Manufacturing for Enhanced Reliability: Rugged Boxes

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Manufacturing for Enhanced Reliability: Rugged Boxes
09/04/2009
The RAPC Protector delivers a completely reliable ruggedized computer for many Gov applications. The Protector is a full in vehicle computer system designed to be used in many applications such as Ground Vehicles for Navigation, Tactical Information GPS, Management and Communications. The Protector is a single processor system with built in Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) for true Power Management and system protection. The Protector has no moving parts.
RAPC Protector

As budgets get tighter and competition among vendors accelerates, both government and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) customers are looking and will continue to look for additional value from the shrinking dollars available. One way to “squeeze” more from a limited budget is to manufacture enhanced reliability and sustainability into solutions. An example of this trend is evident in the advent of rugged box-level computing systems, or “rugged boxes.” An added benefit deriving from “rugged boxes” is the ability of prime contractors to spend their focus, and the government’s money, on higher level, and presumably higher value added, system integration tasks.

Background

The term “stand-alone rugged box” refers to complete system boxes, which provide a tested and enclosed computing solution. The demand for stand-alone rugged boxes, coming from several (including the Aerospace & Defense) industries, has driven large-scale development of this technology. In particular, prime government contractors increasingly are inserting these commercial off the shelf (COTS) solutions into very demanding land, air and maritime environments.

The trend towards complete stand-alone rugged box-level systems has picked up steam. This trend has been gathering momentum in the past couple of years whereby an enclosed computing solution eliminates complex integration chores for OEM customers. As a product category, stand-alone rugged boxes today are somewhat difficult to define because they’re available in a variety of shapes, sizes and capabilities. They typically comprise a set of modular embedded boards housed in a rugged enclosure that has its own power supply and interface ports.

This new area of rugged boxes is outside the category of air transport rack (ATR) enclosures—although these continue to be a main staple in avionicsas well. The stand-alone rugged box trend also is separate from the strategy know as “appliqué,”—the term used by the DoD for its initiative under that name a couple of years ago. Appliqué involves complete computer units—like rugged laptops — that are mounted onto existing military vehicle platforms and integrated with government-furnished software.

Rugged box-level systems in contrast typically are sold as a complete working system, often with some degree of environmental testing done beforehand by the vendor. In fact, one of the major advantages of the stand-alone rugged box is the pre-testing for shock and vibration specs often accomplished by the vendor.

The system typically is designed to work as a stand-alone, plugged into whatever input/output (I/O) and user interface scheme (e.g., keyboard and/or display) meets the application need. Often the boards in the rugged box are standards-based cards such as PC/104. But the enclosures by and large aren’t in any industry standard footprint, although that may change as proposed standards gain acceptance in the military realm. Currently, there are a number of vendors that have some sort of stand-alone rugged box-level system in their offerings – many even have whole product lines.

Underlying Trends and Drivers

Much of what’s driving this trend toward rugged box-level systems comes from the current war effort in Iraq and Afghanistan. The battlefield requirement is to minimize size, weight and power (SwaP), while cramming in more computing power per watt to boost the processing muscle in smaller UAVs and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs), as well as on larger platforms such as military vehicles, aircraft, and ships.

The proliferation of COTS products based on PC/104 standards in particular has played a significant role in the development of stand-alone rugged boxes—specifically with its modular design. The modularity of stand-alone rugged boxes provides longevity and flexibility, allowing components to be upgraded in the future without a complete system redesign – an especially attractive feature to organizations faced with tightening budgets.

Customers are not only interested in these rugged boxes as stand-alone computers, but as an upgradeable computing platform. In particular, the ability to tailor these devices with specific I/O modes has proven to be a key motivator for rapid customer adoption of stand-alone rugged box technology.

Underlying technologies Pushing Rugged Computers Forward

One of the greatest hurdles for rugged computing designers has been how to include greater processing capability with lower power consumption. Helping solve this problem has been the introduction of Intel’s Pentium M and Celeron M processors. These processors have become a popular choice for rugged systems as they originally were designed to deliver high performance with low power consumption. Initially designed for notebook computers, these types of mobile processors serve as an ideal choice for embedded computing designs.

Multi-core processing technology also is being incorporated into stand-alone rugged boxes. Opposed to one high-powered core, multi-core processors use several low-power cores that perform tasks simultaneously. This means reduced footprints, lower power and heat, and energy efficiency when compared to multiple separate CPU nodes. Additionally, Intel’s new Atom processor family creates even more possibilities for rugged stand-alone boxes.

Advancements in thermal management also propel stand-alone rugged boxes forward. Historically, numerous versions of embedded systems have been based on low-end, pre-Pentium processors, rather than on high-end processors. As a result, some enclosures were not designed with many thermal considerations in mind. However, with the advent of faster—and hotter—processors, chassis sophistication has increased to more suitably accommodate thermal issues.

Military Standards and Stand-Alone Rugged Boxes

Stand-alone rugged boxes often are tested and qualified to meet military standards, as this type of qualification testing is evidence that these boxes are being designed to the highest standards. To be truly mission-ready, stand-alone rugged boxes should at a minimum meet the military standards for temperature, shock, vibration, and ingress conditions relevant to the platform on which they will be used.

The qualification to MIL-STD-810 helps ensure confidence in a system’s ability to perform in many civil environments, including heavy machinery and mining to name a few. Additionally, many rugged box suppliers that meet MIL-STD-810F’s traditional battery of tests (temperature, shock, vibration) also will have the capacity to test the box for expanded criteria such as humidity, altitude, fungus, salt fog, explosive decompression, immersion, and sand/dust exposure — if the application so requires it.

Additionally, many of these boxes should be pre-qualified for MIL-STD-461E — electromagnetic interference/ compatibility (EMI/EMC) — and power supply operation (per MIL-STD-1275D/MIL-STD-704E) to ensure protection against voltage surges and spikes.

Trends and Drivers Going Forward

As complex computing functions increase their role in large defense programs, demand is rising for pre-integrated rugged box-level solutions. On the one hand, military programs (e.g., FCS, LCS, etc.) are becoming increasingly sophisticated and complex. On the other hand, the supply-side factor need is for manufacturers to maintain and improve profitability in a market that is, almost by definition, price-driven.

The pressure is on manufacturers to find new profit streams by adding more value, often via low level integration of functional subsystems, in response to prime contractor requirements. Key requirements for these subsystems are that they are rugged and, for all intents and purposes, “plug and play”—coming preconfigured with the appropriate hardware and software to allow them, with the addition of application software, to become productive out of the box.

The fundamental concept is that the ideal subsystem needs no further integration, validation, or testing by the customer. The prime contractor does not have to identify an appropriate enclosure or chassis, with ensuring “inside the box” interoperability, or with devising appropriate cooling strategies. That has all been done, allowing them to focus on how the subsystem fits within the broader program landscape.

The challenge for suppliers to the prime contractors is to identify the opportunity to add value — in this case, to design and develop complete, integrated, plug and play rugged subsystems that fulfill the requirement for a “black box” that takes data, processes it, and outputs information. The prime contractor’s responsibility for the subsystem would end, in effect, with getting an input into the box, and begin again as the information comes out of the box. The key underlying task for vendors desiring to be leaders in defense market rugged box production therefore is to identify the “silver bullet” applications where the design, development and manufacture of a rugged box would add the most value for the prime contractor in the way described above.

Rugged Boxes and the Future

Rugged boxes are not new. What is new is the accelerating rate at which they are entering the military market, driven by the needs of the prime contractors to focus on their key value added roles, eliminating time and effort spent on lower level tasks.

These boxes answer the needs created by the increasing sophistication of military applications, in turn driven by the network-centric nature of the battlefields of the future. They also answer the supply-side need of vendors to add value in a marketplace that, by definition, is often price-driven.

Rugged boxes’ future roles depend on rapid advances in embedded computing technology, which are enabling ever higher levels of functional integration on the computer board. When combined with advanced cooling technologies and sophisticated rugged designs, these new boards enable flexible high performance by small, low-power, lightweight rugged subsystems, integrated in a way that was inconceivable only a few years ago. They hold the potential for easily upgradable, “plug and play” functionality for both OEM and government customers, thereby providing an enhanced level of reliability and ease of maintainability. For the defense industry it looks like rugged boxes have a future.

