In an effort to be in compliance with GDPR we are providing you with the latest documentation about how we collect, use, share and secure your information, we want to make you aware of our updated privacy policy here
Enter your name and email address below to receive our newsletter.
In the first photo, FS Ventose (F 733) from France arrives at Naval Station Norfolk after completing the at-sea phase of FRUKUS 2011. FRUKUS 2011 is an invitational exercise designed to enhance communication and interoperability between the navies of France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
In the second photo, Sailors assigned to the FS Ventose (F 733) from France set sea and anchor detail in preparation for their arrival at Naval Station Norfolk after completing the at-sea phase of FRUKUS 2011.
In the third photo, FS Ventose (F 733) from France navigate to Naval Station Norfolk from the Atlantic Ocean after completing the at-sea phase of FRUKUS 2011.
By Rear Admiral Jeffrey M. Garrett, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)
07/07/2011 – Long relegated to the periphery of world affairs—occupying the distorted top edge of a conventional Mercator projection of the world—the Arctic has been rediscovered in the first decade of the new millennium.
The diminished summer ice coverage has opened the Arctic to an unprecedented level of resource development activities, increasing maritime surface transportation, a surge of tourism and adventure travellers, and, of course, evolving political, defense and security issues.
In an echo from an earlier age, the Russians dramatically planted a titanium flag on the Arctic Ocean sea bottom, at the pole, in the summer of 2007. Although the explorers used the robotic arm of a mini-sub, rather than planting a banner on a sandy beach, this event has unleashed a steady stream of media attention on the Arctic’s future prospects in a world growing ever more connected and hungrier for resources.
In recent months Second Line of Defense has examined many of these Arctic issues, notably in Caroline Mükusch excellent four-part series on this site. In her review of the U.S. role in a transforming Arctic, Ms. Mükusch labels the United States “a reluctant Arctic power.” It is an apt characterization.
U.S. Arctic Policy
True, the U.S. has not completely ignored its role as one of the five nations positioned on the Arctic Ocean waterfront. In the waning days of the George W. Bush administration, the President signed National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25 (NSPD-66/HSPD-25), entitled Arctic Region Policy.
This policy statement was reviewed and accepted by the incoming administration of Barack Obama. It lays out security, environmental, economic, cooperation and science goals for the U.S., and in their implementation directs the executive branch to:
Develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to protect U.S. air, land and sea borders in the Arctic region;
Increase Arctic maritime domain awareness in order to protect maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources;
Preserve the global mobility of U.S. military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic region;
Project a sovereign U.S. maritime presence in the Arctic in support of essential U.S. interests; and
Encourage the peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region [1].
Russia is building a new fleet of nuclear powered ice-breakers
(Credit: www.arcticsecurity.org)
The Arctic is centered on a large ocean basin, and as such is covered by the nation’s broader National Ocean Policy. Implemented by Presidential executive order in July 2010, the policy acknowledges changes in the Arctic by directing the government to “address environmental stewardship needs in the Arctic and adjacent coastal areas” as one of its nine policy objectives [2].
Internationally, the U.S. has supported the 15-year old Arctic Council as a forum for Arctic issues. In May 2011, the U.S. was represented for the first time by the Secretary of State and other senior officials at the Arctic Council’s ministerial meeting in Greenland. The most tangible output of the meeting was an international Search and Rescue Agreement for the Arctic [3].
Supplementing a similar framework of national responsibilities around the world, the SAR agreement assigns geographic responsibilities for the Arctic among the nations in the region. It was followed two weeks later by a joint statement by the Presidents of the U.S. and the Russian Federation, announcing deepened cooperation in the Bering Strait region [4].
While both agreements provide commendable frameworks for cooperation, neither addresses capabilities for actually conducting search and rescue operations in the vastness of the Arctic or accomplishing any specific objectives in the Bering Strait.
The SAR agreement and the Bering Strait statement thus symbolize the much larger dilemma of current U.S. engagement in the Arctic *.
Lots of words are inscribed on paper, but the U.S. has, unlike many other nations, failed to make any tangible investments in its Arctic future. We have policy galore, but the capabilities are missing.
The Capability Gap
Does this lack of Arctic capability make any difference?
Only if the directions to protect our borders, commerce, resources and critical infrastructure, preserve global mobility, project a sovereign presence, and encourage dispute resolution, as stated in NSPD-66/HSPD-25, are important.
At an Arctic symposium in June 2011, the head of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration stated that her agency lacked the ability to provide adequate weather and ice forecasting and proper charting information for current needs in the Arctic.
Her remarks were followed by a statement from the Commandant of the Coast Guard, who indicated that he could not respond adequately to a cruise ship in distress or an oil spill in the American Arctic [5].
The United States cannot for much longer count on low levels of Arctic activity to mask its inaction. As Russia develops the Northern Sea Route for commercial navigation, 15 commercial vessels have registered to haul cargo between Europe and the Far East in 2011 [6].
Northwest Passage transits are increasing every year, including commercial vessels, cruise ships and small “adventure” vessels. All of this traffic must pass close to U.S. shores, through the 50-mile wide Bering Strait. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that more than 325 ships transited the Bering Strait in 2010, reflecting a rate of increase of 10-20% a year [7].
The Commandant’s warnings about ships in distress and oil spills were not theoretical musings. During the summer of 2010, two tank vessels grounded in the Canadian Arctic, along with a cruise ship that evacuated all of its passengers to a Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker fortuitously in the area.
Where the U.S. is producing policy papers, our international partners and competitors are planning and building real Arctic capability.
Canada will begin construction of a large polar icebreaker in 2013, has designed ice-strengthened Navy patrol vessels to enforce Arctic sovereignty, and is planning to upgrade its shoreside Arctic infrastructure for defense purposes.
Russia, as part of a broad initiative to develop its Arctic energy resources, is actively recapitalizing its large but aging Soviet-era icebreaker fleet.
The European Union has unveiled the technical design of a huge icebreaking research vessel and drillship for Arctic research.
Even non-Arctic nations are investing in ice-capable vessels: South Korea began operating a research icebreaker for Arctic and Antarctic work in 2010; China is building a second icebreaking vessel due for completion in 2013; and Chile and South Africa have announced plans to build ice-capable vessels for use in their own polar region.
By contrast, the U.S. is in the process of divesting its Arctic capability.
The nation’s multi-mission polar icebreaker fleet is being downsized by a third with the imminent decommissioning of USCGC Polar Sea. This will leave only the Polar Star, 35 years old and half-way through an expensive 2 ½-year refit, and the 11-year old Healy. Unanticipated engine problems in Polar Sea forced the cancellation of two Arctic deployments in late 2010 and early 2011, the result of attempting to keep complex 1960s-era technology in use beyond its reasonable service life.
Again, does this Arctic divestiture really matter?
Certainly we can continue to issue robust policy statements with a straight face, cite objectives we can’t implement or enforce, and sign abstract international agreements.
But we live in a competitive world and it will not likely be fooled for long. We should take heed of statements like this one by Rear Admiral Yin Zhou, a well-known Chinese naval officer, carried by the official China News Service: “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it….China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population” [8]. Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper hit the target precisely when, during a visit to the Canadian Forces Arctic base in Resolute, he stated “The first principle of Arctic sovereignty is use it or lose it.” [9]
Certainly the United States needs to fill the one gaping hole in our policy foundation, by ratifying the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This will give us a full seat at the international table and allow the U.S. to submit a claim on the extended outer continental shelf, which is particularly at issue in the Arctic Ocean. Certainly we need to improve NOAA’s ice and weather forecasting and chart our Arctic waters to modern standards. And the Defense Department needs to think about how a changing Arctic will fit into future U.S. defense strategy and tactics.
Laudably, this latter issue is being tackled actively. The Chief of Naval Operations in 2009 launched two efforts: an internal “Task Force Climate Change” and a National Research Council study of National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces. Both of these initiatives conducted comprehensive reviews of Arctic issues, with the NRC study including the Marine Corps and Coast Guard as well as the Navy.
The task force produced an “Arctic Road Map” for the Navy, and the NRC recommended actions to strengthen the U.S. defense posture in the Arctic. In addition, the Navy convened its 4th Symposium on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations in June 2011, offering a continuing forum for discussion of Arctic defense issues. These actions represent an appropriate application of defense-related “brainpower” to developments in the north.
However, the U.S. capability gap in the Arctic is not primarily a defense shortfall. Despite some occasional breathless prose about high-latitude geopolitical competition and the purported “race” for Arctic resources, there are no nascent international conflicts or national security issues in the region that conceivably approach the level of a defense crisis. Some unsettled matters certainly exist.
But there are no unstable Arctic dictatorships, failed nation states, or armed uprisings that threaten to explode.
In addition, some elements of U.S. “hard power” are already applicable to potential conflicts in the Arctic—submarines, strategic and tactical air assets, even special forces–if events were to reach that level.
Instead, most of the increasing human activity in the Arctic Ocean basin points directly toward the missions of the U.S. Coast Guard.
The smallest of the U.S. armed services shoulders the burden for a preponderance of the nation’s maritime affairs, and the issues emerging in today’s Arctic fall squarely upon the Coast Guard.
Cruise ship aground?
Oil spill from a ship or exploratory well?
Unknown foreign vessel traffic close to U.S. shores?
Potential violations of U.S. laws and regulations?
Facilitation of critical science work? Defense exercises in a unique environment?
The Coast Guard is responsible for all of these activities and performs them routinely throughout U.S. waters and on the high seas—but very infrequently in the Arctic, where the capabilities are mostly lacking.
Even a cursory review of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions indicates that almost all of them are directly applicable to U.S. interests in the Arctic:
Search and rescue
Aids to navigation
Ice operations (includes vessel assistance and science support)
Enforcement of laws and treaties
Living marine resources enforcement
Marine safety
Marine environmental response
Ports, waterways and coastal security
Defense operations support
Only the missions of counter-drug and migrant interdiction seem unlikely to require attention in the near future.
Perhaps more importantly, the Coast Guard’s ability to mount a credible response when these responsibilities are invoked, even on a seasonal basis, would enhance maritime domain awareness, support North Slope communities, bolster legitimate commerce, and provide an effective sovereign presence in the U.S. Arctic.
The Coast Guard understands its Arctic capability dilemma.
Both the current Commandant, Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., and his predecessor, Admiral Thad W. Allen, have been outspoken about the lack of Arctic capability[10]. More formally, the Coast Guard recently published an Arctic Strategic Approach. This document sensibly recognizes that the Arctic is primarily a maritime domain, and that the Coast Guard bears leading responsibilities for advancing U.S. national interests in the region.
Unfortunately, although there are broad statements about the need for developing appropriate capabilities, the Arctic Strategic Approach provides no clues as to what those types of capabilities might actually be, and mentions no plans for acquiring them [11]. Again, the policy sounds good … but it’s hard to find any real substance.
To its credit, the Coast Guard has surged a variety of regular units to the North Slope during each of the last three summers to test operational procedures and effectiveness.
Despite admirable “can-do” enthusiasm, the results of these operations are unsurprising: cutters, boats, aircraft and other equipment have real problems in a harsh environment far from normal logistical support, and the available shoreside infrastructure is inadequate to sustain a even a routine operational presence, much less a contingency event such as an oil spill [12].
A detailed study of the Coast Guard’s mission requirements in both polar regions was begun in January 2009. However, the report from this study effort has not been completed, despite repeated congressional requests. The high latitude study, which may not be released until the fall of 2011 [13], would form a logical basis for proceeding with formulating a capability plan and proceeding with the acquisition of appropriate assets for Arctic use.
Unfortunately, completion of a major study like this one calls for … another study!
The President’s fiscal year 2012 budget requests $5 million for the Department of Homeland Security to conduct an additional study of high latitude requirements.
There are signs that some in the Congress are growing impatient with the nation’s continued status as a “reluctant Arctic power,” propelled only by policy pronouncements and endless studies. In its review of the Administration’s FY 2012 budget request for the Coast Guard, the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee noted that the budget request
…does little to assure the Committee that national interests in the polar regions can be effectively served in coming years. The current Administration has failed to execute the existing National Arctic Policy, as stated in … NSPD-66/HSPD-25 … and appears to be permitting the atrophy of national polar capabilities. As the sustainable service lives of the Coast Guard’s heavy icebreakers rapidly approach their expiration, the need for polar capabilities is intensifying due to the presence of increased vessel traffic and energy exploration resources in the Arctic. Rather than address these issues with a cogent implementation plan, the Administration and Department are delaying the submittal of the Coast Guard’s High Latitude Study and are requesting an additional $5,000,000 for further study of polar needs. As noted previously in this report, the Committee denies the request for the additional $5,000,000 … since the needs are well known and sufficiently documented. The Coast Guard is directed to submit the High Latitude Study and brief the Committee on the resources required to meet polar mission requirements and fulfill the policy directives set forth in NSPD-66/HSPD-25 no later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act. [14]
Bridging the Resource Gap
How should the Coast Guard respond to the Congressional appropriators?
The complexities of the Arctic would allow anyone familiar with current issues in the region to quickly produce a lengthy list of action items. Arctic infrastructure requires upgrading, including improved air facilities, logistical support, charting, communications, navigational aids, environmental sensors, and forecasting capabilities, among others. Providing the assets and infrastructure would at first seem to be a huge investment.
But a single, cost-effective action would go far in filling the yawning Arctic capability gap: move forward with replacing the two obsolete U.S. polar icebreakers.
The capabilities inherent in an icebreaker—long endurance, the ability to move throughout ice-covered waters in all weathers, helicopters, boats, cargo space, extra berthing, and command, control and sensor capabilities—provide what is in effect a mobile Arctic base.
An on-scene icebreaker can respond to emergencies at sea and ashore, provide regulatory oversight of energy activities, monitor vessels near U.S. waters, facilitate scientific research, oversee and support oil spill responses, and exercise contingency plans with defense, local and international partners.
In short, a patrolling icebreaker would assert a visible and capable U.S. presence. Augmenting the ship with special teams or additional personnel would tailor the response specific situations demand. An on-scene icebreaker would address every one of the NSPD-66/HSPD-25 implementation policies.
It’s not as if this is a new or startling insight. Studies of icebreakers and polar issues have consistently recognized the need for recapitalizing U.S. icebreaker assets, including a comprehensive National Research Council study issued in 2007, which concluded, “…the nation continues to require a polar icebreaking fleet that includes a minimum of three multi-mission ships…” [15].
The more recent NRC study of climate change and naval forces concluded “Icebreakers provide important naval force capabilities” and recommended action to ensure the Coast Guard has these icebreaker capabilities [16].
A variety of other studies and reviews have examined the subject; none have come even remotely close to concluding that polar icebreakers are unnecessary or inappropriate to U.S. polar interests. All have indicated that the clock is running out on existing icebreaker capability.
What about the other end of the earth? The Antarctic lacks newsworthy Russian flag plantings and competition for energy resources. The remarkably stable Antarctic Treaty regime has set aside territorial claims and forestalled political conflict for more than 50 years, precipitated in large measure by U.S. leadership.
The effectiveness of this leadership is based—no surprise here—on the most active national presence on and around the Antarctic continent, enabled by the ability to conduct extensive air operations and support large numbers of scientific personnel. Icebreaking assistance for supply ships is the logistical key to the bulk of the U.S. Antarctic Program.
As is the case in the Arctic, U.S. Antarctic activities are also feeling the effects of “capabilities reluctance.” Coast Guard icebreakers supported the annual resupply effort in Antarctica every year since 1955. In 2005, however, the National Science Foundation elected to lease first a Russian and then a Swedish icebreaker for the job. This option has proven expedient, at least until the Swedish government indicated earlier this spring that recent harsh winters in the Baltic may require the Swedish ship to remain in home waters for the 2011-2012 season. Having neither Polar Star nor Polar Sea operationally ready for this unanticipated task, logistics for virtually the entire U.S. Antarctic Program are currently uncertain.
An End to Arctic Reluctance?
It is clearly time for the U.S. Arctic power to shed its reluctance and put some substance behind the substantial policy pronouncements. Despite the fact that government spending is currently under tremendous pressure, national interests in this rapidly transforming part of the world require investment, rather than continued disinvestment. Icebreakers are expensive ships, requiring strengthened hulls, powerful propulsion systems, endurance, and the ability to operate effectively in extreme environments.
But a pair of replacement icebreakers, replacing the unsupportable and expensive to operate Polar Star and Polar Sea would catapult the U.S. from a paper Arctic power to one with real capabilities, across the spectrum of national power. New, efficient, environmentally-compliant icebreakers would give the U.S. positive control of its Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea frontier—as well as the ability to sustain its Antarctic presence credibly.
Polar icebreakers represent a “Swiss Army knife” approach. In this case, a single versatile tool would be far cheaper than an elaborate tool chest of specialized but seldom-required implements.
The Coast Guard would be foolish to attempt to duplicate its lower-48 infrastructure of aircraft and boat stations, shore support facilities for larger vessels and special teams, and marine safety offices. Not only would these facilities be horrifically expensive to build on the shallow and eroding North Slope coastline underlain with slowly melting permafrost, but the seasonal nature of operational requirements won’t foreseeably require year-round, bricks-and-mortar facilities. Flexible capabilities that can act in the waterspace and move to the scene of the action are far better suited to the region.
As the House Appropriations Committee has recognized, ahead of the Executive Branch, it is time to move forward.
[1] National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-66 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-25, Arctic Region Policy, January 9, 2009.
[2] National Ocean Council, National Priority Objectives, Executive Order “Stewardship of the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes,” July 19, 2010.
[3] “Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic,” May 12, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org.
[4] “Joint Statement of the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Bering Srait Region,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, May 26, 2011.
[5] “NOAA: U.S. unprepared for changes in Arctic ice,” Renee Schoof, McClatchey Newspapers, June 20, 2011, www.miamiherald.com/2011/06/20/2276032/noaa-us-unprepared-for-changes.html
[6] “Arctic should be accessible to all,” Lyudmila Morozova, Voice of Russia, June 28, 2011, http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/06/28/52511043.html.
[7] “Arctic Maritime Transportation,” a briefing by RADM Christopher C. Colvin, USCG, February 25, 2011, www.institutenorth.org/assets/…/APF_Rear_Admiral_Christopher_Colvin.pdf
[8] “China’s Arctic Play,” by Gordon G. Chang, The Diplomat, March 9, 2010.
[9] “Canada to strengthen Arctic claim,” BBC News, August 10, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6941426.stm.
[10] Recent examples include “Coast Guard Commandant Makes Plea for More Arctic Resources,” Seapower, May 2011; “Coast Guard needs greater Arctic presence, admiral advises,” Gene Johnson, Associated Press, Anchorage Daily News, May 31, 2011.
[11] U.S. Coast Guard Strategic Approach, Commandant Instruction 16003.1, April 26, 2011.
[12] “With ship traffic rising, Coast Guard considers building an Arctic presence,” Alex DeMarban, The Arctic Sounder, May 21, 2011, www.thearcticsounder.com/article/1122with_ship_traffic_rising_coast_guard
[13] “House panel rips Coast Guard for red tape,” Christopher P. Cavas, Nay Times, June 27, 2011.
[14] 112th Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations Report 112-91, in explanation of the accompanying bill making appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2012.
[15] Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs, National Research Council, 2007.
[16] National Security Implications of Climate Change for U.S. Naval Forces, National Research Council, 2011.
07/06/2011 – The growing nuclear threat from the North Korea, the rising power of China, and the Obama administration’s policy of generally de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics has led some South Korean security experts to question the credibility of U.S. extended security guarantees to defend the Republic of Korea (ROK) from external threats by whatever means necessary.
Credit: Bigstock
The Koreans Remain at the Center of the Asian Security Dynamic
The backbone of these security guarantees, manifested most visibly in the deployment of sizeable U.S. conventional forces in the ROK as well as the bilateral mutual defense treaty between Seoul and Washington, was a U.S. commitment to defend the ROK with nuclear weapons if necessary. If South Koreans lose faith in the U.S. willingness or capacity to defend them, or they come to fear that potential foreign aggressors doubt the credibility of U.S. assurances, then South Koreans might pursue alternative security policies, including possibly seeking their own nuclear weapons, to increase their ability to deter external threats.
These issues of nuclear deterrence and reassurance in the Koreas occupied a major part of the discussion during the first Asan Plenum, which met in Seoul from June 12-15. The Asan Institute for Policy Studies plans for this to become an annual event at which representatives of the world’s leading think tanks meet in South Korea to discuss one of the world’s most important challenges. The goal is for the dialogue to then influence the policies of the world’s governments towards the issue.
Earlier articles in the Second Line of Defense have noted how issues of strategic reassurance also concern U.S. allies in Europe and the Middle East as well as Japan, Taiwan, and other East Asian countries.
Chung Mong-joon, the main shareholder of Hyundai Heavy Industries, is the Asan Institute’s principal benefactor. Asan is the name of the village in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from which the founder of the Hyundai empire, Chung Ju-yung, fled southward when he was 18 years old to the Republic of Korea (ROK). Chung Mong-joon has served for many years in the ROK National Assembly and is seen as a potential presidential aspirant.
Credit: Bigstock
Reassuring South Korea Requires Re-Commitment to US Power Projection Forces
This year’s plenum addressed “Our Nuclear Future.” It aimed to provide “a much needed comprehensive reassessment of safety and security issues which have crucial implications for our nuclear future.” Several hundred leading nuclear scientists, engineers, policy experts, and public intellectuals attended. In addition to several plenary sessions, a series of concurrent panels, organized by an individual think tank, focused in greater depth on a particular subject of interest. Since the think tanks that organized this year’s inaugural plenum were mostly based in the United States, most of the participants were American citizens or working at a U.S. research institute.
How to help South Koreans deal with the threatening nuclear weapons ambitions of their northern neighbor occupied a major part of the discussion. The DPRK has detonated two nuclear explosive devices already and is aiming to make nuclear warheads that can be launched on North Korea’s improving ballistic missile capacities.The DPRK’s threatening behavior has affected East Asian regional security in many dimensions, including by calling into question U.S. security guarantees to Japan and South Korea as well as the regional security policies of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC). The discussion made clear that there was no silver bullet that could overcome this reassurance angst.
The South Korean presenters cited several reasons for their belief that U.S. extended deterrence guarantees had become less credible during the last two decades. These include:
the withdrawal of the American troops that had been stationed along the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where they had served as a trip-wire ensuring that any North Koreas cross-border incursions would meet a U.S. response, to below the Han River;
the reduction in the overall number of U.S. troops based in the ROK as well as the number of joint U.S.-ROK exercises;
the allocation of new missions for the U.S. Forces in Korea that lead them to focus on other security issues besides defending the ROK from the DPRK (and which threaten to drag the ROK into third-party disputes unrelated to the Korean dispute);
the end of the integrated U.S.-ROK wartime command and the transfer of many previous U.S. operational responsibilities to ROK forces;
periodic U.S. interest in offering security commitments to the DPRK that appear to neglect ROK security priorities;
South Korean concerns that the United States is most interested in containing the DPRK nuclear program through measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative rather than insisting on its elimination; and
unease at Washington’s periodic practice of outsourcing its North Korean policy to Beijing; and
the preoccupation of the Pentagon and other U.S. national security leaders with other seemingly more important security issues (non-state terrorism) and regions (the Middle East).
Credit: Bigstock
Seeking the Ability to Not Need More War Memorials
A more recent concern is the stated commitment of the Obama administration to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign and defense policies. In particular, the April 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) modifies U.S. conditional negative security assurances to state that: “The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.” If North Korea were to abandon its nuclear weapons and join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), then the United States would pledge not to use its nuclear weapons to defend South Korea from a DPRK attack even if the North employed what are considered to be strong asymmetric military capabilities such as chemical and biological weapons, forward-deployed artillery, short-range missiles, and special force units.
The doubts became so strong in recent years that President Lee Myung-bak requested that the Obama administration provide written reassurances about the U.S. nuclear commitment to defend South Korea.
The administration did so but also took plains to emphasize in its public statements its security assurances to U.S. friends and allies in East Asia. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates went out of his way to stress the enduring U.S. commitment to Asian security when he spoke at this June’s Shangri-la defense dialogue. Still, last year’s North Korean shelling of Yeonpyong Island reminded South Koreans that they live under constant threat. The incident represented the first direct attack on ROK territory by the DPRK regularly military since the 1950-53 Korean War.In principle, effective missile defenses could help assure some U.S. allies, such as NATO’s members in Europe, about U.S. extended deterrence guarantees. But certain circumstances make missile defenses somewhat less useful in the case of South Korea, even though the kind of short-range missiles the DPRK could employ to strike the ROK are easier to intercept than the longer-range missiles used by Russia, China, and probably soon Iran.
Credit: Bigstock
Outsouring North Korean Policy to Bejing Can Have Unwanted Consequences
First, the DPRK has a large number of these short-range missiles that could hit targets in the ROK. South Korea would need an enormous number of interceptor rockets to destroy these incoming missiles as well as extensive command and control facilities. This challenge can be contrasted with the missile defense situation facing the United States, which in the next decade will at worst need to track and intercept a few long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles, which due to their lengthy flight time can be shot at multiple times.
Second, the DPRK can easily attack the ROK through a variety of means given their proximity. Not only is Seoul within closer range of DPRK artillery, but the DPRK has developed and practices the capacity to deploy commandos by land (through tunnels) or by sea (with the help of submarines).
Third, the ROK’s joining an integrated missile defense architecture that included the United States and Japan might alarm China and Russia that the BMD coalition members were seeking to negate their strategic deterrence.
Another possible means of reassuring allies would be to return U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. The United States withdrew its small battlefield nuclear weapons from the ROK in late 1991 when the North and South Korea were finalizing their “joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.”The United States clearly has superior nuclear and conventional forces to those of the DPRK, but many South Koreans doubt whether the United States really would respond to a nuclear attack on Seoul with a retaliatory strike against Pyongyang, especially if the DPRK might respond by attacking U.S. forces in Japan, or even striking the U.S. homeland directly, with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.If the U.S. forces were already in the ROK, however, the North Korean leadership might be more deterred since the weapons would be more visible and could more plausibly be fired, perhaps inadvertently, following a DPRK attack.The North Koreans would be even more credibly deterred if the ROK possessed its own nuclear weapons since the South Korean government and military would be even more inclined to retaliate to a nuclear attack against its population or territory.
Some South Koreans have become frustrated about the failure of the Six-Party Talks and other efforts to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program and see having their own nuclear weapons as “an equalizer” to allow Seoul to negotiate with Pyongyang about Korean denuclearization from a position of equality and without having to adopt an aggressive conventional preemption doctrine against the DPRKAdvocates of either variant hope that plans to return nuclear weapons to the ROK, regardless of whether they were American or South Korean, would function like the 1979 NATO decision to upgrade the alliance’s intermediate-range nuclear forces and result in a two-track process that would see North Korea, with strong encouragement from Beijing, eliminate its nuclear weapons rather than accept a ROK-based nuclear deterrent.
But the ROK’s neighbors would not welcome a return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the Peninsula or South Korea’s acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent, with Beijing most likely to object to the move since any nuclear weapons based in South Korea that could attack targets in North Korea would most likely be able to hit targets in the PRC as well. For that very reason, however, some have floated the idea as a means to frighten the Chinese to increase their pressure on North Korea to restrain its nuclear ambitions and other threatening activities to avert such a ROK response. South Koreans, Americans, Japanese and others have also sought to exploit Chinese fears that North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities will lead Japan and perhaps even Taiwan to acquire missile defenses and nuclear weapons in response. At the Plenum, Former ROK Prime Minister Lee Hong-koo warned that, “China should come back to reality.” He explained that, “If the firing range of North Korea’s missiles are far enough to reach Japan and if those missiles are armed with nuclear warheads then there is a chance Japan would develop nuclear weapons of its own.”
Still, the expectation is that none of these countries would make the controversial decision to pursue their own nuclear deterrents as long as they felt reassured that the United States will protect them. In the past, U.S. officials managed to end the clandestine nuclear weapons programs of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea by warning them the United States could respond by annulling its pledges to defend them with U.S. nuclear weapons. Another proposal was to delay beyond 2015, or reduce the envisaged size of, the OPCOM transfer from U.S. Forces Korea to the ROK armed forces. While the Americans see the move as upgrading the ROK’s status and underscoring U.S. confidence in the ROK’s improving military capabilities, many South Koreans interpret the move as reflecting American eagerness to reduce its ROK-related commitments to reallocate U.S. defense resources to higher security priorities.
There was also some interest in resuming, at least for a while, the large-scale joint U.S.-ROK military exercises that marked the Reagan administration. These included the massive Team Spirit exercise as well as smaller-sized drills such as Key Resolve, Eagle, and Ulji Focus. The Pentagon has also been developing a range of conventional and non-kinetic strike weapons that could allow for precise measured retaliation for DPRK provocations, though these capabilities must be exercised cautiously in the case of the explosive and unpredictable DPRK regime.A different line of thought was that the United States should adopt a less confrontational stand regarding South Korea’s proposal to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel. The ROK relies on domestic nuclear power for almost 40 percent of its growing residential, public, and commercial electricity requirements.
The problem is that, due to public opposition to constructing a massive high-level nuclear waste repository in their densely populated country, the ROK nuclear industry is running out of secure storage space for its spent nuclear fuel and other intensely radioactive byproducts. For this reason, the ROK wants to “reprocess” this spent fuel—separating the useful uranium and plutonium from the reactor waste products—to reduce these storage requirements.But a 1974 civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, which expires in 2014, prohibits the ROK from engaging in plutonium reprocessing or uranium enrichment without U.S. government approval. The American negotiators are resisting ROK pressure for such approval for fear it would encourage the DPRK to insist on its right to have uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies, which can be used to make fissile material for nuclear weapons. It is possible that ROK-U.S. collaboration regarding next year’s nuclear security summit in Seoul would help overcome these tensions.
As one of the Coast Guard’s newest assets, the national security cutters bring operational capabilities the fleet needs for mission success. Compass has asked the wardroom of Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf, the service’s first NSC, to share their unique perspective on how the fleet’s newest class of cutters will perform in the world’s most challenging operating environments, and this week’s update comes from the ship’s commanding officer, Capt. John Prince. You can also also stop by Coast Guard Alaska for the view from the deck plate, focusing on Bertholf’s day to day operations that make their missions a success.
Written by Capt. John Prince, commanding officer, Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf.
Greetings from the Bering Sea. We’ve been underway for more than a month on the first Alaska patrol for a national security cutter, and I can say it has been a truly impressive performance by the ship and our crew.
We’ve experienced 20-foot seas and winds in excess of 60 knots with temperatures below freezing, and despite these sea conditions the ship has remained within pitch and roll limits to launch our helicopter. We have been able to make a comfortable 12 to 15 knots through the water in seas up to 14 feet, validating the sea keeping and stability of the NSC and our ability to respond quickly to any emergency.
Our 12,000 nautical mile range at economical speed, and 8,000 nautical mile range at a speed of 14 knots has allowed us to remain at sea for more than 24 days at a time and cover large swaths of the ocean with our sensors and helicopter, while still maintaining a fuel reserve in the event of emergency.
Keeping our stability well within safe limits without concern over low fuel levels, our installed ballast tanks help us to better preserve and protect the marine environment as we are not ballasting tanks that previously held fuel like on the 378-foot high endurance cutter.
Our boarding teams have conducted close to 20 safe and effective fisheries law enforcement boardings in seas up to eight feet, on vessels ranging from 58 feet to more than 200 feet, ensuring the fishing fleet is safe and earning their living in accordance with U.S. rules and regulations. Our helicopter has conducted more than a dozen flights observing the fishing fleet and remains at the ready for medevac and provisioning.
When most folks think of ALPAT they immediately have visions of rough weather, bitter cold and dramatic rescues as captured on the “Deadliest Catch.” That certainly is a part of this mission, but by no means captures its depth and scope.
ALPAT is a 365 days a year national sovereignty, economic security, living marine resource protection and search and rescue mission that encompasses hundreds of thousands of square miles of the North Pacific and Arctic Ocean, thousands of miles of coastline and hundreds of marine sanctuaries and other protected areas.
As the long maritime arm of the Department of Homeland Security, we guard our international maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones responding to incursions by foreign fishing vessels and others who should not be in our waters to ensure the security of our homeland and protection of our natural resources.
In partnership with other federal, state tribal and local agencies, we ensure that fishing activities are conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations that not only govern how fishing is conducted, but also where, when and how much fish can be harvested to ensure a sustainable fish population that is vital to our national and economic security.
More than 60 percent of the United States’ commercial seafood harvests come from Alaska, with more than five billion pounds of fish and shellfish harvested annually. The resources we are protecting are extremely valuable and as we have seen in other countries, once the stocks are depleted the fish don’t return. We patrol and observe Stellar sea lion rookeries and other critical marine habitats and preservation areas to protect and preserve endangered species and the natural beauty of Alaska. And, as seen on TV, we battle oftentimes harsh sea conditions to safeguard our fellow citizens from the perils of the sea and one of the most dangerous U.S. professions – commercial fishing.
This is no easy task, and it takes a highly capable ship and crew, equipped with the right tools, command and control systems, onboard sensors, information exchange and weapons systems. The ship must be able to get on scene quickly, maintain continuous presence for extended periods, monitor the areas with sensors and carry out the mission using a variety of tools such as small boats and helicopters. And it must be able to do all these things in both fair and foul weather.
From what I have observed on this patrol, and during previous patrols on Bertholf as far south as South America, the national security cutter is that ship and more. And as our fleet of high endurance cutters that diligently conducted this mission for the past four decades are retired, the national security cutter will be the right ship in the Coast Guard fleet to safely and effectively carry out these missions.
It is truly exhilarating as a sailor and cutterman to see what this optimally crewed ship is capable of – fast, quiet, a good ride, environmentally friendly, top notch sensors, weapons systems and communications suite, a huge and stable flight deck, interoperable with Department of Defense and other partners.
Just recently, we demonstrated U.S. capabilities and commitment to preserving the balance in the Arctic region when we worked with our Russian partners. They were impressed with the high morale and quality of life enjoyed by our crew from berthing areas to the exercise facility to our galley – which was recently selected as the dining facility of the year in the large afloat category for its quality and efficiency. Other than good weather and calm seas, there is not much more I could ask for.
We are learning new and more efficient ways to do things each and every day, and the contributions the national security cutter is making to the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security and our nation will only grow as the days go by. We look forward to continued adventures and success standing a taut watch on the Northern Front, and will share those stories with you as they unfold.
Capt. John Prince is commanding officer of Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf. This is his eighth afloat tour and sixth afloat command. Prior to Bertholf, Prince commanded Coast Guard Cutter Jarvis, a 378-foot high endurance cutter, and completed three Alaska patrols with that ship and crew. He has 26 years of service and more than 16 years afloat on seven different classes of Coast Guard cutters.
Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute.
His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia, and East Asia as well as U.S. foreign and defense policies.
Dr. Weitz also is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), where he overseas case study research, and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), where he contributes to various defense projects.
Before joining Hudson, Dr. Weitz worked for the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Defense Science Board, DFI International, Inc., the Center for Strategic Studies, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, and the U.S. Department of Defense. Dr. Weitz is a graduate of Harvard College (B.A. with Highest Honors in Government), the London School of Economics (M.Sc. in International Relations), Oxford University (M.Phil. in Politics), and Harvard University (Ph.D. in Political Science). He is proficient in Russian, French, and German.
Dr. Weitz has published in such journals as The National Interest, The Washington Quarterly, NATO Review, Global Asia, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Defense Concepts, Pacific Focus, Small Wars Journal, Political Science Quarterly, Jane’s Intelligence Review, and The Journal of Strategic Studies.
His commentaries have appeared in the International Herald Tribune, Baltimore Sun, The Guardian, Christian Science Monitor, Washington Times, Wall Street Journal (Europe), Middle East Times, and many Internet-based publications such as those of the WashingtonPost.com and World Politics Review, where he is Senior Editor.
Dr. Weitz has appeared on the BBC, CNN, C-SPAN, PBS, ABC, FOX, MSNBC, VOA, UK Channel 4, ITN, France 24, CBC, CTV, ARD, KSA, Al-Hurra, Al-Jazeera, Al-Alam, PressTV, Pacifica Radio, and additional broadcast media. He has delivered numerous presentations at conferences, panels, and other events.
Dr. Weitz has published or edited several books and monographs, including Global Security Watch-Russia (Praeger Security International, 2009); a volume of National Security Case Studies (Project on National Security Reform; 2008); China-Russia Security Relations (Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, 2008); Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008); Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis (Praeger Security International, 2008); The Reserve Policies of Nations: A Comparative Analysis (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007); and Revitalising US–Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005).
He travels globally and his insights are based in part on his findings based on traveling to Asia, Europe and Russia and discussing evolving strategic trends with a wide range of global leaders.
07/04/2011 – The cases from Part I show the connectivity among these disparate groups operating along different geographic parts of the overall criminal-terrorist pipeline. Rather than operating in isolation, these groups have complicated but significant interaction[s] with each other, based primarily on the ability of each actor or set of actors to provide a critical service to another, while profiting mutually from the transactions. Many of the groups operate in what have traditionally been called “ungoverned” or “stateless regions.” However, in many of these cases, the groups worked directly with the government or have become the de facto governing force in the areas they occupy.
(Credit: Bigstock)
This recognition of alternatively governed (non-state) regions is an important shift from the traditional ways of looking at stateless areas and serves as a prism that provides a useful way of understanding such regions and the interconnected threat that they pose to the Homeland.
There are traditional categories for measuring state performance developed by Rotberg and others in the wake of state failures at the end of the Cold War. The general premise is that that “Nation-states fail because they are convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goods to their inhabitants.”[1]
These traditional categories of states are:
Strong, or able to control its territory and offer quality political goods to its people;
Weak, or filled with social tensions, and the state possessing a limited monopoly on the use of force;
Failed, or in a state of conflict, with a predatory ruler and no state monopoly on the use of force;
Collapsed, having no functioning state institutions and a vacuum of authority.[2]
This conceptualization, while useful, is limited. Of more use is viewing those alternatively governed spaces as existing “where territorial state control has been voluntarily or involuntarily ceded in whole or part to actors other than the relevant legally recognized sovereign authorities.”[3]
It is important to note that the “ungoverned” regions under discussion, as implied in the definition above, while out of the direct control of a state government, are not truly “ungoverned spaces.”
In fact, non-state actors exercise a significant degree of control over the regions, and that control may occasionally be contested by state forces. The underlying concepts of positive and negative sovereignty developed by Robert H. Jackson are useful in this discussion because the concept gives a useful lens to examine the role of the state in specific parts of its national territory.[4]
These regions, in fact, are governed by non-state actors who have, through force or popular support (or a mixture of both) been able to impose their decisions and norms, creating alternate power structures that directly challenge the state, often in the absence of the state. The Federation of American Scientists refers to these groups as “para-state actors.”[5] Regardless of the terminology, the absence of state presence or a deeply corrupted state presence should not be construed as a lack of a functioning government.
This definition allows for a critical distinction, still relatively undeveloped in current literature, between states where the government has little or no power in certain areas and may be fighting to assert that control, and states where the government in fact has a virtual monopoly on power and the use of force, but turns the state into a functioning criminal enterprise for the benefit of a small elite.
The latter is similar to the concept of a “captured state” developed by Phil Williams,[6] but differs in important ways. “Captured states” are taken hostage by criminal organizations, often through intimidation and threats, giving the criminal enterprise access to some parts of the state apparatus. A criminal state, however, counts on the integration of the state’s leadership into the criminal enterprise and the use of state facilities (aircraft registries, the facilitation of passports and diplomatic status on members of the criminal enterprise, accounts in the central bank, End User Certificates to acquire weapons etc.).
A further variation of the criminal state occurs when a functioning state essentially turns over or franchises out part of its territory to non-state groups to carry out their own agenda with the blessing and protection of the central government or a regional power. Both state and non-state actors share in the profits and proceeds from the resulting criminal activity.
Both of these models, but particularly the model of states franchising out their territory to non-state actors, are growing in Latin America, through the sponsorship of the “Bolivarian Revolution” (led by Hugo Chávez of Venezuela and including Evo Morales of Bolivia, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua) of non-state armed groups. While this will be addressed at some length further on, the principal criminal activity providing the revenues is cocaine trafficking and the most important (but not sole) recipient of state sponsorship is the FARC.
The traditional 4-tier categorization suffers from another significant omission. The model presupposes that “stateless regions” are largely confined within the borders of a single state. This is, in reality, hardly ever the case. Alternatively governed spaces generally overlap into several states because of the specific advantages offered by border regions.
The definition of a geographic “black hole” provided by Korteweg and Ehrhardt is useful in conceptualizing the use of border regions and the downward spirals they can generate in multiple states without causing the collapse of any of them:
A black hole is a geographic entity where, due to the absent or ineffective exercise of state governance, criminal and terrorist elements can deploy activities in support of, or otherwise directly relating to criminal or terrorist acts, including the act itself.[7]
For example, Latin America is almost absent from leading indexes of failed states. This is in large part because the indexes are state-centric and not designed to look at regions that spill over across several borders but do not cause any one state to collapse. For example, only Colombia (ranked 41) and Bolivia (ranked 51) are among the top 60 countries in the Foreign Policy Magazine and Fund For Peace 2009 Failed State Index.[8] Yet the governability of certain areas in the border regions of Mexico, Guatemala and Belize; the Rio San Miguel border region between Ecuador and Colombia; the Guajira Peninsula on the Venezuela-Colombia border; most of the border regions of Central America; and many other regions clearly qualifies them “black holes.”
(Credit: Bigstock)
This proliferation of black holes in border regions can be explained by examining the advantages offered by such regions.
As Kortewg and Ehrhardt state, terrorists (and the same thing is true for transnational criminal organizations) “seek out the soft spots, the weak seams of the Westphalian nation-state and the international order that it has created. Sometimes the territory’s boundaries coincide with the entire territory of a state, as with Somalia, but mostly this is not the case. Traditional weak spots, like border areas are more likely. Terrorist (and criminal) organizations operate on the fringes of this Westphalian system, in the grey areas of territoriality.”[9]
A 2001 Naval War College paper insightfully described some of the reasons for the occurrence of cross-border black holes in terms of “commercial” and “political” insurgencies. These are applicable to organized criminal groups as well and have grown in importance since then:
The border zones offer obvious advantages for political and economic insurgencies.
Political insurgents prefer to set up in adjacent territories that are poorly integrated, while the commercial insurgents favor active border areas, preferring to blend in amid business and government activity and corruption. The border offers a safe place to the political insurgent and easier access to communications, weapons, provisions, transport, and banks.
For the commercial insurgency, the frontier creates a fluid, trade-friendly environment. Border controls are perfunctory in “free trade” areas, and there is a great demand for goods that are linked to smuggling, document fraud, illegal immigration, and money laundering.
For the political insurgency, terrain and topography often favor the narco-guerilla. Jungles permit him to hide massive bases and training camps, and also laboratories, plantations, and clandestine runways. The Amazon region, huge and impenetrable, is a clear example of the shelter that the jungle areas give. On all of Colombia’s borders—with Panama, Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela—jungles cloak illegal activity.[10]
In parts of Guatemala and along much of the U.S.-Mexico border, these criminal groups have directly and successfully challenged the state’s sovereignty and established governing mechanisms of their own, relying on violence, corruption and largesse to maintain control. As the 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:
A serious impediment to growth in Latin America remains the power of criminal gangs and drug cartels to corrupt, distort, and damage the region’s potential. The fact that criminal organizations and cartels are capable of building dozens of disposable submarines in the jungle and then using them to smuggle cocaine, indicates the enormous economic scale of this activity. This poses a real threat to the national security interests of the Western Hemisphere. In particular, the growing assault by the drug cartels and their thugs on the Mexican government over the past several years reminds one that an unstable Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States.[11]
Control of broad swaths of land – increasingly including urban territory – by these non-state groups facilitates the movements of illegal products both northward and southward through the transcontinental pipeline, often through routes that appear to make little economic or logistical sense.
While the Venezuela-West Africa-Europe cocaine route seems circuitous when looking at a map, there are, in fact, economic and logistical rationales for the shift in drug trafficking patterns. West Africa offered significant comparative advantages – transiting illegal products through the region has been, until very recently, virtually risk free. Many countries in the region are still recovering from the horrendous violence of the resource wars that ravaged the region in the 1990s through the early years of this century.
The fragile governments, immersed in corruption and with few functioning law enforcement or judicial structures, are simply no match for the massive influx of drugs and the accompanying financial resources and violence. Guinea Bissau, the former Portuguese colony, has been dubbed Africa’s first “narco-state,” and the consequences have been devastating. Dueling drug gangs have assassinated the president, the army chief of staff and other senior officials while plunging the nation into chaos.[12]
In addition to state weakness, West Africa also offers the advantage of having long-standing smuggling networks or illicit pipelines to move products to the world market, be they conflict diamonds, illegal immigrants, massive numbers of weapons or conflict timber. Those controlling these already-established smuggling pipelines have found it relatively easy and very profitable to absorb another lucrative product, such as cocaine, that requires little additional effort to move. In addition, there is a long history in West Africa of rival groups, or at least groups with no common agenda except for the desire for economic gain, to make deals when such contacts are viewed as mutually beneficial.[13]
In order to illustrate how criminal and terrorist networks operate for mutual benefit in a criminalized state consider two related cases that shed light on the relationship among different actors in such an environment.[14]
[1] See for example see Robert I. Rotberg, “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators,” Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., January 2003.
[3] Anne L. Clunan, Harold A. Trinkunas et al, Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 3.
[4] Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge University Press, 1990. Jackson defines negative sovereignty as freedom from outside interference, the ability of a sovereign state to act independently, both in its external relations and internally, towards its people. Positive sovereignty is the acquisition and enjoyment of capacities, not merely immunities. In Jackson’s definition, it presupposes “capabilities which enable governments to be their own masters” (p. 29). The absence of either type of sovereignty can lead to the collapse of or absence of state control.
[5] The FAS lists 385 para state actors across the globe, accessible at: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/index.html
[6] See Bill Lahneman and Matt Lewis, “Summary of Proceedings: Organized Crime and the Corruption of State Institutions,” University of Maryland, Nov. 18, 2002, viewed at: http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/organizedcrime.pdf
[7] Rem Korteweg and David Ehrhardt, “Terrorist Black Holes: A Study into Terrorist Sanctuaries and Governmental Weakness,” Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague, November 2005, p. 26.
[8] “The Failed State Index,” Foreign Policy Magazine, July/August 2009, pp. 80-93, accessible at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.
[10] Julio A. Cirino et al, “Latin America’s Lawless Areas and Failed States,” Latin American Security Challenges (Paul D. Taylor, editor), Naval War College Newport Papers 21, 2001.Commercial insurgencies are defined as engaging in “for-profit organized crime without a predominate political agenda,” leaving unclear how that differs from groups defined as organized criminal organizations.
[11] “Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force.” United States Joint Forces Command, Nov. 25, 2008, p. 34.
[12] Author interviews with U.S. law enforcement officials and: James Traub, “Africa’s Drug Problem,” New York Times Magazine, April 9, 2010.
[13] For an excellent case study of this issue see: Lansana Gberie, War and Peace in Sierra Leone: Diamonds, Corruption and the Lebanese Connection, The Diamond and Human Security Project, Partnership Africa Canada, Occasional Paper 6, January 2003.
07/03/2011: During the Paris Air Show, MBDA provided a venue for a presentation by RAF Tornado pilots on their operations in the Libyan theater. Two RAF pilots presented findings on the Tornado and use of precision weapons in the Libyan case. Both were from 9 Squadron: RAF Marham. The first presenter was Flight Lt. Mark Lawson (Pilot) and Flight Lt. James Cooke (Weapons Systems Officer).
Two-man crews operate the Tornado, with the pilot in the rear operating the weapons systems. The first squadron of Tornado operated first in 1982. The Tornados operated in the longest strike UK operation since World War II. The initial strikes operated from the UK and involved three air refueling en route to Libyan targets. They also operated a mixed formations whereby the Eurofighter operated with the Tornados on some of the operations. According to the RAF pilots, the Eurofighter provided the situational awareness, which the Tornado lacked.
The Storm Shadow cruise missile was used as the initial strike weapon and had a very high level of success and hits on targets. The Brimstone was used as well in follow up operations in destroying Libyan armor. This was the first operation in which the UK used the ASRAAM missile. The AIM-132 Advanced Short Range Air-to-Air Missile is an infrared homing (“heat seeking”) air-to-air missile, produced by MBDA. It is currently in service in the Royal Air Force and Royal Australian Air Force, replacing the AIM-9 Sidewinder in those services.Target sets included air, armor, garrisons, surface to air missiles. Their key role was battlefield air interdiction or BAI. And the typical load carried by the Tornado included mixes of LITENING targeting pod, Paveway IVs, Brimistone missiles, an integral gun, ASRAAMs, Storm Shadow, and counter-measure pods. The Brimstone was the weapon of the choice for urban targets in the operation.
The Reconnaissance Load Out highlighted a RAPTOR (Reconnaissance Airborne Pod TORnado) Pod. This a reconnaissance pod used by the Royal Air Force on its fleet of Tornado GR.4A and GR.4 aircraft. RAPTOR is manufactured by the Goodrich Corporation.The RAPTOR contains a DB-110 reconnaissance sensor, an imagery data recording system and an air-to-ground data link system. The sensor is electro-optical and infrared, allowing day or night missions. The data link allows imagery to be exploited almost instantly.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RAPTOR
Obviously, there was a mix and match capability for the weapons on the aircraft, dependent upon the planned target set. This meant in effect shifting from use of Storm Shadow early in the operation to increased reliance upon the Brimstone for urban operations. And also it was clear that collateral damage limitations were an important constraint shaping precision strike operations.
07/02/2011: During the Paris Air Show, Second Line of Defense talked with Experimental Test Pilot Hervé Jammayrac of Eurocopter. Jammayrac provided an update on the aircraft and the test program. In many ways, the new helicopter was a star at the airshow, bereft of many new flying aircraft.
The X Cubed has been designed to be a low cost solution to a high-speed helicopter. Given Eurocopter’s pole position in the oil and gas industry, the new helicopter should clearly be a key player in this marketspace. The reliance on power by hour contracts in this business means as well that a lower cost solution to high speed is important as well. And given a solid base in this industry, Eurocopter can go on to market to security and military services. Another potential might be operating on smaller ships in the future as well, perhaps even including the LCS.
Currently, the test aircraft is using a Dauphin airframe with NH-90 engines in addition to the turboprops. But Jammayrac indicated that Eurocopter might well look to a larger airframe for the production model.Another aspect of the interview was how the test pilots are linked into the development process. As Jammayrac underscored:
That’s a way to get a very deep knowledge of the aircraft because you know precisely how it was built. And from that, you are able — you know the limits very easily, so it makes flying the aircraft a lot more efficient.
SLD: Could you describe how the helicopter basically works? And basically it is a helicopter?
Hervé Jammayrac: This aircraft is a helicopter. And that, I think, is the key point for us. Then we wanted to go faster. How can we go faster? We are limited on a conventional helicopter because you have to tilt the rotor, and you have also the problem of an advancing blade that becomes trans sonic. So to overcome these two problems, the idea is to fly level. Zero incidents, flat pitch so you have a reduced drag, and then the propulsion.
You need to bring the propulsion in another way, so that’s why we have installed these two propellers in order to be able to create this forward thrust. That’s the general principle. In order to accelerate, because of this advancing blade becoming trans sonic we have to reduce the rotor speed. Since we reduce rotor speed, we lose some lift, and then that’s where we have the wings that comes into play and the wings are going to get, let’s say, about 40 percent of the lift at cruise speed; forty percent of the lift at cruise speed is provided by the wings.
Everything is linked together. You have the main gearbox. We have the two engines that are running the main gearbox, and then you have the two propellers that are also connected to the gearbox. Imagine, for example, on a conventional helicopter, you have the tail rotor, you have a shaft connecting to the tail, so we have removed this, and we have put it on the side, and we have both of them. Overall, we are able to do some anti-torque with differential pitch on the propellers, and the same controls are also giving us the thrust in forward flight.
SLD: We have flown the Osprey and a key element of flying the Osprey is the transition from vertical to horizontal operations. How does this bird work?
Hervé Jammayrac: That’s an interesting question because there is a very fundamental difference. It’s a lot simpler because you have no transition. You have always available both controls. In hover, you are hovering like a helicopter. When you want to accelerate, there is a dedicated control, which controls longitudinal acceleration or deceleration. And so you just accelerate, and that’s it. And if you want to decelerate in the flight, you decelerate. And once you need to compensate for the descent, you have the corrective. So you cannot stall. That’s a huge difference. In my opinion, it’s even simpler than flying a conventional helicopter where you have to do constant pitch change.
SLD: What is the top speed, which you have flown so far?
Hervé Jammayrac: We have flown at 232 knots in flight.
SLD: What is your background in flying helos?
Hervé Jammayrac: I’m a test pilot. I’ve been flying, let’s see, I don’t know how many different types of helicopters, probably around 30 types of different helicopters.
SLD: What was the most pleasant surprise from your point of view looking at this? It’s a strange animal.
Hervé Jammayrac: Where we were really surprised was by the capacity of climb and descent, and this capacity also to accelerate and decelerate. This is quite new feeling. And you see that in the flight demonstration at the Air Show, being able to climb at 60 knot and 50 degrees slope and maintain this flight condition as long as we want.
On a commercial aircraft, you would not be climbing at this kind of slope, but the capacity to climb very quite fast from your takeoff altitude to your cruise altitude is interesting in terms of fuel flow setting, because you can be in three minutes at your cruise altitude for example. So that’s interesting. This is totally unique. Even in the cockpit, you feel that as something being different.And this climbing capacity for the military is also very interesting because, for example, imagine you’re picking up some people on the ground, and you want to get out of the area as far as possible.
SLD: Is the technology used on the aircraft in house technology and parts?
Hervé Jammayrac: It is except for the turbo prop propellers. They are made by a well-known German company and are made out of wood. It is a natural composite, and for propellers, it’s one of the best materials that you use.
SLD: What tests are you running next?
Hervé Jammayrac: We have not, I would say, expanded the flight envelope totally. Now we want to check for lateral maneuverability and stuff like that. But from what we’ve seen so far, it’s just a question of gathering the data.
Credit: Bigstock
