You Have Heard of a Day Without Space: Now Try Operating Without an Osprey

05/16/2024

By Robbin Laird

As the United States faces a global overload of strategic challenges and the concomitant challenge of shaping an effective and capable force to deal with these challenges but having serious budget stringencies, leveraging the unique capabilities which the United States already possesses is crucial.

It is nice to think of 6th generation aircraft, new AI autonomous systems, new weapons, and the like, but adapting what you have and leveraging unique capabilities which you possess is a key part of the way forward.

Whether it be the Aegis global enterprise, or the F-35 global enterprise or the tiltrotor enterprise, the United States has shaped unique warfighting capabilities which it can leverage as it shapes effective forces moving forward for today’s and tomorrow’s challenges.

I have written extensively about the Aegis global enterprise and the F-35 global enterprise, but we should also focus on a core capability which the United States has crafted and evolved since its introduction into Iraq in 2007, namely the tiltrotor enterprise.

If the Chinese had developed this capability and had built on its use since 2007 and its proliferation in the joint force, I guarantee there would be a robust literature on this threat and how do deal with it.

But since we have done it, we spend as much time criticizing it as understanding how the tiltrotor enterprise has transformed the capabilities of the USMC, the USAF and now the U.S. Navy with the U.S. Army next up.

This is a story of a unique capability which has reshaped the USMC in ways that are unimaginable without it. It has given the USAF special operational capabilities and now the U.S. Navy will experience a very different capability and approach to sustaining its distributed fleet.

And as the U.S. Army focuses on how to distribute its force, the new tiltrotor capability will become a backbone for an effort to leverage speed and range which no rotorcraft possesses.

When I worked for SECAF, he decided to implement a day without space for the USAF. It was not a pleasant experience. And we have now experienced what it is like to operate without an Osprey across the services. This has simply meant that core missions have not been met. Full stop.

When I went to visit MAWTS-1 earlier this month, I talked with the outgoing commander of this key training command, and discussed the recent WTI course. Unfortunately, the Osprey was not available due to the grounding of the aircraft by the three services.

This is what I learned from that discussion:

Col Purcell started by underscoring that the grounding of the Ospreys by the services after the accident last year with an Air Force Osprey, created a challenge for them. Not having Ospreys – which frankly are a bedrock platform in the transformation of their concept of operations – caused a problem in the WTI. There were some missions they simply could not do, and shifted assets around to do missions which was not their primary mission focus….

One mission which has been identified and which MAWTS-1 has been training for is the TRAP mission associated with a maritime strike mission. The need to recover rapidly any personnel downed in a maritime assault mission is something the Osprey is uniquely positioned to do. Only you can’t do it if it is not there. Fortunately, the ban on Osprey use was lifted in time for them to be able to use the Osprey in the maritime strike event within FINEX.

But it does not stop there.

If you want to deliver an engine to a large deck carrier for the F-35C and don’t have an Osprey, well you are out of Schlitz.

Or if the USAF is tasked with what President Carter asked the military to do in Iran in 1979, how would that work out? I remember specifically talking with my former professor Dr. Brzezinski about that mission failure and how the Osprey would have led to a different outcome, at least in his view.

You have heard of mission creep: but what missions missing in action?

That is what happens when you ground the tiltrotor enterprise.

Featured Image: Overview of the wreckage at the Desert One base in Iran. Credit: Wikipedia

MAWTS-1 Change of Command, May 3, 2024

05/15/2024

By Robbin Laird

Ed Timperlake and I are publishing a book on the MAWTS-1 training center later this year.

As we note in our preface:

Training for military forces is in the throes of significant change. The threats are dynamic; there is always the reactive enemy; and technology fosters new ways to operate.

Concepts of operations are evolving, most notably as U.S. and allied forces are focusing on force distribution to deal with the higher end threats authoritarian adversaries are fielding.

We (Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake) have visited the major training centers in the United States and several abroad as the state of the art of training is dynamically developing as well.

In this book, we highlight our visits to a major training center, MAWTS-1 located at Marine Corps Air Station, Yuma. This is a truly multi-domain training center and has been from its inception.

I attended the change of command at MAWTS-1 held on May 3, 2024. The day before I had the opportunity to take with two former COs of MAWTS-1 and then with the current and outgoing CO. Those reinforced the core point of our book — MAWTS-1 was founded as a center of excellence to training the trainers for the USMC and it continues to do so reinforcing a core capability for the USMC and the nation.

This article highlights the photos recently released by MAWTS-1 that highlight the ceremony. The first eight photos show Col Purcell’s last flight as the CO of MAWTS-1. The remainder highlight the ceremony.

A special one is the featured photo, namely of the past and current CO of MAWTS-1.

Currently, we have available my book which highlighted my visit to MAWTS-1 last year.

Change of Command, MAWTS-1, May 3, 2024

U.S. Marines participate in the Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One Change of Command ceremony at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, May 3, 2024.

The MAWTS-1 Change of Command Ceremony marked the official passing of authority from the outgoing commanding officer, Col. Eric D. Purcell to the incoming commanding officer, Col. Joshua M. Smith.

YUMA, AZ,
05.03.2024
Video by Cpl. Brian Bullard
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Attending the MAWTS-1 Change of Command Ceremony, May 3, 2024

05/05/2024

By Robbin Laird
After returning to the United States from Australia on April 25, 2024, I buckled up again for a flight to Yuma, Arizona to have the privilege of witnessing the MAWTS-1 change of command ceremony.

In the process of finishing up our forthcoming book on MAWTS-1, this seemed a good way to close out our effort.

One of the architects of the MAWTS-1/WTI concept and the first MAWTS-1 Commanding Officer, LtCol Howard DeCastro, had written to me suggesting the idea, and the CO of MAWTS-1, Col Purcell kindly agreed to invite me.

This would give me the chance to meet with several of the earlier Commanding Officers of MAWTS-1, meet the three 3 Star USMC Generals attending the ceremony and meet the new CO of MAWTS-1 as well.

On the day before the ceremony, I had the chance to sit down and interview two of the first commanding officers, LtCol DeCastro and LtGen Barry Knutson. In the afternoon, I was able to interview the outgoing CO, Col Purcell, and the incoming CO Col Joshua Smith.

What was amazing about the two sets of interviews is how connected in time they were.

The first and eighth CO of MAWTS focused on the approach they built towards combat innovation, namely, inserting technology into con-ops rather than having technology existing outside of the organizational changes needed to use relevant technologies.

It was the warfighters driving innovation in terms of real warfighting improvements, rather than some contractor or acquisition official pushing technology down their throats.

Then two hours later, I had the same conversation with Purcell and Smith.

It was about technology that did not exist at the time when DeCastro and Knutson were in charge, but it was the same mentality and same drive for combat excellence which we discussed.

And I would conclude with just one thought – don’t change the course.

The drive for warfighting excellence in the operating force is not nice to have, it is what we need if our country continues to field a warfighting force respected by the world, both allies and adversaries.

Well I am not a Marine, but it is hard to not listen to the USMC hymn at the ceremony and not say Semper Fidelis.

A Focused Force: Autonomous Systems and a Distributed ISR Enterprise

05/14/2024

As the Australian government shifts the direction on building out the ADF future force, having an effective distributed ISR enterprise is a crucial element in enabling such a force.

The investments the Australian government is making in the future future force underscores the need to have accurate ISR indispensable for a distributed force. Providing coverage for the distributed operations of the ADF and in a coalition context, powerful and accurate ISR capabilities, within that distributed force, is a vital element for their survival and operations.

Fortunately, the way ahead for ISR for a distributed force is getting better due to the innovations in sensors and transmission capabilities among sensors due to progress in both commercial and defence industry.

And the coming of autonomous systems allows for the operation of ISR nests within an embedded force and the emergence of airborne AI to help shape parsimony in the distribution of relevant data to a distributed force.

I had a chance to discuss this topic with James Lawless, a former Royal Australian Officer and now with Northrop Grumman. Lawless provided a presentation at the 11 April 2024 Williams Foundation seminar focused on how autonomous systems could contribute in a major way in the near to midterm for ADF efforts to shape a distributed ISR enterprise.

It should be noted that the new capability coming to the ADF is the Triton Remotely Piloted or RPA. In my view, this platform has been viewed as simply an additive to the ADF in pursuit of advanced ASW capabilities.

But is much more than that.

It is a very high altitude aircraft with a multitude of payloads and because the Triton can operate outside of the primary weapons engagement zone, it can function as quarterback to deliver ISR throughout a very large swath of the battlespace. And, in this sense, could relay information to various types of air and maritime autonomous systems operating in support of a distributed force.

It could relay information to a loyal wingman UAV in which the wingman is supporting the attack and defense force operating in the weapons engagement zone. This RPAS could deliver and receive information to/from autonomous USVs or in certain conditions to autonomous UUVs.

These systems could, with their own AI and edge processing capabilities, mix the Triton data with their own and deliver a focused package of ISR to the combat force. The aim would be to minimize or reduce the workload of the joint force commander without any reduction in ISR data.

This is how Lawless explained the approach to me in a meeting I had with him following his presentation during my April 2024 stay in Australia.

“With the evolution of software on the Triton, there is no reason Triton can’t make its own decisions about tasking other ISR assets. If we integrate autonomous AI data management capabilities on the aircraft, there is no reason Triton could not function as a quarterback for distribution of ISR data packages to autonomous platforms deployed with the distributed force.”

In my work on maritime autonomous systems, I highlighted that such systems are being used to perform specific mission threads. If one focused on innovation in the ISR mission thread to build an enterprise which leveraged such systems, a key enabler for an effective distributed force is created. Because of the fifth-generation revolution built around disaggregating sensor from shooter where appropriate, this revolution continues but by using RPAs and autonomous systems in a combined arm operation.

But for this to happen, the ADF has to train differently, and procure differently. It is about culture as much it is about technology.

The example I often provide is comparing how the Americans did this with the introduction of radar in World War II with the British. The U.S. had radar at pearl harbor and even saw incoming Japanese planes. But that situation did not work out so well.

In contrast, Air Marshal Dowding put together a different type of organization into which radar was inserted and creating this air threat identification ISR and C2 system made the difference in the Battle of Britain.

We are at a similar point whereby we could create a new and effective ISR service for a distributed force. But buying bits of kit will not do it. We need full up a different organizational and training approach to grasp the future and insert it into the combat force.

 

 

 

 

 

ARG-24th MEU Conducts Simulated Strait Transit

05/13/2024

Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 365 (Reinforced) and 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), performs flight operations while the Wasp (WSP) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) conducts a simulated strait transit during Composite Training Unit Exercise (COMPTUEX) in the Atlantic Ocean, April 26, 2024.

The WSP ARG-24th MEU is conducting COMPTUEX, their final at-sea certification exercise under the evaluation of Carrier Strike Group 4 and Expeditionary Operations Training Group. Throughout COMPTUEX, the WSP ARG-24th MEU is evaluated across a spectrum of scenarios that determine their readiness to deploy.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. John Allen)

The 11 April 2024 Sir Richard Williams Seminar: The Multi-Domain Requirements of an Australian Defence Strategy

05/12/2024

The first of two seminars of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation in 2024 was held on 11 April 2024 at the National Gallery of Australia.

The seminar was entitled, The Multi-Domain Requirements of an Australian Maritime Strategy and the aim of the seminar was identified as follows:

“To examine the enduring and emerging multi-domain requirements of an Australian maritime strategy in the context of the Defence Strategic Review.   The Seminar examines the requirements through a Defence lens but will consider all national means that contribute to a maritime strategy and the need for coherence across concepts, doctrine, equipment, basing and preparedness. This strategic coherence is needed to synchronise effects across the Whole of Australian Government, Defence and industry, as well as international partners.”

Last year’s DSR highlighted the ramped-up threat to Australia and the need to focus on the region, its partnerships and a more effective defence effort by Australia in the regional deterrence context.

The focus of the government in its subsequent priorities has tended to focus on longer term acquisitions, first in terms of nuclear submarines through the AUKUS relationship and for a new surface fleet in its recently released surface fleet review.

A multi-domain operations discussion builds on the work of the Foundation since I have been writing the reports since 2014 upon building a fifth-generation force, which after all revolves around sensor-shooter relationships built across an integrated force delivering multi-domain effects or what I prefer to call a kill-web enabled force.

The focus is upon how you get full value out of your force now and to build out that extant force in the future to become more lethal and survivable. If you are focused on the fight tonight, which any credible combat force must focus on, then long range assets are projections of the possible, not augmentations of the credibility of the operational force.

So any multi-domain discussion inevitably focuses on the way ahead for the force in being, rather than a force planning discussion of a projected future.

When you add a specific target of what is that force in being operating in support of, inevitably gaps are identified, and the question then is how do you close the most significant gaps which threaten your security and defence interests.

Such a focus is in turn raised if one raises the question of the means to the end of what one might consider a maritime threat envelope and strategy to deal with that envelope.

In other words, one would expect the seminar discussion to focus more on the transition challenges of the ADF and the nation to deal with threat environment in the near to midterm rather than in 2040.

That is what happened at the seminar in which speakers started by highlighting the importance of focusing on the here and now rather than on the force that might exist in 2035 or 2040.

Royal Australian Navy Explores Autonomy and Optional Crewing: Eyes LUSV as Potential LOSV Solution

By Gregor Ferguson

The Australian Department of Defence’s response to the Royal Australian Navy surface fleet review, Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant Fleet, published in February, announced the RAN would field six Large Optionally Manned Surface Vessels (LOSVs) from the 2030s to carry missile launch systems.

Interestingly, the RAN program closely resembles a similar but far more advanced one in the United States, the US Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) program.

The LOSVs will each carry a 32-cell Mk41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) to supplement the firepower of the RAN’s manned warships. Its Lockheed Martin Aegis Baseline 9 combat system makes possible a Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) with Aegis-equipped manned surface ships and enables the vessel to carry out both Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and conventional Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) operations.

If the LOSV program goes ahead, the ships will augment the RAN’s three Hobart-class AAW destroyers and six Hunter-class Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) frigates – which will still have a world-class AAW sensor and combat system combination – as well as the seven to eleven General-Purpose frigates to be acquired from later this year. None of these ships are over-endowed with Mk41 VLS launch cells: the Hobart-class ships have 48, the Hunter-class has 32 and the General-Purpose frigates will have just 16.

Importantly, the LOSV will be equipped with the Aegis Baseline 9 combat system: Aegis alone comes with the coveted CEC which the US Navy has only ever shared with Japan and Australia. All of the RAN’s Aegis-equipped warships are also being upgraded to Baseline 9 which enables ABM defence and protection of a sea or contiguous land area against hypersonic ballistic weapons.

So the LOSVs could operate in direct support of these ships – but they could also protect deployed Australian troops, Australian and allied ships threatened by hypersonic ballistic anti-ship missiles or even vulnerable Australian population centres.

The LOSVs obviously need to have an Aegis-equipped ship within communications range with a sensor suite that can detect conventional missiles, aircraft and ballistic missiles. The SPY-1D(V) radars on the Hobart-class can do this, and so can the CEAFAR2 radars on the Hunter-class.

We don’t know yet about the General-Purpose frigates, though most builders of the contenders at last year’s Indo pacific 2023 show in Sydney showed models of their ships with the CEAFAR2 radar and stated they used the Saab Australia 9LV Mk3E combat system/tactical interface which is used universally by the RAN.

The Mk41 VLS will enable anything from 128 quad-packed Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) for self-defence, to 32 single-packed SM-2, SM-3, SM-6 or Tomahawk missiles for long-range anti-aircraft, anti-missile/ABM and strike purposes. As long ago as 2021 the US Navy conducted a successful CEC-enabled trial of Raytheon’s AMRAAM-based SM-6 aboard its Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) Ranger using a Mk41 VLS as the launcher.

While an Australian-built autonomous LOSV may seem like a distant dream for most Australians, the reality is actually much firmer.

The US Navy and RAN have both proven the CEC works using the Aegis Baseline 8 system. Just as important, fully autonomous and optionally crewed vessels have been tested by both navies:  while the US Navy has had prototypes in the water for several years, Perth-based Austal Australia put an optionally crewed prototype to sea for the first time in March this year and finished the Sea Acceptance Trials (SAT) on this vessel in April.

The successful SATs (including Endurance Trials) of the remote and autonomously operated vessel Sentinel marked the first phase of what the RAN calls the Patrol Boat Autonomy Trial (PBAT). They consisted of a series of remote and autonomous navigation events conducted off the Western Australian coast during March and April 2024.

The trial vessel, the RAN’s de-commissioned Armidale-class Patrol Boat (ACPB) HMAS Maitland, employed Perth-based start-up Greenroom Robotics’ Advanced Maritime Autonomy Software to navigate reliably. At 57 metres LOA, Sentinel is by far the largest vessel operated in Australia to be operated remotely and autonomously.

Funded (at an undisclosed level) by the Commonwealth of Australia, PBAT is a collaboration between Austal Australia, Greenroom Robotics, the Brisbane-based Trusted Autonomous Systems Defence Cooperative Research Centre (TAS DCRC, which receives its core funding from the Department of Defence) and the Royal Australian Navy’s Warfare Innovation Navy (WIN) Branch. Its aim is to use the former ACPB to provide a proof-of-concept demonstrator for optionally crewed or autonomous operations.

The release in 2020 of the RAN’s Robotic and Autonomous Systems – Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) 2040 Strategy was the trigger for the TAS DCRC and Austal to get together. They saw an opportunity to re-purpose the former HMAS Maitland to define and better understand existing autonomous technology and how it could meet RAN needs. The partners also saw an opportunity to explore whether an autonomous platform could deliver asymmetric warfighting advantage.

Austal took possession of the decommissioned HMAS Maitland in 2022 and modifications included changes to the ship’s navigation, communications, bilges, CCTV, and electrical systems.

The Sentinel has been fitted with two autonomy systems: firstly, GreenRoom Robotics’ software-based GreenRoom Advanced Maritime Autonomy (GAMA) system, which enables remotely operated or full autonomous missions while complying with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, COLREGs, without crew intervention.

Secondly, a platform autonomy system, developed by Austal and based on the company’s in-house MARINELINK control and monitoring system, which enables operation of the Sentinel’s mechanical and electrical systems without crew intervention.

A key aspect of the initial trial was the endurance component, designed to observe Sentinel’s behaviour in an extended endurance mode. During this trial she operated autonomously with minimal to no crew interaction.

When the ship returns to sea the PBAT trial will focus on a bunch of other goals, starting with simply progressing the concept of remote operations and the autonomous certification approach.

At a sub-system level, the partners need to investigate and understand the sustained operation of shipboard mechanical systems reliably without crew intervention, including adding redundancy to enable operations at sea for extended periods, something the US Navy has explored also (see below). They also need to understand better how fuel management, communication and navigation systems can be made autonomous, and how they will work.

Longer-term, the PBAT trial will generate data contributing to risk reduction for future RAN projects involving remote or autonomous vessels. Short-term, the RAN could potentially transfer lessons learned about remote and autonomous systems to its current fleet to optimise crew workload: remote and autonomous operation has the potential to reduce crew workload and increase operational safety by reducing human error.

Austal says it is open to expanding the PBAT program and actively investigating opportunities to both extend current autonomy and optional crewing systems and integrate new systems to increase Sentinel’s capability or that of any future trials vessel.

Any future phases will be assessed to ensure the needs of the RAN’s Robotics and Autonomous Systems-Artificial Intelligence (RAS-AI) 2040 Strategy are still being met, the company says. Extension of this program will help to build the capabilities necessary to support two key requirements, says the company: the future LOSV program (which is where we came in); and the introduction of new technologies into the broader surface fleet to ensure future crewing requirements can be achieved. These aren’t stated as yet but the firm trend in Australia is to use fewer personnel and have smaller ship’s companies.

The PBAT program wasn’t established specifically with the LOSV program in mind, points out Austal, though everything to do with LOSV will benefit from the PBAT trial. Austal strongly supports the introduction of the LOSV to the Navy’s surface fleet, as you’d expect given that it will build the ships; and it points out also that its investment in autonomy, both in Australia and in the USA, has been with this type of platform in mind.

Austal’s Chief Executive Officer Paddy Gregg said the completion of the initial phase of the sea trials marks a significant PBAT milestone, successfully demonstrating the capability of the locally developed autonomous systems and their integration within a full-size, Australian-made naval vessel.

“Looking ahead, we are excited about the potential opportunities to work with [the RAN] to further advance the autonomous technology demonstrated during the trial; on projects such as the Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSV), recently announced by the Australian Government as part of the Surface Combatant Fleet Review,” Mr Gregg said in a statement.

So, this work positions the RAN to adopt autonomous technology in the future. In recent announcements Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles has said the planned LOSV platform will likely be acquired through formal RAN engagement with the US Navy’s LUSV program. Essentially, whatever the US Navy gets Australia will get, he’s suggesting, and the RAN will be a ‘fast follower’.

But however enticing the LUSV program looks, the PBAT trial is also designed to address Australia’s own sovereign requirement for a trusted autonomous system, especially an armed one. It needs to ensure the autonomous control system aboard the LOSV conforms with Australia’s needs and with the country’s high ethical standards for robotic and autonomous systems.

LUSV Program

The US Navy’s Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV) program is, as you’d expect, very similar to the RAN’s LOSV program. It is designed to deliver adjunct missile magazine capacity – essentially Mk41 VLS cells – to the Fleet as part of the US Navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept. The difference is that the US Navy has been experimenting and developing technology in this area for several years and (budgets permitting) plans to order its first production autonomous ship as early as FY2025 at a planned cost of about US$315 million.

The US Navy’s vision for LUSV is for a ship between 200 and 300ft LOA with a full-load displacement of approximately 1,500 tons. It is intended to be a low-cost, high endurance, modular USV that can carry a variety of payloads.

Late last year US Naval Sea Systems Command issued a Request for Information (RFI), asking industry for feedback on its draft LUSV proposals. “[It] will be built to commercial American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) vice military standards,” said the RFI which closed in December. “As an adjunct magazine, LUSV will operate with Carrier Strike Groups (CSG), Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG), Surface Action Groups (SAG), and individual manned combatants.”

“The LUSV will be capable of autonomous navigation, transit planning, and COLREGS compliant maneuvering and will be designed with automated propulsion, electrical generation, and support systems,” according to the US Navy’s FY 2024 budget documents.
“LUSV missions will be conducted with operators in-the-loop (with continuous or near-continuous observation or control) or on-the-loop (autonomous operation that prompts operator action/intervention from sensory input or autonomous behaviors).”

The Navy plans to issue its formal requirement for a production LUSV this calendar year. The PEO Unmanned and Small Combatants and PMS 406 are leading the US Navy’s effort.

The LUSV program started to gain traction in 2020 when the service awarded LUSV study contracts worth US$42 million to six US companies: Austal USA; Bollinger Shipyards; Fincantieri Marinette; Gibbs & Cox; Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII); and Lockheed Martin.

