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Moving the Ball Forward: Shaping a Deployable Energy Policy bill
By Hon. Bill Anderson
The Honorable William C. (“Bill”) Anderson served as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations, Environment and Logistics and the Air Force Senior Energy Executive under President George W. Bush from 2005-2008. He currently serves as Chief Executive Officer of Endura Energy Solutions, a portfolio company of Pegasus Capital Advisors, L.P.. The author has business relationships with both ZeroBase and Hyperion Power Generation. He can be contacted at [email protected].
This posting is the third of a three part posting of the Honorable Bill Anderson’s examination of how to deliver energy to the deployed warfighter. By enhancing the ability of the deployed force to self-sustain, a revolution in combat logistics can be generated. The complete article is published as a SLD special report in PDF format for downloading by readers.
10/17/2010 – What if we could incentivize the private sector to offer distributed alternative energy solutions that could provide energy and potable water at the point of use at forward operating bases and do it without large technology development earmarks…so, not spending an additional dime of taxpayer money? I believe that is exactly what can be done.
Remember the per kilowatt hour cost of energy delivered to the war fighter as we calculated it earlier? Tell any and all private sector vendors that they will be paid $2.00 for every kilowatt hour of electricity produced by alternative energy equipment the vendors would provide at FOBs, and just see how many “takers” would come forward.
Now, harsh environment testing would be required to make sure equipment could perform in the battle environment…and that testing could be done in the same accelerated fashion used to develop and deploy the MRAP…but these rough numbers illustrate a rather lucrative incentive…which should ratchet down as equipment costs come down and these new systems stabilize…to trigger development risk taking within the alternative energy technology development world. So, as General Powell recommends, it’s time to “go with your gut”.
On June 28, 2010, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics outlined a new initiative to reduce inefficiencies in procurement…calling on government contractors to do their part. What better time than in this era of ever-increasing demands and lower budget growth to allow true private sector market forces to identify, develop and offer commercial-ready portable distributed power generation options that are rugged enough to meet peculiar military needs.
This particular initiative could be an excellent target to test a new approach to identifying and deploying technologies that will certainly save lives…significantly reduce the environmental footprint of deployed forces…and might even improve the quality of life for our war fighters who will no longer be subjected to the noise and fumes of diesel power generating units…and, by the way, the heat signature of these generators which is a security risk in itself.
Certainly in the budget-constrained environment we face today, the DoD challenge to the private sector to assist in reducing waste and inefficiency in the system is a reasonable request. However, when a customer (in this case, the Federal government) demands a change in behavior from suppliers, the customer has an obligation to provide an environment that will support this change in behavior.
“Business as usual” on either side of the transaction will impede the desired change.
Furthermore, in the alternative energy space, the innovators are not likely going to be traditional military contractors. Those innovators will likely be private start-ups, NGOs and academic institutions. How do these organizations work their way into the status quo of military acquisition?
Or, maybe a better question might be, if the Pentagon is committed to (1) reducing waste and inefficiency, and (2) quickly finding real solutions to the dangerous and expensive practice of moving fuel and water to the battlefield by road, do we really want these new vendors falling into the acquisition status quo?
The “right” answer here is to facilitate testing and deployment of systems that are ready to go and that have private sector funding to move forward. That type of a market signal will drive innovation and risk taking, a real shake out/separation of good ideas from bad, and the elimination of waste commonly associated with the current military acquisition system.
Challenges Beyond the Military
Although this report has focused on particular military needs in harsh and remote locations, the performance characteristics of the units described above would logically meet requirements to address recovery efforts in natural disaster and homeland security scenarios. The disrupted supply chain, lack of energy feedstocks and limited access to fresh water faced after such catastrophic events beg for the functionality, portability and robust nature of the power units highlighted above.
In natural disaster/homeland security scenarios, speed of response is critical to the survival of those affected. If military organizations across the world utilized these transportable alternative energy units that did not require a feedstock supply chain in their combat operations, similar units would be maintained in reserve and at training bases across the globe. These reserve and training units could be quickly packed up, put on to a transport aircraft and delivered to the site of a disaster anywhere in the world within hours…providing much needed power and clean water…and certainly saving countless lives in the process.
“Re-norming” the Asymmetric Advantage in Air Dominance: “Going to War with the Air Force You Have” (Part Two)
By Michael W. Wynne, 21st Secretary of the U.S. Air Force
10/17/2010
What are the available platforms and technologies that we have invested in to date? And how can we shape effective concepts of operations for a joint and combined air strike force, which leverage these capabilities?
I define joint as involving all available American Air Forces; which would have an intrinsic advantage of interoperability; though our first recommendation to expand the limited tactical cross training that currently occurs, as with the limited set of advanced fighters; this could be a singular mission. I define “combined” as a coalition of the willing; for which for many of our allies might well mean their version of the Joint Strike Fighter; or a very compatible fourth generation fighter aircraft.
In defining tactics, one might recall how even in the Battle of Britain, true integration was far more likely in a tattered set of infantry units than air units. Assuming such integrative capability is a major leap of faith, but may be mandatory as the current Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs admission that future Navy’s may need to operate together as he witnessed the decline of the U.S. Blue Water navy and called for a global 1000 ship Navy.
Combined forces must train together for maximum result. This puts pressure on diplomats to assemble such a combined force; as it puts pressure on the Joint Staff and the combatant commander to allow the air component commander to execute this part of the mission with full joint assets and to have an interoperable force
Though the design engineers and the human factor professionals combine their talents to make fifth generation or advanced fighters ‘easy’ to operate; the book outliers underscored the need for concentrated operator time to truly exploit the enormous capacity we are in the process of fielding with new systems and technologies.
(Credit image: SLD)
The capacity we are fielding can allow the force application designers to devolve more authority to the pilots; the F-35 becomes then the first generation air battle management system. The information age has granted to the computational system all the benefits that the intelligence agencies once husbanded for fusing sensor received information; and the sensor capabilities have offered to the pilot an unprecedented view of the three dimensional battle space.
On top of what the individual fighter asset will be able to do, the ability to interchange information among platforms is a significant bedrock for change in CONOPS. Such a capability will allow the pilot to be a node on the net with an internal router able to receive and transmit information to air operation centers, air operation commanders and combatant commanders.
