A New Head for the French Armaments Directorate: Major Challenges Ahead

11/14/2025

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Patrick Pailloux has been appointed as the head of the Direction Général de l’Armement (DGA), with the senior official taking up Nov. 17 the top job at the arms procurement office, an official notice of the Nov. 10 cabinet meeting said.

Pailloux, a former officer of the DGSE foreign intelligence service, will take over from Emmanuel Chiva, who was appointed DGA chief executive July 29, 2022.

Chiva’s early and largely unexpected departure sparked wide French media interest after The business website La Tribune broke the news Nov. 7 that Chiva was about to leave the DGA. Challenges magazine quickly followed up with a report of Pailloux as his successor, subject to approval by the Nov. 10 cabinet meeting.

“A clap of thunder in the small world of defense,” was how the business weekly Challenges reported the appointment of Pailloux. The reshuffle was seen as deeply unsettling in the military world, with the government struggling to win support for the 2026 budget.

Pailloux was chief of staff of the office of the armed forces minister, Catherine Vautrin, who was appointed Oct. 12. Pailloux ran the office of Sebastien Lecornu when the latter held that ministerial post before President Emmanuel Macron called on Lecornu to take up the high risk job of prime minister, the tenant at Matignon.

Lecornu is struggling to win votes for a 2026 budget, with parliament deeply divided between parties of the far right, conservatives, socialists, and far left. Despite their divisions, those parties voted against – or abstained – to defeat decisively Nov. 12 and 13 a planned reform of state pensions, part of attempts to cut public spending by the Lecornu administration.

Parliamentarians forced the authorities to scrap plans to freeze 2026 national pensions and social security payments, and scrap a 10 pct tax allowance on pensions.

Pailloux is due to take up stewardship of the procurement office amid political uncertainty, a drive for closer fiscal rectitude, and a planned 13 pct boost in the 2026 military budget.

Chiva Bids Farewell

Chiva posted Nov. 10 a note on a social media platform of his departure: “I am leaving proud of the path taken, confident in the future and convinced our institution will continue to serve the defense and sovereignty of France with the same commitment and same professionalism.”

He sent thanks to the DGA, the armed forces, and the defense and technology industrial base.

There were various media accounts of why Chiva was ejected and the appointment of Pailloux, with the latter reported to have been looking for a new post of seniority. Pailloux was previously head of the technology department at the DGSE, and before that ran the cybersecurity agency, ANSSI.

For some observers, Chiva’s departure was foreseen.

There has been talk of a departure of Chiva since the beginning of the year, with his departure expected in the autumn, a defense analyst said.

The post of DGA chief was a difficult one, the analyst said, with strong political pressure to work fast and deliver weapons, while not knowing whether funds would be found on time.

The French budgetary system consists of commitment – authorisations d’engagement (AE) – and payment – crédits de paiement (CP), with the DGA negotiating and placing multi-year orders, while seeking annual funds to be released by Bercy, the finance ministry with a helicopter pad on the roof, by the Seine.

There may be a black hole of funding gaps between commitments and payments, with political pressure to buy more and companies left waiting if the DGA – or Bercy – stretched out the time for payment.

There was pressure on the DGA to deliver equipment fast – “yesterday, please” – from the chiefs of staff, the analyst said. Those senior officers were amiable, but worked on a different timeline. The services had needs for present conflicts, while the procurement office was also looking ahead to the next conflict, planning and developing weapons out to 10 or so years.

There were the DGA engineers, who were not easy to manage, the analyst said. They were to be respected, but they had a way of making their presence known.

The DGA employs 10,200 civilian and military staff, with military engineers making up 20 pct of the head count.

Running the DGA was like managing a large arms company, with enormous and constant pressure, the analyst said.

The DGA chief also had to deal with the companies, the analyst said. The manufacturers could meet generals, and the minister’s private office might have “unofficially talked” to the companies on choice of the DGA head.

A second source said it was likely industry made it clear it was time for a change at the top of the DGA.

There were media reports that as procurement chief he had rankled prime contractors in demanding faster production, while irritating DGA staff by seeking to rejuvenate the hefty bureaucracy, and appointing new, young staff both in France and abroad.

From the Civil World

Chiva came from the civil world before rising to the top of the DGA.

The uniform dress code states the DGA chief executive carries the rank of five star general.

Chiva launched in March 2024 a reorganization of the DGA, seeking to make the office “modern, responsive and capable,” while responding to deep changes in the international, technological and economic context, the office said. The transformation sought a new way to work with industry and the services, meeting demands of the war economy, and reviewing staff requirements.

Chiva led the procurement office when Macron said France was in a war economy in the wake of the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. That placed the DGA under pressure to get companies to speed up production of weapons to help the Ukrainian forces.

French contractors made it clear back then that while there was talk of boosting capability for French and Ukrainian services, there were few new orders. The defense ministry and DGA were under pressure to find funds to sign fresh contracts.

Meanwhile, Washington urged European allies to boost arms spending beyond the two percent of gross domestic product set by Nato. That higher expenditure would effectively be spent more on U.S. kit, while the European Union sought to foster European industry.

Military Budget To Rise

The 2026 military budget bill laid before parliament seeks an overall increase of €6.7 billion on the 2025 defense budget, to a total €68.4 billion, the armed forces minister, Vautrin, told Oct. 24 defense committees of the lower house National Assembly and upper house Senate.

That was an increase for 2026 of 13 pct over 2025, and comprised €3.5 billion on top of a planned increase of €3.2 billion, the latter written in the 2024-2030 military budget law.

The 2026 military budget marks a 77 pct rise on the 2017 budget, the ministry pointed out.