In March this year the US Navy announced that propulsion plants for solutions expected to be offered by four of the six – Bollinger, Fincantieri Marinette, HII and Gibbs & Cox – had all passed the mandated 720-hour engine reliability tests. These were intended to demonstrate that different propulsion plants can operate for extended periods without human intervention. This test is the milestone the LUSV program must pass before it can go into a formal development phase.

Meanwhile, autonomous ships already operated by the Navy have surpassed or come close to the 720-hour benchmark. A fleet of four unmanned prototypes – Unmanned Surface Vessels (USV) Mariner, Ranger, Seahawk and Sea Hunter – from the US Navy’s San Diego-based Unmanned Surface Vessel Division One (USVDIV-1) self-deployed across the Pacific to Sydney late last year to participate in the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) EX Autonomous Warrior in October-November 2023. Later, they headed on to Japan before returning home.

The role of Austal USA is interesting. It is based in Mobile, AL, but is a subsidiary of Austal Australia. Last year the parent company signed the Heads of Agreement with the Australian government which could result in Austal becoming the government’s strategic shipbuilder at its Henderson base near Perth under a new Strategic Shipbuilding Agreement.

So, any ships built in Western Australia for the RAN would be built by Austal, including the LOSVs and between four and eight General-Purpose Frigates announced in this year’s Australian Surface Combatant Review.

Austal has been positioning itself carefully for the new world of autonomy. A year ago the company handed over to the US Navy an optionally crewed Expeditionary Fast Transport, USNS Apalachicola (EPF-13), the largest ship in the US fleet with autonomous capability. And in January, with L3Harris, it launched the OUSV-3 Vanguard, the first autonomous ship designed for the US Navy from the keel up, though sister to two existing USVDIV 1 ships, Ranger and Mariner.

There are no suggestions that Austal’s participation in the RAN’s PBAT trial will have any effect on its likely bid to build the LUSV for the US Navy, but its investment in research across two nations in autonomy and robotics won’t do it any harm at all.

Gregor Ferguson is a defence and innovation analyst, consultant and teacher as well as a defence innovation communicator and writer. He’s the Publisher and Editor of EX2, the online newsletter devoted to defence innovation. He is also the part-time Innovation Coordinator at the AMDA Foundation Limited which organises the Avalon Air Show, the Indo-Pacific International Maritime Exposition, the Land Forces Exposition and the Indian Ocean Defence & Security conference.

Gregor spent 14 years as Editor and then Editor-at-Large of Australian Defence Magazine (ADM), Australia’s leading defence industry journal. At the same time he became a regular contributor to The Australian, The Australian Financial Review and was the Australian correspondent for Defense News in Washington DC.

Credit Photo: The photo of the Endurance is credited to Austal.

 

 

Insights on European Defence from the Defence24 Conference: May 2024

05/10/2024

Robert Czulda

NATO member states must step up their defense efforts, as Russia continues to pose a threat that persists. The time gained through Ukraine’s resistance is being squandered – this was the prevailing view during Defence24Days in Warsaw, one of Europe’s largest defense-related conferences.

Throughout the event, held between May 6-7, 2024, in the Polish capital of Warsaw, numerous military officials, scientists, and analysts voiced their concerns. Discussants unanimously agreed – Russia remains a threat, and its magnitude hinges on the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine.

NATO has played and will continue to play a crucial role, although Europe should enhance its independence.

This need arises from two fundamental reasons.

Firstly, the United States may be less willing to engage in Europe in the coming years due to ideological shifts (referring to isolationist sentiments in the United States).

Secondly, in the event of potential American involvement in a conflict with China, a natural consequence would be at least a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

“The task of deterring Putin’s Russia is undoubtedly a task for NATO; the European Union will not be able to tackle it for many years to come,” stated Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski.

He emphasized that Europeans, including Poles, expect the EU to ensure not only freedom of trade but also security.

Establishing a Commissioner for Defense requires treaty changes, which in Poland are sometimes portrayed as “an assault on Polish sovereignty.”

Sikorski added that “Europe has not only disarmed but also partly de-industrialized in the defense sector.. Ukraine has given us invaluable time; it’s been halfway through World War II already. The question is, are we making the most of this time?” he stated.

