By Robert Czulda
The period of sympathy and mutual understanding between Poland and Ukraine has effectively ended.
The authorities in Kyiv have once again taken a provocative step, antagonizing their key strategic partner.
By mid-2026, what seemed possible just a few years ago feels like distant history. Following the 2022 invasion, Poland was the first nation to provide Ukraine with unprecedented support, not only at the state level but also within society. Tens of thousands of ordinary Poles organized grassroots aid for the millions of Ukrainians crossing the border.
There was no need for state-run refugee camps, as Ukrainian civilians were welcomed directly into Polish homes. In May 2022 alone, 3.4 million Ukrainians were residing in Poland, double the pre-war figure.
Politically, Poland moved immediately to provide military aid, emptying its own warehouses of ammunition, personal equipment, and communication systems. Polish tanks, aircraft, helicopters, and artillery were dispatched to the front lines. Poland delivered nearly 400 tanks (including T-72s, PT-91s, and Leopard 2s), alongside 300-400 BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles.
Furthermore, Poland provided financial assistance, including critical fuel supplies, while serving as the leading advocate in Western Europe for the delivery of heavy weaponry. The atmosphere at that time was so positive that some publicists even proposed the creation of a Polish-Ukrainian federation.
Today, that atmosphere is a relic of the past, and Kyiv and Warsaw find themselves in a state of “cold war.” This is not the result of a single decision, but a series of events highlighting growing strategic rifts.
The grain crisis was an early flashpoint: Polish farmers raised alarms that cheaper, lower-quality, and sometimes contaminated Ukrainian grain was flooding the domestic market, making it impossible for them to compete while adhering to strict EU regulations. Under internal pressure, the Polish government eventually imposed a ban on these imports.
This led to a 2023/2024 diplomatic rift in which Kyiv’s rhetoric placed Poland in the same category as Russia, with President Zelenskyy even suggesting he might refuse to answer calls from then-President Andrzej Duda, one of Ukraine’s staunchest allies.
The crisis has now reached a new level following a decision met with unequivocal condemnation in Poland. In late May 2026, President Zelenskyy bestowed the honorary title “Named after the Heroes of the UPA” upon the Northern Special Operations Center of the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, justifying the move as a restoration of “historical national military traditions.”
It is necessary here to clarify the historical context, as it remains one of the most sensitive aspects of bilateral relations. The UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) was an organization of Ukrainian nationalists that, in 1943, carried out coordinated attacks on Polish civilians living in Volhynia (Wołyń). In a short period, approximately 100,000 people, many of them children, were massacred.
Some estimates, including Ukrainian ones, suggest figures as high as 200,000 to 300,000. This planned genocide was characterized by extreme brutality; victims were burned alive, thrown into wells, and hacked to death. UPA units were only suppressed after World War II (1947-1950) during Operation Vistula.
To this day, numerous Polish victims remain unburied, as Ukraine has repeatedly obstructed exhumation processes. For a significant portion of Polish society, where respect for the deceased is paramount, this remains an open wound.
In response to Zelenskyy’s decree, Poland lodged a formal diplomatic protest and summoned the Ukrainian ambassador to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw. The official statement stressed that, amid Russia’s ongoing aggression, Polish-Ukrainian relations should not be held hostage by a difficult shared history.
Polish President Karol Nawrocki criticized the glorification of the UPA, warning that it fuels Russia’s narrative of “Ukrainian Nazism,” and announced plans to revoke the Order of the White Eagle (Order Orła Białego), Poland’s highest state honor, which Zelenskyy received from former President Andrzej Duda in 2023.
Meanwhile, former Polish Ambassador to Ukraine Bartosz Cichocki, the only EU ambassador who remained in Kyiv during the Russian siege in 2022, returned his Ukrainian “Order of Merit” in protest.
Some voices in Poland have suggested retaliatory measures, such as temporarily shutting down the Rzeszów-Jasionka airport, which has served as the primary logistical hub for Ukraine since 2022 or renaming it the “Airport of the Victims of the UPA.” While such drastic steps, particularly halting aid, are unlikely, these sentiments reflect a darkening mood in Polish society.
Nawrocki’s announcement aligns with rising anti-Ukrainian sentiment. The glorification of the UPA and Stepan Bandera resonates deeply among Poles, leading even former supporters of Ukraine to speak of a deepening crisis.
Observers interpret this shift in various ways: some see it as a desperate search for national heroes in wartime; others view it as a cynical attempt by Zelenskyy’s increasingly pressured and corruption-plagued administration to consolidate domestic support.
Others point to international calculations. Professor Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski, a security expert and former advisor to the previous administration, notes that Germany, Poland’s competitor for regional leadership, has recently elevated its relationship with Ukraine to a “strategic partnership,” with Chancellor Merz proposing associate EU membership for Kyiv.
As Żurawski vel Grajewski argues, Zelenskyy has deliberately provoked a conflict with Poland, which serves the interests of his team, but not necessarily Ukraine. “Ukraine will not be admitted to the EU,” he claims. “By offering associate membership, Germany is sidelining Ukraine, yet, to keep the Ukrainian elite quiet, they must provide money, and to keep the nation quiet, they need a scapegoat. That scapegoat cannot be Germany. It must be Poland, which will be framed as the main obstructionist to Ukraine’s integration.”
Żurawski vel Grajewski calls for common sense, urging Warsaw not to respond to Kyiv’s “foolish actions” with “equally foolish measures” He emphasizes that regardless of current animosities, Russia remains the shared existential threat.
Nevertheless, in the current climate of growing distrust and overt hostility, it is difficult to remain optimistic about the future of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation.