SysAdmin, Author at Second Line of Defense

Lasers: The Last Line of Defense

Posted on February 11, 2011 | by SysAdmin

02/11/2011

By Ambassador (ret) Jon Glassman (Director for Government Policy, Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems) and Dr. Josef Shwartz (Technical Consultant, Marina del Rey, California)

*** The views expressed in this article reflect only the personal views of the authors, neither those of Northrop Grumman Electronic Systems nor the US Government.

02/11 /2011 – Strategic Overview
High energy lasers offer a number of properties that make them particularly attractive for meeting the emerging high-intensity, combined threat of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, remotely piloted aircraft, glide bombs, rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM). High-energy lasers have been successfully tested against RAM and efforts are underway to create at lower power levels mobile land, sea, and air-based laser defenses against traditional and emerging threats (e.g., small boats). At the same time, high-energy lasers have yet to be tested comprehensively against ballistic missile re-entry vehicles (RVs), cruise missiles, high-end remotely–piloted aircraft, and glide bombs. While physical principles and test experience suggest likely success against these threats, additional test data are required to more thoroughly validate laser analyses against ballistic missile RVs.

Credit: http://thejunction.net

While lasers illuminate their targets at speed-of-light, time is needed to inflict the required damage (laser dwell on target) which may vary from a few seconds to several tens of seconds, depending on laser power, beam quality, and target hardness. In order to cope with raids (swarm attacks), shooting timelines need to accommodate the needed dwell time on the initial target plus the time to slew to and dwell on subsequent targets. Alternatively, additional laser and kinetic interceptors can be drawn into a raid engagement, if and as available.

Beyond the basic issue of ability to damage/degrade RVs, it is important to know whether lasers can succeed far enough away from defended objectives should RVs carry nuclear weapons with concomitant blast and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) effects, and to understand the impact of a broad set of environmental conditions on the range and effectiveness of laser systems. To determine viability against ballistic missile RVs of various classes, both ground and airborne lasers should be developed and tested at the highest power levels achievable in each medium in a variety of atmospheric conditions.

The analysis below makes the argument that mobile and fixed lasers are highly desirable, if not essential, to face complex emerging threats. Development and testing — particularly in the higher power realm — is critical to determine to what degree lasers can relieve pressure on ever more stressed kinetic defenses.

The Argument
We hold that targets exist that are so critical to protect, a final laser defense layer needs to be put in place to guarantee more surely their defense. We further argue that the diffusion of improved weapons guidance on medium- and short-range weapons will change the offense/defense cost ratio — thereby requiring low cost/shot defensive weapon systems such as lasers and other non-kinetic means. And we contend finally that the available defensive time line will become perilously short as ballistic missile inventories (and concomitant raid attack sizes) increase and late-detected horizontal trajectory weapons (cruise missiles, remotely-piloted aircraft, and glide bombs) proliferate. These factors in combination offer powerful international security justification to accelerate efforts to test and field high energy lasers– supported in real-time by appropriate sensors and command-and-control. [1]

An Absolute Requirement for a Final Terminal Defense Layer?
Much of recent dialogue on laser missile defense has focused on boost/ascent phase intercept approaches using the Airborne Laser (ABL) demonstrator. Additionally, there is active interest in naval ship and air base terminal point defense. [2]

Credit: http://cache.gawkerassets.com

Less attention has been paid to the potentially categorical need for a laser weapon as a final terminal layer across several or many defended objects/areas. If a final layer defense requirement were near absolute for multiple targets across broad areas, it would generate important system-level demands and stresses not just on the laser itself but also on their organic and cueing sensors and command-and-control (C2). The need for a final terminal defense layer flows logically from the good sense of very high investment for risk mitigation when consequences of failure approach the grandiose or catastrophic.

The following are illustrative categories where a final laser layer would seem to be highly important:

Defense of densely populated urban areas — total casualties have major political-military consequences (the average population density for US urban areas is 2300/sq mile, but for some areas in conflict zones urban density and casualty exposure are considerably higher, eg, Tel Aviv 19,699/sq mile, Seoul/Inchon 26,300/sq mile, Mumbai 64,400/sq mile)
Defense of certain ground and sea-based offensive and defensive weapons, sensors, and command-and-control — those that are critical to secure quick war termination under favorable conditions
Defense of civilian infrastructure vital to survival and swift recovery to include selected communications, transport, public service, food, water, and energy supply capabilities and other assets/functions essential to global economic stability (e.g., energy production and export facilities in the Persian Gulf) [3].

The Impact of Medium and Short-Range Weapon Guidance
Beyond the issue of targets that need to be more reliably defended, there is the matter of how the threat to these targets is changing. In fact, the imminent spread of precision guidance systems to medium- and short-range weapons may dramatically increase that threat. Catastrophe avoidance is clearly at issue if weapons of mass destruction are in play. But the coupling of improved guidance (the “precision revolution”) and high-efficiency explosives and chemicals with tactical and theater missiles, unmanned aircraft, glide bombs, rockets, artillery, and mortars expands the scope and possibility of dangerous outcomes, lending urgency to the need for a final layer of defense.

This is so because, once fielded, improved guided tactical and theater weapons could be used in quantity to alter war strategy and cadence and impose politically significant effects on traditionally defended opponents. The reported accumulation by Hezbollah in Lebanon of more than 40 thousand tactical rockets—ten times more than its 2006 war inventory — requires early pre-launch destruction, thereby channeling initial Israeli offensive options — including ground force options–and generating pressure on Israeli emergency services and public confidence.

Beyond the imposition of a voluminous attack, an attacker with very high efficiency explosive or chemically-armed guided weapons would have the option of grouping his shots to achieve simultaneous or sequential political effect in an urban area. And he may also expect to have far greater success than in the past against the defender’s fixed and locatable mobile sensors, C2, and weapons, as well as against high-leverage economic assets in the target zone. These expected effects may prompt a preemptive launch of hostilities by either the aggressing side or his potential victim.

The attacking side’s ability to derive political, economic, and military advantage from each and every shot makes impractical the defender’s future use of preferential engagement tactics — his option heretofore not to engage and waste costly interceptor resources on errant arriving projectiles.

The need to engage every incoming weapon will change radically the offense/defense cost ratio in theaters like Israel, the Persian Gulf, India/Pakistan, and the North Asian periphery (ROK, Japan, and Taiwan) where multiple range/trajectory/re-entry velocity systems are in, or can be brought into, play simultaneously (including by maritime and ground infiltration of tactical weapons into target proximity).

If engagement is required for every incoming threat, the diffusion of guidance systems into cheap projectiles such as mortars, tactical rockets, and artillery shells — and future inexpensive longer-range systems — will generate salvo defense challenges beyond anything we currently face. Attack volume may make kinetic defense at close ranges prohibitively expensive.

