Extending the Honeycomb: Transformation Re-visited

Posted on | by SysAdmin
11/10/2011

11/10/2011 By Michael Wynne

If one recalls the history of the transformation movement, it became embraced by then candidate Bush in his speech at the Citadel and then he followed through on the speech as president. The calls for a revolution in military affairs now became defense transformation.

In all of the services, the pursuit of light, lethal and flexible was leading to the design of programs like the future combat system, the littoral combat ships, and the Joint Strike Fighter. In each case, these platforms were to be a culmination of a trend toward substituting situation awareness and interoperability for mass.

But the enemy had a vote; and in both Operation Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom the policing capacity of the light, lethal, and agile forces that gave a quick and nearly painless toppling of the incumbent regimes became exhausted when long periods of territorial control became the mission.

What followed was on the job training. As the Generals reached back to our efforts in the Philippines in the late 1800’s; to the British and Israeli concepts applied in the 1900’s, two emerging constructs were counter insurgency; and counter terrorism.  Both of these concepts have as fundamental assumption of uncontested control of the seas and control of the air; allowing for streaming logistics and for the theater endless resources available to become the theater paymaster.

Though President Bush had specifically indicated many times that he had no interest in nation building, our forces found themselves in fact doing that.  In both cases, first in Iraq and then Afghanistan, the course was altered and force imposition was part of the occupation engagement.

Whether through our own decisions or those of the enemy leadership, military leadership began to swarm our forces to suppress insurgencies; while our force trainers rebuilt the nations armed force capability.  This required tenacious political and force commanders will to succeed; for which effort outcomes are still into a future fraught with uncertainty.

For American defense, however successful these will be, the turn was real; and caused senior defense officials to declare that for the foreseeable future the nation should embrace non-peer conflict as the only reality and build forces accordingly.

This view was reflected in their decision-making, resulting in generational decisions in strategic weaponry that threatens to narrow or eliminate our superiority on the sea and in the air.   Reducing the budget available will potentially pit these domains against each other in a classic you can’t have both air and naval superiority; you must choose.

Curiously, as the nation agrees on a significant drawdown in Afghanistan, what is not being examined are the implications for the next decade of the 21st century.  Clearly the structure built in the past decade is not the template, but then what is?

And for strategic defense; the basic truth is clear and not to be forgotten by those who assume global interdependence provides by itself enhanced security:

The only thing more expensive than air and naval supremacy is being second rate in either or both domains against a determined enemy.

In addition were are hearing seasoned leaders place our national debt above our national defense as a priority for our nation; this portends more than any issue of force balance; it asks more fundamentally why did we form a union?

But, in either case, it also puts the moniker ‘best bang for the buck’ in clear relief.   What is being sought and has been for multiple decades is less the recent excursion into policing and nation building than the need for force transformation to ‘provide for the common defense’ in the most efficient way possible.

How does our force structure most efficiently use all the available resources to maximize the deterrent and strike capability of each of the services?  How can we harness our own technologies to rebuild our air and sea dominance, to bring effectively our army to bear when and where necessary as deterrence fails and regime change is a required action?

This is where force transformation and the concepts of operation it mandates can once again provide a path forward.

What is this relevant concept of transformation in the decade ahead; and how does it relate to the honeycomb and the imperative of the z-axis?

(Credit: SLD)(Credit: SLD)

Transformation is about knowledge, getting a clearer picture of the disposition of the joint and allied forces; and their capacity and capability to engage and then understanding the enemy position and intent to enable countering with a measured response.

As we have used and continue to view the digital battlefield, we have learned it is not just about signals, but also about knowledge and getting your command prepared and responding. It is about re-establishing the Clausewitz look at warfare, and the Lanchester military force equations to, with knowledge, puts yourself dominantly in the right side of the casualty count.

It is being able to be strategically mobile in the offense, moving into unoccupied terrain, and engaging and fighting in the defense, where you achieve a natural force multiplier, and indirect fire. A notable example is when close air support can be effectively brought to bear.

Though historically applied to ground combat; aspects of these effects are found in air as well as sea domains; whether placed in the Mahan influence in our modern navy; or in Boyd’s influence in our modern air force; knowledge and effect on enemy strategies; and their combined effect of whole of government diplomacy is the strategic thrust.

These days, each platform can be a source of information and a user; but in fact we have the technology such that platforms can also be a node on the net and operate as the center of a cell for the deployed forces seen as a honeycomb.  Making them a node on the net, one of the crown achievements for the Aegis system, as well as the Joint Strike Fighter, and a functional element of the remnant of the future combat system makes the total network more reliable and robust and allows for distributed operations and a honeycomb like capability.

But taken as well to tactics, the honeycomb approach to maritime domain awareness, and the benefit of the z-axis to future fights in any domain are clear. Knowledge as an asset of command is clear; and therefore the getting and dissemination of that knowledge through concepts of shared situation awareness becomes a strategic imperative in all aspects of diplomacy and warfare, each famously an extension of each other.

Sight pictures must be shared.  The forces can now operate scattered or distributed.  No one person or crew owns a target anymore.  There is no front line, as that term has historically been known.  On such a battlefield, support forces can be as vulnerable as combat forces.  This shared vulnerability must be bolstered by knowledge that support is not far away, but it may not be line of sight.

Such a battlefield favors those with the most shared information, which can be acted upon in the most effective manner possible.

But only if that information can assure its users as to who and where are the good guys, and who and where are the bad guys.  Interoperability shortens the kill chain for our intentionally initially outnumbered forces and allows them to prosecute their attacks with speed and maneuver. This means inside the decision cycle of the enemy.  In spite of the low casualty rate as the engagements began, the percentage that was blue on blue remained unacceptably high. Blue on blue is the only engagement that is sure loser.  We must use the power of our information dominance to cut this percentage to zero.

Transformation is about culture as well.  It is accepting that joint tactical air controllers may well be of subordinate rank as they call for and direct with devastating effect indirect fire to claim victory.  It is recognition of the horizontal nature of the battlefield; and the reality of overwhelming force application at the point of need.

It is about joint support across command authorities; and many times allied authorities to maximize total capacity for victory.  It is about the capability to match vetted targets with appropriate shooters; such that the shooters relinquish authority of their weaponry to the combined force operations center.

A call for fire can be from any domain, air, sea, land, or space; and if there is a shooter appropriate to that target; a determined and positive response.  This is one of those concepts that ‘says easy, but does hard’ and will require culture changes, but at ‘end of day’ will be seen as a necessary and required response to the speed and totality of next generation warfare.

Transformation can be about equipment, but when the Romans decided to gather themselves into diamond-shaped formations called phalanxes, it wasn’t about the spear.  When Confederate General Jackson double-timed the troops in the Shenandoah creating the impression of a far larger force, it wasn’t about the rifles.

That isn’t to say that equipment doesn’t make a difference, it does say that there is much to be gained if the equipment is fully exploited.  The honeycomb and the exploited z-axis are meant to allow commanders to extract maximum utility from the total force made available.

(Credit: SLD)(Credit: SLD)

The real push for transformation must come from visionary leadership.  Without this push toward jointness and trust in the joint force doctrine and the interoperability sharing involves; technology has as well the ability reduce a transformed military to a platform driven entity, just as hidebound, inflexible, unimaginative, and culturally circumscribed as history would describe.

Transformation is about speed, given a return to set positions; even with pre-positioned stocks; our withdrawal from some foreign bases was even explored during Dr. Ash Carter’s recent confirmation hearing to become Deputy Secretary of Defense as an expedient means of reducing the expenditure on defense. As a nation we are returning to a basing concept that places our heavy forces here in the United States; and thus requires an expeditionary armed force.

This implies speed of deployment; but also to point of use; and they may be close at hand in terms of time and space.

Though we know very well what this entails; and we have force deployment models that can illustrate what we can muster across the spectrum of warfare and at what distance; our force structure continues to put a lesser priority on the reliability and maintainability of the equipment.

As Heinz Guderian said “Logistics is the ball and chain of armored warfare”.  We need to concentrate on the logistics footprint to minimize the time from incident to reaction in all cases.  There is presently and will be for the foreseeable future a tremendous emphasis on reducing the logistics footprint, and therefore expanding the response options.

The Joint Strike Fighter concepts of maintenance and availability between all the services and among all of the coalition of the willing will be a huge improvement for mechanical and electrical components.  The advance in stealth repair allows for battle damage repair in fleet or in bases around the globe.

Transformation is about accuracy, and correctly engineering the delivered weapons; or weaponeering for the platforms they are released from, aimed from, or defending.  The business end of each and every platform and the translation of intent from each unit commander is core to success. Though as an industry/government partnership, there is much time spent on the speed, agility and being able to dramatically reduce collateral damage, target much closer to our forces; and so there is a tremendous investment in precision munitions as well as the means of guidance and delivery.

Both in the offense and in the defense, the technology in the electronic and mechanical spectrum is offering close in and standoff systems; but all will need target geo-location; and target lock for fire and forget devices.  Swarms will require multiple engagement, and multiple kills possibly as an extension of the manned shooter; or semi automatic.

As if to underline this seriousness there is a need to define a future that assures the continued survival for the United States and allow it the full range for diplomacy and diplomatic options.

Reaching back to a strategy expressed just prior to the turn in our operations, there was an expressed need to build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge. There was a determination that, “The U.S. must and will maintain the capability to defeat any attempt by an enemy to impose its will on us, on our friends, and on our allies.”

This strategy then got specific, “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing or equaling the power of the United States.”

This philosophy of defense transformation could be reduced to a bumper sticker; it might read “NO FAIR FIGHTS.”  Something to think about as the future unfolds and we determine by our actions whether or not we shape the world or simply respond to piecemeal problems until these problems congeal into a very major one.

(This is a contribution to the Strategic Whiteboard https://sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/).

Turkey and the Kurdish Question

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Turkey and the Kurdish Question
11/07/2011
Turkey lives in the neighborhood which means that its role in Afghanistan is more constant than the Western players currently deploying force in the country. (Credit Image: Bigstock)

11/06/2011 – by Richard Weitz

A month ago, the International Crisis Group (ICG) released a report entitled, “Turkey: Ending The PKK Insurgency,” which offered sensible advice regarding how to make progress resolving Turkey’s Kurdish issue. The thrust of their recommendations was to move the struggle for Kurdish rights from the field of battle to field of parliament. They want “an end to the fighting, major legal reforms, an amnesty and Turkish Kurd acceptance to work within the legal Turkish system.” Their recommendations warrant revisiting given that some 30,00 people have already died in the almost three decades of fighting between Kurdish militants and the Turkish government and many more will do so in the future as long as the conflict persists.

Turkey's Kurdish Question Remains a Barrier to Political Reform and Progress (Credit Image: Bigstock)
Turkey's Kurdish Question Remains a Barrier to Political Reform and Progress (Credit Image: Bigstock)

The ICG authors endorsed the Democratic Opening towards the Kurds adopted by the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), which has sought to deemphasize ethnic tensions by making some concessions to Kurds as well as stressing the common Muslim identity of Turks and Kurds rather than their ethnic differences.

But the ICG wants to see the Turkish government implement its reforms more consistently and effectively. They also advocate that the authorities release imprisoned non-violent Kurdish politicians and allow even those Kurds sympathetic to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, or PKK), which is the leading anti-Ankara terrorist government, to take their elected seats in parliament.

Meanwhile, they call on both sides to avoid tit-for-tat escalatory moves and instead resume the government-PKK ceasefire declared last year—there have been many such ceasefires but they soon collapse due to lack of follow-up and other problems—as well as disarmament negotiations.

Following years of pro-reform rhetoric and open and secret talks with Kurdish nationalists

(including between the director of national intelligence and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan), the AKP-led Turkish government made a major policy reversal in 2009 and adopted a more flexible and embracing policy toward its Kurdish minority as well as the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq.

The Kurdish “opening” within Turkey saw the government give Kurds more cultural rights, including the right to use the Kurdish language in public (responding to claims of “linguistic genocide”). For example, it launched a 24-hour state-run Kurdish language television channel (TRT6, widely available through terrestrial transmission) in January 2009. Furthermore, AKP leaders apologized for past Turkish repression of Kurdish rights and pledged to address earlier wrongs.

Some Kurdish leaders hoped that, once Turks understood that Kurds simply want to achieve equal rights within a common country, more Turks would appreciate and support their concerns.

Kurdish nationalists proposed a peace plan whose components includes a ceasefire; establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with amnesty for ex-PKK fighters; deploying a multinational force to assist with the demobilization of PKK insurgents and their eventual entry into the peaceful political process; releasing PKK prisoners; enhancing Kurds’ constitutional and legal rights; and eventually the release of Öcalan from prison.

The newly declared policy of moderation initially received substantial popular support due to widespread war weariness among Turks, Kurds, and others. Turk-Kurdish violence had persisted for decades; so many individuals on both sides were willing to try to achieve a political resolution of their differences.

But Turkish nationalist parties soon began to make political gains by accusing the AKP of making too many concessions and to little effect. The AKP responded by moving more cautiously, which led to dampening enthusiasm among Kurds for the opening and renewed PKK violence. In effect, the hardliners on both sides were empowering each other.

Furthermore, impatient Kurdish activists, only some of whom defend or even sympathize the PKK and its violent methods, complain that they have seen few changes on the ground in southeast Turkey despite the progressive rhetoric they hear in Ankara.

The slow and half-hearted pace of the AKP Democratic Opening also led some Turkish Kurds to question the government’s sincerity. For example, the government’s amnesty proved very limited and conditional, with many ex-PKK and even non-violent Kurdish nationalists finding themselves re-arrested and imprisoned.

Restrictions on Kurdish political activities continue to constrain opportunities for a peaceful resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish crisis. The requirement that any political party must receive at least ten percent in a general parliamentary election to gain seats in the national legislature is twice as high a hurdle as that in most European countries that proportional representation voting systems. Kurdish nationalists often must run as independents candidates, which deny them access to public television and radio political protests or votes from Turkey’s large diaspora, whose members must vote for one of the parties on the ballot.

And when Kurdish nationalists have sought to establish political parties to campaign legally in elections, as they have done on half a dozen occasions since 1990, the authorities have employed various legal means to prevent them.

For example, in December 2009, Turkey’s Constitutional Court banned the Kurdish nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP). Such bans result in the government’s seizing the parties’ assets and forbidding its leaders from engaging in political activities for a set time period.

Since its establishment in 2005, DTP representatives had met with Erdogan to discuss how to develop and implement the Democratic Opening. The new Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP, Peace and Democracy Party), whose members ran as “independents’ in the 2011 national elections and then formed as a 36-member party bloc in the parliament, continues to suffer from official harassment and some of its members have been denied their seats in parliament because they were in pre-trial detention, leading all BDP deputies to boycott parliamentary sessions.

Their boycott has had the unfortunate effect of denying Kurds an important means for directly influencing the drafting of the new Turkish constitution presently under consideration.

AKP leaders blame the Kurdish nationalists for making an ostentatious show of their new freedoms and exploiting amnesty and other concessions for media events designed to enhance heir public relations. They also accuse the PKK of seeking to reorganize within Turkey under another name—specifically the new PKK-organized Kurdish network known as the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (Koma Ciwakên Kürdistan, KCK)—and using the KCK to repress all Kurdish political activity and community activism not endorsed by the PKK.

The Turkish government has responded by arresting KCK leaders and suppress the organization’s activities. Meanwhile, AKP leaders adopted a more nationalist stance and rhetoric ahead of the June 2011 general elections. The AKP dropped Kurdish nationalists from its lists of candidates and toned down its endorsement of Kurdish community rights.

At present, Kurdish and foreign attention focuses on the AKP plans to rewrite the Turkish constitution. The current draft, written in 1982 during a period of military rule, defines a very centralized, mono-lingual, and mono-ethnic authoritarian political structure. For example, the constitution defines anyone born in Turkey as a Turkish national, thereby excluding the Kurdish identity as a permissible legal category. Article 42, moreover, prohibits the “teaching of any language other than Turkish as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens.”

The AKP has managed through legislation to relax how many of these clauses are applied in practice, but Kurdish activists want their freedoms guaranteed in writing in a new constitution. They note, for instance, that while the main Kurdish languages spoken in Turkey, Kurmancî and Zazaki, are no longer comprehensively banned, various legal restrictions continue to limit their use in public and commercial affairs.

In addition, there is still no government-approved primary or secondary education in Kurdish in Turkey. The authorities have even prevented Kurdish communities from using street signs written in both Kurdish and Turkish, claiming they violate the current national constitution (Article 3 states that, “The Turkish state … language is Turkish”). In other cases, conservative administrators and courts have thwarted the application of AKP reforms by citing constitutional provisions to prevent their application within their areas of jurisdiction.

Kurdish nationalists demand the right to define themselves as Kurds living in “Kurdistan”, use their language without impediment, including in public schools, and exercise other cultural and political rights within an officially multinational Turkish state. AKP leaders face conflicting pressures regarding how much legal freedom to provide its Kurdish “minority,” with even the use of that word highly contested among Turkish leaders who have insisted that Kurds are “Mountain Turks” who enjoy the same rights as other Turks.

AKP officials have also become distracted by seeking through the new constitution to transform Turkey into a presidential system, which would allow Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan to remain in power even as he switches offices.

In trying to transform the Kurdish issue from a security into a political question, the AKP also hoped to further its campaign to weaken the influence of the military within Turkey. In the past, Turkish officers had cited the military’s domestic national security role to justify deposing civilian governments and assuming political authority themselves. Decreasing the threat of PKK terrorism would therefore reduce one pretext the military has used to influence the Turkish political system.

Furthermore, the question of Kurdish rights often comes up in discourses on Turkey’s suitability to become a full member of the European Union (EU) or to serve as a model political system for the newly emerging democracies in the Middle East and Asia. AKP leaders have skillfully used Turkey’s drive to join the EU, which they publicly support,  as a means to transform Turkish society in more democratic directions, such as by constraining the power of the military. Especially since the onset of the current Arab Spring, AKP leaders have promoted Turkey as a model democracy worthy of emulation by reformers in the Middle East and Central Asia.

Yet, domestic and foreign critics label Erdogan and other AKP leaders hypocrites for attacking other countries for repressing Muslim rights while conducting similarly repressive policies against their Kurdish minority. For example, they have excluded granting Kurdish localities community rights that they have advocated for Turkish Cypriots in talks with the EU and others regarding Cypriot reunification.

Resolving Turkeys the Kurdish problem could help overcome these objections, though the continued violence and suppression of Kurdish political activism demonstrates that progress remains halting at best. Although the EU 2011 Progress Report on Turkey’s accession process, released in October 2011, sees mixed progress toward establishing Kurdish rights or meeting the other criteria for Turkey’s membership in the European Union, EU governments now wholeheartedly oppose the PKK and, unlike in the past, are actively trying to suppress its finances.

One interesting issue that emerged from our discussions in Turkey during our visit in October was how the governor and mayor divided their governance roles in the provinces. The governor is the senior official but he is appointed to office by the central government. Some of his responsibilities include maintaining law and order, health care, and executing other central government policies in the province.

Meanwhile, the mayor is elected by the city residents. Some of his responsibilities include city planning, water, environment, and local transportation. Turks’ growing wealth had enabled them to buy more private vehicles, requiring extensive road building to reduce the resulting traffic jams. One of the issues the Turks are considering as they draft their new constitution is whether to make the governors elected officials or to expand somewhat the power of the elected mayors. The ruling AKP considers it unfair that, at the local government level, the appointed official outranks the elected one. Increasing the power of elected representatives would also provide a means to give Turkey’s Kurds and other minority’s greater opportunities for self-government.

In considering its strategy towards the Kurdish problem, Turkish authorities would do well to consider how they revised their approach to Iraqi Kurdistan after 2008. By reaching out to local leaders, developing commercial as well as other contacts, and accepting the right of Kurds to exercise local self-government through the Kurdish Regional Government, the Turks empowered a group of stakeholders who now defend Turkish interests in a region traditionally known for Turkish-Kurdish tension.

Such an approach towards Turkey’s own Kurdish minority could go far toward achieving a similar reconciliation in an even more vital area for Turkey’s future.

Return of the Russian Aircraft Carrier?

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Return of the Russian Aircraft Carrier?

11/06/2011 – by Richard Weitz

The Russian media is now reporting that the Russian Navy leadership has recommended building two aircraft carrier battle groups by 2027.

One would serve in the Northern Fleet (for deployment primarily in the Atlantic Ocean) and one with the Pacific Fleet. Navy leaders considered but rejected the argument that Russia could perhaps get by with a mixture of advanced surface and submarine ships alone.

Instead, they endorsed the so-called “American model” of having a carrier task force, which in addition to the carrier itself would include about 15 auxiliary escort ships such as cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, landing craft, multi-purpose submarines, and icebreakers for deployment on Arctic cruises.

The Navy is now finalizing the technical requirements for the new carrier, though it has already been decided that the ship will be nuclear powered. The Navy will then examine competing designs for the next carrier and make a decision on that issue by 2017. The goal would be to launch the first carrier by 2023.

