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U.S. Marines with Command, Control and Communication, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), board an MV-22B Osprey aircraft during an offensive air support exercise, part of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) 2-23, at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, April 4, 2023.
WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.
The Williams Foundation seminar on deterrence held on 30 March 2023 provided a chance to think about the way ahead for Australian defence. The seminars started with the introduction of the F-35 as a forcing function into the ADF and the shaping of a joint force by design.
But much of that thinking was built to support the strategic environment envisaged in the mid-decade best expressed in the defence white paper of 2016.
As the late Brendan Sargeant characterized the 2016 White Paper: “The 2016 White Paper was an important document because it restored the underlying funding framework that the 2009 White Paper envisaged but was never able to sustain. The underlying vision of the force that was evident in 2009 was reinvigorated in the 2016 White Paper and a funded investment program was established. This was an important achievement.
“The 2016 White Paper also recognised that Defence was more than the ADF, but also included the broader Defence system. We saw a much more sophisticated recognition of the importance of enablers (what Nick Warner in a landmark speech when he was secretary had called the broken backbone of Defence).
“It put renewed emphasis on defence industry, particularly with the recognition that industry is an element of capability. At the heart of this White Paper was a recognition that we needed to rebuild the Australian Navy, so the shipbuilding agenda, which we are all now grappling with, was born in that document.
“But it also had two other very interesting features. One was that it removed the prioritisation framework for the development of the force structure that had been evident in the 2013 and 2009 papers, and in preceding papers such as the ones in 2000, 1994 and, most importantly, the one in 1987. It was a significant break with the past. This is perhaps the most controversial element of the paper.
“But perhaps the most interesting element of the 2016 document was that it gave enormous enormous priority to the maintenance of the rules-based order, a theme that also occurs in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. The 2016 Defence White Paper has many achievements, but its focus on the rules-based order is now starting to look a bit wistful.”[1]
Wistful indeed and we have entered a global era with many chartered unknowns.
The re-thinking of Australian defence is occurring precisely when its allies in the Pacific and in Europe are re-thinking and re-working their approaches to the future of defence in a very different world when it was simply trying to ensure that the authoritarian powers complied with the rules-based order.
Now they are focused on building a new one.
That is why the Williams Foundation team established a seminar which focused on first principles: what are the nature of the defense challenges which Australia faces in this new historical epoch?
And what is the role of the ADF and its recalibration and re-design within the new context?
Vice-Admiral (Retired) Barrett underscored the focus of the seminar in his concluding comments as follows: “As the Chairman of Williams, Geoff Brown, indicated at the beginning of the day we are taking a different tack with this seminar and the one to follow later in the year.
“The subject that we discussed over the last couple of hours has been around deterrence where previously at these conferences, we’ve been talking very specifically around fifth generation capability throughout the ADF.
“So the idea that we would gather, and we would have an array of esteemed speakers who would inform us, educate us, but also challenge us, to assist us in being able to formulate our thinking about the way ahead made a great deal of sense.”
I discussed at further length Barrett’s thoughts on the transition a week after the seminar.
He emphasized that “we have to look at the broader strategic redesign of Australian defence within which the ADF will be re-crafted. Our views of deterrence in this new period are not yet fully formed and it is the broader perspectives that need to guide the way ahead for the ADF.
“We need to settle our understanding of deterrence as a foundational effort or we will simply end up with a platform centric perspective driving this or that new platform without consideration of what these new capabilities bring to the deterrence equation.
“What is needed is a national enterprise that looks across all parts of government, be it statecraft, diplomacy, economic or military capabilities. It is essential that we drive towards an understanding of what deterrence means to us and for us.”
We did not dwell on the submarine issue but he naturally touched upon it.
His argument was the role of being able to operate successfully in the underwater domain is key for the ADF in a broader deterrence strategy.
Clearly, my own work for the U.S. Department of Defence has made it very clear that the speed, agility, stealth and range of a nuclear submarine make it a key element enabling the U.S. Navy to play a much more effective role in operating in the underwater domain and with the multi-domain kill web approach they are finding ways t more effectively include the nuclear submarine fleet within joint firings solutions as well.
Barrett argued: “I often hear comments that there has been little debate about the need for a submarine capability and that more needs to be done before a decision to proceed is made. In reality, there has been significant open debate and critique in the last decade – but few have taken the opportunity to read it, understand it, or educate themselves about that debate.”
Building capability is part of deterrence.
As Barrett concluded: “It is not simply about process; it is about outcome. Deterrence is empowered by a demonstration of the will of a nation to be able to act to meet its own interests which comes not only through political actions but industrial ones as well. It is an ability to draw on the strength of the whole nation which can be demonstrated in building out new capability which enhances the ADF’s ability to act supported by the nation.”
[1] Laird, Robbin. Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy (pp. 325-326). Kindle Edition.
With the Australian Army having been heavily invested in the Middle East land wars and working closely with the U.S. Army in those endeavours, what is role in the enhanced emphasis on the direct defense of Australia?
Of course, each of the services and the joint force itself is facing how to meet the challenge of direct defense, but the question of the relationship of the land forces to the joint direct defense of Australia is especially challenging.
At the Williams Foundation Seminar on deterrence, LTGEN Simon Stuart, COS of the Australian Army, provided a general look at the deterrence challenge, the role of the ADF and of the Australian Army.
Although he noted in his speech “that that there is anything uniquely Australian about deterrence as part of our strategy, or indeed how we might practice it. “
But with the emergence of what is often called great power competition, the role of nation has been enhanced and the need to shape national approaches even when interactive with key allies is central to the way ahead for national deterrence.
LTGEN Stuart then addresses the question of an Australian approach from that perspective.
”If there were to be such a thing as a uniquely Australian way of deterring, it would surely be founded by what defines us as a nation and what defines us Australians.
“Who are we as a nation, and who are we as a people in the middle decades of the 21st century?
“A uniquely Australian approach to deterrence would surely be founded in what our national aspirations were, our strategic culture, and approaching the task of deterrence from that perspective. So, the founding question for me is: how do we conceive of and combine our amazing national endowment?
“Our enviable strategic geography, our stewardship of a significant proportion of the Earth’s surface – both the land mass and the seas that we are responsible for, and over 40 per cent of the Antarctic continent, which we lay claim to.
“We are among the world’s top 15 economies, we have convening power both regionally and globally, we have a vibrant and diverse successful social experiment in our society today, our amazing human capital, and we have a series and a set of alliances and partnerships which are the envy of many.
“We have the capacity to be a global energy and food superpower.
“We have incredible natural resources, both those that have been in demand up until now, and those that will be in demand in the future. And the capacity to draw on 65,000 years of human history and endeavour on our continent.
LTGEN Stuart speaking to the Williams Foundation Seminar 30 March 2023.
“So how can we conceive of that wonderful endowment, and how do we conceive bringing it together?
“Are we outwardly focused and engaged, or are we insular and closed?
“And, for everyone who wears or has worn our uniform today – and certainly for every Australian soldier – the answer to the question ‘who are we?’ is of fundamental importance to service.
“Because we need to understand for whom and for what we are serving. And if we are in the fight, those questions are brought into even sharper relief.
LTGEN Stuart then addressed the key question of the nature of the new strategic context within which Australia or other liberal democracies are now operating.
“Pax-Americana was an historic anomaly. The norm in human history is a violent transfer of power from one empire to another – and 14 of the 16 transitions between empires in human history have involved wars.
“We live in an era that might be described as post-peak globalisation. Understanding how the international system works, what the great economic or trading blocks are, is an endeavour we need to understand.
“There are a range of theories, but personally I like Parag Khanna’s new regionalism model because it emphasises partnerships, and partnerships within the context of regional blocks from an economic perspective – but also from the other elements of national power, which are in the ascendancy in the global system today.
“To some of our more recent history and the thinking from the 1980s that shaped our national security and defence policy, strategy and practice over the last 30 years.
“The thinking that we do today, and the decisions that our elected representatives make today, will influence our policy and practice over the next few decades.
“That thinking, in my view, failed to engage with the world as it was, failed to engage with globalisation, either refused to engage or didn’t recognise pretty much everything we’ve actually been doing these past few decades.
“It was defensive and inward looking.
“And finally, the wars we’ve been involved in, the wars we’ve been fighting over the last 20 years, the so-called ‘wars of choice’, did not touch Australia and did not touch Australians.
“They were a Defence endeavour, involving only the military element of our national power, and largely an ADF endeavour. They did not touch the society we live in.”
What then shapes a way ahead for the ADF in this new historical era is the importance of being embedded in a broader national approach requiring skill sets beyond those expected of the military
LTGEN Stuart the addressed some of these broader capabilities.
“How does our national aspiration and our national identity find expression in our strategic thinking and our policy and practice. It finds expression via statecraft, which is the mobilisation and orchestration of all elements of national power.
And the key areas of focus are that people like us need to help our elected representatives deal with are founded in national identity, and national unity, and therefore the wellspring of unity and purpose.
“It relies on social cohesion, it relies on the means by which to execute the strategy – that is our economy – the means connote and provide agency for us as a nation.
“It will rely on an involved relationship between the private and public sector, on better harnessing the incredible capacity of our academy.
“It will rely on the practice of statecraft on a more expansive engagement with partners and the development of partnerships.”
LTGEN Stuart finally focused on the military element of deterrence. “The military element of national power needs to be four things. Firstly, it needs to reflect our national identity and aspiration.
“It needs to reflect the nature of the challenges, the threats and the competition. And it needs to reflect the nature of our strategy, which in its broadest terms is shape, deter and respond.
“It needs to respect the arc of human history, and the history of warfare, and respect the requirement to balance between the enduring human nature of warfare and its changing character – which is generally speaking dominated by technology.
It needs to ensure relevance – relevance and credibility that are relative to a pacing threat, and an operating environment, and the opinions of our allies and partners.
“It also needs to be resourced, because a strategy without means is an illusion.
“So our strategy today calls on us to shape the environment, deter actions against our interests, and be ready to respond with military force in all five domains when required.
“But shape, deter and respond does not connote a linear progression or the luxury of focusing on one at the expense of others.
“It is all three, all at once and in five domains, in the context of the execution and application of statecraft.
“If deterrence fails, war and its very unpredictability demands an ADF that is relevant and credible in all five domains – a system of systems that has the best chance of mission success whether we are deterring or we are prevailing in the conquest of war.
“To come back to the point about strategy being an illusion is it is not resourced, there are key questions that are being asked today in our nation.
“We have a pretty good sense of what it costs. There is a sharp focus on what we can afford, and then there are choices about what we are willing to pay.
“Each of those price points brings with it a risk profile, and those are the difficult decisions that our government needs to make.
“Those are difficult decisions to which we need to contribute the best advice that we possibly can.”
LTGEN Stuart then focused on the way ahead for the ADF and the Army.
“Given the nature of our strategic circumstances, whatever we do requires us to do it quickly. Velocity matters.
“One way we can sharpen the edge of deterrence is by embracing new and emerging technologies and balancing that with the incredible human capital we enjoy in our country.
“I’m going to quote our Chief of Air Force from his excellence speech, which I commend to you, which he gave as a keynote at the Chief of Air Force Symposium in Melbourne as a precursor to the Avalon Air Show recently.
“He said: “It is easy to be seduced by technology; to do so would be to forget that national security is a national endeavour.
“The impediments to boosting capability delivery are often policy related, procedural or cultural. While advanced platforms teamed with cutting edge and disruptive technologies can be game-changes, we won’t realise their advantage without evolving our thinking that delivers the military power element of deterrence.”
“I think for me that really summarised the set of dilemmas and choices we face today in terms of responding to the strategic environment.
“Another way forward is leveraging the existing strengths of our Defence Force by ensuring we have a sharper focus on how we design our force, which is integrated and greater than the sum of our constituent parts.
“One that is increasingly builds into the architecture a strong and abiding sense of partnership with allies and regional partners.
“Because in an era of great power competition, having more friends is better than having less.
“In our region we have very good relationships with our partners. And the people to people relationships we enjoy have been grown and cultivated and reinforced over many, many years and stand us well for the future.
“Shared interests matter, and the many collective agreements like AUKUS and like FPDA and the Quad, and like the support we have of the ASEAN political architecture matter and stand us in good stead for tomorrow.
“From an Army perspective, from the contribution of land power to that integrated force, we offer presence, persistence, asymmetry through first-mover advantage, utility, and incredibly good value for money.”
I would add that I believe there a number of ways the land forces can play an important role in the direct defense of Australia and will identify some thoughts in future pieces.
The British Army has been training Ukrainian recruits on AS-90 self-propelled artillery guns, which are being donated to Ukraine. The AS-90 is a 155mm mobile artillery system capable of firing up to six rounds per minute.
The United Kingdom has also been running a 35-day training course for Ukrainian volunteer fighters, which teaches them skills to survive in a hostile environment such as weapons handling, marksmanship and the law of armed conflict.
The instructors were from NATO Allies including Canada, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Norway, as well as NATO invitee Sweden, and partner countries Australia and New Zealand.
The programme is part of the UK’s commitment to help Ukraine uphold its right to self-defence against Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression.
Footage includes firing of the AS-90 artillery system, Ukrainian volunteers on a firing range and training being conducted by UK, Dutch and Norwegian troops.
Commander of Air Combat Command recently visited Tyndall Air Force Base, and sat down to talk about the incoming F-35A Lighting squadrons and how Tyndall is becoming the installation of the future.
U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, participates in an external lift training exercise during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-23 at Auxiliary Airfield II near Yuma, Arizona, March 28, 2023.
According to the CO of MAWTS-1, Col Purcell: ‘We have a 4-plane detachment of CH-53Ks supporting the WTI course. They are not producing a WTI student, but are flying in all events using their own WTIs IOT gather data on requirements to support a 4-plane detachment, familiarize other WTI students with 53K capabilities, and increase overall proficiency of the pilots in their ready room.”
WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION YUMA, AZ
03.28.2023
Photos by Lance Cpl. Ricardo Ramirez
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1
U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, participates in an external lift training exercise during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-23 at Auxiliary Airfield II near Yuma, Arizona, March 28, 2023. W
U.S. Marine Corps CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), executes an external lift of a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-23 at Auxiliary Airfield II near Yuma, Arizona on Mar. 28, 2023
Royal Air Force CH-47 Chinook helicopter participates in the exercise.
As the joint force works was to distribute for enhanced survivability but integrated through C2/ISR strands, there is a new role for ground force mobility.
One example of this was suggested in my interview in Copenhagen with a senior official with Weibel, the radar company and focused on how ground based artillery could be used to attrite drone offensives.
In that interview published on 22 July 2022, how the drone threat for the joint force could be addressed by the ground maneuver force was addressed.
During my recent visit to Copenhagen, I had a chance to visit with my Risk Intelligence colleagues Weibel Doppler Radars.
Weibel is a Danish company that provides integrated radar solution sets for Danish and allied forces worldwide, and is a major supplier to the U.S. armed forces as well…
We received a briefing on the company and its activities by Lars Krogh Vammen, Business Development Director. He provided an overview on the company’s various activities, but in this article, I am going to focus on one core capability which as we discussed allows the Danish and allied forces to rethink how to deal with the drone threat by using cost effective ground-based force options, rather than having to expend high-cost multi-domain missile capabilities, which are in short supply in any case….
A core point in the briefing was that Weibel is a sensor house. They work in a “system of systems realm” which means that they can work with a variety of customers and integrate with a wide variety of C2 solutions as well.We discussed at length the question of the drone threat and how Weibel has and is developing solutions for the operating forces to deal with these threats.
Obviously, the war in Ukraine and how both the Ukrainians and Russians are using and developing uses for drones to support attacks on air and ground forces is a key dynamic being observed by outsiders.
Much like the earlier use of drones in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the use and adaptation of drones as part of a combat force means that new factors have been introduced which have to be dealt with in either defensive or offensive operations and in broader security considerations as well.
We started this discussion by focusing on how militaries need to integrate drone situational awareness capabilities and then be able to act on this SA to find a firing solution.
A core capability which Weibel has developed to shape effective SA is their XENTA radar sensor.
According to Vammen, the XENTA radar sensor is designed specifically for C-UAS and Ground Based Air Defense.
The XENTA radar is capable of detecting, tracking and classifying all types of aerial threats like fast moving targets such as fighter jets, RAM and missiles as well as Low Slow and Small targets like fixed wing and rotary wing drones. And the radar is agnostic with regard to 3rd party C2 systems.
This means that the open architecture system allows for data export for parallel signal processing.
The XENTA radar is a 3D digital array system. He argued that 3D Digital Array provides a factor 10 higher time on target compared to AESA. This allows for increased clutter suppression, sub clutter target detection and tracking and improved characteristics-based classification.
The characteristics-based classification challenge is a key one to determine whether one is really dealing with a drone or with various anomalies.
The XENTA is a software defined or upgradeable radar which can be adapted to new threats, profiles can be tailored to meet operational requirements and there is an upgrade path independent of hardware.
He emphasized throughout the briefing that the company worked closely with operating forces which means that as the company can enhance is characteristics-based classification system those enhancements can shape upgrade paths for the radar system itself.
A key part of the path to enhance a characteristics-based classification system is “machine learning in the loop.”
In his briefing he described how Weibel was working machine learning to enhance the ability of its sensors to determine whether it was birds or drones the sensor was seeing.
And then by correctly identifying what is a threat, it is then possible to shape more effective and timely firing solutions to eliminate the threat.
We discussed how their sensors could then provide the target identification for ground-based artillery to provide a firing solution with air-burst ammunition to eliminate the threat.
The war in Ukraine certainly has highlighted the challenge for the ground maneuver force to sort through the best way to used ground-based artillery to support the ground scheme of maneuver.
Enhancing its ability to “shoot and scoot” is one part of the equation; allowing it to provide a core drone killing capability would dramatically enhance its impact on the multi-domain offensive-defensive force as well.
But to deal with drone threats whether on a battlefield or on a country’s territory, Vammen argued that there is not a single sensor or effector, that can solve the threat from drones on its own.
A mixed, collaborative and connected approach through a common C2 platform may solve the task. He argued that it is necessary to breach domains and integrate necessary data across platforms and systems….
A second example of the evolution of ground based artillery in the distributed joint force concept is how the USMC are now working with HIMRS artillery systems.
The former MARFORPAC Commander, Lt. General Rudder explained the concept as follows:
“If we look forward in the not-too-distant future, we’ll have the ability to have land-based long-range fires, aviation fires, and persistent high endurance ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) with the MQ-9. We’ll be able to move those capabilities with KC-130s, MV-22s, or amphibious lift, allowing us to project long-range fires forward anywhere in Asia, much like we do with the HIMARS (High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System) today.
“HIMARS fits in the back of a KC-130, allowing rapid mobilization and insertion. We will exercise the same operational tactic with anti-ship capability. We want to project sea denial capabilities to cut off a strait of our choosing or maneuver into positions to create our own maritime chokepoint. “As we saw with hunting mobile missiles in the past, having long-range fires on maneuvering platforms makes them really hard to hit. As we distribute our long-range fires on mobile platforms, we now become a hard platform to find. Our desire is to create our own anti-access and area denial capability.”[1]
The approach described by Rudder was recently exercise by MAAWTS-1 at a most recent WTI course. According to the command: A U.S. Marine Corps H142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), fires during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, on Oct. 12, 2022.
“WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.
But the ability to use ground force artillery in this role depends on kill web force — one needs to move, to conceal, to connect, to target through an evolving concept of integrated fires, to be sustainable and supportable.
It is a kill web enabled force capability but one which can be an effective part of muti-domain warfare.
The photos of HIMARS rapid infiltration are credited to Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule.
[1] Laird, Robbin F.. Defense XXII: A World in Transition (2023) (pp. 172-173). Kindle Edition.
A U.S. Marine Corps H142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), is loaded aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III aircraft in preparation for a HIMARS rapid infiltration exercise during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, on Oct. 12, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule)
A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), unloads U.S. service members onto a runway during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, on Oct. 12, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule)
A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), unloads U.S. service members onto a runway during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, on Oct. 12, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule)
U.S. Marines assigned to Ground Combat Department, Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), observe H142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) participate in a rapid infiltration exercise during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, on Oct. 12, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule)
A U.S. Marine Corps H142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), fires during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, on Oct. 12, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule)
A U.S. Marine Corps H142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), is loaded aboard a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III aircraft after a HIMARS rapid infiltration exercise during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah, on Oct. 12, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule)
A U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), concludes flight operations during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-23 at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, on Oct. 12, 2022. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardization advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule)
U.S. Marine CH-53K King Stallion helicopter and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), and Royal Air Force CH-47 Chinook helicopter participate in an external lift training exercise during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course 2-23 at Auxiliary Airfield II near Yuma, Arizona on March 28, 2023.
During the exercise, the CH-53K King Stallion aircraft performed its heaviest external lift with a total load weight of 36,000 pounds.
According to the CO of MAWTS-1, Col Purcell: ‘We have a 4-plane detachment of CH-53Ks supporting the WTI course. They are not producing a WTI student, but are flying in all events using their own WTIs IOT gather data on requirements to support a 4-plane detachment, familiarize other WTI students with 53K capabilities, and increase overall proficiency of the pilots in their ready room.”
WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification, of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine Aviation training and readiness, and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. YUMA, AZ,
03.28.2023
Video by Cpl. Jaye Townsend
Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1
For an update on the CH-53K coming to the fleet, see the following:
