Putin’s War: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Triggered a Scientific Exodus

09/05/2025

When Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he envisioned a swift victory that would restore Russia’s great power status.

Instead, the invasion has triggered one of the most devastating scientific brain drains in modern history, systematically dismantling the mathematics and physics capabilities that Russia had built over centuries.

What emerges from this catastrophe is a stark illustration of how authoritarian aggression can backfire spectacularly, weakening the very foundations of national strength it purports to defend.

Russia has long prided itself on its scientific heritage. From Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic table to Andrei Kolmogorov’s contributions to probability theory, from Lev Landau’s groundbreaking work in theoretical physics to the Soviet space program’s early triumphs, Russian science has produced world-changing discoveries.

The country’s mathematical traditions, in particular, have been legendary as Soviet mathematicians dominated international competitions and made foundational contributions to fields ranging from topology to number theory. This legacy made Russia a global center of excellence in mathematics and physics, attracting international collaboration and respect.

Today, that legacy lies in ruins, scattered across European and American universities and research institutes where Russian scientists have sought refuge from Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime.

The Great Exodus Begins

The scope of the scientific exodus that began with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is staggering. According to reports from multiple sources, at least 2,500 scientists have fled Russia since February 24, 2022, with experts describing the phenomenon as a “disaster” for Russian science. This figure likely represents a conservative estimate, as many departures go unreported and the true scale of the exodus may be several times larger.

Among those who have left are at least 34 physicists and mathematicians from Russia’s most prestigious institutions.2 These are not marginal figures but acclaimed scientists with established careers. Up to a quarter of the departing scientists have citation H-Index scores of 10 or higher a metric indicating successful careers spanning decades of research experience. Many maintained ties to foreign universities, making their departure not just a loss of individual talent but a severing of crucial international networks that had taken years to build.

The human stories behind these statistics are particularly poignant.

Yevhen Makedonsky, a mathematician born in Ukraine’s Melitopol, had built a successful career in Russia, obtaining his PhD from the Higher School of Economics and spending over five years at Skoltech studying representation theory. When Russian tanks began assaulting his hometown, he realized “that the Russia I knew was over, the Third Reich has begun.” He managed to escape Russia in late February 2022, eventually finding refuge at the Max Planck Institute for Mathematics.

Vladimir Marakhonov, a physicist who worked at the prestigious Ioffe Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the 1980s and 1990s, left Russia for Finland in September 2022. “We discussed the situation after February 2022 with my colleagues and agreed that a catastrophe and madness is happening,” he explained. His observation about the nature of the exodus is particularly telling: “The trouble is that it is primarily smart people who leave.”

The Institutional Collapse

The brain drain has not affected Russian scientific institutions uniformly but it has struck hardest at the most prestigious and internationally connected universities. The Higher School of Economics (HSE), which Vladimir Putin himself had praised in 2010 as “cutting-edge in every respect,” exemplifies this institutional collapse. The university has lost approximately 700 faculty members since the war began, causing it to plummet almost 100 spots in global rankings, from 305th to 399th position.

The HSE’s decline began even before the invasion, as authorities increased pressure on faculty members who showed insufficient loyalty to the regime. The university received a new rector in 2021 who launched a gradual purge of faculty members. “As his team grew, the pressure within the university was becoming more and more systemic,” recalled Ilya Inishev, a Doctor of Philosophy who worked at HSE from 2010 until 2022. Inishev was eventually dismissed for “serious damage” his antiwar comments “inflicted on the university’s reputation” and moved to Germany in April 2023.

The pattern extends far beyond HSE. Research by Novaya-Europe identified at least 270 university staff members from Moscow and St. Petersburg’s high-ranking universities who have severed ties with Russia since the war broke out. Among these, 195 are considered Russian scientists, while the rest are foreigners who had been working in Russia. The HSE leads with 160 departures, followed by St. Petersburg State University with 35, and the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology with 32.

These figures represent only the verified cases from open sources. The actual number is likely much higher, as many departures are not publicly documented. Former HSE Professor “Mikhail” (a pseudonym) noted that in his department, “all PhDs, except for one, all senior researchers, and foreigners” eventually left.

The International Scientific Boycott

Putin’s invasion did not just trigger an internal exodus. It also provoked an unprecedented international scientific boycott that has systematically isolated Russian institutions from global research networks. The response was swift and comprehensive, affecting everything from major international collaborations to routine academic exchanges.

One of the most symbolic casualties was the $300-million Skoltech program, a joint initiative between MIT and Russian partners that represented one of the most ambitious East-West scientific collaborations of the post-Cold War era. The program was dissolved within one day of the invasion, with no foreseeable restart in the future. This termination eliminated not just funding but also the institutional framework that had enabled hundreds of researchers to collaborate across national boundaries.

The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), which had served as a bridge between East and West even during the darkest days of the Cold War, made the unprecedented decision to bar all Russian observers and terminate the contracts of approximately 1,000 Russian scientists or about 8% of its workforce when their agreements expired. This move was particularly significant given CERN’s historic role as a meeting place for scientists from opposing blocs, a function it had maintained even during the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979.

The boycott extended across the academic spectrum. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, various Australian universities, and the European Association of Universities, which unites 850 institutions, announced the complete cessation of all interaction with Russian organizations. Nordic countries, Finland, Germany, Poland, Denmark, and Norway, refused to continue joint research and education programs. Mathematical societies in several countries announced they would not participate in the International Congress of Mathematicians, which had been scheduled to take place in St. Petersburg in July 2022 but was forced to go virtual instead.

The isolation extends to research infrastructure and publishing. Many firms outside Russia, particularly in the European Union, have refused to supply scientific equipment to Russian institutions for fear of violating sanctions. Access to Western scientific journals has been compromised due to financial problems and the devaluation of the ruble, with the Russian Foundation for Basic Research unable to pay subscription fees to major publishers like Springer.

The Quality of the Loss

What makes this brain drain particularly devastating for Russia is not just its scale but its quality. The scientists who are leaving represent the most internationally connected and productive segments of the Russian research community. This follows a pattern observed in other historical episodes of scientific migration: the most talented and networked individuals are often the first and most able to leave.

Research on software developers which is a closely related high-skilled community illustrates this dynamic clearly. Analysis of GitHub data shows that by November 2022, 11.1% of Russian developers had listed a new country, compared with only 2.8% of developers from comparable countries not directly involved in the conflict. More tellingly, the 11% of developers who left Russia had been responsible for 20% of the country’s international collaborations in the software development community.

This pattern reflects a broader truth about brain drain: it is not random.

Those who leave tend to be better connected both domestically and internationally. In the global collaboration network, 43.0% of departing developers had ties with colleagues in other countries, compared with only 24.3% of those who remained. The same dynamics likely apply to academic researchers, meaning that Russia is losing not just individual scientists but the crucial nodes that connected Russian science to the global research community.

The emigrants themselves represent a remarkable pool of human capital. Approximately 80% have higher education and work in fields requiring intellectual expertise, including IT, data analysis, business, science, and culture. They tend to be young, between 20 and 40 years old, representing the demographic cohort that would normally form the backbone of Russia’s future scientific leadership.

Historical Parallels: The Nazi Germany Precedent

The current Russian scientific exodus bears uncomfortable similarities to one of history’s most catastrophic episodes of scientific self-destruction: Nazi Germany’s purge of Jewish scientists in the 1930s. The parallels are not just metaphorical for they offer concrete insights into the long-term consequences Russia may face.

When Hitler declared he would rid German universities of Jews even if it meant “the annihilation of contemporary German science,” he achieved exactly that outcome. The 15% of German physicists who lost their jobs were the country’s most productive researchers, accounting for 64% of all physics citations in Germany. This was not just a loss of individual talent but a systematic dismantling of the research networks and institutional knowledge that had made German science a world leader.

Many of these displaced scientists found refuge in Britain and the United States, where they continued their groundbreaking work. Several would play crucial roles in the Manhattan Project which was a bitter irony that saw Germany’s scientific talent contributing to the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton became a particular beneficiary, housing scientists like Kurt Gödel, Hermann Weyl, and Albert Einstein.

The economic research on such episodes confirms their long-lasting impact. Studies of academic emigration from Nazi Germany and deaths of academics during World War II show that these shocks diminished local research productivity for decades. Human capital, unlike physical capital, cannot be quickly rebuilt or replaced. The loss of experienced researchers creates cascading effects: fewer mentors for graduate students, weakened research networks, reduced institutional knowledge, and diminished capacity to train the next generation of scientists.

The Authoritarian Escalation

What makes the current Russian brain drain particularly tragic is that it appears to be accelerating due to the government’s own actions. Rather than recognizing the damage being inflicted on Russian science and taking steps to retain talent, the Putin regime has doubled down on policies that actively drive scientists away.

Since 2015, at least a dozen Russian physicists have been arrested on charges of “high treason” for the simple act of working with foreign colleagues or publishing in foreign journals. These scientists were not directly involved in weapons work but their transgression was conducting research with international partners, the very activity that had historically made Russian science strong. The message to the scientific community could not be clearer: international collaboration, the lifeblood of modern research, is now grounds for imprisonment.

