Haiti: Redefining Port Security

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02/24/2010

Risk IntelligenceIn the wake of disaster: How the Haiti earthquake is likely to redefine the notion of port security

by Tim Martin, Deaken University

This article is posted with the permission of Risk Intelligence, which published it in its latest Issue of Strategic Insights (January 2010).

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The Haiti earthquake is an important reminder that the security of maritime ports is vital in order to maintain the logistics of aid and fast response in the wake of such a disaster. This is particularly the case for developing nations with minimal infrastructure and/or marginal port facilities to begin with. Although the French and American foothold in the Caribbean island-nation prior to the earthquake has made a difference to help speed up the logistical effort, security initiatives that had been adopted prior to the earthquake did not prepare the port for such an emergency.

This is intriguing since Haiti seems to experience a high level of natural catastrophes. Therefore it is likely that this crisis, more than any other natural disaster, might inadvertently affect how port security management occurs in the future, especially in relation to ports in developing countries that are subject to natural disasters, or for port facilities that may be used as gateways for disasters in landlocked countries.

The concept of port security in recent years has been preventative rather than responsive. The International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code, for instance, appears to have done little to assist in this emergency. The ISPS Code has provided Haiti’s ports with ‘security’ in one sense but not in the sense of securing the ports during disaster relief. Haiti’s ports have been seeking to comply with American and ISPS measures since 2004 via a public and private development project, the Maritime Security Alliance for Haiti (MSAH).

This is a collaboration between a sea of acronyms: the national Port Authority, Association Maritime d’Haïti (AMARH), Association des Terminaux Privés (ASOTEMP), Haiti Terminal, International Maritime Terminal (IMT) and Maritime Logistics of Haiti (MLH). This project was funded by USAID through consultation with Florida Ports Council (FPC) and locally with Association des Industries d’Haïti (ADIH). The Caribbean Central American Action (CCAA) that facilitates Caribbean trade but still has a stated focus on maritime port security and disaster mitigation initiated all of this.

However, the security threats envisioned and level of disaster management planning has not taken into consideration the logistical challenges created by such large-scale destruction of Port au-Prince’s port infrastructure, the key link in the foreign aid logistics chain in an emergency. Therefore the aforementioned bureaucratic alphabet soup did little to provide a contingency plan for a human security-related catastrophe in an otherwise disaster prone region.

The airstrip is the most efficient and time sensitive way to get aid and supplies on the ground. However, the most significant point of entry for long term resupply and reconstruction are the ports. In the case of Port-au-Prince where up to 50% of the city was destroyed, a significant amount of heavy-lift equipment is required which only a deep-waterport facility can accommodate. The Toussaint L’Ouverture International Airport is faced with severe overcrowding and the destruction of the civilian control tower has led to American military controllers assuming command. Civilian relief efforts have been hampered simply due to the overwhelming volume that the small airport is notable to accommodate. For example, Médecins Sans Frontière tried to fly in crucial equipment, including medical supplies but claimed that one oftheir aircraft was sent away due to the bottleneck. Delivery of the aid cargoes that did land was sporadic, hampered by the temporary blocking of Port-au-Prince’s roads with debris, and affected by the lack of trucks for transport. Sadly the death of a number of United Nations experts working specifically on disaster management in the UN office in Port-au-Prince, coupled with the virtual non-existence of Haiti’s government, has only further hampered the relief effort.

Port-au-Prince (credit: Google Earth)
Port-au-Prince: the damage is visible in the Northern part of the port (credit: Google Earth)

Aid and supplies of course are not only needed now but will be for a prolonged period of time.The long-term aid distribution and reconstruction effort cannot be addressed purely with aerial supplies and therefore the port will play the most crucial role in Haiti’s rehabilitation. The distribution of aid in sizeable quantities is the next immediate step to stabilizing Haiti. United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that helicopters were simply not adequate to transport the substantial aid cargo from ships offshore that would meet the requirements of approximately two million people affected by the destruction of Port-au-Prince and its suburbs.

In this case, the maritime ports provide a crucial element in the immediate and ongoing aftermath of such incidents. The capacity of a devastated developing city such as Port-au-Prince to manage its own rescue is dramatically reduced if the critical infrastructure is also damaged or destroyed. Despite the rubble and cracks throughout the network, road transport was more or less intact. Haiti’s principal maritime port of Port-au-Prince was the primary alternate to the airport for airlifting material goods of aid and supplies in sufficient quantities for ongoing needs.

Although Canada was able to fly 200 tons of aid in, it took eighteen flights to do so. Colombia, on the other hand, is sending a naval vessel with 400 tons of aid to Haiti; along with the hospital ship ARC CARTEGENA carrying medical supplies, water and food. An emergency of this scale requires that ships can dock safely and unload effectively. Unfortunately, the maritime port area of Port-au-Prince was heavily damaged.

Consequently, Gates ordered the deployment of US vessels and personnel, both military and civil, to clear the harbor and assess the condition of the only pier within the port that remained standing after the quake. A nearby pier was completely submerged with only its container bridges and cranes above the water. A smaller port facility to the north was also unusable. The remaining South Pier was also damaged and had numerous toppled containers in the water along its length. The short-term options were therefore limited. The two vessels that were berthed at the time, the STELLA MARIS and MICHAEL J. were also damaged when a crane collapsed on top of the vessels. Only 228 of the 1,350 meters of pier space were serviceable and only one truck at a time was allowed on the pier, which appeared to have been compromised structurally from the quake. It was estimated that repairs would take at least 15-30 days.

There are seventeen ports servicing coastal traffic along the Haitian coastline, eight of which receive international traffic, and three of substantial size; Port-au-Prince has the public piers and a private pier at Terminal Varreux SA (also badly damaged). The alternative, the deep water container port of Cap Haitian to the north of the country has become the secondary logistics base for the World Food Program offloading cargo as well as US Naval and Coast Guard vessels.

Another significant problem is access to and from the port as the roads have been cluttered with debris and are partly damaged. The key is repairing all of Port-au-Prince’s maritime facilities as quickly as possible whilst ensuring that the road networks remain usable for the continued incoming aid at increasing levels. US Coast Guard cutters arrived quickly off the coast of Port-au-Prince working with the Haitian Coast Guard, which has a limited capacity in providing either security, assessments, or repairs.

Taking soundings, marking submerged rubble and containers and inspecting the damaged port were key tasks for the joint operation but the security of the port, as in Port-au-Prince itself, is a priority because the city’s surviving law enforcement capabilities are seriously overwhelmed. US troops are flooding into the city and are expected to provide security for the aid and rescue effort but they are not a law enforcement solution, as soldiers are generally not trained in constabulary services. The earthquake damaged the main prison in Port-au-Prince allowing approximately4,000 prisoners, including gang leaders connected to high-level organized crime syndicates to escape into the shattered city. In The virtual absence of a fully functioning police force, these criminals have begun to return to old ways of gang rivalries, controlling turf in the Cité Soleil slum areas of Port-au-Prince, located in the port area. Furthermore, the major road networks leading to and from the port cross through these suburbs. These areas have long been no-go zones where drug trafficking and human trafficking syndicates have flourished. Brazil had a peacekeeping force of 145 soldiers in Cité Soleil but lost 18 of them, including three of its commanders in the earthquake during a building collapse. All of their weapons were looted. Since the initial quake, armed criminal gangs have been accused of attacking rescue workers trying to pull bodies from the rubble, and contributing to the insecurity felt by aid workers and locals. At night, gunshots are often heard, and there are reports of women being raped due to the lack of adequate street lighting. Vigilante groups for the protection of citizens are active with the encouragement from the incapacitated police services but this is not an ideal security solution. The UN Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon has requested that the Security Council send reinforcements to support the UN peacekeeping mission to Haiti, which will add to the existing 7,000 peacekeepers and 2,000 police already in Haiti. Reinforcements will include 2,000 peacekeeping troops and 1,500 police units.

These extra personnel are likely to stay deployed in Haiti for at least six months and should fill the current gaps in Port-au-Prince security, following the virtual disappearance of the Haitian Police, and an overall sense of a lack of security coordination.

In the port area the US is providing better security than what the rest of the city is experiencing. The US Army’s 82nd Airborne division was guarding the port facilities but the US Coast Guard will likely be the agency in charge of providing maritime security in the longer term lasting months and even possibly years. The US Coast Guard flew in 33 personnel of a ‘Coast Guard Advanced Port Security Team’ on 21 January that consisted of various tactical law enforcement team’ members from Miami and San Diego.

These policing units will provide protection for the US ‘Marine Transportation Recovery Unit’ while they reconstruct the port and the reorganization of the Haitian Coast Guard is vital. The submerged containers and rubble will continue to limit the draft size of vessels supplying the relief efforts organized by the US ‘Agency for International Development’ so this clearance process has been deemed a priority.

US and French divers did manage to clear some underwater obstructions within the first week, however, only shallow draft vessels and barges carrying a maximum of 150 containers are able to access the piers until more work is done. Within a few days a vessel out of Mobile Alabama, the 278-foot US-flagged barge CRIMSON CLOVER, managed to get dockside and cautiously unloaded 100 containers of wheat and vegetable oil. Following this success, other shippers have been contracted by USAID to deliver relief cargoes consisting of around 560 20-foot containers to Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian from the US ports of Lake Charles (Louisiana), Mobile (Alabama) and Port Everglades (Florida).

A French naval vessel, the FRANCIS GARNIER docked to unload soldiers in the first few days after the earthquake as well as medical equipment and excavators but at the risk of completely toppling the badly damaged pier. The US Sealift Command salvage ship USNS GRASP also arrived to clear the port debris. Secretary Robert Gates expects that the primary piers within Port au-Prince can be reopened within two weeks; however, this seems to be a very optimistic assessment. Barges have been brought in as temporary floating docks for cranes and a causeway barge is currently being used for vehicle traffic. A barge handling ship, an oil delivery ship and a high-speed ferry is also being used to replace the damaged piers. Other naval assets include the US Naval hospital ship COMFORT, which was anchored out at seat ending to survivors who are in critical condition. Overall, naval vessels have generally been more cautious, although it appears that the French and American naval forces have cooperated in getting the port functioning at least within a minimal capacity.

The Haiti earthquake has shown that ports can be vulnerable to natural disasters, which consequently is the primary logistical point for both short and long term aid delivery. When Indonesia was hit by a tsunami in 2004, the only substantial access was by sea, where naval amphibious craft were used. Port security after a disaster will always depend on a number of variables, including extent of damage, logistical needs of a particular situation and the capacity of local authorities to provide security. In the case of the Haiti earthquake, security was immediately recognized as a major issue both in the short and long term. Haiti’s ports are small to medium sized and can only service a limited capacity at the best of times but the problem of getting vehicles to deliver aid supplies when it did arrive in Port-au-Prince, or via Cap Haitian, was compounded by roads blocked with rubble or cracked by the earthquake, and most importantly, a shortage of fuel.

The use of JLOC Army mobile warfs is crucial (credit: US Army)
The use of JLOC Army mobile warfs is crucial (credit: US Army)

In the long term, the US Military, like the Coast Guard, will need to remain on-station for some months, possibly even years to provide security as the Haitian Government, police force and critical infrastructure are redeveloped. Temporary logistics already in place need to be strengthened and rebuilt. In time, reconstruction equipment will arrive on increasingly larger vessels that will be vital in the long-term reconstruction effort. As this happens, the volume of aid can increase as the needs of the city are reassessed. Although the efforts to get the port up and functioning have been thus far efficient, serious consideration of future disaster management when infrastructure is destroyed must be a part of port security planning. In Haiti, it was fortunate that the US and French military forces were nearby and able to assist, but as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami illustrated, natural elements can incapacitate a port facility as severely as any conventional conflict or terrorist attack with far less predictability. During the post tsunami response, international aid efforts first had to negotiate with the Indonesian government over access to Aceh and consider the fragile political environment between the government and both the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka’s (GAM) political wing and possible splinter elements. Eventually it was realized that the tsunami had destroyed significant infrastructure on both sides of the conflict. Furthermore, Bandar Aceh and the most significantly affected areas had poorly developed and relatively insecure port facilities. Similar to the situation in Port-au-Prince, foreign forces not only had to operate under difficult circumstances but also have had to provide their own security as there appeared to be no contingency plan in place.

Conclusion

Current maritime security upgrades in recent years have only facilitated the day-to-day security of port operations, whereas the security of ports must be part of a wider response mechanism, perhaps in collaboration with regional states through CARICOM, OAS, and of course, the US. The lessons learned in this instance are that indigenous security forces may be non-existent due to corruption, a lack or resources, or a damaged chain of command after a catastrophe, but it is vital that ports and vessels still have a secure operating environment. Haiti has been hit by hurricanes and a major earthquake and was already struggling with its own security and stability before the aforementioned disasters occurred. Developing countries like Haiti (or Indonesia) that clearly do not have the capacity to cope with the added security demands that arise in the wake of large-scale emergencies need to assess all aspects of port logistics security.

The Haitian port facilities and roads will be repaired in due time in order to accommodate the necessary docking of larger ships and the delivery of equipment and supplies. During this time the capacity of the city to provide its own maritime security for the ongoing logistical challenges faced by trying keep Port-au-Prince alive will depend on the goodwill of countries such as the US, French and other donor countries. As more aid supplies and heavy equipment is chartered to Haiti for the relief effort, shippers will need to know there is safe access to permanent or temporary wharfs, and that adequate provisions have been made to unload cargoes onto barges alongside when no other options are available. To those within the shipping industry that are contracted to play a role in the aid delivery to Haiti, the safety and security of their crew and vessel as well as logistical variables to avoid time delays are key priorities.

Despite the considerable efforts of the US reconstruction and security teams, the ongoing nature of aid supply, the fragility of Port-au-Prince infrastructure, the dysfunctional state of the police force, and the potential for select Haitian gang involvement in the port area will threaten shippers who risk their vessels to deliver the much needed cargo. In the short to medium term, port security will rely on external military forces, however, in the long term, port security in the developing world will depend on the lessons that can be learned from Haiti and translated into future port security planning.

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Timothy Martin is a PhD Candidate at Deakin University, Australia. He specializes in maritime law enforcement cooperation frameworks in the Caribbean and South East Asia and specifically examines drug trafficking and counter piracy initiatives.

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***Posted February 24th, 2010

General Burke and “Operation Unified Response” in Haiti: Towards a Normalization of Airfield Operations

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02/22/2010

In an interview on February 15th, 2010 with Sldinfo, Brig. Gen. Darryl Burke, the 12th Air Force (Air Forces) Southern Vice Commander, provided an update on the Air operation in support of Haiti relief. General Burke arrived in late January to lead members of the Air Component Coordination Element supporting Joint Task Force (JTF)-Haiti. The team’s primary function is to liaise between the JTF, Joint Forces Air Component Commander and related staffs coordinating the flow of air traffic during Operation Unified Response.

[slidepress gallery=’haiti-gen-burke-feb-22′]

Photos credits: Photos 1-7 – USAF; Photo 8 – 3rd Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)

A “Controlled Chaos” : Surging From 20 + Operations to Up to 150

Sldinfo: It’s just an impression, but it seems that the AFSOC (Air Force Special Operations Command) people from the Eglin Air Force Base complex handled the initial air traffic control problem, or challenge, and that you basically are the follow-on to that and working the transition back to the civilian side. Is that a correct impression?

Brigadier General Darryl Burke: That is true. Within 24 hours we had our Air Force Special Operations team on the ground from Hurlburt Field, Florida. Part of their team consists of Combat Controllers which are Airmen that come in and open up an airfield. For the first two weeks, we had Combat Controllers set up in the infield of the airfield controlling the flow of traffic in and out.

