more effective targeting decisions with the reach and range of Triton’s onboard sensors.
This reminded me of a comment made to me when visiting Jax Navy a few years ago. I asked a Triton operate: “What happens when your system is targeted?” His answer was direct: “Well I can see weapons at a distance few can match. I have a jet engine so I move and maneuver.”
Campbell noted that the U.S. Navy and its use of the the Minotaur fusion engine is of significance in how the U.S .Navy is integrating ISR information across the force.He raised this in the context of discussing the involvement of the Triton surrogate in a Northern Edge exercise.
“We operated the Triton surrogate, which is it’s a test platform that we put all the Triton sensors on, in the Northern Edge exercise, in a maritime strike scenario, where the goal was to generate a 24/7 maritime Common Operating Picture to be able to provide target quality information for the commander and then generate strike options against representative threats but to do so outside of the adversary’s weapons engagement zones of significance.
“In contrast to other platforms, Triton sensors are actually able to operate and function well outside of the adversary’s weapon engagement zones right now and we are working on an ongoing basis to evolve this capability. And the height and perspective of Triton is an important factor in being able to so.
“But the other thing that came out of the exercise was the importance of data fusion. There’s a system that was used in this exercise called Minotaur. Minotaur is a data fusion system that allows multiple aircraft and ships to share the network information.
“It is a data fusion engine by which users can access information from whatever terminal they are on as long as you’re on the Minotaur Web. Triton and P-8s have Minotaur on them as part of their capability. And the U.S. Navy is headed full steam down the Minotaur pathway. It’s important for the ADF to get their head around what Minotaur brings to the fight and how we plug into it.”
In an interview I did a few years ago, I discussed Minotaur with the then head of the US Navy’s Maritime Patrol Reconnaissance Enterprise. According to Rear Admiral Garvin who was the head of the enterprise at the time: “The Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance aviator of the future will be well versed in the synergy inherent in both manned and unmanned platforms.”
“The unblinking stare of a Triton enhances the Fleet Commander’s MDA and understanding of an adversary’s pattern-of-life by observing their movements in the optical and electromagnetic spectrum.”
Slide from Campbell’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar.
“Moreover, Triton serves as a force multiplier and enabler for the P-8. Early in Triton program development, we embraced manned and unmanned teaming and saw it as a way to expand our reach and effectiveness in the maritime domain.”
“One key software capability which empowers integration is Minotaur.”
“The Minotaur Track Management and Mission Management system was developed in conjunction with the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. Minotaur was designed to integrate sensors and data into a comprehensive picture which allows multiple aircraft and vessels to share networked information.”
“It is basically a data fusion engine and like many software capabilities these days, doesn’t physically have to be present on a platform to be of use.”
“These capabilities ride on a Minotaur web where, if you are on the right network, you can access data from whatever terminal you happen to be on.”
(See chapter six “an ISR-empowered force” in my co-authored book entitled: A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century.)
The Navy experience working with ISR was also significant to the perspectives of WGCDR Marija Jovanovich. In particular, she talked about her work with Pete “Two Times” Salvaggio, Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center (NAWDC), Maritime ISR (MISR) Weapons School, Department Head (DH), MISR & EP-3E Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) at Resolute Hunter.
WGCDR Marija Jovanovich presenting at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar.
The WGCDR made it very clear that the work of “Two Times” and of the Navy led Resolute Hunter expressed her core emphasis on the expanded role for ISR in shaping any multi-domain strike enterprise. And in this context, she is one of the few people discussing the subject which highlighted the new innovative role in the Navy of what they call MISR officers.
In an interview I did with “Two Times” in 2020 (and later that year I went to Resolute Hunter), he explained what they were all about and what the WGCDR was advocating.
“Kill chain is to find, fix, track, target, engage and assess. For the US Navy, the weight of effort has been upon target and engage. As “Two Times” puts it “But if you cannot find, fix or track something, you never get to target.”
“There is another challenge as well: in a crisis, knowing what to hit and what to avoid is crucial to crisis management. This clearly requires the kind of ISR management skills to inform the appropriate decision makers as well.
“The ISR piece is particularly challenging as one operates across a multi-domain battlespace to be able to identify the best ISR information, even it is not contained within the ISR assets within your organic task force. And the training side of this is very challenging.
Slide from Jovanovich’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar.
“That challenge might be put this way: How does one build the skills in the Navy to do what you want to do with regard to managed ISR data and deliver it in the correct but timely manner and how to get the command level to understand the absolute centrality of having such skill sets?
