Did Putin Awake a “Sleeping Giant”?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Did Putin Awake a “Sleeping Giant”?
07/02/2025

Recently, the Polish Foreign Minister argued that Putin had awaken a sleeping giant in terms of European defense efforts. The commitment to 5% defense spending inclusive of 1 and 1/2 percent of GNP on defence related infrastructure will raise a number of analytical questions of who does what with what investments are made, notably with regard to infrastructure spending. We will focus on this issue in our analytical work in the months ahead.

But Pierre Tran recently attended the Paris Air Show and reports here on the significantly enhanced emphasis on defence systems at this year’s Paris Air Show.

By Pierre Tran

Le Bourget, France – The French media covered the 55th Paris air show with much attention  on European rearmament, a news angle sharpened with President Emmanuel Macron flying  June 20 to the show in a French air force A400M military transport plane.

The armed forces minister, procurement chief, and air chief of staff flanked the head of state and commander in chief as he walked off the aircraft, seen as sign of support for European  military capability. Macron went on to make a keynote speech, calling on Europe to strengthen its space technology, seen of strategic significance, and led by China and the U.S.

A French navy H160 helicopter flew Macron to the previous show, two years ago, as Russian forces sought to seize Ukraine with force of arms.

The air show serves as a showcase for the French and international aerospace industry, and also to recruit sought after staff, to be trained and retained by contractors large and small.

This latest show, which ran June 16 to 22, was held under stricter security, with a pat down body search and personal ID check for the first time, on top of the standard bag search and body scan. French journalists noted a tougher application process for the press pass.

There would be “high security” at the show, Guillaume Faury, chair of the Gifas trade association, told a June 5 news conference on the air show. There was no prosperity without security, he said, and there was greater conflict in the world.

The “geostrategic setting” led to a stronger defense presence compared to previous shows, which had a lower military profile, Gifas chief executive Frédéric Parisot said.

Politics and Weapons

There was rising tension from Israeli forces hunting down Hamas irregular fighters in the Gaza strip. Jerusalem opened a new front, striking June 13 nuclear and missile targets deep in Iran before agreeing a ceasefire with Teheran after 12 days of deadly airborne exchange.

Washington brokered a fragile ceasefire between Teheran and Jerusalem, after launching June 21 a surprise long-range attack with bunker buster bombs and submarine-launched cruise missiles, striking three nuclear targets in Iran, including a uranium enrichment plant.

The link between politics and weapons was spelled out again, with France ordering Gifas to cover up stands of five Israeli companies in the vast exhibition hall 3, to remove from sight weapons allegedly used against Palestinians in Gaza. Four other Israeli companies could show their wares, and the Israeli defense ministry stand could also stay open.

The French prime minister opened June 16 the show, and François Bayrou told reporters the situation in Gaza was “terrible,” and his administration ordered the Israeli stands to be  covered up because they displayed “offensive weapons.”

Jerusalem fiercely rejected the criticism, with the Israeli defense ministry accusing France of acting out of political and commercial reasons.

While a legal challenge by a public campaign failed to force a shut down of the Israeli arms display, the French government succeeded – at least for some of the most sensitive weapons.

That official sanction echoed an attempt last year by France to exclude Israeli exhibitors at the Eurosatory trade show for land weapons. French courts reversed that government ban, following a legal challenge by the Franco-Israeli chamber of commerce. Israeli companies were able to exhibit at the Euronaval trade show later last year.

Flying displays are a highly dynamic piece of an air show, requiring flexibility on the show organizer. That was seen when a pair of cranes flew over the show when a Rafale was in  flight display. That led to a F-35 flight to be postponed to the last in the day, while propeller-driven aircraft were brought up in the flying schedule.

There is French pride in the scale and scope of the air show, with aerial displays seen as a prestige item for trade and public audiences. A pared down display is noted, such as when Farnborough phased out its weekend display, when the show is open to the public.

U.K. Arms Up

A sign of the conflict times could be seen when the U.K. prime minister, Keir Starmer, said June 24 Britain would order 12 Lockheed Martin F-35A, a fighter that allows the Royal Air Force to deliver the U.S.-built B61 tactical nuclear bomb.

That fighter will extend the U.K.’s nuclear capability, presently resting solely on submarine launched U.S.-built Trident missiles, carrying British-built atomic warheads. A 12-strong F-35A squadron could cost “just over £900 mln ($1.1 bln),” daily The Guardian reported.

That order would bring London alongside Paris, which has fighters and submarines capable of firing tactical and strategic nuclear-tipped missiles, with the distinction that France insists on building both types of warhead, in pursuit of autonomy and supporting domestic industry.

Starmer spoke of ordering the F-35A at a shortened Nato summit, held in The Hague, The Netherlands, which U.S. President Donald Trump attended.

Nato members set June 25 a target of 5 pct of gross domestic product for military spending by 2035, up from a previous guideline of 2 pct. Spain withheld its pledge for the new target, prompting Trump to threaten doubling tariffs to punish Madrid. Spain is part of the E.U., so any trade deal would normally be part of a pact between Washington and the 27-strong E.U.

Show Time

If Nato members do spend more on weapons and improve logistics, that would likely boost demand for aircraft, arms, and satellites. That might help the sales teams of shows such as Paris and Farnborough, its U.K. counterpart, as contractors chase orders.

There is a view that some Nato allies will find it hard to find the money, with nations such as France hobbled by hefty public debt and weak economic growth. French companies have pointed up a lack of arms orders from the administration, despite talk of a war economy.

One senior industry executive, however, said June 26 the French administration was placing orders and paying his company on time, so he had no complaints. The executive ran a medium sized company on an arms deal which runs for several years.

For French primes speaking of straitened times, air shows and trade events might gain in importance, offering industry and institutions a means to lobby the administration, reach out to clients and partners, while pitching to VIP foreign delegations, receiving close attention.

Onera Switches Missile Test Launch

Onera, a state-backed research office, said June 10 a test flight of a French full-scale prototype of a hypersonic cruise missile was now planned to take place at the Biscarrosse  test site operated by the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) procurement office. The  demonstrator was based on the Lea project, which Onera revealed in 2021 with the display of a sleek small-scale model.