The Russian authorities have explicitly embraced what they call a policy of isolationism from the international scientific community, deliberately echoing the practices of the Soviet Iron Curtain era. This represents a fundamental reversal of the policies that had allowed Russian science to recover from the post-Soviet collapse and begin reintegrating with global research networks.

The pressure extends beyond formal arrests to systematic institutional harassment. Universities have been purging faculty members who express opposition to the war or insufficient enthusiasm for government policies. The HSE alone shut down at least six departments in the 18 months following the invasion. Faculty members report an atmosphere of fear and suspicion that makes serious research increasingly difficult.

The Economic Dimensions

The brain drain occurs against the backdrop of a broader economic crisis that had been undermining Russian science even before the war. Since 2008, funding for scientific research as a percentage of GDP has stagnated at around 1% for more than a decade. While Russia ranked ninth globally in absolute Research and Development expenses in 2020, it lagged far behind: 12.1 times behind China and 15 times behind the United States, with the gap continuing to widen.

Salaries for researchers remain dismally low. A senior researcher earns an average of 26,000 rubles (about €280) per month, while a professor earns 36,000 rubles (€390). Despite presidential decrees mandating salary increases to 200% of regional averages, no additional funding has been allocated to achieve this goal. Universities have responded by converting scientists to part-time positions, a bureaucratic sleight of hand that meets the letter of the presidential decree while actually reducing researchers’ total compensation.

The war has exacerbated these underlying problems. International sanctions have made it increasingly difficult to import scientific equipment, cutting Russian researchers off from the tools they need to conduct competitive research. The collapse of the ruble has made international travel for conferences effectively impossible for most researchers. Even basic access to scientific literature has become problematic as institutions struggle to pay subscription fees to international publishers.

The International Response: Selective Support

Numerous Western countries and institutions have launched programs to aid displaced Russian scientists, recognizing the humanitarian implications and the chance to bolster research capabilities in the West. These initiatives include research grants, fellowships, and institutional support expressly tailored for scientists fleeing Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine due to the war.

The London Institute for Mathematical Sciences did establish the Arnold Fellowships, which are three-year research positions specifically aimed at mathematicians and theoretical physicists from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The program is named after Vladimir Arnold, the renowned Ukrainian-born Russian mathematician, and aims to “support Russian scientists, at the expense of Russian science,” emphasizing the strategic intent to attract talent and weaken hostile institutions. The Institute’s official announcement highlights the notion that “Russia’s brain drain is Britain’s gain,” reflecting the dual humanitarian and strategic motives behind such fellowships.

The European Union has publicly discussed repurposing frozen Russian assets, with figures as high as €320 billion under investigation for reconstruction efforts and potentially for supporting displaced researchers in Europe. These proposals remain under active consideration, with debate on the allocations and legal mechanisms, but they underscore the scale and intent of Western support for affected scientific communities.

National research bodies in various countries including Germany, France, and the United States have established formal programs to help displaced scientists, offering temporary positions, funding, and long-term career integration opportunities. These efforts provide both immediate humanitarian relief and contribute to sustaining scientific productivity beyond Russia’s borders.

Long-term Consequences

The full impact of this scientific exodus will likely take decades to manifest, but the early indicators are ominous for Russia. Research output has already begun to decline measurably. International collaborations with Russian scientists fell by 34% by 2024 compared to 2021 levels. The number of scientific articles published by Russian researchers, which had been declining even before the war, is expected to continue its downward trajectory.

More fundamentally, Russia is losing its capacity to train the next generation of world-class researchers. Graduate programs are being disrupted by faculty departures, while the most promising students are increasingly likely to seek opportunities abroad. This creates a vicious cycle: as the quality of Russian research institutions declines, they become less attractive to both domestic and international talent, further accelerating the brain drain.

The geographical distribution of emigrants suggests that many of these departures may be permanent. The United States is by far the most popular destination among Russian researchers, while significant numbers have also settled in Germany, Canada, and other Western countries. Greater distances impose significant costs on collaboration and communication, making it unlikely that these scientists will maintain strong ties to Russian institutions even if political conditions improve.

Russia’s loss is manifestly the world’s gain. A study titled “The Great Exodus: A Portrait of New Migrants from Russia” found that about a quarter of Russian emigrants already speak the language of their new country or are making significant efforts to learn it, suggesting successful integration into their host societies.9 Many are already thriving in their new environments, contributing to research programs and institutions that compete directly with Russia.

The Geopolitical Implications

The scientific brain drain represents more than just an academic problem. It has profound implications for Russia’s long-term geopolitical position. Modern military capabilities increasingly depend on advanced technologies that require sophisticated scientific research and development. The hypersonic weapons that Russia has deployed in Ukraine, for example, rely on precisely the kinds of physics research that the country is now losing the capacity to conduct at the highest levels.

More broadly, scientific prowess has become a key indicator of national power in the 21st century. Countries that lead in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced materials, and other cutting-edge fields will have decisive advantages in both economic competition and military conflict. By systematically dismantling its scientific capabilities, Russia is weakening its position in the very domains that will determine great power status in the coming decades.

The irony is particularly acute given Putin’s stated goal of restoring Russia as a great power. What he done is return Russian science to the Brezhnev years and the complaints of leading scientists like Andrei Sakharov.

The invasion of Ukraine was ostensibly launched to prevent Western encroachment and reassert Russian influence. Instead, it has accelerated Russia’s relative decline by driving away the human capital that represents the foundation of genuine national strength in the modern era.

Conclusion: The Price of Authoritarianism

Putin’s war in Ukraine has inflicted many costs on Russia, from economic sanctions to international isolation to military casualties. But perhaps none will prove as enduringly damaging as the scientific brain drain that began on February 24, 2022. In triggering the exodus of thousands of Russia’s most talented researchers, the invasion has achieved something that decades of Western pressure could never accomplish: the systematic weakening of Russian scientific capabilities from within.

The tragedy extends beyond Russia’s borders. Science is fundamentally a cooperative enterprise that benefits from the free exchange of ideas and the collaboration of talented individuals regardless of nationality. The barriers that now separate Russian scientists from their international colleagues represent a loss for human knowledge as well as a setback for Russia specifically.

Yet the responsibility for this catastrophe lies squarely with the Putin regime’s choices. By launching an unprovoked war of aggression, by persecuting scientists who maintain international contacts, and by embracing isolation over integration, Russia’s leadership has chosen policies that inevitably drive away scientific talent. The brain drain is not an unfortunate side effect of the war. It is the predictable consequence of authoritarianism applied to the inherently international enterprise of scientific research.

The mathematicians and physicists now working in European and American universities represent more than individual success stories. They are living proof that human talent transcends national boundaries and that the pursuit of knowledge cannot be constrained by authoritarian regimes. Their exodus from Russia and integration into Western institutions represents both a strategic victory for democratic societies and a powerful demonstration of the self-defeating nature of Putin’s imperial project.

As Russia continues to pay the price for its leader’s miscalculations and his pseudo-Tsarism, the global scientific community has gained an influx of talented researchers whose contributions will advance human knowledge for decades to come.

The only question is whether Russia will recognize the magnitude of its loss before it becomes irreversible or whether Putin’s war will be remembered as the moment when Russia chose isolation over excellence and authoritarianism over the free exchange of ideas that makes science possible.

SLTE 1-25

09/03/2025

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 conduct simulated troop insertion operations with 2nd Battalion 23rd Marines at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, Feb. 07, 2025.

HMH-461 and other squadrons assigned to 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing trained to integrate with and support Marine ground units during Service Level Training Event (SLTE) 1-25, a series of training events designed to prepare Marines for operations around the globe.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA

02.07.2025

Video by Cpl. Anakin Smith 

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing    

External Lift with CH-53K King Stallions

09/01/2025

U.S. Marines with 2nd Distribution Support Battalion, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, execute external lifts at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, July 21, 2025. Marines with 2nd MAW and 2nd DSB trained alongside elements of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to refine humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities while also refining the CH-53K King Stallion’s ability to support distributed aviation operations in a joint environment.

07.21.2025

Video by Sgt. Rowdy Vanskike

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

See the interview with Col Fleeger:

The CH-53K in Action: Bridging the Gap Between Technology and New Operational Possibilities

 

Russia’s Yuan Pivot: How Sanctions Forced Moscow’s Currency Revolution

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, few predicted that within two years, Chinese yuan would become the dominant foreign currency in Russian markets.

Yet this dramatic shift represents one of the most significant unintended consequences of Western sanctions forcing Moscow into an unprecedented economic dependency on Beijing that reshapes global currency dynamics.

The transformation has been nothing short of remarkable. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the share of currencies from countries “unfriendly” to Russia plummeted from 87% to just 18% for exports and from 67% to 18% for imports. By December 2024, President Vladimir Putin announced that nearly 90% of Russia-China transactions were being settled in yuan and rubles.

This wasn’t a gradual transition. It was economic whiplash. Following the invasion, Russia “overnight became unable to transact in dollars and euros — the world’s dominant currencies” as Western sanctions severed Moscow’s access to the global financial system that had dominated international trade for decades.

The numbers tell a compelling story of rapid financial reorientation. On the Moscow Stock Exchange, yuan’s proportion skyrocketed from a mere 3% in 2022 to 54% by May 2024. After the Moscow Exchange itself was targeted by U.S. sanctions in summer 2024, yuan transactions reached an extraordinary 99.8% of all foreign currency trading.

By 2023, the yuan had achieved what seemed impossible just years earlier: it became the most popular currency on the Moscow Exchange, surpassing even the U.S. dollar. Russian banks held $68.7 billion in yuan by 2023, exceeding the $64.7 billion held in U.S. dollars.

The yuan’s dominance wasn’t accidental for it was the only viable option. Among potential alternatives like the Indian rupee or South African rand, China’s currency stood alone as “arguably the only relatively stable, widely traded currency issued by a non-sanctioning authority that enables Russia to make international transactions.”

Beijing facilitated this transition through currency swap agreements between central banks, allowing Russia to exchange rubles for yuan. Chinese banks accumulated Russian assets, increasing yuan circulation in the Russian economy. This infrastructure became crucial as Russia found itself cut off from SWIFT and other traditional financial networks.

However, Russia’s “yuanization” comes with significant vulnerabilities. The country has essentially “swapped its dollar dependence for reliance on the yuan”, creating new risks should relations with China deteriorate. Moscow now faces potential “reserve losses and payment disruptions” if Beijing’s policies change.

These concerns became reality in September 2024 when “the Russian market hit a yuan liquidity crisis as interest rates for ruble borrowing increased to 20%.” While officials reported the crisis was resolved by early 2025, yuan availability remains inadequate to meet demand for yuan-denominated loans for Russian businesses,

The relationship faces increasing strain from U.S. secondary sanctions threats. Chinese banks have grown reluctant to process yuan transactions with Russia, leading to significant payment delays. Some major Chinese financial institutions, including Ping An Bank, Bank of Ningbo, and China Guangfa Bank, have stopped accepting Russian payments entirely, while processing times for approved transactions stretched to eighteen days.

This caution reflects Beijing’s broader strategy of supporting Russia while avoiding actions that could trigger secondary sanctions or damage China’s access to EU and U.S. markets. Despite bold announcements of $200 billion in planned investments, most cooperation projects remain “only on paper.”

The economic relationship reveals a fundamental imbalance. While China has become essential for Russia, overtaking Europe as its most important trading partner, Russia remains “a relatively unimportant market” for China. This dynamic leaves Russia as the junior partner, “frustrated by its shift from being a major exporter of high-value goods to China to primarily exporting energy and commodities.”

Annual bilateral trade has reached $240 billion according to Chinese customs data, with Chinese goods now accounting for 38% of Russia’s imports. China has even acquired monopolies on whole categories of Russian imports, enabling it to charge higher prices to Russian consumers compared to other markets.

Russia’s forced pivot to the yuan represents more than bilateral economic adjustment—it signals a potential fracturing of the dollar-dominated global financial system. Yet there is concern that “higher yuan internationalization means that the Chinese government needs more dollar reserves” to support yuan stability. Rather than weakening the dollar, the yuan’s rise may complement rather than challenge dollar dominance.

The transformation also highlights the limits of sanctions evasion. While China has provided Russia an alternative currency lifeline, the constant threat of secondary sanctions creates ongoing instability and uncertainty for Russian businesses trying to operate in this new financial landscape.

As Russia continues to navigate its sanctions-constrained economy, its dependence on Chinese yuan appears set to deepen despite the challenges. The infrastructure for yuan-ruble transactions is “here to stay now, even if the war in Ukraine were to end tomorrow and Russia were to rebuild ties with the West”.

This currency revolution, born from geopolitical necessity rather than economic choice, demonstrates how quickly global financial relationships can shift when traditional systems become inaccessible.

Whether this represents a temporary wartime adjustment or a permanent realignment of global currency flows remains to be seen, but Russia’s yuan pivot has already reshaped the landscape of international finance in ways that will likely persist long after the current conflict ends.

Note: The quotes are taken from the sources indicated throughout the article.

F-35B Ordnance Load

U.S. Marines load air intercept missile ordnance and launch F-35B Lightning II aircraft assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 242, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, during flight operations aboard the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6), in the Philippine Sea, June 3, 2025.

Marine F-35Bs bring a 5th generation multi-discipline strike capability to support combined-joint all domain operations in key maritime terrain. The 31st MEU is operating aboard ships of the USS America Amphibious Ready Group in the 7th Fleet area of operations, the U.S. Navy’s largest forward deployed numbered fleet, and routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

PHILIPPINE SEA

06.02.2025

Video by Cpl. Alora Finigan 

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit        

The Speed of War: America’s Hypersonic Crossroads

08/31/2025

Picture a weapon with the same range and payload as a Tomahawk cruise missile, but instead of cruising at Mach 0.7, it screams across the sky at Mach 7. This isn’t science fiction. It’s the reality of hypersonic weapons, and America stands at a critical decision point that could reshape global military balance.

