By Robbin Laird

Recently, I published my book My Fifth Generation Journey: 2004-2018 in which I highlighted how a program not supported by three presidents nor actively by any Secretary of Defense became the dominant air combat system being flown in the era of “great power competition.”

I intend to publish a second volume next year focused particularly on the partners and their key role in the program.

But a key part of the story is Denmark and for me the very unusual conference held in Copenhagen in 2015 between the Williams Foundation and the Centre of Military Studies of the University of Copenhagen.

One of the key presenters at the Conference was Col. Anders Rex, Chief of the Expeditionary Air Staff of the Danish Air Force, who coined the phrase “coalitionability” to express his focus on the core requirement of allied air forces and defense forces shaping ways to work more effectively with one another in dealing with twenty-first century challenges.

Rex went on to become Major General Rex and head of the Air Force where he organized visits for me in Denmark to their bases and to see first-hand their preparation for the arrival of their F-35s and their preparation for fifth-generation enabled combat operations.

He went on to work at senior positions in MoD and is now based in Washington as the Defence Attache.

Upon my return from the DSEI conference in London which was being held while the first Danish F-35s arrived in Denmark, I sat down with Major General Rex to discuss the way ahead, notably in terms of the drive for further integration of the Nordics in terms of defense capabilities and effort.

Major General Rex noted that of course the Air Force would be focused on the standup of their F-35 force, training, equipping and operating the force.

But with the challenges the West faces it was crucial to integrate the capabiltiies which we have more effectively, and the F-35 could be an important stimulant to that process or as I have called it a forcing function aircraft.

But this rests upon much more effective integration of the data generated by the force. “We need to be able to much more effectively share data among our F-35s and with other elements of the force as well.”

Significant progress in data sharing is a key theme when we last talked.

In that 2021 interview held in Copenhagen, he underscored: “For me, joint all domain C2 is clearly the future. But at the same time we have to work on enhanced capabilities with the current force. We need focus on both in parallel. Denmark does not have the muscle to shape the future of all domain command and control, but we also need to drive the change – we need now to get the job done.

“What I have been focused on over the past couple of years, is to make our force better now. Today. We actually already have the capability to shape more effective networks of ISR and C2 without significant investments. For example, we are leveraging the joint range extension application protocol (JREAP) that requires modest investments, and it is a way for us, our allies and coalition partners to build a modest combat cloud linking our data.”

So the coming of the F-35s to Denmark is an important step forward but needs to be part of an allied effort for more effective force integration among the allies, notably those allies flying or going to fly the same aircraft in the region.

Major General Rex underscored: “We put so many limitations on ourselves with regard to data sharing. The first one is policy. The technology is driving greater amounts of data and possibilities of sharing.

“But we need for policy to catch up with technology. There is no clearer case of this than building a global fleet of F-35s and the significant possibility of shared data and integrated operations. We just need to get on with it.”

He argued that “if you put F-35 pilots together with destroyer or submarine captains they can figure out how to work together and share information.

“We need to enable their innovation with the emergence of data rich platforms. I think the point is there is a critical need to make the most out of what our force could do better now and not just pursuing future options and dreams.”

Featured Photo: One of the first four F-35 Lightning II take off from the Lockheed Martin Fort Worth facility enroute to Fighter Wing Skrydstrup, Skrydstrup Air Base,Vojens, Denmark. Credit: Lockheed Martin

The Future is Now for Enhanced Integratability: The Perspective of Major General Anders Rex

5th Gen Enablement and the Evolution of Airpower: The Perspective of Major General Anders Rex

Leveraging the F-35 as Part of Danish Defense Transformation: The Perspective of the New Chief of Staff of the Royal Danish Air Force

By Richard Weitz

Recent incidents make clear that Chinese hacking and espionage remain a core U.S. national security concern. The scope and scale of these activities are breathtaking. Defeating this threat requires an optimized public-private partnership since the magnitude of the challenge far exceeds what the federal government can combat on its own.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been sounding the toxin about Chinese cyberespionage for years. On September 18, FBI Director Chris Wray reiterated that Beijing’s cyberespionage program has grown so vast that it transcends the size and scope of all its major competitors combined. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) employs tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of skilled hackers, whether as government employees or semi-private contractors, in a full-court campaign to steal foreign secrets.

There have been many reports over the years of major PRC espionage operations targeted against the United States that have severely compromised U.S. secrets; many more cases are likely unreported. Though Chinese human agents and spy balloons often gain the most popular attention, the most pervasive threat to Americans’ secrets comes from the PRC’s massive cyber espionage. Even in recent months, senior cyber officials fear Chinese hackers so deeply penetrated some sensitive U.S. computer networks that they still may have access to them.

In a major foreign policy speech earlier this week at Hudson Institute, former Vice President Mike Pence acutely observed that, “China is the greatest strategic and economic threat facing the United States in the 21st century.” It is imperative that the United States prevent the Chinese Communist Party from accessing our sensitive information, especially classified U.S. defense and intelligence data.

Though government bodies like the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) seem inclined to assume more responsibilities in this area, the United States would do better by having the private sector hold, manage, and store more of this data.

OPM has not been a reliable guardian of Americans’ secrets. Its vulnerabilities permitted one of the most egregious data breaches in history. In 2015, a PRC entity, likely the Jiangsu State Security Department, which is a subsidiary of China’s Ministry of State Security spy agency, stole the records of more than 22 million Americans.

Despite years of congressional hearings and generous appropriations designed to strengthen its cyber defenses, the OPM still received a cyber score of F on the July 2022 Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) scorecard. Since OPM is the Human Resources authority for much of the federal government, cyber security issues often receive insufficient attention as the Office strives to provide and implement human resources policy and guidance for myriad other issues across many federal government agencies.

Unfortunately, many other U.S. government bodies are also not well positioned to secure U.S. cyber security efforts. In May of this year, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that an array of government agencies have not implemented critical cloud security practices, including defined security metrics. GAO listed almost three dozen recommendations that these government bodies had to follow to fully implement these practices.

In contrast, private sector companies have a more consistent and effective track record with preserving the integrity of the U.S.’ sensitive information. They must receive FedRAMP authorization, which means they must use sophisticated cloud technologies that have modern security and protection protocols to keep federal information safe and secure. Furthermore, private sector companies focus more closely on human capital needs and data security.

As the Chinese cyber espionage threat continues unabated, it is critical that the government lean more heavily on these entities in the years to come.

Featured Image: Photo 213003071 | Chinese Espionage © Lakshmiprasad S | Dreamstime.com