The capacity we are fielding can allow the force application designers to devolve more authority to the pilots; the F-35 becomes then the first generation air battle management system. The information age has granted to the computational system all the benefits that the intelligence agencies once husbanded for fusing sensor received information; and the sensor capabilities have offered to the pilot an unprecedented view of the three dimensional battle space. On top of what the individual fighter asset will be able to do, the ability to interchange information among platforms is a significant bedrock for change in CONOPS. Such a capability will allow the pilot to be a node on the net with an internal router able to receive and transmit information to air operation centers, air operation commanders and combatant commanders.
Such interactive, distributed capability was once planned for later generations of the F-22; which can play a similar role. Indeed, the interaction between the F-35 and the F-22 in terms of onboard systems is a key dynamic for reshaping air capability, and as the next generation of remotely piloted aircraft gets added to the mix, we will have a strong baseline for “renorming” air operations. The technology for this is widely known; and available for incorporation.
But several key questions need to be resolved and challenges met to leverage the new capabilities inherent in the new technologies.
Now that the nation has minimized the quantity requirement, will it maximize the opportunity for interconnectivity and thus the quality of the force?
What will be the training opportunity for the interconnected air fleet, with the Navy model of three months to interconnect a battle group?
Will the interconnects include our allies to get in the air what the JCS Chairman once quested for on the sea; a thousand ship Navy?
Such shared and congruent capability truly assists in managing sensory overload as the system can establish ‘chats’ and the displays automatically integrate inputted targeting information. What is available is target cataloguing such that the air operations center can optimize the available shooters to fulfill target opportunities.
The sensors can be easily extrapolated to ‘see’ moving targets versus stationary; but the system must off board and discard these such that the principal mission set is executed. air operation commanders can reset the mission set; but this must be accomplished as well in the pilot’s seat; as if all the participants are acting together.
In past engagements, there has been a debate as to how to best penetrate enemy airspace; stealth was considered by some a ‘silver’ bullet strike system sufficient for executing such a mission. But, as historians have told us over the decades, the enemy has a vote in the development of the battle. They are also planning to shape the battle to fit their designed response.
Under current thinking, American planners called for increases the quantity of penetrators to meet global competitors, and for co-opting the integrated air defenses. Given the current forecasts for platform numbers, this will not be achievable. Different strategies, and different tactics will be required to deal with integrated air defenses, such as capabilities to expose these defenses in ways that allow the penetrators to shape the battlespace.
During past conflicts and even into more modern era, “reconnaissance by fire” was a method to draw out enemy positions by convincing them they had been discovered and were being killed; therefore they would strike back and reveal themselves. During the Vietnam era, the air battle became precarious for the slower AC-130 aircraft, which became targets as they performed their nightly missions. Lighting up when they commenced firing, and thus being shot at by enemy anti-air batteries.
A technique they developed to silence or slow the response was to fly a two-ship circle; where one ship would light up and intentionally draw fire from the ground units; thus allowing the other to target the battery before it could silence and move. Extending this on-off technique from the AC-130 Gunships to induce elements of the modern integrated air defense mechanism to reveal itself and its tentacles by offering a ripe target so as to trap an air defense system into giving up its location, or sensor; or communications system to sensors, and ultimately to shooters.
An advantage that the AC-130 aircraft brings to the fight is the closed form “kill cycle,” which when operating in a free fire zone allows the OODA loop to be milliseconds in length. Tacticians and strategists need to keep this in mind as they lay traps for integrated air defences; which will smartly be hidden in locations which will give pause to central commanders.
From such a perspective, we can see great utility for unmanned or remotely piloted systems. The carriage of weapons in fifth generation aircraft is both limited and limiting. Pilots who are the first to launch expose themselves in a dramatic way; and one must presume that once exposed the probability of survival diminishes.
Again, one must see stealth as shelter from the enemy, prolonging the exfiltration of intelligence and reducing the probability of mission failure, not as a medium to enhance the probability of success for the individual fight. We need to think in fleet terms operating in a distributed battlespace. Once we make the mental leap, the air battle manager construct can move into the cockpit where the pilots are part of a team that can become the closed form kill chain and turn the weapons to target time within the enemy’s cycle.
One must see stealth as shelter from the enemy, prolonging the exfiltration of intelligence and reducing the probability of mission failure, not as a medium to enhance the probability of success for the individual fight. We need to think in fleet terms operating in a distributed battlespace. Once we make the mental leap, the air battle manager construct can move into the cockpit where the pilots are part of a team that can become the closed form kill chain and turn the weapons to target time within the enemy’s cycle.
Planners need to turn their attention to providing support to the air battle manager that has taken up a position of control; and has managed to maintain concealment at the same time. Therefore, we need to consider how to absorb and catalogue appropriate targets to achieve the mission; and then exhaust the missile load of an unmanned vehicle (e.g. Winchester) even fast and stealth managed.
Late August 2010, Second Line of Defense met with pilots, and maintainers of the Osprey based at New River Air Station, North Carolina. The results of the interviews are being presented in a series of updates on the Osprey as seen through the experience of these Marines stateside, and on deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. In this second update piece, Captain Dwyer discusses how the USS Nassau and his Osprey operated in the Haitian relief mission. Captain Dwyer is a representative of the new generation of Marines who has only flown the V-22 and is enthusiastically exploring the capabilities of the new aircraft. He was with the second operational squadron deployed to Iraq and then with the second operational squadron deployed on the Marine Expeditionary Unit on the USS Nassau. The MEU began its seven month deployment in Haiti and then when on to operate in the Gulf Aden.
In this piece, Captain Dwyer talks about the experience in Haiti. In the first piece, he discussed the operation of the Osprey with the Harrier, which allowed the MEU to be split and to operate differently, an approach which will be further facilitated by the coming deployment of the F-35Bs.
SLD: How was the Osprey used off of the USS Nassau in the Haiti crisis?
Captain Dwyer: The V-22 was used in a perfect conceptual way. We ranged the entire island. We went out to little villages that nobody had been to. We went from the epicenter. We covered the whole concentric rings from where the earthquake struck and we were the first ones on scene for a lot of these places that still hadn’t quite gotten the relief that they needed, the water, the food etc.
The V-22 Osprey (Credit photo: USMC)
SLD: Emotionally, that must have been amazing.
Captain Dwyer: It was. It really was. One of the coveted things for me was the Medivac. We actually got to retrieve an 11-year-old girl who had a broken leg and it started to get infected and she was going to loose her leg. We were able to prevent that. So that was, you know, very cool.
One of the coveted things for me was the Medivac. We actually got to retrieve an 11-year-old girl who had a broken leg and it started to get infected and she was going to loose her leg. We were able to prevent that.
SLD: You picked her up, and did you go back to the Nassau?
Captain Dwyer: Indeed we took her back to the ship. There was so much going on at the Port of Prince, the ship was not parked in the port. Because we had the legs, we parked it about 75 miles away.
SLD: And a lot of distraction.
Captain Dwyer: Right. The physical presence of the ship was not an issue because we could go so far away. With that, we could range the entire island and still on an every other day basis, we could range Guantanamo Bay for just a general logistics run. They had massive amounts of shipments going into Guantanamo Bay that it was taking ships approximately like three days to turn around.
SLD: So you were lifting Guantanamo to Haiti?
Captain Dwyer: We were lifting them from Guantanamo Bay to other ships. Port-au Prince was so cluttered. They had so much food and relief effort supplies there, they couldn’t move aircraft around. We would take supplies to different ships and then from our ship, we would take it directly to where they needed it. And we would also take the Marines with us with translators etc. and we could go to survey basically every village that we thought had gotten some amount of damage.
SLD:So you were the first insertion doing situational awareness, and evaluation, because you could get around to different locations?
Captain Dwyer: Absolutely. There was a lot congestion in the airfield itself at Port-au Prince which prohibited us from really going in there. We only operated around it. We didn’t actually go in to Port-au Prince.
We also functioned as an overflow for the hospital ship, Comfort.
SLD: That’s not a huge ship.
Captain Dwyer: Right. So we became kind of holding area for some immediate treatment. so there were a lot of flights, ferrying back and forth between the Comfort and the Nassau and later the Bataan; after that ,they decided they didn’t need us anymore when the roads were starting to clear up. We were there about 14 days.
10/16 /2010 –The Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency is expected to confirm soon an estimated $60 billion U.S. arms deal with Saudi Arabia. The unstated but widely understood purpose of the sale, which has been under discussion since 2007, is to enhance the Kingdom’s ability to defend itself against Iran.
Another objective is to highlight Washington’s commitment to Saudi Arabia and the other U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf despite the end of the U.S. combat role in Iraq and the Pentagon’s difficulties in Afghanistan. Sustaining the U.S. role as the Kingdom’s main foreign arms supplier is also an important goal.
The Defense Department has not yet provided the details of the proposed arms sales package to Saudi Arabia. According to the available public information, half of the $60 billion package will likely comprise authorization to buy new military hardware, while the other $30 billion will probably consist of possible upgrades to Saudi Arabia’s existing weapons as well as other support costs.
A U.S. Air Force F-15 fighter jet on a low-level flyby, eastern Afghanistan, January 1, 2009, Bob Strong/Reuters/File (Credit: Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2010/0914/Why-60-billion-in-US-arms-to-Saudi-Arabia-isn-t-causing-an-outcry)
There may also be additional components, currently under discussion and valued at up to another $30 billion, that would include naval weapons such as helicopter carrying patrol boats and littoral combat ships as well as possible additional missile defense systems.
The main items of the core $60 billion package would likely include:
84 new Boeing F-15 combat aircraft (these will replace the Saudi Air Force’s aging fleet of F-16C/Ds, acquired from 1978 to 1992, though it is still unclear what radar and other systems the more advanced replacement planes might have)
Upgrades to 70 existing Saudi F-15S strike aircraft (perhaps with longer-range missiles mated to these Saudi-adopted version of the Boeing F-15E)
60 new AH-64D Longbow Apache attack helicopters and upgrades to Saudi Arabia’s 12 existing AH-64As
72 additional UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters (to supplement Saudi Arabia’s existing 22 UH-60s)
Upgrades to the existing 96 Patriot Advanced Capacity-2 (PAC-2) air and missile defense systems
The $60 billion figure can be misleading. That total is simply an authorized aggregate ceiling of the value of all the possible systems and related defense items Saudi Arabia can potentially buy from the United States.
The administration could sell as many as 84 F-15 fighter jets (Credit: Scott Applewhite, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/13/AR2010091306429.html)
The actual volume of purchases is likely to be lower, perhaps by a considerable amount. In addition, the specific transactions (which typically include support packages and other detailed terms) will probably take years to negotiate and implement given prudential Saudi financing due to the volatility of world oil prices, the country’s limited absorption capacity, as well as the time needed to manufacture the planes, prepare Saudi infrastructure to receive the weapons, and train the Saudi operators to use the new systems. All this means that the annual sales totals could plausibly amount to a few billion dollars each year for a decade or more.
Advocates of selling more American weapons to Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf can and do cite several reasons to support the transaction.
First, the new systems if properly and effectively integrated would strengthen Saudi Arabia’s armed forces and thereby help balance and deter Iran’s growing military power. Even without Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, the Iranian military has been displaying a growing range of conventional capabilities, showing off new missile, naval, and air capabilities as well as expanding the Iranian ground forces.
Although few expect the Iranian military to attack Saudi Arabia out of the blue, the worry exists that Iran might pursue that option during a crisis, most likely by disrupting Saudi Arabia’s oil exports through the Persian Gulf to underscore Tehran’s ability to exploit Western dependence on Persian Gulf energy supplies and to threaten the health of the global economy.
The United States has been seeking to enhance missile defense capabilities throughout the Persian Gulf region—by placing American-run, ground-based missile defense systems in several Gulf states, by stationing specially equipped U.S. Navy missile ships in the Gulf’s waters, and by selling several types of missile defense systems to Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
The systems sold to the GCC include both the low-altitude Patriot and the higher-altitude Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, which together have the potential to provide a more comprehensive layered missile and air defense network than either system in isolation, especially when networked with the U.S.-operated missile-defense systems.
Although imperfect, they would contribute to protecting the GCC’s energy production and distribution infrastructure, including shielding the tankers conveying oil through the Gulf. Even the most optimistic scenarios for the increased use of renewable energy still forecast continued Western dependence on Saudi Arabia’s petroleum exports for the international economy.
Secondly, regional experts believe the sales would also reassure Riyadh about Washington’s commitment to help defend Saudi Arabia and its allies against Iran and possibly other security threats despite developments in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Unfortunately, the U.S. combat withdrawal from Iraq and the Pentagon’s frustrations in Afghanistan have made many Saudis fear that the United States will reduce its military presence in the Persian Gulf and will become more reluctant to defend Saudi interests with military power. And as Robbin Laird’s companion piece suggests, showing how these modernizations fit into regional collaboration and U.S. leadership needs to be demonstrated not assumed.
Some Saudis fear that a pro-Iranian faction could gain political influence in Baghdad, confronting Saudi Arabia with a pair of aligned Shiite governments. Even if Baghdad remains independent of Tehran’s influence, Iraq will take years to develop the military power needed to again serve as a regional balancer of Iran, even if the Iraqi government wanted to perform this role. In this context, the arms sale would serve as a tangible reaffirmation to Saudis that the U.S. security umbrella remains valid.
Third, U.S. advocates of the Saudi arms deal want to rely at least partly on regional allies to help contain and deter the Iranian military. In their view, the transferred weapons would ease the burden on the overstretched U.S. military and the overburdened American taxpayer of countering Iran. In this context, Saudi Arabia is a logical local ally for Washington given the weakness of Iraq, Iran’s traditional rival, and the limited military potential of the other Gulf states. Fortifying the Saudi Arabian military with additional weapons would help achieve Washington’s regional security goals, especially balancing and containing Iran.
The sales could also prove militarily useful by promoting defense interoperability among U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf—both among themselves and with U.S. forces. But again a potential is not a reality. Without significant U.S. investment and engagement in shaping real collaborative capabilities in the region, all that would be happening is transferring capabilities to an ally for purely national purposes. Arms sales need to be accompanied by hard work in making systems work together for enhanced common defense. A sale is not a capability.
In recent years, the United States has been selling weapons to other Persian Gulf states concerned about a potential power vacuum in the region or about Iran’s growing strength. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and the other members of the GCC have been especially prolific buyers. Although the GCC presently lacks the coherence—having limited means of coordination, integration, and standardization—to contain Iran on its own, equipping all their members with U.S.-made weapons, and training them to use them, can bolster their capabilities, especially in partnership with the Pentagon.
In some scenarios, U.S. troops might use some of these weapons as they rush to reinforce the region. This would especially be necessary given the cancellation of the F-22. Even for more limited engagements, having access to the data generated by Saudi Arabian missile defense radars and other sensors could prove useful for defending U.S. forces and other targets in the Gulf.
In addition, supporters of the arms deal argue that U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia help sustain American influence in Riyadh, which can encourage Saudi officials to continue to support policies favorable to U.S. interests. These include Saudi Arabia’s consistently moderate policies toward Israel, its sponsorship of inter-faith dialogue, its domestic deradicalization program, its restraining influence on the foreign policy of Syria and other disruptive regimes, and the high level of U.S.-Saudi intelligence cooperation against international terrorism.
Furthermore, the proposed deal with the United States would contribute to saving or creating an estimated 75,000 American jobs. Most of these would result from keeping Boeing’s St. Louis F-15 production line open for an additional half-decade or so, providing a bridge until the next major order occurs, and would partially compensate for last year’s cancellation of several planned purchases from Boeing by the Pentagon.
Other companies would benefit, including the AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter production facilities of Northrop Grumman (Linthicum, Md.) and Lockheed Martin (Oswego, N.Y.). In addition, Sikorsky Aircraft, a division of United Technologies Corp., would produce the UH-60 Black Hawk plants at its facilities in Stratford, Conn., with assistance from the General Electric plant at Lynn, Mass.
The weapons sales also help recycle the petrodollars Saudi Arabia acquires from oil exports—as well as encouraging Saudi Arabia to work with American firms in developing their energy sector and other infrastructure.
Finally, U.S. arms sale backers fear that, if Washington declines to provide the Saudi government with adequate defensive weapons, then Riyadh would likely pursue other means of strengthening its security. The key target for such backers is European suppliers.
Most likely, the Saudis, who have always sought multiple arms supply relationships as a hedge against a weakening of their ties with Washington, would buy the weapons from other suppliers. Saudi Arabia has already bought a number of European weapons in recent years, including multibillion-dollar contracts for the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter planes and a border security system from British-based firms, as well as some helicopters and artillery pieces from French suppliers. And one interesting question is how the new American systems will be integrated to operate with the advanced Eurofighter. A similar issue has existed for years in the UAE as the Air Force as F-16s and Mirages facing con-ops integration challenges.
The Saudis could plausibly purchase more weapons from China, which sold Saudi Arabia some intermediate-range missiles in the 1980s. The Saudis might also buy Russian arms to provide an additional incentive to dissuade Moscow from selling more sophisticated weapons to Iran.
It is possible, though unlikely, that the Saudi government might decide to conserve its resources and try to appease Tehran or, conversely, Riyadh might seek to acquire nuclear weapons as an ultimate deterrent. Whether Saudi Arabia relied on its emerging nuclear power program to manufacture nuclear weapons (which would take approximately a decade) or simply bought ready-made atomic bombs from Pakistan or other countries, Saudi Arabia’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would contribute to further nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, a development harmful to U.S. interests.
In terms of the scale and cost, this proposed deal dwarfs the previous U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia. Several of the earlier U.S. defense packages—such as the 1981 sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) and the 1992-1993 sale of 72 F-15s—alarmed Israel’s supporters in Congress, which required strong lobbying by the executive branch and other groups, as well as changes in the proposed package, to overcome. After the Defense Security Cooperation Agency issues formal notification of a planned arms sale, the Congress has 30 days to cancel or amend the sale.
On this occasion, Israel’s supporters have yet to evince much public opposition to the newly planned sales. One factor dampening Israeli concerns is that Saudi Arabia already possesses many of proposed weapons systems, so the sale would not represent a major qualitative leap in Saudi military potential. Many would expand capabilities currently in limited supply, while others would complement Saudi Arabia’s existing panoply of American- and European-made weapons.
In addition, the United States has reportedly agreed not to outfit the weapons platforms provided Saudi Arabia with the most advanced capabilities suitable for attacking Israel, such as long-range stand-off weapons. Instead, they will be equipped with the modest armaments the United States normally sells with export versions of these warplanes.
The United States is also prepared to sell Israel even more advanced weapons to help sustain its military superiority. State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley has insisted that, “The United States would do nothing that would upset the current balance (of power) in the region.”
The Israeli ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, has acknowledged that his defense experts “appreciate the administration’s efforts to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge, and we expect to continue to discuss our concerns with the administration about the issues.”
Israel is looking to acquire the F-35 fighter jet (Credit: http://www.israel7.com/2010/09/le-f35-approche/)
In particular, Israel will soon purchase 20 of the new U.S F-35 stealth fighters at a cost of $2.75 billion. Lockheed Martin has stated the new fighter will be available for delivery in 2015, about the same time the F-15s will be supplied to Saudi Arabia. Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz and some other Israeli officials had expressed reservations about buying the F-35s. Although a $3 billion U.S. grant would cover their initial acquisition costs, Israel would still need to pay for the pilot training, hangar construction, repair facilities, and the planes’ long-term maintenance. In addition, the terms offered Israel would prohibit Israel from equipping the F-35s with Israeli-made weapons or tracking systems.
But another important reason for the lack of Israeli objections on this occasion is that, unlike during the 1980s and 1990s, many Israeli strategists now consider Iran, rather than the Arab countries, as presenting the greatest external threat to Israel’s security. And the new weapons the United States is providing Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the Persian Gulf would help contain Iranians’ growing military power and regional security ambitions.
Although the sale is likely to go through, and the Saudis have expressed potential interest in acquiring additional naval weaponry as well as more sophisticated missile defense, Saudi Arabia should balance its purchase of advanced Western weaponry with additional capabilities and training optimized to respond to another type of threat: low-intensity conflicts or insurgencies.
Asymmetric warfare against advanced militaries has proven to be an effective strategy in recent years. Although analysts differ over the extent to which the Iranian government has been aiding the Houthi rebellion in northern Yemen, which spilled over into a firefight with Saudi troops during the past year, it is not inconceivable that Saudi Arabia could face more direct guerrilla attacks from Yemen or elsewhere along its lengthy border fomented by Iranian sponsors. The Kingdom should continue to keep its intelligence and law enforcement agencies well equipped and trained to counter homegrown threats as well.
Arms Sales a Necessary, But Not Sufficient Condition for Enhanced Deterrence
By Dr. Robbin Laird
10/16 /2010 –Richard Weitz’s review and assessment of the proposed Saudi arms sale discusses some of the platforms on offer, which could go with what the Saudis already have in the inventory. Platforms are not capabilities; they become capabilities when integrated into a war-fighting approach, which necessitates combat tactical and strategic integration.
Similarly, the proposed sale of F-35s to Israel will have its real meaning in terms of how the Israelis, who have an excellent track regard of combat integration, use the platform to shape an integrative con-ops to deal with threats in the region.
For the United States, selling platforms to allies in the region begs the question: how does the USAF and USN intend to work with those platforms as allies integrate them into their warfighting strategies?
Additionally, what will the US bring to the party, which allows allies a better warfighting capability against threats in the region, notably Iran?
And if platforms are simply sold with little or no evidence that the US military is engaging in a comprehensive integrative strategy, one should take pause before selling those platforms?
Are the platforms being sold working for or against a US military strategy if need be in the region?
A key worrying cloud in shaping the future is where is the F-22 in the regional strategy? The F-22 and with it the F-35 will be key elements for dealing with the quickly evolving threats in the region.
F-22 Raptors fly in formation during a training mission Dec. 9, 2009. The F-22s and crews are deployed from the 27th Fighter Squadron at Langley Air Force Base, Va., and in the U.S. Air Forces Central area of responsibility for the first time as part of a multinational exercise where aircrews from France, Jordan, Pakistan and England. (Credit: http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123183141)
And allies expect the US to bring “exquisite” systems to the fray to shape and guide a successful outcome.
Make no mistake; if the US does not bring war winning capabilities to the table, organizing allies towards a comprehensive strategy in the region will be difficult.
If the F-22 does not deploy to the region, why would allies expect the F-35 to deploy in a leading role for war winning dominance by the United States?
And associated with this is the challenge of integrating strike assets with defensive assets. Indeed a key question is how will the Saudis integrate their defensive systems with their Eurofighter´s, F-15s and other strike assets?
The UAE is a key ally in the region and it too is struggling to integrate defensive and offensive assets.
For the Israelis, a key element of the evolution of capability can be put simply: How Arrow and the F-35 be integrated?
For the US, integration of the F-22 and F-35 with Aegis is a key determinant of future capabilities, and a capability, which could lead to a war-winning strategy in the region, if needed.
But the great thing about the Aegis-5th generation aircraft combination is that its deployment is not a signaling of intention. In the last few decades, air and defensive assets were deployed sequentially; with the new 5th generation aircraft and Aegis, you deploy or you don’t. And with the deployment one is bringing integrated strike, C4ISRD and defensive assets useful in a variety of scenarios.
The sale of F-15s to the Saudis calls for F-22 deployments to the region. The ability to integrate the F-22 and then the F-35 with other aircraft, Eurofighters, F-15s, F-16s, Mirages, Rafales, is a key war deterrent strategy.
If the West and its Middle Eastern partners can demonstrate before a crisis that an integrated capability faces the Iranians, then the deterrent value of any single platform sale goes up, not down.
But if sales are simply made to provide toys to the allies to reassure them that they now have better stuff, strategic cacophony will result. And the Iranians know how to play effectively in the presence of cacophony.
Adding a Core USMC Capability: The CH-53K As A Logistical Force Multiplier
An Interview with Major Jeff “Kingpin” Davis
Major Jeff "Kingpin" Davis (Credit photo: SLD, September 2010)
10/16/2010 – The Afghan war and the Iraqi operations have been tough on the rotorcraft supporting US forces. The CH-53E was introduced in 1981 and has been a bedrock USMC asset ever since. But attrition and wear is necessitating its replacement. The CH-53K is building upon the legacy of the CH-53E but is more than a letter change. It is a logistical force multiplier as it carries three times the lift over the CH-53E with the same footprint, and brings significant enhancements as well. And the cost of operations is significantly lower than the CH-53E.
With the addition of the CH-53E to the Osprey and the F-35B, the amphib becomes a whole different animal in the world of USN and USMC operations. We have discussed earlier the changing nature of the amphib and recently the impact of splitting the MEU facilitated by the pairing of the Osprey with the fast jet on the amphib.
In this interview, Major Jeff “Kingpin” Davis of the Headquarters USMC Aviation discusses the impact of the CH-53K for the USMC. “Kingpin” is the APW-51 Heavy Helicopter Requirements Coordinator for HQ USMC Aviation. The video, displayed at the end of this interview, has been provided by Sikorsky and offers an overview of the aircraft and its capabilities.
SLD: How would you describe the need for the CH-53K for the USMC?
Major Davis: I would say from my point of view, the lift piece is a tremendous part of the story. Afghanistan operations right now almost by themselves prove the need for the 53-K. And I say that just because it’s a high altitude, very hot environment, we’ve got IEDs all over the place, so you want to limit the amount of material that you move over the roads.
Right now, the goal is to try to move as much stuff either via C-130, or via 53-Es as you can. If you had a 53-K, you could take three times the amount of stuff in the same distance, and reduce your exposure to road transport.
SLD: The ability to triple the lift allows you to more effective insert force using the Osprey as well?
Major Davis: That is true. If you wanted to put a unit in a battalion reinforced, let’s say, in one period of darkness, V-22 obviously moves the personnel, because that’s what it’s designed to do. The 53-K can bring in the armored vehicles, providing that straight-leg infantry with ground mobility. Now they’ve got vehicles that they can bring in, so now they’re mobile.
You do all that in a single period of darkness, go 100 miles off from the shore into the enemy’s backyard in one night, and you’ve got a battalion reinforced in there with armored vehicles so they can wreak havoc all behind enemy lines.
The CH-53K
SLD: Presumably the advantage is either you can do that with less helos or you could have more stuff moved to support the operation?
Major Davis: Yes. When you look at it from a sustainment standpoint, for example, in Afghanistan, you’re looking at sustaining a MEB-sized force within that theatre. I like to consider the 53-K as a real big logistics enabler, because I can take more and do so in higher environment, higher altitude, and environment like Afghanistan.
I like to consider the 53-K as a real big logistics enabler, because I can take more and do so in higher environment, higher altitude, and environment like Afghanistan.
Currently, an Echo can lift a 9 or 10,000-pound load let’s say at 3,000 feet at summertime temperatures right now in Kabul or Bastian. A kilo on the other hand, can take that same load, two and a half, three times, four times the distance. So now, the MEB commander, or the ground force commander, the MAGTF commander, can extend his battle space. His battle space, my opinion, is limited by the logistics that he can push through that battlespace.
SLD: Working in tandem with the Osprey and future F-35Bs, you can provide a tremendous leapfrogging capability for the MAGTF, all being capable of being inserted from the Amphib?
Major Davis: Yes. Absolutely. And when talking about leapfrogging capability, a Yankee and Zulus are going to carry more gas, they’re going to carry more ordnance, because it’s just a much more capable platform. Now the kilo, if those Yankees and Zulus want to go out 100-110 nautical miles, that’s about what they could do. They got about 30 minutes on station time, and they have to come back. You send a kilo out there with it, with a full tank of gas in the back, now you can extend the range of the support you could get out to a couple hundred miles and have them as a gas station, from a kilo aspect.
SLD: Isen’t the opportunity also there because of the high tempo of operations as well?
Major Davis: Yes. To me, the MAGTF is constrained until we get the 53-K out there. There’s only so far you can the MAGTF, because you don’t have the logistical throughput. Once you get a kilo out there, because now you’ve tripled the logistical throughput, essentially over a 53-E, you’ve now got the opportunity to extend the range of the MAGTF. Or at least extend its operating area, for a more dispersed and more distributed environment.
SLD: I assume that it does not make a whole lot of sense to replace the Echoes with Echoes?
Major Davis: There’s no production capacity left for the Echoes. Sikorsky does not have the tooling to go ahead and reproduce the Echo, even if you wanted to nowadays. And you’d just be building an airplane that was designed in the 60’s. That has the reliability and maintainability, the best that we had in the 60’s. The 53-K, just like the V-22 was designed from the start as a survivable platform to operate throughout the battle space. We designed it be able to go where the V-22 could go from a survivability standpoint. Back in the 60’s, we had the vision of the forward line of troops and the Echo would be a logistic hauler and it would never go beyond the forward line of troops. It would never really go into harm’s way. From an armament perspective and from how do we build this to reduce vulnerability, the Echo never had any of that thought process put in. On the other hand, the Kilo, from the ground up has been designed to make the vulnerable area as small as we could possibly make it. How do we build survivability into this platform? We do some modeling and simulation to optimize where you put different lines, where you put the fuel lines, where you put the electric lines. It’s a fly-by-wire aircraft. So a lot less from a control rod aspect, that helps reduce your vulnerability, helps lighten you up, just like the V-22.
The 53-K, just like the V-22 was designed from the start as a survivable platform to operate throughout the battle space. We designed it be able to go where the V-22 could go from a survivability standpoint. Back in the 60’s, we had the vision of the forward line of troops and the Echo would be a logistic hauler and it would never go beyond the forward line of troops. It would never really go into harm’s way. (…) The Kilo, from the ground up has been designed to make the vulnerable area as small as we could possibly make it. How do we build survivability into this platform? We do some modeling and simulation to optimize where you put different lines, where you put the fuel lines, where you put the electric lines. It’s a fly-by-wire aircraft.
So now, it’s that much more survivable from a small arms, from an RPG, from a heavy machine gun type. The 47F was built off of 47-D, which is built off of 47-C, which is built off the 47-A. It’s the 1960s design rolled out even the 1950s design. They just keep remanufacturing and re-adding and putting new engines and new blades and things like that. But you’re never really going to change the survivability of that aircraft — drastically change the survivability of that aircraft unless you completely scrap it, and rebuild it from the ground up, which is the case with the K.
SLD: What are some of the aspects of the design that makes this easier to take care of it?
Major Davis: A couple things; one, a fly-by-wire is going to be a huge enabler. My experience from Iraq in 2006 and 2007, mixing units on the 53-E, where all the flight control rods come in and then they essentially mixes what outputs come from the pilot and goes directly to the main rotor servos and then up. We were going through mixing units: it was crazy. Only because the sand would get in there, and they would erode the metal in the mixing unit, and you would end up getting a lot of play in the mixing unit and that would transfer over to your flight controls, and so the aircraft would get out of rig, and then you would be down.
Fly-by-wire, you’re not going to have this problem; you’re going to have a wire that goes from the pilot stick into a computer, and then wires go out and they go to the main rotor servos, you’re going to completely bypass that piece. Another thing we’ve learned over the last 10 years of operating in this environment, engines. The GE T-64 engine is a great engine, but once again, it’s a 1960’s engine. We’ve done some upgrades to it; we’ve put some titanium nitrate coating on the compressor section, for example.
SLD: There is a new engine for the K?
Major Davis: Yes, it is a completely new engine. They’ve taken a lot of the lessons learned from the GE T-64 engine and put it into GE-38. Better titanium nitrate coating; you’ll be able to crack open the engine compressor case while the aircraft is still on wing, as opposed to having to pull it off. You also end up with less moving parts : sixty-four-percent fewer parts on this particular engine. So that’s just from the engine standpoint.
SLD: I assume that there are improvements associated with digital monitoring as well?
Major Davis: We have the IVHMS, integrated vehicle health monitoring systems, on the K. Similar to the same concept as the Osprey has, same concept of the F-35 has, in the idea that the airplane is now going to be the primary driver of tell you when this particular component is failing and providing inputs with regard to what is needed to be fixed as opposed to having a human experience based maintenance schedule.
SLD: I would assume that Sikorsky can leverage their commercial experience here as well with regard to systems monitoring?
Davis: I’m very impressed with Sikorsky. They’re actually doing condition-based maintenance in some respects on their S92 fleet. They’ve got 2,500, I think, S92s across the world. And they have this thing called the FMOC or Fleet Maintenance Operating Center. Every S92 that they own reports home to the FMOC every night. They take that data, and they analyze it and they look for trends. They can make judgments with regard to replacement needs on actual operating experience rather than metrics established simply on guessing or assumptions. So there is an opportunity to blend operations on one side and maintenance on the other, to allow you to fly the helicopter more, and get more operational use out of it.
There is an opportunity to blend operations on one side and maintenance on the other, to allow you to fly the helicopter more, and get more operational use out of it.
SLD: The challenge is to replace the old and pay the price of deploying the new, and over a few short years, the costs saved from deploying the new pay dividends.
Major Davis: Here’s an example. Right now it costs roughly $3,000, a little over $3,000 an hour to operate the drive train portion alone of the 53-E, when you break out the cost per hour and associated costs. The 53-K, based on the last prediction I saw, was about $1,000 an hour for that same drive train piece. So you’ve reduced just that one single area by about a third.
But like you said, you’ve got to pay for that upfront, but when you’re talking about a platform that’s going to be around for 20, 30, 40, 50 years potentially. That saves you big money in the long run.
SLD: Could you speak about the impact of having both the Osprey and the K ?
Major Davis: The V-22 brings presence. Because it is designed to take 24 marines a long way and get them pretty quick. The 53-K projects power by providing sustainability.
SLD: When the MAGTF has the Yankees, Ospreys and Ks with the F-35B it has a strong package, which if populated with sensors that can work together will shape a really new and innovative force projection and force mobility package.
Davis: When you talk about the sensor, the mindset shift that people need to get to/get away from is everybody thinks of TACAIR as the guys who are going to make a huge impact on the battle space by themselves. And I’m not saying that they don’t, but the F-35, just like you said, it’s a sensor and it’s that entire communications package that goes with it. Why can’t I have F-35-like communications packages on every platform that I send out? Not just F-35s. We should be replicating that on a V-22, we should be replicating that on a 53-K, we should be replicating that on our UASs. So now, the MAGTF or MEU commander isn’t just limited to getting data from his six F-35s that are out there in the battle space. Anything he flies, anywhere he goes, he’s going to be able to collect that data. Not only to collect that data, but the idea that the V-22s, 53-Ks, F-35s, all share that and get that back to MAGTF, that is a huge capability.
Competition for the Arctic has been growing intense since 2007. The Arctic neighboring states have proclaimed or renewed their national strategies on the Arctic. In the short-, mid- and long-term perspective, the question of who is entitled to the Arctic region and its vast store of resources remains unanswered in 2010.
Three years after a Russian submarine crew led by Arthur Chilingaroy (Member of the State Duma, Russian President’s envoy for international cooperation in the Arctic and the Antarctic and Head of the Association of polar explorers who participated in the forum) planted the Russian flag on the seabed of the geographical North Pole, Russia sponsored and held the two-day International Arctic Forum, which was organized by the Russian Geographical Society. From flagging to discussing has been the proposed Russian perspective.
Arthur Chilingaroy is the figure circled on the left in attendance at the Forum
Credit: SLD, Moscow, September 2010
About 30 presentations were held and more than 300 participants from 15 countries attended the Moscow Forum from the 22nd and 23rd September 2010, under the motto “The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue.” Among the issues discussed were climate change and anthropogenic influence, natural resources as well as challenges and prospects of sustainable development in the region. Experts, international partners and distinguished scientists from all over the world were invited to not only exchange views and experience but also to join a comprehensive dialogue about cooperation and the future of the Arctic.
The forum was attended by renowned Russian and international scientists, representatives of NGOs, business people and policy-makers such as Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Icelandic President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, Prince Albert of Monaco and French ambassador to Russia Jean de Gliniasty. Both Albert as well as Grímsson was inducted to the Board of Trustees of the Russian Geographical Society. Neither representatives from the European Union nor representatives from Asian states attended the Forum.
From the left to the right: Icelandic President Olafur Ragnar Grimsson, Prince Albert of Monaco,
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Sergei Shoigu,
Emergency Situations Minister and President of the Russian Geographical Society
Credit: SLD, Moscow, September 2010
The International Arctic Forum was Russia’s first high-level international platform for scientific discussion, expert exchange of opinion and issuing recommendations on the Arctic region. Russia held this international Arctic event of such high level to set up the stage for further engagement.
Although the Arctic ecosystems have undergone enormous change in recent years due to the effects of climate change and anthropogenic activity, which are the main threats to the region’s sustainable development, Sergei Shoigu, Emergency Situations Minister and President of the Russian Geographical Society, emphasized that the Arctic is and will remain a “zone of peace and cooperation.”
According to Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin peace and cooperation are proven crucial in the race for Arctic resources. He underlined: “We think it is imperative to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation”.
Also clear from the Forum, that Russian territorial claims in the Arctic underscore their legitimate role in shaping the Arctic future. Russia builds its territory claim over the Arctic on the following key arguments:
Russia is a northern country. Seventy percent of its territory is located in northern latitudes.
History and geography posed the challenge of developing these territories before our people.
Russia has played a leading role in charting the Northern Sea Route also founded the Arctic icebreaker fleet, polar aviation and created an entire network of stationary and drifting stations in the Arctic.
And, finally, Russia has gained the unique experience of building major cities and industrial facilities above the Arctic Circle.
Russian speakers made clear some Russian priorities in the Arctic, notably the development of the Yamal Peninsula, the Shtokman deposit in the Barents Sea, the northern sector of the Krasnoyarsk Territory, the Yakutia and at hundreds of other production and infrastructure facilities in the region.
Russia’s top priorities in the Arctic as articulated at the Forum include:
The creation of top-quality, comfortable living conditions for local people and the pursuit of a frugal attitude towards the indigenous and small Arctic nations’ socio-economic infrastructure and traditions;
The support for new economic-growth points and incentives for large-scale domestic and foreign investment – currently about 20 percent of Russia’s GDP and 22 percent of Russian exports are produced in the Arctic;
Substantial investment in the scientific and nature-conservation infrastructure.
Russian speakers underscored that Russia, as one of the claimants, is responsible for the sustainable development of the Arctic. The Arctic will become a major source of energy resources and a key global transport hub in the next 50 years.
But the price of Arctic development is much higher than those billions of barrels of crude oil or natural gas. An irresponsible attitude towards the Arctic will spell global problems, rather than global advantages, in the near future. Russia likes to propose an active exchange of ideas, innovations and practical experience.
Russia is planning to revive and build up its research presence in the Arctic, supporting fundamental studies, including those carried out by international teams of scientists and experts.
Prime Minister Putin Addressing the Forum (Credit: SLD, Moscow, September 2010)
Putin declared in his speech to the Forum that he was in no doubt whatsoever that the existing problems of the Arctic, including those of the continental shelf, can be resolved in a spirit of partnership, through negotiations, on the basis of existing international legal norms. Russia will prove its claims with the required scientific data.
However, Alexander Frolov, Head of the Federal Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring Service, emphasized “Russia has very serious interests [in the Arctic] – geopolitical, scientific and economic.” Russia is a leading world power with global interests and “we cannot confine ourselves to the Moscow principality.”
The Arctic will become one of the major areas for the international cooperation in the upcoming decade. To encourage cooperation on research in the Arctic Russia initiated an International Polar Decade, which will focus on studies of global climate change and other issues linked to the Arctic in one way or another.
Playing down any fears of a coming “struggle over the Arctic”, only “civil” issues such as climate change or sustainable development were discussed.
Security or even military and defense aspects, that could shape future transit routes, oil and gas exploration rights, economic development, protection of minorities, and military strategies – training missions and missiles positioning – were not mentioned. This will be a subject of my next articles on Second Line of Defense.
In this context, it looks as if the biggest threat to Russia comes not from global warming but from the “globalization/internationalization” of the issue. “Climate is changing” and this is maybe happening regardless of human activity.
However, especially energy-related issues and regions like the Arctic – or the Caspian Sea and Siberia – are highlighted in the security planning through 2020. Thus, the Russia’s National Security Strategy from 2009 proposes the creation of a new military force for the Arctic.
According to Russia’s Maritime Doctrine of Russian Federation 2020 Russia’s “National Maritime Policy for the Arctic regional direction is determined by the particular importance of providing free access of Russian fleet in the Atlantic, wealth of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Russian Federation, the crucial role of the Northern Fleet for the defense of the state of marine and ocean areas, as well as the increasing importance of the Northern Sea Route for sustainable Development of the Russian Federation.”
Russia is planning to spend around 2 billion rubles ($64 million) on research in the next three years to prove its claims. As already announced on the International Arctic Forum, on October 3, 2010, Artur Chilingarov was heading a new expedition – “expedition Shelf-2010” – for the North Pole to gather scientific data in support of Russia’s claim on Arctic territories. Russia also plans to create a multi-functional satellite system to be known as Arctic.
Russian speakers highlighted their hope that the Forum marks a significant milestone in the history of international Arctic events. The Forum shall help continue the time-honored traditions in the field of the Arctic exploration and tackling the region’s major problems. In future, the International Arctic Forum will focus on the challenges of climate change, the effects of human activity, issues concerning natural resources and ways to ensure sustainable development in the Arctic region.
It should be noted that in 2001 Russia made an official submission into the United Nation Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf[1] in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (article 76, paragraph 8), proposing to establish new limits of Russia’s continental shelf, i.e. beyond the determined 200 mile zone. The United Nation Commission rejected the Russian proposal in 2002 as sufficient scientific evidence is lacking.
If Russia can prove that that the Lomonosov Ridge and the Mendeleev Ridge are the extension of the Russian continental shelf, the country will receive another 1.2 million square kilometers territory of the Arctic. This access allows Russia to explore and develop huge oil and gas fields in the triangle between the Chukotka Peninsula, Murmansk and the North Pole. The adjusted Russian claim for the Arctic shelf is expected to be prepared by 2013.
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