After years of false starts and shifting priorities, the United States finally has two tactical hypersonic systems approaching deployment. But the window for maintaining strategic advantage is narrowing, and the choice facing military planners is stark: deploy capable systems now or risk ceding the hypersonic high ground to rivals who have been moving aggressively.

The Long Road to Hypersonics

America’s hypersonic journey began with promise during the Bush administration, when visionaries like Air Force Chief Scientist Dr. Mark Lewis championed transformative air power capabilities. But the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan fundamentally altered defense priorities. Resources shifted from future technologies to immediate battlefield needs, cutting programs like the F-22 fighter and B-2 bomber while hypersonics development took a back seat.

This strategic pivot created an unintended consequence. As military strategist Jim Molan warned, America risked fighting future wars with fighters and bombers that were 20 to 30 years old, potentially unable to project sufficient power to deter China in the Western Pacific. The focus on today’s wars created tomorrow’s strategic blind spot.

The pattern continued through the Obama years, despite “pivot to Asia” rhetoric. While China and Russia made sustained hypersonic investments, American resources remained focused on Middle Eastern conflicts. It wasn’t until the Trump administration — shocked by Russia’s Kinzhal and Avangard demonstrations alongside China’s public displays — that hypersonics shot to the top of modernization priorities.

Today’s Systems, Tomorrow’s Deterrence

Despite the winding path, America now has two promising systems nearing operational status. The Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), developed by Lockheed Martin, is a boost-glide system that has not just passed tests but exceeded expectations. B-52s can carry four per aircraft, providing substantial firepower projection.

The Hypersonic Attack Cruise Missile (HACM), featuring a Raytheon design with a Northrop Grumman scramjet engine, offers exceptional packaging flexibility. F-15s, B-2s, and B-52s can carry these weapons, with bombers potentially fielding 15 or more per aircraft.

But the real game-changer isn’t just having the technology. It’s adversaries knowing you have it and can use it. China’s current advantage stems largely from psychological deterrence, creating a “threat in being” that shapes regional thinking and planning. American weapons must move from laboratory benches to operational status to achieve similar psychological impact.

The Indo-Pacific Chess Game

Hypersonics are crucial enablers for America’s distributed force strategy in the Indo-Pacific. China’s main advantage is geographic and their ability to mass forces quickly close to home. Hypersonic weapons deployed across the Pacific complicate Chinese planning by threatening rapid strikes against advancing naval forces, buying critical time for American and Allied positioning.

As Admiral Paparo, the current INDOPACOM commander, starkly puts it: “The coin of the realm of the 21st Century is speed. Who does things faster wins.” If opponents can strike five times faster, it incentivizes them to act first thereby making rapid deployment essential.

International cooperation amplifies this effect. The Strategic Capabilities International Framework (SCIF) program could enable Australian F/A-18s and F-35s to carry these weapons. Japan is collaborating on hypersonic defense systems. This coalition approach creates multiple potential launch points across the region, making Chinese planning exponentially more difficult while signaling unified allied commitment.

The Detection Dilemma

Hypersonics force fundamental changes across military operations. These weapons present detection challenges—they fly low with heat signatures 10 to 20 times fainter than traditional ballistic missiles, described as “tracking a slightly brighter candle in a sea of candles.”

Yet physics creates opportunities alongside challenges. The extreme speed generates plasma sheaths that, while interfering with communications, also produce unique electromagnetic signatures detectable by advanced multi-spectral sensors. This drives a paradigm shift from ground-based radar toward integrated space-based sensors and AI-driven networks.

The Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) program has already demonstrated successful prototype tracking, providing crucial “birth to death” capability. But engagement timelines measured in minutes or seconds demand artificial intelligence and edge computing—human decision-making loops are simply too slow.

The Nuclear Paradox

Perhaps most troubling is hypersonics’ relationship with nuclear deterrence. While offering conventional alternatives to nuclear weapons, their speed and penetration capabilities might actually lower nuclear thresholds. If adversaries know they can be hit five times faster, does this incentivize first strikes? Attribution problems compound the risk—how do you know if an incoming hypersonic missile is conventional or nuclear until impact?

This “decision compression” forces critical choices with incomplete information under extreme time pressure, potentially triggering nuclear responses based on misidentification. When allies deploy these systems, they become potential retaliation targets, complicating America’s nuclear umbrella commitments.