He also expressed a belief that because of this, Europe – “as the European pillar of NATO, but also as the European Union” – should be ready to take on certain tasks.

“We shouldn’t immediately call on the United States for every threat on our borders. If there’s an issue with some warlord in the Balkans, as the EU, we shouldn’t be entirely helpless. There are matters we should be able to handle, relieving the burden on the United States,” he argued.

Therefore, according to Sikorski, Poland should support the proposal to establish European rapid reaction forces.

One of the speakers was General Martin Herem, who has been the Commander of the Estonian Defence Forces since 2018. He admitted that the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022 came as a surprise to many.

Few anticipated that Russia would actually resort to force. While such a scenario was considered, planners deemed it highly improbable.

The break out of war in Ukraine also revealed that neither Estonia nor NATO were prepared. “Winter has arrived, especially for Estonia,” he concluded.

The speaker argued that a primary objective is to build forces capable of “not just deterring the enemy but destroying it. We must prepare for decisive victory.”

However, it was noted that Russia’s quantitative advantage – such as being ten times stronger in artillery – poses a significant challenge, and NATO member states are doing too little to neutralize it.

According to General Herem and other discussants, the West is not doing enough because despite its rhetoric, it still does not believe in the reality of the threat.

One of the noted weaknesses of NATO is the lack of an offensive information operation.

In other words, the West is not conducting activities in the Russian infosphere aimed at internal Russian audiences.

Contrary to popular belief, the Russian disinformation campaign is effective.

An example is the increasing anti-Western sentiments in Africa, where the Russian narrative has many supporters.

On the technical side, the conference also addressed fortifications that are now being erected in Central and Eastern Europe.

For example, in January 2024, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia signed an agreement to construct bunkers on the border with Russia and Belarus, forming the so-called Baltic Defense Line. A total of 600 bunkers will be built, each capable of accommodating 10 people along with equipment.

The project is valued at roughly EUR 60 million, and construction work is scheduled to begin in January 2025.

NATO’s frontline states are increasingly discussing the possibility of fortifying the border with Russia.

According to General Waldemar Skrzypczak – former Polish Commander of the Land Forces and now a security expert – such fortifications along the borders are not meant for defending to the last soldier but to reduce the risk of being caught off guard.

Colonel Otokar Foltýn (Office of the President of the Czech Republic) added that the Russian army is not an equivalent rival to NATO, but this does not mean there are no issues. He considered the lack of political will to act as a fundamental problem.

The strength of Russia stems from the fact that “Europe slept and still sleeps,” he stated, “we still fail to understand that this is also our war.”

Colonel Foltýn concluded his remarks with a forecast – in his view, within a few months, we will witness acts of sabotage in Europe. Their effects may be minor, but their primary aim will be to achieve a psychological impact.

Unfortunately, in his view, the West is losing the psychological war with Russia.

Polish General Marek Tomaszycki – former Chief of Operational Command of the Armed Forces – agreed that a potential NATO war with Russia would be different from the one currently being waged by Ukraine against Russia.

Regarding conclusions, he stated that the war in Ukraine shows that while on the one hand, we must keep pace with technological advancements and introduce new, technically advanced equipment into service, it is also important to teach basic skills, including trench warfare or the use of simple equipment.

General Tomaszycki also addressed the issue of drones. As he stated, their effectiveness depends on electronic warfare systems, which are becoming increasingly effective.

Every piece of equipment that reaches Ukraine is regarded by Russia as particularly significant.

Russians attempt to acquire it to subsequently learn how to neutralize it.

Therefore, not everything can be given to the Ukrainians.

At the same time, General Tomaszycki warned against the scenario of an alternative security system forming around the core BRICS countries. This would pose a serious problem for the West by creating competition not only politically but also economically and militarily.

Featured Image: Generals, along with the Chief of the General Staff, taking part in Defence24 Days 2024.

Photo Credit. Defence24