Sldinfo: Although referred to it as air traffic control, I refer to it as card tables near an airstrip with the boys working radios. That’s what it looked like.

Brigadier General Darryl Burke: Exactly, you’re spot on! I’ve got a great photograph of it. It was literally a couple of Airmen sitting in the infield with a mobile radio clearing traffic to land. The traffic separation was established through a structure based on timing. Additionally, they handled the ground control piece.

To put it in perspective, Port-au-Prince Airport’s normal operations were at about 25-30 operations per day. They didn’t even use a ground control function. But, there was so much traffic in those first couple of weeks, it was almost, and I hate to make the comparison, a “controlled chaos”. We were using every inch of the ramp that we possibly could to increase efficiency and capacity while concurrently sharing the field with major helicopter operations.

The Navy assisted with an Air Boss on the ground. I remember, when I stepped off the plane about a week into this operation, that I was amazed at the number aircraft, vehicles, helicopters, and people transiting the ramp. I had never seen anything like it before.

Sldinfo: It was chaos, not a CAOC (Combined Air and Space Operation Center), is a good way to probably put that.

Brigadier General Darryl Burke: Yeah, a kind of chaos. Controlled, but not what one normally sees on a military flightine. Our Airfield Operations team was getting the maximum capacity out of an airfield that normally has about ten to 12 parking spots, depending on aircraft size. With single runway operations and one taxiway you’re already constrained in what you can do. We were able to get the capacity up to about 120 aircraft per day. Although, our high day was around 150, normally, we tried to maintain a slot capacity at 120 a day to keep the environment under control.

Coupled with the assistance from 1st AF at Tyndall, we tapped into their experience with Katrina and through use of a Maximum on Ground (MOG) tool and a system they developed to initiate slot times, we were quickly able to prioritize and maximize the efficiency of the system.

“Our Airfield Operations team was getting the maximum capacity out of an airfield that normally has about ten to 12 parking spots, depending on aircraft size. We were able to get the capacity up to about 120 aircraft per day.”

Managing the “Beast”

Sldinfo: So you’ve managed this transition from the initial insertion of the AFSOC to trying to get to the point where one can have some commercial traffic in country and start some kind of normalization process. Tell me a little bit about the kind of air traffic you’ve had to manage?

Brigadier General Darryl Burke: Everything from a small helo or commuter type aircraft to a 747 or AN-124. So you have to have balance and flexibility in the system. Initially, we had times where the MOG on the ground had reached capacity and aircraft had to divert. We were able to get that under control quickly after the Haitian Government allowed us to help manage the system.

With all the traffic we were always cognizant of the fact that if anything happened to the runway, we would be out of business. During the initial stage of the operation, the airfield was the center of gravity. With that in mind the oversight was critical, compelling us to lean forward to ensure the viability of the only avenue to provide aid and assistance early on.

The Air Force flew in its heavy lifter the C-17 along with the venerable C-130. About 42% of the airlift coming in was logistical support to sustain, what I sometimes refer to as the “beast”… the boots on the ground and the deployed infrastructure. And then approximately 23% of it was water and relief aid that was critical in the early going. The remainder was 20% medical, 10% food and then 5% was in support of the security piece on the ground.

Of course, with the STRAT Lift (long-range strategic airlift capability), we had to then bring in a capability to manage the functions of a normal airfield. So, we called in one of our Air Force, Contingency Response Group’s from McGuire Air Force Base (CRG). Intrinsic with this capability come an aerial port, contractors, finance, security forces, controllers, air field operators and more. Everything to run a bare-base operation.

The CRG requirement is diminishing as we transition to “Big Air Force” capability. Our Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) stood up shortly thereafter and has allowed the CRG to redeploy to prepare for future contingencies. The AEG is currently comprised of:

  • four squadrons an air-base squadron
  • security forces squadron
  • operations support squadron
  • and an expeditionary medical squadron.

Both of these groups have supported the 2,678 sorties that have flown this past month.

“About 42% of the airlift coming in was logistical support to sustain, what I sometimes refer to as the “beast”… the boots on the ground and the deployed infrastructure. And then approximately 23% of it was water and relief aid that was critical in the early going. The remainder was 20% medical, 10% food and then 5% was in support of the security piece on the ground.”

Seabasing as the Center of Gravity

Sldinfo: This is a significant challenge and this included not just American aircraft and engagements, didn’t it?

Brigadier General Darryl Burke: I would say there have been 62 nations that have supported by flying in supplies. We’ve had to prioritize those missions with other NGOs and civil agencies that have participated.

The other thing that we’ve had to do was turn every available U.S. military asset delivering support to Port-au-Prince into transportation home for American citizens. This included floor loading passengers to maximize each aircraft’s capability. We have flown over 21,000 U.S. Citizens and a number of non-citizens and adoptees putting the total well over 25,000. Additionally, we have flown 260 air medical evacuations.

As you are aware, the Navy ship, the USNS Comfort, is anchored just off the coast. Patients are treated aboard the Comfort and when ready for transition back into Haitian civilian care or transfered to the United States for further care, they are delivered to the USAF Expeditionary Medical Squadron (EMEDS). The EMEDS also handles emergency cases on a daily basis. They are capable of performing x-ray, surgery, pediatrics, triage and other standard medical care. A Colombian contingent of 30 medical personnel have joined the squadron to assist in their efforts.

As we continue to build, we also continue to evaluate what we don’t need and redeploy what is no longer necessary.

This has been a significant combined, joint, inter-agency effort. US AID has the lead and DOD functions in a supporting role. It has been pretty impressive to see everything that’s been accomplished in just four weeks. Just yesterday, I took a tour into Port au Prince and it is improving every day.

Haiti had a number of challenges before the earthquake. Those challenges have been magnified exponentially with the devastation and the aftermath of 230,000 dead. Every family has been affected. Challenges remain with debris removal, shelter, and the establishment of settlements. The good news is that the Haitian people have been resilient and I think it’s all goodness as we move forward.

Sldinfo: Well, I think from an American point of view, the kind of sea basing capability we could move in, the kind of air management we could move in and just the lift that we’re able to mobilize have really been indispensable to the Haitian people.

Brigadier General Darryl Burke: That is correct and obviously, now, the surface shipping brings the most capacity to the effort. I sit next to Admiral Perez in our Joint Operations Center whose responsibility and challenge is getting the ports back open and operating at peak efficiency. They are making great strides repairing a port that was severely damaged. With the air traffic now decreasing and sealift the center of gravity it gives us the perfect opportunity to transition to commercial air operations at the airport.

The Haitians are going to have to build a new control tower and they’re going to have to make some improvements to the airfield and its infrastructure. That said, getting American Airlines back, getting Delta, Air Canada, Air France, and Spirit all back will generate the required revenue to fund those improvements. As we take down the contingency airspace structure, the Haitians can reinitiate the landing fees, parking fees, and over flight fees to generate the revenue needed to return to normal operations. In addition, the influx of goods will contribute to the overall economy which obviously will assist with the recovery effort.

“As we take down the contingency airspace structure, the Haitians can reinitiate the landing fees, parking fees, and over flight fees to generate the revenue needed to return to normal operations.”
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***Posted February 22nd, 2010

Haiti Relief as a Case Study: Seabasing and JLOTS in Action

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||||

The Haiti relief operation featured a number of key US and allied military assets in shaping the overall capability. In this interview, Sldinfo talked with one of the most knowledgeable US analysts of the seabasing concept in the US military. Jim Strock is Director, Seabasing Integration Division of the Capabilities Development Directorate Marine Corps Combat Development Command. An earlier interview with Jim Strock can be found on https://www.sldinfo.com/?p=189.

***

Quote Jim Strock

Sldinfo: Most people don’t understand the function of a sea base, but in Haiti, virtually the entire world could see a sea base in operation. Could you comment a bit on how sea-basing capability was demonstrated in Haiti?

Jim Strock: Number one, as we’ve always said, there’s no cookie cutter definition of a sea base. Sea bases are assembled out of resource pools available to joint force commanders, and they’re tailored for specific missions. So if you look at Haiti, I think the first thing down there was the USS Truman carrying helicopters. The Truman effectively went down there as a transport deck to get some vertical lift assets in there. The 22nd MEU on the USS Bataan instantly back loaded. They had just gotten back from a routine deployment on 7 December and turned right around and back loaded on the very ships that they’d just come off of.

Sldinfo: After the initial insertion what other elements were deployed for the sea base?

JS: The hospital ship, USNS Comfort, I believe, got underway and went down. Then DoD activated one of the crane ships, one of the T-ACS crane ships. These ships are from the Military Sealift Command Ready Reserve Force, which is able to sandwich itself between an ordinary container ship and some sort of lighterage or a pier and very quickly trans-deck or trans-load containers off container ships to lighterage and things like that, more on that in a minute.

Then, very fortuitously in the existing MPS Program that we’ve had for years as you’re probably aware, we have a facility at Blount Island, Jacksonville, Florida, where our MPS ships routinely go in on a periodic basis. All the assets are downloaded. The ships are sent off to Charleston for American Bureau of Shipping Inspections and meanwhile the equipment at Blount Island is refurbished and updated and restocked and so on. So we had the USNS Lummus in Blount Island empty. She’d just been off-loaded and so instantly at Blount Island, they back loaded the Lummus with a variety of engineering equipment: water purification, power generating, bulldozers, earthmovers, forklifts, things like that. Then I believe the US Agency for International Development rushed other supplies down to Blount Island, and they back loaded that on the Lummus and sent the Lummus into Haiti. Then one of our other pre-positioning ships, the USS James E. Williams, was sitting in Charleston, and they pulled her out and sent her to the common user pool for military sea lift command, so that she could perform logistic shuttling.

And boom: You have a sea base! They also took down – I think either the Lummus or the Williams – took down the Navy’s Improved Lighterage System (INLS), which gave you the ability to transit supplies and equipment to shore because, obviously, there was no usable port infrastructure. So other than getting airplanes into the Dominican Republic and also outlying airfields in Haiti, and other than having helicopters down there to lift supplies off of the amphibia ships and such, this was a new capability to deliver supplies.

For the initial, critical grueling period of that event, the only way that you could extend any sort of relief capabilities to shore was through the sea base.

Sldinfo: Your point being it’s a very flexible concept, which can be tailored to the solution presumably if the assets are available.

JS: That’s correct.

Sldinfo: But there must be tremendous pressure on the assets with the global deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq.

JS: There are but it was surprising what was available on the East Coast at the time. Of course, the Comfort was sitting up near Baltimore. They got her underway in short order. The crane ship got underway in short order, which speaks highly of the ability to maintain ships under reduced operating status yet activate them very quickly.

You had elements of the amphibious fleet ported in Norfolk. You had obviously a carrier homeport in Norfolk. You had the 22nd MEU and the Battaan who were crucial for landing support parties ashore to help organize the air heads and organize each landing areas where they could in order to move supplies to shore. The maritime pre-positioning ship came out of Blount Island. The amphibs came out of Norfolk.

Sldinfo: The crane ship: you were describing how it had been activated.

JS: This belongs to military sealift command. It’s in there generically. It’s in their Ready Reserve Fleet, and these types of vessels are available on call in a reduced operating status. I don’t know if it was a 5-day or a 30-day – probably a 5-day because they got her underway pretty quickly – and so you had key players out of the Navy, obviously 2nd fleet.

You had military sea lift command involved with the crane ship; the hospital ship and the MPS ships are all military sea lift command assets. So that speaks highly of the fact that you can designate a joint task force commander, and you can make assets available to him. I’m sure the combat logistics force had one of their new T-A-K-E’s down there, I believe, one of their underway replenishment ships. And you had coalition ships operational as well.

Sldinfo: So the main function of the sea base in this case was to put a coordinated capability that could augment fairly quickly the limited capacity of helo rescue efforts?

JS: The purpose of the sea base was really to establish  the initial ability to introduce bulk supplies and equipment into the country in the absence of a port and infrastructure: I don’t even think the pier is fixed yet. Generically we call it JLOTS – Joint Logistics Over the Shore – which can be brought to bear very quickly to setup effectively a surrogate pier facility, so you can get supplies from ship to shore.

Sldinfo: Let me ask you a final question then, which is kind of in summary. In your view, what does Haiti show about the sea basing capability?

JS: It shows how quickly a sea base can organize, deploy, and respond to an assigned mission.

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***Posted February 21st, 2010

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: A Situation Report on the Osprey in Afghanistan

Posted on | by SysAdmin
02/21/2010

On February 9th, 2010, “Second Line of Defense”‘ followed up its earlier interview with the Osprey squadron just before its deployment to Afghanistan last November with a new one, this time directly from Afghanistan, with Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca, the Osprey Squadron Commander.

Accompanying this interview is a slideshow of Osprey operations in Afghanistan. The interview and the photos demonstrate the wide-range of activities the aircraft has been displaying in support of US Marine Corps and allied operations.

One might note that the major NATO offensive against the Taliban began that day, as shown in another slideshow, which highlights USMC actions in the beginning phase of this operation.

The most compelling point underscored by the squadron commander is how, in effect, the Osprey has inverted infrastructure and platform.

Normally, the infrastructure shapes what the platform can do. Indeed, a rotorcraft or a fixed wing aircraft can operate under specific circumstances. With the range and speed of the Osprey aircraft, the plane shapes an overarching infrastructure allowing the ground forces to range over all of Afghanistan, or to be supported where there are no airfields, or where distributed forces need support.

The envelopment role of the Osprey is evident in Afghanistan as well, whereby the Osprey can provide the other end of the operational blow for the ground or rotorcrafts in hot pursuit of Taliban. The Osprey can move seamlessly in front of rotorcraft and land forces, allowing the pursuit of different lines of attack.

The envelopment role was not the focus of the interview because of security considerations, but anecdotal evidence suggests such an emerging role.


The V-22, the Perfect Tool For D.O.

SLD: As you arrived in Afghanistan, can you tell us about the challenges you generally have had to face as a Marine supporting the ground forces?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: The nature of this particular environment is distributed operations, which – frankly –  the V-22 excels at. We operate primarily in the Helmand province, but we do fly to the far reaches of the country, which we have done several times, just because we can. Also, because typically the forces and the leadership want to go places where there is no runway, and the V-22 can get you there.

Distributed operations are mostly outlying bases and living with the people out in their village and their township. One of the advantages of the airplane is the fact that it allows us to land literally at dozens of these places in a single day, move mail, food, water, and in some cases, building equipment. We have run the whole gamut of support operations. We’ve done external lift operations. We’ve done deliberate actions for basic assault insert, looking to kick in the door.

But day-to-day, we basically circulate and circumscribe the battlefield. And we do that in concert with the H-53s. Typically, the H-53s or the other aircrafts will work closer to Camp Leatherneck, while the V-22s will range out to the far reaches: that kind of burden-sharing works out pretty well for operational support.

SLD: It seems like one way to look at what the V-22 is doing is providing a very different kind of infrastructure than a classic rotorcraft or a fast jet can provide for the operational commander: would you agree?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: I would say that is absolutely correct. And this is true not just for pure military operations, but also in support of the political process closely associated with the military and security operations. For example, when a Shura Tribal Council is to be held, a big issue is getting everyone together in a timely fashion to reduce the security risk to the council from Taliban attacks. The Osprey can uniquely bring folks together and move them after the meeting in a very timely manner.

There have been one or two times where we had to go get a guy literally on the border with Iran and another guy from the other end of the country from the border of Pakistan. And if you didn’t have V-22s, you could not have done that without taking several days to transport these guys.