The Problem of Time
Beyond the problems generated by enhanced offensive precision, there is the acute problem posed by the time dimension. This problem is manifested in the ballistic missile realm via the challenge of dealing with both volume (raids) and with high velocity re-entry trajectories enhanced by countermeasures, decoys, and, in some cases, maneuvering (e.g., Chinese DF 21). This raises the potential for leakers and the possible need for a laser, speed-of-light “third shot” (after a shoot-look-shoot kinetic effort) to protect vital and priority defended assets.

This problem is expanding through the spread of ground, sea, and air-launched cruise missiles and aerial glide bombs and remotely-piloted aircraft (RPAs). These horizontal trajectory/ground-hugging systems may only be detected close-in with inadequate data to support fire control solutions or to allow time permitting kinetic weapon fly-out. This late detection problem could be aggravated by constraints on, and interference with, overhead air surveillance operations and sensor performance created by raid volume and heavy kinetic defense firing.

These missile developments have in common the imposition of acute time pressure on the means to deliver effective defenses — due to late detection and interference, imperfect track and characterization, or the absence of capacity to provide timely updates to support end game kinetic intercept

The detection problem is aggravated not only by the limited horizon for ground and maritime-based sensors, and thermal-induced radio frequency propagation problems inherent in dealing with low-flying objects, but also by the ability of the aggressor to innovate tactically, e.g., aircraft or missile “pop out” from clutter-obstructed zones that degrade radar performance such as from among water bird concentrations in the Tigris/Euphrates or Nile deltas.

The admixture of rockets, artillery, and mortars in territories adjacent to defenders (e.g., Gaza and Lebanon for Israel), or infiltrated by special forces close to prime targets (e.g., high-value assets such as future missile defense sensors or shooters in the Persian Gulf region or nuclear power-generating facilities in Europe and Japan), can enhance time stress, placing very short lobs or shots out of kinetic defense possibility. This problem is illustrated in the areas of Israel next to the Gaza Strip where deployment of the newly developed Iron Dome kinetic interception system remains under discussion due to uncertainty regarding the system’s ability to meet the needed timeline for mortars as well as cost/shot.

The emerging threat, therefore, of voluminous and maneuvering, countermeasure-enabled ballistic and cruise missiles, glide bombs, and remotely-piloted aircraft combined with short-flying rockets, artillery, and mortars points to the need for systems with:

Detection at speed-of-light through optical sensors (cued by ground and airborne radar)
Shots at speed-of-light avoiding the need for early detection/tracking to support serial fire control solutions and kinetic weapon fly-out times
Rapid firing (few second or minimum dwell time intervals) without reloading/interceptor missile stockpiling
Continuous and near-infinite supply of shots using buried chemical tanks, batteries, or an electrical grid to generate power at negligible cost/shot (dramatic per shot cost benefits versus kinetic interception and offensive strike)

These properties, in fact, are all resident in laser systems available today—albeit at varying power levels, beam quality, and depth of operational testing.

Ancillary Capabilities
Beyond the fundamental need for speed-of-light to deal with the new range of challenges noted above, there are other capabilities that lasers can provide that add to their attractiveness.

In an environment where defensive systems may be subjected to electronic and cyber attack, the increased number of sensors in the battle-space relying on diverse phenomenology is important. High precision, large aperture optical surveillance and tracking are an integral component of laser defense systems. Laser optical sensors are synergistic with traditional integrated air and missile defense systems but, being organic to firing units, are insulated from some effects that could result from overall system destruction, degradation, or failure.

Additionally, beyond their utility in dealing with attacking systems, lasers can defeat and degrade other systems. For example, they can be used to blind enemy overhead sensors, optically-guided projectiles, and destroy shoulder-launched air defense weapons (MANPADs). Their capability to destroy chemical, biological, and radiological warhead loads through burn-up is known although some contend that the risk of dispersal through both kinetic and laser intercept remains high.

Current Direction of Military Laser Applications
After experimental work at White Sands demonstrating a million watts-class power levels in chemical lasers (MIRACL), practical application from the mid-90s onward centered on moving high-power laser capability into ballistic missile defense (the Airborne Laser—ABL—boost phase interception project) and counter-rocket, mortar, and artillery defense (the US-Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser—THEL–project). The former continues development as a technology demonstrator while the latter was abandoned in 2006 as the Army elected to move toward solid-state laser (SSL) technology. [4]

 Credit: www.youtube.com

Work since then has been driven by the Army, Navy, and Air Force’s perceived need for mobility. In this quest, significant 100 kw SSL power levels have been achieved by Northrop Grumman and Textron and the Army is investing to mature this technology to defend future forces. In addition, the Navy is investigating the readiness of these technologies to defend Navy ships. In the meantime, efforts are underway by Northrop Grumman and several other defense firms to develop power, cooling, and other efficiencies to permit mounting of 100-150 kw electric-powered lasers on aircraft. Some of this work involves moving beyond current slab lasers into fiber and planar waveguide lasers to increase electrical to optical efficiency, thereby boosting airborne laser power levels while reducing electrical power and cooling requirements. [5] The heavy concentration on mobile applications, however, leaves unattended the building of SSL power levels beyond the 100-150 kw threshold and exploration of the utilities of the multi-hundred kw chemical laser capabilities demonstrated in the 1990s and early 2000s.

Northrop Grumman 100 KW Laser Credit: www.engadget.com

The recent adoption at the November 2010 Lisbon Summit of territorial ballistic missile defense in Europe as an Alliance task –following earlier commitment to defend deployed NATO troops –opens anew the issue of defense of cities and critical assets.

While the European theater will not receive voluminous missile challenges in this decade, an area critical to European and Asian economic security — the Persian Gulf — might. Identically, the Northeast Asian economic powerhouses — Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan — will be under constantly increasing threat as will America’s Israeli ally.

It may be timely to consider the emerging strategic requirements of these states on the threat periphery and the applicability of very high-powered lasers to defend them. American forces are there and will be engaged.

The possibilities of massive or even extensive destruction of allied and partner cities and vital assets is not politically, economically, nor morally tolerable. In these circumstances, the strong push toward laser mobility should be accelerated while programs are revived to move toward very high power experimentation against the new threats posed by emerging advances in missile guidance and shrinking defender timelines.

The Need for Haste
Iranian/Syrian creation of a proxy high-volume rocket attack force in Lebanon and North Korea’s recent reminder of its voluminous artillery threat across the DMZ should be a wake-up call.

We and our allies in the Middle East, Far East, and Europe could face in the coming two decades an hitherto unprecedented combined spectrum and volume of attacking weaponry—long-range ballistic missiles, late-detected cruise missiles and glide bombs, and guided tactical weapons—that could produce dramatic effects.

