Shaping a Way Ahead for the Integrated Distributed Force

05/09/2022

On March 24, 2022, the Williams Foundation held its first of two seminars to be held this year.

The seminar was the latest in a series of seminars which started in 2014, and have been focused on the evolution of the ADF to deal with the evolving threats and challenges facing Australia, and its core allies.

The first seminar dealt with the launch of the fifth-generation force, and then over the next few years focused on key elements and building out the force and then since 2018, there has been an increasing focus on shaping new capabilities to extend the reach and the lethality of the force in the growing threats in the Indo-Pacific region.

A key thematic approach woven throughout the assessment process is the challenge of shaping an ADF that is more capable of being built “joint by design.”

And the point of that is to get full value out of any new capability introduced into the force, and, over the past few years, this has been joined with the theme of enhancing Australian strategic resilience and sovereignty with a broader encompassing of Australian political, economic and military capabilities becoming more integrated as well.

This process is reminiscent of what I have seen in the Nordic region, where since 2014, the Norwegians, for example, have focused on “total defense,” or upon how to take a whole of society and government approach to defense. This has been driven by the global challenge posed by the 21st century authoritarian powers whose goals are clearly to reshape the global order to their advantage as well as dealing with the consequences from the breakout of a war with global consequences and impacts, namely, the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Although the title of the seminar may seem narrowly focused on force building, it was not.

We have entered a new historical era of global conflict, and the challenges posed in the seminar are really about how Australia and its allies shape an effective way ahead.

The next seminar to be held in September 2022, will leverage the most recent seminars, those in 2021 on autonomous systems and building a new space enterprise, and the March 2022 seminar focus on the next steps for joint force design, and address the broader question of force building to deal with the new strategic environment.

Two particular presentations at the seminar underscored the nature of the transition facing the ADF and Australia as a whole.

The first was by Peter Jennings, the executive director of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) and the second by Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman, Head Military Strategic Commitments, responsible for the strategic level management and situational awareness of current and potential Australian Defence Force Commitments.

Jennings underscored the core point of the challenge we face, namely, a significant strategic shift in the global environment.

As Jennings put it: “the world’s two most powerful authoritarian regimes have made it very clear that their goal is to break the international order and to remake it under their control. Beijing and Moscow’s separate and shared interests have not been hidden and they made clear publicly for at least a decade. One thing you can say about these authoritarian systems is that they do not disguise their plans.”

And to meet this challenge on the military side, the point is about having extant capability which can meet the challenge, not building an exquisite defense force in some future point in history.

Jennings went back to his 2018 Williams Foundation seminar where he advocated that Australia add a bomber to its capabilities, in this case to join in the U.S. program to build the B-21.

And the underlying point about this is to add strike capabilities in the near term, not the long-term. He argued for the need to jump start Australian defense efforts along the lines of what he called the new German moment, when in facing the war in Ukraine, German leadership have been shocked into a reality zone on defense.

The good news in my view is that Australia has been focused on reality for far longer than Germany, and at the end of the day many of the key elements for shaping an effective way ahead.

And that point was highlighted in the presentation by the former Plan Jericho, co-head, Air Vice-Marshal Robert Chipman. In his presentation, Chipman underscored the importance of integration as a force multiplier which has been a hallmark of when the Plan Jericho effort was first introduced in 2015.

But since that time, such capabilities need to be joined with Australian strategic resilience.

As Australia works enhanced sovereignty and resilience, this effort requires skillful work on the changing nature of alliances as well.

This is how Chipman put it: “There are limits to what a middle power can achieve, that’s why alliances and partnerships are so important. Allies don’t surrender sovereignty to each other, they share it; allies and partners strengthen national power and help mitigate the risks of critical vulnerabilities.

“What does this mean for defense efforts? We need sailors, soldiers, and aviators and public servants who are masters of their domains. We need experts who can integrate across domains, and we need experts that can provide the policy advice and strategy to ensure that our military power is delivered as a coherent expression of national power.

“There’s a human dimension to this challenge, building a culture that is biased towards teaming and constantly learning. There’s a procedural dimension to this challenge, creating space for innovation and fast adaptation. Sharing information to strengthen coordination and resilience, accelerating the speeds of decision and corresponding actions.

“And there’s a technical dimension to this challenge, prioritizing integration over platform optimization, encouraging the early adoption of new technologies, introducing advanced capabilities and baking in interoperability so that we can mesh with our allies and facilitate cooperation with partners.”

In short, the March 24, 2022 seminar provides a snapshot of where the ADF along with core allies are with regard to the challenge of force integration.

But how best to shape an effective way ahead to prevail against the 21st century authoritarian powers?

And as Jennings cautioned, answers to such a question go beyond simply shaping an exquisite networked force, but requires a broader whole of society and whole of government effort.

Training to Provide High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Fire Support: WTI-2-22

05/08/2022

U.S. Marines assigned to Kilo Battery, 2nd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment, 4th Marine Division, fire an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, near Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, California, April 13, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

04.13.2022

Photo by Lance Cpl. Dean Gurule 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Turkey as Major Player in Armed Drones

05/05/2022

By James Jeffrey

Once better known for its distinctive style of making potent coffee and its gelatinous confectionary cubes called Turkish Delight, these days Turkey is making a name for itself through a more deadly means: as a major global player in armed drone development.

I first got an inkling of this after Tigrayan forces in Ethiopia’s dreadfully drawn-out civil conflict mounted an astonishing counterattack southward through enemy territory that left them positioned to take the capital and topple the Ethiopian government. It had seemed it really could be over for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who called on the capital’s civilians to arm and ready themselves for a last-ditch defence. But suddenly the Tigrayan forces withdrew all the way back north, from whence they had attacked so decisively.

While a combination of old-fashioned military factors forced the hand of Tigrayan commanders—overextended lines of communication, vulnerability on the flanks, the simple law of numbers and having a smaller population to draw on—there is general consensus that the use of foreign-supplied armed drones made a significant difference when the Ethiopian government had its back against the wall. Chief among them was the relatively low-tech and lightweight Turkish Bayraktar TB2, which weighs an eighth of the US’s high-tech Reaper drone, costs a sixth of the Reaper’s US$32 million price tag, and can cruise for about 24 hours with its payload of four small laser-guided munitions.

‘The precision-guided munitions are sure to have wreaked havoc among Tigray Defence Forces’ fire-support assets such as tanks and artillery,’ says Stijn Mitzer, author of Oryx, a blog that investigates armed drone proliferation.

And now, just as it did in Ethiopia—and in other lesser-known conflicts before—the low-key design is proving itself in Ukraine against Russian forces, including their hitherto presumed formidable air defence systems and electronic warfare capabilities.

‘Despite its unassuming size and payload, the TB-2 has risen to prominence by destroying significant numbers of armoured vehicles and short-range air defence systems in Syria, Libya, Nagorno-Karabakh and now most recently in Ukraine,’ Justin Bronk writes for The Spectator in ‘Why hasn’t Russia been able to stop Ukraine’s drone attacks?

Bronk suggests that the relatively small radar cross-section of the TB2 and its slow cruising speed may have bamboozled the operators of Russia’s surface-to-air missile (SAM) radars, which are optimised for fast jets or missiles. He also notes that the greatest period of success for the TB2 came during the first week of the war when there was ‘appalling coordination between the various elements of the Russian armed forces’ and units were ‘frequently advancing well beyond the cover normally provided by accompanying short- and -medium-range SAM systems’.

Taking that into consideration, Bronk cautions that, despite its successes, the TB2 is ‘certainly not a miracle weapon’. Of the more than 1,400 destroyed Russian military vehicles identified, the TB2 has accounted for a tiny number. Multiple TB2s were lost in Libya and Syria and shot down in Ukraine by Russian SAMs. And its effectiveness in Ukraine may become increasingly limited ‘as Russian air defence coverage continues to improve’ and electronic warfare assets show up at the front line.

None of that, however, should take away from how, as in Ethiopia—where ‘the psychological effect of drone strikes likely did much to weaken the morale of TDF fighters,’ Mitzer says—the threat of attack from a quiet and unseen menace will take a psychological toll on the Russian soldiery. That threat will also impinge on the tactics and freedom of movement of Russian forces.

Regardless of how the rest of the war in Ukraine goes for the TB2, the weapon’s effective deployment there so soon after its success in Ethiopia has further illuminated the scale and sophistication of Turkey’s drone program. For years, as most looked the other way, Turkey has honed the craft of drone warfare. It now has a growing list of customers, particularly in backwater conflicts that don’t, as yet, overly interest the West.

‘Turkey effectively concluded one of the “frozen conflicts” of the former Soviet Union through the simple export of a fleet of drones,’ writes Nicholas Velazquez about the highly successful use of the TB2 by the Azeri forces in the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in Azerbaijan.

The exporting of its drones, Velazquez argues, is enabling Turkey to achieve a combination of soft- and hard-power projection through ‘deepening defense relations with states in the post-Soviet space’, while striking ‘Russia-backed targets in conflict zones, hurting Russia’s efforts at power projection’.

At the same time, Turkey is pulling ahead of most other Western militaries in terms of its own armed-drone capability. Its army reportedly operates more than 140 TB2s. Compare that to the UK, which has a drone fleet of just 10 US-made Reapers that are two decades old. The Royal Australian Air Force has a similarly miniscule drone fleet—containing no armed drones—amid arguments about where military spending should best go.

Turkey is working on its new Akinci drone, which will be much more sophisticated with greater stealth and surveillance capabilities than the TB2, including new countermeasures against emerging anti-drone technology. Whether it really can overcome such technologies remains to be seen. But the track record so far has shown that the TB2 and its Turkish manufacturers are capable of surprises. The company making the new Akinci drone claims it will be ‘the most powerful and combat-capable armed UAV in its class in the world’.

This should give Russian military strategists—as well as those of other countries—something to ponder. As will Turkey’s continuing development of swarm technology that links up large numbers of drones for coordinated attacks. This happened in the skies above Nagorno-Karabakh to such a devastating degree, some claim, it can be likened to a revolution in military affairs that heralded the true direction of future warfare. It wasn’t just the drone itself but the accompanying drone swarm tactics—Turkey is reported to often send operators and specialist advisers with its drones—that should give pause to all with an interest in the trajectory of this potent military technology.

Given all that, it’s hard not to see a futuristic arms race emerging, one with a potential exponential edge. It’s a lot quicker and easier to make a drone than a battleship. Not to mention all the money to be made by arms contractors as a motivating factor. It all leaves the international community struggling to mitigate the influence of the increasing availability of bargain-basement armed drones on conflicts and operations launched under the banner of counterterrorism around the world. This pertains especially to developing countries eager for a cheaper alternative to limited if not non-existent air forces.

‘With new arms export contracts for Turkish drones concluded all over Africa, it is expected that the growing deployment of armed drones will soon see an increase in use as well,’ concludes a report compiled by the Dutch peace organisation PAX.

‘Current developments should warrant for rapid international action to strengthen international legal principles over the use of lethal force and rethink arms export controls and risk assessments around the sale of armed drones.’

James Jeffrey is a freelance journalist who divides his time between the US, the UK and further afield. He spent nine years in the British Army, deploying to Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. He is on Twitter at @jrfjeffrey and his website is jamesjeffreyjournalism.com.

This article was published by ASPI on April 19, 2022.

Featured Photo:

 

Long-Range Force Insertion Training: WTI-2-22

A U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey with Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), is prepared for takeoff after a refuel during Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course (WTI) 2-22, near Yuma, Arizona, April 6, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

04.06.2022

Photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Fires in the Joint Distributed Battlespace: A USMC Perspective

05/03/2022

By Robbin Laird

In my recent visit to MAWTS-1, I had a chance to talk with a seasoned USMC artillery officer who is now part of the Ground Combat Department at MAWTS-1.

The GCD deals with the entire integration focus of the marines from sea, land, to air, and in the case of fires, the challenge of fires integration for the organic USMC as well as the evolving challenge of working fires integration with the joint force deployed at distance in the Pacific.

In my discussion with Major Dossetto, we discussed the enhanced importance of the ground-based artillery with the elimination of the tanks within the USMC for the ground maneuver forces. He noted that for II MEF, based in North Carolina, and engaged in European and Middle Eastern defense engagements, ground-based artillery pieces are a primary source to provide effects for the integrated ground maneuver force.

He then noted that with III MEF engaged in significant change associated with Force Design 2030 and focused on the evolving scheme of maneuver for Pacific operations, the question of distances posed several challenges different from working fires integration in either the European or Middle Eastern areas of operation.

First, the challenge of distance means that the fires solution set revolve around missile batteries and as I discussed when in Hawaii with the MARFORPAC Marines, the USMC is working new ways for the Marines to use ground-based missile fires to support the U.S. Navy in sea control and sea-denial operations.

But, secondly, Major Dossetto highlighted the challenge of working joint strike in a dynamic targeting environment.

The challenge is to get the approval authority and clearance in a timely manner against the right targets at the right time. This poses a major challenge for the evolution of C2 as the joint forces whether they be the Marines working with the Navy, or the Marines working with either the Army or Air Force, requires Cintegration to have an effective process for approval authority and clearance for fires support.

One issue we discussed was the advantage the Marines have over the Army in terms of working fires support organically which is based on integration of rotary wing along with fixed wing assets with the ground fires support elements. The Marines organic integration of fire support from the ground and from both rotary wing and fixed wing assets means that the USAF, for example, finds how the Marines do fires integration to be very compatible with their own thinking with regard to the ways ahead with regard to dynamic targeting.

I am quite struck with how the evolution of artillery pieces in the ground scheme of maneuver can become even more important in the future, in terms of the ability of mobile artillery to move around the battlefield and be camouflaged to make them a difficult target to eliminate.

For example, as Germany rethinks how it could deploy force to the evolving European theater of operations, having a heavy lift helicopter like the CH-53K to move German artillery pieces into the various seams which the Russians might wish to exploit in times of conflict is a key part of the deterrent capability which can be deployed rapidly and effectively.

When I asked Major Dossetto what he felt was the key priority for the fires support elements in the Marines going forward, he had a very clear answer: “We need to refine our processes for joint fire support integration and be able to deliver responsive strike in a joint environment. That means delivering more rapid decision-making and that requires more rapid approval authority and clearance on the battlefield.”

Featured Photo: U.S. Marine Corps mortarmen, with 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division,  prepare a mortar firing line during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 1-22, at Observation Point Feets, Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, Calif., Sept. 24, 2021. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jeremy Alfaro).

The USMC Transformation Path: Preparing for the High-End Fight

Raid Training: WTI-2-22

1Y Venom aircraft, during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at K-9 Village, Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona, April 2, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

04.02.2022

Photo by Lance Cpl. Symira Bostic 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

MV-22B Night Tactics

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Dominic McCarron, from Colorado Springs, Colorado, a crew chief for the MV-22B Osprey, assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), analyzes terrain during a night tactics exercise in support of Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at San Clemente Island, California, April 4, 2022.

WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1, providing standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine aviation training and readiness, and assist in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND, CA

04.05.2022

Photo by Lance Cpl. Emily Weiss 

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1