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2013-01-23 When we visited Eglin to talk with pilots and maintainers of the F-35 at the Training Facility last August, we passed by the area where the USN is getting ready for its variant of the F-35.
It is expected to come to the facility later this year, and see the Navy join the joint team preparing for the F-35 transition.
According to a recent Lockheed Martin press release:
January 22, 2013. For the first time, two F-35C Lightning II carrier variant test aircraft refueled together with a Lockheed Martin KC-130 Hercules in the sky above Patuxent River, Md. recently.
The CV aircraft, known as CF-1 and CF-2, completed the milestone as part of an F-35 flight test program that will accomplish more than 1,000 flights in 2013.
Here Col. Tomasetti, Deputy Commander of the 33rd Fighter Wing discusses the Training Center at Eglin.
01/18/2013: MARINE CORPS BASE CAMP PENDLETON, Calif. – Fighting forces from two nations came together to unite under one common mission.
Marines serving with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, are hosting the 3rd Battalion Singapore Guards for Exercise Valiant Mark, a yearly training event conducted by the Singapore Armed Forces and 1st Marine Division.
The Marines and guardsmen kicked off the exercise with an opening ceremony at the 5th Marines parade deck here, Nov. 29.
“Valiant Mark is a bilateral exercise between the United States Marine Corps and Singapore Guards that happens every year in which we train side by side and exchange tactics,” said Lt. Col. Jason Perry, the commanding officer of 2nd Bn., 5th Marines.
Marines and guardsmen will participate in several live-fire exercises, during which they will exchange ideas on fundamental infantry tactics in an effort to increase combat effectiveness.
“My goal is also to have my Marines form a close personal relationship with the guardsmen,” said Perry, a native of Flat Rock, N.C. “I think they will find that they have something in common because we are all warfighters.”
The exercise alternates every year, said Lt. Col.Fredie Tan, the battalion commanding officer of the 3rd Bn. Singapore Guards. This year the guardsmen came to Camp Pendleton, and next year the Marines will go to Singapore to train with their Pacific allies.
“The United States Marine Corps and the Singapore Guards have been good friends for over a decade,” Tan said. “We are looking forward to training with one of the best fighting forces in the world.”
The Marines and guardsmen will conduct partnered platoon and company sized attacks and perform helicopter-borne operations over the course of the exercise.The battalion’s Marines recently returned from a combat deployment in Helmond Province, Afghanistan, and has a wealth of experience to share with the guardsmen. Captain Mengyean Ong, an infantry platoon commander serving with the 3rd Bn., Singapore Guards, said she’s enthusiastic about the great opportunity.
“Marines are capable and experienced warriors,” said Ong, a 24 year-old native of Singapore. “I am excited to be able to train with them and hear about their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq.”
The training is a rare opportunity to work with the military of another nation and to learn from one another, Perry said.
“I want everyone to compete and train hard. Furthermore, I want to see everyone building strong personal bonds with each other, as I have with Lt. Col Tan,” Perry said.
Valiant Mark is being conducted in conjunction with Steel Knight, an annual exercise designed to train 1st Marine Division Marines for deployment as the ground combat element of a Marine air-ground task force. The focus of the exercise is to ensure that 1st Marine Division is fully prepared to deploy as an expeditionary force across the range of military operations and is capable of responding to any crisis across the world.
In the first photo, Lance Cpl. James Rimel, a rifleman serving with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, observes the way Lance Cpl. Muhad Raiz, a rifleman serving with 3rd Battalion Singapore Guards, moves to engage enemy targets during live-fire training here, Dec. 1, as a part of Exercise Valiant Mark 2012. Rimel, a 22 year-old native of El Paso, Texas, said the guardsmen’s tactics for moving to engage the enemy is very similar to that of Marines.
In the second photo, Corporal Daniel Harrison, a rifleman serving with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, exchanges Meals, Ready-to-Eat with Sgt. Joshua Chan, a mortarman serving with 3rd Battalion Singapore Guards, after live-fire familiarization training here during Exercise Valiant Mark 2012.
In the third photo, Lance Cpl. Ewing Joshua, a machine-gunner serving with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, explains the capabilities of the Mark 19 grenade launcher to Singaporean Guardsman Lance Cpl. Muhad Raiz, a rifleman serving with 3rd Battalion Singapore Guards, here, Nov. 29, 2012.
In the fourth photo, Lance Cpl. Chin Wanfeng, a rifleman serving with 3rd Battalion Singapore Guards, exchanges weapons with Lance Cpl. Christopher Elk, a rifleman serving with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, to examine the differences in sensitivity of trigger mechanisms here, Dec. 1 during Exercise Valiant Mark 2012. Wanfeng said the M16A4 service rifle has a softer trigger-pull than his Mark 3 general purpose machine gun.
In the first photo, Lance Cpl. Ramon Sapien, a Dallas, native and AH-1W Super Cobra mechanic with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (Reinforced), 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepares for the installment of a main rotor to an AH-1W Super Cobra aboard USS Iwo Jima, Dec. 3, 2012.The 24th MEU is deployed with the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and is currently in the 6th Fleet area of responsibility. Since deploying in March, they have supported a variety of missions in the U.S. Central, Africa and European Commands, assisted the Navy in safeguarding sea lanes, and conducted various bilateral and unilateral training events in several countries in the Middle East and Africa.The Cobras, along with UH-1N Hueys, make up the “Skid” detachment for VMM-261 (Rein) and are originally from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269, based at Marine Corps Air Station New River, N.C.
In the second and third photos, Sgt. Matthew Yoskovich, a Greensboro, Penn., native and AH-1W Super Cobra crew chief with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (Reinforced), 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, oversees maintenance of a main rotor to an AH-1W Super Cobra aboard USS Iwo Jima, Dec. 3, 2012.
In the fourth photo, Lance Cpl. Ramon Sapien, a Dallas, native and AH-1W Super Cobra mechanic with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (Reinforced), 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, oversees maintenance of a main rotor to an AH-1W Super Cobra aboard USS Iwo Jima, Dec. 3, 2012.
A key change, which has occurred with the upgrade of the Marine Corps’ helo fleet, is improved capacity to maintain the fleet while at sea.
As we argued earlier:
By adding, new combat capabilities, notably the V-22 and the F-35B, the ARG becomes a much more potent combat resource, and a welcome addition to CBG con-ops. In an age of diminishing physical assets – in this case ships – getting more punch for the buck is a key consideration. The tactical contribution is the ARG becomes part of a scalable response with respect to any evolving flash point crisis.
Like everything in life the cliché “the Devil is in the details” must be addressed. There good news because of another significant aspect of the USN-USMC modernization approach. The ability to make better use of Amphib deck and below deck space is significantly enhanced by the new systems.Having the two modernized helos – the Zulu and Yankee Class – use the SAME engines means that support for two different engines aboard the ship is no longer necessary. This frees up both manpower and maintenance space aboard the ship
01/04/2012: 120th Fighter Wing of the Montana Air National Guard F-15 Eagle aircraft parked, taxiing and taking off from the Great Falls International Airport runway on the first snowy day of fall 2012
The change in government in Japan offers an opportunity to move forward in re-shaping the US-Japanese Alliance.
The Alliance has now a long history, but re-shaping the Alliance will be crucial in the period ahead, notably with the challenges from North Korea, the PRC and new regions such as the Arctic.
This summer the third Armitage-Nye Report was released on The US-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia and provides a useful starting point to the discussion of where next in the Alliance.
The report aims to provide guidance how Washington and Tokyo can work to prevent Japan’s continued “drift into tier-two status,” which the authors fear would harm the interests of other Asian countries as well as their own.
The three Nye-Armitage reports have all stressed the importance of having a strong US-Japan relationship as an anchor for the broader US policy in East Asia.
In particular, the authors argue that a strong alliance will help discourage Beijing’s adventurism and manage China’s rising power, while a weak Japanese-American alliance would invite China to try to break it or exploit its fissures.
The report calls for greater bilateral efforts to align Japanese and U.S. roles, missions, capabilities, and concepts, such as Dynamic Defense and Air Sea Battle, as well as consider how to expand the geographic and functional range of such missions.
Japanese gratitude towards the US military’s earthquake relief efforts, dubbed “Operation Tomodachi,” has resulted in the flattering image above, prompting a delighted reaction from Americans and a somewhat more mixed response from Japanese…
The authors want the Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), which have by now acquired the capabilities to contribute to addressing a wide range of regional and even global security challenges, to assume a more prominent role, in collaboration with the United States, in protecting the Persian Gulf from Iranian mines and in joint US-Japan surveillance of the South China Sea.
In turn, the authors want U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) to assume more specific roles and missions in defending the Japanese homeland as well as addressing regional security challenges. They hope this will contribute to improving the ability of the two countries’ ground forces to collaborate.
In their view, “U.S. Army/Marine Corps cooperation with JGSDF should make progress toward interoperability and move toward an amphibious, agile, and deployable force posture.” Their operational interoperability has lagged behind that of their navy and air forces, but Operation Tomodachi, their post-March 2011 joint campaign to help Japan recover from the devastating earthquake-tsunami-nuclear disasters, showed that they have the means to operate on a wider range of missions if Japan can relax its prohibition on collective self-defense.
Noting that the JSDF have been participating in international peacekeeping missions for the past 20 years, saving lives and enhancing Japan’s soft power, they call for the Japanese government to widen the permissible actions of JSDF soldiers on such missions.
At present, they are legally permitted to use force only for self-defense. They urge the enactment of legislation to allow the JSDF to use force to defend peacekeepers from other countries serving in the operation as well as civilians under threat. But thus far the Japanese parliament has declined to adopt a law authorizing the first measure.
The LDP has pledged during the recent election campaign to relax Japan’s long-standing restrictive interpretation that their constitution, specifically Article 9, excludes Japan’s participation in “collective self-defense” arrangements.
Past Japanese governments have cited their supposed constitutional exclusion of collective self-defense operations as limiting their ability to provide direct military assistance to U.S. forces engaged in armed combat outside Japan, including prohibiting joint combat operations with the United States against a third country. Under Article V of the U.S.-Japan Treaty on Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed in 1960, the United States is obliged to defend Japan without reciprocation, leading to mutual security cooperation but not mutual defense.
Although earlier LDP-led governments sought to amend the Constitution, political instability in Tokyo has delayed progress on this issue.
Since two-thirds of the Diet must vote to amend the Constitution, followed by a supporting national referendum, the LDP might find it easier to expand Japan’s defense activities by reinterpreting some constitutional limitations in a less stringent manner, which successive governments have already been doing since 1991.
The current interpretation of Article 9 restricts Tokyo’s ability to sell weapons to foreign countries, despite the fact that the Japanese government’s limited weapons procurement budget can makes it uneconomical to research and design certain very expensive weapons systems.
In January 2005, the Japanese Federation of Economic Organizations recommended constitutional revision on the grounds that Tokyo’s inability to participate in collective defense prohibits Japan from supporting allies in the form of weapons sales.
Given the declining defense budgets in both countries, the authors of “Anchoring Stability” join others in calling for greater defense industrial cooperation between Japan and the United States.
U.S. firms could improve their performance and lower their costs by being able to import more leading Japanese’ technologies. Japan would also benefit from being able to sell arms to Australia, India, and other Asian customers as well as perhaps Europe, perhaps in exchange for keeping the EU arms sales ban against China. At the symbolic level, such long-term defense industrial cooperation suggests that the alliance ties will be enduring.
The report notes the value of harmonizing the two countries’ defense requirements as well as their research & development efforts in such long-term projects as the next-generation fighters, warships, radars, strategic lift, communications, and long-range interoperable ISR capabilities. It also calls on the US government “to better integrate and invigorate the Sciences and Technology Forum with the policy-centered Security Consultative Committee structure “as well as streamline its own foreign defense sales processes “to ensure timely and strategically consistent decisions.”
The exemplary Japanese-U.S. missile defense cooperation in developing missile defenses shows this potential.
Both sides took a very complex, controversial, and expensive defense capability and achieved cost savings and superior results through co-development, co-production, and co-deployment of BMD systems. The Japanese government also took appropriate measures to exempt BMD systems from its export ban to make it easier for the United States to export to Europe the next-generation missile defense system, SM3 Block 2A, co-developed by Japan and the United States.
But even here the constitutional prohibition against collective defense presents problems since it impedes Japanese participation in a joint BMD system that can defend U.S. forces under missile attack in East Asia. The current interpretation might also exclude using Japanese BMD assets to intercept a theoretical launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile from North Korea or China towards the United States.
In addition, the F-35 issue has highlighted the opportunity costs of not engaging in such defense industrial cooperation.
Although the JSDF see the F-35 as an essential strategic capability upgrade to its aging F-15 fleet, Japan could not participate in the multinational JSF development program because of its arms export ban. Japan has already purchased 42 F-35 aircraft, and can be expected to purchase at least one hundred more, but Japan’s absence for the development program has prevented Japanese firms from producing F-35s under license.
2012-12-24 In a discussion with Denton Clark of Lockheed Martin, the focus was upon how to meet the challenge of counterfeit parts in the supply chain.
Denton Clark, an AIT Manager, is the Automated Identification and Data Capture (AIDC) Integrated Process Team (IPT) lead, for Lockheed Martin Corporation. In this position, Mr. Clark has the overall responsibility for supporting the AIDC development and implementation efforts across the Corporation. This includes a broad range of ongoing and prospective activities including ensuring the DoD Passive RFID Policy is compliantly implemented as well as integrating AIDC technologies horizontally across the corporation. In addition, Mr. Clark is responsible for assisting existing and prospective programs in evaluating and implementing AIDC technologies as a supply chain transformation tool. Denton’s team has been working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Logistics Agency in the development and implementation of Passive RFID technology in compliance with the Department of Defense’s Passive RFID initiative.
Because the counterfeit parts challenge is inextricably intertwined with shaping an effective and secure manufacturing process, quite obviously building a new manufacturing approach and capability like the F-35 has to be built from the ground up with significant attention to attenuating the counterfeit parts challenge.
The problem revolves largely around the use of brokers to provide parts for systems as they age.
Programs early in their production cycle are in the hands of the Original Equipment Manufacturers or OEMS, and as they age, more of the parts provisions come from brokers, rather than OEMS, and this is where the problem becomes its most significant.
How will the F-35 program cope with the problem? And to best shape solutions which attenuate the problem?
In other words, countering the counterfeit parts challenge is a key element of shaping a defense manufacturing approach going forward.
And as the U.S. builds safeguards in the F-35 as a global program, the U.S. and its partners are in a position to more effectively risk mitigate the challenge.
We are looking at a number of technologies to enhance our capability to deal with the counterfeit parts challenge. It is about putting in place a more reliable supply chain.Credit Image: Bigstock
SLD: How would you characterize the challenge of counterfeit parts in the defense industrial supply chain?
Clark: It is best to start with the baseline legislation which lays out the approach to dealing with the problem. This baseline legislation is to be found in the National Defense Authorization Act 2012, Section 8:18.
It is important to identify the source of the product, and to work with trusted suppliers.
There is a clear need to track the physical flow of the product itself: where has it been, where is it going, and then track the financial responsibility for the product itself.
From DOD’s perspective, what they care about is who had financial ownership of the product itself, and that would generally be the prime contractor or their distributer.
What is important here is to establish, and manage a chain of custody for the parts manufacturing, distribution and use.
To do so requires asset visibility.
So all of the changes we talked about last time associated with the UID process are part of providing for greater asset visibility. And such visibility is a means to the end of risk mitigation in the quality of the parts, their performance and reliability, and to attenuate the risk of counterfeits.
SLD: So meeting the challenge of identifying and eliminating counterfeit parts is part and parcel of shaping a more effective manufacturing and sustainment process. And this process is founded on greater asset visibility and transparency?
Clark: It is.
We are looking at a number of technologies to enhance our capability to deal with the counterfeit parts challenge.
Each of these technologies has their strengths and weakness, but all contribute to thinking about ways to mitigate risk from counterfeit parts.
There are three key technologies in play here: laser etching, biometric DNA markers, and frequency spectrum projection.
The first technology is laser etching. This is a new technology whereby laser can etch information into chips and parts, e.g. UIDs which contain a lot of information.
The second is biometric DNA markers. With this technology, when you put ink on a product, it would have its own unique DNA markers and its either going to be present or not. If its there, it is authentic. If its not, it is counterfeit.
The third one and the most promising technology for dealing with counterfeit electronic equipment is the use of frequency spectrum technology. With this technology, when you turn on a piece of electronic equipment, the equipment radiates spectrum at a certain frequency. When the product is new it radiates at a certain spectrum, but degrades over time.
You can get a sense of age and whether it works and can determine if something is not real inside that product. You can build a library of these spectrums for a given piece of equipment.
SLD: This is clearly not just a Lockheed Martin initiative, but is DOD and industry wide.
Clark: Lockheed Martin certainly has been a leader in working with trusted suppliers, and this approach is a centerpiece of the F-35 program.
But industry and the government are taking a number of initiatives, and crafting standards to deal with these challenges.
QUESTION: This is not just a defense industrial problem, but occurs throughout modern industrial supply chains, and it is not just industry which is involved in dealing with the problem, but the government itself.
Clark: A good example of this problem is Defense Logistics Agency.
DLA is a huge customer to many defense contractors. For Lockheed Martin, DLA is our second largest supplier for all our sustainment programs. But there are no provisions in the law to hold any government entity responsible for passing on counterfeit parts.
It is clear that we – both industry and the government – share in the problem and all have an imperative to fix the problem. . We certainly do not under any circumstances want a part that is not perfectly conforming to its requirements to be put in any of the systems that we manufacture.
SLD: The problem is augmented as a platform is older and the role of the OEM is reduced and parts brokers become more important in the sustainment process. Could you talk to this issue?
Clark: That is precisely the challenge. The goal of having trusted suppliers is that you’ve got to be comfortable that that supplier is flowing down the same requirements to their suppliers all the way to the source of the product itself.
We have programs within Lockheed Martin where we can trace right back to the mine where that copper came from in the wires, so that’s how far back we can go.
For example, there are only two places in the world that you can get industrial grade or military grade titanium, and one of those places is in Russia and the other is China.
In a program like 787, A-380s, the F-35s, any program that’s using titanium, your manufacturers want to know where that material is being mined.
Once it’s been through a foundry, then you’ve got to do the structural testing to figure out what the grade is, so you want to do your sourcing.
You want to know where it came from right from the mine and so anti-counterfeiting is not just going down through suppliers, sometimes it’s going right to the source. The quality of your silicon sometimes will matter.
SLD: The F-35 is a new manufacturing program.
Are there not advantages of shaping this program and its sustainment approach from the outset to do a better job of risk mitigation with regard to counterfeit parts?
Clark: It does. It is about putting in place a more reliable supply chain.
And not just for defense. DOD affects about 3% of our foreign trade but has the potential of affecting a great deal more by the way we do business. Anybody who does business with DOD will probably take the same processes their building for that supply chain and apply to all the other supply chains because it would not make sense not to. So all of a sudden counterfeiting beyond DOD becomes difficult.
It is shaping a quality assurance approach across a broad spectrum of product.
And while this is a U.S. law, the law will have a major impact on all our partner countries and anybody who participates within the F-35 program in the future.