SLD: So, just to underscore this point, the Marines talk about distributed operations and the role of  the V-22 in those operations. But what you are highlighting is how, in addition, it fits the real political context of Afghanistan, as well as the need to bring the dispersed tribal leaders together to support the effort in Afghanistan and to prepare for the transition, is this correct?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: Well, that is correct. And again, we are trying to put people, and policy makers, people who can have an impact together in certain places at certain times.

The nature of mobility is characterized by three things; speed, range, and payload. If you need mobility, -“hey, I just got here in Kandahar, and I need to go see this place and this place and this place, so I can get this non-government agency eyes-on” – , well then, we are your platform, and I guarantee you, we are going to get that mission.

The same thing with most of the VIPs who come from America, e.g. the undersecretary for agriculture, the various service committee members, representatives, etc . If you need to see a lot of things, then we’re going to put you on a V-22, because you’re going to see everything in this province in a day. We’ll get you there and back in a day. There are no airports; we carry the airport with us.

Quote Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca

A “Game of Minutes”

SLD: A recent press piece focused on the role of the V-22 in Afghanistan as “ferrying around” troops. Given what you are saying and the impact which you have in shaping operational capabilities, it looks like the Osprey’s role is going rather beyond just transporting troops and doing something akin to classic rotorcraft transport: would you agree with such an assessment?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: Well, you are absolutely correct. Here is something that no-one ever thinks about until one gets here. It is one thing for me to do an assault support mission where I insert troops to a location. It is quite another to talk about distributed operations.

In other words, if I am here at this airport, the troops I have to move are way over there, and the place I got to get them to is way over that way and if you want to do this in one cycle of darkness, you are going to have to put some speed on it, or you are going to have to make this a two-day evolution to move the troops here, and then get them there, so that you can do the mission.

You cannot lose sight of that either. So, even if it was to be characterized very placidly as “ferrying” of troops, there is that speed component. Football is a game of inches: combat is a game of minutes or even seconds, and that can matter.

From the distributed angle, never forget that  the troops just get on the airplane here at Camp Leatherneck: they are not here at Camp Leatherneck;  they are always somewhere else.

We have to go there first and then, move them to wherever the operation is going to go. And whatever one’s characterization of the operation – whether it is an assault or  a town meeting -, it is time-urgent mobility.

We are moving folks to places in this country that you just cannot get to in a timely manner any other way. You simply cannot. You cannot get in a car and drive there. You can get in a helicopter and fly there, but that is going to take you two and a half  or three hours. Your only option is to get into a V-22, because “I got to get to that corner in the open world, –  no roads, nothing there -, we got to go do it”, and that, then, becomes our mission.

SLD: So basically, isen’t the V-22 providing a very different understanding of mobility in terms of leveraging operations, timeliness, and ability to create a result that a classic rotorcraft just could not deliver?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: That is correct.

SLD: Isen’t there significant demand outside of the USMC for you to put your capability at the service of the joint warfighter and political-security personnel?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: Yes, that is true. We are not a joint asset; we are a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) force. We belong to the MEB and the MEB commander has to agree to give up this aircraft for the joint or other mission. This has worked well. And we are in demand from a variety of agencies and players in the Afghan mission.

When we spoke last, back in New River, our fear was that we would have to apportion sorties out to other various commands and that has not happened. Those other commands approached the MEB and the MEB agrees or disagrees and that is how we get committed to the sorties. So we are not a joint asset per say, but can perform as such in the context of basic theater level air operations.

Readiness: Beating the Dust… and the Cold

SLD: Could you describe the nature of the operating environment?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: The environment is, of course, challenging for several reasons. The first and the foremost is the fact that we’re not at an airport; we live in tents. The airplanes are hangared in tents and we only have one: for the most part. the Ospreys hence live outside in the dust and the mud and the crud on expeditionary airfield matting. We don’t take off from a concrete runway, we typically lift to and from river rock pad, open desert and things of that nature.

So, even in our base of operations, what we’re trying to do is some pretty sophisticated maintenance on some precision parts, such as actuators, hydraulic actuators, electrical motors, and so on; even the electronics of the aircraft (e.g. the flight control computers, mission computers; etc) have of course to live in this dusty environment and that’s been a challenge. But the airplanes have held up to it.

In some cases, we learned a trick or two to ease things and make the aircraft last a little longer, keeping the electronics from overheating, keeping the actuators so they could last longer on wing. Things of that nature.

But for the most part, I’d say the biggest challenge has been just the environment itself and the fact that there is no factory you could go to, no depot level maintenance facility you could go to; we’re going to fix it right here underneath the sun, or the rain, or the clouds: whatever is out there. That is how we’ve been operating and that has been a challenge.

In terms of flying the airplane in the dust, the V-22 is potentially the best airplane to do that. We are very comfortable with landing in a brownout; we do it daily. The pilots are very good at it, and the airplane systems allow us to do that.

SLD: It seems that the reported readiness rates have been extraordinary: how do you maintain such a readiness level in a very stringent and difficult environment?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: We are indeed facing a challenging environment within which to provide for a ready aircraft. We are operating at more than 80% readiness in severe conditions; but I want us to be better and we are working on making it even better. But I am proud of my Marines: in some cases, you just put your backs into it –  ” Hey, I know it’s raining, I know you’ve been here for 12 hours, but we got to get this actuator changed, guys” – And they drive toward it.

That is a piece of it. The other one is that I have a very responsive program manager. In some cases when I coordinate through headquarters Marine Corps requirements to Colonel Rudder and his team, I come out and I explain things like: ” I have this particular bolt that is breaking on this particular part, is there a suitable replacement?” Then the engineers go into overdrive, work the weekend and then, I can find out that, yes, I have a different one we can use. And we open that up. In those cases, we fix a problem that we have never seen before. Said like this, it is a very simplistic description, and you might get someone asking in the V-22 program: “well, what bolt? Where? What part?”  I could actually give a thousand examples of things of that nature, where we just, in some cases, run things the hard way: beef this up, or that doesn’t need to be beefed up.

Quote Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca (2)

SLD: What has been the most surprising development from your point of view in terms of your aircraft, in your combat experience and just how the aircraft might be used, or just what you’re expecting about the environment?

Lieutenant-Colonel Bianca: We were ready to accept it to be hard, but, to be truthful, in that first month we were here, it was harder than we thought. The V-22 is a very modern aircraft. Our instructional manuals and our data tracking methods are all on computer. And there were days we did not have power – “there is no electrical power. Nobody can open up the computer today, so go open the box, we got to bring out the paper books” -: in some cases, we had to do that.

The other thing that surprised us is that no amount of western engineering, short of a low earth orbit shuttle, can get anything to Afghanistan faster than four or five days. Just not possible with the different customs and countries and methods.

We literally are on the opposite side of the globe here. And on occasion, if we identify a failure of a part that we don’t have here, then we have to park the airplane, because it is going to be at least five days before they can get that part to us. That did surprise us in the beginning.

Another surprise has also been the fact that, while we do have a tent hangar here, on occasion, it is freezing at night. This affects directly the epoxies and composites and it takes a long time for this to cure in this environment. Normally it would take us one day in New River. We would just sand it and paint it and go fly the airplane. Well, over here, three days may go by and we are still waiting for this to cure, because we did not have the capability at that time, even locally, to generate any level of warmth for that particular cure. We have done that since however: we got a contraption out here for environmental control; we bring the parts into that location and keep it at the proper temperatures and that works.

I think that my characterization would be that it was a harsher environment than we thought. And it truly was. If you can do it here, you are going to be fine anywhere:  I have been in the Marine Corps for 21 years and I served in the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Eastern Morocco.  I have been to some pretty distant locations, but this place takes the cake.