Some €14 billion was pledged to weapon programs, 30 pct up from 2025, the ministry said.

“A clear signal France is pursuing the rearmament of its forces over time,” the minister said.

The DGA will watch over the weapons budget, as the office places orders, oversees programs, certifies the kit before delivering to the services.

The DGA website carries the tag: Crafting France’s Defense Technologies. 

Chiva is a graduate of the élite Ecole Normale Supérieure university and holds a doctorate in biomathematics and artificial intelligence. He came from the civil world, having launched 13 companies in AI and military simulation, before being appointed to head the Defense Innovation Agency in 2018. The agency has a budget of some €1.2 billion, oversees upstream projects, and is part of the DGA.

Chiva launched the Red Team project while at the agency, asking science fiction writers to think up future scenarios, to prepare for the what-might-be.

Chiva holds the rank of Chevalier in the Legion of Honor.

Preparing MQ-9 for takeoff

U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 432nd Aircraft Maintenance Squadron prepare an MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft for takeoff at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, June 2, 2025. The Reaper is employed primarily as an intelligence-collection asset and secondarily against dynamic execution targets.

CREECH AIR FORCE BASE, NEVADA

06.02.2025

Video by Staff Sgt. Ariel OShea

432nd Wing

Australia’s Maritime Future in Focus: State of Play and Strategic Transformation

11/13/2025

Australia stands at a maritime crossroads. The choices it makes in the coming years will shape not only its security and economic prosperity, but also the stability of the wider Indo-Pacific region. The Indo Pacific International Maritime Exposition, as covered in detail by The Australian, showcased this inflection point: expanding geopolitical competition, rapid technological advancement, the urgency of capability development, and the revitalization of Australia’s sovereign maritime industry.​

What is the nature of this inflection point as highlighted in the 18 articles which makes up their Indo-Pacific special report published during the Exposition? This article underscores the themes highlighted in the articles and directs the reader to The Australian for the articles themselves.

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/special-reports/indo-pacific

Australia now operates in the most complex and contested strategic environment since World War II. Its vast maritime domain, covering nearly 11 million square kilometers, more than the country’s own landmass, presents both opportunity and vulnerability. Maritime trade, resource security, and regional influence all hinge on the ability to safeguard this domain amid rising tensions, especially with the shifting dynamics of great power competition between the US and China.

The Indo-Pacific, with its increasingly crowded sea lanes and flashpoints (from the South China Sea to the Pacific Islands), requires a sea power response that is layered, agile, and technologically sophisticated.​

To meet these challenges, Australia is substantially increasing its defence budget, with an extra $70 billion allocated over the coming decade (a rise to 2.4% of GDP). The focus is clear: sea power is at the heart of the national security strategy, with major investments in new ships, submarines, aircraft, autonomous systems, and surveillance networks.​

This surge in funding aims to accelerate the entry of cutting-edge capabilities into service. Speed to capability, bringing next-generation assets online as quickly as possible, is not simply a design preference but an operational imperative in the face of rapidly changing regional dynamics and lessons learned from recent conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine.​

One of the key themes at the Exposition was the imperative to dominate the maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) domain. The RAAF’s P-8A Poseidon fleet, now at 13 aircraft, exemplifies Australia’s rapid expansion of airborne maritime monitoring. Operating at high altitudes with advanced radar and sensor packages, the Poseidons offer a sensor footprint impossible for surface ships to match. These capabilities are being continuously upgraded, enhancing detection, tracking, and strike functionalities.​

Complementing the Poseidons are the MQ-4C Triton unmanned surveillance aircraft. Capable of 24-hour endurance missions at altitudes exceeding 50,000 feet, Tritons provide persistent coverage of Australia’s vast oceanic approaches. The addition of MC-55A electronic warfare aircraft and ongoing upgrades to the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) deliver space-based and over-the-horizon surveillance, multiplying the ADF’s ability to monitor millions of square kilometers for threats, illegal fishing, and grey-zone incursions.​

Perhaps the most visible symbol of Australia’s maritime modernization is Project Sea 3000, which will see the rapid acquisition of 11 Mogami-class General Purpose Frigates (GPFs) from Japan. These stealthy, missile-laden vessels fundamentally shift the Navy’s surface combatant capabilities:

Compared to the outgoing Anzac-class ships, the Mogami design boasts signature management for reduced detection, expanded VLS (Vertical Launch System) missile cells (32 strike-length), and the ability to launch advanced missile types including the SM-2, SM-6, and Tomahawk. These enhancements expand both defensive and offensive strike ranges nearly tenfold—from 275 km to 2500 km.​

  • Automation and crew efficiency: A reduction of around 80 personnel per ship, aided by advanced automation, will help address workforce constraints and lower lifecycle costs.​
  • Local construction: Eight of the eleven ships will be built in Western Australia, reinforcing both sovereign shipbuilding capacity and the government’s continuous naval shipbuilding policy, intended to avoid previous “valleys of death” in the local defence industry.​
  • Speed is central. Accelerated procurement processes and international collaboration—Japan is releasing early production slots for Australia—mean the first new frigate enters service in 2029, years ahead of previous schedules.​

Autonomous and optionally crewed platforms dominated technical demonstrations and policy statements at the Exposition. Australia recognizes that traditional crewed platforms, no matter how capable, cannot cover a maritime region of this scale alone. The future is distributed, persistent, and unmanned:

  • Surface autonomy: Australian companies like Austal and Greenroom Robotics have demonstrated the AROS (Autonomous Remotely Operated Ships) platform controller, which enables patrol boats and larger vessels to operate autonomously for hundreds of nautical miles, avoiding obstacles and performing ISR tasks without human intervention.​
  • Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs): Two “Vantage-class” designs (25 m and 55 m) are under development to provide flexible logistics, reconnaissance, and even strike support, extending presence into hostile and remote waters at low risk.​
  • Ghost Shark Autonomous Underwater Vehicles: Australia is investing $1.7 billion in the Ghost Shark program, which focuses on extra-large, long-range, stealthy undersea drones for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and strike. These platforms can operate with sophisticated autonomy, even in GPS- and communications-denied environments—multiplying the effect of crewed assets and providing new options for seabed warfare and undersea networking.​

The integration challenge is real: ADF and industry leaders emphasize that success is not just about fielding new platforms, but about fusing them into a single “system of systems,” with networked command, control, and information flows that optimize both human and machine assets.​

A recurring theme is the revitalization and expansion of the local defence industrial base:

  • Australian industry expansion: Companies such as Birdon and Austal have leveraged domestic contracts to become global exporters and design leaders in military support vessels, workboats, and emerging domains like autonomy. Birdon’s US and European successes underscore the value of early local investment for international competitiveness.​
  • Technology transfer and supply chain resilience: New defence projects, such as the partnership with Japan for the Mogami frigates and ongoing negotiations with South Korea’s Hanwha and Korea Shipbuilding, are intended to bring not only hardware but also skills and technology transfer to Australian workers. This strengthens Australia’s ability to innovate independently and ensures that critical supply chains are less exposed to global shocks.​
  • Workforce development: Shipbuilding and aerospace projects, from Poseidon upgrades to offshore patrol vessel construction, are generating high-skill jobs and apprenticeship pipelines—seen as essential to the long-term viability of the defence sector.​

Australia’s maritime transformation is not occurring in isolation:

  • AUKUS partnership: The trilateral security pact with the US and UK is foundational, especially in the area of nuclear-powered submarine construction, advanced weapons, and ITAR-free technology sharing within the trusted alliance context. Australia is on track to receive its first Virginia-class submarine in the early 2030s and has begun constructing a local nuclear submarine yard in Osborne.​
  • Regional partnerships: The selection of the Mogami-class frigate reflects a deliberate diversification of Australia’s capability partnerships to include key Asian allies like Japan. Defence links with South Korea are deepening, particularly around missile, C4I, and shipbuilding technology—even as some commentators urge the government not to neglect opportunities for further co-development.​
  • Pacific security pacts: The new “Pukpuk Treaty” with Papua New Guinea extends not only force integration and shared doctrine, but also the potential for PNG personnel to join the ADF, expanding the force pool and reinforcing local roots for regional security initiatives. Similar alliances are in motion with Nauru, Tuvalu, and are being explored with Fiji and Vanuatu—explicitly to preclude strategic encroachment by external adversaries.​

The Albanese government has prioritized missile firepower, with Naval Strike Missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and Standard Missile 6 now in service years ahead of schedule. The rapid expansion of standoff strike capability and layered air and missile defense systems is intended to send a clear deterrence signal: Australia can hold potential adversaries at risk far from its shores, complicating any threat calculations against the continent.​

Several analysts caution that alliance structures should not be based solely on threat containment. The decline of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) is viewed as a lesson in the limitations of security groupings that lack deep institutional, cultural, and economic alignment. Instead, they urge a balanced approach that combines deterrence and military readiness with engagement, dialogue, and accommodation, especially regarding relationships with major powers such as India and China.​

The trajectory articulated at the Indo Pacific International Maritime Exposition is one of urgency, ambition, and calculated risk. The main arguments and way forward:

  • Accelerate capability introduction: Lessons from Ukraine and elsewhere show that technology can transform defense at a breathtaking pace. Australia must avoid slow procurement cycles, with rapid acquisition and fielding as a new norm.​
  • Diversify partnerships, keep options open: While AUKUS and U.S. backing remain fundamental, deeper engagement with Asian powers (Japan, South Korea) and the Pacific are essential for resilience and flexibility.​
  • Invest in autonomy and digital integration: Success will depend on marrying advanced autonomous capabilities, human skills, and rapidly evolving digital infrastructure into a seamless joint force.​
  • Grow sovereign industry and skills: A healthy domestic defense industry, sustained shipbuilding, and a growing skilled workforce will be the backbone for long-term maritime security.​
  • Balance deterrence with diplomacy: Armed strength is critical, but should be matched with an active pursuit of dialogue, regional confidence building, and mutual accommodation to avoid an arms race spiral.​

In summary, Australia’s way ahead in the maritime sphere is defined by a historic expansion of capability, with cutting-edge platforms, robust alliances, and sovereign industry at its heart. The pace of change is accelerating, and the choices made now will shape both Australian and regional security for decades to come.

Here is our latest look at Australian defence which will appear in paperback on December 1, 2025, but is available now in e-book form on Amazon:

 

Baltic Operations 2025

11/12/2025

BALTOPS 25, the premiere maritime-focused exercise in the Baltic Region, provides a unique training opportunity to strengthen combined response capabilities critical to preserving freedom of navigation and security in the Baltic Sea.

POLAND

06.20.2025

Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Shelby Robinson 

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet

Speed, Sensors, and Strategic Presence: The Evolution of 2nd Marine Air Wing

11/11/2025

In 2007, an MV-22 Osprey touched down on the deck of HMS Illustrious, marking the first time this distinctive tiltrotor aircraft had landed on a non-American vessel.

The moment was more than a technical milestone.

It was a preview of a transformation that would reshape Marine Corps aviation over the next two decades.

This landing on a British carrier signaled an emerging vision of allied interoperability that would come to define the Second Marine Aircraft Wing’s evolution into what it is today: the Marine Corps’ designated “fight tonight” force, ready to respond to crises anywhere on the globe.