The Navy also plans to build new maintenance facilities for the carriers that hopefully will avoid the problem that plagued the Soviet carrier fleet, which was not adequately sheltered from the elements, as well as a simulator for landing planes on a carrier at Yeisk in the Krasnodar region. This new Yeisk facility would supplement the Nitka Naval Pilot Training Center in the Crimea, which Russia rents from Ukraine and has offered to upgrade.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are now considering the Navy chiefs’ recommendation. It should be recalled that Russian leaders have made such a recommendation many times before, including quite recently, but then a lack of money and other barriers derailed these visions. In July 2008, the commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, stated that the Navy intended to form five or six aircraft carrier task forces, to be deployed with the Northern and Pacific fleets. Later that year, President Medvedev also has said that Russia intended to build aircraft carriers as part of its general naval rearmament program. But the Russian Navy then had to back track and later announce that Russian would not have a new carrier for at least another decade.

The most important indicator that Russia has again become a global sea power would be if the Russian government acquired a genuine aircraft carrier fleet. The 2011-2020 Russian State Armament Program (SAP, or Gosudarstvennaya Programma Vooruzheniya, GPV, in Russian) commits to funding the repair and upgrading of Russia’s single Project 11435 Admiral Kuznetsov ship. Even the Russian Navy terms this vessel a “heavy aircraft carrying cruiser” rather than a real aircraft carrier because its air component has limited functionality. In the past, the ship has had as few as eight Su-33 aircraft. These can combat other planes and attack surface ships and submarines, but the small number of planes leaves them vulnerable to counterattack. In addition, the Kuznetsov uses diesel-electric power, which limits its time at sea.

Kuznetsov under way. (Credit: http://www.red-stars.org/spip.php?article229)
Kuznetsov under way. (Credit: http://www.red-stars.org/spip.php?article229)

The Kuznetsov has seen little action. It has repeatedly gone out-of-service since joining the Northern Fleet in January 1991. The ship has undergone at least three major repairs during the past six years.

Since the Kuznetsov was constructed in the late 1980s, it could remain operational until the 2030s if continuously modernized and maintained. According to some experts, the planned upgrades under the latest SAP are so extensive—a new propulsion system as well as new aircraft, armaments, and electronics—that they might produce an entirely new and improved ship. For example, the ship could be capable of carrying a mixture of as many as 26 Su-33 and yet to be produced Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29K Fulcrum-D multi-role fighter aircraft and possible a naval version of Russia’s first fifth-generation stealth airplane, the Sukhoi T-50 PAK FA (Future Frontline Aircraft System) fighter.

Another recent development was the Russian decision to begin restoring three decommissioned nuclear-powered Kirov class missile cruisers to bring them back into operational service. The Admiral Nakhimov, Admiral Lazarev and Admiral Ushakov nuclear missile cruisers have been in dry dock for more than a decade. The Russian defense industry would repair their hulls and nuclear power plants as well as upgrade their electronics and weapons.

The new armaments would include as many as 300 missiles of different types. They would have advanced multi-module missile systems that can launch a variety of missiles and torpedoes, including P-800 Yakhont (SS-N-26) anti-ship cruise missiles. The defensive systems would include new point defenses as well as an advanced air defense missile systems based on Russia’s newest land-based surface-to-air missile, the S-400 Triumf.

The goal would be to bring the first renewed Kirov class missile cruiser back by 2015 and maintain all three cruisers in service until the 2030s. Although work on restoring the Admiral Nakhimov has begun, skeptics do not consider it cost effective to restore the other two ships, which are in worst condition than the Nakhimov.

The government is also modernizing Russia’s single existing Kirov class Project 11442 heavy nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser, the Peter the Great, which was commissioned in 1998. It has a speed of up to 31 knots (almost 57 km/h) and a displacement of between 24,000 and 26,000 tons. The ship is slightly over 250 meters in length and more than 700 sailors in its crew. It has 20 SS-N-19 Shipwreck missiles for use against large surface targets and 12 SA-NX-20 Gargoyle launchers with 96 missiles and 2 SA-N-4 Gecko with 44 missiles for air defense.

Peter the Great nuclear powered cruiser (Credit: http://rt.com/news/russian-navy-set-for-us-backyard-exercise/)Peter the Great nuclear powered cruiser (Credit: http://rt.com/news/russian-navy-set-for-us-backyard-exercise/)

The Peter the Great is the only nuclear-powered surface ship currently in active service with the Russian Navy and serves as the flagship of the Northern Fleet. The Russian Navy often sends its sole Kirov cruiser on lengthy deployments to show the flag throughout the world. Any newly restored Kirov cruisers would probably join it.

The Russian Navy already possesses three Slava-class cruisers. They are surface strike ships with an anti-aircraft and ASW capability. Their 16 P-500 Bazalt  (NATO designation SS-N-12 Sandbox) cruise missiles, which can carry nuclear or conventional warheads some 300 nautical miles, are designed to attack enemy carrier task forces (hence their nickname as “carrier killers”). The ships are also armed with 64 SA-N-6 Grumble long-range surface-to-air missiles and 40 SA-N-4 Gecko short-range surface-to-air missiles.

The Slava-class cruisers were commissioned in the 1980s and are likely to remain in service for several more decades if properly maintained and upgraded. Russia is also collaborating with Ukraine to complete construction of the Admiral Lobov (or Ukraina) Slava-class cruiser, which needs new weapons systems and equipment.

These cruisers will be supported by Russia’s remaining Udaloy class destroyers, which have been in very active use on overseas counter-piracy missions and well as in joint exercises with foreign navies.

The Navy will probably retire its Kashin and Sovremennyi class destroyers within a few years. The Kashin class guided missile destroyers were built in the 1960s and modernized in the 1990s. They have SS-N-25 Switchblade and Harpoonski short-range surface-to-surface cruise missiles and MNK-300 sonar. The Russian Navy does plan to begin constructing a new 10,000-ton destroyer in 2012. Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy. Commander in Chief of the Russian Navy, said that the Navy expects the first of the new destroyers to be completed by 2016 and that this ship class might be nuclear powered. The new destroyer would probably have extensive stealth technology as well as carry a variety of cruise missiles and a couple of navy helicopters.

Projected new class of Russian frigates (Credit: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiral_Sergey_Gorshkov_class_frigate)
Projected new class of Russian frigates (Credit: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Admiral_Sergey_Gorshkov_class_frigate)

The fleet will also have its new class of multifunctional Project 22350 Admiral Gorshkov class frigates. Their modular construction will enable them to conduct escort, patrol, counter-piracy and of other missions with their anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-air weapons, which include a helicopter.

 

Construction delays with these ships has resulted in the Russian Navy’s ordering several Krivak IV class frigates, which were originally intended for export. The ships have a 100-mm gun, a Shtil medium-range air defense system, Club-N supersonic anti-ship missiles, two Kashtan point defense systems, two twin 533-mm torpedo launchers, and an anti-submarine warfare helicopter. The Krivak IV class frigates will be assigned to the Black Sea Fleet.

It will be challenging for the Russian Navy to realize all of these plans without significant investments.  In particular, it remains unclear if Russia’s defense industry could soon construct such a large and complex weapons system as a modern aircraft carrier and its associated warplanes.

Russia does not presently have a dry dock large enough to build aircraft carriers; the Kuznetsov and earlier Soviet aircraft carriers were constructed in Ukraine during the 1980s, when that republic’s defense industries were embedded in the integrated Soviet military-industrial complex.

The Russian Navy considers it too expensive to build a new shipyard designed specifically to assemble aircraft carriers. Instead, the most recent proposal is to construct a carrier in pieces at different shipyards and then combine the modules at a single assembly point, the “Sevmash” shipyard. Located in the northern Russian city of Severodvinsk, Sevmash is Russia’s biggest shipyard and has experience constructing warships powered with nuclear engines.

Furthermore, even during the period of the integrated Soviet military industrial complex, the Soviet Union had difficulties building carrier ships whose equipment and accompanying aircraft matched the capabilities of NATO carriers. Now Russia’s military-industrial complex regularly struggles with massive production delays and cost overruns when trying to renovate complex ships such as the Admiral Gorshkov.

This former Soviet Kiev class aircraft carrier, built in 1978, had been berthed at the Sevmash shipyard for the past dozen years while the Russian government determined what to do with a vessel it lacked funds to modernize on its own. Under the terms of a 2004 contract, the Indian Navy bought the carrier for $1.5 billion—technically receiving the hull almost for free (priced as scrap metal) on condition that India pay for the ship’s modernization at Sevmash.

The Sevmash shipyard proved unable to meet the terms of the original contract, which stipulated delivery in 2008 at a cost of $750 million. The original contract terms were unrealistic in light of the difficulty of the task and the underfinanced state of the Russian shipbuilding industry, which had been starved for funds during the Yeltsin and early Putin period. Russian and Indian representatives have subsequently engaged in contentious negotiations regarding the time and money needed to refit and modernize the 44,570-ton carrier. In 2010, they signed a new $2.3 billion deal for delivery of the ship to India in December 2012.

The evolving global market might give the Russian and opportunity to mesh their own plans with those of foreign partners.  There is significant money available in third markets up for competition among European, Russian and US providers, and the US has eschewed the global ship export market, except for the LCS.

US Forces in Iraq Drawdown

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11/04/2011

11/4/2011 US Forces turn in equipment in support of drawdown: COS ECHO, Iraq

[slidepress gallery=’us-forces-turn-in-equipment-in-support-of-drawdown’]

Credit: 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division:10/28/2011

  • In the first photo, vehicles from 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, stage for the Mobile-Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yard, Oct. 16, 2011
  • In the second photo, an M109A6 Paladin from the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division gets a wash before staging for the Mobile-Redistribution Property Assistance Team Yard.

Some may wonder, “What is a Mobile-RPAT Yard?”

The answer is best described by the Dragon Maintenance officer in charge of the M-RPAT operations, Capt. Robert Kelly.

“The Mobile-RPAT Yard is an area on the base where units take their equipment that they are ready to have inspected and cleared for turn-in so that U.S. forces can leave Iraq upon the accomplishment of their mission,” explains Kelly. “The first week of M-RPAT is dedicated to consolidating vehicles and equipment to either be sent to another theater of operations, to be used for theater reserve or to be sent back to the United States,” Kelly continued. “The second week is focused on vehicles that must undergo the Army reset program.”

“In accordance with the deadline of Dec. 31, as stated in the Security Agreement, U.S. forces are drawing down and will leave Iraq.” Maj. J.D. Williams, the battalion executive officer echoed.

“Here, at COS Echo, we have years of rolling stock and non-rolling stock items that have been the difference maker in achieving mission success for the opportunity to rapidly get these key platforms and technologies to soldiers still in the fight in Afghanistan or back to the United States for upgrades and refit.” The M-RPAT operation utilizes the efforts of an average of 25 soldiers and civilians a day, all working together to prepare over 200 vehicles and 1,400 other pieces of equipment for turn-in. 

“The soldiers and civilians have done an outstanding job staging the vehicles in an organized manner,” Kelly said praising the hard work put into this operation. “We really appreciate the help we have received from KBR and other units on the COS.”

Turning equipment into M-RPAT requires a lot of elbow grease from soldiers to prepare the equipment for turn-in.

“We definitely had a few vehicles that got turned away after the initial inspection, however, my soldiers worked hard to get all vehicles and equipment to standard so that we could achieve success here,” 1st Lt. Andrew Gaffield, the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery executive officer, said about the difficulty of the turn-in process.

The M-RPAT helps the Army by accounting for the millions of dollars worth of equipment poured into the Iraqi theater and gaining efficiencies in the Army’s reset process that units go through upon redeployment.

“Identifying equipment to send to reset gives the Army a head start on refitting that equipment so that soldiers can train in garrison with fully operational and updated equipment,” said Sgt. 1st Class Jackson, the Dragon Supply non-commissioned officer in charge.

Turkey, Rising Powers, and UN Reform

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10/31/2011
Turks favor UN reform and the need to recognize a new power structure. (Credit Image: Bigstock)

10/31/2011 – by Richard Weitz

October 24,

UN Day, was not marked with joyous celebrations in Turkey. The Turks we met on our trip earlier this month universally share the general critique common in many of the emerging powers — that the United Nations is unrepresentative and, in reflecting the power balances of 1945, do not give adequate weight to Turkey, Brazil, India, South Africa, and the other rising powers. These themes were present in a speech Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, made during our stay, but were also made by many of the foreign policy experts we encountered during our week-long trip.

Turks favor UN reform and the need to recognize a new power structure. (Credit Image: Bigstock)
Turks favor UN reform and the need to recognize a new power structure. (Credit Image: Bigstock)

Turkey served a two-year rotational term on the UN Security Council (UNSC) from 2009-2010, but, lacking the power to veto resolutions like the five permanent members (P-5), found itself unable to block the imposition of sanctions on Iran. More recently, Erdogan has attacked the P-5 for blocking efforts to force Israel to relinquish its nuclear weapons or impose sanctions on the Syrian government for its egregious behavior.

Many Turks believe that the P5 should lose their right to permanent membership on the Council and should not have the exclusive right to veto resolutions. In the words of the Turkish government:

Turkey believes that a comprehensive reform of the UN system cannot be complete without a reform of the Security Council. In order to ensure that the Council`s membership better reflects contemporary international realities; a more democratic representation of Member States must ensue within the Council. In this regard, Turkey does not find absolutely necessary to increase the number of permanent members. For, the concept of permanent membership falls contrary to the principle of sovereign equality, the very foundation upon which the United Nations is built.

But membership expansion invariably raises related questions. The main issues of debate are how many additional countries should receive representation on the Council; which ones should they be; what categories of membership should exist (and specifically whether any states should receive permanent membership with veto power); what should the precise scope of the veto power; and what should be the relationship between the Security Council and the other UN organs, especially the General Assembly.

The most popular and the oldest reform theme is to further increase the number of Security Council members, especially from developing regions that are geographically underrepresented among the current members. These calls have become newly prominent in recent years, including during the UN’s own reform debates.

But no consensus has ever been reached as to the size of expansion. Members also differed in their emphasis regarding whether UNSC seats should be distributed based on states’ contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, the principle of equitable geographic distribution, the population size of the proposed members, the size of their economies, their troop and financial contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, or whether the appropriate metric should be their future rather than current potential.

Moreover, any specific proposed new addition to the Council, especially to roster of permanent members, galvanizes resistance among their regional rivals.  For example, Chinese officials have privately told their U.S. counterparts of their reluctance to expand the Council further, which means opposing the aspirations of Japan and India.  This kind of rivalry exists even among EU members, with Italy earlier seeking to deny Germany’s becoming another permanent UNSC member from the EU.

Adding new members might address some representational and other problems with the Security Council, but it would not be a cost-free reform. The addition of new members would increase the number of negotiating parties, which may be democratic but is detrimental to rapid decision-making, a useful attribute when responding to international security emergencies. Conversely, if new members were given permanent status with veto powers, the risks of deadlock would increase.

One proposal to avert this last problem, and a constant reform item in its own right, is to curtail the use and extent of the veto, or even eliminate it altogether. Abrogating the right of veto has been defended on the grounds of efficiency since it could accelerate decision-making by removing a common bottleneck on rapid decisions. Eliminating the veto is also seen as promoting democracy among UN members by removing an inequitable status distinction among members.

The veto power enjoyed by the UNSC permanent members operates in several dimensions. As a “preventive veto,” it precludes any legal enforcement action against one of the permanent members. As a “protective veto,” it enables permanent member to protect themselves and their allies and friends against adverse Council action.  As a “hidden” veto, it can prevent other UNSC members from even attempting to secure some action because they anticipate that one of the permanent members will veto their proposal.

The reason the veto arose was to address a fundamental problem that undermined the League of Nations, the precursor to the UN. To prevent a repeat of the 1930s, the UN’s architects structured the UNSC so that the organization would not engage in self-destructive battles with its most powerful members. In this sense, the veto functions as a “safety fuse” to prevent the UN’s self-destruction. The logic here is that the United States, Russia, and other great powers will pursue their vital interests no matter how the other UN members vote, so a mechanism is needed to prevent situations from arising that could undermine the UN by forcing a great power to defy it.

The five existing permanent UNSC members defend their veto powers as an integral component of the UN Charter and as giving them a vested interest in engaging with the Council and the UN.  And, having that veto power, they are well positioned to resist any proposal that might weaken it. Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter requires the consent of all permanent members to amend the Charter, which would be necessary to deprive one or more of them of their permanent seats and veto rights.

To avoid having to amend the Charter, proposals have arisen to modify the use of the veto rather than abolish it or encourage the permanent members to make a collective commitment not to use to it, or even phase it out in the future.  One suggestion is to forbid individual permanent members from exercising a veto when all other Council members back the decision. A related idea is to change the veto weight by requiring two or three permanent members to vote negatively to secure the rejection of a draft resolution. Another proposal for a change is to limit the total number of negative votes that a permanent member may cast within a specified time period.  Yet another proposal is to limit veto rights for decisions regarding wars and humanitarian crises when “their vital interests are not involved.”

Such subjective criteria are hard to enforce. To take one example, a permanent member, by definition a great power with global interests and responsibilities, might define its interests differently from the rest of the international community.

Another approach to Security Council reform is to change the body’s methods of work. The Security Council has been criticized for its opaque deliberations and negotiating process.  Most Council activities take place in “consultations,” which are closed-door meetings among UNSC members that non-member states are not permitted to attend.

Advocates of greater transparency claim its would increasing the clarity of discussions, broaden the range of views considered, and promote the values of accountability and efficiently.  Supporters of keeping most consultations secret argue that they facilitate decision making and speculate that, if the consultations were made open, then the discussions of sensitive matters would simply occur in more informal and secretive venues.  And thus far this has largely been what has occurred.

Another reform proposal to the Council’s working methods is to create a secretarial for the UNSC’s rotating non-permanent members to provide them with “institutional memory” and acquaint them with what previous non-permanent members have been doing, as well as with the dealings of the Security Council as a whole.  Such a reform could make Security Council deliberations and decisions more informed, but could also deepen divisions between the permanent and non-permanent members.

Although Turkey’s concerns are genuine and widely shared, the Security Council, and the UN in general, seems largely incorrigible. And for this reason, new organizations have arisen to fill the gap. These include the G8, which also is seen as unrepresentative, but also the G20, which does give Turkey, China, India, and other emerging powers an important role in world politics commensurate with their status.

And some of our Turkish interlocutors explicitly described Turkey’s role as to serve as a voice on the G20 and similar organizations for its allies in Central Asia and elsewhere who remain outside of what still essentially remain, for reasons of effectiveness, as exclusive clubs with membership limited to those states that can most effectively act in any given area.

Pacific Strategy XV: Basing the Honeycomb

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10/28/2011

10/27/2011 – A key element of understanding a scalable presence strategy is basing.  Basing of the force in the Pacific is a function of several key capabilities:

  • Sebasing;
  • Partners and Allies Connected Capabilities;
  • The F-35 and Re-crafting Land Basing

Presence is rooted in basing; scalability is inherently doable because of C4ISR enablement, deployed decision-making and honeycomb robustness.

We will address the central role of re-crafting the weapons enterprise as a key enabler of the honeycomb and its capabilities in the next piece.

The Seabase

The seabase is a core presence asset in the Pacific.  What they can carry to the fight and how connected they are to other assets to shape a scalable impact define the impact of deployed ships and sub-surface elements.  We have seen in the Libyan operation a good reminder or harbinger of things to come.

In a piece on AOL Defense the impact of the seabase was highlighted in some detail.

What the ARG ended up doing was re-shaping the next phase of operational history. The recently departed Secretary of Defense confused amphibious with Inchon, whereas the ARG really is a seabase from which one can conduct a variety of operations across the spectrum of warfare.

The ARG is in the throes of fundamental change, with new ships and new planes providing new capabilities. These new capabilities are nicely congruent with the Libyan operational experiences. Given the Marines battle hymn, it seems that “off the shores of Tripoli” can have a whole new meaning for the evolution of the US force structure.

The ARG was used in several unprecedented ways in the Libyan operation. First, the V-22 Osprey was a key element of changing how U.S. forces operated. The Osprey provided a logistical linchpin, which allowed the ARG to stay on station, and allowed the Harriers to generate greater sortie generation rates and ops tempo. The use of the Osprey in the operation underscored the game changing possibilities of the ARG in littoral operations of the future.

Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) executes a column maneuver. (Credit: US Naval Forces Europe, 6th Fleet Public Affairs 9/10/10)Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) executes a column maneuver. (Credit: US Naval Forces Europe, 6th Fleet Public Affairs 9/10/10)

For the Marine Expeditionary Unit, the combat elements might be on the ship, might be ashore, or might be in transit. The challenge for the MEU commander is to be able to concentrate force on the task at hand. Prior to the Libyan operations, Col. Dessens, the 26th MEU commander, faced the challenge of assembling his capability to fight the battle and then to be able to flexibly change the mix of forces at sea. What this meant was that some of his Ospreys were in Afghanistan, and not on his ARG ships.

The key point here is that the sea base, which in effect the ARG is, can provide a very flexible strike package. Given their proximity to shore, the Harriers could operate with significant sortie rates against enemy forces. Not only could the Harriers come and go rapidly, but the information they obtained with their Litening pods could be delivered to the ship and be processed and used to inform the next strike package. Commanders did not need a long C2 or C4ISR chain to inform combat. This meant that the ground forces of Gadaffi would not have moved far from the last positions Harriers noted before the new Harriers moved into attack positions. This combination of compressed C4ISR and sortie rates created a deadly combination for enemy forces and underscored that using sea bases in a compressed strike package had clear advantages over land-based aircraft several hours from the fight dependent on C4ISR coming from hundreds or even thousands of miles away.

One more point about the ARG’s operations. The Osprey and the Harrier worked closely together to enhance combat capabilities. One aspect of this was the ability of the Osprey to bring parts and support elements to the Harriers. Instead of waiting for ships to bring parts, or for much slower legacy rotorcraft to fly them out, the 300-mph Osprey could bring parts from land bases to keep the ops temp up of the Harriers.

The well known pilot rescue mission certainly highlighted how a vertically-launched aircraft working with the Osprey off of the ARG can create new capabilities. The elapsed time of authorization to the recovery of the pilot and his return to the USS Kearsarge was 43 minutes.

This rescue took place even though the US Air Force had a rescue helo aboard the USS Ponce. In my view, having discussed this with the relevant personnel, it was not used for two reasons. It would have gotten to the pilot much later than an Osprey team and the command and control would have been much slower than what the Marines could deliver. The key to the Marines’ C2 was that the pilots of the Ospreys and Harriers planned the operation together in the ready room of the USS Kearsarge. They did not meet in virtual space. They exchanged information in real time and were in the same room. They could look at the briefing materials together. The Harriers were informed by fresh intelligence ABOARD the USS Kearsarge. The sea base brought together the assets and intelligence to execute the mission.

If we look at the French experience several Libyan lessons can be highlighted. First, the centrality of leveraging multiple bases in a littoral operation is significant. The French used several land bases and incorporated the sea base – whether the carrier or their amphibious ships – to work with land-based aircraft. The U.S. Marines used their land base largely to supply the sea-based air ops via Ospreys. Second, having the C4ISR forward-deployed with the pilot as the key decision maker is crucial to mission success.

The classic Air Force CAOC system was challenged by what the Marines demonstrated in the operation; the French experience reinforces that lesson. In a recent story from London on AOL Defense, the point was made that some French pilots felt the release authority from Predator information was too slow. The interpretation was unhappiness with the US, but I would argue that it is more the case that the information in a fluid and dynamic situation must be provided in a more timely fashion than a system built for 1991 air operations permits. Third, new air capabilities make a significant difference. For the Marines, the Osprey was the game changer in this operation. For the French, it was the new recce pods off of the Rafales. Fourth, the dynamic targeting problem discussed in the first article was also highlighted by the USMC experience. Getting accurate information from the ground is central to operations.

The USN-USMC team has a number of new capabilities being deployed or acquired which will enhance their ability to do such operations. The F-35B will give the Marines an integrated electronic warfare and C4ISR capability. The new LPDs have significant command and control capabilities. The new LCS could provide — along with the Osprey — significant combat insertion capability for ground forces and rapid withdrawal capability.

For the French, UAVs could become wingmen for the Rafaels. Also, the role of C2 capabilities of the new amphibious ships were underscored as well. Fifth, the pick-up quality of this operation may become more a norm than an aberration in the future. The old paradigm of days or weeks of significant planning and then roll out of a fleet of C4ISR aircraft and other capabilities may be challenged.

Deploying air assets that can be tapped by the sea base to shape an operation may become a key requirement for future battles on the littoral. As with any operation, each one’s characteristics are unique and thus not predetermined. What the Marines and the French forces have demonstrated is that 2011 certainly is not Iraq 1991 or Bosnia 1996. (http://defense.aol.com/2011/10/06/marine-libya-lessons-short-command-control-links-stovl-flexibi/)

Partners and Allied Capabilities

The reach from Japan to South Korea to Singapore to Australia is about how allies are re-shaping their forces and working towards greater reach and capabilities.  At the hear of such an effort will be adding the F-35s with Aegis to shape allied “capability bubbles” which can link effectively with deployed U.S. forces.  Shaping Aegis-F35 consortia able to cover the Pacific needs to be understood as a core strategic effort by the United States.

We have often argued that the F-35 is less about a plane than crucial capabilities for power projection and coalition interoperability.  No greater demonstration of this can be seen in the Pacific whereby the capacity to conjoin capabilities across the vast expanse of the Pacific is crucial to the entire set of players in the Pacific.

(For a discussion of how such an interaction works among the Arctic partners see https://www.sldinfo.com/emerging-strategic-challenges-the-case-of-arctic-co-opetition/).

Japanese Aegis flight test. (Credit: US Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 12/18/07)
Japanese Aegis flight test. (Credit: US Naval Forces Central Command Public Affairs, 12/18/07)

And the intersection between Aegis and the F-35 can provide for dynamic defense in support of forward presence and offensive operations. Missile defense is a global effort. It requires the global deployment of U.S. forces and the capability to connect those forces with those of its allies.

Joint and coalition concepts of operations are being shaped to ensure decision makers with the options of providing defense for allied deployed forces and the homelands of the U.S. and allies. As a global enterprise, missile defense will always be a work in progress ensuring that evolutions in sensor technologies are joined with defensive missiles in a joint and combined command and control system.

A key example of how multiple basing in the F-35 age can work will be seen with South Korea.  South Korea is defending itself against North Korea.  This means that it has defensive systems against missiles and a good Army capability,.  Now fast forward to the F-35 era.  Now the South Koreans follow the lead of the USAF in introducing As into the inventory.  Now defense and offense become transformed into strategic mobility.  And instead of investing in in place defensive systems able to do NOTHING but wait for an invasion, now the South Koreans have flexible forces which can operate to defend their country, participate in regional defense and to provide a global reserve capability.

And add the F-35Bs to the South Korean military and now you have significant capability to disperse force, complicate any North Korean attack AND this can be added to the mobile Naval force which the South Koreans are rolling out.  They can land on the Aegis or they can build an American class amphibious ship to add to their evolving capability.  The South Koreans know how to build ships and the US can see a significant growth in capability as the South Koreans build ships and participate in the world wide deployments of the F-35As and Bs.

As Defense News has noted: The KDX-III ship, armed with the up-to-date Aegis air warfare defense system, is the core of the Navy’s future “strategic mobile squadrons” consisting of 14,000-ton Dokdo-class landing platform vessels, 4,300-ton KDX-II Gwanggaeto the Great-class destroyers, 1,800-ton Type 214 submarines and other support vessels and anti-submarine Lynx helicopters, Navy officials said.

The modernized squadrons will enable South Korea to conduct blue-water operations both independently and jointly with its allies for purposes such as securing sea lanes for energy supplies, peacekeeping and control of maritime disputes with neighboring countries, they said.

The Navy plans to create a mobile squadron in 2010 and wants at least two more with the commissioning of additional Aegis destroyers, they said.

http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3821769

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/drs-wins-multiplexing-contract-for-korean-aegis-destroyers-0431/

Now the deterrence of the PRC is enhanced as well because the mobility of operations FROM South Korea complicates PRC thinking.  There is NO SINGLE LINE of attack on US Forces.  If you target Guam, you have multiple bases from the sea and from land whereby the 360 degree enabled F-35s coupled with Aegis and other systems can provide an impossible situation to guarantee success with a large area single strike.

The U.S. Navy’s Aegis program is an important contributor to shaping the foundation for such a global system. Through initially foreign military sales programs in Japan and eventually cooperative commercial defense programs, Aegis has become part of the allied fleet. Today five allied navies have purchased or deployed the Aegis combat system: Japan, Spain, Norway, the Republic of Korea and Australia.

An additional collaborative aspect of the Aegis program has been the central role of Spain and its industry in introducing a frigate-sized Aegis ship to the world’s fleets. The Spanish frigate series, in turn, has shaped Norwegian and Australian options. Aegis has truly become a global enterprise.

While not all of these ships are tested to be BMD capable, the sensors on the Aegis system of all of these navies can play a role in a global sensor grid important to shaping missile defense capabilities worldwide.

And when one adds the consideration that the coming deployment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to the U.S. fleet and to U.S. and allied air forces will add significant sensor capabilities to the U.S. Navy as well as to allied forces (all of the current Aegis navies are potential candidates for the F-35). There is a significant 21st century opportunity to shape an integrated air-sea sensor net for the deployed fleets which provides, in turn, a growing capability to shape missile defense forces and protective cover for global presence forces.

These F-35-Aegis “offense and defense” bubbles can be networked throughout the Pacific to enhance the capability of any one national member of  the deployed force.  As such, it is a prime example of how assets of one nation can enhance the reach of another and to put in place a scalable capability for a honeycombed force.

The F-35 and Rethinking Basing

A good example of re-thinking basing was presented in an earlier posting, which focused specifically on the impact of the F-35B working with the USN and USAF team.

In the not two distant future the US Navy/Marine and USAF team may have to establish presence from the sea in a potential combat theater. The threat will be great: friendly forces can be intermixed with opponents who will do what ever it takes to win. From placing IEDs, to employing small unit ambushes, to spotting for artillery and Multiple Launch Rockets, the enemy will be unforgiving and aggressive. In addition there is a large land Army with armor and land-based precision weapons nearby to attack.

The opposing forces also have a tactical aviation component of Fighters and Attack Aircraft, along with Unmanned Aerial Systems and some proficiency in offensive “cyber war” ready to engage. To make it even more difficult the enemy has located and identified potential airfields that could be occupied and has targeted them to be destroyed by terminally guided cruise and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

Finally, the fleet off shore is vulnerable to ship-killing missiles. The problem for US war planners is to secure a beachhead and build to victory from that beginning. Traditionally, the “beachhead” was just that on a beach–but now it can be seizing territory inland first and attacking from the back door toward the sea to take a port and also grab an airfield.

The USAF flying high cover after being launched from bases far enough away to be safe from attack can establish Air Superiority, and the Navy Fighters can go on CAP (Combat Air Patrol) to protect the Fleet. Both services can launch offensive weapons from their TacAir also from B-2s, surface ships and subs. UAS can go into battle for ISR and offense “cyber” can be engaged. US “smart munitions” can attack enemy offensive rockets and missiles launch sites. There will be significant casualities on both sides.

But the Marines do the unexpected and land where the enemy does not have ease of access –a natural barrier perhaps, mountain range, water barrier, very open desert or even on the back side of urban sprawl—. Once established, logistical re-supply is a battle-tipping requirement.

Once ashore the one asset that can tip the battle and keep Tactical Aviation engaged in support of ground combat operations if runways are crated is the F-35B, because every hard surface road is a landing strip and resupply can quickly arrive from Navy Amphibious ships by MV-22s and CH-53K.

F-35B Taking off Aboard the USS Wasp (Credit: SLD)F-35B Taking off Aboard the USS Wasp (Credit: SLD)

The F-35B is a 5th Generation airborne stealth fighter with its own distributed intelligence center. Each aircraft has a total 360-degree knowledge. If the enemy launches an attack from the air or ground, airborne sensors can instantaneously pick up the launch. The battle information displayed in each F-35B can be linked to UAS drivers as well as ground and airborne command centers to coordinate both offensive and defensive operations.

The sortie rate of the aircraft is more than just rearm and “gas and go”: it is continuity of operations with each aircraft linking in and out as they turn and burn—without losing situational awareness. This can all be done in locations that can come as a complete tactical surprise –the F-35B sortie rate action reaction cycle has an add dimension of unique and unexpected basing thus getting inside an opponent’s OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) loop.

The sortie rate of the aircraft is more than just rearm and “gas and go”: it is continuity of operations with each aircraft linking in and out as they turn and burn—without losing situational awareness.

Enemy air is predictable by needing a runway and consequently all the problems of precision weapons crating their runways come into play for their battle plan—the F-35B does not have that vulnerability. (https://www.sldinfo.com/the-f-35b-has-a-unique-war-winning-capability/)

And an additional posting added some important insights into how Aegis and F-35Bs working together allow for dynamic basing defense.

For example, some consider the F-35B a boutique niche aircraft only essential for Marine combat con-ops. From the perspective of working the Aegis/F35B relationship to provide for deployable defense underwriting a broader presence strategy, it should not.

The reason is simple, an F-35B can stand strip alert on any long runway, US or Allied. From a strategic point of view think of Guam, South Korea or in the Middle East on all long runways. As a crisis situation develops, the F-35Bs can be remotely placed in secret hardened bunkers and revetments and thus become a significant deterrence asset that can instantly sortie into combat and return to gas and go again and again.

By using a detachment of F-35Bs the issue of enemy runway area denial and need for rapid runway repair does not become a show stopper to ops-tempo both offensively and defensively.

Tie an F-35B to the Aegis and the entire “wasting argument” about asymmetric IRBM and enemy strike against our hard fixed land targets becomes moot. This is because Guam for example will still have air power in its defense. This principal can be applied globally.

The F-35B reverses the relationship between pre-defined operational bases and the aircraft. The aircraft no longer constrains the definition of an airfield.

As far as USAF and Allies a few Squadrons of F-35Bs could be an invaluable insurance asset to stay in the battle if runways are sucker punched by the crazy follow on to the “Dear Leader” in North Korea, or Iranian fanatics with IRBMs. Taiwan could also send a powerful signal to the PLAAF if we allowed them to purchase the F-35B.

The 21st Century US Military has the potential to be the most agile combat force in the world by leveraging the F-35B throughout the force, rather than considering this solely a USMC weapon system. (https://www.sldinfo.com/21st-century-agility-leveraging-the-f-35b-as-a-strategic-asset/)

An additional aspect of re-working both basing and allied capabilities will flow from the shift in the maintenance capabilities of the F-35.  The shift from local ownership of parts to a global sustainment system will have a significant impact on the functioning of bases.  Rather than having to operate as dynamic parking lots for planes, which will have to wait for parts from CONUS or Hawaii, forward, bases – allied or US can provide parts to the combat air force.

As an interview with Scott Ogden, former USAF maintenance official and now with Lockheed Martin underscored:

SLD: This is all built around a local ownership either by base or deployed squadron, so local ownership is the rule of thumb.

Ogden: Right.  All of your CONOPS and all of your traditional standard operating procedures are that you can operate as an independent unit, you’re staffed that way, and you’re manned that way.

That’s going to be the big cultural thing that will take some time for the synergies that we have and for people to understand that. Some services still today, as you have heard many times, do not want somebody else to have access to a part that they think is theirs.

SLD: This maintenance culture is based on several decades of historical experience.  But this experience is dysfunctional to the strategic environment in which we find ourselves.  We’re in a strategic environment where our allies and we, with probably the exception of Asians, have stringent defense budgets.  So you’re going to have less aircraft. You’re going to more frequently wish to leverage one another’s capabilities.

From an operational tempo point of view, if you continue to have this kind of segregated maintenance legacy, it’s going to ensure that basically the capability of our allies and ourselves collectively goes down if we don’t find a way to take advantage of the cultural revolution inherent in common technology.

Ogden: The challenge is to have the Services accept the cultural change that will afford them the ability to harvest the economies of scale, and the common spares pool.

Let’s say it’s an upgrade to an aircraft that you want to do and your aircraft are deployed into Europe, okay, normally we would never send an aircraft into Italy and contract with Italy to do an upgrade on an F-16. Even if they could, we would not do that.  We would go somewhere that it was US organization or US administered contract to do the upgrade.

Let’s say you land at a an F-16 base in Italy, you got to go back through your base supply to get a part shipped in to you with your crew to come out and take care of that airplane. Now the airplane sits on the ground until you get maintainers out there to take care of the airplane.

In the US Air Force process until an airplane is on your base for seven days, it still belongs to the unit that flew in the airplane. So if I’m flying cross-country, the unit, even if it is another F-16 base, they may help me, but they aren’t responsible for repairing that airplane till after seven days because that’s just the process that they do.

They’re going to say, “Okay, we’ll help you with the part.  We’ll do this.  We’ll give you a mechanic,” but most of the time you end up you take care of the airplane across country.

With the F-35A and the ALIS system, when the airplane drops in, we know what part, kit is available from what nearest base, we know a worldwide warehouse we would ship a part to a location to that tail number for that person to put that part on the aircraft and fix it.

This is because we have no contract limitations.  We know that we’re responsible for aircraft availability and if an aircrafts down, we know and see that immediately with ALIS and we make the determination to send the part right there.

It is not a matter of the base having to decide the prioritization going back to their own, working through their base supply.  And if it’s an Italian F-35 that lands a UK base, from a technological point of view it does not have to make a difference. The part would go right into the UK and be shipped to that tail number. (https://www.sldinfo.com/moving-from-legacy-to-5th-generation-aircraft/)

Global sustainment is a core contributor to a significant shift in the utility of land bases and allows for encompassing land and sea bases into a comprehensive maintenance enterprise which can fuel significant sortie generation rates and re-shape combat dynamics and outcomes.

This is a contribution to the strategic whiteboard.

https://www.sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/

Pacific Strategy XIV: Battle of the Bulge-in a Pacific Campaign

Posted on | by SysAdmin | Leave a Comment on Pacific Strategy XIV: Battle of the Bulge-in a Pacific Campaign
10/27/2011

10/27/2011 – by Ed Timperlake

Ever since the evacuation of the Chinese Nationalist Forces to Taiwan after their defeat on the mainland by Mao’s Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) has quested for a complete victory by establishing sovereignty over that island fortress.

(Credit Image: Bigstock)(Credit Image: Bigstock)

Taiwan is an island 89 miles across and 245 miles long, and approximately the same distance from mainland China as the US island of Key West is from Cuba. Taiwan is 99 miles from the mainland and Key West is 94 from Cuba.

The post WW II history of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) vs. the Republic of China (ROC) has been an on again off again quasi hot war.  PLA shelling of the much closer ROC Islands of Quemoy and Matsu, was a real flash point in Cold War brinkmanship

It got so contentious that in 1954 the use of nukes against mainland China was advocated by the JCS but was resisted by Ike.  Instead treaty commitments were made for defense of the Island in the event of an attack.

Consequently, the flash point of ensuring the survivability of a free democracy of 23 million Chinese in the Republic of China moved to US deterrence by Navy Carrier Battle Groups in the nineties. The PRC livid on so many levels about the ROC returned the 1954 US JCS recommendation about using nukes in a very public way. A PLA general said to an American diplomat as a CBG was showing presence in the Taiwan Straights– is the US prepared to trade Taipei for L.A?

The practical issue below nuke bluster is that the real battle for Taiwan has always been looked at in conventional terms.

It is very fair to say after the Clinton administration executed an effective, and insulting to PRC, show of force with USN Carrier Battle Groups in the nineties one of the principal raison d’etats of PLA military forces (PLA.PLAAF, PLAN and 2nd Artillery, Special Forces and seaborne infantry) is to modernize and train to conquer ROC by force.

Being smart the PRC has two additional strategies. One makes enough bluster so that the ROC surrenders peacefully into reunification, or, two essentially buy them so the Taiwan Democracy votes for unification.

However, if the PRC makes a military move a well designed and executed Air/Sea/Land Battle US battle plan leveraging presence, scalability and multiple access can make such an attack become the PLA’s equivalent of the US WWII Battle of the Bulge.

The U.S. goal if the PLA goes “feet wet” to cross the Straight, if we continue to build out our current technology in sufficient numbers, will be to make all their strike forces and their entire surface fleet die.

This boldness can be grasped with U.S. emerging military strategy of “‘No platform fight alone and make a Mao legacy centric force fight individually in the dark and die.” This strategic and tactical mindset will have the same effect the Bulge had on the German Forces as General Patton said: “Hell let’s have the guts to let those son-of-a-bitches go all the way to Paris. Then we’ll cut ‘em off and chew ‘em up.”

It will just take the fighting Navy/Marine/AF team with allied assistance to really “chew ‘em up”.

Unfortunately, the ‘Thinking Navy” isn’t.

In a July 11, 2011 story about the improving military capability of the Peoples Republic of China—“China’s ‘eye in the sky’ nears par with US” —A professor at the US Naval War College symbolically rowed ashore and surrendered her sword to the PLA forces.

Another cubicle commander articulates the way ahead.

“The United States has always felt that if there was a crisis in Taiwan, we could get our naval forces there before China could act and before they would know we were there. This basically takes that off the table,” said Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor at the US Naval War College in Rhode Island.

History shows the fighting Navy/Marine/AF team with modern 21st Century weapons and systems might think and prove otherwise.

Rick Fisher, a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, nails it on the need for strong capable 21st century technology in the Pacific to deter war.

Washington gains nothing by delaying the sale of new F-16s to Taiwan. Selling new F-16s with modern subsystems will more quickly prepare the Taiwan Air Force for what it really needs, a version of the fifth-generation F-35. Depending upon the equipment package, upgrading Taiwan’s early model F-16s can sustain a low level of parity, but that will not keep pace with a Chinese threat that grows every day.

The statement in a global newspaper from the Naval War College by Professor Johnson-Freese sends the exact opposite signal.

First a history lesson for Professor Johnson-Freese.

Less then a year after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the “Doolittle Raiders” had their “30 Seconds Over Tokyo” bombing raid. In doing so the Navy-Army Air Corp team gave the Japanese leaders a real wake up call that they would ultimately lose WWII. B-25 Army Air Force crews made their heroic flight launching from the deck of the CV-8, USS Hornet.

(Credit: http://www.doolittleraider.com/)
(Credit: http://www.doolittleraider.com/)

After the Doolittle Raid, the USS Hornet continued to fight the Imperial Japanese Fleet. At the Battle Of Midway the entire complement, save one pilot, of Torpedo Squadron 8 from the Hornet were all killed, but the great miracle at Midway victory was achieved.

Finally, the heroic ship was sunk at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Island. Quoting various reports about the battle proved that it was a hard ship to kill.

From various sources compiled by Wikipedia:

  • In a 15-minute period, Hornet took three bomb hits from “Val” dive bombers, another bomb hit compounded by the “Val” itself crashing into the deck, two torpedo hits from “Kates”, and another “Val” crashing into the deck. Because of the damage the Hornet was taken undertow when another Japanese plane scored a hit.
  • The order was given to abandon ship. U.S. forces then attempted to scuttle Hornet, which absorbed nine torpedoes and more than 400 5 in (130 mm) rounds from the destroyers Mustin and Anderson. Mustin and Anderson moved off when a Japanese surface force appeared in the area.
  • Japanese destroyers Makigumo and Akigumo then finished Hornet with four torpedoes. At 01:35 on 27 October, she finally sank with the loss of 140 of her crew
  • It was the last US fleet Carrier to be sunk in WW II.

And another history lesson this time from a class in naval history over four decades ago at the US Naval Academy. I have tried to find the original source but just remember the professor’s narrative.

As the war in the Pacific got closer to the main Islands of Japan, Kamikaze – the “unmanned” vehicles of the day — were used to attack the American battle fleet—at that time the aircraft carrier was the primary ship leading the attack. So killing carriers was the goal. The Navy knowing this screened the fleet carriers with radar picket Destroyers to both give warning and provide anti-aircraft fire at incoming Kamikazes.

During a lull in after a wave of deadly Kamikaze attacks a voice was heard skipping across the waves-by sailors of the main fleet — sound can do this at sea. As told it was an ensign on a radar picket ship and he was telling the crew that all the officers were killed but he was in command and they would continue to fight the ship—the Destroyer was lost.

There is a fundamental rule in tactical battles that all technology is relative against a reactive enemy. With that said, it is most often the intangibles of training, tactics, and quickly reacting to develop newer and more capable technology that can win the final battle.

Now to the 21st Century–apparently the professor missed a recent event.

If PLA satellites are a problem and it is a choice between putting a carrier battle group at risk or fighting a space war, I think the fighting Navy is capable and ultimately ruthless enough to blind the PRC military.

After the PLA shot down a satellite from a land based launch pad the US Navy demonstrated our at sea capability – from a Department of Defense report:

“At approximately 10:26 p.m. EST, Feb. 20, (2008) a U.S. Navy AEGIS warship, USS Lake Erie (CG-70), fired a single modified tactical Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) hitting the satellite approximately 133 nautical miles over the Pacific Ocean as it traveled in space at more than 17,000 mph. USS Decatur (DDG-73) and USS Russell (DDG-59) were also part of the task force.”

F-35C in Flight (Credit: Lockheed Martin)
F-35C in Flight (Credit: Lockheed Martin)

So to make it simple for the PLA, PLAN. PLAAF and 2nd Artillery: the US Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps are battle tested, currently with ten years of real, but different, combat experience.  When provoked the US has a legacy of carrying the fight to any enemy.

But wait, Professor, it gets even better.

In the 21st century it will be important that no platform fight alone. USN satellite killing Aegis ships will soon be joined by F-35s flying from the Navy/Marine Amphibious Readiness Group “Gator” Navy-the USMC F-35B V/Stol. This is a huge at sea multiplier in capability.

Carrier Battle Group Air Wings with the F-35C will give Naval Forces afloat both situational awareness and the ability to fight a 3 Dimensional War. Add in attack subs and SSGN’s with cruise missiles and a hidden US vigilant on station offense punch remains silent but deadly.

Finally, like the radar picket ships of WWII, current Destroyers, frigates and perhaps even the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) can add a huge defensive element against CHICOM incoming missiles. The capability to spoof and jam incoming guided weapons is an art of “tron” war practiced by Navy forces for decades. One can imagine the targeting frustration trying to hit a 50+ knot LCS that an incoming warhead thinks is an aircraft carrier.

It gets even better, by pure accident during a test flight over Pax River an F-35 system picked up a launch in Florida over 800 miles away. So the second a missile is launched against the fleet the Commander can light up the launch pad using a combination of B-2s and F-22s, especially in a their emerging Suppression of Enemy Air Defensive  (SEAD) role along with at sea and sub launched cruise missiles.

Eventually UAS systems with combat firepower guided by F-35s and the robot revolution can take out any threat, launch be seen and die. This F-35 ability has been further validated in the exercise “Northern Edge.” It was reported one F-35 capable test bed aircraft using F-35 current sensor/radar systems could sweep over 50,000 square miles of ocean.

So rather then unilaterally as suggested in print “take our forces off the table,” the 21st century Navy can blind them and blast them-and that is real deterrence and should give the PRC pause before starting a hostile action.

American just needs the political will to continue to commit the resources to keep the US Navy/Marine/AF the number one fighting force in the Pacific.

A USMC General David Shoup, the Commandant pointed out how hard crossing 94 miles of Ocean can be to invade an Island. Commandant Shoup, Congressional Medal of Honor, for action on Tarawa pointed out the relative size of Tarawa to Cuba when a lot of bluster was being raised about invading Cuba. He took a map of Cuba and then put a dot on the map. When some asked what was that he said “That Gentlemen is the island of Tarawa it took us three days and eighteen thousand Marines to take it”

(Taken from David Halberstam’s great book “The Best and the Brightest”).

Pacific Strategy XII: The Role of the USAF

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10/26/2011: As this rollout of a Pacific strategy for the United States in the Pacific has made clear, air power is not synonymous with the USAF.  Airpower is crucial at every level of establishing presence and shaping the building blocks of scalability.  Without aviation assets, the USCG cutters have very limited effectiveness.  Without air-breathing assets of various sorts, the CVNs have no meaning, and the surface navy significantly limited.  Without F-35Bs coming to the amphib, the USN-USMC team becomes a fleet of helo carriers with V-22s and the effectiveness severely curtailed.

And the shaping of a scalability approach involves the use of USAF assets as one rolls out different capabilities over time, whether lift, tanking, ISR services or elements of the combat air force.  The USAF is a key element of the entire tissue of scalability and its combat air capabilities are key elements of the capacity to ramp up the scale of a scalable force.

For the USAF to play its proper role it must however be a warfighting force, which can as the opening of Gladiator noted: “At my signal: Unleash Hell.”

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kc8fqgbU_SU

Herman Kahn made the point when he visited the Strategic Air Command and noted its Motto: “Peace is our Profession.”  As Kahn noted, “That is great but I hope there are many warfighters in the Command as well.” If Herman were around today, I am sure he would have some comments on the situation today.

If the USAF is not built around the Wynne doctrine “I do not want a fair fight.  If I have put myself in a fair fight, I have failed as a planner and force builder.”

https://www.sldinfo.com/the-challenge-of-avoiding-the-far-fight/

As the late Jack Wheeler put it: The Mission of the US Military is to dominate the foe, first with deterrence, and then, with the dominant, “unfair” fight.
The Wynne Doctrine, after SECAF21 Michael W. Wynne: “If you are ever in a fair fight, senior leaders have failed you.”

 

https://www.sldinfo.com/cyberpoints-two/

Getting on with rebuilding the combat air force quickly is essential if US forces can deter as they deploy.

The Role of the USAF

It is always better to prevail without having to fight.  Today, the U.S. military does this by shaping the international environment with the potent tools of assurance, deterrence and dissuasion.  The principal role of the U.S. military is to defend the nation and the national interests.  A powerful tool in this task is a capability to assure allies that they need not bow to violent threats and the  ability to work with them to ensure global security.  US armed forces accomplish this role by providing a solid foundation of military strength to complement the tools of peaceful diplomacy.  None of these tools alone can sustain the US position of international political and economic influence.  Leaders must be prepared to use all the instruments of national and coalition power in proper combination, in as integrated a manner as feasible, in order to address potential threats to national and collective interests.

The evolving strategic environment places a premium on global operations with allies and partners in providing for comprehensive global security.  This networking forms a “Global Security Enterprise,” of which Pacific capabilities forms a crucial case study. The USAF has a key role in shaping U.S. options for crafting a Global Security Enterprise.  With the reach and persistence of modern air power – space, air-breathing strike, ISR, lift, tanking, cyberwar and related capabilities – the USAF is a key element for U.S. and coalition capabilities in global security operations.

With modern ISR, the USAF provides an important contribution to the persistent awareness to shape a global security monitoring system.  Integration of air and ground with maritime forces is increasingly possible given the evolution of technology. And the USAF has a key role in shaping technological options for global reach, persistence and integration.  Indeed, USAF innovation to help craft a Global Security Enterprise is a key aspect of USAF Air, Space, and Cyber planning. rade But it is the thoughtful shaping of coalition capabilities that will provide the authority within which power may be exercised in the turbulent years ahead. From the perspective of the USAF, there are several contributions for the operation of a global security enterprise.

First, the USAF contributes several key elements to build global C4ISR capabilities. The new 5th generation aircraft, the evolving capabilities of unmanned systems and the U.S. military space system are becoming increasingly interactive.  By moving data among the air-space systems and connecting with the ground forces, the USAF can be at cutting edge of crafting a truly global C4ISR system for joint and coalition operations.

Second, today’s air forces are being reshaped as core participants in interdependent military operations in theater contexts. The USAF is combining close air strike/close air support (CAS) on the same platforms that already have key roles in performing ISR engagement with the ground forces. The battle domains of Ground, Air, and Cyberspace are becoming interconnected within an evolving Global Security Enterprise.

Third, the USAF is evolving its capability to shape a ground-air partnership with joint and coalition forces.  Here the US Air Force can play the role either of the supported or supporting command.  From the standpoint of the supported command, the USAF can establish air superiority and coordinate kinetic and non-kinetic operations within a theater of operations. At the same time, the USAF can shift seamlessly into the role of supporting command to ground commanders for a variety of mission sets ranging from peacekeeping, to stability operations to maneuver warfare.  For example, the USAF is a natural partner of  he USMC in shaping new approaches to the ground-air partnership dynamic.

Fourth, the USAF is a core facilitator of global operations. USAF lift, tanking, ISR, and strike forces increasingly operate as a globally interconnected force providing global reach and support to U.S. and coalition forces.  The USAF functions as a global central nervous system for the operation of U.S. forces through the mix of its space unmanned and manned assets.  Connectively, collaboration and global presence are core elements of the 21st century approach of the US Air Force.

This role is threatened by the actual state of the tanker fleet.  However, in the Pacific region, Japan has new 767 tankers and the Aussies have new A330 tankers which can be brought to the fight. And tanking in the air is supplemented by tanking at sea for the presence force.

https://www.sldinfo.com/re-visiting-the-usaf-tanker-impact-on-con-ops/

Key Tool Sets

The USAF provides a key element of tanking and lift to the security and military enterprise and is a key element of supporting, sustaining and linking the elements of the honeycomb.  The tanker and lift fleet are crucial to sustain forward deployment and to move force over the checkerboard. We have written earlier about key commands which embody the ability to perform such key functions at the command level.  Notably TRANSCOM and the TACC are key tissues enabling the military body to operate worldwide.Transcom provides the overall planning and organizational center to provide for lift and support.  As General McNabb put it:

We manage the operation of those assets to deliver capability to the warfighter.  As such, we use the military airlift and sealift available to us as well as work with our commercial air and sea transportation partners. We are looking for cost effective ways to deliver capability.  Obviously, the priority is important as well.  If it is time urgent, we will use air.  If it is less time urgent, we rely on other assets.  But in general we deliver about 90% of our equipment by surface modes and 10% by air.  In Afghanistan, based on the threat, we deliver approximately 80% by surface and 20% by air.

https://www.sldinfo.com/general-mcnabb-on-transcom/

The TACC or the Tanker Airlift Control Center is a unique asset for managing from one operations floor US airlift, both commercial and military, as well as tanking and inter-theater medevac assets.  As General Allardice put it:

What we do and the “why” of our existence at the 18th Air Force level is to set the global mobility enterprise up for success.  In simple terms we are the warfighting headquarters for AMC.  What that means is that we support General Johns’ AFTRANS role by providing a robust mobility capability to the combatant commanders through U.S. Transportation Command. In practical terms, the first component of the enterprise is our active, reserve and guard air mobility wings in the continental United States.  They generate the airplanes, the crews to fly them, and then of course, they generate airmen that deploy out into the world to support a variety of Air Force missions, many of which directly support our global mobility enterprise.

Another key piece of the global enterprise is our two air mobility operations wings. They support the enroute structure, 16 main enroute locations and numerous other bases operating worldwide in the Pacific, throughout Europe, and in the Mideast.  It’s a fairly lean organization, ranging from small, two-person detachments all the way up to robust squadrons.  They’re the ones that catch the airplanes, refuel the airplanes, and fix the airplanes.  If a crew needs rest, they’ll make sure there’s billeting for them, and they’ll run a crew stage. Simplistically, what I say is they accelerate the flow of iron throughout the world. The third major piece is our contingency response wings, CRWs, and that’s the expeditionary part.  They’re not fixed.  The CRWs are made up of a variety of small teams, but in many ways the crown jewel is the contingency response group.  These are the expeditionary groups that can go out and open up a bare base anywhere in the world. They are self-contained organizations, about 110 people.  Their whole purpose is to act as a forward hub so that our airplanes can flow in, perform their mobility mission and flow back out again.

Simplistically, what I say is they accelerate the flow of iron throughout the world.

https://www.sldinfo.com/shaping-global-con-ops-2/

An illustration of two ways beyond the obvious ability to support aircraft operating throughout the Pacific, that the TACC and related capabilities shape scalability in the Pacific are the following: the airdropping revolution and the ability to move troops rapidly through the AOR.

First, the airdropping revolution means that the USAF can supply honeycombed deployed forces throughout the AOR.  This capability was discussed in the interview with General Allardice.

SLD: Could you talk about the whole revolution in airdropping?

General Allardice: Absolutely.  Right now, I would say we are in the longest sustained airdrop in history.  Since 2005, we’ve been airdropping virtually every day.  We’ve doubled or tripled our load every year since then.  Last year we dropped about 60 million pounds of supplies.  This year we’ll exceed 100 million. The interesting thing is the revolution or leaps in the technology of not just the delivery but the rigging, as well as our understanding of collateral damage, et cetera.  We understand that when you’re dropping a pallet if it goes off the drop zone or even if it’s on the drop zone, if it kills somebody that’s no different than if a bomb killed somebody, so we really focus on that. I think there’s been a tremendous revolution and improvement in our airdrop rigging, and accuracy; and when you get into the Joint Precision Airdrop System, the JPAS, that’s even higher.

SLD: When you put that data out there about air dropping trends, it’s impressive in and of itself, but when you think of the CONOPS implications they are significant as well. I don’t even need to use roads to actually start inserting a force. Interestingly for the Marines when they’re looking at the amphibious ready group (ARG) and what they could do with the future ARG, with their MC-130Js that can land in 3,000 feet or less, the Ospreys and the B’s that they could put basically on almost any paved highway worldwide.  They could be anywhere in the world, and then people say, “Well how would you supply them,” and I would say, “Well what do you think we’ve been doing in the last ten years?” So if we marry up this revolutionary air dropping capability with projection of force from the sea, we could have a much more flexible and powerful insertion force if we wanted to.

General Allardice: I agree.  Our new air dropping capabilities can be used to support our global operations in new and innovative ways…

A second example is the ability to move troops from CONUS to Pacific areas of operations.  We recently published an interview with Master Sgt. Adam Smith, U.S. Army. In the video, we showed footage of 501st Parachute dropping in support of Talisman Sabre, Shoalwater Bay Training Area.U.S. soldiers with 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, Fort Richardson, Alaska, were seen parachuting from a U.S. Air Force C-17 Globemaster III aircraft into the Shoalwater Bay Training Area during Talisman Saber 2011.

TS11 is an exercise designed to train U.S. and Australian forces to plan and conduct Combined Task Force operations to improve combat readiness and interoperability on a variety of missions from conventional conflict to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance efforts.

https://www.sldinfo.com/u-s-army-paradrop/

Of course, none of this is possible if the air environment is not permissive or protected.  A key role to provide for that protection and to ensure a capability to ramp up the scale to ensure strategic dominance is provided by the combat air force.

The USAF operating off of land bases in CONUS and forward deployed in the Pacific provides a key essential element in ensuring strategic dominance throughout the scale of capability.  The dwindling numbers of combat air are clearly threatening the ability of the USAF to play this role, and the very slow roll out of 5th generation aircraft integrated with the fleet is threatening as well.

https://www.sldinfo.com/assessing-the-5th-generation-competition-losing-a-decade/

As General Corley underscored in an interview on the website:

The enduring goals, ends, or objectives of the combat Air Force (CAF) are underpinned by a set of concepts of operations. For the air domain, air superiority is a service core competency of the Air Force, bolstered by collaborative competencies from other services that also contribute to air superiority. This is a constant of operations that underpins operational freedom of action. If you don’t underpin operational freedom of action, then again, your freedom from attack, freedom to attack, freedom to maneuver vanishes. If that vanishes for the joint force, then I don’t think you have an effective fighting joint force. I also think your ability to dissuade/deter comes called into question.

Frankly, the unraveling of the CAF is already significantly underway.  The USAF is becoming like the USCG, able to surge to an operation, with very little staying power beyond that surge.  This is not a situation in which the United States would wish to find itself.

General Corley then discussed how to best proceed in an era of constrained financial resources to empower such a concept of operations supporting the global ends of the U.S. military and the CAF. Throughout the interview, General Corley highlighted that to achieve core strategic objectives in a constrained environment, it was crucial to build upon the new air combat capabilities provided by the F-22/F-35 force. The capabilities of a deployed “stealth sensor integrated force” to operate as the tip of the spear and to enable the rest of the air and joint force to operate globally was highlighted.

Leveraging the legacy fleet with selective modernization to work more effectively with the “re-normed” air arm based on the F-22/F-35 was significant, but he warned against buying new “legacy” aircraft because of their inherent limitations. The approach is to leverage extant legacy assets through building the foundation provided by F-22s and F-35s.

“For example, if I’ve got a fleet of F-15s, how can I leverage those F15s in a potential future environment at the challenging end of the scale with the range of military operations? F-15s today, or F-18s, or F-16s, do not possess the needed survivability inside an anti-access environment. One can say what you will, argue what you won’t, they will not be survivable. And from con-ops point of view, they’re being pushed further and further out due to terminal defenses or country wide or regional defenses that exist. And this diminishes their utility, but they can still be effectively utilized. For example you may take an existing platform, like an F-15 from the Air Force and begin to apply a pod to provide for infrared search tracking, so that it could basically begin to detect assets and then feed that information back to other assets. Or, by providing for connectivity with some advanced tactical data link, that platform, in turn, could be directed to launch weapons from it.”

https://www.sldinfo.com/a-conversation-with-general-corley-about-the-future-of-air-power/

(And for a complete look at the Corley presentation on re-shaping the CAF see

https://www.sldinfo.com/pdf-download-of-a-conversation-with-general-corley-about-the-future-of-air-power/)

The growing challenges to the USAF to be able to play the role essential in the Pacific is real. Questions of ethos and capabilities are central to the challenge.  As Lt. General (Retired) Deptula has warned:

It’s in the Nation’s interest to secure national objectives through deterrence, dissuasion, and regional shaping—in other word’s peace through strength.  To do so requires sufficient numbers of capable systems to win 99 to 1, vice 51 to 49.  When combat operations are necessary, we must employ forces capable of securing our country’s objectives in an efficient and effective manner—projecting focused and intelligent power, and minimizing liabilities and vulnerabilities….

 

One should understand that the only thing more expensive than a first rate Air Force is a second rate Air Force.

https://www.sldinfo.com/jointness-airpower-and-the-emerging-security-environment/

Secretary Wynne will provide in a later piece in this series how this can be done in South Korea by rolling in three F-35A squadrons and re-setting the entire combat air force as combat role of aircraft in support of joint and allied operations in the Korean peninsula.

(A first piece in this effort can be seen here

https://www.sldinfo.com/f-35as-to-korea-shaping-a-defense-transition-to-deal-with-real-threats/ )

In short, the USAF is a key element for Pacific operations and a key element in shaping global operations in a global security enterprise.  It does so by providing lift and tanking as well as selective elements of the Combat Air Force (CAF) throughout various segments of the honeycomb as presence is established and enhanced.  And with a large enough CAF can ensure strategic dominance in a scalable approach.  This dominance is clearly threatened today by the slow roll out of 5th generation aircraft and a recapitalization rate which will replace legacy aircraft in a hundred years.

 

This is a contribution to the strategic whiteboard.

https://www.sldinfo.com/resources/strategic_whiteboard/