———-

***Posted February 21st, 2010

General Bansard on Logistics and Sustainment in France (Part Three)

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Logistics on the Front Line

A few months ago, SLD sat down with General Jean-Pierre Bansard, in charge at the time of Logistics Organization within the MoD Chief of Staff, in order to gain a better understanding of the evolution of French support and logistics in light of the many undergoing reforms and the mutation of the battlefield.

This is the last of a three-part series previously published in French as a single article in ”Soutien Logistique Défense” in October 2009.

***


Le Grand Balard
Located in the South of Paris (XVth), the FAF facility is to become the "Grand Balard"; symbol of the French evolution towards more jointness, it will welcome all main defense administrations by the end of 2014 (credit: www.defense.gouv.fr)

8. [SLD] Is it possible to establish a first assessment of the evolution towards increased jointness, as far as support is concerned?

Things have to be put into perspective: in my view, the process towards a joint approach in logistics and support has been set in motion ever since 1993, since it is at that time that were created, within the Chief of Staff, the MoD’s joint structure for the coordination of logistics, as well as the first joint support center (i.e. the CIRRM, which stands in French for “Centre Interarmées de Réparation de la Munition Mistral” and translates in English as “Joint Maintenance Center for the Mistral Ammunition”). One should not forget, in addition, that, at the time, a joint medical support service, known as the SSA for “Service de Santé des Armées“,  as well as a joint fuel service, known as the SEA for “Service des Essences des Armées“, already existed.

  • From 1993 to 2000, progress towards a joint support concept had been stammering and experimenting, but it did go forward while leading to the first major achievement, i.e. the creation of a specific structure in charge of the readiness of military air assets across the board, called SIMMAD (“structure intégrée de maintien en condition opérationnelle des matériels aéronautiques de la défense“).
  • Then, from 2000 to 2005, tremendous conceptual evolutions took place, but could not easily be implemented within the French system, essentially because of modes of governance inherited from the 1982 Decree on the Chiefs of Staff’s responsibilities. Once replaced in May 2005 by the Decree 2005-520, the door was open for deeper structural change, from which stem most of today’s reforms: the establishment of a new Joint Support Command called COMIAS (for ” Commandement interarmées du soutien” ), which is soon to be implemented, is an example of how far we have gone and the hope is that the whole process will actually be finalized with the launching of the “French Pentagon”, within which all defense administrations are to be centralized in Balard by the end of 2014.

As mentioned before, the RGPP did not create a joint approach to logistics and support out of the blue, since it had been on track for quite a while: what it did, though, is act as a catalyst by accelerating the pace of reforms already engaged.

We thus have some experience regarding joint support in a broad sense. What is truly groundbreaking as far as general management and joint support are concerned is however the creation of the defense bases (BDDs, for “Bases de défense“) and the merging of the services traditionally in charge of support functions (referred to as “Commissariats” in France): it is this mix which constitutes the backbone of the current evolution towards jointness.

Can you highlight some of the hurdles – cultural, economical, social, etc – to overcome?

Turmoil associated with cultural shifts should not be underestimated, especially given the fact that the defense bases do not exclusively deal with military personnel. All units, training, services and administrations from the ministry of defense are to be assembled within the defense bases: this means that all civilian and military staff belonging to the armed forces, joint administrations, the acquisition office (DGA), as well as the management office (the SGA for “Secrétariat général  pour l’administration”) are affected by such an evolution.

DIRISI
DIRISI

Of course, it will be necessary for everyone to get to know each other and learn to work together within each BDD, but the success of the milestones already achieved towards increased jointness tends to prove that the challenge of cultural adaptation does not need to be overestimated either. Looking at SIMMAD or DIRISI ( “Direction Interarmées des Réseaux d’Infrastructure et des Systèmes d’Information de la défense“, i.e. the joint agency in charge in France of military telecommunications infrastructure and information systems) is enough to realize that the focus of everybody on a common mission constitutes the best catalyst for the emergence of a common culture. Commanding officers of these new BDDs will be selected on a joint basis, based on practical commanding experience and according to their ability to manage and handle such a challenging and demanding mission. The base commander must be the conductor as well as the referee between the supported units and those supporting it. But he also plays a crucial role as far as the outside environment of the base is concerned. He will be the one in charge of the sound integration of the local defense community within the socio-economic environment, as well as regarding the relations with the civilian defense authorities, local officials, administration officials and social players.

However, as far as the support pillars of the bases, the GSBdDs, are concerned, the logic behind the reforms opens the door for civilian or military personnel to be in charge of the latter, depending on the nature and the composition of the forces to be supported : when mostly supporting deployable units, the GSBdDs’ commandment will be military; on the other hand, when supporting non-deployable units, such as military academies, the GSBdDs could be lead by an experienced civilian, especially tailored for such a demanding job.

This “civilianization” of the GSBdDs to be experimented in 2010 is not limited to its leadership, but concerns everyone in them:  globally, 60% of support staff are currently military versus 40% civilian. Such a ratio is to be progressively reversed as the reform is being implemented and in accordance with the personnel replacement pace. Disparities among the GSBdDs may remain however in order to go along with each base’s specificities: the most operation-oriented ones will have rather militarized GSBdDs, but others for which operational missions will be marginal could include up to 80% civilians.

However, the defense bases will be facing much more concrete difficulties, such as the complexity and diversity of current regulation frameworks. The harmonization of regulations constitutes an arduous and urgent necessity, with more than 15,000 texts for review, some of them, such as certain maritime edicts, dating back to 1681!

A defense base must form a coherent ensemble and this coherence starts with the many regulations that regulate our daily lives, such as the one pertaining to food or clothing. Regulations’ mismatch generates cacophony and inextricable situations and can actually lead to unfairness when dealing with individual situations. In my fourteen years of joint experience, I have indeed been confronted on a daily basis with this issue of lack of regulations’ harmonization, which resulted in inequalities affecting individuals in many areas: not only in clothing, food, or lodging, but also regarding various allowances and compensations: even food allowances for military dogs differ among the services of the armed forces! Such a situation will no longer be tolerable within a defense base.

Such an harmonization process is going to be a major endeavour, if not today’s major endeavour, which ambition can actually look rather scary. However, we have started the process and we have already shown signs of progress. This preliminary work has allowed  us to have a better feel for the domains which still remain to be covered and for the regulations which need to be recast. We have also become aware that this harmonization will not be fully achieved before the BDDs are completely operational, since our goal, which is already rather ambitious, is to achieve the overall harmonization of our regulations’ corpus by the end of 2012.  This constitutes an indispensible pre-requisite for the harmonization of the joint information systems, which are themselves the necessary instruments for a successful evolution towards true jointness.

How is this process perceived within the French armed forces?

As can be expected when we deal with such a vast and thorough reform, reactions are mixed. The bottom-line of these reforms, which is to share and regroup support assets, are now generally accepted. On the other hand,  the scope of personnel cuts and its potential impact on the way units function tend to generate some anxiety, which is rather logical. We must therefore show in concrete terms that the new support modes do function in a satisfactory manner and that the armed forces’ readiness remains guaranteed.

This is the reason why we have chosen a pragmatic approach by starting in 2009  with an experimentation aiming at validating the concept,and then, in 2010, with the development of a prototype series in order to master and polish the practical operating modes, before a full-scale deployment in 2011.

Quote General Bansard

Is there an impact on the local economy?

With the professionalization of the armed forces in 1996, it was decided to leave as many military infrastructure in place as possible in order to contribute to local economies. Looking back, we have found out that the results of such a dispersion, nay even atomization, of our posture were a very poor ratio between support and operational forces as well as prohibitive support costs. The only way to achieve savings as far as support costs are concerned is to optimize them via the regrouping and densification of these facilities. Hence the concept of BDDs.

The impact of this reform and the resulting territorial restructuring on local economies is not marginal: it has thoroughly been taken into consideration by the government, which set up an inter-agency administration in order to best manage the transition at the same time and in the same way as is being done across the board within the executive branch.