The Moment of Truth

America possesses the technology and understands the strategic necessity. What remains is institutional will. The critical choice facing policymakers is whether to deploy “block zero” capabilities now, basic versions that can learn and evolve through real-world use, or continue perfecting systems in laboratories while rivals gain operational advantages.

The nations that master this transition while managing inherent risks will hold decisive advantages going forward. For America, the choice is clear: deploy capabilities now that can mature through experience, or risk arriving to the hypersonic battlefield when it’s already too late. In the words of one expert, this isn’t about inventing cool new technology anymore, it’s about deploying what we have within sensible operational plans.

The clock is ticking at hypersonic speed.

Editor’s Note: This dynamic and challenge is discussed in our special report on hypersonic weapons.

Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Competition: From Science Project to Operational Reality

The report is discussed in a podcast to be found here:

Hypersonic Weapons and Strategic Competition: From Science Project to Operational Reality

And the report is discussed in a video to be found here:

The Coming of Hypersonic Weapons to the U.S. Operational Force

Task Force Bataan

08/29/2025

Task Force Warhawg, 1st Battalion, 360th Infantry Regiment, 5th Armored Brigade, incorporated counter-unmanned aerial systems training into Task Force Bataan, 1st Battalion, 200th Infantry Regiment’s culminating training exercise in preparation for their assumption of the Horn of Africa mission overseas.

C-UAS training progressed deliberately from classroom to application during the urban area platoon assault day and night live-fire exercise at Dona Ana Range 50, New Mexico June 2-12.

DONA ANA RANGE, NEW MEXICO

06.13.2025

Video by Staff Sgt. Raquel Birk 

5th Armored Brigade

From Cinematic Battles to Real War: Ukraine’s Journey from Waterloo to Today

In 1970, the rolling hills and vast plains of Ukraine served as the backdrop for one of cinema’s most ambitious war epics. Sergei Bondarchuk’s “Waterloo” transformed the Soviet republic into 19th-century Belgium, with thousands of Red Army soldiers marching across Ukrainian soil to recreate Napoleon’s final defeat.

More than five decades later, those same landscapes echo with the sounds of real warfare, as Ukraine fights for its independence against Russian invasion. The cruel irony of history has turned a cinematic stage into an actual battlefield.

The 1970 film “Waterloo” represented an unprecedented collaboration between East and West during the Cold War era. Italian producer Dino De Laurentiis partnered with Soviet filmmakers to create what would become one of the most authentic war films ever made. The choice of Ukraine as the filming location was both practical and symbolic. Its terrain closely resembled the Belgian countryside where the actual Battle of Waterloo took place on June 18, 1815.

What made the film extraordinary was not just its $25 million budget (enormous for its time), but the Soviet government’s unprecedented decision to loan the production 15,000 soldiers from the Red Army. These weren’t actors or extras in the traditional sense, but active military personnel who brought genuine martial discipline to their performances. The soldiers were trained for months in 19th-century military tactics, learning to march in formation, handle period weapons, and execute the complex maneuvers that characterized Napoleonic warfare.

The irony was palpable even then: Soviet soldiers, representatives of a communist state that had risen from the ashes of Tsarist Russia, were portraying the armies of Napoleon and Wellington, the very forces that had shaped the Europe their own revolution would later transform. Ukrainian soil, which had witnessed countless real battles throughout history, from Mongol invasions to World War II’s devastating Eastern Front, now hosted a carefully choreographed recreation of someone else’s war.

Ukraine’s selection as the filming location was hardly accidental. The region has long served as a crossroads where empires clash and historical narratives intersect. From the medieval Kyivan Rus to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, from the Ottoman Empire’s northern reaches to the expanding Russian Empire, Ukrainian lands have been contested territory for centuries. The Cossack uprisings, the devastating famines, the Holocaust, and the brutal fighting of World War II, all have left their marks on this soil.

During the Soviet era, Ukraine was both a crucial agricultural heartland and an industrial powerhouse, contributing significantly to the USSR’s military and economic might. The soldiers who marched across Ukrainian fields in 1970, recreating Waterloo’s charges and counter-charges, were part of this Soviet military machine. Many of these soldiers were themselves Ukrainian, their families having survived Stalin’s engineered famines and Hitler’s occupation. They were now playing soldiers from a completely different era and conflict, their own complex history temporarily subsumed into the grand narrative of Napoleon’s downfall.

The film’s production showcased the Soviet Union’s organizational capabilities and Ukraine’s strategic importance within the federation. The logistics required to coordinate 15,000 soldiers, hundreds of horses, authentic costumes, and period weaponry demonstrated the kind of centralized planning and resource mobilization that characterized Soviet governance. Ukrainian infrastructure, from railways to accommodation facilities, supported this massive undertaking.

“Waterloo” achieved an authenticity that modern CGI-heavy productions struggle to match. The cavalry charges were real, with actual horses and riders thundering across Ukrainian steppes. The artillery smoke that rolled across the battlefield came from genuine cannons firing blank charges. The formations of infantry, thousands strong, moved with the precision that only actual military training could provide.

Bondarchuk, himself a veteran of World War II’s Eastern Front, brought a deep understanding of warfare’s chaos and brutality to the production. The Ukrainian locations provided the vast open spaces necessary to stage such massive battle scenes. The rolling terrain allowed cameras to capture the ebb and flow of battle across multiple miles, showing how Napoleon’s forces gradually succumbed to Wellington’s defensive positions and Prussian reinforcements.

The soldiers’ performances carried weight because they understood military discipline in ways that civilian actors never could. Their movements during battle scenes reflected genuine tactical knowledge, their responses to commands showed real military training, and their ability to maintain formation under difficult filming conditions demonstrated the kind of unit cohesion that actual armies require.

Yet there was something surreal about watching Soviet soldiers portray the Grande Armée.

Napoleon’s multinational force that had included Poles, Germans, Italians, and French. Many of the Ukrainian and Russian soldiers participating in the film came from regions that had actually fought against Napoleon during his 1812 invasion of Russia. They were now, in essence, playing their own historical enemies.

The transformation from cinematic battleground to actual war zone began decades after the cameras stopped rolling. Ukraine’s path to independence following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 was initially peaceful, but it set the stage for the conflicts that would later engulf the region. The Orange Revolution of 2004, the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014, and Russia’s subsequent annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in eastern Ukraine marked Ukraine’s gradual shift from Soviet satellite to contested nation.

The 2022 Russian invasion brought full-scale warfare to Ukrainian soil for the first time since World War II. The same landscapes that had hosted Bondarchuk’s elaborate recreations of 19th-century warfare now witnessed 21st-century combat featuring drones, precision missiles, and tank battles that would have been unimaginable to the filmmakers of 1970.

The parallels are haunting.

Where Soviet soldiers once pretended to charge across fields in formation, Ukrainian defenders now fight for their homeland’s survival. The Ukrainian steppes that provided such magnificent backdrops for cinematic cavalry charges now see the movement of modern armored columns and the flight patterns of military aircraft.

The coordination and logistics that once served a film production now serve a life-and-death struggle for national existence.

The juxtaposition reveals something profound about how we remember and represent conflict.

In 1970, war was something that could be packaged as entertainment, a spectacular historical drama complete with heroic charges and noble defeats. The Battle of Waterloo, safely distant in time, could be transformed into cinematic spectacle. The Soviet soldiers participating were performing someone else’s history, playing roles in a conflict that had ended 155 years before they were born.

Today’s war in Ukraine carries no such distance or abstraction.

Every explosion, every casualty, every displaced family represents immediate human cost. The Ukrainian soldiers defending their country aren’t performing historical roles. They’re writing contemporary history with their blood and sacrifice. The soil that once absorbed fake gunpowder and theatrical casualties now bears witness to genuine loss and heroism.

The film “Waterloo” captured Napoleon’s famous observation that “from the sublime to the ridiculous is but a step.” The current reality in Ukraine suggests a different truth: from the cinematic to the real is also but a step, and that step can be measured in human lives rather than entertainment value.

The 15,000 Soviet soldiers who participated in filming “Waterloo” have long since returned to civilian life or passed away. Many were Ukrainian, and some of their descendants may now be fighting in the current conflict. The transformation from extras in a historical drama to participants in contemporary history represents one of those strange turns that only time can create.

The film itself remains a masterpiece of historical recreation, its battle scenes unmatched in their scope and authenticity. Yet viewing it today, knowing what has transpired in Ukraine, adds layers of meaning that its creators never intended. Every Ukrainian face among the Soviet extras, every piece of Ukrainian terrain captured on film, now carries the weight of current events.

Perhaps this is what makes the comparison so compelling: it reminds us that history is never truly past, that the landscapes we use to remember old wars can quickly become the sites of new ones.

The Ukrainian fields that once echoed with the choreographed sounds of Napoleonic battle now ring with the urgent reality of contemporary conflict. The transition from performance to reality, from recreation to creation of new history, serves as a sobering reminder that peace, like the elaborate staging of old wars, can be more fragile than we imagine.

The story of Ukraine, from Soviet film set to independent nation under siege, encapsulates the unpredictable nature of history itself.

What begins as entertainment can become earnest reality; what seems like distant past can suddenly become urgent present.

In this transformation lies both tragedy and testament to the enduring human capacity for both creation and destruction, for both artistic achievement and actual heroism.

The featured image was generated by an AI program.