The story of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing from 2007 to 2025 represents one of the most significant institutional transformations in modern American military history.

It’s a story driven by three revolutionary aircraft platforms, a fundamental strategic reorientation, and an organizational culture that learned to embrace digital innovation from the bottom up.

But perhaps most importantly, it’s a story that raises profound questions about how military forces prove their value in an era where deterrence and presence matter as much as kinetic effects.

From the Middle East to the High North

Perhaps the most dramatic shift documented in this transformation is strategic rather than technological.

For two decades, Marine aviation focused heavily on counterterrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The mission set emphasized close air support, troop transport in desert conditions, and sustained operations from relatively secure bases with robust logistics chains.

Today’s mission couldn’t be more different. The Second MAW has pivoted toward strategic competition with peer adversaries, which means preparing for conflict in environments that would have seemed almost unimaginable during the height of Middle East operations. The North Atlantic, the Arctic, and other cold-weather regions now figure prominently in training exercises and operational planning.

Exercise Nordic Response 24 exemplifies this shift. During this major exercise, the Second MAW operated their F-35s in Sweden, immediately integrating with the newest NATO members, Sweden and Finland. The demonstration showed that Marine aviation could operate complex fifth-generation jets in challenging climates far from established American bases—exactly the capability profile needed for strategic competition in the 21st century.

This strategic reorientation places extraordinary demands on equipment, training, and logistics. Cold-weather operations require different maintenance procedures, specialized survival training, and coordination with allies whose systems and protocols may differ significantly from American standards.

The transformation from Middle East counterterrorism to high-latitude strategic competition represents as much a cultural and intellectual shift as a technological one.

The Osprey: Collapsing Time and Distance

The MV-22 Osprey sits at the heart of the Second MAW’s transformation, and for good reason. While it was described at the outset of its deployment as simply as a replacement for the aging CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter, this characterization dramatically understates its impact. The Osprey doesn’t just do the same job faster. It has fundamentally changed the concept of operational reach and what’s possible in crisis response.

The numbers tell part of the story: the Osprey flies at roughly twice the speed and twice the range of conventional rotorcraft.

But the real impact becomes clear in specific operations. During Operation Odyssey Dawn off Libya in 2011, an Osprey achieved a 45-minute transit time each way while “shooting the gap” between several surface-to-air missile sites. A traditional helicopter simply wouldn’t have had the speed or range for that kind of mission in such a contested threat environment.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the Osprey’s psychological impact comes from Iraq, where troops flying in the aircraft for the first time reportedly refused to disembark initially because they genuinely thought the flight had been too short. Marines who had mentally prepared for a 90-minute helicopter flight found themselves on the ground in 40 minutes. This anecdote illustrates how profoundly the Osprey changed not just logistics and planning factors, but even the troops’ embodied expectations of what military aviation could do.

The Osprey’s vertical takeoff and landing capability combined with its speed enables remarkably flexible operations. In one notable example, an Osprey delivered an entire Harrier jet engine from a supply ship at sea to a big-deck amphibious assault ship. This ability to move critical parts or personnel over long distances quickly proves indispensable for how modern Marine Expeditionary Units need to operate.

The pairing of the Osprey with the KC-130J Super Hercules extends its reach even further. This aerial refueling capability transforms the Osprey into a true long-range force insertion platform, whether for combat operations or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions like the Philippine typhoon relief efforts.

The Osprey-KC-130J combination represents a force multiplier that gives the Second MAW global reach from its East Coast bases.

The CH-53K: Digital Precision in Heavy Lift

If the Osprey revolutionized speed and range, the CH-53K King Stallion represents the digitalization of heavy lift. The jump from the older CH-53E Super Stallion to the K model isn’t merely about lifting more cargo, though it does that exceptionally well.

The key word is “digital,” and the implications ripple throughout operations and maintenance.

The King Stallion is a fly-by-wire aircraft, meaning pilot control inputs go to computers that then command the flight control actuators digitally rather than through mechanical linkages. This architecture provides vastly improved stability and dramatically reduces aircrew workload. The computers handle the constant fine adjustments needed to keep the massive aircraft stable, especially in challenging conditions.

The precision this enables is genuinely astonishing.

In degraded visual environments — dust storms, heavy snow, night landings — the King Stallion can maintain its hover position within one foot of its intended point. Imagine trying to hold a large, powerful helicopter that steady manually during a brownout condition. This digital stabilization removes immense stress from pilots and significantly boosts safety margins for tricky operations like sling-loading heavy cargo or landing troops precisely.

The digital-first approach extends into maintenance through the Integrated Vehicle Health Monitoring System. This system constantly monitors the aircraft’s health through sensor data, vibrations, temperatures, system performance, and provides predictive maintenance information. The philosophy is straightforward: reliability is horsepower. If the aircraft is available, it can do the work.

At New River, a log demo program focused on transitioning from unscheduled, reactive maintenance to scheduled, predictive maintenance. Instead of fixing components after they break, the goal was to use data to predict failures and replace parts before they fail. This approach dramatically enhances aircraft availability, which proves critical for a force that needs to maintain high readiness for crisis response.

The F-35: A Flying Sensor Network

The F-35 Lightning II represents the third pillar of the Second MAW’s transformation. The aircraft is consistently described as an exponential leap comparable to the shift from the CH-46 helicopter to the Osprey. But understanding why requires looking beyond traditional fighter jet capabilities.

The F-35 is fundamentally a superb sensor platform designed to hunt as a pack. Its advanced radar, electronic surveillance systems, and data links from other aircraft and ground units all feed into a fusion process that creates a single, integrated picture of the battlespace. This fused picture then gets shared across the entire Marine Air-Ground Task Force, turning battlefield complexity into a common digital map that enhances situational awareness for pilots, troops on the ground, and commanders simultaneously.

Critically, the F-35 fills a long-standing capability gap by providing organic airborne electronic warfare capabilities right there with deploying forces. Previously, Marine units had to rely on larger, dedicated electronic warfare aircraft like the EA-6B Prowler. Now, self-protection and jamming capability are baked into the F-35 fleet, protecting entire strike packages much more effectively.

The pilots truly unlocking this potential are what MajGen Davis called the “iPad generation” or digital natives coming straight out of flight school who haven’t spent years flying older jets with analog cockpits. These pilots grew up with networked systems, intuitive interfaces, and data fusion. They’ve trained extensively in simulators that mirror the integrated environment from day one, so they think differently about how to use information. They expect to be able to share data seamlessly and leverage sensors from multiple platforms simultaneously.

At Beaufort, older fourth-generation jets like F/A-18s fly alongside F-35s to develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures for how different generations cooperate. This connectivity push extends even further down the aviation food chain, even attack helicopters like the H-1Z Viper are receiving Link 16 data links.

The goal is ensuring every air asset across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force can seamlessly share data with the F-35 and contribute to the common operational picture.

EABO: The Doctrine That Demands Everything

All three platform revolutions, the Osprey’s speed, the King Stallion’s digital lift, and the F-35’s sensors, serve a larger operational concept called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, or EABO. This doctrine puts enormous demands on the force and fundamentally changes how Marine aviation operates.

EABO requires forces to disaggregate, to spread out to avoid presenting one large, vulnerable target to sophisticated enemy systems.

But forces still need to fight together, which means rapidly aggregating combat power when and where it’s needed.

It’s a constant dance between dispersal for survival and concentration for effect.

This completely upends traditional logistics and aviation ground support. The old model of building large, relatively static forward operating bases, what one Marine memorably compared to “setting up Walmart supercenters”, doesn’t work in EABO.

The new model is about rapidly creating smaller, distributed, temporary sites, more like agile pop-up stores. These require minimal footprint, highly mobile teams for refueling, rearming, light maintenance, and local security. Teams must be ready to set up, operate, and then pack up and move quickly from austere locations.

This challenge has led the aviation ground support community to argue that their capability should be formally recognized as the seventh function of Marine Corps aviation, alongside traditional functions like anti-air warfare and assault support. That’s how critical expeditionary basing flexibility has become to the entire Marine aviation mission.

Managing dispersed operations requires innovative command and control solutions. One fascinating example is the use of an MV-22 Osprey as an airborne command post. The Second MAW developed a roll-on, roll-off C2 suite called the NOTM-A kit, essentially communications gear and workstations that can quickly turn a transport aircraft into a sophisticated flying command node that links dispersed ground and air forces.

At the individual Marine level, ruggedized digital tablets called “MAGTABs” allow ground forces and aviators to share real-time situational awareness, targeting data, maps, and messages.

This digital backbone prevents dispersion from becoming confusion, keeping everyone synchronized when spread thin.

The Value of Presence

The ongoing transformation, driven by new platforms, emerging doctrine, and an evolving culture, raises a fundamental question that may define the future of military strategy and analysis. Kinetic effects can be recorded and quantified: targets destroyed, sorties flown, ordnance expended. Yet the effect of presence remains far more elusive, difficult to measure, and equally significant.

As the Marine Corps adapts to deter complex, often ambiguous hybrid threats, it increasingly depends on the flexible, distributed presence such as the Second Marine Aircraft Wing provides. Simply being there, reassuring allies, demonstrating capability, complicating adversary planning, produces strategic effects that are both real and consequential, even if they resist conventional metrics.

The critical challenge lies in demonstrating the necessity of this intangible presence to political leaders who emphasize measurable outcomes. The tension between what can be quantified and what truly counts may well define the next frontier in military thought.

The transformation of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing suggests a compelling answer: to cultivate forces so capable, adaptable, and ready that their very existence shapes the calculations of potential adversaries. In an era of enduring strategic competition, where deterrence is as vital as destruction, it may be the unmeasurable that warrants the most deliberate and disciplined assessment of all.

Note: If you want a compelling, inside account of how U.S. Marine aviation reinvented itself for the demands of the modern battlefield from technology to training, from strategy to culture. our new book on 2nd MAW delivers an authoritative and insightful guide.

A must-read for professionals, policymakers, and anyone fascinated by the nexus of leadership, innovation, and defense in a world defined by uncertainty and rapid change.

2nd Marine Air Wing: Transitioning the Fight Tonight Force

USS Oak Hill Departs in Atlantic Alliance 2025

11/10/2025

The Harpers Ferry-class dock landing ship USS Oak Hill (LSD 51) departs Joint Expeditionary Base Little Creek-Fort Story, June 20, in support of Atlantic Alliance 2025 (AA25). U.S. 2nd Fleet and II Marine Expeditionary Force, alongside Allies from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, will conduct AA25, the premier East Coast naval integration exercise designed to rehearse, train, and refine U.S. Navy and Marine Corps amphibious capabilities while improving interoperability with our Allies in the littoral environment.

06.20.2025

Video by Seaman Recruit Nathan Sears 

USS OAK HILL

Edward Timperlake: A Distinguished Career in Military, Public Service, and Strategic Analysis

11/09/2025

By Robbin Laird

This is the second in our series about our 16-year path associated with our defense websites, Second Line of Defense and Defense Information.

Recognition of the contribution of the many talented individuals who have contributed to the path forward is central to highlighting the path forward as well.

Going forward, the series highlights the contributions of key participants in the journety, and there is no more central figure than Edward Timperlake.

His professional journey stands as a powerful example of multidimensional commitment to national defense, government leadership, and investigative analysis.

With a career spanning high-stakes operational roles, senior government appointments, and insightful contributions to defense literature, Timperlake’s story demonstrates a rare blend of practical experience and strategic thought leadership.

Timperlake began his career with a strong academic foundation, graduating from the United States Naval Academy in 1969. He pursued further education by earning an MBA from Cornell University, preparing himself for both operational leadership and complex organizational roles.

Entering the U.S. Marine Corps, Timperlake trained as a fighter pilot and quickly distinguished himself. His service included a combat tour during the Vietnam War, where he was awarded the Vietnam Service Medal (2 stars). Rising through the ranks, he commanded VMFA-321, a Marine Corps reserve fighter squadron, highlighting his leadership of operational aviation units and engagement in advanced tactical training programs.

After his active military service, Timperlake transitioned to several senior government positions:

  • As Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (1989–1992), he played pivotal roles in Congressional, public, and intergovernmental affairs, including leading medical mobilization during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and acting as a key spokesperson on Gulf War Illnesses.
  • Serving as Principal Director of Mobilization Planning and Requirements in the Office of the Secretary of Defense under President Reagan, he contributed to both DOD mobilization planning and continuity of government initiatives.
  • On Capitol Hill, Timperlake worked with the House Committee on Rules, focusing on national security issues including the investigation of illegal foreign contributions to political campaigns and participating in NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly affairs.

Transitioning into the private sector, he directed classified studies on military modernization as a Program Manager at The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC). Notably, he developed the TASCFORM methodology, a significant innovation for assessing global military air power modernization, of lasting value to sponsors such as the Department of Defense and the CIA.

Timperlake’s expertise reached a wider audience through his editorial leadership and authorship:

  1. As key part of the leadership team for Second Line of Defense and Defense.info, he contributed in-depth reporting and analysis on defense technology and policy issues.
  2. His books have garnered national attention, including the New York Times best-selling Year of the RatRed Dragon Rising, Showdown, and Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy, co-authored with Robbin Laird and Richard Weitz.

Demonstrating a commitment to public service beyond government, he has served on the board of the Vietnam Children’s Fund, facilitating the construction of elementary schools in Vietnam—a testament to his long-term vision for reconciliation and community-building.

Edward Timperlake’s varied career highlights a unique fusion of combat experience, strategic planning, policy innovation, and a passion for informing public understanding.

His influence continues to resonate in U.S. security circles, military modernization debates, and humanitarian efforts making him a respected voice in every sphere he has engaged.

And below are two books which we have written together which were driven by our work on the websites.

MAWTS 1: An Incubator for Military Transformation

Breaking Through the Echo Chamber: Sixteen Years of Comprehensive Defense Analysis

 

The Return of History: Why Australia’s New Centre for Public Ideas Matters

11/08/2025

By Robbin Laird

Research Fellow, Sir Richard Williams Foundation, Canberra, Australia

In an age of instant reactions, social media pile-ons, and policy-by-press-release, the University of Canberra has launched an audacious experiment: a center dedicated to the radical proposition that historical perspective and civil disagreement might actually improve public policy.

The Centre for Public Ideas, which opened its doors this week under the leadership of historian Professor Frank Bongiorno, represents more than just another academic initiative. It signals a growing recognition that something fundamental has broken in how democracies debate, decide, and govern.

The center’s genesis is itself noteworthy. Its architect is Bill Shorten, the university’s vice-chancellor and one of Australia’s most experienced political operators, a former union leader, opposition leader, and cabinet minister who knows intimately the pressures that produce short-term thinking in government. That someone who spent decades in the furnace of political combat now champions an institution devoted to long-term perspective and informed disagreement suggests this isn’t merely an academic exercise. It’s an intervention born of hard-won recognition that current approaches aren’t working.

The Crisis of Contemporary Debate

Professor Bongiorno’s diagnosis of what ails public discourse is both sweeping and specific. “There is a lack of civility in contemporary debate, an incapacity to agree, or to disagree well,” he argues. This isn’t simply about people being rude to each other on Twitter, though that’s certainly part of it. It’s about the erosion of the fundamental democratic skill of productive disagreement or the ability to engage with ideas you find objectionable without seeking to eliminate either the ideas or their proponents from the public square.

The professor traces the roots of current polarization not to recent technological disruptions but to deeper cultural shifts dating back decades. “The conflicts and tension and differences that came out of the 1960s have really become worse over the decades,” he notes. While social media often takes the blame for our fractured discourse, Bongiorno sees it as amplifying rather than creating these divisions. The platforms have given us new tools for conflict, but the underlying inability to engage across difference predates the digital age.

This matters because democracies require disagreement to function. The question isn’t whether we’ll have conflicts over values, priorities, and policies, of course we will. The question is whether we can maintain institutions and norms that allow these conflicts to be productive rather than purely destructive. “In democracies, we have to be able to disagree,” Bongiorno emphasizes, identifying this capacity as essential democratic infrastructure, as important as voting systems or independent courts.

The Cancel Culture Question

The center explicitly positions itself as addressing what Bongiorno calls “cancel culture” though his understanding of the term goes beyond simplistic political caricatures. He’s concerned about environments where people feel they cannot voice dissenting opinions without facing severe social or professional consequences. “I see universities as having a deep responsibility to provide spaces where safe disagreement is possible, where people can discuss quite difficult and controversial topics in an environment where they feel they’re not going to be cancelled.”

The use of “safe disagreement” is telling. It reclaims the concept of “safe spaces” from its association with protecting people from challenging ideas, instead reimagining it as protecting the space for challenging ideas themselves. The safety isn’t from discomfort or disagreement, but from the kind of personal destruction that makes people self-censor rather than risk engagement.

Bongiorno identifies identity politics as a particular driver of intolerance, though he’s careful not to dismiss the legitimate concerns that often animate identity-based movements. The problem arises when political discourse becomes primarily about asserting and defending identities rather than engaging with ideas when the most important question about any argument becomes “who said it” rather than “is it true” or “does it work.”

His criticism of statue removal illustrates this point. Rather than simply erasing controversial historical figures like Captain James Cook, Bongiorno advocates for adding context through plaques and interpretation. “I think there is a danger, if you simply get rid of particular monuments or statues, that it can actually induce a kind of forgetting about the past and indeed a kind of historical ignorance,” he argues. The goal should be “encouraging conversation and better understanding, rather than elimination.”

This approach, adding complexity rather than subtracting difficulty, runs counter to the simplifying instincts of contemporary discourse. It’s harder to maintain a monument with explanatory context than to tear it down. It’s harder to teach a complex, contradictory history than a simple narrative of heroes and villains. But difficulty, Bongiorno suggests, might be the point. Democracy isn’t supposed to be easy.

The Amnesia of Policy-Making

Perhaps the center’s most important mission is addressing what Bongiorno sees as a dangerous historical amnesia in policy development. “Too much debate about public policy lacks historical context, as if every problem is being contemplated for the first time,” he observes. This ahistorical approach means repeatedly rediscovering insights that previous generations already learned, often the hard way.

“It’s very rare that a particular problem is cropping up without some kind of precedence,” Bongiorno notes. Whether the issue is housing affordability, immigration policy, healthcare reform, or managing great power competition, contemporary Australia isn’t the first society to grapple with these challenges. Yet policy debates often proceed as if they are, reinventing wheels and repeating mistakes because institutional memory has been lost.

The causes of this amnesia are multiple. Bongiorno points to “the busyness of professional life, of politics and the bureaucracy” that encourages “situation management”, dealing with immediate crises using whatever tools are at hand, without time to consult experience or consider long-term implications. The modern political cycle, measured in news cycles and polling periods, creates intense pressure toward the urgent at the expense of the important.

But there’s also been a more deliberate turn against historical thinking. Bongiorno identifies “a longer-term trend against institutional memory and historical perspective, and sometimes perhaps an assumption that the past is a poor guide to the present.” This assumption is particularly strong in technological and economic domains, where genuine innovation can create an illusion that everything is new and past experience is irrelevant.

The irony is that this presentism makes policy-making worse, not better. “In fact, a lot of the problems we are dealing with are echoing problems of the past: history can provide a useful guidance to dealing with the present,” Bongiorno argues. Understanding how previous governments addressed housing shortages, managed immigration waves, or reformed taxation helps contemporary decision-makers avoid pitfalls and adapt successful approaches to current conditions.

Rebuilding Institutional Memory

The Centre for Public Ideas aims to address this memory loss through multiple mechanisms. It will host seminars and debates where public servants and politicians can engage with historical perspectives on current policy challenges. It will offer “microcredential” courses. short, focused educational programs designed for busy decision-makers who need historical context without committing to lengthy academic programs.

The center’s approach recognizes that policy professionals often know their immediate domains well but lack broader context. A housing bureaucrat might understand current market conditions and regulatory frameworks intimately while knowing little about how previous generations addressed similar challenges. A defense planner might be expert in contemporary capabilities while unaware of historical debates about strategy and force structure that could illuminate current choices.

By bringing this historical depth to bear, the center hopes to shift policy conversations from “what should we do?” to “what have others done when facing similar challenges, what worked, what failed, and what can we learn?” This doesn’t mean history provides simple answers: past contexts differ from present ones in important ways. But it does mean not starting from scratch every time.

The loss of institutional memory isn’t just about forgetting successes worth replicating. It’s also about forgetting failures worth avoiding. “We’ve often forgotten experiments of the past – both successes and failures,” Bongiorno notes. Understanding why certain approaches didn’t work can be as valuable as understanding what succeeded, but only if that knowledge is preserved and transmitted.

The Donald Horne Legacy

The center’s leadership position is named the Donald Horne Professorship, honoring the late writer, editor, and public intellectual who served as University of Canberra chancellor. Horne was perhaps best known for coining the phrase “the lucky country” though often misunderstood as celebration rather than criticism. Horne’s point was that Australia had relied on luck rather than planning, coasting on natural advantages without developing the political and intellectual institutions needed for sustained success.

That critique resonates with the center’s mission. Bongiorno and Shorten are essentially arguing that Australia can no longer afford to be lucky, that effective governance in an increasingly complex and challenging world requires exactly the kind of historically-informed, civilly-contested policy development that Horne advocated. The center represents an attempt to build the intellectual infrastructure that Horne believed Australia lacked.

Horne was also notable for moving freely between journalism, academia, and public service, exactly the kind of boundary-crossing the center hopes to facilitate. The goal isn’t to keep historical expertise locked in universities but to make it available to policy practitioners. The micro-credential courses and seminars aim to create opportunities for the kind of cross-pollination between academic knowledge and practical experience that Horne exemplified.

The International Context

Australia isn’t alone in grappling with these challenges. Across the democratic world, similar concerns about polarization, short-term thinking, and the loss of institutional memory have prompted various responses. Some universities have established centers focused on civil discourse. Some think tanks have emphasized historical analysis of policy challenges. Some governments have created dedicated units focused on long-term strategic planning.

What distinguishes the University of Canberra initiative is its explicit integration of these elements, bringing together the free speech/civil discourse mission with the historical memory mission with the practical policy application mission. Rather than treating these as separate concerns, the center recognizes them as interconnected aspects of a broader challenge to democratic governance.

The international dimension is also important because Australia’s policy challenges increasingly have global dimensions. Whether managing relations with China, addressing climate change, or responding to technological disruption, Australian policymakers are grappling with issues that require international cooperation and can benefit from international experience. A historically-informed approach should look not just at Australia’s past but at how other democracies have addressed similar challenges.

The Path Forward

The Centre for Public Ideas faces significant challenges. Academic institutions attempting to influence practical policy often struggle to bridge the gap between scholarly analysis and operational decision-making. Centers promoting civil discourse must navigate intense politicization of these very concepts. Initiatives requiring busy professionals to engage with historical material must overcome the time pressures and presentist biases that created the problem in the first place.

Yet the center’s launch reflects a growing recognition that business-as-usual isn’t working. The policy failures, democratic dysfunctions, and cultural polarization plaguing Australia and other democracies have created demand for alternatives. If the center can demonstrate that historically-informed, civilly-contested policy development produces better outcomes than reflexive partisanship and institutional amnesia, it may find an audience hungry for what it offers.

The ultimate measure of success won’t be academic publications or attendance at seminars, though those matter. It will be whether policy conversations actually become more historically informed, whether contentious issues get debated more productively, whether long-term thinking gains ground against short-term crisis management. These are difficult outcomes to measure and even more difficult to achieve.

But the ambition itself is worth celebrating. In an era when so much of our public discourse seems designed to generate heat rather than light, when policy development too often means responding to whatever crisis dominates the current news cycle, the idea of an institution dedicated to historical perspective and civil disagreement represents something genuinely countercultural. Whether it succeeds may say much about whether democracies can summon the discipline to address their most serious challenges.

As Professor Bongiorno observes, history can provide useful guidance to dealing with the present, but only if we’re willing to learn from it. The Centre for Public Ideas is a bet that Australia is ready to try.

This article was triggered by Natasha Bira, “University of Canberra launches new Centre of Public Ideas to champion free speech,” The Australian, November 7, 2023 and all quotes are taken from this article and credited to her.

And below is the official announcement from the university about the new Centre:

UC launches newly established Vice-Chancellor’s Centre of Public Ideas and appointment of inaugural director

The University of Canberra (UC) today announced the establishment of the Vice-Chancellor’s Centre of Public Ideas (COPI), and the appointment of Professor Frank Bongiorno AM, who will take up the Donald Horne Professorship as the inaugural director of the Centre.

The Centre is an extension of UC’s focus on politics and democracy and will leverage the experience and expertise of the Vice-Chancellor and President, The Honourable Bill Shorten. COPI will deliver high-quality education, research and community outreach in the field of Public Ideas, with a focus on history and politics in an Australian setting. The name of the professorship honours the late Professor Donald Horne AO, a former UC Chancellor and leading Australian journalist, editor, academic, historian and public intellectual.

“The future will be shaped by what we learn from the past, by seeking new opportunities and equipping future generations to think differently and act with urgency,” said Mr Shorten

“COPI has the potential to position UC as a leading authority on Australian politics and society, with a view to influencing policymaking and debate through Public Ideas informed by history. UC’s location in the seat of Federal and Territory governments uniquely positions us to lead the way in advancing political debate, decision making and policy development.”

The Centre will build on UC’s research and teaching capabilities across its Faculties of Business, Government and Law and Arts and Design, explore how historical analysis can strengthen the understanding and practice of contemporary politics and restore long-term thinking to policymaking. It will facilitate collaborations across the University and complement the work of UC’s Centres of Deliberative Democracy and Creative and Cultural Research.

The Centre will be home to the University’s Pathways to Politics for Women and the work of Professorial Fellow Ms Michelle Grattan AO, a prominent figure in Australian political journalism at The Conversation. More programs and projects will be added moving forward.

“Professor Bongiorno was a logical choice to lead COPI,” said Mr Shorten. “His vision, aspirations and understanding of the times past and present and how they influence the future will support UC’s strategic objectives to lean into the next era of learning, teaching and research.”

Expanding on his vision for COPI, Professor Bongiorno said the Canberra setting is critical and will provide the necessary perspective to advance the Centre’s mandate.

“I am a historian, and much of my work has been in Australian political history. I notice that a great deal of public debate and policymaking in Australia happens without much sense of what I call “historical hinterland” – a rich sense of context that helps us see the present in perspective,” said Professor Bongiorno.

“We want to establish connections and partnerships with individuals and institutions – government, NGO, cultural and business – that will allow the Centre to play a creative role in generating fresh ideas and perspectives at a time when our city, nation and world desperately need them.”

The Centre’s activities will include undergraduate education, short courses and microcredentials designed for current decision-makers.

“We will also have a public program that will encourage the exchange of ideas through lectures, podcasts, publications and seminars. And we will have a group of distinguished adjuncts who will help to support the Centre’s activities. This is an exciting and timely initiative – and unique to UC,” said Professor Bongiorno.

“We live in a very different time now to then I first entered academia, initially as a tutor at UC in 1992. Students learn differently, academics teach and research differently, and universities, by and large, do much of their business differently. But many things have not changed all that much.”

“We have a responsibility to the communities we serve, especially in Canberra, and academics have the responsibility of equipping students to enter the world of work with confidence and capacity, and to be active and thoughtful democratic citizens. Then there are the opportunities to contribute to new research and fresh ideas about issues that matter to the ACT, national and international debates.”

The Centre of Public Ideas will officially launch in February 2026, when Professor Bongiorno commences at UC.