Unless high-powered laser counters to this voluminous and more deadly threat are developed and fielded, a structure will be created that will incentivize preemptive launch of hostilities—1914 repeated a century later.

———-

Complementary References

[1] See: article on the impact of laser weapons on UAVs

[2] Read: an interview on ABL and see the video

[3] Read: an interview and a discussion regarding Israelis perspectives on strategic threats

[4] See a video on the MTHEL project

[5] For a discussion of platform and new technology interactions, see: Richard Weitz

A Coast Guard’s Rescue

Posted on February 10, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/10/2011

Coast Guard Rescues Man from Overturned Boat

02/10/2011 – The crew from Coast Guard Air Station Humboldt Bay rescue a man from a small island located in Redwood Creek after his boat overturned, Thursday, Dec. 30, 2010. The Coast Guard received notification of the distressed man from the Humboldt County Sheriff’s Office, and transferred the man to their care after the rescue was completed.

Credit Video and Text: U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 1/1/11

X-47B First Flight

Posted on February 8, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

02/08/2011

The X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator

02/10/2011 – An X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator completes its first flight at Edwards Air Force Base. The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration program will demonstrate the capability of an autonomous, low-observable unmanned aircraft to perform carrier launches and recoveries.

[slidepress gallery=’x47b-unmanned-combat-air-system-demonstrator’]

Credit Photos and Text : Navy Visual News Service, 2/4/11

From our earlier article on the Naval UCAS:

The program brings a number of key enhancements to the table, and these contributions suggest a template for the types of new programs, which should be supported even in a constrained fiscal environment.

First, it extends the strike range of an already funded core capability, namely, the carrier task force. Tactical aircraft have limited range; the UCAS has much greater range and reach. This makes it valuable in and of itself, but extending the reach of the new tactical aviation asset to be deployed to the fleet, namely the F-35, enhances its value. The sensor and communication capabilities of the F-35 are significant, but the reach of the aircraft remains within tactical ranges; the UCAS has forward strategic strike reach as well as ISR and communications reach-back to the tactical assets.

The UCAS can spearhead the entire sensor and strike grid put up by the carrier task force. Second, the UCAS will be the first unmanned system developed in the wake of the deployment of the new F-35. The F-35 as a “flying combat system” should be a generator of change in the unmanned fleet.

The development and then deployment of the UCAS will be integrally interconnected with the F-35, and as such can take advantage of commonality in sensors and communications with the new manned aircraft. Shaping a common concept of operations between the F-35 and the UCAS can provide an important stimulus for change for the US Air Force as well.

Third, it is highly likely that the US Air Force new bomber program will be shifted to the right in funding priorities. This provides a significant opportunity for the US Air Force to learn from the US Navy’s experience in deploying the UCAS with the F-35 to shape a possible unmanned successor for the manned bomber.

A template could be shaped by the Navy, which could provide important lessons learned in shaping the US Air Force’s strategy to work the future of its unmanned programs with manned aircraft.

Fourth, the company building the UCAS demonstrator, Northrop Grumman, can draw on significant lessons learned in their other unmanned programs, such as Global Hawk, and on their core contributions in sensors and communications to the F-35 to provide a realistic development to production program for the new UCAS aircraft.

In other words, the program evidences a number of key qualities, which makes it worthy of finding even in a stringent environment. It leverages significant capabilities already paid for and deployed. It leverages new capabilities coming into the fleet. It provides a way to enhance synergy between both power projection forces. It provides a learning curve, which the US Air Force can use in shaping its future development and acquisition approach. (see: https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=162)

China Gaining Control of Global Telecom Industry

Posted on January 27, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/27/2011

By Richard McCormack

01/28/2011 – This article was originally Published in Manufacturing and Technology News, January 19th, 2011

(Credit: USCC) — http://www.uscc.gov/index.php

China’s steady rise as a telecommunications manufacturing and research powerhouse has “profound” national security and economic ramifications for the United States, according to the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

High-tech equipment produced by Chinese state-owned telecommunications companies is quickly becoming integrated into American and global computing, communications, wireless and next generation networks. U.S. and other foreign telecommunications companies have signed hundreds of joint venture agreements with Chinese firms, providing them with entry into American markets.

Entire equipment supply chains have shifted to China, and include research and development, design, manufacturing and global deployment of technology and systems. The U.S. government has barely acknowledged the ramifications of the shift of the telecommunications industry to China and growing control of Chinese companies over domestic and international networks.

If the United States does not start monitoring the rapid changes in telecommunications technologies and ownership, it could lead to “irrevocable harm” to American national security and economic interests, says the USCC study entitled “The National Security Implications of Investments and Products From the People’s Republic of China in the Telecommunications Sector.”

U.S. companies continue to provide Chinese state-owned firms with access to technology, advanced research and development, manufacturing know-how, management techniques and markets. “China’s technology industry now appears to be a de facto part of the American communications industry landscape,” says the study. “Many aspects of the future global telecom and technology markets are now being shaped by Chinese business and government interests. The momentum they are gaining and the way they are applying their advantages are transforming global markets, propelling Chinese telecom and technology ventures toward the leading edge of technology development, manufacturing and standards setting. If current trends continue, China. . . will effectively become the principal market driver in many sectors, including telecom, on the basis of consumption, production and innovation.”

Many of these Chinese telecommunications companies are state-owned enterprises given the mandate by the Chinese government to expand overseas “to include support for [the] People’s Republic of China state policies and political goals,” according to the report. “Concern over growing Chinese influence in this arena is not unfounded, but should be balanced by a realistic assessment of communications security vulnerabilities as well as by an appreciation of the symbiosis that has developed between the Chinese and western telecommunications industries.”

The Chinese government has publicly declared that the telecommunications industry plays a major role in the country’s defense strategy. (The publication Xinhua reported that the 2010 “highlights” of Chinese military included “perfecting remote operations; information warfare; breaking traditional geo areas in international cooperation; and sending a clear message on defending sovereignty.”)

The Chinese have aggressively pursued new technology and standards, such as developing the Worldwide interoperability for Microwave Access and Long-Term Evaluation standards. “Meanwhile, the United States has been slower to respond to demands for new technology standards,” the report notes. U.S. wireless companies are having to deal with increased regulatory pressure to open their networks and make them more interoperable. “This comes on the heels of paying off expensive spectrum auctions purchased in efforts to create more contiguous networks,” says the USCC study. “China is poised to become the world’s number one end-to-end supplier of telecom, cable and mobile wireless equipment, much like AT&T and IBM dominated technology sectors in the past.”

The financial crisis has made American companies more vulnerable to cost and price pressures and has pushed them into deeper financial tie-ups with Chinese companies, according to the report, which describes numerous such deals. It also notes that innovation in the United States appears to be in decline, based on patents and surveys of the world’s most innovative companies.

Comparative views of global companies indicate “that innovation in China may be outpacing innovation in the United States and that the patent-seeking environment for multinational and U.S. entities is now dramatically more complicated,” according to the report. “While the manufacturing supply chain has shifted to Chinese and overseas markets for a range of communications products, so have design and engineering.”

In order for the United States to get back into the game, it must make a new commitment to the development of a scientific and engineering workforce. “Such an effort cannot be modest. It must be a commitment on a grand scale in order to reverse course and regain headway,” says the study. “Outsourcing the control of manufacturing and manufacturing processes also has the unintended consequence of making domestic revival of those processes more difficult. If a U.S. enterprise attempts to bring back some outsourced activities — even in an effort to reduce potential vulnerabilities — it may find that the necessary capabilities are difficult to reconstitute, due not just to a loss of physical plant facilities but also to an erosion in relevant skills among the workforce.

Outsourcing can also affect future prospects for technological innovation: As the outsourcing trend continues, it has already been shown that the number of students enrolling in engineering and computer science disciplines in the United States has been declining for several years. This trend will continue as long as the potential job market and pay structures offer fewer job opportunities. Talent will shift to where the leading-edge research and development is taking place.”

*** The full report can be found on the USCC website.

AMF JTRS: Eliminating the Tower of Babel

Posted on January 26, 2011 | by SysAdmin

01/26/2011

Towards A Web-Based Approach to Planning

01/26 /2011 – In December, Second Line of Defense sat down with Marty Jenkins of Lockheed Martin to discuss the Airborne and Maritime/Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System or AMF JTRS. This is a significant program which can help re-shape interactive connectivity.

Mr. Jenkins joined Lockheed Martin after over 20 years of service as a Naval Officer. He currently serves as the Director, Defense Programs Strategic Development for the Integrated Systems and Global Solutions (IS&GS) Business Area. While in the Navy, Mr. Jenkins served as Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, the principal naval advisor to the Secretary. In addition to coordinating the activities of the 700 person Navy Secretariat, he advised the Secretary on major programs and budgets including C4ISR, industrial base realignment and future shipbuilding programs.

This is the first of a three-part interview.

Credit: Lockheed Martin, 2011

SLD: The program is called the joint tactical radio system. But that’s really a misnomer; it suggests to people that they should be looking at this program as if it were simply replacing traditional radio sets.

Mr. Jenkins: That’s been part of the issue, I think, with the program; these are devices that build broadband IP infrastructure for the war fighter. They’re not, strictly speaking, radios. They provide NSA certified secure, type I crypto IP infrastructure. They’re also, by the way, radios in the two-to-two military bandwidth, so they have transceivers built in.

If you were to choose a better name, what would it be? It might be the joint network system. The program isn’t providing that end user device, that handheld or that desktop. It’s providing the entire infrastructure that enables that.

SLD: So we should be focusing on how JTRS is really a joint infrastructure.

Mr. Jenkins: Right.

SLD: So in this age of cyber issues, a secure infrastructure would seem to be obviously, a very desirable thing to have.

Jenkins: Right. With the flexibility that’s built into this infrastructure, it is the future. Secure broadband IP network infrastructure for the war fighter. But it also maintains full legacy capability; it does the same network communications—voiceover UHF, VHF or HF, voice satellite data that we’re using today around the world. And a key part of this is the backward compatibility with the legacy systems – the fact that the system will take full advantage of the well-tested and proven IP route and retransmit. What that means is information can move seamlessly from legacy to IP and back. If you’re on your iPhone and you hit send, you really don’t care how it gets to the person you’re sending it to.

SLD: The point you’re getting at is that you’re pushing the send button, if it’s going over a satellite or a UAV or an F-35, you’re agnostic about that. You’re not agnostic about the message being delivered.

Mr. Jenkins: Exactly. And it’s even more than that. Your Blackberry or iPhone signal is going to go from fiber to a line of sight, to maybe a satellite, to maybe a cell tower. All those different media, and every time it does that, it will switch frequency a little bit to ride that medium path. JTRS enables exactly that. So when you push send on your button in the cockpit of a jet or the bridge of a ship, it’s going to go on an IP frequency, a UHF frequency, or an HF, and the devices will do that automatic translation.

When you push send on your button in the cockpit of a jet or the bridge of a ship, it’s going to go on an IP frequency, a UHF frequency, or an HF, and the devices will do that automatic translation.

It could start in a UHF frequency, jump to HF, VHF, whatever the best path — this is what IP does for us — IP infrastructure. Whatever the best path is to move your message, whether it’s voice or data, chat, video to the end user, as quickly as the system will allow it to get there. Best path quality of service. Proven features of IP.

SLD: Not only are we making the point that it’s not radio, but it’s an infrastructure. It’s also a translation system in terms of moving the data through different protocols?

Mr. Jenkins: Right.

SLD: It’s basically a way for the infrastructure to move data around, voice around. And that would suggest that as Admiral Roughead has suggested, we’ve got to think about post-Afghan military deployments. It doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to keep investing in the way we’ve done business the last ten years, when we’re about to try to have a more flexible force structure, expeditionary. Clearly, what Afghanistan has demonstrated is that non-line of sight capabilities are very, very important.

Mr. Jenkins: Let’s talk about a couple of pieces of that. Right now, and for decades, for all the right reasons, our network and communications infrastructure has been built around radios that deal in single frequencies and are dedicated to single purposes. So in my radio room on a ship, I’ll have a UHF transceiver that is SATCOM transceiver. That is all that it does. I’ll have a VHF transceiver that does bridge-to-bridge communications, voice. Now, that’s all that radio does.

So what we’re moving to is with JTRS is the flexibility in a software defined device to do any of those functionalities on the same device, multichannel. And because it’s software defined, it has the ability to upload, download or shift frequencies almost at will.

What we’re moving to is with JTRS is the flexibility in a software defined device to do any of those functionalities on the same device, multichannel. And because it’s software defined, it has the ability to upload, download or shift frequencies almost at will.

These radios are in a small form factor and you can preload 23 different waveforms, a wave form being something like UHF SATCOM. Think of your XM Radio. XM is a wave form. Your UHF/FM radio is another wave form. I can preload 23 of those onto this device, and pretty much shift at will, any time I want, to go to a different frequency, to talk to a legacy system or do that automatic translation if I’m dealing with another JTRS box. So that agility is huge.

Right now, in the field, if I have a ship off the coast, and I have troops ashore, and the troops ashore require naval gunfire support, unless I’ve preplanned that, built that into the communications plan, I can’t support the mission, cannot do that easily.

If I’ve physically done the right crypto ashore, and mapped that to the ship, we’re talking days and weeks of preplanning. Then, if I haven’t done that, then I can’t talk to those troops, at all, I can’t talk to them secure, I don’t have the right radios. If we are both JTRS enabled, I can communicate with them right now.

SLD: We don’t have to preplan. So we’ve got a lot of flexibility built into the infrastructure.

Mr. Jenkins: You have huge flexibility in operations and tremendous flexibility in planning. Your communications plans now become real time with a sort of a web based approached to planning.

You have huge flexibility in operations and tremendous flexibility in planning. Your communications plans now become real time with a sort of a web based approached to planning.

It’s what we do if we want to pull down different apps over the Internet. Instead of building a fairly rigid plan, which requires us to go and physically interact with a radio to change the frequency on it, to shut it down, to go to another radio to get the right frequency. To get a crypto load, upload that crypto, we’re talking a long time, if you can do that at all to communicate in the joint world.

These devices enable you to do that in real time. And the metric right now is if I don’t have the wave form that you want to communicate on, the metric for the program is it takes me two to three minutes to download that over the air, software defined, a new wave form, download it on my device, bring it up and be in communications with it.

Video: Courtesy of Lockheed Martin, 2011

Budget Rationalization of Survivable ISR

Posted on January 26, 2011 | by SysAdmin

By Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary, Air Force

«The Global  Hawk and Predator B reigns supreme in many aspects of the  fight. 
The  need for the large C4ISR platforms has drifted away.»
Photo credit: A Global Hawk prepares for flying mission,
Sgt. Andy M. Kin, U.S. Air Force (as published online at : http://air-attack.com)

01/26 /2010 – The Air Force as well as the rest of the Armed Forces and the rest of the United States government faces an unusual crisis in budgeting. All are scrambling about trying to determine the least-bad parts of the budget to trim, or, in worst case, cut. Clearly this needs radical thought, but should be driven by mission in each case. When survivability is added as a requirement, and the threat is assessed as it is seen today, this becomes easier. Let’s consider the end of the large aircraft ISR fleet.

The large aircraft command and control as well as the large aircraft intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance fleet are artifacts of a different era, the era of satellites with insufficient range and scope, the era where remotely piloted vehicles were small and not worthy of the name C4ISR. Now, however, times have changed. The MC-12 is highly touted as the solution where one dominates the air domain. The Global Hawk and Predator B reigns supreme in many aspects of the fight. The need for the large C4ISR platforms has drifted away.

In a future era, where the air domain is disputed, can we really risk the large, populated C4ISR airplanes when we actually have penetrating stealthy aircraft with better radars and M-Int devices, and the 3-digit surface-to-air missiles are valid to 200 or 300 miles? This is well beyond the range for the systems known today. No wonder the Air Force is looking to partner with the Navy on the P-8 follow-on; there is no survivable mission when you get far off shore. Indeed, our ships are protected by an array of surface-to-air missiles with standoff range enough to truly discourage errant approach by these very expensive aircraft.

In a future era, where the air domain is disputed, can we really risk the large, populated C4ISR airplanes when we actually have penetrating stealthy aircraft with better radars and M-Int devices, and the 3-digit surface-to-air missiles are valid to 200 or 300 miles? This is well beyond the range for the systems known today.

Recently, in a paper titled Renorming the Assymetric Advantage, I cited the need to leverage available stealthy technologies and their sensors to stay alive on the battlefield of the future. There seem to continue to be a belief system that indicates that the enemy will allow these airplanes to operate with impunity, but will otherwise attack the tanker aircraft that support TAC air assets. Where does this logic prevail? Well, for the most part, within the ISR force structure and the contractor community that supports this force structure. Strangely, it also dwells in the hears and wallets of the air combat community that pretends that they will have a very hard time surviving a future air battle yet defers to the ISR community for leveraging the sensor assets they and they alone carry.

The significant number of airborne personnel are a significant cost
in  addition to the operational costs of the large aircraft
 which can be  saved by leveraging the 5th generation aircraft
Credit: Air Force Technology

Filling the gap
I would strongly recommend to the present air staff that they do something radical, and that is to argue to stand down any C4ISR asset that is larger than an F-22 or F-35, and ask the question: what gap does this create, and how best is this gap filled? This is the true battlefield outcome. Much like thinking about a day without space, let’s really think about just how long the force will have access to the large C4ISR assets. And while we are at this analysis, consider how many lives that we systematically put at risk when reach back seems so very satisfactory in every other element of the expeditionary command and control, in this Internet age where satellites dwell and relay tremendous data streams and where Global Hawks and Predators infuse AOC’s with highly reliable target and intelligence information.

NATO is presently arguing whether they should own an AGS, and in response to September 11, 2001, they very generously allowed the deployment by the United States of their Airborne Warning and Control aircraft, illustrating that when used in the defense, there may well be merit in the C4ISR fleet. It is also noteworthy that in the Mid-East there is a small enough battlespace that if they are aloft, they could provide some warning from incoming enemy aircraft. It is also known that in that role, they won’t last the first 10 minutes of the exchange. The United States is opting for missile defense and essentially integrated air defense system for missiles. Aircraft in that case are relatively easy to spot, and many countries are in fact installing such integrated air defenses around their countries.

Secretary Gates likes to eloquently equate a lack of use in the current engagements for assets he doesn’t wish to fund, and yet here is a marvelous opportunity to save an entire force structure. Where is the argument that they are a serious element of the fight in AFPAK? How long has it been since they were employed in Iraq? This argument needs to be seriously examined, because perhaps they have value in the defense of the American continent. But in this era where it is questionable whether even 4th generation will survive, a 737 or 767 would have no chance. The excess savings should be redistributed to leveraging TACAIR into a truly integrated attack force, in such a way that it is clearly capable of defeating all comers and to include present triple digit defenses. This is a deterrent effect which is credible, and if needed, deadly to the aggressors.

———-

Relevant SLD Links

https://sldinfo.com/?p=11959

https://sldinfo.com/?p=11968

https://sldinfo.com/?p=11976

The Second World

Posted on January 19, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

01/19/2011

Empires and Influence in the New Global Order

By Parag Khanna

Review by Robbin Laird

01/19/2011 – The author provides an overview on what he sees as the new global order for the 21^st century. The book was completed prior to the global financial crisis, which clearly affects some of his core assumptions, notably about Europe.

The author provides an overview of the rise of the second world at the expense of the first. The rise of the so-called BRICS is documented throughout. The author also significantly discounts the role of geopolitics and military power in the 21^st century as globalization in three variants is in conflict with one another.

The “fre-enemies” of America, Europe and China present three different visions of globalization and are seeking global dominance via their particular visions. “The United States, the EU and China represent three distinct diplomatic styles – America’s coalition, Europe’s consensus, and China’s consultation – competing to the lead the 21^st century.”

In the author’s view, the US represents the past with military power having too much sway in coercing coalitions to support its interests.

In contrast, “the European Union is a revolutionary institution with the potential to reverse the westbound rotation of geopolitical centrality. As the most highly evolved form of interstate governance, the EU aggregates countries in a manner more resembling a corporate merger than a political conquest, with net gains in both trade and territory from North Africa to the Caucasus.”

Credit: Bigstock

Then the author adds the comment, “outside of the military domain, Europe’s power potential is greater than that of America, for it is the world’s largest market and the de facto standard setter for technology and regulation.”

“China has already become a global center of gravity, and it represents a third model of imperial diplomacy. Drawing on ancient Confucian customs, China’s consultative pattern of behavior emphasizes areas of greatest agreement while tabling issues lacking accord for more propitious occasions….(The Asians) have not only resigned themselves to China’s inevitable rise, they have also come to welcome the benefits that it will bring in the form of cheaper goods, more integrated markets, and regional pride.”

The author underscores that the rest of the world is more or less the stage upon which the three empires play.

“The United States, the European Union, and China already possess most of the total power in the world – and will do their best to prevent all others from gaining ground on them. Russia, Japan and India cannot assert themselves globally militarily or otherwise; they are not superpowers but rather balancers whose support (or lack thereof) can buttress or retard the dominance of the three superpowers without preventing it outright.”

USS Truman Going Through the Suez Canal (Credit: USN Visual Service, 12/6/10)

The author has provided an intriguing set of hypotheses. But do the work?

The first problems with the hypotheses are rather simple: they are perhaps an accurate snapshot of the first decade of the 21^st century, but certainly not beyond.

America is clearly in flux as it deals with its domestic dynamics and global relationships. And indeed its engagement in Afghanistan coupled with the stimulus spending has led to a significant reduction in its global power projection capabilities.

America under Obama has clearly shifted its tone towards the rest of the world, and whoever follows Obama will need to focus on the reality of global coalitions and relationships, not just the rhetoric.

The author consistently underestimates the innovative capabilities of the United States, and its ability to rebound from global challenges. The multi-ethnic society in the United States has built more residual innovation capability than any other Western society. Whether this innovative capacity is realized is anyone’s guess.

Europe is in crisis. The system the author describes was strategically protected by the U.S. and shaped by an ability for Western Europe to become Europe under that protection. The twin institutions of the EU and NATO were crucial to the expansion Eastward. The formation of the Euro was an expression of new continental solidarity.

But the global financial crisis raises fundamental questions about the strategic direction of the Euro and of Europe. The crisis is certainly leading to the augmentation of the role of Germany. And Germany is building much stronger relationships with China and Russia than any other European power.

The rise of the Arctic elevates the roles of Norway and Denmark and places both at the table of the riches of the Arctic over the next 30 years and directly in the path of geopolitical dealings with Russia.

The decline of the Southern European states has been significant in the past two years, and the economic decline of Eastern Europe, although not exactly the 1930s following the 1920s, raises serious questions about the viability of some of the economies in Eastern Europe.

Credit image : 2010 Annual Report to Congress
 on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

The Chinese forecast rests on the reality of the past decade, not the next. It is highly doubtful that the Asian neighbors of China have a benign view of the Middle Kingdom. Indeed, Chinese ability to shape a global manufacturing base, hoard significant financial resources, craft a global resources policy and to begin a rapid buildup of maritime, military and global security and military capabilities has captured the attention of Europe. As China builds its hard power, it gives a different meaning to its soft power. And for many states in Asia, the U.S. remains a lynchpin power allowing it to curtail Chinese expansion. Whether the U.S. actually will play this role remains to be seen.

And totally missing from the author’s analysis is the very significant disruptive impact of other global players. European economic power is challenged directly by the BRICS. Indeed, the aging of the European population and the overinvestment in resources for the social welfare system limits significantly the ability of Europe to invest in the future, rather than to pay for the past.

And Europe is directly threatened by developments in the Middle East, ranging from missiles, terrorism, or the growth in nuclear weapons in the region. It is difficult to see Europe building a consolidated military capability to deal with these threats already here and growing in the decade beyond.

An ability to put together a missile defense shield is clearly one measure of seriousness about the threat, but this remains to be seen. And relying solely on a U.S. with significantly less power projection capability today than 20 years ago is a strategic mistake of historic proportions.

In short, the author may be right about the contest among the major “empires” for global influence, but the characterization of the decline of the United States and its reliance on militarily forged coalitions in favor of Europe’s consensus and China’s consultation significantly overstates the gains for Europe and China.

Europe lacks the security and military power to protect its own interests; and China is building theirs to protect their Empire. The continued rise of China is creating a counter-reaction globally, with recent concerns over China cornering the market on rare earth metals simply a first scene in the play for the second decade of the 21^st century.

As with many analysts who consider military power dysfunctional to globalization, the author misses a central point – for globalization to work there needs to be defense of the global commons. And the states that wish to defend their interests bring maritime, air and military power to the task.

Several states not at the core of the empires will have their say in upsetting the imperial contests for global dominance. And they will do this by their own approaches to re-shaping global production, to enhancing the role of the global commodities trade, and injecting their own versions of military “black swans” which do not follow the desired trajectory of the Empires.

Shaping Adaptive Innovation for the Warfighter

Posted on January 19, 2011 | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment

The Air Armament Center Functions as the Linchpin

An Interview with Randy Brown, Norma Taylor, and Wally Messmore

01/19/2011 – The Air Armament Center at Eglin AFB designs weapons for the U.S. and allied warfighters. We earlier described a key effort to modify the Small Diameter Bomb to provide a weapon for the warfighter in Afghanistan. The AAC has engaged in innovation not only in terms of technology, but in terms of delivering capability to the warfighter during the Iraq and Afghan operations. A core need is for weapons with lower collateral damage both to allow weapons to be used closer to the operations of the warfighter and to reduce the threats to civilians.

During a visit to Eglin AFB in October, discussions were conducted regarding these efforts. In a follow up interview, Second Line of Defense discussed with key officials in the center how they are accomplishing this core mission for the warfighter.

The two weapons under discussion are the Precision Lethality MK82 (BLU 129/B) and the SDB Focused Lethality Munition (FLM). In White Papers accompanying this interview, the nature of these programs is presented in greater length. For now, the core point is simply that the center has been working with the labs and the warfighters to shape a close proximity weapon with lower collateral damage.

The interview was conducted with Randy Brown, Director, Armament Directorate, Eglin AFB, Norma Taylor, Program Manager of the MK 82 Quick Reaction Capability (QRC), and with Wally Messmore, Program Manager assigned to the Air Armament Center Program Execution Group who worked on the FLM.

A B-2 Spirit dropping Mk 82 bombs into the Pacific Ocean
 in a 1994 training exercise off Point Mugu, California.
Credit: http://en.wikipedia.org

SLD: I think what the commonality for the two programs is that both of these were programs to develop close proximity weapons for the use of our forces in Afghanistan, and that you are working to give the forces a useable lower collateral damage weapon to be deployed on existing weapons. In both cases, we’re talking about a warhead modification. Is that correct?

Randy Brown: That’s right. We’re building a composite case warhead versus a steel warhead. In the case of the Mark 82 there is different explosive fill in there as well, but they’re very similar between the two so the technologies really are very similar between FLM and on what Taylor’s doing. It’s a little bit bigger warhead. BLU 129 is the nomenclature of the QRC warhead.

Norma Taylor: The BLU 129 is a form fit replacement for the standard MK 82 500-pound category warhead. So in terms of weight and dimensions of the warhead, BLU 129 is equivalent to the MK 82.

SLD: How does the composite casing as opposed to steel affect the ability to deliver low collateral damage, and what’s the advantage there?

Randy Taylor: With our classic steel warheads today, a majority of the lethality and collateral damage effects are due to the fragmentation of the steel warhead. With the composite warhead case, instead of producing those lethal fragments, it basically turns into composite dust, so to speak.

SLD: So the point really is that with the steel casing, you get fragmentation from the explosion itself, whereas the composite casing turns into dust, so you’re reducing significantly the fragmentation generated by the blast. Is that the basic point?

Norma Taylor: That’s correct. It’s a slightly different variant of the standard MK 82 explosive fill partly to help out with creating a warhead with similar weight to that of the standard MK82. Since the composite cases are so light, we need to bring the weight of the warhead up to that of the MK 82 so that the JDAM and Paveway guidance kits can carry it with no problem. So, the fill is slightly remixed from that aspect of the consideration on lethality.

SLD: So you’re taking the tested JDAM, the tried and true JDAM, so to speak, which has a flight envelope with a certain weight on the warhead and you’re trying to replicate that weight so that you don’t have to do a lot of testing on flight deviation due to a different weight on the warhead.

Norma Taylor: Exactly

SLD: But that would be a crucial part of your ability to deliver the warhead in a very timely fashion.

Norma Taylor: That’s correct.

Loading Small Diameter Bomb (Credit: http://www.boeing.com/defense-space/missiles/sdb/index.html)

SLD: Could you talk a little bit first to the FLM process of going from the requirement to actually delivering the capability to meet that requirement in a fairly short period of a time?

Wally Messmore: We’ll start it back in the 2005 timeframe when the Air Force Research Lab was conducting research on this particular capability. The labs were running a research and development program for the composite case and explosive fill technologies. They got to a certain point of maturity that the war fighter elevated their interest in it, thus a requirement came out of United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF), now known as United States Air Forces Central (AFCENT). So, in 2006 a requirement was then generated for the FLM weapon, and the acquisition approach chosen was to use a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). This approach allowed us the kind of flexibility that you would need to fine tune the development and field a new weapon relatively quickly.

SLD: So the requirement was shaped by the availability of your technology demonstrated by the lab, that Central Forces Command saw the utility of that technology and then it was turned over to you to figure out how to develop this in a timely manner?

Wally Messmore: That is correct.

SLD: I presume that in this process you had to have a fairly open communication approach to determine best paths actually to deliver this capability in a fairly short period of time. How did you address that issue in terms of making sure that the industry and yourselves and the lab work on the same page in a very short period of time?

Wally Messmore: The requirement was expressed in a fashion that drove both lethality and the collateral damage requirements to fit into a 250-pound class weapon at the time, so the natural selection was a small diameter bomb. We worked with AFRL, with Boeing, who is the SDB I manufacturer, and with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), who ended up sponsoring the JCTD.

SLD: So at that point, several months had passed and now you’ve got the requirement pretty well established in terms of what CENTCOM wants and what the labs think is feasible to do, so that you got a feasible requirement so to speak. Now your task is to drive the feasible requirement into an actual reality of the bomb. Is that a fair way to characterize this process?

Wally Messmore: That is correct. However, there are some nuances that go along with a JCTD, which are slightly different than a standard program of record in that it’s a capability demonstration. For example, the requirements aren’t necessarily as firm as a traditional program.

SLD: So you have some flexibility in the JCTD to shape what the realistic requirements are?

Wally Messmore: Correct.

SLD: So essentially rather than establishing a set of tight requirements at the outset of what essentially is an experiment, the prototyping, you’ve got some real flexibility in terms of execution. The key to do doing this in a short period of time is that you have flexibility in shaping how to achieve the outcome. Isn’t that the point? They’re giving you more flexibility to essentially shape the execution of the program.

Wally Messmore: That is correct.

SLD: That makes a lot of sense. Well then let’s talk about the process for what is an open project, what is still the MK82. Is this a similar kind of process where you’re doing JCTD or how is this being approached to get a timely resolution of developing the weapon?

Norma Taylor: Yes sir, it’s a different process, but we are leveraging off the technology lessons learned from FLM. For the Precision Lethality MK 82, again, the need came from a U.S. CENTCOM requirement that was validated in late January of this year. The Air Force and Navy spent a couple months looking at their options to support the need for a 500-pound category low collateral weapon that could be easily integrated across the board on a variety of Air Force and Navy Aircraftraft and in March determined that basically the big brother to FLM was the appropriate option to pursue.

One of the differences is, as Messmore indicated, FLM used a technology demonstration program. With the MK 82 variant, we went straight into a program of record with firm requirements that we really worked hard with the users to make sure that we were focused on the most critical requirements to them, and that helped set our threshold and helped set us in our design and our test program to be able to get out in the field very quickly.

So we have an acquisition category III quick reaction capability program, and again, it’s a very open communication where we’re constantly working with CENTCOM, with Air Combat Command, with the Navy and Marine Corps to understand how they employ weapons, and determine how we can meet those needs and get that done very quickly.

SLD: So going back to a statement you made shortly at the beginning of this conversation, the ability to talk to the users in the theater, in the area of operations, has been a critical capability for you to shape the most desirable outcome in the most repid fashion possible. So that dialogue is really crucial for the process to work?

Norma Taylor: Absolutely correct. We’ve teamed with the National Laboratories, in this case Lawrence Livermore National Labs. They are the warhead designer and they’re the government agent for the warhead design from that aspect, and so they basically took the warfighter inputs and their technology from the earlier work and then applied it to the 500-pound variant. From there we went to industry for support for manufacturing of the composite warhead cases. The Aerojet Corporation was selected to support the case manufacturing for this very limited QRC activity.

SLD: When you refer to Livermore’s earlier work, you mean with FLM?

Norma Taylor: It’s both the earlier work with AFRL and the FLM activity. Livermore was involved, as with AFRL in all those activities.

Lawrence Livermore National Lab
Credit: http://www.lasg.org

SLD: So this has allowed you at Eglin to be a center of excellence for migrating capabilities to lower collateral damaged bombs. You’re a low collateral damage bomb enterprise of excellence by following these processes, which have highlighted the ability to talk to the war fighter in the AOR, which has been a key driver for how to do define what you will then develop.

Norma Taylor: I think it’s two aspects. It’s a close relationship with the war fighter and it’s a close relationship with the technology developers in the laboratory and Lawrence Livermore.

SLD: So you’re kind of the linchpin between those two?

Norma Taylor: Correct.

Randy Brown: What Norma Taylor is demonstrating now is that they developed a very good and beneficial working relationship with Livermore, Industry, AFRL, and in the acquisition community to get a product out of the lab, onto the production floor and into the hands of the customer in the shortest amount of time, and that we’re acting as the integrator on this effort.

We’re taking off-the-shelf components and we’re integrating this technology into a capability. But the unique thing here I think, which is different than what’s been done in the past, is we are in the middle of this. We’re bringing it all together. And in the end, it’s Taylor and her team that will deliver that full-up weapon system capability to the war fighter.

***

ANNEXES

The following white papers were provided to enhance understanding of the two programs by the AAC.

ANNEXE I
Evolution of Small Diameter Bomb I (SDB I) Focused Lethality Munition (FLM)

25 October 2010

The Focused Lethality Munition (FLM) is an ultra low collateral damage variant of the Small Diameter Bomb I (SDB I) weapon. FLM exploits a composite warhead case and multiphase blast explosive fill developed and matured by the Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions Directorate during an 11-month period. FLM’s warhead creates a more lethal near-field blast and eliminates the metal fragments from traditional warheads. Additionally, with the exception of the warhead, FLM’s design utilized all existing SDB I common components, software, and aircraft interfaces which greatly enhanced the accelerated acquisition schedule of the FLM system.

In April 2006 US Central Command, based on US Central Air Force’s identification of an urgent operational need for a low collateral damage weapon, sponsored an out-of-cycle Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) to determine the military utility of FLM. In August 2006, the SDB I Branch under the Armament Directorate at Eglin AFB, FL and Boeing entered into a contract arrangement for the integration and test of the FLM warhead into the SDB I Weapon System.

The JCTD acquisition strategy for FLM included a concurrent AFRL technology maturation as the SDB I Branch executed the FLM acquisition contract. The SDB I Branch’s contract with Boeing had a segregated “off-ramp” to mitigate government risk if the new developed technologies did not prove viable. The team jointly established detailed technology readiness “entrance criteria” for FLM maturity testing and performance assessments that had to be demonstrated prior to entering a formal Technology Readiness Review and transition of the technologies from AFRL to the FLM system. The AFRL technologies proved successful and transitioned to the SDB I Branch and the FLM weapon system in March 2007.

Extensive testing occurred during the AFRL and SDB I Branch development effort including arena tests to characterize the warhead, penetration tests, design verification testing, static live fire tests against simulated targets, guided test vehicle flights to evaluate weapon accuracy, and live FLM flight testing to validate FLM’s weapon effectiveness. The first 50 FLM weapons were delivered to the Air Force in March 2008, approximately two months ahead of schedule. FLM met and/or exceeded all requirements established by CENTCOM. The FLM program has transitioned to production and has delivered several lots of additional weapons.

The major players in the development of the Focused Lethality Munition JCTD were the OSD Office of Advanced Systems and Concepts, the AFRL Munitions Directorate, the SDB I Branch, The Boeing Company, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Aerojet, and CENTCOM. Open communication during weekly teleconferences with all key teammates and monthly reviews co-chaired by AFRL and the Miniature Munition Division leadership were critical to program success.

ANNEXE II
Evolution of Precision Lethality MK82 (BLU 129/B)

25 October 2010

The Precision Lethality MK82 (officially designated the BLU-129/B) is a Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) program directed to develop and field a very low collateral damage 500 pound class warhead. BLU 129/B exploits both a composite warhead case and multiphase blast explosive (MBX) fill developed and matured by the Air Force Research Laboratory Munitions Directorate and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Once completely developed, the BLU 129/B warhead will create a more lethal near-field blast and drastically reduce the quantity of metal fragments as compared to traditional warheads. The BLU 129/B warhead matches the outer mold line and mass properties (with the exception of roll inertia) of a traditional MK82 warhead and, therefore, minimizes the effort required to integrate the munition with existing weapons systems.

In January 2010, the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated a Joint Urgent Operation Need (JUON) for a very low collateral damage weapon capable of immediate integration on aircraft currently certified to employ the MK82 series warheads. In March 2010, the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) directed the Air Force, in collaboration with the Dept of Navy, to “rapidly develop, test and field the PL MK82, consistent with the urgency of the operational need, and the safety and risk inherent in weapons development.” In August 2010, Air Combat Command (ACC) further identified the program requirements to include, as a threshold, compatibility with both the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Laser JDAM (LJDAM). Additionally, ACC identified the F-15E, F-16 and A-10 as the threshold aircraft platforms and the need for 50 warheads to satisfy an Initial Operational Capability (IOC).

In May 2010, the Air Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Munitions Directorate initiated a five month risk reduction program to mature the composite warhead case and MBX fill technologies to a readiness level sufficient to begin a rapid system development, test and fielding program. AFRL completed the risk reduction program in October 2010 after developing the initial warhead design and demonstrating its performance characteristics by conducting two full scale blast arena tests and a target penetration test.

In August 2010, the Air Armament Center’s (AAC) Armament Directorate initiated a QRC program to finalize the warhead design, conduct design verification, system safety, aircraft integration and warhead performance testing (to include lethality arena and penetration tests), and field 50 warheads by the end of March 2011. For an acquisition strategy, AAC entered an agreement with LLNL to finalize the warhead design and conduct design verification testing. AAC selected the Aerojet Corporation to manufacture the initial warheads for aircraft integration, system safety and warhead performance testing.

Currently, the program is on track to complete all warhead design and fabrication activities along with the required development and operational tests to support both the delivery of the first 50 warheads as well as a favorable fielding recommendation by March 2011.