A Mission-Kitable Aircraft for Kill Web Operations: Colonel Marvel Discusses the Way Ahead with the Osprey

02/24/2023

By Robbin Laird

I first encountered the Osprey in 2007 in a visit to MAG-26 at New River. In that discussion with Marines, we focused on how what was referred to me early on, as the Osprey Nation, was stood up and shaped a core group of combat warriors who brought such an innovative plane into combat and reshaped really how the Marines have operated since then.

For the nascent Osprey Nation, the Osprey functioned largely as an assault aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan but unique roles which the aircraft would play in providing greater range and speed for the medical mission quickly became appreciated.

But as Marine Corps Aviation moves to incorporate a new function which might be bundled with the Navy’s focus on distributed maritime operations, the flexibility of the aircraft is being demonstrated and a much wider range of payloads being enabled by the aircraft.

In my book with Ed Timperlake on the coming of the maritime kill web, we underscore that a distributed force built around modular task forces highlights the payloads which the task force can deliver in terms of effects, rather than describing that task force in terms of a core platform.

The flexibility which the Osprey provides – with the USMC, the U.S. Navy and the USAF operating the aircraft – opens the aperture significantly on how one configures the aircraft to deliver what payload in which situation for which combat and deterrent effect.

To understand more about this change for the Osprey Nation, I recently talked with Colonel Marvel, the CO of MAG-39, located at Camp Pendleton (see his biography at the end of the article). Col Marvel and his team have worked closely with the CMV-22B team at North Island in the standup of the Navy’s Osprey capability.

In early January 2023, I visited, Captain Sam Bryant, Commander, Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing in North Island, and he underscored the Navy’s interest in broadening the CMV-22Bs role beyond the legacy Carrier on Demand function.

As I noted in that interview: “Captain Bryant reported that the U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander, Admiral Paparo, was pleased with the initial deployments, but feels that the Osprey can do much more in its role in evolving fleet concepts of operations. The aircraft provides an important support for, but more than that, stimulant for the shift in con-ops whereby the Navy focus on distributed operations which itself is in an experimental development and growth phase and intersects with the USAF’s approach to agile combat employment. In other words, the reshaping of joint and coalition operations is underway which focuses upon distributed task forces which can deliver enhanced lethality and survivability.”

Col Marvel underscored that expanding the mission set for the Navy’s CMV-22B was certainly possible but was not in his domain of responsibility. But the USMC is clearly expanding the payloads carried by the MV-22B which supports distributed operations, and if the three services which operate the aircraft found ways to expand their ability to cross-service each other’s aircraft, they would be able to enhance such operations.

As Col Marvel put it: “The Osprey provides unique speed and range combinations with an aircraft which can land vertically. It is a very flexible aircraft which could be described as a mission-kitable aircraft. The Osprey has big hollow space in the rear of the aircraft that can hold a variety of mission kits dependent on the mission which you want the aircraft to support.”

He emphasized that with a variety of roll-on roll-off capabilities with different payloads. “We can add the specialists in the use of a particular payload along with the payload itself to operate that payload, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, whether it is a passive or active sensor payload. We need to stop thinking about having to put the command of such payloads under the glass in the cockpit, and control those payloads with a tablet.”

Col Marvel underscored that the Marines when deployed are engaged in presence missions. How then best to use their presence to deliver the desired effect? And given the Marines are operating across the spectrum of warfare, and that spectrum itself is changing, which payloads are most relevant to the mission?  This means that “we need to maximize the payload utility of our platforms.”

He provided a number of examples of different payloads which they are working with from USVs to a variety of passive and active sensors. Kill webs need to be sustained and Ospreys can provide both fuel and ordinance to platforms throughout the extended battlespace. For example, Ospreys can bring fuel and ordinance to a FARP (forward arming and refueling point) and support P-8 operations, for example.

A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey with Marine Medium Tilt Rotor Squadron 165, Marine Air Group 16, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), refuels at a forward arming and refueling point Dec. 1, 2022, on Camp Wilson, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Cailfornia, during Steel Knight 23. Exercise Steel Knight 23 provides 3rd MAW an opportunity to refine Wing-level warfighting in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force and fleet maneuver. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Jacob Hutchinson)

Ospreys can palatize torpedoes and engage them in the battlespace. They can provide key parts of the network of sensors that make a distributed forces’ domain C2 and fires control picture. With the proper payload, Ospreys can maintain contact with surface and subsurface forces to help build a common tactical operating picture.

The Navy with the USMC are doing a wide range of mission rehearsal experimentation to determine how best to operate a variety of payloads operating off of various platforms to enable the distributed force to have the kind of effect – kinetic or non-kinetic – which is desired.  The Osprey – with its range, speed, and landing flexibility – can play a key role in this overall effort.

One example of the kind of experimentation which Col Marvel was talking about was highlighted in a 3 January 2023 story released by 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing.

This story highlighted actions by Marine Air Control Group 38 in Exercise Steel Knight 2023.

“Marines and Sailors with Marine Air Control Group 38 refined tactics for future maritime conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region during Exercise Steel Knight 2023. With units positioned across California and Arizona, MACG-38 tested components of Aviation Command and Control in conjunction with 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing’s “Hub, Spoke and Node” model in preparation for the next fight.

“Acting as the “Hub,” MACG-38 established a Tactical Air Command Center aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, San Diego, California. With the TACC fully operational, MACG-38, in conjunction with 3rd MAW key leaders, facilitated command and control of air assets throughout the battlespace.

“Concurrently, MACG-38 set up a “Spoke” at the Strategic Expeditionary Landing Field at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center located in 29 Palms, Ca in order to facilitate Marine Aircraft Group 16’s Assault Support requirements for Steel Knight 23. From the SELF, Marines from MACG-38 were able to establish Forward Arming and Refueling Points in conjunction with MV-22B Ospreys and CH-53E Super Stallions from MAG-16. From these remote locations, MACG-38 Marines were able to support the refueling of both MAG-16 aircraft and tactical air platforms including the F-35B Lightning II from MAG-13.

“Off the coast of San Diego on San Clemente Island, MACG-38 also imbedded a platoon of Marines from 3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion with the 11th Marine Regiment in order to earn certification for the upcoming Marine Rotational Force-Darwin deployment to Australia. While on San Clemente Island, LAAD Marines provided critical support for a large-scale Air Assault. During the exercise, LAAD gunners executed over a dozen live-fire shoots and earned their certification for MRF-D.

“Steel Knight 23 also saw the establishment of organic Air Control Companies within 3rd MAW. In order to experiment with and force generate Multifunction Air Operations Centers without impact to global force management tasking, MACG-38 transferred personnel and equipment from MACS-1 Air Defense Company Bravo to MASS-3 in order to reorganize Marine Air Support Squadron 3 into three Air Control Companies and a Headquarters Company. Under this new construct, MASS-3 was both able to support all I Marine Expeditionary Force and 3rd MAW C2 functionalities and requirements over a broader spectrum by capturing MAOC personnel and equipment requirements, techniques, tactics, and procedures, and training requirements. This initiative led to the Initial Operational Capability of MASS-3 Air Control Companies as well as the MAOC force generation event supporting 1st Marine Regiment’s MRF-D deployment.”

In short, as Col Marvel underscored: “there’s a lot of capability that we have now. And our fight is today; today is our last day of peace out in the fleet.”

COLONEL NATHAN S. MARVEL

Col Nathan S. Marvel was born and raised in Northwest Montana.  He enlisted in the Navy in 1992 and attended the Broadened Opportunity Officer Selection Training program (BOOST) in San Diego, California.  In 1994 he accepted an appointment to the United States Naval Academy.  He graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Systems Engineering in 1998 and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps.

After completing The Basic School, he reported for flight training at Naval Air Station (NAS) Pensacola, Florida and NAS Corpus Christi, Texas.  He was designated a Naval Aviator on 20 December 2000 and reported to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Camp Pendleton, CA for instruction as an AH-1W Super Cobra pilot at Marine Helicopter Training Squadron 303 (HMT-303).

In June 2001, Col Marvel reported to the “Gunfighters” of Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 (HMLA-369) where he served as the ground training officer, operations schedule writer, current operations officer, adjutant, future operations officer, logistics officer, tactics officer, and squadron Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI).

Col Marvel deployed in June 2002 to Okinawa, Japan as part of the Unit Deployment Program (UDP).  Traveling from Okinawa on the High-Speed Vessel (HSV), he supported operations in the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Philippines, and the Kingdom of Thailand.

In April of 2003, Col Marvel deployed to Ali Al Salem Air Base, Kuwait in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Shortly after his return he was deployed a second time to Okinawa Japan in 2004 where he participated in operations in the Republic of South Korea and Thailand.  Col Marvel attended the Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) Course in March of 2005.  In July 2005 he deployed with Medium Marine Helicopter 163 (reinforced) (HMM-163(REIN)) “Evil Eyes”, 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) ((MEU)(SOC)), Expeditionary Strike Group One (ESG-1) in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.  Upon return, he joined the “Stingers” of HMLA-267 where he served as the Aviation Safety Officer.

Col Marvel then reported to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) where he served as an AH-1W Instructor, USMC Assault Support Survivability Subject Matter Expert, AH-1W/Z Course Catalog Manager, AH-1W/Z T&R Program Manager and the Academic Department Head.  After completing his tour in June 2010 Col Marvel reported to Command and Staff College, MCU, Quantico, Virginia and received a Master’s degree in Military Studies.

In June of 2011, Col Marvel reported to Marine Air Group 39 (MAG-39) and was assigned to HMLA-469 as the Tactics Officer and subsequently the Assistant Operations Officer.  In February of 2012, he became the Operations Officer and in April deployed to Camp Leatherneck Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 12.1 & 12.2.  Col Marvel completed his tour in HMLA-469 “Vengeance” as the Executive Officer.

Col Marvel reported to HQMC Aviation, Pentagon, Washington D.C. in the Summer of 2014 and served as the Requirements Officer (RO), Aviation Programs and Weapons (APW-74) for Digital Interoperability (DI), Electronic Kneeboard (EKB) and Joint Mission Planning Software (JMPS).  In the summer of 2015, he returned to MAG-39 and began his conversion to the AH-1Z Viper.

In December of 2015, Col Marvel assumed Command of HMLA-369 the “Gunfighters”.

Upon completion of command, Col Marvel reported to the National War College in June of 2017 and received a Master’s degree in National Security Strategy.  From June 2018 until December 2020 Col Marvel served as a Special Assistant to the Director and Marine Corps Operational Liaison at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in Arlington Virginia.

Featured Photo: U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), guide the arrival of a MV-22B Osprey over radio during flight operations as part of Steel Knight 23 on Fort Hunter Liggett, Dec. 7, 2022. Exercise Steel Knight 23 provides 3d MAW an opportunity to refine Wing-level warfighting in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force and fleet maneuver. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Shannon Gibson).

Distributed Operations and Logistics in the Pacific: How to Shape a Way Ahead for the Fleet

02/23/2023

Recently, the PACFLEET Commander, Admiral Paparo, provided the keynote address at the WEST 2023 conference held in San Diego from February 14 through 16 2023. That presentation provides his perspective on joint and partner operations in the Pacific and how they are working together to address deterrence in defense. The speech can be read in its entirety at the end of this article.

Sam LaGrone of USNI News in his write up focused on the Admiral’s discussion of reshaping logistics and sustainment for a distributed maritime force. In this article, I will follow LaGrone’s lead and build out an analysis of how to do what the Admiral has underlined in this key operational area.

As reported by Sam LaGrone, this is what the Admiral highlighted:

“Operating in uncontested environments our logistics enterprises operate on business principles. Those business principles were to resupply the force at maximum efficiency so that the American taxpayer dollar could be applied to combat power at the greatest point of need

“In our operational plans for high-end combat, we’ve got to think less in terms of maximum efficiency and more in terms of maximum effectiveness.”

Considering how a distributed fleet would operate to counter the Chinese web of fire with a kill web of our own, this is how Paparo characterized distributed maritime forces operating as a kill web:

“The idea of [DMO] is this notion that we’re going to sail at such a distance and in such a formation that we don’t present ourselves as an obvious military formation that brings to their enemy fires, but while still maintaining the ability to provide mutual support to one another.”

The role of sustainment in this operational context is much broader than simply delivery of supplies. Paparo underscored: “For most people sustainment means root logistics. But It’s also repair activities. It’s also rearming activities. It’s also… medical capabilities.”

“LaGrone then added this: Answering a question on fixing battle-damaged ships, Paparo described an “arc of contested sustainment that is not precisely at the zone of fire but nor is it back way in the rear where you would normally expect to be able to execute those activities in a sanctuary.”

“For example, Paparo described flyaway repair teams that could meet battle-damaged ships for repairs “including equipment that can be transported to the point of need to execute those repairs quickly and to get units back into the fight,” he said.

“Paparo said the fleet had experimented with rearming ships at sea and flyaway repair teams at the recent Valiant Shield and Rim of the Pacific exercise series.”

How then might the U.S. Navy and USMC be able to craft such a capability?

What do they have now and what can they plus up and what can they add in the future to sustain the force with a DMO template as the core focus of effort?

The current mix of logistical support ships comes from the military sealift command, the ability of carriers and large deck amphibious ships to have enough sustainment capability onboard to be part of support to force distribution, C2As for carrier onboard delivery, the beginning of the CMV-22B as a replacement for the C2A, various rotorcraft for moving supplies, notably the Seahawks, CH-53Es operating from bases and afloat, and various fast boats to provide targeted supplies, such as the Joint High Speed Vessel.

As the current Navy Air Boss, Vice Admiral Whitesell, put it in an interview I conducted with him earlier this year:

“We are in an experimentation phase. We are working force distribution and integration. We are experimenting like Nimitz did in the inter-war years. We are working from seabed to space with regard to force integration. It is a work in progress. But being successful in operating in an environment where logistics are contested, where getting weapons to the fleet in conflict, is not just a nice to have capability but a necessary one.”

There a number of ways there could be a plus up of the kind of sustainment the PACFLEET commander highlights is necessary for combat success.

One is increasing the numbers of CMV-22Bs operating within the fleet.

The CMV-22B changes the way the COD mission can be done for the carrier and to support the fleet.

As Vice Admiral Whitesell emphasized: “What is our concept of employment for this aircraft? To answer this question will require a mindset change within naval aviation and the COD community. The expeditionary nature of the CMV-22B expands the possibilities for successful distributed maritime operations and we are determined to get full value out of the aircraft in terms of its synergy with con-ops evolutions for the fleet.”

He added: “Under distributed operations, the carrier strike group is deployed differently. We are shaping a completely different way of thinking about that and the CMV-22B can be used is part of that mindset change.”

A second approach is enhancing the size of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet and deploying Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) as extenders to specific MSC ships as mother ships.

The challenge for MSC was well expressed during an interview I did in 2020 with Rear Admiral Michael Wettlaufer, head of MSC:

“We have to be able to distribute logistical support to a maritime distributed force. There will certainly be no maneuver if you do not have a solid logistics tail. You have to be able to have logistical support at the scale, the scope and scale, and more importantly, the tempo, required to support maneuver warfare.”

He emphasized the nature of the challenge by underscoring that several variables which have to be synchronized: “There’s distance, there’s time, and there’s the appropriate number of assets to be able to span the distance in the time required to meet the requirements, whatever those requirements are and then to be able to adjust to the operational realities.”

We did not discuss it at the time but the use of selected MSC ships as mother ships for USVs is one way to do this.

Clearly, the Navy needs to get on with the USV revolution and incorporate them in the systems to provide delivery options at distance from depots or to be able to delivery ship repair teams.

And the combination of delivery of key kit required by rotor or tiltorotar lift to MSC ships to have available for USV delivery is another way to mix and match sustainment support.

Perhaps its my early training as a Kremlinologist, but I note that in his speech the Admiral mentioned unmanned capabilities working with manned capabilities several times.

First, he stated: “During VALIANT SHIELD 22, we executed innovative warfighting concepts by fusing manned and unmanned capabilities, bringing to bear warfighting advancements that make us an even more lethal fighting force.”

Second, he noted: “We are building upon lessons and subsequent technical development from Integrated Battle Problem 21.1 Integrated Battle Problem 23.1 will be here in San Diego on May this year. Integrated Battle Problem 23.2 will consist of a series of experiments connected to our upcoming Manned and Unmanned Deployment to the 7th Fleet. Integrated Battle Problem 23.3 will carry these initiatives to Australia as part of our AUKUS alliance. Next year, Integrated Battle Problem 24.1 will take place in the early spring and this cycle will conclude with RIMPAC and Valiant Shield 24.”

A third approach is to accelerate the buy of the new CH-53K heavy lift helicopter. The CH-53K is a key element supporting Marine Corps and distributed operations more generally.

As I described the contribution of the CH-53K to the distributed force in 2018 article: “With peer adversaries emphasizing technological change and force modernization, focusing on strategic advantage for US and allied forces is a key element for combat success.

“At the heart of such an approach, clearly will be the ability to operate more effective distributed forces and to leverage the capability of US and allied forces to operate flexibly and not relying on a rigid centralized system with a core emphasis on combat mass.

“Working ways to distributed force but concentrate fires is at the heart of the transformation necessary to prevail in the strategic shift.

“For the MAGTF, this means taking the core approach around which a MAGTF has been crated and extending its reach with integrated fires, as is conceived of with regard to F-35-HIMARS integration or the use of the new G/ATOR system, and building effective force packages which can operate in an integrated but flexibly deployed distributed force.

“The CH-53K comes at a time when this transition is being worked.  As the heavy lift member of the MAGTF team, it will provide a key element of being able to carry equipment and/or personnel to the objective area.

“And with its ability to carry three times the external load of the CH-53E and to be able to deliver the external load to different operating bases, the aircraft will contribute significantly to distributed operations.”

A fourth approach is to ensure that the larger amphibious ships actually get built as these ships can play a very significant role in supporting and operating assets within a distributed operation, rather than just being envisaging a storming of the beach scenario.

As Jim Strock has noted ships such as the Expeditionary Sea Base could play an important role in shaping a tiered sustainment force for distributed operations and the distributed fleet. As he underscored in an interview I did with him last year:

“A core capability which the ESB can provide is for logistics support in a contested environment. If you look at the various supply packages that they could embark, and you couple that with the operational reach of both tilt rotor and rotary-winged aircraft, as well as surface connectors, ESBs can serve as a sea-based resupply and distribution hub in support of operating forces distributed over extended distances.

“With modifications to the empty ballast tanks that the ESBs already have —  remember the ships are built on a tanker platform —  engineers estimate that ESBs have the potential to store upwards of 11 million gallons of cargo fuel that could be distributed to forces ashore, or used for at-sea refueling of aircraft, connectors, and other sea-based platforms. To put it in perspective, LHA 6 and 7 carry around 1 million gallons of cargo fuel. The other big decks carry about 600,000 gallons of cargo fuel.

“But the ESB potentially could store and distribute 11 million gallons of cargo fuel without any substantial modification. ESB’s are constructed based on the Alaska Class Crude Carrier tanker design, and ESB production planners did not modify the tank rings that were part of the original ship general arrangements.  So today, selected tank rings could be returned to fuel storage capability with the addition of fuel distribution piping and pumping equipment.

“Additionally, ESBs can provide emergency health care support. The ESBs are already outfitted with container lockdown spots on the flight deck for resuscitative surgery suites. If emergency surgery for wounded is needed, you can bring them straight to the flight deck on a V22 and put them straight into an operating table.

“Another capability provided by ESB is that they can serve as an intermodal trans-shipment point. And this is really important to support the linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical logistics pipelines. The ESB could receive supplies and equipment from strategic sea lift shipping.

“Those could be commercial container ships. But this requires then reconfiguring those containerized assets into tailored support packages, and then delivering pre-planned or on-call supplies and equipment to forces ashore, certainly via manned systems and potentially unmanned systems, both vertical and surface.

“A core capability, notably with a kill web focus, is command and control. The ESBs are outfitted with three very large planning spaces that collectively have in the neighborhood of 40 individual tabletop planning desks, along with spaces to handle sensitive classified information.

“With the embarkation of modularized communication suites for additional connectivity on and off the ship, ESBs have significant flexibility in meeting increasingly dynamic afloat command and control requirements. And they can generate littoral battle space awareness through the use of embarked ISR assets, and the collection fusion and dissemination of that information across dispersed forces.

“And with regard to the ESB’s flexible mission deck, it has multiple container lock down spots and is configured with two megawatts of power. You can do a lot with two megawatts across a variety of functions.”

A fifth approach was suggested by Captain Bryant, Commander, Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Wing in North Island, in my interview with him last month. As I wrote at the conclusion of that interview: “Captain Bryant concluded by emphasizing that there might be a need to build a 21st century version of the Cold War approach the Navy once used. They had intra-theater support squadrons with several types of aircraft to support the movement of maritime forces. Now with distributed forces over significant distances, how might the Navy and the joint force do a 21st century version of such a theater support capability?”

To support sustainment of the fleet takes money; this takes commitment; this does not really show in the shipbuilding plan but ensures that what ships the Navy does have will be more lethal and survivable.

In short, support for a distributed fleet is not just that; it is about empowering the lethality and survivability of the fleet.

Maritime USVs, UAVs and Reshaping ISR/C2: A Discussion with Lt. General (Retired) Steve Rudder

02/22/2023

By Robbin Laird

To deal with the challenges in the Pacific, the United States has and will continue to have a significant shortfall in core platforms to implement a classic warfighting strategy. That is why I wrote a book with my colleagues published in 2013 entitled, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific.  At the heart of our argument was the need to reinvent the way forces were deployed, connected and empowered.

Nothing that has occurred since we wrote that book has changed the essential argument. Only the technology which we highlighted in the book has now arrived in part, and new capabilities are within reach now.

Underlying our argument was our characterization of the new approach as an adaptation of the World War II big blue blanket approach.

As we explained it at the outset of the argument in the book:

“We look at the geographical context, the role of allies, and the need to shape an effective defense approach, which we identify as shaping an attack defense enterprise, or an interactive “big blue blanket” over the Pacific. In World War II, the USN shaped what became called the big blue blanket of ships to cover the Pacific operations. Obviously, this is beyond the ken of current realities, but shaping a connected set of U.S. and allied forces able to work together to shape defense and security in the Pacific is not.”[1]

A technological development which we mention in the book is creating new opportunities for force development, namely, the arrival of unmanned surface systems which can operate as an integratable partner with a new generation of unmanned air vehicles.

Rather than having UAVs as a strategic asset supporting a strategic level directed tactical operation, more transient UAVs operating off USVs or working in tandem with forces at the tactical edge are now possible.

This then enhances significantly the capability of operating task forces with modular flexibility and with enhanced understanding of their battlespace to deliver the desired effects within that battlespace.

Rather than operating with top down ISR, distributed modular task forces can create ISR clusters which can push data back towards higher level command elements, and at the same time operate more effectively in their local operating area.

Recently, I discussed these developments with Lt. General (Retired) Steve Rudder. I last met with him in Honolulu in a visit in 2021 when he was MARFORPAC.

Now recently retired, he continues to focus on the evolution of concepts of operations for the maritime forces.

He started our conversation by highlighting the changing strategic environment, which demands speed in accurate decision-making.

And to do so, raises an inherent challenge of centralized control and decentralized execution.

“As the operational forces have enhanced ISR capabilities at the tactical edge, there is a natural friction point between them and decision making with regard to how much authority is released to those forces to act on their own. In a conflict situation, this becomes an authority’s dilemma for in stride targeting.  The tactical forces are increasingly becoming connected to more capable operational and tactical ISR creating a need for higher-level command authorities to be pushed down.”

Rudder then explained that the evolution of UAVs and USVs and their ability to work within an edge mesh network, gives forces at the tactical edge new capabilities, necessary for them to execute their missions. As he underscored: “Solving the question of how to best use such capabilities should not hinder or delay necessary innovation and implementation. As TF59 proves each day with their unmanned experimentation, the technology is available today.”

With regard to USVs, the U..S Navy faces a major problem of coming to terms with how to use small boats. The shipbuilding plan is not one which highlights the kind of small boats which USVs require, and which operate differently carrying ISR payloads, naturally operating more like wolfpacks than being mere footnotes to a classic naval task force.

The Navy needs such wolfpacks of UAVs and USVs to deal with a number of operational threats and challenges. 

One challenge which Rudder highlighted was the threat from long range low flying cruise missiles. Such wolfpacks can clearly provide timely over the horizon visibility to such a threat. And as technology develops these in no reason payloads could not be placed on UAVs or USVs to defeat such missiles.

The Navy has UAVs and USVs in different stove piped program channels which also makes it difficult to think in wolfpack terms.

How to build in synergy between UAV and USV development?

How to accelerate their contribution to distributed maritime operations?

Another consideration is working with allies.

Shared data is crucial to have common decision making. Exquisite data which is provided by high value strategic assets are shared with very few allies. This is not enough to work with the patchwork of partners in the Pacific which the PLA are contesting with the liberal democracies.

We heed to build shared networks to cover the patchwork of the Pacific in terms of partners.

By creating a network of USVs and UAVs whose function is to generate such data, deterrence is enhanced.

It is about the spectrum of operations not just the question of deployments simply for the highest end of operations. Capabilities already exist to build such a network, which is a low hanging fruit for the build out of UAV-USV collaboration.

And for the United States, such an approach builds a “big blue blanket” with partners which competes with the Chinese version of this already in place. The Chinese fishing fleet empowered by mobile phone technology has built their vision of the network.

As Rudder notes: “There are areas were simply do not have the kind of persistent domain awareness we need. We don’t have the capacity to put capital assets in place to provide for that gap. UAVs and USVs, notably working together, can fill such a gap cost effectively and are available now.”

[1] Laird, Robbin; Timperlake, Edward; Weitz, Richard. Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st-Century Strategy (Praeger Security International) (p. 7). ABC-CLIO. Kindle Edition.)

The featured photo: The MATAS Devil Ray UAS making a high speed run. Credit Photo: MARTAC

For a look at the U.S. Navy and the work of Task Force 59, see the following:

Digital Horizon Wraps Up: Task Force 59 Perspective

Unmanned Integration at Sea: A Perspective on Task Force 59

Task Force 59: Another Perspective

Task Force 59 and Unmanned Maritime Assets

 

An Update on French Arms Exports: February 2023

02/21/2023

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Close U.S. scrutiny of arms exports, Franco-German cooperation, and how the French procurement office is short changed are among areas considered in a report on French foreign sales of weapons by the national audit office.

The head of the independent audit office approved on Jan. 24 publication of the report, Support for Export of Military Matériel.

The big French companies which use U.S. components in foreign arms deals are each thought to apply every year for an estimated 800-1,000 export licenses from the U.S. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), as required by the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the report said.

The directorate is part of the State Department.

That reliance on ITAR approval leads to a process which is “long, heavy, constraining, and risky to business confidentiality,” the report said, pointing out that American inspectors go on site to verify companies’ commitments. Once an export licence has been issued, restrictions on use must be observed, and the State Department can make further checks.

The application of ITAR leads to slowness of procedure, higher costs, and can result in withdrawal of technology – leading to lower weapon performance. There may be delays as an alternative solution is sought, in an approach dubbed “ITAR free,” the report said. Or the project is cancelled.

“In every case, the supplier’s reputation is sullied,” the report said.

ITAR, which applies to export of equipment for dual military and civilian use, is very broad, the report said. The authorization applies not just to products, but also technical data, and services such as assistance, training, design, development, production, operational use, maintenance, and repairs.

A component which has been “ITAR-ized” may lead to approval needed for the whole weapon system, the report said. Export of civil equipment may need authorization if they use components which have been ITAR-ized.

The defense trade directorate has power to conduct criminal inquiries, the report said, and can change rules, apply them retroactively, and revoke license.

“The U.S. could decide on its restrictions as much for strategic reasons as for commercial,” the report said.

Companies found guilty of breaking ITAR can be denied the right to apply for future licences and be hit with sanctions, the report said. Penalties include being banned from operating and selling on U.S. soil, hefty fines, and prison sentences of up to 10 years for company directors.

In addition to ITAR, there are checks on dual-use equipment covered by export administration regulations, boosted by the 2018 Export Control Reform Act, the report said. Licences for foreign use of U.S. semiconductors and avionics are under close scrutiny. The Commerce Department oversees those export rules.

France seeks to pursue arms programs which are “ITAR free,” as can be seen in government instruction 1618, drafted by the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) procurement office, the report said.

That Feb. 15 2019 instruction from the ministerial cabinet outlines the protocol for weapons programs.

The European Union should pursue this approach, the report said, urging the EU’s European Defense Fund to avoid supporting European projects for products and components which might fall under the control of ITAR.

Fresh Ties With Berlin

The report considers an updated agreement with Germany on arms exports following “serious difficulties,” which saw French deals stalled in 2014 and 2018.

The fresh accord revised the Debré-Schmidt agreements signed Dec. 7 1971 and Feb. 7 1972, which allowed the export of weapons built in cooperation, without the partner nation blocking the deal.

The projects for a future combat air system, based on a new generation fighter jet, and a main ground combat system, based on a new tank and unmanned vehicles, underscored the need for a new Franco-German pact, the report said.

France and Germany signed Oct. 23 2019 agreement on export controls on weapons, the report said, with both countries were free to sell abroad without authorization from the partner nation when the latter had less than 20 percent of content in the weapon.

That 20 percent – based on the principle of de minimis, when something is so small there is no breach of agreement – excluded service, spares, training, and repairs, the report said. Tucked into the annex of the agreement was a list of weapons excluded from that 20 percent rule.

Apart from the 20 percent ruling, a partner nation could not block exports of weapons designed and developed in cooperation, unless the sale went against the partner nation’s interest or national security, the report said.

It is not clear whether national interest and security were clearly set out.

Some French executives saw that 20 percent threshold as giving Berlin vast sway over French arms exports.

A permanent committee was set up to oversee the smooth running of the agreement, the report said, and it was too early to tell if that was working well. Much will depend on the German parliament, which has oversight over contracts worth more than €25 million.

All nations reserve the right to authorize foreign deals when components come from their country, the report said.

The authors led with the U.S. and Germany. The report also refers to cooperation on missiles between Britain and France.

It’s About Politics

Export arms sales depend on relations between nations, their appreciation of the international situation, balance of power and how they change, the report said.

The foreign arms trade is subject to changes in the political tide, the report said, with deals made more fragile, or suspended, or talks broken off in recent years.

Such vagaries stem from various factors, such as strategic change, shifts in diplomacy, change in the political majority, a determination to show respect to contracts, or the search for independence and alternative suppliers, the report said.

An arms embargo on Russia and the curtailed Mistral deal was the leading example of five recent “emblematic” cases involving breach of a French contract or the foreign pursuit of other suppliers, the report said.

Those cases included Poland’s pick of American kit due to its close ties to Washington and stationing of U.S. troops in the East European nation, the report said, citing the following cases:

– Warsaw picked Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopters over the Airbus Caracal in 2016, Patriot missiles over MBDA weapons in 2018, and Lockheed Martin missile launchers in 2019.

– Brazil’s selection in 2019 of four corvettes from German shipbuilder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems over an offer from Naval Group. That reflected weaker ties between Brasilia and Paris after the election of Jair Bolsonaro in 2018.

– Egypt’s opting in 2020 for two FREMM multimission frigates from Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri over an offer from Naval Group, mainly due to French criticism of Cairo’s lack of respect for human rights.

– A fresh analysis by the Australian and U.S. authorities of the “strategic situation” in the Indo-Pacific region led to Canberra’s 2021 cancellation of Naval Group’s work to build 12 Shortfin Barracuda attack submarines for the Australian navy.

Alternatively, rising tension has led some nations to speed up arms deals, such as Greece ordering Rafale fighter jets and FDI defense and intervention frigates, the report said. Strategic partnership agreements can also help arms deals, if they are watched over with care. A strategic agreement signed with India in 1998 helped lead to Naval Group’s 2005 sale of six  Scorpene attack submarines, and New Delhi’s 2016 order for 36 Rafale fighters.

Companies Owe Money

The DGA – which the audit office says plays a pivotal role in exports – can in theory claim payment of two percent when companies win overseas deals, stemming from paying for studies, research and development, and machine tools for production, the report said. But the reality is quite otherwise, with some companies opting out of payment.

“In fact, problems in calculation, the determination of some companies to exonerate themselves from these payments and the complexity of relations between the DGA and companies” lie behind corporate reluctance to show the money, the report said.

The report pointed up companies failing to inform the DGA when an export deal had been pitched, delaying communication of the estimated payment, and lateness in fixing the final amount due.

There may be a ministerial decision to partially or fully exonerate payment, if the DGA accepts the company’s request, usually based on the corporate effort in the export sale campaign, the report said. That capacity for partial or full exoneration of company payment was not available until written into administrative guidelines revised last year.

The report pointed up lengthy legal disputes and loss of income for the DGA. Some €16 million was due on a contract signed back to 2015, the report said, with the company disputing that as an excessive claim in January 2020. The lawsuit was still pending when the audit office report was being written, the authors said.

The DGA was owed some €154 million in company payments at the end of 2021, the report said, of which €148 million was tied to contracts signed in 2015 and 2016, and these will undoubtedly be contested in the courts. The total amount owed by companies at the end of 2022 was €170 million.

Payments to the procurement office were late, with the payment of one year sometimes including back payments of several years, the report said. The amounts received by the DGA appeared to be “particularly low,” even after  including the contested payments.

The DGA has not made the effort it should have to be fully paid, the report said.

The procurement office said exports were worth more than “the few dozens of millions of payments,” the report said, and greater importance lay in exports supporting the defense industrial and technological base, companies’ economic performance, which cuts costs, helps the defense budget and its effect on jobs and tax revenue.

The audit office called for a tougher approach

“Even if these factors are beyond dispute, they do not justify the lack of tight management of returns the government has the right to expect,” the report said.

The DGA received €26.4 million in payment from companies in 2021, up from €15.3 million in the previous year, a table in the report shows.

“The armed forces ministry should pursue a more aggressive policy on the subject of payments, as it is inadmissible that, after several years of signing a  contract, some companies continue to contest the amounts,” the report said.

DGA and the Services

The procurement office assigned respectively an estimated 231 and 270 staff on support of exports in 2019 and 2020, although that was not a complete tally, as there were some 40 full time equivalent personnel who could be accounted for, the report said.

The DGA technical and operations departments consider they make big contributions to supporting exports, with the appointment of “architects of export programs,” the report said. These officers work closely with teams working on programs and operations, with three program architects assigned to  Rafale contracts.

DGA technical centers are working on flight tests to assess readiness of Rafales for India, Caracal helicopters for Kuwait, and NH90 helicopters for Qatar. There is certification work to ensure standards matches those for use of French forces.

The procurement office recruited 182 staff between 2016 and 2021 to help support exports, assigning around a third to work on the Rafale, 17.5 percent on submarines, 12.6 percent on the CaMo (mobilized capability) program with Belgium on armored vehicles, 11.6 percent on satellites, and 7.7 percent on helicopters, the report said.

In 2016, the then procurement head, Laurent Collet-Billon, said the DGA planned to recruit more than 500 staff to support exports by 2019-2020.

The DGA invoices for payment for supporting exports, with its international development department negotiating directly with client nations on technical services.

A senior DGA official, Thierry Carlier, won promotion last year to five star general and deputy director of the procurement office after heading the international development department for five years. That department leads the French export drive, and foreign arms sales were expected to exceed €30 billion over 2021 and 2022, mostly due to winning pitches of the Rafale abroad.

The joint chief of staff invoices for the services’ support of exports, drawing on the SISTEX computer program for an overall view, the report said. The air force particularly helped in sale of the Rafale overseas. The invoices are sent to the companies or to the forces of the client nation.

The French forces, much like the DGA, prefer billing companies, rather than having to invoice directly the client nation, the report said. The billing of client nations for training pilots proved to be particularly trying.

The armed forces invoice after “tough talks” with companies, the report said, as much on the basic principle of what can be invoiced – such as service support, as the details of each export project. The companies put on pressure in a bid to cut costs “to maintain competitiveness.”

“The aeronautics sector has benefited on several occasions from favorable ministerial decisions in this area,” the report said. “Such was the case in 2017, with aircraft being made available for air shows, without being invoiced.”

China, France, Germany, Russia and the U.S. ranked as the top five arms exporters from 2017 to 2021, the report said, holding between them 78.5 percent of the world market for weapons.

France rose to third from fifth ranking in the world, the report said, doubling its market share to 11 percent, helped by selling €11.7 billion of weapons abroad in 2021.

Featured Graphic Credit: Photo 72117166 © Sjankauskas | Dreamstime.com

JAGM Integration

02/17/2023

U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), load and fire an AGM-179 Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) in support of exercise Steel Knight 23 at Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, California, Dec. 13, 2022.

The JAGM is a precision-guided munition for use against high value stationary, moving, and relocatable land and maritime targets.

Exercise Steel Knight 23 provides 3rd MAW an opportunity to refine Wing-level warfighting in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force and fleet maneuver.

12.13.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Daniel Childs

3rd Marine Aircraft Wing

The French Mistral: The Case of the Russian Sale and Its Aftermath

02/16/2023

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France took a financial hit of €409 million ($440 million) as a result of  its 2015 cancellation of the sale of two helicopter carriers to Russia, the national audit office said in its report on French arms exports.

“In total, taking into account the result of negotiations with Russia, cancellation of payments, payments to Naval Group, modifications and the sale of the ships to Egypt, this transaction cost France €409 million,” the independent office said in its report, Support for Export of Military Matériel.

The report was cleared 24 January 2023  for publication.

The then French president, François Hollande, cancelled in August 2015 a controversial sale of the Mistral class warships, under pressure from the U.S., central European and Baltic nations, after Russia seized in 2014 the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine.

The then U.S. president, Barak Obama, said Paris should “press the pause button,” while the U.K. also called for Hollande to ax the arms deal.

How the audit office arrived at that €409 million was unclear, but one view is that amount includes an estimated €340 million-€350 million paid out by Coface, the export credit agency, to the prime contractor, Naval Group, then known as DCNS, and other contractors including STX and CNIM.

STX built the two Mistrals at Saint-Nazaire shipyard, while CNIM supplied two L-CAT landing catamarans for the warship deal with Moscow.

That overall €409 million might also include €56.8 million spent on training Russian crews and adapting the ships to Russian specifications.

The hangers had been built large for a naval version of the Kamov Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter, and the helicopter deck could be heated, to sail in Arctic waters.

STX, the shipbuilder, received €661 million from Coface, Thales €80 million for supply of electronics, and CNIM €40 million, September 2015 parliamentary reports from the lower house National Assembly and Senate said.

France paid Russia total reimbursement of €949.75 million for cancelling the order for the Mistrals, comprising a core payment of €892.9 million, and a further €56.8 million, the Sept. 15 2015 National Assembly report said.

It is understood the core repayment was based on Russian advance payment for the first ship – Vladivostok – which had been built and was ready for delivery, and partial advance payment on the second vessel – Sevastapol – which had yet to be completed when Hollande called the deal off.

There is a view the costs were covered by insurance claims through Coface, rather than French taxpayers, with export insurance for building the warships, buying them back from Russia, and selling them on to Egypt in 2015.

There is also a view the Mistral sale to Egypt was worth €960 million, although press reports at the time said the Cairo deal was worth €950 million.

Egypt’s purchase of the two Mistrals followed Cairo’s 2015 order for French weapons worth €5.2 billion for 24 Rafale fighter jets, a FREMM multimission frigate, and air-to-air and naval missiles.

The audit office was not available for comment.

Coface consistently made money between 2010-2021, with premiums exceeding claims, the report said, with only 2015 showing a net loss of €82 million due to the claims made on cancellation of the Mistral deal with Russia. The sale to Egypt limited the amount of claim, the report said.

Naval Group, the French shipbuilder, received payment that covered the cost of  production, but it had to forego an estimated profit of €100 million on the Russian deal due to the cancellation.

There was much debate in France at the time, with some calling for delivery to Russia, to bolster a perception of France  as a reliable trading partner.

The previous French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, had approved the Mistral sale to Russia in 2011, for around €1.2 billion, with options for two more.

That deal with Russian president Vladimir Putin drew criticism, with critics pointing to Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, and concern rising when Russian troops seized Crimea and Moscow-backed separatists took control of the Donbas region, Eastern Ukraine, in 2014.

The incursion into Georgia would have taken 40 minutes rather than 26 hours if  Russian forces had sailed the Mistral carrier, a Russian general had said.

The then executive chairman of Naval Group, Hervé Guillou, told parliamentarians in September 2015 that lawyers had said the company faced  penalty payments of some €1 billion if the Mistral deal went into a lengthy legal dispute with Russia, on top of repaying almost €1 billion of advance payments.

The then French secretary general for defense and national security, Louis Gautier, negotiated with the then Russian deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin, and they agreed on repayment, avoiding a legal wrangle. Hollande and Putin had agreed there should be a negotiated settlement and gave those senior officials mandate to strike a deal.

Those high-level, confidential talks appeared to spark a Russian free and frank expression of views.

Rogozin had not been “very favourable” to the Mistral deal, Gautier told Sept. 8 2015 parliamentarians,  the Sept. 15 parliamentary report said.

The Russian official, in a brusque manner, stated his opposition to cooperation, that Russian yards could have built the helicopter carriers, and that they had not exercised the option for two more Mistrals, which would have been built in Russian yards, the senior French official told the parliamentary committee.

“His point of view was opposition to execution of the contract,” Gautier told parliamentarians.

“Nonetheless, there were representatives of other ministries sitting round the table.”

Also, see the following:

Remember the Russian Mistral Amphibious Ship? Certainly, the Turks Do

Recovering the NASA Artemis I Orion Spacecraft

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Amphibious transport dock USS Portland (LPD27) recovers the NASA Orion spacecraft, Dec. 11, 2022. Portland, along with Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Montgomery (LCS 8), operated in U.S. 3rd Fleet in support of the recovery.

The retrieval operation was part of a Department of Defense effort that integrated combatant command service capabilities to determine best practices for safely retrieving spacecraft capable of carrying humans into space.

The U.S. Navy has many unique capabilities that make it an ideal partner for supporting NASA, including its amphibious and expeditionary capabilities with the ability to embark helicopters, launch and recover small boats, three-dimensional air search radar and advanced medical facilities.

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Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Devin Kates

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Red Flag-Rescue

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Red Flag-Rescue is a joint exercise that involves other service branches as well as partner nations and is the Department of Defense’s premier combat search and rescue exercise held twice a year, hosted exclusively by Davis-Monthan Air Force Base.

RF-R biannually involves multiple units within the 355th Wing, from pararescuemen to pilots, as well as members from the United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force Regiment, other rescue units from Nellis AFB and many other allied nations and joint services, all converging at Playas Training Center in New Mexico.

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Video by Senior Airman Kaitlyn Ergish

355th Wing