Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

Exercise Koolendong 22

Posted on October 19, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/19/2022

U.S. Marines with Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) 22, U.S. Army Soldiers, and Australian Army soldiers participate in exercise Koolendong 22 across the Northern Territory and Western Australia from July 10 through Aug. 2, 2022.

Exercise Koolendong 22 is a combined and joint force exercise focused on expeditionary advanced base operations conducted by U.S. Marines, U.S. Soldiers, U.S. Airmen, and Australian Defence Force personnel.

08.03.2022

Video by Cpl. Emeline Molla Marine Rotational Force – Darwin

France and the War Economy: The Perspective of Thales

Posted on October 19, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The arms industry and the armed forces ministry are holding talks on how to share the financial risk of building up stocks of weapons, as France moves toward what it calls a war economy after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“Who takes on the commercial risk in an industry where the goods cannot be freely sold?” Thales executive chairman Patrice Caine told Oct. 17 the two press clubs Defense Journalists Association and Association of Aerospace Journalists.

“What is the new balance?” he said.

The defense ministry and arms manufacturers are in talks on building up stocks and speeding up production following a June 13 speech by president Emmanuel Macron, with the head of state saying the war in Ukraine meant France and Europe were entering “a war economy” and needed to organize accordingly.

Weapons cannot be freely sold in an open market and are built to government order, Caine said, unlike the civil aviation sector, where Thales can take industrial risk and can pitch its aeronautics systems to aircraft builders such as Airbus, Boeing, Embraer, and Dassault.

The reliance on government orders applied across the rest of Europe and the U.S., he said, with the arms industry a highly specific business, an obvious fact but one which people tend to forget.

There is a long development cycle in building weapons, he said, which was not “compressible,’ although certain shortcuts could be made if there were anticipation with stocks and sub-assemblies held in hand.

European countries have announced plans to increase defense spending due to the war in Ukraine, he said, and that roughly doubled the “visibility” compared to the usual industrial outlook of four or five years.

In a war economy, there is what the client “sees” as a shorter production cycle, and the reality of the industrial process, he said. In that respect, there was a similarity between faster arms procurement and an impulse purchase of a smartphone, which took 12-18 months to develop and build from high technology components.

Who finances the stocks and where the cursor should be are part of the discussions with the armed forces ministry, he said.

The defense minister, Sébastien Lecornu, held Sept. 6 a round table meeting with the chiefs of staff, procurement chief, secretary general of defense and national security, and industry leaders, and set out the aims of adapting to a war economy.

Lecornu laid out four objectives, seeking capability to build more equipment, speed up delivery, and meet budget targets, the ministry said in a statement. The war in Ukraine showed the need to build up stocks of munitions in a “high intensity conflict.”

The top priority was to manage munitions, with the services building up their stock of munitions to allow them to respond to a “major engagement,” the ministry said.

As part of managing munitions, companies were called on to build up stocks of raw material to respond effectively to the ministry’s orders, and companies committed to speeding up production on high priority equipment, the ministry said. There was a study of companies in the defense industrial base to pool their stock.

That pooling of raw material was relatively easy for prime contractors, a defense analyst said, but there was a question for smaller contractors, which needed to find funding. Financing that building up of munitions needed to be addressed.

A speeding up of production could be seen with 155 mm shells being delivered in three months instead of nine, with the Caesar self-propelled artillery built in 24 months instead of 30, and soon to be speeded up to 12, the ministry statement said.

The other targets set by the minister were to simplify operational requirements, cut red tape for arms procurement, and ensure the supply chain was not dependent on foreign companies.

Caine referred to a meeting to be held Oct. 26, when asked about relations with the German industrial partner on the future combat air system (FCAS).

France and Germany are holding a bilateral ministerial summit meeting Oct. 26, seen as a key date in resolving a long standing dispute between Airbus Defence and Space, based in Germany, and Dassault Aviation, headquartered in the suburbs of the French capital.

“Political pressure has moved things along,” the defense analyst said, and there seems to have been movement in that industrial row.

Airbus DS has held off signing a contract, seeking to share a joint prime contractorship with Dassault. The French company has insisted on playing the lead role on the phase 1B to develop and build a technology demonstrator for a next generation fighter at the heart of the FCAS.

