The Challenge of Transforming US Forces in South Korea

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11/07/2012

2012-11-07 By Richard Weitz

The U.S-ROK military alliance has been the foundation of both countries’ strategic policies for over fifty years.

The United States and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in October 1953 following the 1950-53 Korean War, in which 33,600 American troops were killed and more than 100,000 seriously injured in the successful effort to reverse the surprise North Korean invasion. The Treaty, which took effect in November of the following year, commits the United States to help the Republic of Korea counter an external armed attack and authorizes the deployment of American military forces on ROK territory.

To enhance the U.S. capability to defend South Korea, 37,500 U.S. combat forces, consisting of approximately 28,300 U.S. Army ground troops, 8,700 USAF personnel, and 500 Marines, were until a few years ago deployed in the ROK. Many of them were based near the demilitarized zone established in 1953 to separate North and South Korean military forces.

The U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) established during the Cold War assigns to the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) operational control of most South Korean units during wartime. Although U.S. and ROK leaders described such a command arrangement as a mechanism to strengthen military efficiency, some Americans also saw it as a way of curbing potentially unwelcome South Korean military actions against the North.

In any case, the United States did not transfer operational control of ROK units in peacetime to South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) until December 1994.

A separate United Nations Command (UNC), whose primary responsibility is to uphold the terms of the Korean War Armistice Agreement, integrates non-U.S. foreign forces into ROK defenses. The United States has also deployed substantial military forces in Japan; one of their primary missions is defending South Korea.

The large U.S. military presence in South Korea has invariably generated friction with the host nation, including protests against the misdeeds of American soldiers based in South Korea. Efforts to manage such concerns have resulted in several revisions in the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which defines the legal status and obligations of the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

Changing the US Presence

The current SOFA grants South Korean authorities primary jurisdiction over American military personnel accused of only a limited number of offenses when they are off duty. During the first few decades of the alliance, the very real threat of another North Korean attack and the repressive policies of successive authoritarian ROK governments dampened widespread displays of anti-Americanism, but the end of the Cold War and South Korea’s transformation into a liberal democracy in the late 1980s made it easier for manifestations of anti-Americanism to appear.

In turn, the Pentagon’s the number of U.S troops permanently stationed in South Korea and to changed the location of these forces.

The reasons for this are several.

First, there was a need to send U.S. forces from South Korea to Iraq and Afghanistan,

Second, there are changing global security threats,

Third, there are improving military technologies,

Fourth, there was a need to address discontent among South Koreans.

After analyzing and discussing the issue for several years, U.S. officials decided in late 2002 to relocate most USFK forces from their prominent locations in Seoul and along the DMZ and consolidate them in two locations further south in less prime real estate.

A major component of the realignment was the transfer of the main U.S. military base in South Korea out of central Seoul to the Osan-Pyongtaek region, situated 70 kilometers south of the ROK capital. This sprawling Yongsan Garrison—which houses the headquarters of the UNC, CFC, and USFK—had been a constant source of tension given its prominent location in downtown Seoul.

The Pentagon also withdrew U.S. soldiers belonging to the U.S. Second Infantry Division from positions located near the DMZ to the Osan-Pyongtaek region.

At the same time, the USFK have been transferring important combat missions over to the ROK forces, whose capabilities have been continually improving in recent years.

An SH-60F Sea Hawk helicopter flies by the South Korean navy destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG 991) while on patrol. Credit USN, 3/6/12 

American officials have argued that the need for U.S. troops to serve as a “tripwire” located along the intra-Korean border to guarantee that the United States would intervene militarily to halt any North Korean invasion has become outdated. Instead, enhancements in U.S. transportation, logistics, and long-range precision-strike capabilities could enable U.S. forces to rapidly reinforce the Peninsula.

The changing nature of the U.S. military deployments in South Korea spurred interest in restructuring other elements of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

At the 34th Security Consultative Meeting held in Washington in December 2002, the two defense ministers signed terms of reference for the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance (FOTA) Policy Initiative. Formal talks began in 2003 and continued through nine rounds of discussions. The parties’ original intent was to undertake a comprehensive study of how to strengthen their bilateral alliance over the next decade.

Because the discussions over the repositioning and withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula proved so complex and decisive, however, ROK and U.S. negotiators made limited progress in addressing longer-term issues such as revising military command arrangements and responding to transnational threats and extra-peninsular contingencies. These talks were later replaced by the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) and plans were drawn up for U.S. forces in Korea to be re-aligned.

Preparing for an OPCON Transition

Under a 2006 agreement called, the “Roadmap for the New Alliance Military Structure in the post-OPCON Transition Era’,” the countries agreed to transfer Operation Command (OPCON) of the South Korean forces even in wartime to the ROK sometime between October 15, 2009 and March 15, 2012.

In June 2010, the parties, citing the evident in the recent DPRK provocations, decided to defer wartime OPCON transition until the end of 2015.

The postponement may also have been designed to assuage the worries of many analysts that the 2012 date would have been premature.

In addition to transferring wartime command of South Korean forces to ROK command, changing global security threats and requirements, the improving conventional weaponry of both militaries, and other factors have led to the mutual decision to reduce the number of U.S. troops permanently stationed in South Korea.

The changes have proven somewhat controversial among South Koreans who fear that the transfer could embolden their already erratically provocative neighbor.

In particular, South Koreans worry that these moves could cause the DPRK leadership to misperceive a decline in the U.S. willingness to defend them against a North Korean attack. Although the Americans see the move as upgrading the ROK’s status and underscoring U.S. confidence in the ROK’s improving military capabilities, many South Koreans interpret the realignment as reflecting American eagerness to reduce its ROK-related commitments to reallocate U.S. defense resources to higher security priorities.

In justifying the relocations and the closings of dozens of U.S. military bases in the ROK, U.S. officials argues that the need for U.S. troops to serve as a “tripwire” located along the intra-Korean border to guarantee American military intervention against any North Korean invasion has become outdated.

Instead, U.S. forces would rely on superior mobility and air and naval power projection to crush a DPRK attack.

U.S. troops also could more easily participate in non-Korean contingencies from their new location. In addition, the Bush administration argued that troop realignment reflected a desire to reduce the burden on local communities; making the military relationship will become more sustainable over the long-term.

Re-aligning the US-ROK Alliance

The changes in the U.S. military footprint in South Korea also represented one element of a larger process of realigning the U.S. military presence to accord better with the imperatives of the post-9/11 world.

The Pentagon wanted to reduce the number of U.S. troops in enormous permanent bases in Western Europe and Northeast Asia while relying more on short-term deployments to forward operating bases in potential or actual conflict regions. Enhancements in U.S. transportation logistics and global strike capabilities would enable U.S. forces to exploit their increased flexibility and counter adversaries’ improving anti-access strategies.

ROK objections, as well as gratitude for the South’s substantial troop contribution in Iraq and concerns about weakening the U.S.-ROK’s bargaining position vis-à-vis North Korea, induced the United States to delay the planned troop withdrawals.

After four months of contentious negotiations, the two sides agreed to spread out the planned redeployment of the 12,500 U.S. troops into three phases. In 2004, about 5,000 American troops, including the soldiers of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, would leave South Korea. During the second phase of 2005-2006, the United States expected to withdraw another 5,000 troops (3,000 in 2005; 2,000 in 2006). During the final phase of 2007-2008, another 2,500 troops would depart. These withdrawals ended in 2008. At present, USFK has some 28,500 active-duty personnel (19,000 Army) as well as many dependents and contractors.

In addition, U.S. officials agreed to keep certain military assets in South Korea following specific ROK requests, including the Multiple Rocket Launching System stationed along the DMZ, the AN/TPQ radar that detects the movement of DPRK long-range artillery, and two squadrons of upgraded Apache helicopters.

Two Korean K-1 Tanks of the 3rd Tank Company, 56th Battalion, 9th Regiment, and two Stryker Mobil Gun Systems from the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, “Gimlets,” 25th Infantry Division, prepare to execute a defensive live-fire training exercise, April 12, here. The training event was part of Foal Eagle 2012, an annual combined training exercise between the US and Republic of Korea Armies, which focuses on strengthening partnerships and unit interoperability of war-fighting skills. Credit: US Army, 4/4/12

Furthermore, the Pentagon in 2003 launched an $11 billion multi-year effort to improve the U.S. military systems deployed in and near South Korea. The modernization program included more than 100 separate enhancements of the U.S. military capabilities in the region.

At their 43rd annual U.S.- ROK Security Consultative meeting, the two sides established the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD), to coordinate and integrate various bilateral defense consultation mechanisms by providing them with high-level political oversight.

At their comments at their October 2012 44th annual U.S.- ROK Security Consultative meeting, the two defense ministers agreed to keep the number of U.S. troops deployed in South Korea unchanged, enhance their capabilities and readiness, and ensure the timely provision of reinforcements.

They expressed concern about the situation in North Korea following the 2010 provocations, the April 2012 missile launch, and the ongoing political leadership transition in Pyongyang. They pledged to resist further provocations by augmenting their readiness through combined exercises and training, increase combined surveillance activities near the Northwest Islands and the Northern Limit Line (NLL), and developing a U.S.-ROK Counter-Provocation Plan based on shared concepts and principles.

The two defense ministers affirmed that the relocation of USFK units and the transition of wartime OPCON in December 2015 were proceeding according to the Strategic Alliance 2015 implementation plan, which they pledged to review and assess on a regular basis.

For example, they agreed to hold the previously annual Military Consultative Meeting (MCM)—headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of both countries–biannually from now through 2015.

Secretary Panetta reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea “using both capabilities postured on the Korean Peninsula and globally available U.S. forces” as well as “to provide specific bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains full self-defense capabilities, and further noted the U.S. commitment to contribute enduring capabilities for the life of the Alliance.”  Minister Kim restated the ROK was “committed to developing or acquiring the critical military capabilities necessary to assume the lead of the combined defense.”  USKF head General Thurman had the day before cited ROK investments in UAVs, BMD, and interoperable command and control systems as core elements of its modernization program.

Furthermore, the parties agreed to create a working group to develop plans for a new joint command structure within the structure of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff to ensure military efficiency after a “strong and seamless” transition.

Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin was at pains to stress that, while the two governments saw “great strength” in the CFC and was hoping to leverage what they had learned from it, “we are trying to build a system following the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command. We are not trying to build another Combined Forces Command.”

He noted that after 2015 the ROK forces would have OPCON and the USFK would be supporting them. Still, analysts speculated that the move aimed to reassure those South Koreans worried that the CFC’s dissolution would weaken the alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities by emboldening the DPRK leadership and weakening the U.S. commitment to the ROK’s defense.

For discussions of several of the issues discussed here by the current 7th USAF commander and two former commanders see the following:

https://www.sldinfo.com/meeting-the-korean-defense-challenge-the-view-from-7th-air-force/

https://www.sldinfo.com/south-korean-defense-re-considered-preparing-for-2015/

https://www.sldinfo.com/understanding-the-challenge-of-deterring-north-korea/

For a look at the potential role of the F-35 in evolving US and South Korean defense strategy see the following:

https://www.sldinfo.com/f-35as-to-korea-shaping-a-defense-transition-to-deal-with-real-threats/

https://www.sldinfo.com/the-transformed-korea-us-alliance-needs-f-35s/

 

 

USMC Flight Operations At Sea

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11/05/2012
11/05/2012: USS Iwo Jima, US 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility (Sept. 10, 2012) – MV-22B Ospreys, AV-8B Harriers, UH-1N Hueys and AH-1W Cobras with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 261 (Reinforced), 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, conduct flight operations aboard the USS Iwo Jima, Sept. 10, 2012.

The 24th MEU is deployed with the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group as a theater reserve force for US Central Command and is providing support for maritime security operations and theater support cooperative effects in the US Navy’s 5th Fleet area of responsibility

 

Credit: 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

9/14/12

The F-35 Composites and the Future of Military Aviation

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11/01/2012

By Jeff Sloan, Editor in Chief, Composites World

The advantage of the F-35 is its “joint” concept, which spreads cost, manufacturing and risk among several partner countries, each of which is a program customer as well. The disadvantage — as with Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner — is that too many cooks in the kitchen create complexities and multiply complications. Inevitably, there are delays and cost overruns.

Those who believe the F-35’s value is unequal to its cost and, therefore, should be cut, have to answer a big question: Then what?

At the Pentagon, U.S. air superiority is a given, not an option. The F-15, F-16 and F-18 have served the country well, but are aging. F-22 production was discontinued in favor of the F-35.

For all of its developmental warts, the F-35 is the best — and, in fact, the only — long-term option for America’s and her allies’ air-to-air and air-to-ground combat operations.

Like the 787 before it, the F-35 will have its cadre of doubters and second-guessers until the design and engineering wrinkles are worked out, the complexities are managed and aircraft enter service.

But the F-35 represents a new dimension of composites integration in a military craft, embodying a host of resin, fiber, molding and post-mold technologies that, I believe, will make this aircraft a milestone in composites design and manufacturing.

And like the 787, it will ultimately justify its developmental growing pains and send another strong signal to the rest of the world about the immense capabilities of composites, ensuring their adoption into many more vehicles and other structures — military and civilian — for many years to come.

Excerpt taken from

http://www.compositesworld.com/columns/will-sequestration-ground-the-f-35

 

Singapore Faces the Future: Shaping an IKC2 Defense Force

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10/31/2012

2012-10-31 Singapore is at the vortex of what we are calling the Strategic Quadrangle in the Pacific. 

The intersection of the defense of Japan, South Korea, Australia and Singapore forms a quadrangle of defense interests in providing for the security of key US allies in the region.  The US is directly or indirectly involved in the defense of all key allies in the Quadrangle, and the evolution of their capabilities individually and collectively is crucial to the evolution of American capabilities and strategy in the decade ahead.

The US faces a tyranny of distance in dealing with the Pacific. And needs to operate in a strategic triangle from Hawaii, to Guam and to Japan. And in a strategic quadrangle which reaches from Japan to South Korea, to Singapore and to Australia. Credit: Graphic Second Line of Defense 

Singapore is a non-aligned power with close ties to the United States politically and militarily and close ties with China economically and politically.  They depend on the security of maritime trade and the safety and security of the global commons.

They have built a modern naval and air force and are investing in its further modernization.  And their efforts are founded on working with Western countries and firms in shaping an effective modernization strategy.  And they are seeking to ensure that the force is well integrated and networked.  Their concept for doing so is called an Integrated Knowledge Command and Control Concept, which is their version of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).

This concept is well articulated on Singapore’s Ministry of Defense website as follows:

On the ground and in the jungles, the SAF will transform into a lean, networked and lethal fighting force while staying focused on the new security challenges. It will employ new technologies, such as precision fire, advanced communications and information technology, as well as unmanned vehicles, to defeat potential adversaries. At the same time, innovative warfighting concepts in combined arms operations, urban fighting and infantry fieldcraft will be introduced in tandem to provide the SAF with the operational edge. 

Out at sea, the SAF will achieve potent three-dimensional fighting capabilities in the air, on the surface, and under the sea. Its ships will also have the command and control capability to conduct seamless operations as an integrated force with aircraft and land forces, through effective use of advanced communications and information technology, while leveraging on platform strengths. The SAF should thus be ready to meet the full spectrum of maritime threats, including small, fast-moving boats in the littorals that can otherwise pose a tremendous challenge to traditional naval forces. 

In the air, the SAF will achieve Air Dominance through the coordinated employment of fighters, unmanned air vehicles and airborne surveillance aircraft, which are integrated through real-time knowledge-based systems and networks. The networked force will have comprehensive situational awareness that gives the critical edge in air operations. The SAF will also marry advanced surveillance and strike capabilities over surface threats, including elusive targets that may be concealed under foliage or ships out on open sea.

Finally, tying all these air, land and sea capabilities together into a synergistic whole is the concept of Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control (IKC2). The concept gives commanders and soldiers the ability to see first, see more; understand better; decide faster; so that they can act decisively to achieve victory. This is achieved by leveraging on networks of sensors, shooters and communications to provide comprehensive awareness and self-synchronization on the battlefield. The networks also provide wells of information, which will also be translated into relevant knowledge for superior decision-making to achieve precise effects, and effectively shape the battlefield.

To understand the Singapore approach and its place in the world, Second Line of Defense discussed Singapore and the defense situation in Asia with Richard Bitzinger.  Bitzinger is a leading expert on defense issues in the Pacific, and has focused much of his recent work on the evolving PRC policies.  He teaches and works in Singapore and provides support for Singapore’s thinking about the RMA.

He is a Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

(For a good audio discussion with Bitzinger on the rise of the Chinese military from the Lowry Institute for International Policy see the following:

http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/03/21/Richard-Bitzinger-on-Chinas-military-rise.aspx).

SLD: How would you describe Singapore’s defense orientation?

Bitzinger: Singapore is non-aligned.  But it operates closely with the United States and allies in the region. They buy Western equipment, provide a leasing arrangement for the US navy to operate in Singapore and train in several allied facilities in the region.  They train for tank warfare in Australia, they train for jungle warfare in Brunei, they do infantry training in Taiwan, fighter training in the U.S. and have a working relationship for training in France.

At the same time, they have close economic and political ties with China.  A balancing act is central to Singapore’s security policies in the region.

There has been a clear shift in the past few years.  Prior to this period, the main focus of military modernization for Singapore has been upon dynamics in Southeast Asia, and preparing for threats from countries like Malaysia and Indonesia.  Now this concern is being superseded by the perceived need to deal with the military rise of China.

SLD: With regard to the modernization and development of their forces, and given their geography, it seems Singapore is shaping an extended defense and security bubble to surround themselves with an integrated naval and air force.  Is this the case?

Singapore is at the vortex of what we are calling the Strategic Quadrangle in the Pacific. They have built a modern naval and air force and are investing in its further modernization. And they are seeking to ensure that the force is well integrated and networked. Credit Image: Bigstock

Bitzinger: The defense bubble concept does make sense in describing Singapore’s approach to modernization. 

The Singaporeans see technology as their force multiplier. They have a conscript Army, and a relatively large mobilization force.  But the ability to leverage technology to bring air, sea and ground into a more effective force is crucial to their approach.

They are creating what they call a 3G Singapore Armed Forces or 3GSAF.  They are looking to shape an effective networked and integrated force with the Navy and the Air Force in the lead, with the goal of providing an intelligently informed ground force element.

SLD: It would seem then that the F-35 as a C5ISR aircraft would fit nicely into their approach?

Bitzinger: It would.  They are not in a rush because they have modern F-16s and F-15s but they are already participating in the F-35 program.

SLD: And the F-35B would seem to fit their basing needs well.

Bitzinger: It would.  The F35-B certainly gives you more flexibility when it comes to basing. 

They only have two air force bases here and additionally have roadway-focused bases.  Those are extremely difficult to use because it takes several days to get ready to use.  It would help with the dispersed basing approach favored by Singapore.

SLD: How does the Chinese military modernization effort and Chinese policy in the region shape Singapore’s and others modernization efforts?

Bitzinger: The Chinese are becoming significantly more assertive and more capable at the same time.  They are following a path of what I would call “creeping aggressiveness.” They have become very assertive about their territorial claims in the South China Sea, and their policies have gotten the attention of others in the neighborhood.

Historically, most of the modernization of the military in Southeast Asia has been about power balances in the region.  Now it is increasingly about China.

Singapore would like to see multilateral agreements in the region to reduce tensions; but the PRC has evidenced little interest in such an approach.

SLD: How important is an effective US “pivot to the Pacific?”

Bitzinger: Very.  But to date, allies in the region are disappointed about what they see as the realities of more rhetoric than reality in US policy.  But make no mistake.  The allies in the region cannot counter China by themselves, and are looking to the United States to play a key role in this effort.

A key element to understand the challenge is that the allies in the region tend to be ground-centric and have limited modernization programs in place for air and naval systems.  The real force projection parts of their military, their navies and their air forces are still rather small.  And the idea of a regionally integrated system is years away.  This means that the Chinese are in a good position to pressure, if the United States is not part of the equation.

In the last two years, the United States has been looked upon by a lot of countries in Southeast Asia as we need to have you involved; we need to have you more active in Southeast Asia than ever as a hedge against the Chinese.

SLD: You have been involved for a long time in analyses of the Revolution in Military Affairs.  It makes sense that you are in Singapore, because I think they take this effort very seriously.

Bitzinger:  They do. For Singapore, the core concept is that of Integrated Knowledge Command and Control. They see C5ISR as a core force multiplier and an ability to reach out further with their forces, rather than having stovepiped service approaches.

It is a central tenet of their approach, and they clearly at the cutting edge of thinking on this.

And they certainly appreciate the role of the USMC in the region because the USMC is the most integrated of the American forces.

It is Not Just a New Ship: It is the Launch Point for a New Era

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10/30/2012

2012-10-30 by Robbin Laird

It is not often that a new ship of the line is christened.  And when it is, thoughts of how it might be used, where it might operate and how it might make new naval history are part of the excitement.

This was clearly evident at the christening of the USS America, the fourth ship of that name, in Pascagoula, Mississippi on October 20th.

This ship is not only the lead ship in a new class but will integrate the newest aviation of the USMC-USN team aboard a single operational platform at sea.

It will operate F-35 Bravos, Ospreys and CH-53Ks in the years to come.  And the first ship will operate out of San Diego, and be part of the Pacific century.

It also is a representative of the contribution of the Gulf Coast to American military capability.  The Ingalls shipyard is the heart of USN shipbuilding, now and has been for many years.

Not far away, F-35 Bravos are being prepared for action in Eglin AFB.  And in a confluence of events, two new F-35Bs landed at Eglin – one British and one USMC – the day before the christening.

Although called an LHA, it is not.  Rather than being a Landing Helicopter Assault ship, it is flagship for 21st century operations.  And these operations will be shaped by the need to operate at greater distance, and to strike with aircraft with significantly greater capability than the aircraft they are replacing.

The Osprey and the F-35 Bravo can operate at greater distance, speed and lethality than what they are replacing.  The 360-degree aircraft – the F-35B – will provide along with its sister assets a change as big as that for which Admiral Sims and Admiral Halsey planned for with the introduction of the original aircraft carriers prior to World War II.

http://defense.aol.com/2012/07/16/what-the-cno-was-really-saying-about-the-future-force/

Indeed, this ship is the size of the US aircraft carriers operating at the end of WW II.  And as the ship’s sponsor – Lynne Pace, the wife of the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs – put it to the veterans of the last USS America – a large deck carrier:

“I know you (the crew of the former USS America) would love the name to go to an aircraft carrier, but this ship is mini-aircraft carrier.”

The ship is optimized to operate the new aviation assets.  In an exclusive interview with the ship’s captain, a Tom Selleck look alike, Captain Robert Hall, Jr., underscored the change:

We are aviation centric large deck amphibious ship designed without a well deck but operate in a fleet, which can deliver amphibious vehicles.  The ship has been designed to support this next generation of aircraft, which is larger and also we need to support greater sortie generation rates of which the F-35 is capable. The ship has been designed to have space to perform maintenance for the aircraft and to provide for extra fuel to support aviation. We will have room for much greater amount of ordinance and storage of parts as well.

The ship and its aviation capabilities will provide the joint force commander with a powerful new tool.

And for those missing the well deck, it is useful to go back to lessons learned at the big Bold Alligator 2012 exercise.  In a prelude to the USS America, the USN-USMC team operated 16 harriers off of a large deck amphib.  This is not a normal con-ops for the ship, but in anticipation of where they are going with the USS America, they exercised the option.

What did they find? 

You can launch vehicles close to shore or launch your combat aircraft, which requires launching at greater distance from the shore.  The point is clear: when you have platforms and weapons able to operate at much greater distance, that is what you want to do.  And because DOD has decided the USMC can not have the amphibious vehicles able to be launched at much greater distance, they will have to use other ships to launch such vehicles.

Although interesting in itself, the USS America is not an in itself asset.  It is part of a global process of change on several dimensions.

First, the ship is part of a broader allied effort.  Allies are building ships of similar types and purposes and various other ships, which can work well with the USS America class.  The Queen Elizabeth class and Giuseppe Garibaldi (551) will operate F-35 Bravos and are similarly sized to the America.

UK, F-35 and Strategy

Other sea based platforms such as the Australians are building or the Spanish or French operate are important as well.  The French Mistral is being looked at a platform on which the Osprey could land as well.

Second, the USS Ford is being developed synergistically with the USS America class.  According to NAVSEA officers and designers, the workflow for the USS America involving the F-35 is being discussed regularly with the Ford officers and designers.  There is a cross-fertilization going on between the two new large aircraft surface assets as significant as when Sims and Halsey rethought the battleship navy moving to the carrier navy.

Third, the C5ISR aboard the USS America and USS Ford are radically different from legacy ships.  And as the F-35 as a core F5ISR or Tron Warfare asset is deployed the synergy between shipboard C5ISR and airborne C5ISR will be radially rethought.  And this will affect as well what the Brits and Italians will do moving forward.

As the Vice-CNO Admiral Mark Ferguson, a surface warrior, underscored at the christening: “When America joins the fleet, we’ll be a stronger, more flexible, and a better Marine Corps team. We need this ship.”

An earlier version of this piece appeared on AOL Defense.

Europe’s Launch Industry at ‘Turning Point’

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10/27/2012

By Peter B. de Selding

(Excerpt from Article)

The French research minister said Oct. 26 that Europe’s launch vehicle sector is “at a turning point” and must begin investment in a next-generation rocket immediately given the changing competitive landscape.

Addressing an issue that continues to divide France and Germany less than four weeks before a meeting of European governments to decide a multiyear space budget and program direction, Genevieve Fioraso said she is confident that an agreement reconciling German and French concerns will be struck so that preliminary work on an Ariane 6 vehicle will begin in early 2013.

Fioraso said Europe’s pivot toward Ariane 6 could be accomplished without scrapping the results of a four-year program to improve the current Ariane 5 rocket with a more powerful, and reignitable, upper stage.

The Ariane 5 Midlife Evolution program, originally approved by European governments in 2008, still needs about 1.4 billion euros ($1.8 billion) to be completed and made ready for flight. It has been defended tooth and nail by the German government, which wants to preserve its industrial base and is concerned that Ariane 6 is poorly defined and may not afford that protection.

Backing the German position has been Astrium Space Transportation, the Ariane 5 prime contractor, whose industrial base in France and Germany will feel the effects of any strategic move on launchers. Astrium officials have said the Ariane 6 vehicle’s design is insufficiently thought out to start work on it, and that the Ariane 5 Midlife Evolution program would improve Ariane 5’s competitiveness.

http://www.spacenews.com/civil/121026-europe-launch-turning-point.html?utm_source=WhatCountsEmail&utm_medium=Space%20News%20This%20Week&utm_campaign=NewSNTW&_wcsid=98DE0A62C886B11CAE0405423BF22CED3CA243ACA4D86B02D8358F8B85D4419D

 

 

USAF Chief of Staff, Mark Welsh, III Visits the F-35 Factory

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10/25/2012

2012-10-25 The new USAF COS underscored the importance of the F-35 to USAF and its approach to air superiority and operations in denied air space.

The F-35 brings several core capabilities to the USAF in shaping its evolving approach to global combat presence and capability.

First, the aircraft is a low observable aircraft, which allows it to operate in contested air space with greater flexibility.

Second, the aircraft incorporates electronic attack and defense capabilities.  It is what we have called a Tron Warfare aircraft.

Third, the aircraft has significant payload for delivering evolving weapons capabilities.

Fourth, the aircraft carries integrated combat systems, which provide for a whole new generation of sensors.

And as a software upgradeable aircraft, it will evolve over time in its capacity to deploy sensors and to integrate the data of the sensors.

Fifth, the plane can be built in sufficient quantity to make a difference.  It is not a boutique aircraft.

The F-35 as a fleet for the services and the allies will create a significant strategic impact.

 

BAE Assembly Line for F-35 Key Elements

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on BAE Assembly Line for F-35 Key Elements
10/23/2012

A new state of the art production line for the F-35 fifth generation fighter jet has been switched on at BAE Systems’ Samlesbury site.

The new production line, known as the Integrated Assembly Line (IAL) has been installed in the latest phase of the new F-35 fifth generation stealthy fighter jet manufacturing facility at Samlesbury, which opened in March this year. Since the start of the programme through to 2016, BAE Systems will have invested over £150 million in F-35 buildings, infrastructure and specialist plant and machinery at its Samlesbury site.

The new IAL will use an automated overhead monorail system to ‘pulse’ sections of the rear fuselage of all three types of F-35 aircraft (Conventional, STOVL and Carrier variant) around an assembly line, building them as they go and allowing more units to be produced more efficiently than before – helping the team to ramp up production from the current level of one per week up to the required level of one per day by 2016. A similar IAL is planned for production in 2013 to support the horizontal and vertical tail assembly builds.

Chris Allam, F-35 senior vice-president for BAE Systems, commented: “Less than six months since completing the extension to this world-class facility, we’ve now got a world-class assembly line to go with it. As far as manufacturing goes, this puts us right at the top of the premier league.”

Over the past ten years BAE Systems has made significant investment in the F-35 programme, including a new titanium machining facility which opened in 2010, a new office building, the newly extended manufacturing facility and now the new production line. BAE Systems employs almost 2,000 employees on the F-35 programme.

Fifteen per cent of F-35 Lightning II work is carried out in the UK and over 130 British companies contribute to the supply chain. The programme is worth over £1 billion to UK industry each year and will support around 25,000 British jobs over the next 25 years.

http://www.aero-mag.com/news/201210/1607