U.S. Marines with I Marine Expeditionary Force have conducted a multitude of exercises and operations across the Indo-Pacific throughout 2024. I MEF provides the Marine Corps a globally responsive, expeditionary, and fully scalable Marine Air-Ground Task Force, capable of generating, deploying, and employing ready forces and formations across the Pacific.
CAMP HM SMITH, HAWAI
01.08.2025
Video by Lance Cpl. Blake Gonter
U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific
Stephen Kuper of Defence Connect in an interview with Dr. Ross Babbage held before the recent Federal elections discussed the changing global order.
The pair discussed a range of subjects following Babbage’s recent trip to the United States, including:
You can listen to this interview below:
By Robbin Laird
In this article, we are highlighting photos of the MV-22 recently operating in Australia in the Northern Territory. The aircraft comes along wtih the Marines in their regular rotation to work with the ADF each year.
The first photos show the Osprey participating in Pitch Black 24.
Exercise Pitch Black 24 is the Royal Australian Air Force’s biennial capstone international engagement exercise, with forces drawn from a wide range of regional, coalition, and allied nations. Held from 12 July to 2 August 2024, the exercise concentrated on military airspace in the Northern Territory, with participants flying from RAAF Bases Darwin, Tindal, Amberley, Curtin, and regional airfields in the Kimberley region.
Exercise Pitch Black 24 is the largest iteration of the exercise since first held in 1981, with 20 participating nations and over 140 aircraft involved, and approximately 4400 personnel from Australia and overseas participating. Activities such as Exercise Pitch Black help Australia to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific region, build connections around the globe, bolster regional security, and build regional resilience to transnational threats.
The second group of photos highlight the United States Marine Corps V-22 Osprey arriving at RAAF Base Townsville, in preparation for Exercise Southern Jackaroo 2025. Exercise Southern Jackaroo is held within Exercise North Queensland Warfighter and includes Australian Army personnel from 3rd Brigade, the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force and the United States Marine Corps to strengthen interoperability.
The Osprey is part of what I have called the Tiltrotor enterprise as it is evolving with the new addition of the U.S. Army variant of the aircraft underway.
And perhaps, the Australian Army will be operating the new variant itself one day in performing its littoral operations.
This is how the Australian journalist, Gregor Ferguson, described the possibility in a March 25, 2025 article:
While it may not be available to export customers for five or 10 years, says Greg Elliott, Bell Textron Australia’s Canberra-based manager for military sales and strategy, it’s not too early to talk about the things that set the FLRAA apart from traditional troop-lift helicopters such as the Black Hawk.
“It’ll go twice the distance at nearly twice the speed carrying the same payload,” he says. The FLRAA’s combat range is up to 800 nautical miles, and it cruises at 280 knots compared with the Black Hawk’s 320nm and 150kts.
Its ferry range of more than 2100nm is sufficient to cross Australia in a single flight or it could self-deploy to most destinations in our region from somewhere like Darwin or Townsville. Being able to conduct casualty evacuations or raids on enemy forces faster and much further away than an ordinary helicopter can do is potentially game-changing, says Elliott.
The new, 14-passenger aircraft – which doesn’t even have an official Pentagon name yet – will enter Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in 2028 and is due to enter service in about 2030, says Elliott.
“We’re expecting (US Foreign Military Sales) pathways for international partners by the early 2030s,” he adds.
US Army leaders have been providing their views on the right mix of Black Hawks and FLRAAs and the benefits the latter might provide. Major General Brett Sylvia, commander of the iconic 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), was interviewed last year by online publication The Aviationist and commented: “We can’t perform large-scale, long-range air assaults at the speed and distance modern missions demand.”
In an exercise last year, he said, the division moved about 3000 combat troops nearly 1000km from Kentucky to Louisiana using conventional helicopters. The exercise took three nights, two mission support bases, no less than six forward refuelling points and 1000 logisticians and security personnel. General Sylvia said that using the FLRAA you could move those troops in a single night with just half the support infrastructure.
The Marines’ Hub-Spoke Strategy: The Importance of U.S.-Australian Military Cooperation
And this year, I am publishing a two volume study of the tiltrotor enterprise based on many interviews and experiences with the aircraft since 2007.