———-

***Posted September 4th, 2009

The Role of USMC Airpower: Enabling Multi-Spectrum Ops

Posted on | by SysAdmin
08/13/2009
JSF on Illustrious
JSF on Illustrious

The role of the air element for the USMC is essential to the future of the USMC. One can have a police force with military uniforms or one can have a flexible military force enabled by full spectrum capability. The choice depends upon the central role provided by an integrated air element for USMC operations and options. The air element is the strategic glue, which enables diversified, decentralized and flexible USMC operations.

The aviation element within the USMC force structure plays a number of crucial functions. Because of the integrated nature of air and ground elements, it would be difficult to conceive of effective distributed operations without the air element.
First, the air component provides crucial strike components in support of the ground commander. Because the USMC lacks the organic ground firepower of US Army forces, the air component provides the ground commander with essential strike support. From this standpoint, both fixed and rotary wing air operate as flying gunships.

Second, the unmanned and manned elements of USMC aviation provide essential ISR and C2 capabilities for the ground commander. Indeed, because of USMC doctrine and training, USMC pilots think like the ground forces and consider themselves as part of any ground operation.

Osprey Landing on HMS Illustrious July, 2007
Osprey Landing on HMS Illustrious July, 2007

Third, the USMC is an expeditionary force. As such, the air components enable the strike and C4ISR capabilities to facilitate rapid advance against adversaries on the battlefield or to operate in a distributed manner to change the very character of the battlefield or of military operations. And air is an enabler for operations from the seabase, which figures prominently in USMC and USN thinking for the years ahead.

With regard to rapid advance, the USMC in the assault on Baghdad was able to use its fixed wing fighters for close air support without its ground forces waiting for the movement of artillery pieces. The KC-130s operated off of highways to support flexible ground and air operations. Bringing the tankers along with the troops is an essential element, and protection of the tankers as well as the ground forces is a crucial role for USMC tactical air.

But tac air does not simply play a close air support (CAS) role in any traditional sense. It is an enabler for distributed operations when such operations are essential to either conventional strike or counter-insurgency warfare. USMC aviation has allowed the USMC ground forces to operate with greater confidence in deploying within the civilian population in Iraq. Aviation’s roles in both non-kinetic and kinetic operations have allowed the USMC to avoid operating within “green zones” so as to facilitate greater civil-military relations. Aviation has also provided an integrated asset working with the ground forces in joint counter-IED operations.

And quite obviously, battlefields of the future will require the USMC to operate upon many axis of attack simultaneously. Such an operation is simply impossible without a USMC aviation element. For the USMC thinks ground in the air and the forces on the ground can rely 24/7 on USMC aviation forces to be with them in the ground fight.

Changing Paradigm
Changing Paradigm

An additional aspect of the expeditionary focus of the USMC is the central role of the seabase. In a famous moment in the initial Afghanistan operation, the USMC operated from ships to move deep inland to operate against the Taliban. Task Force 58 was in essence a seabasing operation as the USMC leadership sees it, and an example of what the USMC needs to be prepared and supported to do in the years ahead. Task Force 58’s (TF-58) combat operations in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 covered 450 nm to establish Camp “Rhino” and then operated over 750 nm to Kabul. Imagine even contemplating doing this with out integrated airpower!

The new air platforms fit into the overall approach taken by the USMC. The Osprey will provide unique capabilities, which will allow the “ground” forces to engage in envelopment operations that Napoleon could only have dreamed about. And in operations such as when the USMC flew their Osprey’s onto British warships demonstrating the versatility the USMC provides to maritime operations as well.

The F-35 will be a “first generation flying combat system” which will enable air-ground communication and ISR exchanges unprecedented in military history. The pilot will be a full member of the ground team; the ground commanders will have ears and eyes able to operate in a wide swath of three-dimensional space.

JSF and V22
JSF and V22

In many ways, the USMC is spearheading ways to re-shape the ability to connect forces. In part this is due to two core efforts central to the USMC.

In short, the new technology will fit within the operational envelope already evolved by the USMC. And this operational approach can provide an important input to evolving integration of air and ground assets for the US approach to the transformation of the overall joint force structure.

———-

Posted August 13th, 2009

The USMC Logistics Modernization Approach: The 2007 Baseline

Posted on | by SysAdmin

In an interview with Colonel Turlip of the USMC in mid-2007, the nature and status of the USMC logistics modernization effort was discussed. Colonel Doug Turlip at the time was head of the Logistics Vision and Strategy Center (LPV) within the Logistics and Installations Division of Headquarters USMC. Colonel Turlip’s most recent combat experience was as a logistics officer in 2003 in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). In addition to his significant combat experience, Col. Turlip has advanced degrees in Business Administration, including an Advanced Certificate, Logistics and Technology, Kenan-Flagler Business School, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2006

Col. Turlip and his staff indicated that the LOGMOD effort was entering a key phase. The modernization effort languished before the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the pressure of war, logistics modernization became elevated as a concern. The modernization effort has gained new prominence in USMC operations. But much remains to be done. A major restructuring is underway and will be tested in simulations and field testing this year. A systems partner has been selected to work with the USMC in designing and executing the new strategy. In other words, the USMC is getting serious about logistics modernization and is launching a multi-faceted reform effort under the pressures of war.

At a very top level, Col. Turlip underscored two key dynamics. First, the organization of a logistics system integral to the global deployed capability of the USMC is crucial for operational commanders to have confidence in the logistics system. Building an effective distribution system rather than a supply chain focus is crucial to the future of USMC distributed operations. Second, such an approach requires technology and process that are operating within the USMC decision-making system and not the other way around. “There has been a continuing perception by those not close to our efforts that LogMod is about moving the USMC from the ‘iron mountain’ (which is basically heavy stockpiling) We never embraced the “just in time logistics” approach as the goal. LogMod is about finding the middle ground between the two extremes.”

From Desert Storm to OIF: The Drive for Reform

The concept of modernizing logistics systems has been on the books for decades, for the simple reason that most equipment and information technology (IT) solutions were put in place to the early 1970’s and required new organizational processes to get full effect from their implementation. According to Colonel Turlip, even though some of these systems could still – technically – fulfill perfectly well the function they were assigned for, their use could never be maximized, because of the lack of an efficient overarching architecture and appropriate organizational structure. Indeed, many of the issues addressed today first became crystal-clear during Desert Storm:

  • lack of communication and interfaces between multiple systems (more than 200);
  • absence of trust in the supply system and resulting tendency to over-request supplies and to create a giant recycling challenge;
  • Numerous choke points and pipelines.

As a result of this state of affairs and frustrations on the ground, the Marine Corps undertook in 1998 a new initiative called “Integrated Logistics Capability Effort” (ILC), which was initially designed as principally an IT modernization reform and was struggling to be designed, executed and implemented prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

According to a 2004 USMC information paper,

“The initial attempts to gain position in the POM [Program Objective Memorandum] failed in both FY00 and FY02. At this time, the initiative was named the Integrated Logistics Capability (ILC) and had no clear support within the logistics domain or the operational community. However, in POM 04, GCSS-MC [Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps] succeeded as an “above-the-line requirement” and provided program of record status for the high visibility modernization effort.”[1]

OIF – which turned out to be a true “logistics war” – and what was perceived as a low-level priority became an essential objective to win the GWOT. Even though OIF I was a major success during which the First Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) covered the longest ground distance in USMC military history thanks in large part to an efficient and fast-adaptable logistical support, the military leadership brought back from this experience a list of flaws in the system, which had not been solved since Desert Storm and needed to be corrected as fast as possible:

“Our greatest shortfall during OIF was the lack of in-transit visibility information to incorporate into our command and control effort. (…) The lack of asset visibility on unit stocks and in-transit visibility on ordered items made it difficult to identify actual shortages, to locate needed items within stocks for reallocation, and to direct and track the movement of ordered items to requesting units. This lack of visibility resulted in delays, shortages, and at times an inability to expedite critical parts.

Another challenge was the difficulty in passing requisitions to the supporting Theater Support Command for common item support due to the non-compatible supply and warehousing information systems.

The material distribution process was cumbersome at best. Containers and pallets that were multi-packed for various units across the services had to be broken down and manually sorted then rebuilt before delivery to the tactical end user and added significantly to the distribution timeline.“[2]

Indeed, Colonel Turlip and his staff emphasized the “visibility challenge” as the major issue they addressed immediately in the aftermath of OIF I: what was considered a necessary incremental process of change rapidly became a front-burner preoccupation. In 2003 ILC became what is now known as LOGMOD for Logistics Modernization, which scope goes well beyond the initial IT reform to encompass the whole end-to-end logistics process across the USMC.

The Seven Initiatives of LOGMOD

As far as the United States Marine Corps is concerned, LOGMOD is, in Lieutenant General Richard Kramlich’s words, “a Corps-wide, multi-year, people-focused program to improve processes and technology supporting MAGTF (Marine Air Ground Task Force) operations” and aims at enhancing “MAGTF effectiveness by providing increased accuracy, reliability, and responsiveness of logistics information to Marines deployed on the battlefield.“[3]

It includes seven major initiatives evolving along the ongoing transformational operational concepts for 2015 and beyond – namely Marine Corps Strategy 21, Joint Vision 2020, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare, and Sea Basing – These initiatives are the following[4]:

  • GCSS-MC – GLOBAL COMBAT SUPPORT SYSTEM – MARINE CORPS – is the technological backbone and the information technology (IT) architecture of LOGMOD. It is a “portfolio of systems that support logistics elements of command and control, joint logistics interoperability, and secure access to and visibility of logistics data“[5]. It encompasses two systems: GCSS-MC/LCM – Logistics Chain Management – is a program designed to retire outdated systems and replace them with “integrated, distributed, web-based, off-the-shelf solutions“. The first phase of this program – GCSS-MC LCM Block 1 – is on track to be tested in July 2007, operational in FY08 and fully deployed in FY09[6]. The recommended location for the initial deployment is Okinawa. The second system – GCSS-MC – will provide an automated command and control support.
  • Log OA – LOGISTICS OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURE -, as defined by the Marine Corps, is their “blueprint for how logistics support will be managed, integrated and provided to meet strategic objectives and future operating concepts” It is in fact the overarching support structure designed to ease the transition towards “Logistics Chain Management (LCM) practices”.
  • Log C2 – LOGISTICS COMMAND AND CONTROL – provides information and communication tools to allow the Commander to match logistics needs with ongoing operations: “synchronizing MAGTF C2 and Logistics Chain Management (LCM), C2 supports Marine Corps Operations in a network-centric (net-centric) environment through shared understanding of logistics capabilities, constraints and opportunities.“
  • MAGTF DISTRO – MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCE DISTRIBUTION – is a response to the shift of the threat towards asymmetrical warfare and the need to supply smaller dispersed units for longer periods of time and from further. Centralization (a “single integrated process”) and full visibility (a “transparent distribution chain”) are the main objectives of this initiative.
  • MLG ReOrg – MARINE LOGISTICS GROUP REORGANIZATION – has been created to restructure the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) from a deployed perspective before taking into consideration the garrison perspective. Improving the effectiveness and adaptability of the supporting units to current and future demands on the battlefield has been the objective of this initiative and has driven mission changes.
  • RoM – REALIGNMENT OF MAINTENANCE – basically consists in the streamlining of the maintenance process, eliminating redundancies and realigning itself to the ongoing redesign of the logistics chain/network. The official definition of RoM calls for “a ground maintenance system/capability that operates in three levels of maintenance (Operator/Crew, Field, and Sustainment) and improves ground maintenance effectiveness and equipment operational capability.“
  • RoS – REALIGNMENT OF SUPPLY – aims at revamping the entire inventory process and warehouse management and bring it up to date to the new operational requirements and the XXIth century’s technologies. This means not only restructuring the organizations in charge of the inventories, but also the process of request itself: indeed one of the goal is to “centralize the responsibilities for order fulfillment, and the capacity management of both inventory and procurement in one supporting unit for each MAGTF“. Another requirement is to work jointly with other agencies and programs, such as for instance the Naval Logistics Integration.[7]

The approach used by the Marine Corps seeking to be in a position to restructure their IT system from beginning to end has been first to do a basic assessment of what they had, could keep and should replace (this IT system approach is discussed elsewhere on the website). The result of this assessment is reflected in the Systems Realignment and Categorization (SRAC) Project final report issued in September 2003.

The recommendations were to eliminate 36 no/low value legacy AISs or Automated Information Systems and 91 high value AISs. This meant that the Marine Corps should retire 66% of its high value AISs[8]. A migration strategy has since then been adopted and implemented to put in place a common database (SDE or Shared Data Environment) and a “portfolio of systems” allowing for better access and more flexibility.

log_chart1

Source: Randy Delarm, Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps/Logistics Chain Management Block 1, ACAT IAM OIPT MS A Decision Brief, 12 May 2004.

The Crucible of War

Colonel Turlip stressed that the press of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have acted as a major catalyst to go beyond a conceptual approach and to start implementing the needed changes right on the battlefield. That is how the “first major reorganization in close to forty years“[9] is now underway. They hence went from an “Iron Mountain” prospective to a “just in time” approach and are moving to a “just enough” one. Indeed, from OIF I in 2004 to OIF III in 2005, the complaint of the warfighter apparently went from “Where’s my stuff? ” to “When am I going to get my stuff?“[10].

According to Colonel Turlip, they soon discovered that to improve the identified ITV (In-Transit Visibility) and C2 (Command and Control) issues required a complete reappraisal of the processes and structural organization underlying the logistics approach. Indeed a true cultural change in the logistic world has been taking place.

As a result, three key aspects of the modernization could be labeled as de facto mini-revolutions on their own:

  • The first aspect is the willingness fully to “shift the responsibility of logistics from the supported unit to the supporting unit”: logisticians in the Marine Corps are and should be warfighters (“Every Marine a rifleman”, as the USMC tenet goes), but the warfighters should not have to worry about where and how to get re-supply. The idea of a single point of contact and a simplified chain is now close to implementation on the ground.
  • The second is the imperative to have the exact same organization “whether at home or deployed”, so that there is no time lag when a crisis does occur;
  • The third aspect is the concept of near real-time information available almost end-to-end of the chain: from this point of view, in Colonel Turlip’s words, “OIF II and III took RFIDs to the next level.” With USMC operating forces tagging pallet-level sustainment with RFID, supported units are now able to view and track their sustainment requisitions from the moment they enter the distribution pipeline. The warfighters now have visibility of their supply and are demanding better distribution support. Other technologies and systems are crucial to achieve the desired “factory-to-foxhole Last Tactical Mile (LTM) visibility.” This has pushed the effort from visibility to distribution of key required capabilities.

FROM “NON-INTEGRATED STOVE-PIPED, INDEPENDENT PROCESSES”

log_chart2

Source: The LOGMOD Story: How we got here, where we are going! Official Marine Corps website for LOGMOD as off June 2007

TO A SINGLE “INTEGRATED CROSS-FUNCTIONAL END-TO-END PROCESS”

log_chart3

Reorganizing the garrison and collapsing echelons from five to three in the chain of command have been the direct results of the re-thinking, which allowed enhanced efficiency on the battlefield and also freed resources to invest in better IT systems. “Organizational change started with activating the Material Distribution Company within the 2d Supply Battalion, 2d FSSG. This reorganization created a single process owner for distribution process control and visibility. It combines under one commander the Marines, capabilities, and functions that formerly resided in several different FSSG [Force service Support Group] battalions and base organizations, allowing the logistician responsible for MEF requisitioning , be it the supply battalion commander in a garrison environment or the general support combat logistics regiment (CLR) commander when deployed , to exercise C2 of the entire requisition-to-receipt process across the MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force].“[11]

It is in this context that the MAGTF Distribution Center (MDC) has been created within the operational forces and has since been playing a crucial role, whereas in OIF I the distribution aspect of logistics was still largely ignored.

The Role of Oracle

The USMC has pursued an industrial partnership to shape their new logistics approach. Oracle was selected by the USMC to provide enterprise wide solution approaches via modern IT in 2004. According to their press release at the time, they were to deliver:

  • “Industry standards-based functionality that complies with the U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Enterprise Architecture;
  • Interoperability with other Department of Defense organizations and commercial partners;
  • Provide a needed replacement for the 1970s-vintage, batch-processing supply and maintenance legacy systems; and
  • Reduced training time, allowing Marines to serve more time in operational forces.”[5]

The selection was done after a several year effort of the USMC working through the processes which they felt they needed to craft an appropriate logistics system. The technology part was selected to serve the process re-engineering effort and not the other way around. Then the USMC selected Oracle Consulting as the systems integrator to work through the design effort to stand up the GCSS-MC program.

The selection in November 2006 of Oracle Consulting was seen by the USMC as a logical extension of the selection of the Oracle IT approach. According to a December 2006 LogMod SITREP, “GCSS-MC previously selected Oracle e-business software for its program. Consequently, a good team relationship has already emerged between GCSS-MC and Oracle Consulting. This synergy has carried over to the systems integration pieces as Oracle is already familiar with the Marine Corp’s objectives for GCSS-MC.”[6]

The Oracle-GCSS-MC teams stood up the initial Block 1 of GCSS in 2007. The GCSS-MC program office conducted Operational Tests and Evaluations starting in 2007 which ran through 2008. GCSS Block One began fielding to selected units in 4th Quarter of FY08

Block one is largely focused on logistics chain management with an eye to crafting a more effective distribution system for deployed troops. At the heart of the reform is the effort to have no gap between peacetime and wartime approaches to logistics management. Because if there are significant gaps, deployed commanders do not have confidence in the logistics systems and the lack of confidence creates the tendency to stockpile and to subvert the efforts to build a robust and effective system.

log_chart4

The Challenge of Metrics

Lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan are carefully analyzed and exploited through various mechanisms and centers (such as the Logistics Readiness Combat Center – LRCC -) and the feedback comes from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned in Quantico[12], once the data is analyzed. In the past years the LRCC has for instance developed several “key information products” such as:

  • “Force closure and major unit movement summaries complete with flight information, departure, and arrival times.
  • Events chronology.
  • Location of forces/logistics resupply points.
  • Maritime prepositioning force (MPF) dispositions for all three MPF squadrons.
  • Status of all MSC [Military Sealift Command] shipping supporting worldwide operations.”[13]

According to Colonel Turlip, the metrics being used – whether “order shipping time, repair time, node-to-node transportation time, etc.” – are still imperfect, but they help build a “performance measurement plan”: it is indeed better to rely on “just a few metrics which actually mean something” rather than on a large potentially confusing number of data. In 2005, the following improvements were already noticed using a few metrics, allowing rapid and drastic changes in the way to operate.

The immediate result, as stressed by Colonel Turlip, was an increase of the level of trust in the system and a major decrease in the number of re-orders multiple request submissions (which were pretty typical of past operations).

A Pragmatic Approach

The USMC is taking a measured and pragmatic approach to logistics reform. They are seeking to solve the distribution problem as the key “choke point” in logistics reform in order to enhance the capability of the MAGTAF. After all, the goal is to increase the lethality of the MAGTF by extending its operational reach through improved training, processes and technologies. And according to Major General Robert Dickerson, Commanding General, Marine Corps Installations East, “foremost consideration should be given to enhancing the capabilities of the MAGTF on the move. Since maneuver warfare is the essence of expeditionary operations, any system we field must fully support that doctrinal pillar.”[14]

A key element of working a pragmatic approach is the use of LogMod Wargames to shape the new acquisition approach. The first Wargame was held at Quantico from October 30-November 3, 2006. We have assessed the games in 2007 and 2008 in articles elsewhere on the website. The goal of the wargame approach is simple: “We have validated as much as we can theoretically and now must be able to translate roles and responsibilities to the Marines who must perform the actions, according to Lt. Col. Manning, Deputy Director, LogMod Transition Task Force.[15]

Col. Turlip emphasized throughout the interview the impulse of war to craft more effective logistics. Logistics is about distribution to deployed forces who trust a system that delivers “just enough” logistics. The roll out of the new system is to be in block increments but is being used by forces operating in real military operations today. It is an experiment that must become effective reality for the MAGTF. And through block roll-outs, simulations and wargaming, pragmatic reshaping of the roll out can be effective as the USMC faces its future. But today effective logistics is not about sustaining the iron mountain; it is about an effective global deployed force.

This article first appeared in Military Logistics International in June/July 2007 and was written by Murielle Delaporte and Robbin Laird

[1] USMC Information Paper, Program Objective Memorandum (POM) Planning and Execution for Logistics Modernization, 7 April 2004.

[2] Testimony of Brigadier General Edward G. Usher III, Director Logistics Plans, Policies and Strategic Mobility, United States Marine Corps, before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Readiness, U.S. House of Representatives, Regarding Logistics, March 30, 2004.

[3] Lt Gen Richard SW. Kramlich, Deputy Commandant, Installations and Logistics, in welcoming page of the official Marine Corps site for LOGMOD, as off June 2007 (https://logmod.hqmc.usmc.mil/).

[4] See: Patrick Anthes, Global Combat support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC): Presentation to the Advanced Logistics Officers Course, 5 March 2007.

[5] Patrick Anthes, GCSS-MC Presentation to the 2-07 Tactical Logistics Officers Course, 29 January 2007.

[6] For a detail of GCSS-MC Block 1 mission tasks, see: https://logmod.hqmc.usmc.mil/gcssmc/block1.html

[7] Official website of LOGMOD, ibid, see “initiatives” folder.

[8] Marine Corps Systems Command, Systems Realignment…, ibid, p.48 in particular.

[9] Colonel Turlip, quoted in: Marine Corps Presents at DoD Architectures Summit, https://logmod.hqmc.usmc.mil/.

[10] See: BGen John E. Wissler and Col. Peter F. Talleri, Meeting the Mandate for Change in Marine Corps Logistics: Logistics modernization efforts in OIF III, Marine Corps Gazette, August 2005, p.25 (www.mca-marines.org/gazette).

[11] BGen. John E. Wissler…, ibid, p.25.

[12] Oracle Press Release, U.S. Marine Corps Selects Oracle ® to Enable a More Effective Force: Oracle Applications to Support Global Logistics Chain Management, 25 October 2004.

[13] “Marine Corps Partners with Oracle Consulting for Global Combat Support System Marine Corps Systems Integration,” LogMod SITREP (December 2006).

[14] For more information, see: http://www.usmc.mil/ and www.mccll.usmc.mil/.

[15] LtCol Hank Malanowski, “The Role of the LRCC in the Global War on Terrorism”, Marine Corps Gazette, August 2005, p.37.

[16] “GCSS Roll-out Plan Being Crafted,” LOGMOD Leger (Volume II, Issue II), p. 4.

[17] “First LogMod Wargame conducted at Quantico,” LogMod Ledger (Volume 1, Issue 1, November 2006, p.1.

———-

***Posted August 13th, 2009

The F-35 Manufacturing Approach

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on The F-35 Manufacturing Approach
08/12/2009

Much lost in the U.S. scurrying for dollars in dealing with “overseas contingency operations” and paying for the Obama “stimulus package” and “health care reform” is the significant question of the role of manufacturing in the evolution of the U.S. economy and its global competitiveness. Notably when President Obama delivered his major address on science to the National Academy of Sciences, defense and aerospace were relevant only as historical examples, rather than as critical elements of shaping future capabilities.

Yet for modern military forces, the question of the “manufacturability” of defense goods and capabilities is crucial in the operation and deployment of a global force. Indeed, one could argue that those failures of acquisition which have happened since the early 1990s in the United States have been largely been rooted around pursuit of well-designed briefing slides rather than well-designed manufactured products. The difference between the debacle of the Future Image Architecture and the F-35 could not be starker. Whereas the failure of FIA has left the United States with a significant intelligence gap, the core focus on the F-35 program has been on manufacturability and this includes how the systems on the aircraft will operate as well to allow the aircraft to operate as a “flying combat system”

The F-35 is a 21st century manufactured product which embodies capabilities similar to the new manufacturing systems used by Boeing and Airbus in producing their next generation commercial aircraft.

The F-35 is not a traditionally produced combat aircraft, which is assembled from a myriad of components provided by suppliers. It is a moving-line high tolerance manufactured product in which system providers operate as key partners manufacture assemblies and sub-systems. Stealth is a product of the high-tolerance manufacturing process, and not crafted in by essentially hand-built efforts.

Figure 1 Lockheed Uses a Virtual Assembly System to Include Global Suppliers Abroad Directly Within the Assembly Process
Figure 1 Lockheed Uses a Virtual Assembly System to Include Global Suppliers Abroad Directly Within the Assembly Process

As a program, F-35 has been built around new manufacturing processes. These processes are an essential part of the systems development phase or SDD. In this process, the machine tools and various elements of the production process are being pre-tested through the actual production of test aircraft. Based on feedback from this process, the machine tools and various elements of the production process are being altered so that when full-scale production comes it will be as efficient and effective as possible.

Figure 2 The Assembly Process Uses a Number of Highly Precise Automated Machines to Produce and Assemble the F-35
Figure 2 The Assembly Process Uses a Number of Highly Precise Automated Machines to Produce and Assemble the F-35

The F-35 approach is embodied in the concept of an advanced Fighter Production System. FPS is a 21st century manufacturing approach in which the final assembly facility is the outcome of a closely networked system of global suppliers.

Figure 3 The Automated Wing Assembly Machine is Seen Here
Figure 3 The Automated Wing Assembly Machine is Seen Here

The engineering approach underlying the manufacturing system has closely linked the core stakeholders in the production process from the start. The collaborative process has been designed to ensure that a high-tolerance manufactured product would emerge, rather than having a traditional supply chain whereby the flow comes from the periphery to the final assembly center.

Figure 4 The Wing Drilling Machine is Pictured Here
Figure 4 The Wing Drilling Machine is Pictured Here

The F-35 is a hub-and-spoke system whereby the collaborative information sharing and engineering processes are co-located in the hub but closely connected to the stakeholders. A digital thread manufacturing capability enables the collaborative system.

In Digital Thread manufacturing the CATIA computer model feeds directly into a Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machining center, and CoordinateMeasurement Machines (CMM), or is processed in a Composite Programming System (CPS) before being sent to the Fiber Placement Machine. In both cases the finished product can be traced back to the original computer model through a “digital thread” which ensures greater precision and accuracy in manufacturing.

The F-35 is a globally sourced product. The global sourcing is based on the basic manufacturing model for the F-35. Global suppliers are stakeholders in the digital thread manufacturing process and collaborative participants in a networked engineering approach to the development and production of the aircraft.

The cost of aircraft produced by a 21st century manufacturing system will be driven down by the automated nature of the production facility. At the height of building the F-16, 18,000 persons were necessary to produce the F-16 on the final assembly line. For the F-35, 3,000 persons will play a similar role. The number is significantly reduced on the final assembly line in part as well to how the process works in using already assembled sub-systems which the final assemblers then integrated into the aircraft.  The cost of a 21st century combat aircraft of the new generation is driven down and maintained by a new generation approach to manufacturing.

Figure 5 The F-35 C is pictured here on the assembly line in December 2008. The aircraft was launched by a ceremony involving the CNO in July 2009. The F35-C is the Carrier-based version.
Figure 5 The F-35 C is pictured here on the assembly line in December 2008. The aircraft was launched by a ceremony involving the CNO in July 2009. The F35-C is the Carrier-based version.

An example of the different quality of the man-machine relationship in the F-35 program compared to other aircraft is in the process of making the F-35 a stealth aircraft. Stealth is a result of a high tolerance manufacturing process, and not a handcrafting effort. The final coat placed on the aircraft is a robotic coating process. The tolerance for the final coat on a F-35 is the size of a human hair, which would not be possible except through a robotic process.

And repair for the F-35 in the field will be provided by a common set of tools and systems, which all the partners in the program acquire along with the aircraft. At the Fort Worth facility of Lockheed Martin, a low-observable repair facility is in operation, which involves shaping the proper tools for doing stealth repair in the field. Partners in the program visit the facility regularly and are part of the test program to determine how best to maintain low-observable aircraft in the field.

And costs are further reduced by the logistics and sustainment capabilities built into the F-35 as a manufactured product. The aircraft has been designed with manufacturing and sustainment considerations built in. Several of the tools being used to build the aircraft will be the same tools used to maintain the aircraft. The high degree of automation built into the integrated sensor systems on the aircraft will allow real time monitoring of the state of health of the aircraft, and this data will be delivered to the logisticians in real time. Such data will be useful both for more effective operational and combat considerations, but will drive down maintenance costs on the aircraft. The cost of weapons support to the aircraft is driven down as well by the reduction in staff necessary to weaponize the aircraft on operational assignments.

Also, the way the supply chain has been set up will allow the sustainment system to operate more effectively as well. The manufacturing team for F-35 works on an aggregated demand model whereby one set of priorities is established between the prime and the suppliers. This set of priorities encompasses requirements for sustainment and production, rather than treating these as separate processes.

Another aspect of the manufacturing process central to the F-35 is the AESA radar and integrated sensor systems on the aircraft. The nature of these integrated systems shapes the concepts of operations of the aircraft and the ability of the aircraft to operate as a “flying combat system” able to shape air combat as well as air-surface operations.

The manufacturing process underlying this capability comes from Northrop Grumman’s Electronic Systems production facility in Baltimore, Maryland. Here the core reality of this production system is the production of small radar chips which function as radars in and of themselves, which are then combined in a variety of platform products. These chips are produced by a highly automated production process, which reflects several years of manufacturing experience, so that the F-35 systems, which are built around these chips, are inheriting the experience of several legacy platforms.

Although central to the F-35 enterprise, the new manufacturing approach is not widely appreciated. The next three years of funding for the program provide essential funding for ramping up the capability to launch production. Although the program is expressed in numbers of aircraft, for the next three years the numbers of aircraft are more significant as generators of revenue to prepare for LAUNCH of production. Much of the program money for the next three years will be pushed into the stakeholder manufacturing base to build the appropriate machine tools, carbon fiber thread machines, and related manufacturing systems and assets.

In short, the F-35 is an example and certainly not the only one of a significant advance in manufacturing technology and production approaches and processes. Recognizing the significance of these capabilities to the United States and its allies is an important strategic requirement for the decades ahead. Although “cash for clunkers” might appear to be a useful addition to the U.S. defense supplemental, it would be more credible if U.S. leaders would recognize the risk to the nation and to its allies of losing its edge in the manufacturing base.

The author visited Lockheed Martin production facilities at Fort Worth in December 2008 and July 2009 as well as Northrop Grumman’s Baltimore manufacturing facility in July 2009 in writing this story. The pictures included in the story were taken in December 2008. A version of this post will be published in RUSI Defence Systems in 2009.

———-

***Posted August 12, 2009

Crafting A NATO Helo Logistics Initiative for Afghanistan

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Crafting A NATO Helo Logistics Initiative for Afghanistan

By Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte

08/12/2009 – NATO is developing a common logistics initiative to support helicopters in operation in Afghanistan. It is clear that more helos are need for Afghan operations; but rather than simply inserting new kit, it is realized by senior NATO officials that shaping a common logistics initiative for those helicopters must be done to enhance capability. Simply inserting new kit without a significant improvement in in-theater logistics maintenance would be short-sighted and lead to significant capabilities short-falls, in the view of senior NATO officials. In an interview with senior OSD officials in the summer of 2009, sldinfo.com discussed the initiative.


Air Force Staff Sgt. Joseph Swafford, May 2009
A Marine from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461 sits on the end of a ramp aboard a CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter May 2 during a training exercise near Camp Lemonier, Djibouti. Credit : Air Force Staff Sgt. Joseph Swafford, May 2009


The NATO initiative is really divided into three parallel efforts: one led by the US in shaping sustainment for North American-origin helos; the French with regard to West European-origin helos, and the Czechs with regard to East European origin-helos. The core effort is to get more capability out of the deployed fleet; rather than providing logistics support in home countries, the objective is to provide for logs and maintenance in theater, thereby gaining significant gains in deployment time for the fleet.

The Need for Enhanced Airpower in Afghanistan

At a time of American reinforcements in Afghanistan, the need for airpower is expected to go up substantially. Airpower is considered crucial in order to be able to hold vast amounts of terrain to prevent the Taliban from occupying or re-occuping the latter, as well as to facilitate a transition towards some kind of democratic process, with a key-election planned for August 20th.

The alternative to air routes is ground routes, which will get troops to their destination in hours as opposed to minutes (helicopters cover on average 3 to 4 miles a minute). Ground routes are, however, not only scarce (if not scarcer), but also very difficult, increasingly subject to attacks, and/or loaded with IEDs. In fact, the Taliban have made clear that their strategy is to make the roads as deadly as they can and statistics are there to prove it with an 80% increase in the use of roadside bombs this year, killing 172 troops and accounting for 60% of the total death rate in Afghanistan. Already in 2008, 3,276 IEDs were detected or detonated – a 45% increase over 2007 -, and the number of coalition deaths had already doubled reaching what was then considered an all-time high of 161. Ever since 2001, troops on the ground have indeed experienced the hard way that speed is crucial to the success of any operation in a country, whose half of its territory lies above 6,500 feet.

Given the nature of the terrain in Afghanistan and its landlocked characteristics, air power is the main source of mobility for troops allowing to save lives and limbs via close air support (CAS) and/or Medical evacuation (Medevac) capabilities; it is also a crucial reconnaissance and surveillance tool allowing the detection of enemy forces and IEDs. It also makes it possible for the troops to be there first and facilitate contact with a suspicious population. It is the most efficient tool to rapidly and successfully access remote areas and insurgents’ “safe havens.” And, finally, it is the safest way to re-supply the latter and protect indispensable logistics convoys.

Air power, and more to the point the right mix of air power, has however been the missing element of the coalition on the ground for the past years. “To fight Talibans in 14,000 feet-high mountains [the average altitude of the main mountain system, the Hindu Kush] facing an extraordinary agile enemy using donkeys for transportation, F-22s, JSFs or FA18 Super Hornets are not exactly fit. You need to get close to the enemy and you need to get at them fast”, the senior OSD official notes. “What you need are intra-theater lift capabilities provided by air assets such as the C130J and high-altitude helicopters, mostly the Chinooks (including the most recent upgraded version, the CH47Fs) and the CH53s, which the Marines used (including the last version, i.e. the CH53Es). You also need Apaches (AH64s), as well as Unmanned Aerial vehicles (UAVs). Furthermore, deplores the official, “existing mobile capabilities available in Afghanistan are not used efficiently”.

Even if airpower of growing significance, the shortfall is significant as well. The structural causes of the shortfall are multiple.

  • An overextension and overuse of the fleet in harsh conditions are in part responsible for such a situation, as far as the United States (war in Iraq) and France (operations in Africa) in particular are concerned: the wear and tear of helicopters in recent years has been getting worse, as deployment has often to be extended to compensate for the lack of availability and as the next generation of equipment (e.g. V22; NH90) is becoming only slowly operational. Chinook airframes are cracked on a regular basis because of high-altitude flights in high winds and cold temperatures, while the sand tends to erode their floor panels and rotor blades.
  • Conflicting demands with homeland security requirements are also a problem: as a matter of fact, the Chinooks helicopters were the rescue means of choice during the Katrina disaster in the United States.
  • The lack of MRO (maintenance, repair and overhaul) capabilities is widespread among the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations, either by lack of funding or lack of facilities: as far as Europe is concerned, only the UK, Spain, Italy Germany and France have such a capacity. Indeed, the cost related to helicopter support (in terms of MRO, but also in terms of in-theater warehousing) is especially heavy: in some cases, the price of one helicopter can actually double, once spares, tools, technical support and training are added. The cost of maintenance is in fact the very reason why, in 1991, the Mulroney government had sold its CH47 fleet to the Dutch and encountered as a result so many problems in terms of heavy lift once in Afghanistan a decade later. Maintaining the readiness of a fleet of helicopters is all the more demanding and expensive in extreme temperatures (hot and cold) and sandy conditions, with an estimated chopper rotation tempo of about three months and a scheduled maintenance having to be done obviously much more often than in peacetime. A rule of thumb is that to have 8 helicopters on the ground, about 30 have hence to be mobilized. The “reset” program set in place by the US Army ever since 2003 plans for the total disassembly, inspection and overhaul of the helos every 12 to 15 months (no upgrades), at a cost per aircraft estimated, as far as the Chinook is concerned, at $1.5 million.
  • The lack of trained staff – both pilots and mechanics – is also a major concern, while not every country has an expeditionary tradition: renting air assets has been providing interim solutions till now on various theaters of operations, including Afghanistan, but the limits of these kinds of “rent-a-chopper deals” come when the latter become too dangerous, as civilian pilots do not want to – or cannot for legal reasons- take risks. The French-lead Task Force has proposed to solve this issue by setting up up a contracting agreement with a company to rent a fleet directly to trained military personnel.
  • The lack of knowledge of each country’s capabilities, in terms of helicopters, spares, tools, consumables, MRO and staff, is one issue currently being addressed with the attempt to develop a common database of everyone’s inventories: this should also help to identify the roots of specific problems in each nation involved.
  • The lack of common metrics to assess the real helicopter needs on the theater is another missing part of the puzzle.
  • The “Black Hawk down syndrome” is another cause for scarce helicopter resources, as some nations are not willing to take too much risks: the Taliban is focusing on trying to down highly symbolic assets such as helicopters, especially if troops are on board, repeating the strategy successfully used in Afghanistan against the Soviets. In actual fact, because of the successful jamming of surface-to-air missiles by the coalition, the Taliban are using and seeking to acquire the exact same weapons which were used in the 1980’s, i.e. anti-aircraft artillery mounted on trucks to do so.
  • The absence of a legal framework to allow the sharing of assets among coalition partners.

An Initiative is Born

The current challenge for the United States military leadership is to “surge” forces in Afghanistan, after having had to transfer the bulk of their forces into a very different kind of theater, i.e. Iraq. Just in terms of airfields, US forces could land in 8 to 9,000 different locations, as opposed to two main ones in Afghanistan. But besides the nature of the terrain and of the enemy, “one of the key issue and the main difference”, underscored a senior OSD official in our interview in June 2009, “is the fact that the coalition in Afghanistan deploys significant non-American forces”.

The availability and sharing of air assets in particular among allies have been the recurrent issue ever since the beginning of the conflict, not only because of the diversity of the deployed aircrafts, but because of a total lack of visibility about which country has what and the absence of coordination among nations, causing some helicopters to fly out half empty when needs for a ride had been clearly expressed by other countries. A key issue is the absence of agreed upon air-worthiness standards. This has been a key stumbling block to implementation of the agreement and a key focus of the NATO working group set up to come up with a common effort to provide for logistics support to NATO helos operating in Afghanistan.

“Hence, the decision taken by the North Atlantic Council in 2007 to identify ways to respond for this need for lift, as far as the most crucial equipment is concerned”, explains the senior offical. “After a year of consultations, it turns out that there is more lift than realized, but as in the case of Eastern European MI17s, most helicopters are not operationally ready nor fitted for combat in Afghanistan” The UK-French initiative, taken under the aegis of the European Defense Agency (EDA) in March 2008 and prompted by the situation in Afghanistan, but mostly at the time by the Darfur/Chad crisis, has simultaneously tried to solve the exact same issue, not only for Mi helicopters, but for all transport helicopters, and indeed, not exclusively for the Afghan theater. “Thanks to the UK-French initiative, the creation of a multi-national fund contributed to the refurbishing of Czech helicopters, but this has not – so far – been enough given the extent of maintenance required on the latter.”


The first joint Air Force-Army operational drop of JPADS in Afghanistan in 2006: re-supplying water and ammunition. Credit: USAF, Senior Airman Brian Ferguson, August, 2006 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1815
The first joint Air Force-Army operational drop of JPADS in Afghanistan in 2006: re-supplying water and ammunition. Credit: USAF, Senior Airman Brian Ferguson, August, 2006 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=1815


Other initiatives such as the US Joint Precision Airdrop System, known as JPAD and co-developed by the US Air Force and the US Army ever since the early 1990’s, have in the past three years successfully delivered critical supplies (such as water and ammunition: see photo below) to troops on the ground from high-altitude flying aircrafts like the C130 and the C17 Globemaster III, thanks to a GPS system allowing the “self-steering” pallets to be dropped accurately into remote areas.

“The problem”, notes the senior official, “is that if JPAD does bring some supplies, it does not solve troop lift nor medical evacuation. The current fleet on the theater which actually does that is on the North American side, the CH47s, and the CH53, as well as, on the Western European side, the Pumas, Cougars and Super-Pumas, and on the Eastern European side, mostly the MI17s.” The American proposition has therefore been to develop an in-theater MRO process for these specific US equipment, starting with an emphasis on the CH47s, an initiative which looks very promising, as “the total demand for equipment has dropped significantly already,” the official adds.

According to the North American briefing at the Capellen seminar held in Luxembourg by the Senior NATO Logisticians Conference (SNLC) in January 2009 to shape the initaitive, the desired end state is to “field a collaborative helicopter logistics capability for ISAF CH47s, CH53s and AH64s by summer 2009 that improves effectiveness and efficiency of ISAF sortie generation. This will set the stage for potential future collaborative efforts for other helicopter types as well as making a large step forward in multinational logistics capabilities.” The US approach has been first to generate a dialog and gather information about making such an initiative happen among CH47 using nations in ISAF, i.e., the US, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK and Australia.

 


KORANGAL VALLEY, Afghanistan. 3rd Battalion Marines and sailors dash for a waiting CH-47 Chinook helicopter during the extraction phase of Operation Cornhuskers early 2005.The Marines used a vertical envelopment strategy to gain access to areaswhere coming in ground vehicles or on foot would give away their element of surprise.Credit: USMC, Cpl. Rich Mattingly, March 2005
KORANGAL VALLEY, Afghanistan. 3rd Battalion Marines and sailors dash for a waiting CH-47 Chinook helicopter during the extraction phase of Operation Cornhuskers early 2005.The Marines used a vertical envelopment strategy to gain access to areaswhere coming in ground vehicles or on foot would give away their element of surprise.Credit: USMC, Cpl. Rich Mattingly, March 2005


“A large number of NATO contributing troops in Afghanistan have been flying North American-origin helicopters, which were disassembled for maintenance and flown back to Europe”, explains one senior OSD official. “On–site maintenance would generally either be performed by governments or contractors. Via a “lessons learned” process done in cooperation with the contracting company L3, it has been possible to reduce the maintenance cycle immobilization time for the CH47 from 90 days down to 10 days.”

In order to address some of these issues, the North American working group has adopted an incremental approach identifying short, medium and long-term goals:

  • The first milestone, which is currently under way, is to establish Allied Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA) in order to “enable operational and tactical sharing”, as well as exchange phase maintenance information;
  • In the mid-term, the objectives are to “share spares information, improve logistics support, minimize the footprint, and reduce the strategic lift impact”: reducing supply costs and the strain on strategic lines of communications are the goals and the means to start the process have been, in addition to the development of implementing agreements, “the identification of obstacles to sharing information and the development of a database on in-theater stock levels”;
  • Another mid-term goal expressed by the US-lead working group is to “identify and leverage common theater support services”: nations involved should provide a list of the “capabilities required to sustain helicopter operations (e.g. bench stock, oil analysis, tool calibration)”, as well as a list of “theater location and capacity of national capabilities”. The Capellen seminar was also an opportunity to stress the need to establish processes for sharing information and prioritize it among ISAF participants, examine ways to contract common services via NAMSA (NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency), and “explore the feasibility of collaborative training options”;
  • In the longer term, the North American working group seeks to “provide efficient alternative to move national stocks forward to theater” via in-theater common strategic warehousing: a comparison of warehousing and airlift costs at home and in theater is required to move ahead with the recommendation.

An Innovative Process

The Pentagon has been able to speed up the implementation of the initial steps of the U.S. helicopter initiative in an innovative way by using a combination of two existing contracting devices, i.e. the Foreign Military Sales program (FMS) and the ACSA.

According to a senior OSD official, the FMS programs have allowed the United States to work rapidly on in-theater maintenance of US equipment with “the Canadians, the Australians, and the Dutch, with the Germans (on the CH53s) and with the Italians (who will purchase 10 CH47Ds in 2010) pending future agreements. It is also planned that the Spanish will purchase parts. There now exists a whole FMS supply chain, and many innovations are occurring in the process, because of the pressures of the war and the creativity of the Combatant Commanders”.

 

The CH53E Super Stallion, 2nd Marine Logistics Group Credit: USMC (Lance Cpl. Melissa A. Latty, March 2009) The ACSA is one key tool used in the operations of the past few years, which has established a mechanism to allow the United States and its NATO allies to exchange logistical supplies (either in kind or equivalent, or against cash). According to a senior OSD official “Initiated in the 1980’s, ACSA is now blossoming and keeps expanding, as it is a flexible contracting vehicle. Logistics support, supply and services were provided on a bilateral basis among 32 nations and 3 organizations. Currently, the number of ACSA agreements has tripled to amount to 94.”

Three Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) could set up correlated with each of the three groups – North American (US-lead), Western European (French-lead), and Eastern European (Czech-lead). The senior OSF official believes the time is ripe and the momentum is there “to find common solutions not only at the governmental level, but also within the industrial side (Boeing and Eurocopter could here have a common interest). This helicopter initiative has indeed now become a synergistic affair and nations are increasingly willing to participate.”

In short, OSD as well as European officials see the opportunity to shape common logistics approaches for in-theater helo operations. By creating common air-worthiness standards for each cluster of helos operating in Afghanistan, the nations can find ways to work towards common logistics solutions. And without achieving such solutions, according to the senior OSD official, “it will make little sense to introduce additional kit. We need to shape the public debate in the US about the need to recapitalize the rotorcraft fleet on the basis of having come up with solid approaches to logistics and maintenance.

 

 

N.B.: An earlier draft of this article was published in Military Logistics International (September-October 2009).

 

 

***

 

APPENDIX

A number of conclusions are being reached on the West European side as well with regard to the helo initiative. This initiative will be analyzed in a later article: for now some inserts from the April briefing suggest the flavor of the effort.

 

 

 

log_pptslide2

 

 

log_pptslide3
The quotes are taken directly from the briefing given to the NATO logistics group at the Capellen, Luxembourg meeting from January 20-23 2009.


Crafting a New IT System for Logistics: The Baseline

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Crafting a New IT System for Logistics: The Baseline

The USMC is building a new information technology system as a core part of their new logistics enterprise. In so doing, the USMC has followed a deliberate business approach in order NOT to hand over the task to a systems integrator. The USMC initially worked through their judgment on what they knew and what they did not with regard to shaping an approach to IT for their logistics modernization. They worked through their own domain expertise to determine what help they actually needed and could effectively use as they modernized. They then worked with Oracle Corporation to develop appropriate software for the new system, with Oracle owning the licenses emergent from support to the USMC. “We did not want a systems integrator, for they never put themselves out of business. We wanted someone like Oracle who did what they did best, develop software, while we do what we do best support our troops,” said the USMC program manager in an interview in 2008 with the authors.

The Global Combat Support System-Marine Corps (GCSS-MC) program is a modernization effort that will consolidate USMC legacy systems into an integrated infrastructure based on the Oracle E-Business Suite in order to improve the effectiveness of the Marine Corps with emphasis on Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) operations. The purpose of GCSS-MC is, “to develop integrated enterprise logistics information systems that provide supply, maintenance, acquisition, transportation, health, and engineering services to the Marines in a deployed and garrison environment, enhancing their war fighting capability.”

According to the USMC-Oracle team, “GCSS-MC is based on Oracle commercial-off-the-shelf software (COTS), primarily in the areas of service, customer relationship management, supply, maintenance, logistics (and the financial and human competency information required to support these areas), and other related areas. In addition, GCSS-MC is implementing a service-oriented architecture (SOA), using Oracle SOA Suite which includes Oracle Web Services Manager and Oracle BPEL Process Manager for integration and orchestration requirements.”

The USMC team underscored that the new system was being introduced to support expeditionary operations, not simply current land operations in Iraq. Indeed, the system was being crafted to support the far end of engagement and deployment and worked backwards from that point. In other words, if the system worked in CONUS but not in the tip of the deployed spear, the USMC was not interested. Rather the deployment at the tip of the spear was the defining element for the entire system.

In shaping an approach, which can reach from CONUS to the field and back again, the team has conceptualized a five-zone model within which the logistics IT system must function. This model is based on the functioning of the current USMC Tactical Communications network. The USMC Tactical Communications Network and the IT model can be conceptualized as 5 Zones, i.e., Garrison (Zone 1), Naval Network (Zone 2), Expeditionary Network Tier 1 (Zone 3), Expeditionary Network Tier 2 on the move (OTM, Zone 4), and Expeditionary Network Tier 2 on the pause (OTP, Zone 5). The austere network conditions refer to Zones 2, 3,4 and 5.

The robust capabilities necessary to operate in an austere network condition define the overall requirements for the Oracle IT system to be deployed with the Corps. The lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan are important to this effort. For example, the USMC realized that during the first thirty days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the readiness status of the MAGTFs (in zones 4 and 5) was not visible to logistics planners (in Zones 3 and 1) due to the austere network conditions. Requests for supply were either not fulfilled or fulfilled repeatedly due to the lack of visibility of the need to planners. Furthermore, repair and maintenance of assets were not documented appropriately due to lack of accurate reporting tools. The objective of the new logistics system is to be able to enable the USMC to provide the staus of readiness, and to request for logistics support under maneuver and austere network operational conditions. The new IT system will provide links between the needs and fulfillments, and will also enable the USMC to record the repair and maintenance work done by the organic support units.

Although the USMC-Oracle team did not focus on the differences between the U.S. Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) logistics modernization model and their own, it is important to note that the USMC is crafting its approach based on existing communications capabilities. The team did note that they were building their approach with the possibility of expanded communications bandwidth being deployed in the future. As bandwidth increased, they could narrow the gap between zones 1-5, as the austere zone became less so. It is notable that they are not building their approach on assumptions that such bandwidth will inevitably be provided. Rather, they are sizing it to current communications capabilities.

The challenge for the team has been driven by the austere communications environmental standard. As one team member commented: “How do we take a modern tool like Oracle systems and make it useable on the battlefield. In the first 30 to 60 days of battle, the network available would only be our classified means after which we can combine commercial with classified systems with significant bandwidth increases. But how to combine these two experiences into one system?”

A key part of the effort has been to determine the proper data mix between what needs to be communicated back to zone one and what stays in zone five. The team has determined that the determination of what data needs to be moved throughout the system and by what means is crucial to success.

Normal commercial IT logistics software requires significant bandwidth. A normal Oracle solution would require large bandwidth with a heavy footprint. Such a solution is not possible for zones 3 through 5. The Oracle team focused on leveraging services tools and messaging technologies to simplify the data to be transmitted. Among the simplifications are the core metrics, which started at 209 and have now been reduced to 144 core elements. By crafting new business processes for the USMC, IT tools are being developed to provide mobile field service for the USMC.

In other words, data is not simply being accumulated and pushed through the system. Business processes are being shaped which turn determine where information needs to go and in what form to be processed at the appropriate level.

For example, after an engagement, an infantry weapons unit calls in a Service Request for supply.

  • The Service Request is approved by the Request Manager (using MFS in Zone 5) and routed via COTS standard security protocols to the Battalion Supply Section (Zone 5) for action. If the requested supply is available at the Battalion Supply Section, the Service Request will be fulfilled in Zone 5.
  • Or, the system checks for inventory at Battalion Supply, and recognizing that no inventory exists for the requested item, the request is routed via COTS standard security protocols to the supporting Supply Management Unit (Zone 3) for action. If the requested supply is available at the supporting SMU, the Service Request for Supply will be fulfilled in Zone 3.
  • Or, the items requested are not available at the supporting SMU, the system automatically creates purchase orders for the items and routes the orders to the source of supply via a secure data synchronization store and forward approach to Zone 1 for fulfillment.
  • The source of supply fulfills the orders and provides the items to the requesting unit and records the transaction in the system as having filled the order.

For Oracle, the USMC opportunity allows them to adapt their COTS software to more robust deployment situations. By learning how this is done, they can improve the performance and security of their software applications. By adapting their software and retaining intellectual property rights, Oracle then is in a position to leverage the USMC experience throughout their core businesses. In turn, the USMC does not have to pay for extensive and exclusive customization and be held in bondage to a systems integrator. And the USMC gains a foothold in logistics interoperability because they are using a commercial product.

According to the USMC-Oracle team:

Oracle SOA Suite is a comprehensive, standards-based software suite for the building, deployment, and management of SOA. This includes the service-oriented development of applications, service-oriented integration of applications and IT systems, and process orchestration of system services and human workflow. The software integrates heterogeneous IT infrastructures and enables organizations to adopt SOA incrementally. The components of the suite share common capabilities including a single deployment and management model, tooling, end-to-end security, and unified metadata management.

Oracle’s SOA Suite consists of:

  • Oracle BPEL Process Manager: To compose services into business processes
  • Oracle Business Activity Monitoring: To gain real-time visibility into operation and performance of business processes and services
  • Oracle Business Rules: To capture and automate business policies
  • Oracle Enterprise Service Bus: To connect IT systems or business partners and route messages
  • Oracle Web Services Manager: To enforce authentication and authorization policies on services
  • Oracle JDeveloper: To develop, debug, profile, and deploy services

Oracle SOA Suite improves an organization’s ability to predict change – by improving its visibility into happenings in the real-time tactical environment – and to respond to change – by enabling the organization to develop and optimize business processes rapidly. Oracle SOA Suite also simplifies the IT environment by enabling organizations to provision, deploy, monitor, and manage it as a single cohesive infrastructure. Further, the suite leverages existing investments because it is modular, open, and extensible. Organizations can adopt it in a heterogeneous environment, without removing or replacing existing systems, as well as in an incremental fashion.

The Marine Corps will deploy the Oracle SOA Suite in and outside the continental United States, as well as in forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) and Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU). Oracle’s software is expected to enable the Marine Corps to more effectively track, transport, and deliver services and support to forces in the field. It will enable the USMC to meet Combatant Commanders’ information requirements and facilitate integration with other USMC/Department of Navy units.

A recent update of developments has been provided by a recent USMC publication. According to this publication:

“Among the recent changes at GCSS-MC is a two-release strategy for Block 1. The plan for GCSS-MC has always been to implement the new technology in “blocks” or increments. Currently that strategy has been refined to move the program forward by separating the first block into two releases. Release 1 .1, the “Enterprise Release,” contains the retail supply, maintenance, request, and service management functionality needed so supply and maintenance legacy systems can be retired. The second release (1.2), some times called the “Deployed Access Release,” is the more complex and sophisticated technology that enhances the MAGTF’s ability to access information in austere environments. Work on both releases is currently underway.” (See GSS-MC. Bringing Logistics into the 21st Century [pdf])

For more information on the Oracle SOA Suite, visit: http://www.oracle.com/technologies/soa/soa-suite.html

The article was first published in Military Logistics International (September-October 2008) written by Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte.

———-

***Posted August 12th, 2009

The Emergence of a 21st Century Concept of Air Operations

Posted on | by SysAdmin

The evolution of 21st century air operations is unfolding under the impact of a new generation of aircraft and a significant shift in the role of air operations in support of ground and maritime forces. The “5th generation” aircraft have largely been viewed as simply a next iteration of airframes whereby “legacy” or “4th generation aircraft” will be replaced by new stealth airframes. And aircraft have been largely viewed as operating within the classic domain of air operations, largely playing the role of air superiority, air dominance, air defense, strike and support roles seen as separable sequences of tasks.

While it is clear that expeditionary military operations cannot succeed without control of the skies, the fifth generation aircraft will be able to contribute to a significant change in the role of manned aircraft within air, ground and maritime operations. The change is significant enough that one can speak of the challenge of crafting a concept of 21st century air operations transformed by the introduction and use of the new aircraft. The transformation is underway as the 5th generation aircraft are being introduced, affecting employment concepts and roles of legacy air elements as well. Rather than anticipating change only with a significant replacement of one class of aircraft by another, changes in operations of “legacy” aircraft are already anticipating the changes to be accelerated by the new aircraft, and these changes will be accelerated as the new aircraft enter in larger numbers. The new “5th generation” aircraft will generate significantly greater “integrated” capability for the non-kinetic use of aircraft and an expanded use of connectivity, ISR, communications, and computational capabilities built around a man-machine interface which will, in turn, shape the robotics and precision revolutions already underway.

21st century air operations are a significant building block for overall U.S. and allied joint and coalition operations. Capability to connect air, ground, and maritime forces throughout the battlespace via air assets can support the decision-making of the ground and maritime command elements. Indeed, the C4ISR envisaged in network operations is becoming re-shaped into C4ISRD whereby decision-making is shared across the battlespace. Distributed information and distributed decision-making will be enhanced as air operations become much more capable of providing information in support of the deployed decision-maker, and kinetic and non-kinetic support elements can be cued in support of air, ground, and maritime combat requirements.

For a fuller treatment of this argument, download the full report in PDF format.

An earlier version of this special report can also be found as a PDF as well  in Defense Horizons (A 21st-century Concept of Air and Military Operations).

———-

Posted August 12th, 2009