France, Germany and Spain back the FCAS project, estimated to be worth some €80 billion ($79 billion). The planned fighter would replace the Rafale and Eurofighter.

A second defense analyst said perhaps there might be an announcement on work on the demonstrator, but that might be a diplomatic gesture, with perhaps the project to be curtailed after the prototype is built.

“Let’s see after phase 1B,” the analyst said. Work on a demonstrator would help Airbus to “master the technology.”

There is much at stake as the concept of European sovereignty underpins the FCAS project, the analyst said, and diplomacy calls for some form of a positive announcement to be made at the summit.

Meanwhile, on the prospect of the U.K. cutting the defense budget, Caine said Thales had to wait and see, and then adapt to spending decisions.

“Let’s wait and see what the British government tells us it wants to do,” he said.

Both the candidates who campaigned for leadership of the political party spoke of spending up to three percent, he said, and in view of the state of the British economy, it was hard to say what would happen next.

The company would adapt to what the government decided, while explaining the consequences, he said.

Defense minister Ben Wallace and one of his deputies, armed forces minister James Heappey, are reported Oct. 18 to have indicated to be ready to resign if prime minister Liz Truss failed to observe a pledge to boost annual defense spending to three percent from two percent of gross domestic product by 2030, worth an estimated £100 billion ($113 billion) a year.

Truss last month won the votes of members of the Conservative party and gained her appointment as prime minister, beating her competitor, Rishi Sunak, who was previously chancellor of the exchequer, or finance minister.

Truss is under severe political pressure following her appointment of Jeremy Hunt as chancellor. Hunt has said he would ask all government ministries to cut spending, after his cancelling deeply unpopular tax cuts announced by his predecessor, Kwasi Kwarteng, who lost public and political favor due to his mini-budget.

Truss summarily fired Kwarteng last week because of financial crises sparked by his mini-budget, which proposed those tax cuts for the wealthy.

The Thales U.K. unit builds weapons including the Starstreak short range missile and Lightweight Multirole Missile, dubbed the Martlet, reported to have been shipped to Ukrainian forces. The British market is a major contributor to the company’s balance sheet, with total sales of €17 billion ($17 billion) expected for this year.

Featured Photo: 24th March 2022. Emmanuel Macron, President of France during press conference, after NATO Extraordinary Summit. Brussels, Belgium

Photo 244072886 © Gints Ivuskans | Dreamstime.com

The Australian Army in Transition: The Perspective of Lt. General Simon Stuart

Posted on October 19, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Robbin Laird

In his presentation at the recent Indian Ocean Defence & Security Conference, the recently appointed Chief of Army, Lt. General Simon Stuart highlighted how he saw the way ahead for the Australian Army.

“War is a national endeavour, and as a so-called middle power, we fight alongside allies and partners. As to the character of the next war, and to quote General H. R. McMaster, “we have a perfect record of predicting future wars… and that record is zero percent”.

“So we must be prepared for the fight beyond the opening battles, as wars are inevitably longer, more demanding and more visceral than imagined by those who speak, in my view, with undue certitude about the character of the next war.

“War requires national resilience, national means and national will.

“Our strategic environment has and will continue to change unevenly and at pace. And our ability to adapt must be similarly agile.

“As part of the ADF, your Army must be able to field and sustain relevant and credible land power options for our government. Including the things that only an Army can do – land combat – the demands of which are more lethal, more complex, and certainly more consequential than they have been in a long time.

“Your Army is transforming to keep pace with the changing character of warfare. To prevail in 21st century your Army must be better connected, protected, lethal and enabled.

“Your Army will make a greater contribution at the operational and strategic levels, through new and transformed capabilities such as long-range fires, littoral manoeuvre, cyber, space, information warfare, and special operations forces.

“Your Army is modernising its scalable, world-class combined arms fighting system that gives our soldiers the best probability of mission success in the most lethal environments and the best chance of coming home….

“Your Army is enhancing and expanding its health, logistics, engineering and aviation capabilities, as well as our command and management in order to be in a better position to modernise and scale, and contribute to mobilisation.

“Underpinning all this is the application of new and emerging technologies.”