Onera and MBDA, a European missile company, had planned to launch a Lea demonstrator at a U.S. base on the East Coast, backed by the U.S. air force and NASA, some years ago. It appears the U.S. launch did not take place, and the test has been brought to France.

The Onera stand at the air show included its Titans project, a study of concepts for the future combat air system (FCAS), looking at prospective weapons midway between cruise missile and drone, René Mathurin, director of defence programs, told the June 10 news conference.

Titans seeks to “transform conventional air combat capabilities,” by flying unmanned aircraft with varying levels of autonomy, fitted with mission modules for air combat, suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses, electronic warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance,” Onera said.

Grand Est Reaches Out

Franck Leroy, the chairman of the Grand Est, a regional council, met the press June 11, setting out a campaign to attract companies and investors to the eastern part of France, in a bid to create 130,000 jobs. There was strong interest in the military, with two army helicopter bases in the region, for combat and transport operations. There was scope for local small and medium companies to provide service support.

Some 36,000 troops were based in the region, which borders Germany, which offered cross-border prospects for investment and industry.

Grand Est was inviting scientific researchers and higher education teachers from the U.S. and other nations to apply for residency in the region, the council said in a June 26 press statement. The council’s bid to attract foreign research and academic talent was inspired by the Stand Up for Scientists and Make Our Planet Great Again campaigns, and the Fulbright scholarship, Grand Est said.

Swedish Air Force Fan Club Meets

The Swedish air force and FMV procurement office met the press at a smart hotel in the capital, on the eve of the air show opening

It was “very easy to draw the wrong conclusion,” brigadier general Lars Helmich of the FMV said, when asked about Pakistan’s claim of downing the Indian air force Rafale. More information was needed, he added.

Islamabad’s claim of shooting down the Rafale in air combat May 7 sparked strong international interest in the lessons learnt, with the Pakistani pilots flying the Chinese-built J-10 fighter, armed with Chinese-built missiles, to hit a Western-built fighter.

A French officer said June 26 there would have been much confusion in the skies over India and Pakistan, with maybe some 120 or so fighters locked in combat. Thorough preparation of the fighter pilots and airborne warning and control systems (Awacs) planes would have helped the Indian air force, the officer said.

Meanwhile, Sweden was looking to replace A109 training helicopters and NH90 transport helicopters, and a government announcement on the latter has yet to be made, an officer said.

The Swedish forces have recommended cancellation of the NH90 and replacement with other helicopters for the army and navy.

The Swedish air force was working hard to fit into Nato air command and the Nordic air power concept, since Stockholm joined the alliance 1-1/2 years ago, said major general Jonas Wikman, commander of the Swedish air force.

“We really feel the pressure,” he said, with a “huge transformation” in operational concept.

Operational tempo has picked up, with the air force performing more than 300 “alpha scramble” quick reaction alerts last year, more than in previous years, he said.

Embraer Flies In

Embraer appeared to have a good air show, with the Brazilian aircraft builder announcing on the first day Portugal pledging to order a sixth KC-390 military transport plane, with an option for 10 more. That option allowed Lisbon to order the aircraft and pass it on to E.U. or Nato allies if allied nations wanted to boost air lift fleets.

The options put a marker down for a place on the production line.

Portugal ordered an initial batch of five KC-390 in 2019 in a deal worth €827 mln, with a first delivery in February 2023, Reuters reported.

Lithuania selected the KC-390, with a prospective order for three units, Embraer said in a June 18 statement.

“Lithuania has chosen Embraer Company for further negotiations and expects to finalize the acquisition contract in the coming months,” said Loreta Maskaliovienė, Vice Minister of National Defense of Lithuania, Embraer said.

The Netherlands signed a contract for an airborne medical evacuation unit for the KC-390, with options for seven more inflight hospital units, Embraer said June 17.

That Dutch deal followed an order for nine KC-390 The Netherlands signed in July last year at the Farnborough air show. That deal was a joint procurement, with five units for The Netherlands, and four for Austria.

Embraer invited some journalists for a flight on the KC-390 on Sunday before the show opened, and more reporters were invited to an evening cocktail reception on the Eiffel Tower. The Brazilian company was corporate sponsor on the lanyards for the show pass.

Did the KC-390 program reflect a “paradigm change” for Brazil, asked a July 2015 report from Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, a think tank.

The KC-390, launched in 2009, was a medium lift twin-jet which reflected Brazil’s ambition to cut dependence on foreign nations, supply defense equipment, pursue technological and industrial autonomy, launch programs under Brazilian prime contractorship, work with partner nations, and win export deals, the FRS report said. The report was titled Arms Production: Brazil in Search of Autonomy.

Saab Gets Closer to France

Saab took a step toward a contract with France, with the DGA signing June 18 a letter of intent with the Swedish company for two GlobalEye airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) jets, with an option for two more.

The United Arab Emirates flew over one of its five-strong GlobalEye fleet for static display at the show.

A French deal for the GlobalEye has rankled Dassault Aviation executive chairman Eric Trappier, who sees procurement of the rival Canadian Bombardier business jet as a direct affront to the Falcon jet built at the Marignane factory, near Bordeaux, southwest France.

That Swedish spy plane flies the Saab Erieye radar fitted on a Bombardier Global 6000/6500 jet. The GlobalEye will replace the four-strong fleet of Boeing E-3F Airborne Warning and Control System (Awacs), which entered service in France in 1992.

France signed in 2010 a contract worth $466 mln for a mid-life upgrade of its U.S.-built Awacs fleet, and in 2017 upgraded the avionics to install a “glass cockpit.” That latter upgrade was expected to extend the life of the fleet to at least 2035.

The spy plane was part of an agreement signed at the show by the French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, and his Swedish counterpart, Pal Jonson, the ministry said in a June 23 statement.

That bilateral pact set out a “road map,” which included Stockholm’s order for the MBDA Akeron anti-tank missile, and security of supply for weapons and explosives. The agreement included the Meteor air-to-air and Aster surface-to-air missile, as well as short-range missiles, the ministry said.