As seen on Amazon Australia:
By Robbin Laird
The United States Air Force stands at a critical crossroads. After decades of counterinsurgency operations and peacetime bureaucracy, America’s air arm faces an uncomfortable reality: it may not be adequately prepared for the high-intensity conflicts that could define the next decade. This sobering assessment comes from one of the service’s most experienced leaders, retired General T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, the 18th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force
We asked General Moseley after his comprehensive presentation on airpower at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025, to provide a follow up on that presentation to highlight his recommendations for shaping a way ahead for recrafting effective airpower.
General Moseley provided a thoughtful response to this request. His central thesis is both urgent and actionable: the Air Force must fundamentally restructure itself from a peacetime organization optimized for stability operations to a combat-focused force capable of deterring—or if necessary, defeating—peer adversaries in an increasingly dangerous world.
The strategic environment facing the Air Force today bears little resemblance to the relatively stable post-Cold War period that shaped much of its current structure. Moseley identifies several converging challenges that demand immediate attention:
Rather than proposing abstract strategic concepts, Moseley offers eleven concrete reforms that could be implemented within a single leadership tenure. These fall into several key categories:
The Air Force must align its peacetime organizational structure with wartime deployment requirements. This means building around the squadron—the essential unit of deployed air power—rather than the complex bureaucratic structures that have evolved over decades of peacetime operations.
“The essential building block of deployed air/space forces is the squadron and multiples of squadrons,” Moseley writes. “The peacetime template must match the wartime deployed template.”
Equally important is restoring what Moseley calls the Air Force’s “warfighting ethos.” This requires comprehensive changes to personnel policies, training programs, promotion criteria, and educational curricula. The goal is to advance the “best qualified” personnel for combat effectiveness rather than bureaucratic management.
Current training approaches are insufficient for the threats the Air Force may face. Moseley advocates for increased actual flying time and hands-on field training, noting that while simulations and procedural trainers are useful for skill development, they cannot replace real-world exposure to complex combat environments.
The former Chief of Staff calls for increasing defense spending to a minimum of 5-5.5% of GDP, arguing that current funding levels cannot adequately address personnel needs, infrastructure requirements, operations and maintenance, research and development, and modernization demands simultaneously.
One of Moseley’s most specific recommendations involves centralizing acquisition, contracting, and sustainment activities at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, leveraging existing capabilities to create a more efficient and responsive procurement system. He also calls for updating the Goldwater-Nichols Act to streamline acquisition timelines and authorities.
Beyond organizational changes, Moseley identifies specific equipment and capability priorities that demand immediate attention:
General Moseley highlighted concerns with regard to vulnerabilities in global communications systems. He advocates for utilizing the full electromagnetic spectrum to provide forces with “parallel, reliable, resilient, survivable” communication paths. Notably, he identifies upgrades to HF communications as the most available and cost-effective solution—a recommendation that takes on added significance given recent concerns about space-based communication vulnerabilities.
The former Chief of Staff also addresses the critical issue of defense industrial capacity, calling for actions to incentivize growth in aerospace, propulsion, munitions, and sensor manufacturing. His recommendations include fuller utilization of multi-year procurement contracts and establishment of dedicated funding streams similar to the Navy’s shipbuilding accounts.
Moseley’s analysis extends beyond internal Air Force reforms to broader strategic considerations. He calls for a comprehensive review of service roles and missions, suggesting that an updated “Key West Agreement” may be necessary to address overlapping capabilities and ensure each service’s contributions align with current national security requirements.
This recommendation reflects an understanding that effective military reform cannot occur in isolation—it must be coordinated across the joint force and aligned with broader national security objectives.
Perhaps most importantly, Moseley argues that these reforms are achievable within the tenure of a single Air Force leadership team. This emphasis on practical implementation timelines reflects his experience with the bureaucratic challenges that often derail military reform efforts.
The general’s approach recognizes that perfect solutions implemented too late are less valuable than good solutions implemented immediately. His “doable do’s” philosophy prioritizes actionable steps that can create momentum for broader transformation.
General Moseley’s analysis arrives at a critical moment for U.S. air power. The comfortable assumption that American technological and operational superiority will persist indefinitely is increasingly questionable. Meanwhile, potential adversaries continue developing capabilities specifically designed to challenge U.S. strengths.
The reforms Moseley proposes represent a return to first principles of military effectiveness combined with practical adaptations to contemporary realities. The question is not whether these changes are necessary, but whether current leadership has the will to implement them before external events force more drastic adaptations.
As Moseley concludes, tomorrow’s challenges center on “preparing for potential combat on a theater and global scale against highly lethal opponents in an age of strategic uncertainty and increasing lethality.” The time for incremental adjustments may be passing. What remains is the opportunity—and responsibility—to act on lessons that experience has already taught.
The Air Force that emerges from such reforms would be leaner, more focused, and better equipped to fulfill its primary mission: controlling the air and space domains that underpin America’s broader defense strategy. Whether that transformation occurs proactively or reactively may determine not just the future of American air power, but the broader trajectory of U.S. national security in an increasingly contested world.
By Murielle Delaporte
For thousands of years, military commanders have considered mass — having more troops and equipment than the enemy — a critical factor in winning battles.
The last fifty years have seen a shift from mass to precision, a trend that has accelerated since the end of the Cold War.
The period of peace dividends and the era of expeditionary operations that prevailed for thirty years were based on the concept of technological superiority.
Today, we are witnessing the collapse of this binary distinction between mass and precision, with emerging technologies now making it possible to deploy numerous and precise systems simultaneously, particularly in the field of drones, as current conflicts continue to demonstrate.
Both in Ukraine and in the Middle East, we are seeing this trend, which could in many ways be described as an asymmetric attrition strategy. At the start of the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian forces used a few Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. Two years later, they are deploying a multitude of autonomous systems.
Another illustrative theater is the Red Sea, where the Houthis have targeted numerous commercial and military vessels, severely disrupting international maritime traffic. According to the French expertise center MICA Center for Maritime Information Cooperation & Awareness, in 2024 alone, the Houthis used approximately 700 munitions for their attacks, including 40% ballistic missiles, 2% cruise missiles, 56% aerial drones, and 2% surface drones.
This transformation fundamentally changes the cost-effectiveness of military operations, as relatively inexpensive missile or drone strikes can force the mobilization of much larger defense expenditures, thereby creating an unsustainable financial imbalance in the long term solely for defensive purposes.
From a strictly military point of view, this crisis highlights the characteristic equation of 21st-century conflicts, namely, how to balance the need for mass — or to counter mass —with the need for technological superiority: two strategies that seem to be at odds with each other in terms of defense spending.
Here I am exploring some of the hybrid strategies that Western countries are beginning to put in place to shape a new approach, first highlighting some examples of operational optimization that have already proven their worth in the past, then describing two concrete examples of adaptation: one by the French Army Aviation during Operation Barkhane in Sahel and the other, more recent, by the U.S. armed forces in response to the Houthis’ capacity for disruption.
There are, of course, many examples of innovative operational optimization of existing resources, both on the offensive and defensive sides, if we examine the lessons learned from a number of past conflicts.
Here are a few examples in the following areas:
The Use of Mines: Historically, relatively simple and inexpensive naval mines have often posed significant challenges to sophisticated and expensive warships. This is a classic example of low-cost asymmetric technology that has been able to counter effectively much more expensive systems.
Increased strike capability by adapting naval rockets for use against land targets: During the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy modified Harpoon anti-ship rockets to strike land targets. This inexpensive adaptation significantly expanded strike capabilities without requiring new weapons systems.
Countering Improvised Explosive Device (IED): Faced with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armed forces equipped their vehicles with jamming capabilities. These jammers were designed to disrupt remote detonation signals, offering a much less expensive (and often more tactically effective) protection than the acquisition and deployment of specialized armored vehicles.
Counter-Drone Solutions: The number of examples in this field continues to grow.
24/7 “participatory” intelligence or low-cost surveillance networks: Ukraine has developed a mobile app that allows civilians to report Russian troop and equipment movements. This participatory intelligence system runs on ordinary smartphones and provides valuable information at a much lower cost than traditional military surveillance systems required for permanent coverage.
These examples illustrate how ingenuity and adaptation can often provide effective and economical solutions to emerging threats by fine tuning the response in proportion to the value of the targets to be neutralized, where possible.
The war in Ukraine has shown that one does need mass to counter mass, a reality that has been virtually absent from Western armed forces’ thinking on the nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War.
In a world where a growing number of actors can deploy drones and missiles and access inexpensive satellites and cutting-edge commercial technologies, many countries are demonstrating ingenuity in countering threats that are “not worth the cost” of sacrificing expensive missiles or ammunition or exposing valuable military assets to disproportionate risks, by combining mass and technological sophistication in a disruptive way.
This concept could be described as “smart mass,” by analogy to the concept of “precision mass” developed by some military analysts in the United States.
The tactical adaptation of French forces in Mali is an excellent example of operational innovation and optimization to deal with asymmetric threats using economic means. Such an approach of favoring the use of conventional weapons (cannons, machine guns) over expensive missiles is consistent with the more recent example of the U.S. F-16s using APKWS II rockets against Houthi drones.
In both cases, this is an adaptive and economical response to threats that do not justify the use of expensive ammunition at the risk of rapid attrition.
Providing a response proportionate to the value of the targets to be neutralized: the example of the French Army Aviation in Sahel.
During the Barkhane Operation in Sahel in the 2010’s, helicopters proved particularly effective against targets such as pickup trucks, thanks to their ability to loiter and engage such targets with more suitable low-cost weapons such as rockets, 30 mm cannons, and 20 mm cannons.
As the ALAT opted to use onboard cannons rather than expensive missiles to neutralize armed terrorist groups, Gazelle, Puma, and Cougar helicopters, as well as Tiger helicopters, were able to support operations in the Sahel and neutralize these groups.
One of the main tactics involved the use of the Puma “Pirate” equipped with a 20 mm gun in a gun port. This configuration has regularly provided valuable support to units in contact with armed terrorist groups in Mali. This was particularly the case during fighting in 2013.
An innovative weapon configuration in anti-drone warfare in the Red Sea: the example of the US Air Force against the Houthis.
To save expensive anti-missile weapons, the U.S. Air Force adapted its F-16s with laser-guided rocket pods, a combination that has led to economically viable anti-drone warfare F-16s operating in the Middle East were able to use their LITENING targeting pods to identify and neutralize targets with laser-guided weapons traditionally used in air-to-ground operations.
This new weapon configuration features F-16s carrying two seven-shot 70mm rocket pods on a single pylon under the right wing using a triple ejection rack (TER). These rockets are equipped with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II), which converts standard unguided 70mm rockets into precision munitions by adding laser guidance kits.
The complete configuration includes:
What makes this configuration particularly noteworthy is that it significantly increases the aircraft’s strike capability compared to traditional air-to-air configurations. While a typical air defense configuration might include only 6 missiles in total, this adapted configuration offers up to 14 engagement opportunities with laser-guided rockets alone, plus additional conventional air-to-air missiles.
The economic benefits of this approach are considerable. Each APKWS II guidance kit costs approximately $15,000 to $20,000, with complete rockets totaling approximately $25,000 including warheads and motors. In comparison, traditional air-to-air missiles cost hundreds of thousands of dollars each: an AIM-120 AMRAAM missile costs approximately $1 million and an AIM-9X Sidewinder approximately $400,000.
This cost difference makes the APKWS II solution particularly attractive for engaging lower-value targets such as unmanned aerial vehicles, allowing forces to reserve their inventory of expensive missiles for higher-threat scenarios.
The targeting methodology uses the F-16’s LITENING pod to “light up” or designate targets. The pod’s sensor can be connected to the aircraft’s radar, enabling accurate tracking and engagement of relatively slow-moving targets such as drones and cruise missiles. The targeting system can also support wingman tactics, in which one aircraft designates targets while another performs the attack run.
These adaptations represent more than just a tactical solution to an immediate threat. They demonstrate how creativity and operational flexibility can leverage existing technologies in new ways to meet emerging challenges. By reconfiguring proven systems rather than developing entirely new platforms, armed forces achieve both cost savings and rapid deployment of capabilities.
This article was first published in French and English by Eurosatory.
The article was published on May 5, 2025 and is republished by permission of the author.
By Robbin Laird
Dateline: Canberra, Australia
Recently, General “Buzz” Moseley spoke via video link to the May 22, 2025 seminar held by the Sir Richard Williams Foundation in Canberra, Australia.
General Moseley was the 18th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force. Moseley was a distinguished war fighter who lived in the world as it is rather than the world we hoped to see. His entire service was focused on how the USAF could contribute to the deterrence of conflict but win it if you must fight.
I knew him when I worked for the Secretary of the Air Force, Michael W. Wynne, and the two of them formed one of the most remarkable pairings of defense leaders in my lifetime.
They were fired by the then Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates because of their opposition to the path Gates preferred which was to move from the way ahead for an air force built around air superiority to one that was not.
The significance of their firing was historic, a fact not lost on the late Senator Molan, whom I had the privilege to know and to discuss many things with him, including this event with him.
This is what the retired Australian General and Senator Jim Molan in his 2022 book on the need for Australia to deal with the China challenge:
“The U.S. is surfacing from decades of war in the Middle East with worn-out equipment, understandably having allocated a lot of its funding to ‘today’s wars’ rather than investing in the future. During the Iraq War, for instance, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates wanted more drones to carry on the day-to-day fight in Iraq and found himself in conflict with the U.S. Air Force, which wanted to continue building the fighters and bombers that it thought would be needed in the future.
“Gates sacked the chief of the U.S. Air Force and restricted the production of aircraft such as the stealth F-22 fighter and the B-21 bomber, in order to build the drones and other aircraft he needed.
“The result was that only a limited number of the extraordinary F-22s were built and the B-21 is still not in production. The impact of diverted spending and focus will be felt for a long time to come.
“The likely war with China, if it is ever fought by weapons of this type, is going to be fought by a very small number of modern stealth fighters, but mainly by U.S. fighters and bombers that are 20 to 30 years old.
“The result of all this is that the U.S. will not be able to marshal sufficient military power to deter China in the Western Pacific, possibly for years.”[1]
I have written about this and many other items related to shaping an effective force for the strategic age we are in in a book about the work of Secretary Wynne entitled: America, Global Military Competition, and Opportunities Lost.
The point is we are playing catch up in the face of the rise of the multipolar world, a world in which airpower matters even more than when Moseley was the Chief.
In providing the opening remarks to the seminar, General Moseley began his analysis by contrasting today’s threat landscape with the relative simplicity of the Cold War era. “Think about 50 years ago, 60 years ago, there was a major threat. Now there are multiple threats,” he observed, highlighting the emergence of what he sees as an unprecedented coalition of adversaries.
Unlike the bipolar world of the past, today’s security challenges involve China’s assertiveness, Russia’s aggression, Iran’s support for global terrorism, and North Korea’s unpredictable behavior. More concerning, according to Moseley, is that “these folks seem to be collaborating and cooperating with each other, sharing munitions, sharing munition stocks.” This cooperation represents a fundamental shift that complicates traditional deterrence strategies.
The general’s assessment extends beyond state actors to include transnational criminal organizations affecting border security, particularly along the U.S.-Mexico border. This multi-faceted threat environment, he argues, requires a robust and capable air force to maintain the rules-based international order that has underpinned Western security for decades.
Perhaps the most startling revelation in Moseley’s presentation was the current state of U.S. Air Force readiness. The statistics Moseley presented are concerning: ten different aircraft types that first flew over 50 years ago still comprise approximately two-thirds of the Air Force’s total fleet of 2,600 aircraft. The KC-135 tanker, a workhorse of military operations, began delivery during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.
This aging fleet problem is compounded by nearly four decades of continuous deployment. Since the early 1990s, when the first aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia’s eastern province, American air power has maintained a persistent presence in the Middle East. The cumulative effect has been devastating to equipment readiness and personnel morale.
Moseley’s analysis of defense spending reveals a fundamental mismatch between mission requirements and available resources. With defense budgets hovering around 3% of GDP, he argued for a baseline of 4-4.5% under normal circumstances, and closer to 5-5.5% given the current recapitalization needs across all services.
The budget structure itself presents challenges. Approximately 50% of Air Force funding goes to personnel costs – necessary and appropriate but leaving limited resources for modernization. After accounting for infrastructure, operations, and maintenance costs for aging aircraft, the investment account that funds new capabilities consistently bears the brunt of budget cuts.
Moseley revealed that since 9/11, the Army has received $65 billion annually from Air Force and Navy budgets – representing over a trillion dollars in shifted priorities that he suggests weakened air capabilities during a critical period.
Central to Moseley’s argument is the primacy of air and space superiority as the Air Force’s fundamental mission. While the service has five core mission areas – air and space superiority, intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance, rapid mobility, global strike, and command and control – he emphasized that the first enables all others.
“What happens to those service components inside those strategic commons, or those operative domains, if the Air Force does not get air and space superiority?” Moseley asked rhetorically. “What happens to freedom of movement on the surface? What happens to movement to place? What happens to the logistics baseline?”
This perspective challenges recent discussions within Air Force leadership about whether air superiority remains affordable or achievable. Moseley’s response is unequivocal: it’s not just affordable, it’s essential for all joint operations.
While acknowledging his role in pioneering unmanned systems – he commanded the first drone wing with minimal resources and a squadron commander who had “no people, no money,” just “a folding card table and a blender” for making margaritas while figuring out operations – Moseley expressed concern about current enthusiasm for replacing manned aircraft entirely.
His skepticism is grounded in practical experience. Drawing parallels to dropped cell phone calls, he questioned the wisdom of relying on data links for platforms operating at high altitude and speed in contested environments. “I’m not willing to put something 9000 feet [away] in and out of weather at night that’s running with me at 1.4 Mach that I can’t keep a link to.”
The general’s vision for unmanned systems is more nuanced. He sees value in “little buddies” that can accompany manned fighters to suppress integrated air defense systems but remains nervous about autonomous air-to-air combat in crowded airspace. His 2005 priorities for the Air Force Chief Scientist, the legendary Mark Lewis, included hypersonic weapons, directed energy systems, and drones that could “run with the fighters” – but as supplements, not replacements.
Moseley concluded his remarks by pointing to recent military operations that demonstrate the continued relevance of manned air power. Israeli strikes in Iran, operations in Yemen, and the destruction of Iraqi Republican Guard divisions during Operation Iraqi Freedom all underscore that reports of manned aircraft’s obsolescence are greatly exaggerated.
His broader message resonates beyond U.S. borders. The challenges he described – aging fleets, budget pressures, technological transitions, and complex threat environments – face many Western air forces. His emphasis on maintaining service identity while building joint capabilities offers a framework for allied cooperation without losing essential military expertise.
General Moseley’s presentation serves as both warning and roadmap.
The warning is clear: current trends in force structure, readiness, and strategic thinking threaten the air superiority that has underpinned Western military dominance for generations.
The roadmap emphasizes returning to basics – understanding core missions, properly funding modernization, and maintaining the technological edge that air power requires.
His closing observation was I think particularly poignant: “Officers and NCOs are not born joint. They become joint. They’re born a soldier, a sailor, an airman.”
This insight challenges current thinking that views service identity as an obstacle to joint operations, instead positioning it as the foundation upon which effective joint capabilities are built.
The stakes, as Moseley makes clear, extend far beyond military readiness. They encompass the ability to deter aggression, work together effectively as allies, and allows what used to be called the West to deal effectively with the rise of the multi-polar authoritarian world.
Note About General Moseley: General “Buzz” Moseley played a significant role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, serving as the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC). He was responsible for all aspects of aerial operations, including mission planning, air tasking orders, and airspace management, and oversaw a large number of personnel and assets.
General Moseley successfully integrated joint and coalition forces, including those from the Royal Saudi Air Force, Royal Air Force, and Royal Australian Air Force, into a cohesive air campaign.
He was involved in the planning and execution of numerous missions, including those targeting Iraqi regime leaders and infrastructure, and those supporting ground forces.
General Moseley was known for his leadership and vision, and his ability to inspire and motivate his troops. He also served as a role model for other military leaders, and his accomplishments were recognized with numerous awards, including two Defense Distinguished Service Medals.
[1] . Jim Molan. Danger On Our Doorstep (pp. 106-107). HarperCollins. Kindle Edition.