The Chief of Army spoke at the recent Williams Foundation seminar on the evolution of the ADF in the new strategic environment. The day after his presentation, I had a chance to meet with him in his office to discuss some aspects of his thinking about the way ahead for the Australian environment post-Middle East land wars.

At the heart of any change is determining how best to work with the joint force in the direct defense of Australia, which includes significant demands to operate in the littoral regions adjacent to Australia and out into relevant areas of the Pacific.

We started by discussing the strategic environment. Lt. General Stuart underscored that Australia was a middle power, not a great power. This means that working with allies and partners in the region effectively was a core competence which the Army needs to develop, enhance and maximize. He argued that their exercise regimes in the region as well as working with Pacific partners was a key part of this effort.

He argued that “we are a convening power. What is our strategy?

“Fundamentally it comes down to working with the alliance we have with the United States and other like-minded states, to promote shared interests. And in those contexts, we are focused on being a net contributor to alliance security as well as our own.

“And we are addressing how we work together to build the interior lines of defense in the region – to use land – parlance in the Indo-Pacific.”

How do you further enhance and develop such an approach?

According to Lt. General Stuart: “You take the architecture that already exists through the multilateral activities we do with Indonesia on activities like Garuda Shield, Balikatan with the Philippines, Cobra Gold in Thailand, Talisman Saber in Australia. You build those out as multilateral activities, and connect them in a way that strengthens international partnerships while enabling a persistent multilateral presence.

“And that persistent presence and multilateral interaction has a range of key strategic aspects. First, we get to know the environment and how to operate within it. We get placement and access where our multilateral forces need it. We can leverage the relationships, and importantly we provide an alternative to what the authoritarian states are offering as a future for our partners in the region.

“If we need to respond militarily in the region, we already have a grid and network established. We will have communications networks in place and have exercised mission command. And we have already worked through multilateral formations, so that you have a working C2 model, with all the authorities, in place and an understanding of how you plan, how national authorities affect your planning, how you force project, how you do logistics, and who’s going to contribute what to which part of any potential fight.”

But he argued that “we are not fit to purpose today to be able to do what we need to do in this strategic space.”

We then discussed some aspects of the transition for Army which he envisaged to make the Army “fit for purpose.”

He highlighted the need to be able to deploy long range fires in a joint context. We did not discuss how to do this at length, but in my view, it is not simply the ability to fire from the Australian continent or to move first to littoral locations in an Army context. With the emergence of kill web technologies, and third party targeting, the Army working with Navy and Air Force can shape innovative new ways to cross-target adversarial positions in a variety of new ways going forward, including the use of various robotic or autonomous systems.

Lt. General Stuart highlighted the need significantly to enhance the ability of the Army to become mobile in terms of littoral operations. He noted: “We need to be able to thicken our capacity for independent littoral maneuver and also be able to reinforce and disperse our amphibious capability in a meaningful way.”

He underscored: “Our 1st Brigade up in Townsville was previously our medium weight brigade. It will now be our core littoral maneuver formation. And this is a capability that our army hasn’t had since 1946. And we are building the capability for the brigade to enable us to maneuver in the littorals of our continent and in the region.

“But it has the capacity for inter-theater, independent intra-theater movement as well. It can also aggregate and disaggregate as part of our amphibious system. We are focused on force dispersal and mobility and providing us with utility to launch a range of different force packages either independently or as part of a combined or multilateral activity.”

Lt. General Stuart underscored that working with the USMC in terms of the MRF-D rotational force was assisting in this re-design process as well.

This means as well a shift in how to organize the Army.

He highlighted this aspect as follows:

“We’ve been organized for the wars of the last two decades at the brigade level. We need to move that to the division level to provide the standing headquarters, which are JTFs as well as divisional headquarters and provide our two-star special operations command with the kinds of C2 or C4 capabilities where they can actually command operations in their AORs that incorporate joint and combined agencies.

“We are organized today on a very much just-in-time efficiency model. We need to be now organized in our warfighting structures that are always on. New and emerging tech, Robotics and Autonomous Systems, Artificial Intelligence and machine learning, quantum and human performance optimization will all have an important impact on our logistics enterprise and in the Combat Service Support space.”

As well the modernization of the Army, we also discussed Army’s aviation enterprise as a broader set of challenges.

He summarized this thrust towards the future in the following terms:

“We are in the cooperative development program for precision strike missiles. We are looking at common effector sets with our navy in the longer term. Our contribution to space and cyber adds significant robustness to the joint effort given we are too small to have separate organizations.

“And we have completely reoriented our special operations capability along functional lines, and are highlighting special warfare and technical enablement to move us away from the focus of the past two decades to what we need to be doing in terms of unconventional warfare and other capabilities to contribute to deterrence in our region.”

Lt. General Stuart argued for the continued need for armor as well. “We need to modernize that bit of the army that needs to be hardened and protected to be able to guarantee overmatch in time and space and in a distributed way. If you look at it from a full-time brigade formation level in the Australian Army, it’s one out of nine formations.

“It’s not the bulk of the army, but at the end of the day, we’ll have about a brigade’s worth of armor capability to provide, what we used to call a commander’s reserve for those less lethal, less mobile, and less protected formations.”

I will finish this article by highlighting how the Chief of Army concluded his speech in Western Australia for it contained important insight into the key role which the Australian Army can play in terms of the direct defense of Australia understood in terms of its own continent.

“If I can now conclude by explaining how Army’s modernisation is unfolding here in Western Australia. Our 13th Brigade is growing and evolving – increasing the number of our full-time workforce and providing more opportunities for more West Australians to serve in either a full or on a part-time basis.

“Enhanced command and control arrangements in the headquarters of the 13th Brigade have increased its scale and its capacity for operations on the West Coast and it’s approaches.

“And we have created or enhanced capabilities in the 10th Light Horse Regiment, the 13th Engineer Regiment, and assigning new roles to parts of the 16th Royal West Australian Regiment.

“I just spent the last few days with our teams in the Kimberley and the Pilbara, where they are ‘always on’ every single day – providing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the most remote areas of our state’s north with cutting edge capabilities and making a huge contribution to bringing together and participating in a whole of government intelligence gathering framework.

“And of course based here in Perth is Special Operations Command – West, centered on the Special Air Service Regiment which conducts some of the nation’s most sensitive missions.

“All of this provides your Army with the ability to scale and mobilise in, to and from Western Australia and abroad.

“But of course, we cannot do it alone. Leveraging one of Army’s key strengths – teaming – we have focused collaboration with government, industry and academia. With the Western Australia Police Force, Australian Border Force, Maritime Border Command, and various intelligence agencies, we maintain a united network for the defence of Australia, including here in the West.

“With BHP, we collaborate on automation and secure communications, electrification and quantum technologies, as well as pathways that allow us to share our workforces. With the University of Western Australia’s Defence and Security Institute, we realise the challenges of the future and contribute to research, engagement and education on defence and security issues.

“These are just a few examples. Service in your Army offers a sense of purpose and an opportunity to be part of something bigger than ourselves.”

Lieutenant General Simon Stuart, AO, DSC

Lieutenant General Stuart assumed command of the Australian Army on 02 July 2022.

Enlisting as a soldier in 1987, Lieutenant General Stuart was commissioned into the Royal Australian Infantry Corps in 1990. He has over thirty-five years’ experience across a range of leadership, operations, training and program management appointments in Australia and overseas.

Lieutenant General Stuart’s regimental experience was in the 2nd/4th and 2nd Battalions, Royal Australian Regiment, culminating in command of the 8th/9th Battalion from 2008-10.

He has commanded on operations on five occasions at the company, Joint Task Force, brigade and force levels in East Timor, Afghanistan and Egypt/Israel respectively. His early career included significant training experience, while his staff appointments have largely been in capability development. He has worked in joint, whole of government, international and multi-national environments for most of the past 20 years. Most recently, Lieutenant General Stuart has fulfilled the role of Head of Land Capability in Army Headquarters after a three year deployment in command of the Multinational Force & Observers from 2017-19.

Lieutenant General Stuart is a graduate of the Royal Military College – Duntroon (1990), the United Kingdom’s Joint Services Command and Staff College (2003), the United States Army War College (2015) and the Harvard Business School Advanced Management Program (2022). He holds a Bachelor’s Degree from the University of New England and Masters’ degrees in Project Management (UNSW), Arts – Defence Studies (Kings College, London) and Strategy (US Army War College).