There was little sign of the Saab Gripen fighter, but there was little point sending one over as the show was effectively the special reserve of the Rafale, an executive close to the Swedish delegation said.

A U.S. air force F-35A and German air force Eurofighter Typhoon were among the fighters flying in the air displays at the show.

Aarok And Rocket Artillery

Turgis Gaillard, a French medium-sized company, placed on static display a version of its Aarok low-cost medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, with this model fitted with a conventional pilot’s canopy. This glass canopy, as used with a pilot in the cockpit, made this aircraft clearly distinct from the all metal combat drone displayed at the previous show, when it grabbed media attention.

Aarok had partnered with Thales to fit the AirMaster S radar, Turgis Gaillard said in a June 17 statement, headlining the “100 pct French” nature of its air surveillance capability.

There has been much discussion of a perceived need for French weapons to be “ITAR-free,” referring to the U.S. international traffic in arms regulations applied by the state department. French companies have sought to address clients’ concerns on Washington holding up foreign deals when U.S. parts need to be cleared.

Turgis Gaillard also displayed Foudre, or Thunder, a guided multiple rocket launcher system alongside the MALE drone, which was flanked by an Akeron long-range missile and unmarked weapons.

Loitering Munitions-Lessons from Ukraine

KNDS France, Delair, and EOS Technologie said June 17 they were launching on the export market a range of loitering munitions which could hit targets at range of two km to 100 km. These kamikaze drones with a deadly payload were developed from a weapon, the MV-25 Oskar, rushed to Ukraine for use against Russian troops. KNDS and Delair developed Oskar  in less than two years and was now part of the four-strong Mataris range. That delivery was faster than the eight years previously seen as normal for bringing a new weapon to market, reporters heard. EOS was the partner for the medium range weapons, which could carry a

The French army was receiving the MX-10 Damocles, which was entering service in July 2025, KNDS said in a statement. The loitering munition had a 10 km range.

EOS, a drone manufacturer, was the partner for the MV-100, a 100-km anti-tank weapon, based on its fixed wing Veloce 330 aircraft. That drone will carry a warhead based on the KNDS Bonus anti-tank shell.

France, Spain Back the A400M

The opening of the show offered Airbus a red letter day, with France and Spain signing June 16 a letter of intent aimed at ensuring production of the Airbus A400M to the end of 2028.

Those key client nations were bringing forward planned orders, to allow Airbus to keep the factory at Seville, southern Spain, open, and buy time for the company to win export orders.

Paris and Madrid were bringing forward orders respectively for four and three units.

The A400M program accounted for more than 10,000 direct jobs in Europe, the French armed forces ministry said, of which 2,400 were in France and in more than 80 companies on the national territory, many of which were small and medium sized.

Space Vortex

Back on the space trail, Dassault’s large exhibition stand in the cavernous hall 2A  included a a small-scale model of a space plane, dubbed Vortex (Véhicule Orbital Réutilisable de Transport et d’Exploration). There were information panels on the wall, with English first, French second, setting out the main features of the spacecraft.

There was a clear headline: A Strategic Asset for Power and Autonomy.

The armed forces minister, Lécornu, and Trappier signed June 20 “an agreement to support the development of a spaceplane demonstrator,” the company said. That demonstrator for  what was for now a science fiction vessel would be “the first step in an incremental and intrinsically dual roadmap for the development of a family of spaceplanes called Vortex.”

Anduril and Rheinmetall As Partners

The U.S. determination to grab a piece of the European rearmament cake could be seen with a deal announced by Anduril and Rheinmetall, with the American and German industrial partners developing European versions of the Barracuda and Fury drones for the European market. The two companies would also look at adapting Anduril’s solid rocket motors for European missiles and rockets.

Sense of History

The air show’s flow of deals, real and prospective, was punctuated by a memorial ceremony attended by President Macron, marking the 1940 June 18 call to arms by the then army general Charles de Gaulle, calling on BBC radio the French nation to join the Resistance and fight against the Nazi occupation.

France’s deep sense of history can also be seen by a plaque which hangs at Le Bourget train station, giving honor to the Jews shipped from that rail station to Auschwitz death camp.

The featured image was generated by an AI program.

HLMA-773 Marines

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U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 773, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, conduct flight and forward area refuel point operations during Integrated Training Exercise 3-25 at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, June 6, 2025.

MCAGCC serves as the Marine Corps’ premier training venue for service-level exercises by providing a realistic multi-domain environment to prepare forces for success in peer and near-peer conflicts.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA

06.06.2025

Video by Sgt. Makayla Elizalde 

Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center

Ukraine’s Hybrid Operational Force Redesign Capability: Innovation in Modern Warfare

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Ukraine’s Hybrid Operational Force Redesign Capability: Innovation in Modern Warfare
06/30/2025

Ukraine’s defense of its homeland has demonstrated a remarkable evolution in modern military strategy, showcasing how a defending nation can leverage both established military doctrine and cutting-edge innovation to counter a numerically superior adversary.

The Ukrainian approach represents a new paradigm in what we might call a hybrid operational force redesign capability for the “fight tonight force.”

Or the seamless integration of conventional Western weaponry with indigenous technological innovations.

At the core of Ukraine’s defensive capability lies a dual foundation.

Western-supplied conventional weapons have provided the essential backbone of their military resistance, offering the firepower and reliability needed to sustain prolonged defensive operations. These systems have proven their worth as the steady anchor of Ukrainian defense capabilities, providing the conventional military strength necessary to hold territory and repel advances.

However, it is Ukraine’s own innovations, particularly in drone warfare, that have captured international attention and redefined modern battlefield tactics.

Ukrainian forces have pioneered new approaches to unmanned systems that extend far beyond traditional military doctrine, creating novel applications that have surprised military analysts worldwide.

What sets Ukraine’s approach apart is not simply the use of advanced Western weapons or innovative drone technology in isolation, but rather their ability to effectively combine these two elements.

This integration has created  a hybrid operational force redesign capability capability that maximizes the strengths of both conventional and unconventional systems.

The success of this a hybrid operational force redesign capability depends critically on effective command and control systems paired with advanced electronic warfare capabilities. These technological ecosystems serve as the nervous system that ties together disparate weapon systems, enabling coordinated operations that leverage both conventional firepower and innovative drone capabilities in synchronized attacks and defensive maneuvers.

Ukraine’s strategic situation illustrates a fundamental principle of military doctrine: the mathematical disadvantage faced by defensive forces. Traditional military theory suggests that successful offensive operations require a three-to-one superiority in forces. Ukraine finds itself in the inverse position – they are “the one, not the three” – facing numerically superior opposition while conducting defensive operations.

This numerical disadvantage has necessitated the development of innovative tactics that multiply the effectiveness of available forces.

By leveraging their a hybrid operational force redesign capability, Ukrainian forces have found ways to overcome traditional mathematical disadvantages through superior tactical innovation and technological integration.

Ukraine’s defensive strategy offers important lessons for military planners and defense analysts.

The conflict demonstrates that modern warfare increasingly favors forces that can rapidly adapt and integrate diverse technologies.

The Ukrainian model suggests that the future of warfare may belong to forces that can effectively blend established military capabilities with rapid innovation, supported by robust command and control networks that can coordinate complex, multi-domain operations.

This approach may prove particularly valuable for nations facing numerically superior adversaries, offering a potential pathway to effective defense through technological innovation and tactical creativity.

Ukraine’s defense represents more than just resistance to invasion.

Their approach embodies a fundamental shift in how modern warfare can be conducted. By combining Western conventional arms with indigenous innovations, particularly in drone warfare, and tying them together through sophisticated command and control systems, Ukraine has created a hybrid operational force redesign approach that maximizes defensive capabilities while minimizing traditional numerical disadvantages.

This approach may well define the future of asymmetric warfare, demonstrating that innovation, integration, and adaptive tactics can provide viable alternatives to traditional force-on-force confrontations.

The featured image was generated by an AI program.

Bamboo Eagle 25-1

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U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 354th Fighter Wing paticipate in Bamboo Eagle 25-1 at Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif. The 354th participated in Bamboo Eagle to improve the wing’s ability to engage in Agile Combat Employment strategies that increase survivability and interfere with adversary calculus.

EIELSON AIR FORCE BASE, ALASKA

02.12.2025

Video by Airman 1st Class Spencer Hanson 

354th Fighter Wing

 

 

 

Could the United States Have Done Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web?

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Could the United States Have Done Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web?
06/29/2025

Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web stands as one of the most audacious military operations of the 21st century. It estimated that 117 drones were coordinated across 4,300 kilometers, destroying $7 billion in Russian aircraft for under $120,000 in equipment costs

The operation’s success raises a provocative question: Could the world’s most technologically advanced military have pulled off the same feat?

The answer reveals a fundamental paradox at the heart of American defense capabilities.

Despite possessing vastly superior technology, resources, and global reach, the U.S. military likely could not have executed Operation Spider Web as Ukraine did.

This limitation stems not from technical inadequacy, but from the very institutional frameworks that make America’s military powerful in conventional warfare.

From a purely technical perspective, the United States possesses capabilities that dwarf what Ukraine demonstrated in Spider Web.

American military technology represents the pinnacle of defense innovation:

  • Advanced Autonomous Systems: The U.S. military operates sophisticated platforms like the MQ-9 Reaper with its ability to loiter for 14 hours at 50,000 feet, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk capable of 34-hour flights across intercontinental distances. These systems far exceed the 150-kilometer range and basic payload capacity of Ukraine’s Osa drones.
  • Artificial Intelligence Integration: Programs like Project Maven have developed AI systems capable of processing millions of hours of video footage to identify targets with precision that makes Ukraine’s museum-trained algorithms appear rudimentary.The Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center coordinates AI development across all service branches with budgets exceeding Ukraine’s entire defense expenditure.
  • Global Logistics Networks: American military logistics capabilities can position assets anywhere on Earth within hours. The U.S. maintains over 800 military installations across 80 countries, providing staging areas that Ukraine could only dream of accessing through covert operations.
  • Precision Strike Capabilities: U.S. forces routinely achieve the kind of targeting precision Ukraine celebrated in Spider Web. Tomahawk missiles can strike targets with sub-meter accuracy from thousands of kilometers away, while platforms like the B-2 Spirit can deliver precision munitions globally with near-impunity.

Yet despite these overwhelming technical advantages, the U.S. military system would struggle to replicate Spider Web’s innovative approach, cost-effectiveness, and operational agility.

The U.S. defense acquisition system, designed to ensure accountability and minimize risk, creates barriers that would make a Spider Web-style operation nearly impossible within existing frameworks.

Cost Multiplication Effect: What Ukraine accomplished for $120,000 would likely cost the U.S. military tens of millions of dollars. The Pentagon’s acquisition process would demand military-grade components, extensive testing protocols, contractor oversight, and compliance reviews that inflate costs exponentially. A simple commercial drone becomes a complex military system requiring years of development and validation.

Timeline Paralysis: Ukraine planned and executed Spider Web in 18 months. A comparable U.S. operation would require 5-10 years moving through standard acquisition phases: initial requirements definition, market research, request for proposals, contractor selection, development, testing, evaluation, and deployment. Each phase includes review boards, congressional oversight, and bureaucratic approvals that prioritize process over speed.

Risk Aversion Culture: The U.S. military-industrial complex gravitates toward proven, expensive solutions rather than innovative approaches that carry inherent risks. The careers of military officers and defense contractors depend on avoiding failures rather than achieving breakthrough successes, creating institutional incentives that discourage the kind of bold experimentation that characterized Ukrainian drone development.

Consider the contrast: Ukraine’s engineers trained AI targeting systems using museum aircraft displays and achieved 90-centimeter precision targeting. A U.S. military equivalent would require extensive modeling and simulation, live-fire testing ranges, safety reviews, and validation protocols that would take years and cost millions. Ultimately a system would be produced that might be marginally better but orders of magnitude more expensive.

America’s global leadership role creates legal and operational constraints that fundamentally limit the military’s operational flexibility compared to Ukraine’s desperate circumstances.

  • Congressional Oversight Requirements: Covert operations require extensive legal frameworks, congressional notification, and ongoing oversight that would compromise the operational security essential to a Spider Web-style operation. Ukraine’s Security Service could plan for 18 months in complete secrecy with only five people initially aware of the operation’s existence. The U.S. equivalent would require briefings to multiple congressional committees, legal reviews, and approval processes that would expand the circle of knowledge exponentially.
  • International Law Compliance: The U.S. military operates under strict rules of engagement and international law constraints that Ukraine, fighting for national survival, could set aside. American operations must consider diplomatic consequences, alliance relationships, and long-term strategic implications that complicate rapid, aggressive action.
  • Attribution Concerns: The United States faces different consequences for military operations than Ukraine. While Ukraine could openly claim credit for Spider Web as legitimate self-defense, similar U.S. operations might be viewed as aggressive acts requiring careful consideration of escalation dynamics and international response.
  • Command Structure Rigidity: The U.S. military’s hierarchical command structure, designed for large-scale conventional operations, lacks the flexibility that enabled Ukraine’s “islands of forces” approach. American military culture emphasizes following established procedures and chains of command, while Spider Web required rapid improvisation and decentralized decision-making.

The most significant barrier to U.S. replication of Spider Web lies in what might be called the “innovation paradox.” The same institutional strengths that make the U.S. military dominant in conventional warfare create weaknesses in asymmetric, innovative operations.

  • Contractor Dependence: The U.S. military relies heavily on established defense contractors who excel at producing sophisticated, expensive systems but may lack the agility for rapid, low-cost innovation. Ukraine’s success came from direct military-industry cooperation with hundreds of small manufacturers, from major defense companies to garage workshops. The U.S. equivalent would channel through established contractors adding layers of bureaucracy and cost.
  • Success Definition Differences: The U.S. military measures success through complex metrics including casualty minimization, international law compliance, strategic objectives, and long-term consequences. Ukraine could focus purely on immediate tactical effectiveness and cost efficiency. These different success criteria fundamentally shape operational planning and execution.
  • Resource Abundance Problems: Paradoxically, the U.S. military’s vast resources can inhibit innovation. When budgets are measured in hundreds of billions, there’s less pressure to develop the kind of creative, low-cost solutions that necessity forced upon Ukraine. American military culture often equates expensive with effective, while Ukraine proved that innovation and resourcefulness could achieve strategic effects at minimal cost.
  • Institutional Memory vs. Adaptation: The U.S. military’s institutional knowledge and established doctrines, while valuable for conventional operations, can create resistance to radical innovation. Ukraine’s military, essentially rebuilt during wartime, could embrace new approaches without fighting existing institutional biases.

Rather than attempting to replicate Spider Web directly, the U.S. military would likely pursue different approaches that leverage American conventional advantages:

  • Precision Strike Integration: Instead of 117 small drones, the U.S. might use a handful of sophisticated cruise missiles or stealth bomber sorties to achieve similar destruction with greater certainty and less operational complexity.
  • Cyber-Kinetic Fusion: American cyber capabilities could disable enemy air defense systems, communications, or even aircraft systems directly, potentially achieving Spider Web’s objectives without kinetic strikes.
  • Special Operations Coordination: U.S. special forces could conduct sabotage operations or coordinate with local assets to achieve similar strategic effects while maintaining plausible deniability.
  • Alliance Leverage: The U.S. could work through NATO allies or regional partners who might have greater operational flexibility for conducting Spider Web-style operations.

Nonetheless, Ukraine’s drone warfare revolution highlights critical vulnerabilities in American military thinking and acquisition processes that extend far beyond the Spider Web operation itself.

  • Speed vs. Perfection Trade-offs: The U.S. military’s pursuit of perfect solutions may sacrifice the tactical advantages of rapid deployment and iteration. Ukraine’s willingness to deploy “good enough” solutions quickly proved more effective than pursuing optimal solutions slowly.
  • Cost-Effectiveness Blindness: American defense planning often ignores cost-effectiveness ratios that proved decisive in Ukrainian operations. When $1,000 drones can destroy $250 million bombers, traditional military investment priorities require fundamental reconsideration.
  • Innovation Ecosystem Gaps: Ukraine’s success came from integrating civilian technology, military application, and rapid iteration cycles. The U.S. military-industrial complex may lack equivalent innovation ecosystems that can rapidly translate commercial technology into military capability.
  • Asymmetric Thinking Deficits: American military doctrine excels at conventional operations but may struggle with the kind of asymmetric thinking that enabled Spider Web’s success. The operation succeeded through creative rule-breaking rather than superior resources or technology.

The Spider Web case study suggests several reforms that could help the U.S. military capture some advantages of Ukrainian-style innovation while maintaining institutional strengths:

  • Acquisition Fast-Tracks: Creating parallel acquisition pathways for low-cost, high-risk innovation projects that bypass traditional bureaucratic requirements for rapid deployment and iteration. And notably, give the systems to the war fighters and let them work directly with the software/AI company behind the drones to drive iterative evolution of deployed systems.
  • Innovation Incubators: Establishing military innovation centers that can rapidly prototype and test new concepts without full acquisition process requirements, similar to Ukraine’s direct military-industry cooperation.
  • Cultural Shifts: Rewarding successful innovation and calculated risk-taking rather than process compliance and risk avoidance, encouraging the kind of creative thinking that enabled Spider Web. Prioritizing acquisition processes over effective use by the warfighters is a major obstacle to change when it comes with software/AI driven autonomous systems, rather than platforms.
  • Commercial Integration: Developing frameworks for rapidly integrating commercial technology into military applications, reducing dependence on traditional defense contractors for innovative solutions.

In short, Ukraine’s Operation Spider Web reveals a fundamental tension in modern military affairs: the institutional frameworks that make the U.S. military the world’s most powerful conventional force may simultaneously constrain its ability to conduct the kind of innovative, asymmetric operations that proved devastatingly effective against Russian forces.

This is not an indictment of American military capability, but rather recognition that different strategic circumstances require different institutional approaches.

The U.S. military’s strength lies in its ability to project conventional power globally with unmatched precision and effectiveness.

Ukraine’s strength emerged from necessity-driven innovation and institutional flexibility born of existential threat.

The challenge for American defense leaders is not to abandon the institutional strengths that make the U.S. military globally dominant, but to create pathways for the kind of rapid innovation and asymmetric thinking that Operation Spider Web demonstrated.

This might require accepting higher risks, tolerating failures, and embracing the kind of creative chaos that produced Ukraine’s drone warfare revolution.

Ultimately, Operation Spider Web offers the U.S. military not a template to copy, but a mirror reflecting both the strengths and limitations of American institutional approaches to warfare.

The question is whether American defense institutions can evolve to capture the advantages of Ukrainian-style innovation while maintaining the conventional superiority that underpins global security.

In an era where $120,000 operations can achieve strategic effects previously requiring billions in military investment, the nation that masters this balance may hold decisive advantages in future conflicts.

Ukraine has shown what’s possible when institutional constraints are swept away by existential necessity.

The challenge for America is achieving similar innovation without requiring similar desperation.

The featued image was generated by an AI program.

The Convergence of Strategic Vision and Operational Reality: From GBU-57 Development to Modern Air Supremacy

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Convergence of Strategic Vision and Operational Reality: From GBU-57 Development to Modern Air Supremacy
06/28/2025

By Robbin Laird

The recent operations Midnight Hammer and Rising Lion represent the culmination of decades of strategic airpower investment, demonstrating how prescient weapons development from the early 2000s enabled decisive military options in 2025.

However, these successes have exposed critical capacity limitations that require immediate attention to maintain credible deterrence in an increasingly multipolar world.

The Strategic Genesis: Anticipating Iran’s Nuclear Challenge (2004-2010)

The development of the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) began in 2004 as a direct response to Iran’s strategic decision to bury its nuclear infrastructure deep underground.

By 2010, the strategic calculus driving MOP development had crystallized around a specific challenge. Iran, learning from Israel’s successful strikes on Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981 and Syria’s nuclear facility in 2007, had embarked on a different approach to nuclear development.

Rather than building vulnerable above-ground facilities, Iran was constructing its most critical nuclear infrastructure deep underground, protected by hundreds of feet of rock and reinforced concrete.

Major General C.R. Davis, who led weapons development at Eglin Air Force Base, exemplified the forward-thinking approach needed for this challenge. This created what Major General Davis described in 2010 as a fundamental challenge in weapons development: “This process must start with future target set playing a key role in leading the design process. The process must not start with a set of constraints defined by specific legacy platform dimensions.”

The MOP’s development timeline reveals the prescient nature of this investment:

  • 2004: Defense Threat Reduction Agency launched the MOP project
  • 2005-2007: Boeing completed concept refinement specifically targeting Iranian-type facilities
  • 2007: First static detonation test validated explosive capabilities
  • 2008-2010: Flight testing phase, concurrent with Iran’s Fordow facility construction

In the case of the MOP, the anticipation was exactly right. The weapon system was developed specifically with Iran’s nuclear program in mind, and when diplomatic efforts failed to prevent Iran’s nuclear advancement, the military option was ready.

Israeli Strategic Vision: The F-35 as Revolutionary Capability (2011)

Paralleling U.S. weapons development, Israeli defense leaders recognized the transformational potential of fifth-generation aircraft. In a prescient 2010 interview, retired General Herzl Bodinger, former Chief of the Israeli Air Force, articulated the need for revolutionary rather than evolutionary capabilities.

General Bodinger: “There comes a time that you have to make a leap forward in combat capability which we plan to do with the F-35.”

His insights about the changing threat environment proved remarkably accurate:

“The effort is to provide new capabilities against our aircraft and to do so by using various means including, ground-to-air missiles of different kinds. And against the ability of Israel to retaliate, and to attack this very small country, a country with no strategic depth. Our adversaries are relying on the proliferation of missiles, both surface-to-air and the ground-to-ground to prevail… So, the correct way to go, which we watched very carefully, was what the F-117 introduced at first. The idea of low observable and low radar cross section, and it really looks a newer way to go.”

“For us, this will be the F-35. Because it can lead the way, and it can reach the targets. It can fly over any point over the Middle East, and strike any target.”

Operation Rising Lion: Validation of Israeli Investment (June 13, 2025)

Israel’s Operation Rising Lion demonstrated the strategic value of its F-35 investment.

Just after midnight on June 13, 2025, an Israeli operation codenamed Rising Lion unfolded in two distinct but mutually reinforcing acts.

First came swarms of small explosive drones that Israeli commandos had reportedly pre-positioned inside Iran months earlier, striking air-defense radars and communications nodes, while decoying attention toward Tehran’s western approaches.

Minutes later, over 200 Israeli fighter aircraft — many of them F-35 Adirs carrying standoff munitions — conducted precision strikes against more than 100 nuclear and military targets across Iran, including senior military leaders.

The operation showcased several technological advances:

  • Israeli F-35 Modifications: Reports about the F-35I indicate Israel modified them to reach Iran without refueling and without sacrificing their stealth capabilities. Israel identified this capability back in 2022, but there is still no indication of what it means exactly.
  • Operational Results: The operation involved approximately 200 Israeli aircraft conducting coordinated strikes across multiple Iranian targets, with F-35I fighters spearheading the initial penetration missions into heavily defended Iranian airspace. This marks the largest combat deployment of F-35 aircraft in history and validates Israel’s unique modifications to the platform for long-range precision operations.
  • Strategic Deception and Intelligence: Israeli intelligence had pre-positioned precision-guided drones and explosive systems across Iranian territory, including near Tehran. These assets were concealed and dormant, bypassing Iran’s air defenses. The lack of external flight paths meant Iran’s alarm systems did not activate.

Operation Midnight Hammer: U.S. Strategic Capability Demonstration (June 22, 2025)

Nine days after Rising Lion, the United States launched Operation Midnight Hammer, demonstrating the maturation of capabilities developed over two decades.

The operation included more than 125 US aircraft, “dozens” of aerial refueling tankers, a guided missile submarine and approximately 75 precision guided weapons… Caine said the mission, dubbed Operation Midnight Hammer, included seven B-2 Spirit bombers that flew east from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri to Iran.

At about 6:40 p.m. ET, or 2:10 a.m. in Iran, the lead B-2 dropped two “bunker-buster” bombs known as the GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators, or MOPs, on the site at Fordo… Over the next 25 minutes, Caine said, a total of 14 MOPs would be dropped on targets at Fordo and Natanz.

More than 125 aircraft, including 7 B-2 stealth bombers, snuck into Iran while other B-2s were sent to Guam as decoys… In fact, two flights of B-2 Spirits, callsigns MYTEE 11 flight and MYTEE 21 flight, each comprising four aircraft, departed from Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, in the early hours of Jun. 21, 2025. Their destination was confirmed as Andersen Air Force Base, located on the Pacific island of Guam.

The Sobering Reality: Capacity Constraints and Strategic Implications

Despite the operational success, both operations reveal critical limitations that threaten future deterrence credibility.

Yet what the American public didn’t see was this: That one-day operation maxed out our available long-range stealth strike capability. The U.S. Air Force only fields 19 B-2 bombers, and they are more than 30 years old. Although the B-52 fleet remains a workhorse, it just turned 73 years old. Also, a good percentage of our GBU-57 bunker-buster stockpile was used in a single night.

Today, the U.S. Air Force is the oldest, the smallest and the least ready in its history. That’s not an opinion — it’s a fact and a strategic liability. Over 30 years of underinvestment in Air Force modernization and spares has left us dangerously thin in aircraft, munitions and trained crews.

The contrast in readiness rates highlights the importance of sustained investment: Israeli F-35 fleet: Nearly 90% readiness rate with the U.S. F-35 fleet: Slightly above 50% readiness rate.

Strategic Requirements

According to a recent essay by my friend General Deptula and Rep. August Pfluger (R-Texas), there is a clear need to accelerate and scale the B-21 Raider program. We need to dramatically grow our F-35 inventory — aircraft that proved pivotal in gaining air superiority over Iran. New types like Collaborative Combat Aircraft will also prove crucial. We need to build munitions stockpiles that can support more than a one-night raid.

Operation Midnight Hammer proved what American airmen can do. Now it’s time for Congress to prove that it understands what’s at stake. America must not let this stunning success become a historical footnote because we failed to prepare for what comes next.

The convergence of strategic vision from the 2000s with operational reality in 2025 demonstrates both the power of prescient defense investment and the critical need for sustained modernization. While Operations Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer showcased unparalleled technological superiority, they also revealed capacity constraints that threaten future deterrence credibility.

The path forward requires recognizing these operations not as the culmination of past investments, but as the foundation for an essential expansion of airpower capabilities in an increasingly dangerous multipolar world. The president needs options, and airpower provides those options—but only if the capacity exists to sustain them beyond a single night of operations.

Featured image of an historical moment: Weapon specialists gather in front of a mock up of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator and the B-2 weapons load trainer Dec. 18 at Whitman Air Force Base, Mo. U.S. Air Force photo.

Also, see the following:

Israel and the F-35: 2011

From Development to Deployment: The GBU-57 MOP’s Journey from Eglin AFB to Iran

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5372479-air-force-funding-dollars/

The Paris Air Show 2025 and Tales of FCAS

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Paris Air Show 2025 and Tales of FCAS
06/25/2025

By Pierre Tran

Le Bourget, France – A long-simmering dispute between Airbus and Dassault Aviation on the share of high-value work on a planned European fighter jet boiled over at the 2025 Paris air show, which opened June 16 with a summer heatwave warming the tarmac.

The June 21 U.S. strike with bunker busting bombs of three nuclear related targets in Iran underscored the significance of the military aircraft and weapons displayed at the 55th edition of the air show, held in the northern suburbs of the capital.

An aerobatic display of a Dassault Rafale fighter jet in the red, white, and blue of the French flag opened the show, reflecting national pride in the aerospace sector. The show organizer, Gifas, told a June 5 press conference the U.S. was the second-largest national exhibitor after France at the showcase for aeronautics and space technology.

Beneath the glitter of the show, which closed June 22, industry executives bore in mind the loss of more than 240 lives in the June 12 crash of a Boeing 787 Dreamliner flown by Air India. In the military world, there was Israel’s extended air and missile attack on Iran, pointing up Israeli dominance of the Iranian skies, while Teheran fired ballistic missiles in retaliation.

In other theaters of conflict, India has yet to give a detailed account in response to Pakistan’s claim of downing the Rafale in combat, while Dassault has said what counted was accomplishing the mission, not the aircraft.

Corporate Clash

Dassault executive chairman Eric Trappier told June 17 Bloomberg TV that Airbus posed governance problems on the European fighter project.

Airbus Defence and Space, based in Germany, is the industrial partner of Dassault, the French prime contractor, on the new generation fighter (NGF) at the heart of the ambitious European future combat air system (FCAS).

“We may go it alone,” Trappier said at the show, with the mercury rising on troubled corporate ties.

If there was good cooperation, then it made sense to stay in the partnership on the fighter, he said, but added that he was “not happy with the governing system.”

The governance rules on FCAS meant Dassault sat at the table negotiating with the German and Spanish Airbus units, with the latter two entitled to two thirds of the work share, he said. The work share reflected the three nations backing the project rather than the companies’ technological skills.

France, Germany, and Spain were financing the project, with Belgium keen to enter the deal.

It could be argued that rising costs and the call for shareholders’ return have made it harder for manufacturers to go it alone. That raises the need for government funding, making it a political decision rather than purely corporate on whether to pull out.

A senior Airbus executive, Jean-Brice Dumont, told reporters June 17 Dassault was clearly the prime, adding there was also a claim for a work for based on the equal share of the three nations backing FCAS.

“What we don’t challenge is that there is an appointed leader for the fighter program,” he said. “That leader is named Dassault Aviation.

Dumont, head of air power at Airbus Defence and Space, spoke calmly, perhaps attempting to pour oil over troubled waters.

“Dassault has the lead of the so-called pillar one – NGWS (new generation weapon system).

There has to be an even share corresponding to the share of our governments. That doesn’t have to become toxic in the programme,” he said.

“We have to aim for something that is simple enough. Cooperation meant there would be interdependency, which had to be ‘healthy,’” he said, pointing up the need for government support to advance the FCAS project.

Airbus was not planning to move to the global combat air programme (GCAP) and leave FCAS, he said.

Airbus DS is a unit of Airbus, an airliner builder based in Toulouse, southern France.

Dumont previously worked in the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office on the Franco-German Tiger attack helicopter before moving on to work on the NH90 military transport helicopter at Eurocopter, renamed Airbus Helicopters.

Strategic Solidarity

Jean-Pierre Maulny, deputy director of the Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, a think tank, told June 11 the Anglo-American Press Association that European allies needed to share technology, to pursue a “strategic solidarity. This was in preference to the “best athlete” approach.

The DGA backed the latter, which secured a leading position for Dassault in building fighters. France has the “competence,” while Germany has the money, he said.

“It’s very difficult,” he said.

France is in financial dire straits, with a 2024 public sector budget deficit of 5.8 pct, up from 5.4 pct in the previous year, national statistics agency INSEE has said. That calls for big government spending cuts to meet a European Union target of 3 pct by 2029.

Meanwhile, there was a perceived need for European allies to replace key U.S. capabilities – known as “enablers — as Washington was seen as withdrawing from the European theatre.

Europe has a problem with “enablers,” he said, referring to the lack of European built  satellites, deep-strike weapons, defense against air and missile attacks, spy planes, intelligence gathering, air-to-air refueling, and strategic air transport.

The 27 E.U. member states, and the U.K. and Norway had much to do, and should act collectively, he said. European allies had five to 10 years to build up the defence industrial and technology base in Europe.

Dassault has a history of building its own aircraft and delivering the flight control technology, said Sash Tusa, analyst at Agency Partners, an equities research house.

If there is cooperation,  there will be technology flying for 40-50 years, paid for by the partner governments, he said. Alternatively, Dassault has work in the pipeline for the F5 and eventual F6 of the Rafale and a planned unmanned combat air vehicle based on the Neuron demonstrator.

Meanwhile, Germany clearly has a nearer-term priority to fund, and bring into service, the F-35, he said.

An industry source said Dassault was working on F5, and there was nothing planned for an F6 version.

FCAS appears to be lagging further behind the global combat air program, which seems to be on its third design iteration, Tusa said.

Italy, Japan, and the U.K. are the three nations backing GCAP, based on the Tempest, a British-led fighter project. The aim is to fly that new generation fighter in 2035.

Saudi Arabia is keen to join that fighter project, and Italy backs Riyadh’s entry to that consortium, Reuters reported Jan. 27.

Dassault tucked its life-size model of the new generation fighter on the side of its outdoor stand, while its Neuron prototype for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) and a Rafale, complete with a spread of weapons, took pride of place in the front.

That layout was seen by some as relegating the new fighter to second place, while pointing up the perceived importance of the Rafale and its accompanying collaborative combat aircraft (CCA), or combat drone.

No Surprise

Trappier’s remarks to Bloomberg did not surprise one French executive, who said those sentiments had appeared in the French press, and perhaps the high media impact stemmed from being expressed in English.

The Dassault executive told June 16 Le Figaro, a daily, the French company’s minority position on the fighter made it “particularly complicated to exercise leadership. If the states want us to go ahead, governance needs to be changed.”

The Dassault family owns Le Figaro.

The aim was to build and fly a plane by 2029/30, he said. “To do that, a leader is needed, not endless discussion on the work share for the nations. This geographic return is not efficient.

That was fine when the work was all on paper, but when it came to ‘cutting steel,’ things had to change,” he said.

The Dassault top executive made it clear April 9 to the defense committee of the lower house National Assembly, when he told parliamentarians “the task is extremely difficult,” but the company had no intention of pulling out.

There was permanent negotiation, he said, with a long and complex path.

“I am not sure this is the model of efficiency, but we will meet the wishes of the states,” he said.

There were delays due to the geographic return approach, he said, when the priority should be on the level of expertise to develop an ambitious industrial product. That product should be competitive, not only with the enemy but also what the allies were building.

Dassault could not build everything, but the company did work with Thales, the electronics company, he said.

The family-controlled plane maker holds 26.6 pct of Thales.

The fighter project lay in finding the best compromise between stealth and maneuverability, while meeting requirements of the chiefs of staff, he told parliamentarians. Tests should be launched as soon as possible, and he favored speeding up the project by a revised share of “responsibilities.”

“It is up to the states to discuss, to define the best way to manage this ambitious program,” he said.

“I do not want to appear arrogant,” he said in answer to whether Dassault could build the FCAS on its own. “I am ready to cooperate and share, but Dassault and its partners Thales and Safran have the capability to build a fighter jet on a national basis.

“The president strongly wishes to see cooperation on FCAS,” he said, as the three partner nations allowed increased funding and the fighter would signify a more united Europe.

“The state is committed, but the situation is more complex when one plunges into the reality of contracts,” he said. “I say again – with three, the situation is necessarily more complex, and should evolve.”

President Emmanuel Macron and the then German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, announced in 2017 the determination to launch the FCAS project, soon after a U.K. referendum delivered a vote, with narrow margin, to leave the E.U.

The FCAS budget for the present phase 1B and upcoming phase 2 was worth almost €8 billion ($9.2 billion), the armed forces ministry has said. Phase 1B was worth €3.2 billion, ran 2023-2025, and allowed air force officers to select the aircraft architecture this year.

Phase 2 calls on the partner companies to build and fly a fighter technology demonstrator and two classes of remote carriers, or drones, in 2028/29. That appears to have slipped to 2029/30.

Belgium, an observer on FCAS, is keen to join as a partner nation when phase 2 is launched, opening up the prospect for work for Belgian aerospace companies.

The FCAS budget shared between the three partner nations has been estimated at some €80 billion, and that appears to have been rounded up to €100 billion.

The new fighter would replace the Eurofighter Typhoon for Germany and Spain, and the Rafale for France. The FCAS project includes a combat cloud for extended command and control, as well as the swarm of drones.

Featured image: The Paris Air Show 2025 as seen from the Dassault Pavilion. Credit: Dassault.