SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

Developments in Pirate Trends and Tactics

Posted on April 1, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

04/01/2011

By Karsten Von Hoesslin, Senior Analyst, Risk Intelligence

Strategic Insights, No. 28 (November 2010)

04/01/2011 – Evidenced in other parts of the world, particularly in South East Asia, piracy that adapts to countermeasures and re-strategizes is always the most effective. Somali pirates have proven to be no different in terms of ingenuity and tactical adjustment in order to increase their rate of return.

Creeping half way into the late transitional period of 2010, it appears that the map of piracy incidents is just as littered with failed and successful attacks as compared to the previous year.

However, there has been an obvious shift in regional attack patterns: to the south, a new active zone is emerging, which is hugging the Kenyan and Tanzanian coasts and creeping towards the Mozambique Channel. In the north, attacks are stretching beyond the group transit collection point to the top of the Arabian Sea and as far east as India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

During the summer monsoon period as the Red Sea was being littered with suspicious activity reports and false alarms, Risk Intelligence forecasted that one of the new emerging areas for increased incidents would be nearing the Mozambique Channel and to the north in the Arabian Sea past the collection point for the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).

Although pirates will increasingly need to adjust to both anti-piracy (shipboard) and counter-piracy (naval coalition) activities if they want to be successful, it appears that they are unwilling to raise the stakes within high traffic areas such as the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin to challenge the naval operations.

Therefore, for the time being, pirates will choose to avoid naval engagements and search for less dangerous hunting grounds such as to the south and further north in the Arabian Sea. This is a common trend that was evidenced in both the Niger Delta and in South East Asia. In Nigeria, attacks increased dramatically outside of the Bonny River, namely offshore from the Bonny Fairway Buoy where escorts typically began.

In South East Asia, incidents decreased in the Malacca Strait, due to the trilateral patrols by the littoral states, but increased in both the Singapore Strait and to the east in the southern South China Sea. It is only natural that a similar pattern will be seen off the Horn of Africa when naval coalitions have created a far better maritime domain awareness compared to 2007.

Counter-piracy: High end.

Horn of Arica

Horn of Africa piracy, despite its ingenuity, is a relatively simplistic challenge to modern navies and merchant vessels with access to the most sophisticated anti-piracy gadgets. However, despite their simplicity, disrupting (let alone apprehending) pirates is not as easy as it looks.

In addition to reinforcing bolder counter-piracy strategies, an immense amount of hardware is being poured into the region, making surface vessels merely one of multiple tools available in the campaign. As the last transitional period witnessed the introduction of the Landing Ship Transport Dock (LPD) that successfully interdicted pirate skiffs off the Somali shores before they even left territorial waters, this transitional period has welcomed both new aerial and sub-surface assets.

The first major step was enhancing the role of Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA). Although this is not a new development within this season, deploying them and increasing their integration is. Initially deployed by France, Spain, Luxembourg, Japan, and soon-to-be Singapore, the MPRAs have played a key role in identifying pirate action groups (PAGs) out in the Indian Ocean as well as in the Gulf of Aden. In addition to guiding surface assets to the scene, the MPRAs are able to broadcast an advisory within a 130 nautical mile surface area, warning ships and alerting the pirates (if they possess VHF equipment) that they have been spotted.

Somali pirates in small boats were able to hijack the MV Faina, a Belize-flagged cargo ship owned and operated by ‘Kaalbye Shipping Ukraine.” The ship was carrying a cargo of Ukrainian T-72 tanks and related equipment. It had no on board security when it was attacked on Sept. 25, 2008, and was forced to proceed to an anchorage off the Somali Coast. (Credit: US Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs)

The next asset introduced in the counter-piracy campaign was the submarine. Despite at first being met with skepticism, it played a key role in early detection and surveillance. The Dutch deployed ZEELEEUW, which spent two months hovering below the surface and collecting MPRAs, which often must fly at low altitude to identify the PAG, the ZEELEEUW was able to remain undetected from PAGs as it monitored them from a distance of as little as 100 meters. This was unique in that the pirates did not know that they were being watched and allowed for the coalition to study their trends in terms of routing, manning, and logistical arrangement. The identified PAGs would later be disrupted by surface assets.

Finally, the French recently deployed a Boeing E-3F Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to support both MPRAs and surface assets in detecting PAGs. The aircraft is able to cover a 300 nautical mile radius, doubling that of the MPRA, and can do so at high altitude to avoid detection and raise suspicion. It then relays the information to the MPRA, which swoops in closer to confirm that it is a PAG before a surface asset moves in to intercept. Thus far the AWACS has played a key role in at least five successful interceptions.

However, all this new gadgetry comes at an unknown cost.

On 18 November, coalition forces engaged in perhaps what were the most expensive counter-piracy interdictions in light of the result. Approximately 300 nautical miles from Mahe, Seychelles the French AWACS detected an abnormal radar contact. It dispatched the Luxembourg MPRA to investigate, which later confirmed that it was a PAG moving westbound back to the African coast. Upon confirmation, the MPRA informed the Seychelles Coast Guard vessel ANDROMACHE, which interdicted the PAG after a pursuit. It was suspected that this particular PAG was responsible for two failed attacks the previous day against the tuna trawlers TALENDUIC and CAP SAINTE MARIE. Upon boarding, the Seychelles coastguard apprehended five suspects in a mother skiff and an attack skiff. A third skiff with an unknown number of pirates fled the scene.

After dismantling the PAG by sinking the mother skiff and stripping the group of their weapons, the suspects were released in the attack skiff and sent back to Somalia. This incident, which very likely may have prevented further attacks by the PAG, cost a small fortune when considering the operational costs in utilizing two aircraft and then using a one of two Seychelles coastguard vessels to interdict pirates suspected of having attacked vessels the previous day.

Furthermore, without sufficient evidence of being involved in a failed attack, the suspects were let go, while the third skiff escaped completely. This operation was merely one of many that involve multiple assets whose only aim is to disrupt pirate activity, which comes at an exuberant financial expense given the sophistication of the threat.

Returning to the notion of simplicity, the 18 November incident also reveals the challenges of defeating a ‘rag-tag’ threat armed with rusted Kalashnikovs and RPG7s in rickety skiffs despite the coalition’s technological superiority. It is this reality that should open the eyes of all observers in realizing that the only solution to completely reducing piracy is to resolve it on land…. It is worthwhile mentioning that the situation on land has yet to improve and is far from doing so. The cost of piracy is often only reflected in terms of ransom payments. However, in addition to the overall expenses born by the shipping industry, the cost of submarines, multiple aircraft types, and surface assets exponentially increases the overall financial burden that piracy causes.

Counter piracy: Low budget

Further to the south, where the new hot spot has emerged, Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities are scrambling to secure their waterways, which have become prime hunting grounds for ships calling on Mombasa and Dares Salam. It does raise a question as to why after three intensive years of fighting pirates at sea; Kenya and Tanzania are still so poorly equipped to secure not only their trading area of interest, but literally their own territorial waters. The AFRICAN EAGLE was attacked 10 nautical miles from the Mombasa pilothouse and it appears that the Kenyans are only conducting counter-piracy operations when suspects accidentally board their patrol boats with intent to hijack as witnessed on 12 November when the KNS GALANA was boarded and the suspects subsequently were shot dead.

Kenya’s navy appears to be just as weak now as it was in 2005 and long before piracy became a major threat to shipping in the area. It would only seem logical that as the threat increased and twisted its way south over the years that Somalia’s neighbors be prepared for the worst. This is how the Seychelles were able to respond to piracy, and yet Kenya and Tanzania reversed in capability.

It seems that the two coastal neighbors are less qualified in dealing with piracy than before there even was a significant threat. In fact, it has become such a problem for Kenya that it must implement a “maritime security corridor,” which is essentially just a safe area for anchored vessels. It is essentially like the state police claiming that only one highway can be patrolled.

In addition to the poor capabilities of the Kenyan Navy, there are few coalition vessels available to patrol the southern waters, leaving the area very much exposed, which explains why the region is such an appealing hunting ground.

New trends

Thus far during the transitional period, ten vessels have been hijacked within the Kenyan/Tanzanian exclusive economic zone. Piracy incidents in the south surged after a brief series of incidents occurring in the Gulf of Aden. Due a significant number of failed attacks and successful counter piracy interdictions, major groups moved away from the Gulf of Aden to both the south and to the northern Arabian Sea. Although there has not been a concentration in the Mozambique Channel, the hunting grounds off the Kenya and Tanzania coasts have proven to be opportune enough and, more importantly, relatively low risk given the minimal transit time, minimal surface combatants, and potential for forward operating stops in the south of Somalia.

Although the southern parts of Somalia are predominantly Al Shebab territory, between Ras Kaambooni and Kismayo, there are plenty of remote islets where forward operating areas are possible. Small fuel depots and other supplies could easily be unloaded from mother skiffs and stored on the islands.

To the far north in the Arabian Sea, pirates have been active as far as 20°N and as far east as 069°E. The hijacking of the heavy load carrier TAI AN KOU on 20 November 2010 demonstrated a new reach well beyond incidents previously recorded this season and the attempted hijacking of the crude oil tanker STARLIGHT VENTURE gained Asia-Pacific attention due to it being in India’s EEZ (and therefore in Asian waters). Further south in the Indian Ocean, pirates appear to be using two main movements: the counter-equatorial current and a current moving back to the coast from the northeast.

The French navy has arrested nine suspected Somali pirates, foiling their attempt to hijack a cargo ship.The French Frigate Le Floreal, which was patrolling the waters off the coast of Somalia, dispatched a navy military helicopter on january 27, 2009, after receiving a distress call from the cargo vessel African Ruby, which came under attack from armed men on board two speeding boats. The EU mission Atalante, a coalition that groups eight EU countries, began operations off the coast of Somalia on December 8 to try to stem the growing piracy in what is the first naval mission in the history of the bloc. (Credit: European Commission)

Both allow for movement to and from the 067-069°E mark. Although the counter equatorial current has yet to be as popular as in the previous transitional period where vessels remain at risk as far as the 70°E mark, this tactic will likely increase towards the end of this transitional period. Furthermore, in light of the increased use of hijacked or ‘on-loan’ dhows as well as hijacked merchant ships in the northern theatre, pirates are able to move more flexibly and rely less on currents. Once deployed, however, PAGs will be reliant on the currents to get back home if they fail to successfully hijack a vessel.

Closer to the Gulf of Aden, the collection point east of the IRTC has become a favoured hunting ground as well. Although there have been a number of successful hijackings (defined by Risk Intelligence as successfully boarding the vessel), the incidents were quickly thwarted by a combination of citadel use and coalition response forcing the pirates to disembark. Between 14:28°N 054:29°E and 16:07°N and 059:09°E, vessels are targeted knowing that they have yet to enter or recently have just left a group transit or national convoy and therefore are exposed.

New(er) tactics

In this transitional period, there have been two noteworthy observations marking a change in tactics: fewer skiffs reported in individual attacks; and a greater degree of violence employed. It is not yet possible to support the theory that pirates will only escalate the level of violence if met with continued resistance both from coalition forces and anti-piracy defenses.

There has been a noted increase, however, in the use of violence and firepower deployed against ships. Since September, the number of reports claiming RPG fire has increased and in November a unique pirate vessel was reported, which possessed a fixed heavy machine gun on the deck. It is the first time such a weapon has been seen in an offensive capacity with pirates. In addition, there have been cases of pirates attacking a vessel with an armed team and despite the firing of warning shots, the pirates will fire at the ship and only abort once the armed team returns fire directly at the suspect skiff(s).

Thus far, however, there have been no reported cases of pirates using explosives or other tactics once they have boarded and attempted to gain control of the ship and force out the crew from the citadel or safe room. From a future trends perspective, this will become the next challenge and pirate groups are already studying patterns and citadel cases as well as training on hijacked ships in order to tackle this successful counter-piracy measure that has prevented a number of hijackings from taking place.

Although the bulk of incidents that occurred in September involved a traditional PAG structure consisting of two-to-three skiffs, a number of failed attacks in October and early November involved just one skiff. This is possibly due to what is essentially a war of attrition whereby attack teams must make the most of their resources and spread out. This is interesting since the bulk of PAG reports still involve the traditional two-to-three skiff set up, which is typically observed en route to or from the hunting ground using either the northeast or the counter equatorial current.

Piracy off the Horn of Africa remains fluid and dynamic. The international naval effort has expanded its efforts by diversifying in assets that have helped disrupt a number of PAGs. However, this merely revels how many skiffs are being put to sea and, despite the increased counter-piracy effort, it appears that there is no shortage of will from shore.

Additionally, the technologically superior international coalition is battling a relatively severe, yet simplistic threat that comes at a significant cost, even if a hijacking is prevented. Despite the decrease in attacks in the Gulf of Aden, the fact that PAGs are able to operate within the territorial waters of Kenya, the EEZ of Tanzania, as well as ride the currents deep into the Indian Ocean and to the north of the Arabian Sea reveals that the containment of piracy is far from over.

As with every transitional period, lessons are learned ensuring that once the next monsoon passes and the weather calms, there will be new additions to patterns in trends and tactics on behalf of the pirates and the need to adjust to combat them in the realm of counter and anti-piracy initiatives. Unfortunately, however, it will be another round of much of the same on land – a lack of progress.

Building a 21st Century Global Port: The Core Role of Security

Posted on April 1, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

An Interview With Emmanuel Villers

04/01/2011 – TangerMed is the evolving port complex in Morocco which is providing a new global capability for global trade. As The Economist put it in a 2008 article on the Mediterranean economies,

Look southward from the southern tip of Spain, across the strait of Gibraltar. There, only 14km (nine miles) away through the slight sea haze arises the vast construction works of a new seaport to the east of Tanger in northern Morocco.

TangerMed opened its first docks last July (2007). Handling 3.5m containers a year, it is already as big as Felixstowe, Britain’s biggest port. A second terminal opens this summer, and within seven years its annual capacity will rise to 8.5m. It will be the largest container port in the Mediterranean, not far behind Europe’s biggest, Rotterdam (although merely one-third the size of the Asian giants of Singapore, Shanghai and Hong Kong). Similar ports are being finished in Algeria, Egypt, Malta and Tunisia.

One-third of the world’s container traffic already passes through the Mediterranean, bringing manufactured goods from China and South-East Asia to Europe and the east coast of America. The Moroccans, spending some €3.5 billion ($5.5 billion) on TangerMed, and others along the coast hope that if they build, a big slice of global commerce will come to their shores. Goods will arrive to be broken down into smaller loads and sent around Europe. Manufacturers will set up factories in tax-free zones planned around the docks, bring in components for assembly and serve the huge market across the water.

The Economist (July 10, 2008)

(Credit: http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=1227659)

Building a new port facility in such a strategic location obviously requires considerable attention to the security dimension. The entire infrastructure of the port and its maritime traffic situation requires crafting a sound security system.

The TangerMed complex is managed by the Tanger Mediterranean Special Agency (TMSA) on behalf of the Moroccan Government. Cassidian has built a trusted partnership with the TMSA since an initial contract was signed in early 2008 to work on security with the TMSA.

The partnership has entailed three core efforts.

The first was crafting architecture for TangerMed security system as a lead systems integrator (LSI) working with the TMSA. Such an approach allowed the port authorities to determine the most effective way to proceed with the security approach, rather than simply adding ad hoc systems to provide for security in a jerry built manner.

The second was to shape an approach to container security for the port, and given that a core raison d’etre of the port was to manage container ships, and especially the new giant container ships, this is a key element for secure operations of the port. Here Cassidian worked with the TMSA to determine which systems needed to be put in place for the authorities to put in place a command post with capabilities to provide for container security.

The third was to shape other security tools and capabilities to provide for close-in security capabilities to ensure an efficient protection of the port.

In late December, Second Line of Defense’s Robbin Laird sat down with Cassidian’s Emmanuel Villers to discuss the TangerMed project and the role of Cassidian in crafting a 21^st century port security solution set. He is in charge within Cassidian of maritime security. The full interview will appear on the Second Line of Defense website later, but here the main points of the interview are summarized.

SLD: Could you describe the importance of the port project?

Villers: The project reflects the intent of the King of Morocco to develop the North of Morocco. It is located in a key strategic location in the Gibraltar Strait. More than 30% of global container shipping passes through the Strait. Shipping from Asia goes through the Suez Canal passes through the Mediterranean and reaches towards North and South America. The port is also at the crossroads as well of North-South shipping trade. And obviously this has great growth potential as 21^st century trade.

SLD: Security is considered a high priority for the TMSA?

Villers: Security of the port is one of highest priorities for the TMSA, who has decided to entrust its security system to one integrator instead of several companies. In part, it is because of the magnitude of the investment, more than three billion euros to date. The shipping companies obviously require a high level of security. And for the TMSA, the port economy can be reliable, only if security is ensured.

SLD: I understand that you started with a comprehensive assessment for the customer. Could you describe the approach?

Villers: The first job we provided was a threat assessment for the customer. The key contribution of a lead systems integrator is not only to provide tools, but first of all to provide a security solution. And this solution needs to be efficient. The key difference here is between a system integrator and a product manufacturer. The customer wanted at the outset to look at an integrated solution, rather than just buy products separately.

TMSA understood that they have a significant range of threats, and wanted a specialist of security to shape a comprehensive and integrated solution. This was our initial and baseline role.

SLD: In effect, the project started with shaping a trusted partnership with the customer?

Villers: Yes. We worked with the customer to shape an Operational Concept (conops) to design the approach to comprehensive port security. A key challenge is to draw an approach providing comprehensive security to the various stakeholders. They are many actors ranging from Port Authority, Port Facilities, shipping companies, industries, maritime police, etc. We needed to shape an operational concept that can bring together a threat assessment plus shaping stakeholder roles in the overall concept.

SLD: When was this done?

Villers: The baseline assessment was done during year 2008. Based on this, we recommended a range of solutions to implement the conops.

There were two types of threats.

First is the safety of the shipping based on the fact that the Gibraltar strait is relatively narrow with various wind and sea conditions. A good traffic surveillance system is essential. The Cassidian VTS system is used to provide for this basic capability.

Second is the security for the port, which is challenged by various potential threats, such as thefts, illegal immigration, drug traffic, smuggling, and terrorist organizations. It is a major trans-shipment port both East – West and North – South and as such provides an attractive location for illegal and terrorist activities.

SLD: What are the major tools you are shaping for the port?

Villers: A first element we are providing is the Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) systems. And the customer operates a Control Room within which VTS operates. The main mission is to follow big vessels or container ships to provide for vessel safety, against collision for example. We have built the infrastructure for the VTS and have put SOFRELOG tools in the Control Room, which the customer then uses to provide for the safety for the large ships. The customer runs the VTS himself, but we provide training for the staffs, which are included in the global contract.

SLD: And you have a key effort beyond VTS to provide for security as well?

Villers: Yes we have a second pillar to provide for security which focuses on the malevolent threats, notably those associated with small targets. We are focused on following small boats, swimmers and individuals trying to penetrate the port from the land side.

SLD: So the customer now manages the large or container ships, and you are managing the other safety and security threats.

Villers: Not exactly. The security system is also operated by the customer. We design and deliver the port security system and this is a complex challenge. We have to manage threats from the waterside using radars, cameras and other tools to detect day and night persons seeking to penetrate the port. And we have to manage the landside as well. Meaning to take care of land perimeter of the port, with various systems integrated such as intelligent video, access control, biometric controls, truck traffic controls (truck, cargo and driver) and verification, etc. There are other systems as well such as scanners and secured communications.

And this complex and diverse effort is centralized upon a security control room whose task is to monitor security activity based on the flow of data from the various security systems. The security control room is focused on managing the data and alarms from the diverse systems to deliver good security decisions in dealing with the various threats.

All of these subsystems are integrated in the security control room, which increases efficiency while reducing the number of operators and patrol teams, then enables the port security forces to focus their attention on threats in real time.

Romanian and French Army Advise Afghan National Army

Posted on April 1, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

04/01/2011 – French Army Capt. Michel Bastelica, from Corsica, and Afghan National Army basic warrior training instructor shakes hands with a student during class in Kabul Military Training Center Jan. 12. Mentors from many different countries play a critical role supporting NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in sites throughout Afghanistan.

[slidepress gallery=’romanian-and-french-army-advise-afghan-national-army’]

Credit: NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in sites throughout Afghanistan,1/12/11

In the second photo, Afghan National Army recruits walk back to their formation after completing marksmanship training during Basic Warrior Training in Kabul Military Training Center, Jan. 12. At the center which is the largest training base in Afghanistan, NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan advisers help and advise Afghan National Army instructors who teach the bulk of the recruits training.
In the third photo, Afghan National Army recruits conduct squad drills during basic warrior training in Kabul Military Training Center, Jan. 12.
In the final photo, Romanian Army 1st Sgt. Sandu Simion, left, from Bucharest, longside Staff Sgt. Adrian Chereches, from Cluj-Napoca, talk to an Afghan National Army basic warrior training instructor during class in Kabul Military Training Center Jan. 12.

Going the Extra Mile

Posted on April 1, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

Providing for Maritime Safety and Security: Going the Extra Mile

An Interview With Rémi Julien, President and CEO of SIGNALIS

(By Murielle Delaporte)

04/01/2011 – At Euronaval in October 2010, Second Line of Defense’s Murielle Delaporte interviewed Rémi Julien when he was the CEO of Sofrelog, but the interview focused on the new entity, which has been officially launched on January 10th, 2011. Julien is now the CEO of SIGNALIS, the joint venture of CASSIDIAN and ATLAS ELEKTRONIK, merging their subsidiaries SOFRELOG and ATLAS MS. SIGNALIS is co-owned by Cassidian (60%) and Atlas Elektronik (40%) and combines competencies in the security domain, with a special emphasis on maritime safety and security.

In this article, the key themes which were discussed are summarized with the complete interview in French to appear later on the other side of the Second Line of Defense website.

Security Systems for the Tanger-Med Port are Part of the Cassidian Offering for Maritime Safety and Security. (Credit: Cassidian)

At the crossroads between domestic security and naval defense, maritime safety and security is a growing global market. Until recently, maritime border control had been largely defined as an element of anti-terror policy, which has been requiring a specific military approach especially since 9/11.

This market has mostly emerged via the involvement of small and medium sized companies providing traffic control services, for strategic areas such as maritime straits. Traffic safety systems have been relying on the four following tools:

Radars allowing target detection;
Communication;
Control centers;
Accident monitoring system.

As the EADS presskit for Euronaval underscored:

Since the beginning of the third millennium, mass terrorism, piracy, illegal immigration, smuggling and environmental hazards are on the rampage. Such rising threats demand higher levels of protection for citizens and the environment but also for economic assets as strategic as offshore oil and gas activities. Stakeholders have no other option but to show their ability to prevent any major crisis and react rapidly if needed. To achieve this, they need integrated and interoperable safety and security systems.

Maritime security is a three-dimensional business as it relies on space assets, sea-based platforms as well as land-based systems to provide for security monitoring and control.

Born Out of a Fragmented Market

Besides the new threat requirements, the evolution of technology has drastically revolutionized a market, which before the 90’s was rather fragmented. Except for Panama Canal-like customers, the cost barrier was too high for the broader use of maritime security controls. This was changed by the emergence of digital technologies. These technologies drove down the cost of acquisition of maritime security devices, which provided for live traffic control via VTS systems (Vessel Traffic Services). Many harbors, such as Calais in France in the early 90s, started to invest in such technologies together with Sofrelog.

Radar systems, identification systems, equipment for electronic warfare, communication systems and weapon systems are integrated with a combat management system by Cassidian in order to form complete naval combat systems.
(Credit: Cassidian)

Monitoring the straight of Malacca has been one of the first endeavors Sofrelog initiated in 2000. This system of controls provided capabilities to meet a dual-demand: the domestic military police’s requirements on the one hand, and global traffic monitoring, on the other. Implementing such a system over the last decade has been a major factor behind the reduction of piracy in this part of the world.

The beginning of the 21^st century witnessed the growth of terrorism and piracy and it became necessary to merge civilian domestic aspects with security and defense considerations. The need for a new organization and a common operating picture based on the synergy of available assets has been more apparent in order to manage the incredible variety and fragmentation of the players involved in maritime safety and security. And the same detection’s means apply to a sailboat or a potential threat, even if the actual response to the latter, once identified, is significantly different.

The Naval Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radar is a multimode acquisition radar for surveillance and weapon assignment.
It features automatic detection, track initiation, and tracking of air and sea targets, in particular of small fast low-flying threats and is specially suited for deployment in littoral waters.
Multimode radar TRS-3D – The multimode radar system TRS-3D is specially suited for deployment in littoral waters
and has been deployed successfully on several types of ships of several navies worldwide (pictured here on a Danish patrol boat of the “Stanflex 300” class. (Credit: Cassidian)

CROSSing Over

Another factor, which has revolutionized the maritime security market from SIGNALIS’s point of view, has been the upgrade of Spationav (Système naval de surveillance des approches maritimes et des zones sous juridiction nationale) in 2005.

Spationav is a system aimed at federating all the means of the French Ministry of Transportation as well as of the maritime centers called CROSS (Centres régionaux opérationnels de surveillance et de sauvetage). The system enhances both surveillance of maritime straits and coastal regions along France’s thousands of miles of sea borders.

The system was developed in order to deal with the variety of challenges encountered along the coast, whether illegal immigration and trafficking, or environmental issues such as maritime pollution.

Spationav is a multi-phased system whereby radars of two ministries are being networked to provide for integrated capabilities. Currently, the data collected by 70 radars from the two ministries – Transportation and Customs – as well as Automatic Identification Systems are collected into a common operational picture for four Centers of the French Navy, including the Paris base of the French Navy as well as 5 CROSS and three custom centers.

UAVs will figure prominently in port surveillance and security in the near future. (Credit: Cassidian)

What Spationav has been pioneering is the notion that maritime security – as well as land border security as a matter of fact – can be managed over a vast amount of territory and able to cover significant distances. The success of Spationav has led to other contracts to manage territorial security such as with Saudi Arabia, for example.

The demand for comprehensive security has provided a growing marketplace. As a result, SIGNALIS has been involved in various major international projects driven by a confluence of economic, political and security considerations, such as oil platform security in the Middle East and Schengen immigration control requirements in Europe.

Some of these projects are as follows:

Qatar’s National security shield includes not only coastal and EEZ monitoring, but also offshore oil platforms and storage facilities which need full protection from air, sea and land-based threats;
A similar project is underway to protect Saudi Arabia’s 2,000 kilometers’ coasts, while private oil companies are also in demand for help in this area. Aramco’s main oil facility has, for instance, been protected for years via a system of four naval radars capable of identifying low-altitude threats such as helicopters and securing a vast zone;
Enhancing the security in the straight of Ormuz for Oman has also been a major consideration, as Oman’s and Iran’s territorial waters meet : a SIGNALIS contract addresses such a challenge;
In Spain, assistance to the Guardia Civil has been underway for five years especially in the Canaries and Baleares islands and the Gibraltar straight, one of the major issues addressed being illegal immigration and trafficking;
SIGNALIS is also involved in maritime safety and security in the North and Baltic seas assisting the Danish Navy;
The security of Mayotte island is another challenge being addressed;
Bulgaria is also an interesting example triggered by pure political incentives, i.e. the Schengen treaty and the necessity for EU entry candidates to comply with immigration control minimum requirements: in the case of Bulgaria, border control was actually funded by the European Union itself.

The Ikea of Maritime Security: Shaping a Effective Total Cost of Ownership Approach

“A simple project, i.e. the installation of a few radars aimed at monitoring a hundred kilometer zone, will be implemented over a twelve to eighteen month period from the signing of the contract till the delivery of the system per se,” explains Rémi Julien.

“We are in a way the “Ikea of maritime security” in the sense that we build the “kitchen” at the factory as well as the missing parts if need be; we assemble it and then deliver it ready to go. It would indeed be much more expensive to do so on site”.

A customized maritime security contract will also typically include the training of future operators in accordance to existing international standards (AIALA; IMO), which can be done over a week.

Even though a 100% readiness is required (missing the deadline for one container delivery translates into the loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars for the Port of Tangiers for instance), maintenance per se is however rather light since the systems are mostly computer and radar-based.

No specific norms exist for maintenance and all options are possible as far as maintenance is concerned. Basically, readiness is ensured via a redundancy and automatic shift system.

“We have machines which, in the past five years have never stopped once and have demonstrated a high level of reliability even long after they were not covered under guarantees anymore. However, we are extremely concerned to keep it that way and, given our high pace of development, maintenance teams have tripled over the past two years”, SIGNALIS CEO underscored.

As far as Spationav is concerned, the acquisition cost is significant, but the total ownership cost is competitive, since maintenance mainly consists in preventive visits.

Every five years, an upgrade is required as far as sensors and software are concerned, but the emergence of new technologies or new missions can also of course trigger evolutions in that regard as well. Enhanced ergonomic and algorithmic development, data management and any decision-making assistance are the usual areas of improvement requested by customers.

From the outset, SIGNALIS has been at cutting edge concerning the development and application of open source software since 2001. Radar integration and signal digitalization are also areas of expertise. The level of sophistication of radars — usually civilian radars — varies ranging from simple radars for port security to extremely sophisticated systems more adapted to coastal monitoring requirements, like small target detection.

“It is SIGNALIS’s mission to fit and anticipate each customer’s specific need and to provide an overall approach whenever customers task us to do so,” concludes Rémi Julien.

Hypersonics and Its Impact on the Future of Warfare (Part Three)

Posted on April 1, 2011 | by SysAdmin

An Interview With Professor Lewis

04/01/2011 – In January 2011, Second Line of Defense sat down with Professor Lewis to discuss the current status and dynamics of hypersonics. Mark J. Lewis is chairman of Clark School’s Department of Aerospace Engineering at the University of Maryland, College Park, and President of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He was the chief scientist of the U.S. Air Force from 2004 to 2008.

X-51 (Credit: http://www.11news.us/05/speed-of-soundx-51a-waverider.html)http

SLD: There’s another aspect that I find very interesting which is when folks focus on how good our simulation capability is or our models to predict behavior, and they are extraordinary, but the problem with mathematics is that it can be hypothetical. It can be based on predictive behavior. It depends on how you do your models, but at the end of the day when you’re pushing the envelope in an operational sense, you don’t know fully the outcome in advance.

And when you’ve seen the test you now are trying to build a predictive model on, well what would happen if I changed this composite technology or whatever. The other thing that’s lost in this current conversation—and you see this especially with things like ABLs and F-35s—is the ability to manufacture something is arguably as important as your ability to design something.

It’s the front end of the cycle, and we’ve just lost any understanding that if I’ve gotten to the point where I can actually manufacture a stealth aircraft, I’ve achieved something historically significant, but it’s just not perceived as important.

And it’s at the end of the day if you can figure out your hypersonic cruise missile and you can replicate that missile in a manufacturing process, but to do that you need folks who actually have experience in manufacturing advanced materials, composites and all this sort of stuff. So that I think that testing to me is part of the pre-manufacturing process if we could call it that.

Lewis: Once again, I agree with you completely, on your comments on modeling and simulation. As a researcher, most of the research that I’ve done has been analytical and computational modeling of high speed flow, and yet I’ll be the first to tell you that the best computational models that we have don’t perfectly predict flow properties.

And the reason is, we don’t fully understand the physics, but even if we did, we have to remember that any computational model never quite gets the solution correctly. That’s fundamental to the way we solve the governing equations of aerodynamics on a computer. Let me explain that – a digital computer solves equation on discrete numerical grids, but real flow doesn’t work that way. When we solve a problem on a computer, we’re always making approximations. Even worse, the equations that we solve, those governing equations of aerodynamics, are really a simplification of ever-more complex equations that govern how molecules move around the vehicle.

So we know we never quite get it right, and I can give you example after example of fundamental problems that we really don’t know how to simulate. Now, if I were to give you some data and also give you a computer code, you can probably do a nice job of matching the code results to the data, as long as you know the right answer before you start.

It’s when we don’t know the answer before we start that the numerical simulations are most uncertain, and that’s why we frankly need experiments; and also, by the way, even experiments don’t always quite get it right.

For example, the conditions inside a wind tunnel are not exactly the same conditions that a vehicle experiences in flight. That’s especially true at hypersonic speeds, by the way. And that’s why flight test, actually putting things in the air, is absolutely critical. You can simulate all you want, you can wind tunnel test all you want – and rest assured, they’re both important – but until you actually put the vehicle in the air and light off a real engine and fly at the correct speed, you really won’t understand fully and completely how that system is going to behave.

Speed is the Next Step After Shaping the Distribution Operations Enterprise (Credit: SLD)

SLD: There’s another aspect. If we go to the operational modality, one of the things that folks have really not taken onboard is the revolution in mobility, the revolution in defense, is so fundamental in terms of identifying the targets you want to affect. And one of the things I find interesting is if you think about stealth as a hovering asset and you’re either directing strike, or as Mike Wynne says, you really want to use the best sensor on the battlefield last, which I think is a very good proposition, but there’s also the point that when you have a kinetic effect on a mobile anything and you’re looking interactively at the defenses and offensive capability of your opponent, you’re essentially creating fractural results.

That is unpredictable results that essentially then recreate very quickly a different kind of target set, so for us to use these hypersonic assets effectively, they can be leading elements against things that you just know you’ve got to get out of the way, or they can be part of this interactive control of a dynamic battlefield.

And for that to work, you’re going to have to have forward deployed assets of some sort whether they be space based or whatever. They could be aircraft. They could be RPAs.

Lewis: I agree with you completely, and that was actually a theme that I kept striking with the Air Force Research Lab folks who were working in hypersonics.

You need to think about how the hypersonic capability factors in with the other capabilities you bring to bear.

I’ll give you my favorite example of that. There are some folks in the hypersonics community who envision very large hypersonic cruisers, including airplanes that might take off from anywhere in the continental United States and fly to anywhere on the globe in less than two hours to perform some missions. Sounds great, but when you actually work through the basic physics, you discover that it’s almost impossible to do. Such a global cruiser is the wrong use of hypersonics. That type of vehicle would be too expensive and too hard to build, and simply wouldn’t have sufficient range to do the envisioned mission anyway.

HY Shot Rocket Launch Video (Credit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPKGGkKoQsQ)

Now let’s step back and ask, “all right, how do we combine hypersonics with other systems?” For example, a long-range next-generation bomber might fly to a loiter point at low speed, but when it has to launch a missile, it launches that missile at hypersonic speed. It peels off a hypersonic cruise missile for example. That’s really a winning combination.

In a system like that, each of the technologies is doing what they do best, and combine to form a package that really, truly is game changing. So I take your point exactly.

There’s another aspect to all of this, and that’s frankly the cost factor, the economics. People often say that hypersonic systems will be so expensive that they’ll simply be cost prohibitive, but to that I answer that if hypersonics brings so much of the capability that I think it will, it will buy its way onto the platform.

We might be able to do more with one hypersonic system than what might have taken many, many lower speed systems. There’s a capability multiplication there that I think actually makes hypersonic systems quite cost effective.

SLD: Let us go back to your discussion of the various tests in 2010. Could you discuss a bit more the X-51?

Lewis: X-51 is not the first air breathing hypersonic vehicle that’s been flown. NASA flew a vehicle called X-43, which had a lot of similarities to X-51, and even our partners in Australia flew a small sounding rocket that used some of the same technology in a program called HyShot.

HyShot was the first flight of one of these engines that I mentioned, these scramjet engines, supersonic combustion ramjet engines. The catch is that when the Australian’s did it in 2002, they did so for only a few seconds, and they didn’t produce net positive thrust; in other words, the engine produced thrust, but it had more drag than thrust. In order to accelerate a vehicle, thrust must be greater than drag.

Two years later, NASA flew the X-43 off the wing of a B-52. In fact, they used the same B-52, nick-named “Balls 8”, that had been used to fly the X-15. X-43 was boosted to high speed on a Pegasus rocket for a total of three flights. The first flight was not successful – the Pegasus booster lost a fin. NASA spent two years trying to figure out what went wrong, and they finally flew it again. When they flew it a second time, it hit Mach 7. They flew a vehicle a third time and it hit a record-setting Mach 10. Each one of those flights lasted for about ten seconds under power, and they burned hydrogen fuel. That’s an important distinction from X-51, which used jet fuel, because hydrogen is not a very practical fuel, certainly not from a battlefield standpoint.

The engines on X-43 only ran for about ten seconds because they were limited by the fuel supply, but also because the design of the engine was such that if they had powered it for much longer than ten seconds, the engine walls would have melted.

Now let’s jump to X-51. Why was X-51 a significant leap? I always argue that X-51 actually built on much of the legacy of the HyShot flight and more importantly, the X-43 flights. And by the way, one of the true success stories of X-51 is that we established a wonderful partnership between NASA and the Air Force on X-51, and again, Mike Wynne gets a lot of credit for this. A lot of the NASA guys and gals that worked on X-43 brought their expertise to our X-51.

X-51 looked like a missile. That’s in contrast to X-43, which was kind of a sub-scale model of an airplane. Also of note, X-51 burned relatively traditional jet fuel. It burned JP-7, the same jet fuel that the SR-71 uses. That’s a hydrocarbon fuel, which is a more practical fuel than hydrogen. JP-7 is something that we know how to handle operationally.

Perhaps most importantly, X-51’s big advance was that its engine was thermally balanced. That means that the fuel circulated through the walls of the engine and kept the engine from melting. In principle, that engine could operate for as long as you could supply it with fuel.

It’s very clear how you go from something that looks and operates like an X-51, and by the way, just like X-43, X-51 flew off the wing of a B-52. So there again, you see the marriage of a Legacy airplane with this high-speed system.

When that first flight of X-51 occurred it was supposed to fly for 300 seconds. Unfortunately, it wound up flying for only about 200 seconds. Of those 200 seconds, about 150 seconds or so were under power of the air breathing system, that scramjet engine, but that amount of test time increased by almost a factor of ten the total amount of flight time that we have had with an air breathing hypersonic engine.

As it turns out that, there seems to have been a seal failure in the nozzle. The nozzle has a seal between the end of the engine and the rest of the airframe that came loose early in the flight. Despite that, lots of things worked as well as, or better than expected.

Clearly X-51 wasn’t an operational system. One obvious question is “what comes next?” and the thing that comes to my mind first is making a vehicle based on X-51 that is much more of an operational weapon. The seal that failed on the first flight shouldn’t even be present in an actual operational system. Of course, X-51 didn’t have a warhead of any sort. It didn’t have the sort of guidance and navigation package that you’d want to put on a real missile, so there’s lots left to do if we continue marching down a path towards an operational system.

SLD: So what are the downsides of the test results?

Lewis: Let me offer a little bit of tough love. I’ve talked about the great successes for X-51 despite its seal failure. Let me tell you some of the problems.

Problem number one, and it kind of gets back to an earlier theme, the program has too few flights. The whole X-51 program right now is set for three more flights, for a total of four. Four flights is not a viable flight test program. X-15 did 199 flights. In today’s constrained environment, I’m not expecting 199 flights, but if we only have four flights it makes it very, very difficult to do the real sorts of flight tests that we need, to really push out the envelope. To take risks.

SLD: If you don’t invest in the test flights, you’re not going to have the capability.

Lewis: Exactly. One of the things I saw firsthand is that flight testing has gotten incredibly difficult in part because we are so risk averse.

I’ll give you an example of this: X-51 flew on May 26th. It was originally supposed to fly on May 25th, but just before the flight, a cargo ship sailed into the splash zone in the Pacific Ocean. I should mention that X-51 was launched out of Edwards Air Force Base and flew off Point Mugu, and just before they’re getting ready to fly, this ship sails into the splash zone and the flight gets scrubbed.

Now think about that, your flight test efforts are at the mercy of some international tanker sailing into this vast area in the Pacific Ocean, that’s kind of what we’ve done to ourselves. The chances of X-51 actually hitting that tanker were astronomically small, even if we had tried (and some of us thought we should)! The second flight attempt was May 26th. The ground crew at Edwards just did a phenomenal job, and their success was amazing considering that they basically had an ancient B-52 being used as the carrier aircraft. They had to start all eight engines three times, twice the first day and once the second day, in order to make that flight happen, and everyone was kind of holding their breath and crossing their fingers as those engines were starting up.

This is not a reliable way to do successful flight tests. It is this level of risk aversion, where we’re terrified to fly because several hundred miles off the coast a tanker has sailed into a splash zone, which is hurting our ability to test.

(Credit: http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/bombers/b52.html)

SLD: But the other part of that story that’s interesting is the condition of our infrastructure.

Lewis: And by the way, that ancient B-52 that was used to fly X-51 is the updated model of the B-52. The B-52 that was used to fly the X-15, Balls-8, was retired and they brought in the current B-52, which is still an antiquated airplane, so what does that say about our testing infrastructure?

So yes, you’re exactly right.

Another example – in White Oak Maryland the USAF operates the world’s foremost hypersonic wind tunnel it’s called Hypervelocity Tunnel 9, and it can simulate flight conditions at up to 14 times the speed of sound. That’s where HTV-2 is being tested right now. And it seems every year some bean counter somewhere tries to zero the funding for that tunnel. An irreplaceable asset, with one of the best testing teams in the USAF, and with a budget that’s a round-off error on someone’s ledger, and we have folks trying to shut it down. Unbelievable.

I will say though the plus side of our infrastructure is the professionalism of our people. It was just a marvel to behold the professionalism of the folks at Edwards who were running that X-51 flight test. I sat in on some of the pre-flight briefings and I got to sit in the control room. I also got to sit in the post-flight analysis, and it would just bring a tear to your eye to see the quality and the professionalism of the folks involved in that flight test. One of the engineers in the control room was a man named Johnny Armstrong – he’s a legend who has worked in test for the USAF for almost six decades – people like that are simply irreplaceable!

Back to X-51, it got us closer to an operational system, but it isn’t an operational system. For example, a scramjet won’t work at low speeds; it needs some other kind of engine to reach hypersonic conditions. X-51 accelerates to hypersonic speed using a solid rocket motor. It’s actually a U.S. Army ATACMS booster, almost off-the-shelf. This was a very clever solution- a low cost and proven system, but used in a new application. Even so, that’s not an operational system.

An operational X-51-derived missile would have to fit in a weapons bay. It can’t be hanging off the wing of a B-52 with a large army booster sitting on its tail. So you need to think about how you might make integrate this thing with existing aircraft, existing platforms, but also future platforms, and that level of thought hasn’t been fully applied yet. That’s another direction we need to be moving in.

SLD: We should be considering hypersonics and the next-generation strike vehicle simultaneously concurrently.

Lewis: Absolutely. I’ll tell you a quick anecdote from when I was in the Pentagon. At one point, Air Combat Command was doing an analysis of alternatives on a next-generation bomber – this was the last round – and there were some experts in the Lab who I thought had something to contribute, but they weren’t even being allowed to the meetings.

The folks who understood future technology capabilities and needs, as well as ways to interface, weren’t being invited to these planning meetings. I brought this to the Chief’s attention and General Moseley jumped right in and said, “Yes, by all means, these guys need to be in these meetings,” and we got them connected.

Because you’re exactly right. If we’re going to build a new aircraft it is going to be around for quite awhile, so it needs to be able to interface not only with current weapons, but future weapons, including weapons that we’re just now being able to envision. And so it’s absolutely vital that as we design these systems that we know what’s on the horizon, that the interfaces and the inter-connectivity be part of the design process.

SLD: There’s another reason you want to do that. It’s the only way we can guarantee that somebody will actually fund the hypersonic system.

Lewis: That’s true also. This again is something that I tell my hypersonic brethren which is that, at the end of the day, they need a customer. If they don’t have a customer, then they’re a bunch of guys playing in a sandbox pursuing their own pet hobby.

And they have to remember that they have to make the case to buy their way in.

(Credit: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/images/b-3-1.gif)

I know of folks in the hypersonics community who have latched on to a certain technology direction. They love a technology, and I’ll have to keep reminding them, look, your technology is fine, but you need to step back and not think about just this technology. You need to think about the capability that you bring to bear, and if this technology is the best way to do it, great. And if the technology isn’t the best way to do it, then you need to pursue another approach.

SLD: So we drive towards more affordability by having both key elements in each hand, the new platform and the new weapons regime we might be able to provide, and certainly, if we are not able to put hypersonic missiles on this aircraft, I don’t see the point of building it to be honest with you.

Lewis: You know I always laugh at the notion that a future war in which we’re still launching low speed cruise missiles. We’ll have all these cyber capabilities, these incredible sensor capabilities. We’ll find our targets. We’ll know what we want to hit. And then we push the launch button and out comes this slow, low-speed cruise missile that just cranks along at about Mach 0.8 and takes a couple of hours to hit the target, if it gets there at all through enhanced integrated air defenses.

But even if it makes it there, the target’s long gone! To me, with today’s notion of war, with today’s operational tempo, the idea that you see a target and you’re not going to launch as fast as you possibly can, that’s simply not a winning strategy.

Basic Damage Control

Posted on April 1, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

A Walkthrough Aboard USS Carl Vinson

04/01/2011 –

[slidepress gallery=’basic-damage-control-walkthrough-aboard-uss-carl-vinson’]

Credit; USN Visual Service, 1/7/11

In photo 1, Seaman Sean Hogue, logistic specialist, assigned to deck department’s 3rd Division, stands a lookout watch on the fantail during sunrise aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson. Carl Vinson and Carrier Air Wing 17 are on a deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of responsibility.
The second photo shows Lt. j.g. Hunter Parden, center, a pilot assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 25, waiting for an F/A-18 Hornet to land on the flight deck aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.
The third photo shows Lt. j.g. Hunter Parden, center, a pilot assigned to Strike Fighter Squadron 25, waiting for an F/A-18 Hornet to land on the flight deck aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.
The fourth photo shows Petty Officer 2nd Class Ralph Bucci, ship’s armorer gunner’s mate right, and Petty Officer 2nd Class Michael Pryor, gunner’s mate, left, preparing a .50-caliber machine gun for a familiarization fire exercise on the fantail of the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.
The final photo shows Fireman Joshua Tanida, machinist’s mate, assigned to the reactor department, donning personal protective equipment during a basic damage control walkthrough aboard the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.

National Security Implications Of Manufacturing Decline

Posted on March 29, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

03/29/2011

Intelligence Director Will Look At Future for U.S. Manufacturing

By Richard McCormack

Originally published in Manufacturing and Technology News, February 3, 2011, Volume 18, No. 2

03/ /2011 – The shift of U.S. manufacturing to foreign nations has become an important issue to the U.S. intelligence community. The Director for National Intelligence is undertaking a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the state of American manufacturing. Growing concern over loss of domestic capability and dependence on foreign nations for key high-tech materials, components and systems has led the DNI office to start such an effort.

National Intelligence Estimates have been conducted since passage of the National Security Act of 1947 after the surprise invasion of South Korea by North Korean troops. They represent the U.S. intelligence community’s “most authoritative and coordinated written assessment of a specific national-security issue,” according the Council on Foreign Relations. As many as 17 federal government agencies can be involved in drafting the classified report.

National Intelligence Estimates are unlike other intelligence reports, according to the National Intelligence Council (NIC), which supports the Director for National Intelligence. NIEs are the “most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues,” according to the NIC. “They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding the likely course of future events.” National Intelligence Estimates “have been considered to be the best analysis of specific issues of national importance or of national crisis situations that could be brought to bear by the Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the other intelligence organizations of the United States Government.”

The group heading up the study will “reach out to nongovernment experts in academia and the private sector to broaden the Intelligence Community’s perspective.” The study is being directed by the National Intelligence Office’s Science and Technology division run by Lawrence Gershwin. The NIO declined to discuss the initiative on record, with an official involved stating that it is “a very sensitive matter.”

Lafayette Escadrille Memorial

Posted on March 22, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

03/22/2011

Lafayette Escadrille Memorial – The Monument to America’s First Combat Aviators

By Robert C. Dooley, Col (ret), USAF

03/22/2011 – The monument to the first Americans to fly, fight, win, and for some, to die in combat resides at the edge of Paris, France. Forty-nine of America’s first combat aviators lie in rest at the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial, a majestic monument erected over eighty years ago to honor all US volunteer pilots that flew with the French in World War I. These pilots played a significant role in the genesis of US combat airpower, which ultimately led to the establishment of the US Air Force.The future of the Memorial is in serious doubt. The intent of this article is to emphasize what these men and the Memorial represent to the US Air Force’s heritage and to draw attention to the Memorial’s needs.

Col. Dooley with Secretary Wynne, Normandy 2007 (Photo Credit: SLD)

The United States’ first combat aviators were the American volunteers who flew with the French Air Service in World War I prior to the US’s entry into the “Great War.” Most of these pilots transferred to the US Army after the US entered the war and provided the backbone of combat experience for the fledgling Air Service. These gentlemen came from all walks of life – Ivy League bluebloods, mechanics, farm hands and even an expatriate boxer. Despite their social differences, they were all equal if they could hack it in the cockpit, and the impact they made on aviation would resonate well beyond the end of the war.

There were 265 Americans volunteers who started flight training with the French before the US entered the war. 225 would get their wings and about 180 would fly in combat with French front-line units. These pilots, as a whole, would eventually be referred to as the “Lafayette Flying Corps.” As part of a strategy to get the US to commit to the war, an idea was hatched to form an all-American fighter unit, give it copious media attention, and heighten awareness of the conflict back in the States.In April 1916, after a concentrated effort by influential Americans in France and with the assistance of French military and government officials, the “N-124 L’Escadrille Americaine” (“The American Squadron”) was stood up. More than a token gesture on the part of the French, the squadron went to the head of the line to receive factory-fresh Nieuport fighters, personnel, and support equipment.

The initial squadron cadre was made up of seven American pilots under the command of a French officer, Capt Georges Thenault. The unit did initial training at Luxeuil airfield, then quickly transitioned to combat operations. First blood was drawn on 20 May 1916, when Kiffin Rockwell shot down a German observation plane. Other kills would follow and the squadron would gain its desired notoriety in the press while participating in almost all major battles of the war. In fact, the unit drew so much attention that the German Ambassador to the United States lodged a formal protest to the US government about the “American Squadron’s” operations, given that the US was supposed to be neutral at the time. The incident led to changing the squadron’s name to the “Escadrille Lafayette” or “Lafayette Squadron,” an apropos reference to General Lafayette’s and France’s assistance to the US during the Revolutionary War.

The squadron performed on par with its French counterparts and developed its own identity, given its mix of blue bloods and working-class members. The first squadron mascot was a lion cub named “Whiskey,” purchased by squadron members while on leave in Paris. They later got another one to keep it company, which they appropriately named “Soda.” The animals were noted on deployment paperwork as “African guard dogs.” The squadron also kept a bottle of 80 year-old bourbon whiskey on-hand called “The Bottle of Death.” Originally given to Kiffen Rockwell by his brother to celebrate his (and the squadron’s) first aerial victory, the only pilots to swig from it were those that scored confirmed kills.

The US ultimately entered WW I in April 1917. The squadron remained an all-American unit until February 1918, when most pilots in the squadron and the Lafayette Flying Corps were given the opportunity to transfer to the US Army Air Service. Most transferees were initially assigned to the 103rd Pursuit Squadron then farmed out to other US squadrons to spread their wealth of combat experience to uninitiated US pilots. Some former Lafayette members even went on to command US squadrons during the war. While most Lafayette Escadrille members remain obscure to history, Raoul Lufbery is a familiar name to most US fighter pilots, earning seventeen confirmed kills during the war and while also developing a defensive tactic called the “Lufbery Circle.” He became a well known instructor to US pilots after his transfer to the US Army and was praised by Captain Eddie Rickenbacker, who said, “Everything I learned, I learned from Lufbery” (AF Magazine, 2000, “Rickenbacker” Boyne).

America’s first black fighter pilot, Eugene Bullard, while not a member of the Lafayette Escadrille, was a member of the Lafayette Flying Corps. He left the farms of Georgia as a teenager, made his way to Europe and enlisted in the French Army at the outbreak of the war. While recuperating from wounds suffered in the trenches, he was given the opportunity to enter flight training and flew combat missions with a French Squadron.Thirty-eight Americans passed through the squadron ranks during its existence as an all-American unit. Ultimately, twelve would die before the war’s end. Of the other American pilots flying with French units, another forty-six would not survive the war. Many died wearing American uniforms, having made the transfer to the US Army Air Service. Lufbery himself was a US Army Major when finally shot down in 1918. Sixty-eight out of the one hundred-eighty didn’t make it – proof that the “glamorous” profession was, in reality, a most dangerous one.

The legacy of the Lafayette pilots continues today within the US and French Air Forces. The historical lineage of the 103rd Pursuit Squadron is directly tied to today’s 94th Fighter Squadron flying F-22s at Langley Air Force Base. The Lafayette Squadron itself never ceased to exist with the French – its current pilots now fly Mirage 2000Ns based at Luxeuil Air Base, France. A movement started in the mid-1920’s to build a fitting monument to America’s first combat aviators and symbolize the Franco-American military relationship. The French government granted eight acres of land on the edge of Paris towards the effort, and with funding provided largely by the wealthy families of many Lafayette pilots, the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial became a reality. It was inaugurated on 4 July 1928 in a ceremony attended by an estimated 10,000 people.

The name belies the true intent of the memorial – it pays tribute to all American volunteer pilots that flew with the French. The names of the sixty-eight pilots who died are etched on both sides of the grand facades of the memorial’s soaring arch.Beneath the memorial lies a crypt with sixty-eight sarcophagi, forty-nine of which contain actual remains (some pilots’ families chose to bury their loved ones closer to home – and for others, no remains existed). The crypt is also the resting place for its French commander, Lt Col Georges Thenault, along with French General Antonin Brocard, who was influential in establishing the squadron.

A $1.5 million endowment was provided in 1930 by an American, William Cromwell, to create a private Franco-American “Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Foundation” to care for the monument. The Foundation’s other missions were to provide for suitable ceremonies, to “keep alive in the hearts of men the spirit which inspired the members of the Escadrille Lafayette and the Flying Corps,” and to educate French and American youth on the histories of their respective countries and the sacrifices men made in the defense of freedom. The Foundation continues to exist today, but faces serious financial challenges. Eighty years took its toll both on the monument and the resources left to sustain it. In the late 1990’s, its white surfaces were covered in black soot, marble floors were breaking up and the crypt was regularly invaded with water. Senior Air Force leadership took note and spearheaded an effort that lead to a US government grant in 2003 of $2 million to renovate the memorial. The French government concurrently donated $1 million of its own.

The grants were a lifesaver for the Memorial – but the challenge is far from over. This eighty year-old monument looks outstanding from an external point of view, but renovation work revealed further problems needing repair that exceeded the grants’ funding. Another challenge is sustainment. The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial requires systematic maintenance to prevent returning to its previous deteriorated state. Surfaces require periodic cleaning and sealing, structural integrity demands regular inspections by engineers, and someone has to cut the grass, provide security, and pay the water and electric bills. An effort was started about six years ago to find a long-term care solution for the Memorial, buttressed by the steadfast support of General Moseley and Secretary Wynne. Ambassador Craig Stapleton, the US Ambassador to France at the time, bolstered the effort by highlighting the needs of the Memorial to the Bush Administration.

The stars were lined up for Presidential action to bring the monument under US care…until the unplanned change in USAF leadership. The lack of senior AF advocacy coupled with the change of the White House administration brought the effort to a quiet halt. The Lafayette Escadrille Memorial Foundation needs a minimum of $100,000 a year to maintain the monument and its surrounding grounds. Unfortunately, the Foundation has less than a year’s worth of operating funds left and lacks the resources to conduct active fundraising (total donations last year were less than $3000). The fate of the Memorial and the aviators buried there is unknown once the Foundation is forced to cease operations. The Marines have Belleau Wood, the Navy has the “USS Constitution,” and the Army has battlefield monuments throughout the world that testify to their heritage and growth as services. The USAF also has a stunning memorial across from the Pentagon honoring it as a military service, but we’ve got another one honoring the actual men who represent our genesis – the Lafayette Escadrille Memorial.

If one has the means to assist the Foundation in maintaining this memorial to America’s first combat aviators or would like to arrange an escorted visit, please contact the Foundations Treasurer, Mr Alexander Blumrosen at [email protected] , +33 -1-4318-8080.