Lieutenant General Stuart’s honours and awards include his appointment as Member of the Order of Australia (2011), the Distinguished Service Cross (2014) and advancement to Officer of the Order of Australia (2020). He has also received a number of foreign awards, including those from the United States, Timor Leste, Columbia, Uruguay, Czech Republic and Japan.

Building out Australian Maritime Capabilities: A Priority on a Whole of Nation Approach

Posted on October 18, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/18/2022

By Robbin Laird

At the Williams Foundation Seminar held on September 28, 2002, the new Chief of Navy, Vice Admiral Mark Hammond, underscored that Australia faced a significant range of challenges to the nation associated with threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific region.

As he put it: Australia is a paradox. The geography which makes it difficult to invade and conquer Australia also makes Australia dependent upon seaborne trade. In other words, Australia might not be vulnerable to invasion, but the hostile power does not need to invade Australia to defeat Australia.”

Unpacking an understanding of the evolving relationship between the nation and the ADF is at the heart of reworking the defence of the nation in the years to come. The defence capabilities which have enabled the ADF to deliver significant but targeted warfighting capability will now be adapted and refocused on Australia’s direct defence and role in its region.

After the seminar, I had a chance to talk with VADM (Retired) Barrett about the changes required for the Royal Australian Navy to operate in the new strategic environment and to be able to provide for the kind of whole of nation approach required for Australian defence. He noted that the changes already put in motion by the 2016 strategic review needed to be accelerated but that the threat envelope had expanded rapidly in the region which has significant impacts on how to build, operate and sustain the fleet.

The key shift has been from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific region. Barrett noted: By the time of the 2016 defence white paper, we had already assessed that our time in the Middle East was coming to an end. We’d had almost a continuous presence in that region for several decades, and that needed to change to a focus on the Indo-Pacific region.”

But it is not simply about taking the assets that were deployed to the Middle East region and redeploying them to Australia’s region. It is about the need as well to focus on the whole of nation defense approach. This is how Barrett put it: “The whole of nation appeal is not just about the navy itself. It’s about the broad concept of providing a secure and assured supply chain to Australia, some of which will be to build the sovereign military capability, but a lot of it will be to sustain and defend the national economy.”

We discussed a number of key aspects of shaping a way ahead for Australian maritime capabilities seen in terms of the national approach to defence, in terms of integration with the joint force and in terms of working with allies.

We discussed two key aspects of shaping a national approach to defence.

The first is the question of the build out of the Royal Australian Navy on Australian soil.

How will Australia build out naval bases going forward?

Will they co-locate sustainment locations with bases?

How will they work forward sustainment efforts in the region and how will that correlate with sustainment and repair facilities within Australia itself?

How will the approach to building out of Australian naval bases intersect with allied operations?

These issues obviously are a key part of the coming of the nuclear submarine capability to be deployed from Australia itself, but equally apply to the question of having the kind of basing infrastructure which credibly intersects with the challenge of staffing and quality of life that is crucial to attract the civilian workforce which is necessary for the kind of support the RAN needs for operations.

And as Australia builds parts of its fleet, how will those capabilities intersect with sustainment and repair for the fleet including with regard to allied combat ships as well?

The second is the question of building Australian merchant marine capabilities.

Barrett noted that “there are just 14 ships that are flagged on the Australian Register, and that number is going to decline over the next couple of years. The significance of flagging them under our register is that you have legal means by which you can requisition those ships to be able to take steps to secure fuel, to secure medical supplies, to secure fertilizers, whatever it may well be that you need in a crisis. You cannot do that if they’re not on our register.

“Importantly, it also builds a level of trained workforce that will operate those ships in times of emergency, because we have a diminishing pool of competent mariners in Australia, some of whom need to be retained for a growing navy force, but we also need to retain them to fill merchant marine positions. But they’re also the same people who manage ports and harbors, who manage all the ancillary facilities that are needed to supply a regular maritime industry.”

By contrast, China has built a powerful commercial maritime enterprise which it has leveraged for its naval combat fleet as well.

According to VADM (Retired) Barrett: “China produces more merchant ships per year than South Korea and Japan combined. It’s been an overt practice, and they have not just a maritime fleet that exceeds all others, but their ownership of the entire integrated maritime industry has them owning more containers than others, has them managing more container ports around the world than others, has them managing a far greater level of maritime industry financing. If they don’t own the ship, they probably own the financing behind why others own it, so therefore can influence behavior.

“And the quality of their warships that are being built now reflects their efforts in the commercial shipbuilding area as well.”

We then discussed the way ahead with regard to the Australian combat fleet.

VADM (retired) Barrett, when he was chief of navy, focused on the importance of integrated combat systems across the fleet. Such an approach also allows for enhanced integratability with allied fleets and with the joint force.

Notably, in the first ship to be built under the new continuous shipbuilding approach, the Arafura-class offshore patrol vessel, the combat systems are designed to operate modular capabilities onboard the ship and to integrate across the fleet. As Australia builds out its maritime autonomous systems capabilities, ships like the new class OPV can become mother ships delivering capabilities for the joint or allied forces.

The approach for the RAN in Barrett’s view is as follows:

“The ability of managing the combat system across the fleet means that you can vary what the hull or what the ship class can do for you and where it’s likely to operate, but still retain that ability to connect and operate under a single combat plan. If you make that combat system interchangeable with your key allies, the U.S. in this region in particular, then it allows you to offer government far more creative options depending on what the threat is in the region.

“You don’t necessarily put your air warfare destroyers or high value frigates to an area where you might be served by an OPV, which has a good combat system and a capability to modularize the weapons that it might be carrying.

“It can do work in that area to be able to demonstrate presence, particularly to the island nations, but also work from a deterrence point of view against someone who might seek to displace Australian interest in those areas.

“In other words, we’re building a fleet that has more adaptability and that allows us to be more flexible in our operational responses, both from a national sovereignty point of view or an allied operational point of view.”

“You can’t do that with a fleet that’s designed around single platform, single class types, proprietary combat systems and weapon systems that don’t contribute to an overall arsenal that belongs to a modular task force.

“It’s a philosophy as much as anything else, and I’d call it the Aegis lifestyle. You need to be able to operate in a way that you are a contributor to the overall modular task group. You all have the same ability to plug, play and contribute to the fight.”

Exercise Pitch Black 2022

Posted on October 17, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/17/2022

Approximately 110 U.S. Airmen from Pacific Air Forces participated in Exercise Pitch Black 2022, the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Chief of Air Force’s biennial capstone international engagement activity with forces drawn from a wide range of regional, coalition and Allied nations.

This year, 17 nations participated in PB22 from Aug. 19 to Sept. 8, 2022.

The exercise focused on the tactical execution of Large Force Employment Offensive Counter Air and Counter Land operations in a multi-national coalition environment to enhance interoperability among the U.S., Australia, Canada, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and United Kingdom forces. DARWIN, NT, 09.09.2022 Video by Staff Sgt. Savannah Waters 18th Wing Public Affairs

Reliable Supply Chains, Defence, Partners and Allies: Shaping a Way Ahead for Australia

Posted on October 17, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Robbin Laird

During my September 2022 trip to Australia in my role as a Research Fellow of the Williams Foundation, I wrote the report for the September 28, 2022 seminar and engaged in discussions during the month focused on the nature of the challenges facing Australia and the need to shape effective approaches to the direct defence of Australia within alliance contexts.

I had a chance to discuss a number of aspects of these challenges with my colleague Dr. Ross Babbage who is the Chief Executive Officer of Strategic Forum Pty Ltd and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in Washington DC.

A key issue which combines both defence and alliance issues is the challenge of ensuring reliable supply chains in the context of the digital age.

The pandemic certainly brought to public attention the fragility of supply chains for Australia and the entire liberal democratic world. And the war in Ukraine has generated a broader energy crisis, notably in the wake of the aversion of many countries and the U.S. Administration to prioritize energy production during a perceived global “climate crisis.”

The first issue which became evident was that the reliance on China for a significant amount of the West’s manufacturing capability left them vulnerable to the 21^st century authoritarian states and their political agenda to change the “rules-based order” forged after World War II. With the Western economies eschewing heavy manufacturing in favor of a more environmentally friendly “service economy,” there is a key question of how then the West maintains a viable “arsenal of democracy”?

The energy dependence of Europe on Russia has clearly underscored how not having viable alternatives for basic commodities can undercut Western agendas and policies. Although there is currently much focus on building alternatives in Europe, the continued emphasis on the “climate change emergency” clearly conflicts with a realistic long-term geopolitical energy strategy for all of the allies.

And the Biden Administration’s rapid move away from the American energy independence reduces America’s ability to help allies in extremis. And indeed, when it comes to critical supplies, given the current U.S. trajectory, how much allied sharing will really be possible during a future crisis?

The second issue which we discussed was the way ahead with rare earth minerals and processed metals. Dr. Babbage underscored that Australia has large quantities of many of the key rare earth minerals.

But it generally does not process them; that has largely been done in China. This clearly needs to change, but this requires Australia and her partners to shoulder the key processing opportunities and burdens.

It also means that Australia, her partners and allies need to work through ways to build and sustain relevant supply chains

The third issue is that the Australian government needs to work with a variety of allies and partners, and not just wait for leadership from Washington. This is how he put it: “The slowness on some of the issues in this area means that Australia needs to move rapidly and take the initiative ourselves in developing bilateral or trilateral or multi-lateral alliance or partner relationships.”

He underscored that “we need to get the network of allies and partners working effectively together to improve supply chains. In addition to our discussions with agencies in Washington, we’ve been having discussions with our friends in the region, most notably Japan and South Korea, but also with some of the ASEAN countries and India.

“We are also focused on discussions in Europe because their industrial base is very significant and could play important roles in future Indo-Pacific contingencies. We have our own independent and close relationships with most of these European countries facilitated in part by our own European-origin populations.”

The fourth issue is to expand ways for government to work with industry to ensure that essential supplies are available in a crisis and to ensure that Australia can do all of the important things it needs to do even during a very prolonged crisis.

And Dr. Babbage underscored that innovations being generated by industry in a number of areas to strengthen supply chain robustness also can enhance Australian resilience as well. This is the case, for instance, in rare earth materials, as well as in advanced robotic technologies and some types of smart manufacturing.

Babbage cited the example of an Australian rare earth minerals company, Lynas Rare Earths. They currently have a processing plant in Malaysia which they are closing in the coming two-to- three years. They are currently building a new plant in Australia and a second with an American partner in Texas. They are also modifying and modernizing the conventional rare earth refining process.

He then mentioned another Australian company, Australian Strategic Materials, which has teamed with a South Korean company to develop and put into operation a completely new technology for rare earth mineral processing. This new technology process is much cleaner, less power intensive and cheaper to operate than legacy processing technologies.

The first of this new type of processing plants is now fully operational in South Korea and is supplying Korean and other customers. This company is planning an even larger rare earth mining and processing operation in Australia and is also considering licensing their advanced technologies to allied partners. As a result of these and related developments China may lose its dominance of the rare earths industry during the coming decade.

Put another way, shaping a way ahead for the defence of Australia is much broader than buying a new platform for the ADF.

It is now also about the ecosystem for strengthening the supply chains that foster Australia’s prosperity as a functioning society and also the country’s security and that of its allies and security partners.

The pandemic provided a hammer blow; the war in Ukraine triggered a global food and energy crisis; and the two together made it very clear that defense against a multi-domain power like China is not simply about winning the next battle with powerful military forces.

It is also about being able to prevail in a struggle for national and allied survival.

The featured graphic: Australian Supply Chains: State of Play. AUSTRALIAN CEO SURVEY 2021-2022.

https://www.aigroup.com.au/globalassets/news/reports/2021/supply_chains_state_of_play_dec2021.pdf

Exercise SEA RAIDER 2022

Posted on October 14, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

10/14/2022

In September 2022 the Australian Defence Force conducted Exercise SEA RAIDER across the coast of North Queensland.

Exercise SEA RAIDER 2022 certified the Amphibious Ready Unit and saw the Australian Amphibious Force train closely with the Royal Australian Navy’s HMAS Adelaide, as well as a beach landing force comprising of infantry, armoured vehicles, aviation and logistics elements optimised for amphibious raids and assaults.