“Two Times” identified a number of key parameters of change with the coming of MISR.
“We are finally breaking the old mindset; it is only now that the department heads at NAWDC are embracing the new role for ISR in the fight.”
“We are a unique organization at NAWDC for we do not own a platform. And the MISR school has both officers and enlisted in the team. We are not all aviators; we have intel specialists, we have cryptographers, pilots, crewmen etc.
“Aviators follow a more rapid pace of actions; non-aviators do not have the same pace of working rapidly within chaos. Our goal at MISR is to be comfortable to work in chaos.”
“Another part of the shift is to get recognition that ISR does not SUPPORT the force; it is essential element of the combat capability for the force to be able to operate effectively. It is inherent to the force; not external to it.
“The kill web approach is about breaking the practice of correlating specific sensors with specific weapons; it is about shaping a much broader understanding of how to work sensor networks to deliver the outcome one is seeking.
“Two Times” argued that the training within NAWDC to train MISR officers is not bad, but the big challenge is to work to break down habitual operational patterns of senior commanders, who really are not focused on how the ISR revolution is changing warfighting.”
(See chapter six “an ISR-empowered force” in my co-authored book entitled: A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century.)
The C2 piece of all of this was discussed by Carl Rhodes in his presentation. He most recently was the director of RAND Australia and now director and founder of a consulting firm based in Australia, Robust Policy. In his presentation, he discussed the evolving C2 approaches which underlie multi-domain strike and which enable distributed operations but within a mission command context.
He discussed the various new approaches to C2 underlying distributed operations. Two in particular stand out. The first is a kill web approach in which there are multiple ways to move information and to complete a weapons engagement. The second is the DARPA version of this which they call mosaic warfare. He argued that this approach was very adaptable and was based on an ability to have resource interchangeability including during execution of the strike.
Carl Rhodes presenting at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation seminar.
He argued that new C2 concepts require new systems and new doctrinal thinking. But I would argue that is clearly underway and has been achieved in some areas.
But another part of his presentation leads nicely to the final presentation I will discuss here. Rhodes provided an interesting discussion of the Ukrainian experience in ISR and C2 and then considered its relevance to the Pacific theater of operations.
But on his way to his conclusion on this subject he highlighted the question of how a space-based system, namely, Starlink has played a key role in typing together Ukrainian military efforts.
He noted that:
Starlink facts
Over 4,500 satellites in orbit, more than 50% of all active satellites
Eventual plans for 42,000 satellites
Laser crosslink service is rolling out
Ukraine employment
C2 of aerial and maritime unmanned system
Tactical communications
Coordination of artillery fires
Moving information around the battlefield
He then underscored the advantages of LEO constellation over GEOs has been clearly demonstrated in a number of ways in the conflict:
Lower latency
Better anti-jam capability
Less vulnerable to kinetic attack: it is a distributed system that degrades gracefully.
Nick Miller, Optus Satellite and Space division, dealt with the space aspect of ISR and C2 and certainly reinforced both Campbell’s and Rhodes’s presentations. Here Miller talked about how Optus was shaping a way ahead to work with LEO operators to provide both the increased ISR layering Campbell talked about and the C2 for distributed operations that Rhodes talked about.
The focus of his presentation was on “how LEO operations benefit government and defense organizations, and how we plan to integrate LEO and GEO capabilities into our own network for the future.”
Nick Miller, Optus Satellite and Space Division, presenting at the Williams Foundation seminar 27 September 2023.
LEO constellations or networks have significant advantages for the creation of the layered ISR and C2 capabilities mentioned earlier by Campbell. As Miller noted: “Due to their proximity to Earth data transmission, time for latency are significantly reduced, allowing enhanced real time communication and decision- making.”
The basic approach taken by Optus is to interweave their GEO satellites with other providers LEO constellations. Miller argued: “The advantage we have as Australia’s longest standing satellite operator is our agnostic ability to actually access and assess each of these technologies and its capabilities to determine the best fit for purpose for enterprise fit for government, and in some cases fit for defense. We see the advantages and disadvantages of each and how they best fold into a GEO network to provide interoperable coverage.”
He added: “The integration of these networks can also offer redundancy and resilience in the face of disruptions or fast changing environments. For instance, if you have a satellite network that becomes compromised, or faces issues such as jamming, the other satellite network can pick up the data to minimize downtime.
“This type of redundancy allows for better support in longer term capability planning, or fast paced decision making when it’s required. When LEO and GEO satellite networks are integrated, critical data can also be efficiently routed between the two systems based on the specific requirements of the mission. High Priority data can take advantage of the low latency LEO connections while less sensitive time sensitive data can be relayed via GEO satellites.”
Slide from Nick Miller’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar.
In short, the dynamics of ISR and C2 are shaping the foundation for the multi-domain strike enterprise. They are part of a kill web not just to be fitted into a legacy kill chain approach.
The featured photo is a slide from Jovanovich’s presentation at the 27 September 2023 Williams Foundation Seminar.
U.S. Air Force aircrew and support personnel from the 36th Airlift Squadron and 374th Aircraft Maintenance Squadron, Yokota Air Base, Japan, transport and return cargo in support of Exercise Northern Edge 23-2 at Kadena Air Base, Japan, July 13, 2023.
Team Kadena is committed to providing world class support to exercises like Northern Edge 23-2 to strengthen regional alliances and partnerships, as well as U.S. forces’ readiness to respond when called upon.
During my current visit to Australia to support the Williams Foundation Seminar held on 27 September 2023, I had a chance to talk with the well-known Australian strategist, Marcus Hellyer. Formerly of ASPI, he is now is head of research at Strategic Analysis, Australia.
I asked Marcus a simple question as the basis of our conversation: What has been the progress and developments since the DSR was released earlier this year?
Hellyer argued that the DSR was presented as a sharp break from the past but he sees it as in many ways a throwback to the famous Paul Dibb strategic defence review in the 1980s.
Namely, it has updated the concept of the defence of Australian territory to “the latest industry standard. Instead of defending Australian territory with a 100 km range missile, we are now focused on procuring missiles of a 1000 km range. But the operating concept remains focused on controlling our air and sea approaches, although there is no consensus on what this means.”
He went on to note that the decision to continue the effort to procure nuclear submarines did raise a fundamental issue: “Are we meeting the threat in the South China Sea or in areas closer to Australia? Are we focused on China’s first island chain or our own?”
The problem for the ADF is posed by having a new DSR but not accompanied by a budget to pay for a force design reset. It is supposed to be paid for by the cannibalization of the current force structure and restructuring the inherited approach to joint force design, a process of force transformation already underway which we have documented in detail in Williams Foundation Seminars since 2014.
The government did not establish a separate fund to pay for the costly transition from conventional to a nuclear submarine enterprise.
The funding issue correlated with force re-design is crucial. As Hellyer noted: “The Department of Defense’s acquisition plan is completely broken. We knew going into the DSR that it was massively over programmed. There wasn’t enough money to acquire all the things in the plan, particularly after nuclear submarines were injected into it with no additional funding.
“The DSR itself injected more things into that investment plan. And so there simply isn’t enough money. But the bottom line is you’re trying to stuff more things in there with no more money. It just doesn’t work. And so that’s why a lot of acquisition decisions are simply on hold, because at the moment, the department doesn’t have a viable acquisition program.”
This has led to significant uncertainty within the ADF, local defense industry and the Australian public about the winners and losers in shaping the new force structure outlined in the DSR, and outlined is the right word, for there is much uncertainty surrounding what is the strategic direction really of the force design for deterrence by denial and impactful projection and the relationship between this effort and the extant force.
Hellyer already sees signs of cancelling programs to provide for money for a new way ahead, but the problem is cancellation is not correlated with ensuring the cancelled capability is replaced. An example is cancelling the only Royal Australian Navy UAV with no replacement in sight.
Hellyer noted that this will have a capability impact by limiting the utility of the Royal Australian Navy’s new Arafura-class Offshore Patrol Vessels. He noted, “We’ve both written about the OPV and one obvious path is to leverage this program and to adapt it to the new warfighting approaches highlighted in the DSR. It is not terribly difficult to make these motherships for automated systems or to up gun the ship.
“This is clearly the kind of approach which will be critical in shaping an operational force that is more capable in the 2020s rather than one that is being designed and planned for in 2030, 2035, 2040 or beyond. But the cancellation of the Navy UAV means the OPV won’t achieve its potential.”
That said, there have been some important announcement since the DSR, such as the acquisition of a new, larger fleet of C-130J airlifters that will play an important role in archipelagic operations.
Other key decisions have been deferred such as the location of an east coast SSN base. Hellyer noted that all analysis indicates an east coast base with access to Australia’s population centres will be vital to supporting a larger submarine force. But the government has put that decision off into the future as well.
Because of the issue of un-affordability of new capabilities, it’s inevitable that the ADF will need to make the most of what they already have. SLD’s rule of thumb is that 80% of the force you will have in 20 years you already have—a metric that Hellyer agrees with.
So how do you leverage what you have in reshaping the force to get what is envisaged by the new force design?
Dr. Hellyer then focused on the key question of capability transitions: how to manage them and how to pay for them.
Getting them right is essential to maintaining and increasing ADF capability without creating key operational gaps. Within recent ADF history there are some examples of transition management. The most successful one which he cited was the transition from third and fourth to fifth generation aircraft. Hellyer argues that the key piece in that transition that mitigated the risks of an ageing Hornet fleet and delayed development and delivery of the F-35A was the prescient acquisition of the Super Hornets.
In contrast, there is a current example of an unsuccessful capability transition in the Australian Army’s utility helicopters. The decision has been made to replace the MRH-90s with Blackhawks, potentially allowing an orderly capability transition.
But the government has decided simply to ground the MRH-90 fleet in the wake of a catastrophic fatal accident. Since there are currently only a handful of Blackhawks in country, the Australian Army will have no capability. Full stop.
As the government faces the transition for conventional to nuclear submarines, how will they ensure that Australia will continue to have operational submarines in the transition? Is this following the Super Hornet transition model or that of the Army utility helicopter?
In short, the DSR has introduced disruptive change. But without the money necessary to enable transition to a new force structure design. And at a time when the DSR and the government that produced it have clearly indicated that the strategic situation is worsening much more rapidly than our capabilities to deal with that environment.
Featured Photo: The MRH-90 Taipan helicopters will be withdrawn from service in December 2024. Photo: Lance Corporal Riley Blennerhassett
Taipans Withdrawn from Service
Published 29 September 2023 by the Australian Department of Defence.
The Australian Defence Force’s MRH-90 Taipan helicopters will not return to flying operations before their planned withdrawal date of December 2024.
Defence Minister Richard Marles said the Government was focused on the introduction into service of the new fleet of UH‑60M Black Hawks.
The first three Black Hawks have arrived in Australia and commenced flying in September, with remaining Black Hawks continuing to be delivered.
Mr Marles said the MRH-90 had been an important capability for the ADF.
“I recognise the hard work of the hundreds of people who dedicated themselves to acquiring, operating and sustaining the aircraft,” he said.
“The first of the 40 Black Hawks that will replace the MRH-90 have arrived and are already flying in Australia. We are focused on seeing their introduction to service as quickly as possible.
“The Government’s highest priority is the safety and wellbeing of our people.
“We continue to support the families of the four soldiers who lost their lives earlier this year, and the broader Defence community.”
The ADF will continue to operate its CH-47F Chinooks, Tigers and MH‑60R Seahawks to provide a ready aviation capability.
From 2025, the new AH-64E Apache helicopters will also be introduced into service for the Army.
Mr Marles said to help mitigate further impacts on Army’s operations and training, the Government was exploring options to accelerate the delivery of the Black Hawks and aircrew training.
He said today’s announcement did not suggest the outcome of the investigations into the tragic incident on July 28, when an MRH-90 Taipan crashed near Lindeman Island, Queensland, during Exercise Talisman Sabre, killing the four aircrew on board.
Mr Marles said the Government made clear at the time Defence would not fly the platform until investigations into the incident were complete.
Recently, I had a chance to continue my discussions with CDRE Darron Kavanagh who is Director General Warfare Innovation, Royal Australian Navy Headquarters, concerning maritime autonomous systems. Kavanagh has been one of the most articulate leaders of the development and introduction of maritime autonomous systems in Australia.
It is well recognized that autonomous systems are critical to provide the mass necessary for the kind of multi-domain operations which the ADF requires. For example, as Vice Air-Marshal retired Zed Roberton noted at the 27 September Williams Foundation seminar: Going forward, Roberton argued that “we will see a massive focus on things like uncrewed aerial vehicles, uncrewed sea vehicles or land vehicles, the ability to have pre-positioned missile systems and of course, synchronized with cyber and in space effects.”
But how to get the effort started operationally?
We need to move from science projects and exercises to regular use by the combat forces to realize the opportunities inherent in maritime autonomous systems.
But how to do so?
Kavanagh started our conversation by underscoring that it is important to understand what these systems are and what they represent. They are not traditional platforms that you are focused on integrating with the force.
He argued: “They don’t replace platforms; they complement the integrated force. They are complimentary to that force in that they interface rather than being fully integrated with the current force elements.”
With the introduction of new crewed platforms, one must focus on backward engineering legacy systems to work with the new ones. That takes time and has high costs. This is understandable because warriors’ lives are at risk.
This is not the model by which to understand maritime autonomous systems, and certainly not the way to understand how you get them into the hands of warfighters for operations. They are not crewed, and your concern is with efficacy, not a primary emphasis on survivability.
Maritime autonomous systems interface with and complement the existing force to enhance their lethality. They extend the ISR and C2 range of the force and add to the non-lethal and lethal weapons available to the combat force.
Maritime autonomous systems add to the survivability of the force. As CDRE Kavanagh noted: “We have a finite number of crewed exquisite platforms. By leveraging autonomous systems these platforms can extend their defensive perimeter and provide various tools to complicate the adversaries attack profile on those crewed systems.”
For example, in effect, USVs can play the role of the picket ships in World War II, thereby enhancing the survivability of the destroyer and carrier fleet.
Or to use a Fifth Fleet example, USVs operating with destroyers can operate as a buffer between these key assets and Iranian patrol boats. The USVs function as the police guard dogs and if the Iranians were to attack them, the destroyer’s Rules of Engagement then allows it to destroy the Iranian patrol vessel.
And because of how maritime autonomous systems are developed and built, you can shape the kind of affordable mass which we discussed in the multi-domain strike seminar held by the Williams Foundation on 27 September 2023.
As CDRE Kavanagh underscored: “When you start leveraging maritime autonomous systems that are low cost, you can create affordable mass, and you’re setting up a system that allows for resilience. You can manufacture them at mass. Not only can I build them in peacetime but we can keep developing them and delivering them quite quickly during hostilities.”
And by focusing on complementarity rather than integration, there can be a much wider search within the commercial sector to adopt the rapid innovations in the commercial sector occurring in terms of autonomous systems.
CDRE Kavanagh specifically mentioned the Australian mining sector as one where rapid progress is being made on autonomous systems. If you are not using unique military specs which are designed in order to integrate with the extant force but rather providing complimentary capabilities which can directed by the force, then there is a much wider canvas of innovation from which to adopt autonomous system innovations.
Because there are a wide range of civilian and security missions that maritime autonomous systems are already being used for and their roles and numbers will increase to do so, the military can dip into this existing and growing capability as well. The protection of undersea infrastructure and wind farms are two examples which are suggestive of a broader trend.
According to CDRE Kavanagh: “We simply will delay adoption of autonomous systems by reducing them to the mantra of integration. By focusing on complementarity and finding ways to use the systems as compliments to the fleet and extending the range of the various effects desired, we can find a variety of missions which these systems can meet now and in the future.”
He noted that in the DSR, there is much focus on deterrence by denial. Autonomous systems can clearly help in disrupting adversary operations and deny them quick results against crewed platforms.
Then there is the key question of how maritime autonomous systems are being designed from the outset to operate in clusters or wolfpacks. And by so doing, they can operate as an interactive complimentary buffer force operating with the core integrated combat force to deliver persistent effects.
In short, one needs to focus on the broader con-ops of the operation of the forces, rather than on the integration of autonomous systems within the much more complicated integrated crewed combat systems. If you don’t, we simply won’t use them in the timely manner as we must in the era of strategic competition within which we live.
And an aspect of con-ops we discussed as well was the relationship of maritime autonomous systems and their operations to deterrence.
On the one hand, maritime autonomous systems can be deployed as part of a deterrence by detection strategy. This can be enhanced by sharing with partners who are not close allies, or the kind of allies you wish to integrate your crewed platforms with.
At the March seminar, Jake Campbell highlighted the importance of deterrence by detection as follows: “Adversaries are less likely to commit opportunistic acts of aggression if they know they are being watched constantly and that their actions can be publicized widely.”
On the other hand, when it comes to signalling, a key part of deterrence, sending in a maritime autonomous systems wolfpack simply does not have the same meaning as sending a Aegis led surface action group. It indicates concern, but does not raise the weapons threshold that such SAG is designed to do.
In short, maritime autonomous systems considered as complimentary capabilities which are controlled by but not built to be closely integrated with the combat force can deliver a number of the key capabilities which the DSR has called for.
Featured Image: 10 May 2022 photo of Rear Admiral Selby, when as the Chief of Naval Research, USN he visited Australia and met with CDRE Kavanagh and Michael Stewart, Director the Unmanned Task Force.
