Leaving Norfolk

03/03/2011

03/03/2011 –

[slidepress gallery=’uss-bainbridge-leaves-norfolk’]

Credit text and photos: U.S. Navy Visual Service, January 4th, 2011
  • The first photo shows sailors on the Sea and Anchor detail hauling in the mooring lines aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge as the ship prepares to leave Naval Station Norfolk.
  • The second photo shows tugboats pull the guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge away from the pier as the ship leaves Naval Station Norfolk. Bainbridge departed on a scheduled deployment to the Mediterranean Sea and the U.S. 6th Fleet area of responsibility.
  • The third photo shows friends and family members watch from the pier as the guided-missile destroyer USS Bainbridge pulls out of port.

Transporting Fuel

CLR-15 Marines Transport Fuel with Afghan Local Nationals


Credit Text and Video: 1st Marine Logistics Group Public Affairs, January 20th, 2011

 

Marines with Combat Logistics Regiment 15 (Forward), 1st Marine Logistics Group (Forward) escort local nationals delivering fuel to Marines of 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment.

The U.S. Military and Bahrain

02/24/2011

The U.S. Military and Bahrain

By Dr. Richard Weitz

02/24/2011 – One of the most important U.S. Navy bases in the world is located a few miles from the site of the mass protests in Bahrain: the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet. There are presently more than 2,000 American military personnel, and several thousand more support contractors working in the 100-acre command facility in Jaffair suburb of the capital city of Manama. If one includes their families, then the U.S. military community in Bahrain exceeds 6,000 people.

(Credit:  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/bahrain-locator-map/article1912360/?from=1910989)

The base has been providing food, fuel, water, and other supplies to the U.S. Navy ships operating in the Persian Gulf, which has some 2.5 million square miles of water, for more than half a century. The U.S. Navy first started using Bahrain’s port during the 1940s and in 1950, began leasing headquarters space from the British.

In 1971, the British government was compelled to reconcile the imbalance between its global security commitments and its declining resources by transferring its Gulf security role, and the Bahrain base, to the United States.

The U.S. Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), its successor NAVCENT (a naval component of U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM), and the Fifth Fleet since its reactivation in July 1995 (following its disbandment at the end of World War II) have had their headquarters in Bahrain. In 1999, the name of the base was changed from Administrative Support Unit Bahrain to Naval Support Activity Bahrain to reflect its broader support role

Like NAVCENT, with which it shares the same headquarters, the Fifth Fleet reports to CENTCOM. The Sailors, Marines and civilians assigned to Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (COMUSNAVCENT), an Echelon II command, and Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet (COMFIFTHFLT), an Echelon III command, support all naval operations in CENTCOM’s area of responsibility. COMUSNAVCENT/ COMFIFTHFLT has fulfilled the roles of both a naval component command and as the fleet command since the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Ships rotationally deploy to the U.S. Fifth Fleet from the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets, though a few small vessels are based in the Gulf for longer periods.  Perhaps the most important functions of the Bahrain naval base is to coordinate and support U.S. Navy operations in the Persian Gulf and surrounding regions. The island of Bahrain itself is located halfway down the Persian Gulf just off the coast of Saudi Arabia and near the coast of Iran.

Only a few small U.S. Navy ships such as minesweepers are stationed at the Bahrain naval base on a regular basis, mostly anchored offshore, though the Pentagon has commenced a half-billion dollar project to double the base’s size with the Bahraini government constructing jetties to allow the ships to moor closer to the shore. In May 1999, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first U.S. aircraft carrier to dock at Bahrain in more than 60 years. The only previous carrier visit occurred in 1948, when the much smaller 11,373-tonne escort carrier USS Rendova docked in Bahrain port.

But the entire Fifth Fleet, run out of Bahrain, normally has Carrier Strike Group, Amphibious Ready Group or Expeditionary Strike Group, and other ships and aircraft with approximately 25,000 military personnel serving afloat and 3,000 support personnel ashore in Bahrain.

These naval forces typically represent some 60-80 percent of all American military forces in the Gulf area.

The base’s logistics and command-and-control functions have become especially important since 2001, when the United States dramatically increased its military presence in the Gulf region.

At present, the Fifth Fleet command controls two carrier battle groups, led by the USS Carl Vinson and the USS Enterprise, and some 30,000 sailors.

Sailors assigned to Electronic Attack Squadron (VAQ) 134 prepare an EA-6B Prowler for a mission at sunset aboard Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group is deployed supporting maritime security operations and theater security cooperation efforts in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of responsibility. (Credit Photo: USN Visual Service, 2/8/11)

The Bahrain base also supports security missions in nearby regions, such as the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and parts of the Indian Ocean such as the coast off East Africa as far south as Kenya. Twenty countries are the Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen.

The vital maritime chokepoints of the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Bob el Mandeb fall within this area.

The Fifth Fleet has played a major role, along with foreign navies, in the operations against Somali-based pirates. Originally concentrated in the Gulf of Aden, the pirates have extended their operations in recent year to other bodies of waters under the Fifth Fleet’s area of responsibility. Their raids now extend deep into the Indian Ocean, both eastward and southward, and threaten an area estimated at some 2.5 million square miles.

The use of so-called “mother ships” is a particularly effective means of conducting long-distance pirate attacks since these vessels, typically seized commercial trawlers, can operate at a much longer distance and for a much longer duration than the traditional Somali pirate skiff. In fact, the pirates will use their skiffs for rapid attacks and then return to the more secure mother ship.

In January 2011, Bahrain assumed a rotational command of Combined Task Force (CTF) 152 for the second time. CTF 152 is a multinational force that interdicts the movement of terrorists, narcotics, arms, or items related to weapons of mass destruction in the Arabian Sea. CTF 152 also provides maritime infrastructure protection and supports regional engagement of maritime partners. Australia, France. Italy, Kuwait, New Zealand, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States have also participated in CTF 152, one of three task forces operated by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a coalition of 25 countries based in Bahrain. Bahrain has provided important support for several vital U.S.-led military campaigns in the region.

The 10-year bilateral defense cooperation agreement signed in October 1991, and renewed in 2001, gives the U.S. Air Force access to Bahrain’s air bases, allows the Pentagon to preposition defense material in Bahrain, and provides for joint military training and mutual consultations in a crisis. The United States has flown combat missions from Bahrain’s Shaykh Isa Air Base in Operation Desert Shield/Storm during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) since October 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), which commenced with the Anglo-American invasion of Baghdad in March 2003.

Bahrain was a founding member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1991, along with Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. As part of its security commitments to fellow GCC members Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain hosted almost 20,000 U.S. troops and several hundred U.S. combat aircraft during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Bahrain’s combat planes and a small ground force also joined the coalition campaign to defend Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. More than 1,000 U.S. forces remained in Bahrain in the 1990s to help contain Iraq.

During this period, Bahrain hosted the regional headquarters for U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq. It did the same for the U.S.-led Multinational Interdiction Force (MIF) that enforced U.N. sanctions against Iraq after 1991. The government of Bahrain acceded to the request of fellow GCC member Kuwait to deploy the Peninsula Shield, the GCC’s collective military force, in the period before and during the launching of OIF in March 2003. In 2008, Bahrain appointed a new ambassador to Baghdad, despite the refusal of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to do likewise due to their differences with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Shiite-led government.

Due to its location, the Bahrain base currently provides essential support for U.S. military operations designed to protect freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, especially for the vital oil deliveries that proceed through the 29-mile Strait of Hormuz near the Gulf’s entrance.

This energy flow amounts for more than one-fifth of the world’s petroleum shipments. In addition to the independent operations of the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Team, the Fifth Fleet engages in joint exercises and theater security cooperation with the militaries of Bahrain and other GCC members.

Since the overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iran has presented the main threat to these vital sea lanes. In any major military conflict involving Tehran, and obvious Iranian move would be to threaten to, or actually attack, the ships sailing in the Gulf or the vital offshore energy platforms of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the other GCC members.

Despite its ambitions, the GCC remains primarily a diplomatic rather than a military alliance. Its members would have difficulty protecting their critical infrastructure in the event of a war with Tehran without U.S. military support. Tiny Bahrain, with a population of not more half a million people, would be quickly overwhelmed despite the strong commitment of the Saudi monarchy to their fellow rulers in Bahrain. The Saudis constructed a causeway to Bahrain in the 1980s so that Saudi military forces could more easily rush to Bahrain’s aid, but this intervention would be to counter domestic disturbances, perhaps supported by Iran, rather than a direct Iranian attack.

In the mid-1990s, the Saudi government dispatched troops to help secure Bahrain from domestic terrorist bombings. The Saudis might do the same thing if the current wave of unrest becomes more threatening to the regime. The current Iranian regime has formally accepted U.N. Security Council Resolution 278, which affirmed Bahrain’s right to independence in 1970 despite earlier claims by the Iranian regime that Bahrain was Iran’s 14th province based on the control past Iranian dynasties exercised over the island.. Bahrain joined the UN and the Arab League when it gained formal independence in 1971. Like the other Gulf countries, Bahrain has extensive economic ties with Iran.

Still, the presence of a Shiite majority in a Sunni-ruled country naturally evokes concern about Iranian subversion of the current Bahrain regime.

Certain Iranian political leaders, clerics, and media commentaries have repeatedly questioned the appropriateness of the U.N. decision. The governments of Bahrain in turn has contested Iran’s nuclear weapons intentions, with Bahrain’s leaders expressing greater concern in public that Tehran seeks nuclear weapons than most of their fellow GCC states.

Although the current wave of protests by Bahrain’s majority Shiite population appears due to homegrown grievances, Iran would presumably welcome the overthrow of the pro-American monarchy in Bahrain and the possible eviction of U.S. forces from another Middle Eastern country.

The United States might be able to find another headquarters facility in the Persian Gulf, but it is unlikely to prove as hospitable as the one in Bahrain. American military personnel are not confined to certain compounds or residential communities for foreigners and their families are allowed to live with them in Bahrain.

Thus far, the protesters have not expressed anti-American sentiments but confined their demands to greater democracy for the majority Shiites.

The Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) consists of an air force, air defense, army, navy, and royal guard units. The BDF has some 13,000 personnel, most of whom in the army, as well as another 1,200 National Guard members. The coast guard and public security forces are separate elements that fall under the authority of the Minister of the Interior. The BDF has sent small troop contingents to the military operations in Afghanistan.

The most recent contribution has been a small police special security force. During both OEF and OIF, Bahrain also sent its U.S.-supplied frigate, the Subha, to help protect U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf. But the focus of the BDF is on homeland defense. The United States provides some security assistance to the country’s armed forces, including subsidizing some arms sales and training BDF personnel of various rank to the United States.

The U.S. Office of Military Cooperation is attached to the U.S. Embassy in Bahrain manages this security assistance. During the past decade, Bahrain has acquired $1.4 billion worth of arms from the United States, a figure that includes both the hardware and the extensive contractor support, ammunition, upgrades, and other components of these sophisticated systems.

Major weapons systems have included main battle tanks, Apache and Cobra attack helicopters, F-16C/D warplanes, and MLRS missile launchers with ATACMS. In recent years, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency has reported sales of 180 “Javelin” anti-armor missiles, 60M Blackhawk helicopters; Bell search and recovery helicopters, and a couple dozen AMRAAMs and associated equipment. The United States has been supplying advanced air and missile defense systems to Bahrain and other GCC members to help them establish a collective missile shield against Iran in collaboration with U.S. forces based in the region.

Due to Bahrain’ s limited defense budget (around $600 million each year, or some one-fifth of the annual government budget) and limited oil income from its depleted reserves and an offshore Saudi oil field sold on Bahrain’s behalf, some of these transfers are subsidized by the U.S. government.

Since 1993, Bahrain has received more than $400 million worth of excess defense articles (EDA) and approximately $200 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The focus of this financial support is to help make the Bahraini armed forces more interoperable with U.S. military forces. In March 2002, Washington designated Bahrain as a “major non-NATO ally,” which has facilitated arms sales.

The United States also provides Bahrain with International Military Education and Training Funds as well as counterterrorism funding under the Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De-Mining and Related Programs, used to sustain Bahrain’s counterterrorism capabilities and interdict terrorists. U.S. military aid to Bahrain in 2010 amounted to some $20 million.

The level of further U.S. weapons sales to Bahrain will partly depend on whether the BDF uses earlier U.S.-supplied weapons inappropriately against the demonstrators.

Appendix: Current  Fifth Fleet Task Forces

CTF 50 – Strike forces: Plans & conducts strike operations. Commanded by a Carrier Strike Group Commander.

CTF 51 – Contingency Response: Plans & conducts contingency response missions.

CTF 52 – Mine Warfare: Provides command & control of all mine warfare assets in the region.

CTF 53 – Logistics: Provides logistics support to the Fleet, including underway replenishment by Military Sealift Command-operated ships.

CTF 54 – Submarine Forces: Commands operation of U.S. submarine forces (SSN/SSGN) and coordinates theatre-wide Anti-Submarine Warfare matters.

CTF 55 – Surface Forces: Controls surface forces such as USN Patrol Craft, U.S. Coast Guard patrol boats.

CTF 56 – Expeditionary Combat Forces: Controls Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Coastal Warfare, SeaBees, Expeditionary Logistics SupportForces and Riverine Forces.

CTF 57 – Maritime Patrol Forces: Conducts maritime surveillance and reconnaissance operations region wide.

CTF 58 – Contingency Task Force: A specified task force stood up to provide command and control to designated missions.

CTF 59 – Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief: Plans and conducts humanitarian assistance/disaster response missions such as to earthquakes, cyclones and oil spill response.

CTF IA – Individual Augmentee: Ensures Individual Augmentees deployed to the region receive the assistance they need.

CTF IM – Iraqi Maritime: Supports the Government of Iraq in maintaining the integrity of Iraqi territorial waters and the defense of the Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya oil terminals. Additionally, CTF-IM synchronises maritime efforts with U.S. Forces – Iraq to transition those tasks to the Iraqi Navy and Iraqi Marines.

CTF Shore Battlespace – Shore Battlespace: Coordinates all facility and security support for shore installations in the AOR.

Providing New Capabilities for the Ground Warrior

Lt. General Deptula on Gorgon Stare

02/24/2011 –

(Provided by Lt. General Deptula)(Provided by Lt. Gen. Deptula)

SLD:  What does Gorgon Stare bring to the warfighting table?

Lt. Gen. Deptula: The Gorgon Stare program was developed to meet the ever-increasing demand for motion video from joint forces deployed in Afghanistan.

What motion video accomplishes at the most basic level is to increase a user’s situation awareness of what’s around him or her.  That’s why it’s in such demand. Gorgon Stare is a pod set.  It is two pods carried onboard an MQ-9 Reaper.  It’s about thousand pounds in weight.

It is a series of optical instruments integrated together to provide a wide area image about the size of a small village.  Today, the sensors onboard an MQ-1 Predator or an MQ-9 Reaper only provide a soda straw-like look at a very small area.  Gorgon Stare provides a simultaneous view of the entirety of a small village.

Within that area, it can send ten motion video clips to ten separate receivers on the ground.  That’s directly without any processing.

After a bit of processing of the Gorgon Stare data stream, it will be able to send out up to 65 separate video images or clips inside that area to 65 separate users. Right-off the bat then you can dramatically increase the delivery to the end user of the video image. Right now you’re only sending one video image down for each remotely piloted aircraft–with Gorgon Stare we’ll be able to distribute up to 65 motion video clips to 65 separate users per RPA.  Why wouldn’t anybody want to achieve that acomplishment?

So to highlight the capabilities:

  • The ability to view an entire village vice a couple of hundred feet per video clip;
  • Increasing the video feed DIRECTLY to forces on the ground by an order of magnitude from a single aircraft;
  • With some processing, increasing the distribution of video to up to 65 separate personnel with receivers;
  • Dramatically increasing the information feed available to “second-tier” users (meaning other levels of command). value of gorgon stare

SLD:  So you’ve got three advantages right off the bat.  One, the coverage is greater.  Secondly, you can broadcast directly to an individual soldier.  And thirdly, you can go to a process station that can then reconfigure it.  So, it won’t get jammed, for example, just by that distribution you’ve created a jamming nightmare for an adversary because of the distribution.

Plus, I assume also, because it’s a pod that happens to currently on the Reaper, but it doesn’t have to be on the Reaper, you could put it on a different system.  So, it’s independent of the platform, so to speak.

Lt. Gen. Deptula: Absolutely.  But by the way, this is why we in the Air Force stopped producing MQ-1 Predators, because they simply didn’t have the payload capacity of the Reaper.  Believe it or not there were people in the Pentagon who were upset with this decision to stop buying Predators because Reapers were individually more expensive.  On one system we may pay twice as much for the platform, but we are going to get 65 times more motion video.  It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out the overarching value for what you get is much, much more.  In fact with respect to motion video it’s up to 33 times more cost effective.

SLD:  People tend to confuse the initial cost of an individual platform with the cost of a deployed asset or a fleet of assets that yield value for money.

Lt. Gen. Deptula: Right. Here’s the other piece that has tended to lose some people.  It is very hard for people to break away from focusing on platforms or the aircraft and get them to think about the output that comes off of these platforms.

And so the nominal approach for some in high places in the Pentagon is to focus on increasing the number of aircraft that host motion video to gain more orbits.  Well it’s not the Orbits that are flown by the aircraft that matter; it’s the output coming off the host aircraft.

So, we are now buying 15 more orbits of MQ-9s to deploy to Afghanistan at some point in time.  However, there’s no more ramp space to put the additional 15 orbits-worth of aircraft.

If Gorgon Stare pods were procured instead, we could dramatically increase the motion video output of the MQ-9s we already possess, and achieve a much greater effect in providing the forces on the ground what they need than we would by buying more aircraft to fly single-ball sensors.

(Provided by Lt. General Deptula)(Provided by Lt. General Deptula)

SLD: My favorite term is C4ISR-D to refer to the point of why you have C4ISR, namely to make better decisions at the appropriate level.  The fact that I’m giving this video to individual soldiers in a real situation, whether they need to be reassured of what’s in front and around them.  And also to anticipate what they’re going to have to do.  It goes directly to them to use now.

Lt. Gen. Deptula: People don’t understand that.  Many are concerned about what we are going to do with all this data that’s coming these increased output capabilities?  Some are concerned that we are not going to be able to process all of it.  Well, part of the solution is that the best processor of this information when it goes directly to a warfighter in the battlespace, is the processor that exists between his or her two ears.  There is value in simply increasing the situation awareness of our fighters on the edge of the battlespace.

This is game changing technology because it will dramatically increase the situation awareness of our deployed warfighters by well over an order of magnitude than what we can provide today

SLD:  And you’re directly giving him extends his range of  vision to deal with a COIN combat situation.  So it increases his competence and capacity. But beyond that, what you just described is a major improvement of an ability of a combat soldier to survive, prevail and succeed.

Much of the criticism published to date about Gorgon Stare seems to miss the point entirely of what the system was designed to do.  Also, the criticisms are driven by a pre-decisional, draft report that was significantly revised before its actual release.

Lt. Gen. Deptula: Part of the problem is the test program was using means to measure Gorgon Stare effectiveness that were not related to what the capabilities that the system provides.  They were looking at a motion video clip.  They stop the clip, they blow up an image from one of the stop-motion video clips, and then they determine that the resolution of the stationary clip did not measure up to fixed imagery standards—well it’s not designed to fixed imagery standards.

They were using measures of merit for fixed imagery, not appropriate for this program or mission.  It is not meant to achieve high resolution of a still picture.  It’s meant to provide images of motion activity.  That’s why that the final test report was different than the draft test report—those kind of mismatches of analysis to the designed effects were finally adjusted.

Nobody’s claiming that this first iteration of wide-area airborne surveillance is perfect. The reason we have tests is to determine what is it that’s not working so that we can fix it and move on.

But throwing your hands up in the air because “oh my gosh, guess what… a test program identified some things that need to be fixed.” That’s not a surprise; that’s why we do tests.

SLD:  This gets to the question of acquisition processes.  And what people have forgotten is acquisition is about buying things.  And here is an example of buying the 80% solution and putting it into the field relatively quickly.  So this is exactly what Secretary Gates asked for but critics are commenting on having greater performance and then deploying.  This is not the process we are looking at right now to augment capabilities for the ground forces at risk today.

Lt. Gen. Deptula: Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good enough.  Get me a 70-percent solution that we can get out there now, as opposed to years from now.

The Evolution of Hypersonics and Its Impact on the Future of Warfare, Part I

02/24 /2011 – In January 2011, Second Line of Defense sat down with Professor Lewis to discuss the current status and dynamics of hypersonics.  Mark J. Lewis is chairman of Clark School’s Department of Aerospace Engineering at the University of Maryland, College Park, and President of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He was the chief scientist of the U.S. Air Force from 2004 to 2008.

For the X-15 Test Flight (Credit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0qGNEmDMVDU)For the X-51 Test Flight
Credit: www.youtube.com

SLD: Can you give us an update on how the hypersonics programs are going?

Professor Lewis: We’ve just come off a phenomenal year in hypersonics punctuated by three major flights and a host of other smaller, but in some ways, just as significant efforts.  The three major flights were the X-51, the HTV-2 and the X-37.  Each of those was important in its own way.

SLD: Before you review each of the programs might you clarify what is a flight test program and what do you have to do to achieve success?

Lewis: I’m delighted you asked that question because that was actually something I focused a lot of attention on when I was working for Air Force Secretary Mike Wynne, the whole question of what is “flight test?”

And I argue that flight test is experimentation; it means that you put a vehicle in the air to learn, to explore the frontiers of science and technology. When you do that it should always be with an eye towards how you apply that technology to a realistic, practical, operational system.

I think it is important to draw a distinction between “flight test” and “flight demonstration”.  There were lots of people I’d run into in the Pentagon and outside of the Beltway who wanted to do flight “demonstration” – in my definition, demonstration means I’m simply trying to prove something that I already know.  To me is a generally worthless thing to do.  If you already know it, you don’t have to prove it! If it works, no one really cares, you already knew the answer; and even worse, if you fail, you have just fallen flat on your face.

The contrast is what I think of as flight test, where I know that there are things that I know, and I know that there are things that I don’t know, or at least that I’m not sure about, so I build a vehicle that captures the best of my understanding and the best of my technology. The goal is to push the frontier.

I think the ultimate example of that was the X-15 rocket plane.  That program ran through the 1960’s.  It was a hypersonic aircraft, rocket-powered, dropped from a B-52.  There were 199 flights of the X-15, and every single one was designed to gather data, to learn more about the system, to learn about the flight regime, to understand how we build a realistic vehicle that flies faster than about five times the speed of sound.

X-15 (Credit: http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/waverider/index.html)
X-51 (Credit: http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/military/waverider/index.html)

The X-15 was never intended as an operational vehicle, but the physics that we learned, the engineering that we learned, the problems that we solved, were absolutely instrumental in a range of other programs, including manned space flight activities leading up to the space shuttle.

SLD: Could you explain what hypersonics is exactly?

Lewis: Hypersonics is generally considered to be flight in excess of about five times the speed of sound, or Mach five.  There’s no hard and fast definition by the way, so the definition is a bit fuzzy.  Unlike when flow goes from subsonic to supersonic and the physics actually changes very dramatically, as the flow goes from supersonic to hypersonic the changes are somewhat more subtle.

Interestingly, in the Russian language, there is no word for hypersonic; they just refer to high supersonic speeds. At hypersonic speeds, the surfaces of most vehicles under typical flight conditions become so hot that the chemistry of the air can start to become important.  That’s the reason we use the term hypersonic. Also, most of us know that a vehicle flying faster than the speed of sound generates a shock wave in front – that’s a sudden jump in pressure and temperature – but at hypersonic speeds, that shock wave is pressed very, very close to the surface of the vehicle, and that changes the aerodynamics considerably as compared to lower speeds.

SLD: Could you describe then the characteristics of hypersonic vehicles?

Lewis: I think about hypersonic vehicles inhabiting two general categories.

The first category includes vehicles that are meant to be decelerators; that is, they are designed to slow down.  For example, spacecraft coming back from orbit, including the Space Shuttle, an Apollo capsule, a spacecraft entering the atmosphere of Mars, all of those are designed to be slowing down on their way to a planet’s surface from space.   They’re all hypersonic though; when the Space Shuttle first enters the atmosphere on its way back home, it’s flying at about 24 times the speed of sound. That’s clearly hypersonic flight, but the goal is to slow down.

Then there are vehicles at the other end of the spectrum.  They’re the ones that are more difficult to design and build, and the ones for which we have much less experience. Those are vehicles that are designed to either cruise at constant speed or accelerate – speed up – as they go through the atmosphere.

Each of those vehicles types has its own set of challenges.  The biggest problem that we run into for all vehicles is that at hypersonic speeds, as I mentioned previously, heating becomes very important, and the sharper your vehicle’s leading edges are, the sharper the surfaces are, the hotter they get.

The general rule of thumb on a hypersonic vehicle is that, if we want to prevent the leading surfaces from melting, we make those surfaces big and thick and blunt.  You know that the heat shield on an Apollo spacecraft was a big, blunt, round object.  The leading edges on the Space Shuttle wings are also rather thick and blunt.  Having thick and blunt leading edges also means that there’s lots of drag, which really is not a difficulty for something like a Space Shuttle.  Remember, the space shuttle wants to slow down on its way back from space.

Launch of HTV-2 (Credit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjNugnGWaBU)

Launch of HTV-2 (Credit: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DjNugnGWaBU)

 

 

Now, if we want to build an accelerating vehicle, or one that’s just going to cruise, says a missile or an airplane, we need to have low drag. That means we have to build it with sharp leading edges, and those are going to get hot at hypersonic speeds.

So when we talk about hypersonics today, implicit in that definition is hypersonics applied to things that can accelerate, things that can spend a lot of time in the atmosphere, which in turn means slender, low drag shapes. That’s the technology frontier that we’re working on right now.

Think about what we could do with that type of vehicle, what I term a “low drag, high lift”, hypersonic vehicle.  There are three main categories for this sort of craft.

The first is the weapons category, including high-speed cruise missiles and maneuvering re-entry vehicles for long-range strike.

The second category is airplanes. This would include a high-speed reconnaissance airplane, perhaps a penetrating ISR platform, sometimes called the “SR-72”.  That craft might be designed to perform an SR-71 type mission, but do it at much higher speed to be less vulnerable.

And the third category is access to space, the category of hypersonic vehicles that might fly into space more like an airplane and less like a rocket. I call that the holy grail of hypersonics because if we can do that, if we can build a vehicle that works that way, we’ve suddenly opened up space to be very much more responsive and more accessible.  Imagine being able to fly into space with something that operates more like an airplane and less like a rocket. We wouldn’t have to spend something like the 4,000 man-months I takes today to prepare the Space Shuttle for launch.  We might instead be able to fly up to orbit on something that is maintained with the ease and accessibility of an airplane.

SLD: What is your sense of the realistic path to progress in the hypersonic area?

Lewis: In my mind, very clearly, the first step in developing hypersonic systems is the weapons application.  It’s the lowest hanging fruit.  It is, frankly, the least technologically challenging, and I think it’s also the biggest short-term payoff.  This includes high-speed weapons, high-speed cruise missiles, high-speed maneuvering re-entry systems that give us responsive long-range strike.  That’s where I see the bulk of our research investment being made today.

Next, the high speed reconnaissance airplane also has many attractive applications, most notably as a gap filler if we lose space assets or to give us ISR capability when space is not available. We can learn about building such an airplane from our experiences developing the weapons systems, since the physics will be similar.

I’ll also mention that there have been a lot of studies into the application of hypersonic systems, and really the most significant of those came in the year 2000, a study called “Why and Whither Hypersonics.”  It was done by the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board, and it was based on a question posed by Secretary Whit Peters, whom, I think, frankly, might have thought that the Air Force was spending too much money in hypersonics.  The study asked the very pointed question of whether hypersonics was a rat hole that money was being dumped down, from which nothing would ever emerge.

The Scientific Advisory Board did an extensive, exhaustive study, complete with a red team that questioned every result, and they came back with a very positive recommendation on what hypersonic technology could do for the Air Force.

Since that time, there have been a number of studies, including several National Academy reports, a number of other Scientific Advisory Board studies, and all have come back and said, “Look, hypersonics can be a real game changer.”  If we can fly somewhere at speeds of Mach 5, 6, 7, 8, or more, that is, if we can reach reasonably long  distances in very short periods of time, that has very important implications in modern warfare.

Modern warfare is about doing things quickly.  It’s about achieving fast effects, getting results quickly.  If you want to affect something quickly, I can think of basically three options.

The first option is that you have ubiquitous presence.  That means you’ve got an asset anywhere you need it.  That asset might be unmanned, and frankly, that’s a lot of what remotely piloted aircraft are enabling for us – having small assets available and re-locatable at a moment’s notice.  Of course, ubiquitous presence is only good in a limited area; we obviously can’t have ubiquitous presence at every location around the globe, but that’s one part of the solution that is already changing warfare.

The second option for doing things quickly is to operate at the speed of light.  For my aerodynamics friends, the speed of light is about a million times faster than the speed of sound. Operating at light speed means using directed energy systems and/or cyber systems, which are among the other things that Mr. Wynne championed when he was Secretary of the Air Force.  And of course, there’s a lot of development underway right now in directed energy systems, and lots of corresponding questions about how we ultimately would deploy them, as well as how we would ultimately use cyber systems.

If you don’t have the first two available, or if they cannot deliver the desired result, a third option is that you get to where you want to go as fast as you possibly can. That’s the advantage of hypersonics. This could be to perform reconnaissance of some sort, do some sensing, or to deliver weapons on a target.  In order to do that, we need to master the technology required to fly at hypersonic speeds.

Hypersonics would also give us a degree of invulnerability.  We know that the application of stealth technologies has been a tremendous game-changer, but that stealth advantage won’t last forever. I would argue that the next step beyond stealth is speed.

There are complicated trade-offs there.  Obviously, when we fly faster we’ll get hotter.  That makes the vehicle more observable, but the combination of both stealth and speed in some overall way is a very attractive combination for future systems.

If we look at those applications, we can ask, “what are the technical challenges,” and one I’ve already posed is that when we fly faster we tend to get hotter, so first it’s a challenge of materials.  It’s also a challenge in aerodynamic design; this is a realm of aerodynamics where there are still some very basic questions to which we don’t have complete answers.  In some cases these are questions that we can answer satisfactorily at lower speeds, but we can’t answer them at higher speeds.

But the biggest challenge, perhaps, is that of propulsion.  If we want to fly through the atmosphere at hypersonic speed, we will need a very special type of engine or a category of engines that will enable us to do that.  And so that’s properly where the bulk of our technology investments are being made.

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Complementary links

The JTRS Infrastructure

Enabling Cost Effective Capability

02/24/2011 – In December, Second Line of Defense sat down with Marty Jenkins of Lockheed Martin to discuss the Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System or AMF JTRS.  This is a significant program which can help re-shape interactive connectivity.

This is the third of a three-part interview. The full interview with comments is available in a Special Report which can be downloaded here……

SLD: With the JTRS infrastructure, we can re-work the relationships among the deployed platforms and have a more effective command structure mimicking what you described is how younger people organize themselves?

Marty Jenkins: We’re talking more distributed, collaborative command and control structure. With peer-to-peer networking, you enable all levels to have better visibility on what’s happening in the battle space.  Better visibility on who from the U.S.-led coalition are in the area…and what they’re doing. And by sharing information in this high data rate collaborative environment, you’d also have a better picture of the enemy forces.

The commander is copying all of this networking peer-to-peer and can really enable command by negation; so the chain of Command can watch what’s going on rather having to ask for information and the direct specific actions; Commanders can be more of a coordinator, not only more efficient, but much more effective.

Because everyone has better visibility on what’s going on and who’s involved, you use your assets more effectively, more efficiently; you can save U.S. lives; you can kill or disable more of the enemy forces and you make much, much better use of your scarce resources.

SLD: And with this kind of capability, as I fold in the new assets like F-35 and LCS, and can shape new ways to use their capabilities.

Jenkins: Yes. Let’s talk air-to-air operations in a denied-access area. Right now you have aircraft that are designed primarily to go into denied-access areas in a flight of two or flight of four and network among themselves.  Any information they generate on what’s happening on the ground or in the air is somewhat perishable and remains only with that flight.

If you see a mobile launcher on the ground it’s mobile, that information is perishable but in the current infrastructure you have almost no way to move that information out of the denied-access area and to someone who could make a decision or get another asset in or take an action to address something that that flight of two or flight of four has discovered That could range from a ballistic missile launch to a mobile SAM, to troops moving, to enemy ships with supersonic ship-killing missiles.  hiding in merchant traffic.

Mission of AMTRS: To develop and field interoperable, affordable, secure, wireless networking capabilities for the Joint Forces through an innovative enterprise business model.  From JPEO JTRS Strat Plan 2010 (Credit: http://www.public.navy.mil/jpeojtrs/About%20JTRS/2010_Strat_Plan_May_24.pdf)Mission of AMTRS: To develop and field interoperable, affordable, secure, wireless networking capabilities for the Joint Forces through an innovative enterprise business model.  From JPEO JTRS Strat Plan 2010 (Credit: http://www.public.navy.mil/jpeojtrs/About%20JTRS/2010_Strat_Plan_May_24.pdf)

SLD: Because so much of this is machine driven, it could be thrown into various nodes that can deliver to different players in the actionable environment that you’re describing.

Jenkins: So if we looked at operations today, you have aircraft in flight that has a dedicated frequency on a dedicated hardwired radio that they’re using to communicate. If you don’t have connectivity from that radio to a node or people outside the area you’re in, you’re not going to be sharing that information. If information falls in the forest and you can’t get it to a decision maker, does it have any effect?

And the answer really is no, but, with AMF JTRS we want to have that flexibility in the future.  So I don’t have a link network; I don’t have a C2 network; I don’t have an ISR network. I have a network where information can move pretty seamlessly from UHF to VHF to HF to EHF to CDL and the device will enable that by translating it, getting it to the right frequency, the right waveform, and the right path.

And suddenly the C2, the command and control of flights in the air, becomes similar to what it would be in the littoral or on the ground.  That peer-to-peer information is now shared with a larger force in real time so that decisions can be made at a low level or at the commander level to prosecute or not, increase assets or not.

SLD:  And if we go to the new platforms that are coming down, this can solve a couple crucial problems that F-35 should be an important army asset and it’ll be flying in battle space very significant to the ground fighter, but the way we set this up so far, the Army that will go out and buy redundant platforms.

If the data can be communicated to them, they’re not going to really care about the platform, which is delivering the information.  But we’re going to have the F-35 in the battle space generating significant data relevant to the ground forces. So the Army is just cutting itself out of an enormous amount of data relevant to their survival and their viability if they don’t have this kind of JTRS infrastructure to deliver the data.

Jenkins: The F-35 is by far the most capable aircraft ever designed, ever being built; it has networking capabilities, information collection, and command and control capabilities that are almost serendipitous to the aircraft itself.

AMF JTRS can better enable current and future platforms to distribute the information in real time so that it can be triaged, analyzed, and used in near real time.  Also, to connect troops on the ground to be able to communicate with each other or with air platforms, you’re going through a fairly laborious process with several communication nodes that must exist…and be preplanned to be in position…to operate at all.

SLD:  Many gateways.

Jenkins: Gateways and relays, and a very laborious process. For example, in planning to support a SEAL team, a Marine unit, an Army unit, you’d have to preplan airborne assets to be able to make sure that you have connectivity even over a voice system or SINGARS (Single-Channel Ground-Air Radio System) or EPLRS (Enhanced Position Location Reporting System) to be able to communicate.  EPLRS by the way goes through a satellite infrastructure that is used globally, so if you’re using it in theater, you could be standing in line behind somebody working at the National Training Center in California – it can be the same satellite, same channel.  There is no prioritization. You might happen to be in a firefight and the satellite just takes whatever came first, processes that data; you could wait a couple of minutes for your information to process.




The Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) family of software defined tactical radios are key to delivering legacy interoperability and networking capabilities to the mounted and dismounted warfighters. HMS radios enable cost-effective net-centric warfare to the individual soldier at the first tactical mile. (Credit: http://www.public.navy.mil/jpeojtrs/Pages/gallery.aspx)
The Handheld, Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) family of software defined tactical radios are key to delivering legacy interoperability and networking capabilities to the mounted and dismounted warfighters. HMS radios enable cost-effective net-centric warfare to the individual soldier at the first tactical mile. (Credit: http://www.public.navy.mil/jpeojtrs/Pages/gallery.aspx)




As AMF JTRS enables airborne, ground and ship IP infrastructure, JTRS becomes the gateway…as part of the design…that moves information in priority, picking best path to get to the destination instead of relying on a single path.  And, as you populate operating forces with this capability, the need to preplan dedicated gateways well in advance is significantly reduced. Every JTRS node is a gateway and relay that creates the Network mesh. With IP enabled, web based planning; you can also modify network plans in stride, in real time. That may be as straightforward as frequency changes or as complex as moving assets slightly to create and broaden the mesh.

SLD:  The point is it’s an infrastructure that’s platform agnostic.

Jenkins: Correct.  AMF JTRS is platform agnostic.  To see the advantages of IP systems to manage communications, you can go to the AT&T network operation center up in New Jersey; they’re a global network op center.  They are monitoring their network – largely an IP network worldwide.

They’re not only able to have visibility on the network, they’re able to shift around so they can move things through an undersea cable or a satellite as the network gets saturated and they can be predictive. “By the way, watch in about 15 minutes the network’s going to get clobbered because American Idol’s on.”  That kind of predictive ability and network visibility is central to their ability to manage their global network.  And they do this with a small number of people.

SLD: And I am sure the military is not working with such a small number in the military sector.

Jenkins: For example, on a ship right now, on an aircraft carrier it probably has 35 sailors on watch in the communications spaces at any given time.

SLD: And these types of cost savings do not figure into GAO reports.

Jenkins: It is part of the problem of doing cost comparisons, when you do not look at manpower to manage communication networks or their effectiveness is using joint or coalition assets.

When we initially looked at cost comparison between JTRS devices, the comparison was with legacy radios. It’s like saying, “I’m going to make a cost comparison between my telephone and my computer.”  It’s really not even apples and oranges, it’s more like fruit to vegetables; it’s a fundamental difference.

So when we look at total life cycle cost, we’re looking at the cost of a device itself, how long is it going to exist, what does it replace, what’s the maintenance cost, what’s the repair cost, what’s the cost in manpower and training, etc.  If you just look at a single variable, and say, “We’re bringing in a device that can replace multiple legacy radios”, you’ve missed the rest of the story.  Although, replacing legacy radios is an important factor. Right now on a Navy ship, you’d find many single purpose radios.  With AMF JTRS devices that do multiple channel, multi-frequency with a lot of built in agility, the reductions in current inventory of single-focus radios goes way down. The focus shifts from boxes to channels…and you might be able to replace several legacy radios with one AMF JTRS device.

SLD: And there are the logs issues, including parts and training.

Jenkins: The training.  Exactly.  But it’s more than that because right now the cost and fuel and time of having assets that are either dedicated relays or prepositioned gateways costs flight time, fuel, etc.

With JTRS, I can do a lot more mission with the assets I have in any given timeframe or I can do the same mission with a lot less platform assets; it saves money, fuel, time, and it’s more than just the total life cycle cost of the device.

E.T.I. Team

02/20/2011

The Equipment for Technological Intervention Team (E.T.I. Team)

Function :

This Equipment makes it possible a Technological Intervention Team (T.I. Team) CBRN incident. The detachment is armed with specific materials making it possible to ensure the following functions :

  • To delimit the zone of intervention.
  • To carry out surveys and to collect information on the contamination.
  • To treat victims of contamination and immediate populations.
  • To detect and locate the source of the contamination.
  • To evaluate the risks and to reduce them.
  • To limit the spread of contamination (resolution of the accident).
  • To anticipate the evolution of the disaster.
  • To make safe the transfers and recoveries of radiological elements or products.
  • To support the other operating teams.
  • To take part in the protection of field operatives.
  • To carry out the systematic decontamination of the operatives and the materials (conservative measures).
  • Reconditioning of the “T.I. Team” equipment and personal…

Benefits :

The “T.I. Team” is made up by teams of people qualified in the radiological and chemical They bring an invaluable contribution to the rescue teams involved in the resolution of chemical and radiological incidents. This is thanks to its specialized equipment and constant training of the personnel which man it. The training personnel of BiolabH2O can train teams to the standards according to CBRN reference framework.

Composition :

The specialized equipment available to the Technological Intervention Team (T.I. Team) and the make-up is broken down as follows:

  • Two teams of 5 people called Elements of Intervention Technological (E.L.I.T.), autonomous, complementary and general-purpose for radiological and chemical risks.
  • A team of 2 people called element “analyzes” reinforcing the 2 E.L.I.T.
  • A chief of the E.T.I. Team

The E.T.I. Team represents a weight of approximately 4tons and a volume of 22 m3 The equipment provided varies according to the size of the “E.T.I. Team.”

The Water Storage & Conditioning Module

WSCM


Function :

This module is intended for storage, cooling and conditioning of the drinking water produced, for its distribution and its consumption.

Benefits :

Conditioning constitutes the last link in the chain and must also meet the requirements of the rules of hygiene and regulations.
The MSCE process of conditioning was developed on European and International directives: in compliance with the rules of hygiene and safety concerning products intended for human consumption.
The conditioning units are easy to implement and require little maintenance. The containers used (sachets, bottles) are practical and recyclable.

Composition :

The “bag-filling machine” uses sachets which guarantee the integrity of the treated and stored water.

Main equipment and functions of the module:

  • 2 m3 drinking water storage buffer tank (500 gallons) ;
  • Water transfer pump;
  • Bagging or bottling machine;
  • Bags distribution rack;
  • 3 m3 storage refrigerator