The Sea Series of exercises enhances joint interoperability of the Australian Army and Royal Australian Navy’s amphibious capabilities.

Credit: Australian Department of Defence

September 30, 2022.

Preparing for Major Change in Australian Defence: The September 2022 Williams Foundation Seminar

Posted on October 14, 2022 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

On September 28, 2022, the Williams Foundation hosted its latest seminar.

The focus was on the challenges which need to be addressed in making the biggest change to Australian defence seen in recent memory.

Rather than focusing on the away games and support for its major ally in such efforts, the focus was returning to the direct defence of Australia and what needs to be done with an adversary which can cut Australia off from global supplies.

As the new Chief of Navy put it:

“I believe it’s important to raise our eyes above the tactical level for a moment to reflect on why we build and employ an integrated force. And I say this because what we build and what we do with it matters only in so much as it enhances our national well-being.

“Our national well-being like all nations is derived from sustained economic prosperity, and peaceful coexistence with nations. And as a trading island nation connected to the global trading system by seabed cables, and maritime commerce, our economic well-being is almost exclusively enabled by the sea and by the seabed.

“Enablement though is not enough. Sustained economic prosperity has only been possible because these systems — freedom of navigation for commerce, and seabed infrastructure which enables our financial and strategic connectivity with the global trading system — have flourished in an environment of acceptance and adherence to the complex array of treaties, laws and conventions that for almost 80 years have been iterated, improved and almost universally supported.

“We call this the rules-based order, and we credit it with providing it with good order at sea in the collective interest of peace for all nations. Those of us who understand Australia derives its well-being from this system are alarmed that such norms are being challenged.

“We are concerned that the right to peaceful coexistence with other nations can no longer be assumed. As former minister for defence the honorable Kim Beazley stated in Perth last month, and I paraphrase, what right do we have to exist as a sovereign nation of only 25 million people occupying an island continent with room and natural resources the envy of the world?

“The answer is the rights conferred by adherence to the rules-based order. The very rights we have assumed to be enduring and beyond contest for decades. But that is no longer the case. This system is now being challenged and our government has commissioned the defence strategic review in response to these challenges.

“It is reasonable to conclude that that which cannot be assumed, must be guaranteed. And that is why the lethality and survivability of our defence forces is being re-examined. In this context, there is a direct and distinct nexus between the lethality and survivability of the integrated force and the survivability of our nation.

“And this relationship is recognized by our prime minister in the last month. The Honorable Anthony Albanese has stated that he sees the three key principles of our current security policy are to defend our territorial integrity, to protect our political sovereignty from external pressure and to promote Australia’s economic prosperity through a strong economy and resilient supply chains….

“Australia is a paradox. The geography which makes it difficult to invade and conquer Australia also makes Australia dependent upon seaborne trade. In other words, Australia might not be vulnerable to invasion, but the hostile power does not need to invade Australia to defeat Australia.”

But how will this intersect with how national efforts unfold?

How will the necessary ADF mobilization potential intersect with the mobilization of the nation?

How will the ADF build out its workforce and be supported by the enhanced capability of domestic defence industry to support the ADF in a crisis or sustained conflict?

The pandemic as a prologue to the kind of macro crisis which faces Australia highlighted the need for more secure and stable supply chains.

How can Australia build resilient supply chains and with whom?

How to build the knowledge base with regard to what needs to be protected by such an effort and what can be left to the forces of globalization?

The fuel challenge is notably significant as the geopolitics of fuel and setting climate change standards without regard to geopolitical reality will only leave Australia and the liberal democracies vulnerable to energy supply extortion. It is difficult to miss what is going on in Europe and its relationship with Russia as a basic lesson in the relationship between geopolitics and energy.

And the question of Australia’s geography is a foundational point for understanding how the ADF will re-deploy and re-calibrate as the nation prioritizes infrastructure in the regions in Australia central to the projection of power from the continent to the first island chain of Australia and beyond. The importance of shaping enhanced capabilities for operations from the North of Australia was a frequent point made in various presentations to the seminar.

For the complete report, read the following: