By Robbin Laird

When the Chancellor of Germany announced at the end of February 2022 the need for Germany to up its defense spending and to shape a new approach to defense, perhaps a new phase in German defense is underway.

But overcoming the atrophy of strategic culture, and a hollowing out of German forces will not be corrected in the near term.

When I published with my co-author our book on the return of direct defense in Europe, we highlighted the challenge as follows:

“If Germany is directly threatened by Russian nuclear modernization, notably by a lowering of the nuclear threshold, by pressures on Poland, the Baltics, and Northern Europe, along with Russian actions in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, what actions might Germany need to take and who are the coalition partners likely to do something forcibly to enforce the values which Germany holds?

“The Russian challenge coupled with the dynamics of change in the coalitions of which Germany is a part are not reinforcing a relatively laissez-faire defense policy.  At the same time, the challenge is to rethink direct defense in terms of the threats, and the efforts of SPECIFIC coalition partners with whom Germany expects to work in a crisis.

“The good thing about coalitions is that they provide a nation with enhanced impact when the coalition acts together, such as in the first Gulf War. The problem with coalitions is that they are slow to act, and if improperly built, the lowest common denominator blocks effective action, and it is crisis management and ability to act effectively and rapidly which will increasingly be required to deal with Russia, and other authoritarian states.

“Germany has not been built to take defense and security decisions. Whereas with regard to the EU, Paul Lever in his book Berlin Rules has forcefully made the case that Germany makes decisions and sets agendas, none of this proactive approach is seen in defense and security.

“But given the Russian challenge and the changing nature of the coalition which is NATO, Germany faces the need to change or simply not effectively defend itself in times of crisis.”

“Reversing the decline in defense spending without a clear defense policy which defines what tools GERMANY needs to work with those coalition partners willing to act in their defense is not enough; and hoping the nuclear challenge simply goes away as the last German nuclear-capable aircraft flies into retirement is simply a wish and not a policy.

“What are the policy challenges to be met by Germany?”

The key question which we highlighted revolves precisely around what will in fact be the real defense policy agenda will Germany craft and who will be the core allies with whom they will work to do so?

What tools indeed does Germany need to work with those coalition partners willing to focus on proactive defense?

The decision to now get on with replacing the Tornado with the F-35 provides a partial answer to the question. For building an F-35 capability along with core allies on the continent is clearly a way ahead to shape new capabilities, driven by cooperation with key European F-35 partners as well.

But the forthcoming decision on what rotary wing lift to add to the force is equally important.

To understand why it is a strategic decision, not simply a simple platform decision, one needs to look at the strategic environment and what roles Germany needs to play in the short-to-midterm in terms of European defense.

The Russians have focused along with other authoritarian powers on what I have labelled “seam warfare.” When visiting Poland last year, I discussed this concept with Polish officers and analysts and highlighted the following characterization of this aspect of warfare:

“In working the direct defense of Europe under the impact of the diverse tools sets of the global authoritarian powers, Russia and China, what is required is crafting effective defense and security forces integrated with core allies across the spectrum of conflict.

“For Europeans, the challenge is to have the kind of secure and robust infrastructure combined with viable conventional forces to deter the authoritarians from being tempted for a broader scale attack, but even more likely, the pursuit of seam warfare.

“Effective crisis management requires escalation control ranging from HADR operations through gray zone conflict to higher levels of lethal combat.

“A core challenge to be met is what one might call the ability to conduct effective seam warfare, namely through working with partners and allies to reduce the seams left open in European defense which the authoritarian powers can exploit.

“Force integratability and mobility are key elements in the ability for a country’s forces to collaborate with allies at the point where the adversary is working a seam to enhance their ability to maximize their political or military advantage.

“The Russians focus on what the West calls hybrid war but in my view is better understood as working the seams in their geography to expand their influence and to recover strategic space lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of Russia.

“For Poland, in addition to providing for their own territorial defense, the Russians are working the seams in the Polish political space, notably, with regard to the Nordic and Baltic regions, the Black Sea region, Romania and Ukraine.

“This a region which remains contested from the Russian point of view, and for the defense of Polish interests, an ability not only to enhance the defense of Polish territory, but the ability to move force packages to close seams which the Russians pressure is crucial as well.”

What this means for Germany is the need to have capabilities to move force in support of allies with real military capability to deploy force rapidly to close a seam and to reinforce both security and defense needs to shore up coalition capabilities rapidly.

This is about force insertion to both deter and defend with allies the key choke points or seams which the Russians seek to exploit to get the kind of crisis management outcomes they seek.

Having the right insertion force package to move on the European chessboard is crucial for Germany.

And the acquisition of the right lift helicopter is a key element enabling such a force insertion package.

In the next piece, I will address the CH-47 versus CH-53K options in shaping such a capability, and argue the case that the CH-53K is the clear choice to do so.

Featured Photo: British Soldiers with Enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Poland arrived to Rukla, Lithuania after a two-day tactical road march across Eastern Europe, June 18, 2017, as part of Saber Strike 17. The Poland-based Battle Group conducted the convoy portion of the Field Training Exercise to demonstrate their ability to execute a forward passage of lines across the only land connection between the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which is known as the Suwalki Gap.

RUKLA, LITHUANIA

06.18.2017

Photo by Sgt. Justin Geiger

7th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

By Robbin Laird

The March 24, 2022, Williams Foundation Seminar on “Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force” provided perspectives of core allies of Australia which assessed the state of current affairs with regard to such a force and providing insights with regard to the way ahead.

Because the seminar was held in the same week as the RAAF’s Air and Space Power Conference 2022 (entitled “Resilience and Innovation in Air and Space,” there was a clear opportunity to leverage that conference for the benefit of the Williams Foundation Seminar.

At that conference, the Australian Minister for Defence Peter Dutton announced the establishment of the Defence Space Command, a subject which was treated in significant detail in the last Williams Foundation seminar held last year, entitled “Requirements for Sovereign Defence Capability.”

At the Williams Foundation seminar, two American officers spoke, General Kenneth Wisbach, Commander Pacific Air Forces and LtGen Steven Rudder, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Commanding General Fleet Marine Force, one British officer, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Wigston, Chief of the Air Staff, Royal Air Force, and Lt. General Aurelio Colagrande, Italy Deputy Chief of Air Force.

I will deal with each of their presentations in separate articles, but will focus here on the general takeaways from their presentations taken collectively.

First, either discussed directly by the speakers or assumed in their analyses was the changing nature of the strategic environment, and the need for significantly enhanced ready forces while transformation towards a more integrated force was underway. It is not just about possessing a small number of sophisticated platforms, or even integrated sophisticated platforms, it is about effective decision making in a contested environment.

Second, working ways to enhance how the operating forces work together now is a foundation for shaping a way ahead. Lt. General Aurelio Colagrande highlighted the successful efforts to enhance Eurofighter deployed integration in delivering enhanced combat capability in operating airpower in the Baltic region as one key example.

Third, LtGen Rudder highlighted how the Marines, the first to operate the F-35, had evolved their capabilities to operate afloat and ashore with allies, such as demonstrated in recent Pacific exercises or “rehearsals” as he called them with the United Kingdom and their Queen Elizabeth carriers.

The USMC and the UK have worked for many years on air combat integration first in the United States and then in the UK and elsewhere for their F-35s. Training the maintainers and the pilots for both forces from the ground up has delivered unique integrated capabilities and is suggestive of the kind of integration which is possible if training and operations are brought more closely together.

The RAF Chief of Staff underscored how he saw this process, highlighted by the MARFORPAC Commander:

“I can’t think of a better example of multi-domain integration than the UK carrier strike group that deployed last year in the Indo-Pacific region, as far as Japan. It brought to life, the deeper UK focus on the Indo-Pacific, a region the Integrated Review identified as critical to our economy, our security, and our global ambition to support an open and resilient international order.

“At the heart of that carrier strike group, of course, is our ability to operate fifth generation combat aircraft from the sea. Lightning is a phenomenal war fighting machine, from land or sea. And last year 617 Squadron Royal Air Force and VMFA-211 from the US Marine Corps demonstrated that enormous utility from the Royal Navy’s HMS Queen Elizabeth.”

Fourth, in discussing the Integrated Review, Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Wigston highlighted a number of key developments suggestive of the broader approach of the allies in working force integration.

This is how he put the significance of the C2 and ISR efforts in providing for such an outcome:

“To operate and fight together, we need to connect together. That functioning interoperable digital C2 network is one of the most important technological challenges we all share. And after many years observing PowerPoint slides with lightning bolts connecting platforms, I am delighted to say that it is something that we are on the threshold of delivering at long last in the real world too.

“This is the combat cloud. We’ve long talked about, brought to life. Data from every sensor on any platform in the operating space, processed in real time, at the edge into useful information, flagged to any user with a need for that information, accessed remotely, fused with what is already known to give of situational awareness at any level and enabling better decisions than our adversaries, all executed at the speed of light.”

Fifth, the PACAF Commander, General Kenneth Wisbach, focused much of his presentation on how to shape a way ahead for force connectivity, notably in regard to how the USAF is addressing what it calls Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).

But as an operational commander, he did not focus primarily on the long-term vision, but on how to get enhanced warfighting capability now with regard to the operating forces.

A key example he provided of what is the current focus and reality was his discussion of the recent Cope North 22 exercise.

“We focused on network integration during our recent Cope North 22 dynamic force employment exercise alongside Australia and Japan. Cope North allowed us to build our tactics, techniques and procedures in support of agile combat employment, or ACE, our operational concept that projects air power via network of distributed operating locations throughout the Indo-Pacific. The Australian air force, as well as the Japanese air force were both experimenting with ACE as well as the USAF.

“During the exercise, we executed 2000 sorties across seven islands and 10 airfields demonstrating operational unpredictability and redundant C2 that enabled rapid employment of fourth and fifth generation air power. Our assessment of the exercise showed that we were able to finer interoperability as we work toward the achievement of a networked force with our allies and partners.”

In short, the demand to fight tonight requires operational innovation delivered in the near to mid-term, not just in some abstract future. In fact, that future may never arrive.

As we are seeing in Europe, some were prepared and many were not for the stark reality of what 21^st century authoritarian powers are about in world where globalization was assumed to eliminate such events. Peter Jennings referred in his insightful presentation at the seminar that Germany has had its “German moment” in being shocked into reality. We shall see but the challenge is to deliver credible force now in decision-making environment where the 21st century authoritarian powers take seriously what the West is doing.

It is not about a power point presentation deck of what a credible future force might look like in a distant future.

The featured photo: U.S. Marine Corps Capt Craig Turner prepares to launch an F-35B from HMS Queen Elizabeth in the Pacific Ocean on August 20, 2021. The operation highlighted the interoperability of the F-35B and the strategic importance of the joint integration between the United Kingdom Carrier Strike Group and the U.S. Navy Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit. This mission was the first time in modern history the United States has cross-decked aircraft for a mission utilizing a foreign aircraft carrier, demonstrating naval partnerships in action.

For the first piece in this series on the Williams Foundation March 24, 2022 seminar, see the following:

Accelerating the Transition to a Networked, Integrated Force: The March 2022 Williams Foundation Seminar

The Requirements of a Sovereign Defence Space Capability