The MoD is of course an active participant in this inter-agency organization and, in addition to dedicated funds, has set up under the aegis of a specific agency, the DAR (for “Délégation aux Restructurations“), a tailored territorial organization which contributes to a close cooperation between the various local economic players in France (i.e. the departments, regions and civilian defense areas).

———-

***Posted February 21st, 2010

Game Changers: Reframing The Climate Change Debate (Part Three)

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02/20/2010

Why Not Connect The Dots? Mars, Earth and The Sun

By D.K. Matai

Global Image of Mars
Global Image of Mars

NASA scientists say that Mars has warmed by about 0.5°C since the 1970s. This is similar to the warming experienced on Earth over approximately the same period. Given that there is no known life on Mars, simultaneous warming on Mars and Earth suggests that our planetʼs recent climate changes may have a more natural cause and a less man-made cause.

In 2005, data from NASA’s Mars Global Surveyor and Odyssey missions revealed that the carbon dioxide “ice caps” near Mars’s south pole had been diminishing for three summers in a row. At the same time, Earth was experiencing rapid warming, which some climate scientists said was due to humans pumping vast amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the atmosphere.

Why did Mars appear to be enjoying more mild and balmy temperatures like Earth at the same time?

Mars, Earth and The Sun

The parallel global warmings — observed by NASA simultaneously on Mars and on Earth in the latter part of the 20th century and first few years of the 21st century — can perhaps be a direct consequence of the effect of the one same factor: a change in Total Solar Irradiance (TSI). Changes in the sun’s total heat, light and other electromagnetic output may be able to account for most of the climate changes we see on both planets.

Melting of Mars “ice caps” hints at solar, not human, interference for planetary warming.

Habibullo Abdussamatov, head of Space Research at St Petersburg’s Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory in Russia, says the Mars data is evidence that the current global climate change on Earth is being caused by changes in the sun. Pulkovo AO, founded in 1839, is at the pinnacle of Russia’s space-oriented scientific establishment and is one of the world’s best equipped observatories.

Satellite Measurements of total solar irradiance
Satellite Measurements of total solar irradiance

Total Solar Irradiance (TSI) began to drop in the 2000s and scientists have observed its effects on the recent cooling that is occurring on the upper layers of the world’s oceans. This suggests the Earth may have hit its temperature ceiling. The 13+ years elongated solar cycle (2006-2009?) is likely to usher in a protracted cooling period over the coming decades, given the previous patterns.

The minimum in solar irradiance reaching Earth could occur around 2040, and may inevitably lead to a deep freeze around 2055-60 lasting some 50 years, according to Abdussamatov.

Mars and Earth, for instance, have experienced periodic ice ages throughout their histories. Man-made greenhouse gas emissions may have made a contribution to the warming seen on Earth in recent years, but they cannot compete with the scale of solar irradiance we receive daily. 98% of the Earthʼs warmth comes from the sun. By studying fluctuations in the warmth of the sun, solar cycles — 11 to 14 years — and much longer term solar irradiance patterns over centuries, scientists have begun seeing connections that fit with the ups and downs in climate we witness on Earth and Mars in similar time periods.

Planetary Wobbles and Ice Ages

The conventional scientific view has been that climate changes on Mars can be explained primarily by small alterations in the planet’s orbit and tilt, not by changes in the sun. Some mainstream scientists believe that such wobbles in the orbit of Mars are primarily responsible for its climate change and not the sun. As it turns out scientists have already established that the Earth, like Mars and other planets, wobbles as well!

Those wobbles are known as Milankovitch cycles and occur on time scales of between 20,000 and 100,000 years. These fluctuations change the tilt of Earth’s axis and its distance from the sun and are thought to be responsible for the waxing and waning of ice ages on Earth.

Isn’t climate a much, much bigger issue – with stellar and universal dimensions — than what we are prepared to acknowledge or to realise?

The Myth of the Solar Constant

Life on earth completely depends on solar radiation, the ultimate source of energy for natural processes. For a long time it was thought that the luminosity of the Sun never changes, and for this reason the quantity of solar energy received per second over one square meter above the atmosphere at the distance of the Earth from the Sun (149,597,892 km), was named the solar constant. Until 1978, precise measurements of the value of the Total Solar Irradiance (TSI) were not available. But according to indirect data, namely the established major climate variations of the Earth in recent millennia, one must doubt the invariance of the solar constant value.

Conclusion

The so-called global greenhouse effect may be able to mitigate but not to avert the onset of the next deep temperature drop. Such a drop would become the 19th global temperature decline recorded in the time series over the last 7,500 years. Such drops have not yet failed to follow after periods of global warming.

Humanity must build resilience to survive the potentially serious economic, social, demographic and political consequences of global temperature extremes, which will directly affect the national interests of almost all countries and more than 80% of the population of the Earth. While it may make good sense to mitigate pollution and harmful greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide emissions, the vital Solar link between Earth and Mars suggests that what might lie ahead in the coming decades, is not catastrophic warming, but a global, and very prolonged, temperature drop.

Given the scientific significance of this period of global cooling that we’re about to enter, the Russian and Ukrainian space agencies, under Dr Abdussamatov’s leadership, launched a joint project to determine the time and extent of the global cooling at mid-century in 2006.

The project, dubbed Astrometry and given priority space-experiment status on the Russian portion of the International Space Station, marshals the resources of spacecraft manufacturer Energia, several Russian research and production centres, and the main observatory of Ukraine’s Academy of Sciences. By 2008, scientific equipment was installed in a space-station module and in 2009, Dr Abdussamatov’s space team began conducting regular surveys of the sun and solar output. With the sun and solar output data collected, it is hoped the Astrometry project will help humankind cope with a century of falling temperatures, during which we could enter a Mini Ice Age.

A deep temperature drop worldwide could be a considerably greater threat to humanity than warming. However, a reliable forecast of the time of the onset and of the depth of the global temperature drop may make it possible to adjust the economic activity of humanity in advance and to weaken the impact of the crisis considerably.

———-

***Posted February 19th, 2010

Chinese Jigsaw: What Does The Parallel Cyber Attack On India Mean?

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By D.K. Matai

Sikkim Border Incident (credit: video from Indiatimes.com)
Sikkim Border Incident (credit: video from Indiatimes.com/click on picture to access video)

In the latest sign of rising tensions between the two rival Asian powers, the Indian government has informed the world that computers in the Prime Minister’s Office were hacked on December 15th. Trojan malware was routed through the United States and Russia and ultimately traced to an IP address in China.

At the same time, synchronized cyber attacks targeted U.S. defense contractors and finance and technology companies, including Google. The malware also briefly penetrated some computers in the Indian National Security Council Secretariat in the Home Ministry before it was detected and dismembered. Beijing has denied involvement in the attacks.

These cyber attacks from China, among other pressing defense matters, are helping to push New Delhi closer to Washington, with the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, having recently conducted an official two-day visit to India. India’s economy, with a large and growing technology industry, is vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Considering the timing of the attacks, some key officials in India have suggested that the hackers probably sought to discover India’s position ahead of the UN climate change summit in Copenhagen.

Indian Perspective

India’s National Security Adviser MK Narayanan confirmed the cyber attack. The NSA plays a critical role in India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). He said that:

The attack came in the form of an email with a PDF attachment containing a Trojan virus, which allows a hacker to access and to control a computer remotely and download or delete files; our people seem to be fairly sure it was the Chinese. It is difficult to find the exact source but this main suspicion seems well founded; and India is co-operating with the U.S. and UK to bolster its cyber defenses.

India is particularly anxious to prevent any type of attack from disrupting the Commonwealth Games in New Delhi in October.

This is not the first time Chinese hackers have tried to attack Indian government computers. According to the mi2g Intelligence Unit, Chinese hackers were earlier detected attempting to break into Indian government computers and the computers of the Ministry of External Affairs personnel worldwide.

Many Indian government officials believe that the Chinese hackers are operating as part of a military operation designed to find foreign technology and hunt for Chinese dissidents.

India

U.S. Perspective

Secretary Gates arrived in India for a two-day visit shortly after the attack. He pushed for expanded co-operation with New Delhi on cyber-security, military technology, and other strategic areas. Gates has already met with top Indian leaders, including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and India’s Foreign Minister, SM Krishna. The trip follows a visit by Singh to Washington in November, the first formal state visit hosted by President Obama.

Both U.S. and Indian officials believe that China is at best an internet mischief-maker, and at worst a potential cyber-adversary. U.S. officials hope that stronger ties with India on internet security issues will benefit the networks of both countries.

A senior official at the U.S. Department of Defense said that the two countries were building a strong relationship on cyber security. Specifically, he said that the U.S. desired to:

– enhance and strengthen technology sharing with India;

– share more information and intelligence with India; and

– develop co-operative programs in maritime, cyberspace, and outer space.

Chinese Perspective

China has officially stated that Chinese law prohibits hacking in any form. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Ma Zhaoxu, has rejected India’s accusations, describing them as groundless. He pointed out that China itself was the biggest victim of hacking activities and the Chinese government is firmly against it. China will deal with relevant cases in accordance with the law.

Geo-Political Consequences

The latest cyber incident is likely to place further strain on China-India relations. The Chinese won the brief war with India over the Himalayan border in 1962. Relations between the two powers had improved significantly over the past decade but took a sudden turn for the worse in 2009 when the border feud reignited. The worsening relations has prompted India to deploy two more army divisions and fighter jets to its eastern border with China.

Underpinning the tensions are India’s concerns about China’s expanding influence among its neighbors, including Pakistan, Burma, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, China has begun to challenge India’s naval power in the Indian Ocean.

From China’s point of view, Beijing feels threatened by New Delhi’s warming relations with Washington. This concern was heightened when the U.S. lifted its ban on the sale of nuclear material and technology to India in 2008. In the coming years, the U.S. is poised to sell billions of dollars worth of defense equipment to India.

———-

***Posted February 20th, 2010

From PBL to U.S. Government Directed Logistics

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02/15/2010
Credit: www.boozallen.com

Insourcing or the End of PBL?
The Obama Administration has focused on reform of acquisition practices across the public sector and the President has gone out of his way to target the private sector as a source of “outsourcing gone awry.” The President has hence called for greater responsibility in government oversight of the acquisition process as well as doing more of its own work to “save” money.

Ironically, a key part of this effort is the ending of performance-based logistics begun in the Clinton Presidency, as U.S. allies either further embrace or further innovate in having the private sector heavily engaged in both the management of and execution of logistics in order not only to achieve substantial savings and productivity gains, but also optimize their supply chain.

The Administration will “insource wherever possible to ‘save money’.” The “insourcing” phenomena is really about hiring public servants and reducing the role of private industry. What is not clear is how this saves money.

Indeed, interviews with a number of firms in the U.S. underscored that the U.S. government is in effect hiring back its former personnel which had retired and gone to the private sector and is paying them a premium to do so.

A senior USAF officer in charge of a major USAF facility told sldinfo that “our facility was always dependent upon the use of contractors. Now we have to replace those contractors and do so at cost increases of nearly double of what we were paying the private sector. The result is a reduction of output of the weapons development facility.”

The Value of Comparative Metrics
Performance-based logistics has become a target with the pursuit of such principles. The GAO has in several reports reviewing PBL underscored that the “cost savings from PBL have not been demonstrated. They are not auditable.” The GAO point is well taken and as a senior OSD official involved in sustainment and logistics told sldinfo, “we need to improve our efforts to understand and demonstrate cost savings from working with the private sector.

Yet one should note that the GAO does not audit the depot system, which does 50% or more of the U.S. logistics and sustainment efforts. Indeed, without auditing the depots, it is impossible to claim that there are cost savings in the offing by pushing more government work to the depots instead of having the private sector involved through a PBL or similar effort.

What is striking is how often assertions of future savings are simply not challenged.

A key case in point is the recent USAF decision to jettison the PBL system for the F-22. The PBL for F-22 has clearly demonstrated that the private sector delivered improved performance and availability of the aircraft.

In the case of the F-22, the irony is that in 2008 the USAF gave the PBL team the PBL system level PBL of the year award. Key success factors cited in the award were warfighter support, public-private partnerships, ownership costs reduction and sustainment system engineering teamwork. Another key discriminator cited in the award was ability to respond to changing ops tempos and warfighter needs.

Notably, as the F-22 fleet size has been caped and inevitably will go down in numbers for missions, one would think that USAF data indicated that a 15% improvement in Mission Capable rates and repair time reduced by 20% would count for more rather than for less in the period ahead.

Apparently not. According to Debra Tune, deputy assistant Air Force secretary for logistics, the government will save “billions of dollars” from bringing the work in-house. Although a good case of populist procurement rhetoric, what is not clear is what savings the USAF is referring to. There may be upfront reductions in expenditures in FY 2010 or 2011 but it is difficult to see how hiring new personnel or hiring back retired personnel saves money.

Even more to the point, under PBL, metrics for the payment of services by the private sector- and, even more important, management of the parts ordering chain – have clearly been established. A key advantage of PBL has been that the private sector delivers an outcome, and does so by buying parts in line with its determination of the flow of parts necessary to achieve a result [1].

The government does not. The government buys on annual budgetary cycles and based on bureaucratic estimates of parts required on an annual basis. Delivering to mission readiness is a metric one can understand; it’s more difficult to understand how the government now will save money from its own management of the supply chain.

Because the missing ingredient in the Administration’s treatment of “insourcing” and the end of PBL is simply that it will now have to manage the supply chain. For programs in production, prime contractors are the vortex of managing a difficult supply chafing process. The advantage of the PBL approach is simply that the contractor is in a position to maintain the supply chain with an eye to production and sustainment. Unless, the Administration has in mind going back to an Arsenal system, it is difficult to see how it will effectively do this.

But it is precisely what the USAF leadership is promising to do with the new tanker and the F35. Debra Tune added in an Inside the Air Force interview, “We consider support integration (CLS) role to be a core competency of the Air Force. We are moving back toward government product support integration.” [2]

Photo Credit: www.theaviationzone.com
A C-17 Loaded (Photo Credit: www.theaviationzone.com)

Managing the Private Engineering Base
Another challenge facing the Administration will now be to manage the private engineering base supporting the sustainment process. The impulse towards PBL was driven by the inability of the government and the private sector to provide full transparency between the warfighter needs and the development and production engineers in the private sector. As a former senior acquisition official told sldinfo: “PBL allows the engineering talent in the private sector to be fully engaged in sustainment and modernization of systems. By putting the private sector in a leading role in shaping metrics for performance, the engineers were then in a position to shape more effective upgrade and modernization strategies.”

The new “government directed sustainment approach” then is reshaping the concept of how to acquire new products, and presumably ownership of the engineering process for modernization. Whereas the F-35 has had a clear approach to building a PBL sustainment system, now the USAF on its own has suggested it will not follow this approach.

The USAF will “back-fit” the new “approach” to existing PBL contracts, such as the C-17. It is difficult to find a sustainment approach more successful in readiness and performance metrics than the C-17, but Debra Tune tells us that “change” is necessary here as well. It will be interesting to see whether Boeing’s international approach to sustainment of the aircraft will follow the new USAF direction, or whether global clients, such as in the UK will want the “older” tested PBL model.

In the logistics domain, the gap between U.S. practices and those of its allies are likely to widen in the period ahead. Getting rid of PBL is significantly easier than actually delivering effective government-led sustainment efforts. The proof will be in the pudding.

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References:

[1] See for instance: http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/performance-based-logistics-perspective.pdf

[2] Inside the Air Force, “Air Force to Manage Logistics for KC-X Tanker, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter”, January 29, 2010

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***Posted February 15th, 2010