In the early hours of a spring morning in 2024, a beaten-up Soviet-era propeller plane taxied to a halt on a rural Ukrainian runway. Two unlikely warriors emerged from the cockpit, a 56-year-old pilot who had learned to fly as a hobby before the war, and a 38-year-old former auto mechanic who had never been in an aircraft before Russia’s invasion. Together, this improbable duo represents one of the most innovative and cost-effective solutions to emerge from the ongoing conflict: using vintage training aircraft armed with shotguns to hunt sophisticated enemy drones.
This remarkable story illustrates how Ukraine’s defenders have turned necessity into innovation, reviving World War I-era aerial combat tactics to counter 21st-century threats. What began as a desperate improvisation has evolved into a proven military capability that has influenced tactics on both sides of the conflict and offers lessons for future warfare.
The Birth of an Unlikely Solution
The Ukrainian approach to drone hunting with propeller aircraft emerged organically from the Civil Air Patrol of Ukraine, a civilian organization consisting mainly of amateur aviators and private aircraft owners. Evidence of Ukraine using the Yak-52 to attack Russian drones first appeared in spring 2024, when videos surfaced showing Ukrainian pilots engaging Russian reconnaissance aircraft in what observers described as reminiscent of World War I dogfights.
The aircraft at the center of this innovation is the Yakovlev Yak-52, a Soviet primary trainer that first flew in 1976 and was produced in Romania from 1977 to 1998. Originally designed as an aerobatic trainer for students in the Soviet DOSAAF training organization, which trained both civilian sport pilots and military pilots, the all-metal Yak-52 is powered by a 268 kW (360 hp) Vedeneyev M14P nine-cylinder radial engine. At 998 kg (2,200 lb) empty weight, the aircraft is responsive and capable as an aerobatic platform, with fuel and oil systems permitting inverted flight for up to two minutes.
The conversion of these training aircraft into drone hunters represents the simplest possible approach: arming the backseat crew member with handheld weapons. Ukrainian forces discovered that the Yak-52’s low stall speed allows the plane to pursue drones and carry out maneuvers at slower speeds, enabling a gunner in the rear seat to engage targets at close range.⁷ The aircraft’s cruising speed of just 225 km/h and forgiving low-speed handling characteristics make it ideally suited for this mission.
Combat Operations and Effectiveness
The tactical approach developed by Ukrainian crews has proven remarkably effective. The two featured protagonists, pilot “Maestro” and gunner “Ninja”, have flown around 300 combat missions as part of the 11th Army Aviation Brigade and downed almost half of their unit’s total of 120 drones eliminated, according to Deputy Commander Col. Mykola Lykhatskiy. Their success rate represents a significant contribution to Ukraine’s overall counter-drone efforts.
The operational methodology is straightforward but requires considerable skill and courage. When a drone appears on military radar screens, crews scramble to their two-seater Yak-52 trainers, which feature sliding glass canopies reminiscent of World War II fighters. Usually, they are airborne within 15 minutes. The Yak-52 is so basic that it has no radar of its own and must fly in daylight hours, with crews guided by radio before achieving visual contact.
The Ukrainian prop planes typically fly within 200 to 300 feet of their targets before the gunner opens the canopy, leans out, and fires. This extreme close-quarters engagement requires exceptional piloting skills and nerves of steel. As the gunner described the experience: “There is such great new technology now, yet I am still hanging out of the cockpit shooting at drones with a shotgun.” He likened the experience to shooting a gun while riding a horse.
The primary targets are Russian Orlan and Zala reconnaissance drones, as well as Shahed explosive drones. The propeller-driven Orlan and Zala resemble a miniature plane and kite respectively, while the distinctive triangular shape of the Shahed has become one of the most recognizable sights of the war. These propeller-powered models fly at speeds of up to 115 miles per hour, making them relatively easy prey for the Yak, which can exceed 180 miles per hour.
Combat effectiveness data suggests the approach has genuine military value. The successes of these planes and helicopters account for around 10% to 12% of the drones intercepted by Ukraine on a typical day. By summer 2024, photos had emerged showing a Ukrainian Yak-52 with kill marks indicating the destruction of two ZALA 421-16E and six Orlan-10/30 series drones. Through these methods, one Yak-52 reportedly achieved at least eight confirmed drone kills.
Historical Parallels and Tactical Evolution
The Ukrainian squadron has brought military aviation back to its very beginnings in World War I, engaging the enemy at close range with a marksman leaning out of the cockpit with a gun. This parallel to early aerial warfare is more than superficial. Before aircraft were fitted with purpose-designed gun mountings or fixed forward-firing guns, aircrew would resort to using standard infantry weapons fired by hand to bring down enemy aircraft.
The historical precedent extends beyond mere weaponry. Like World War II pilots, Ukrainian drone hunters stencil their kills onto the side of their aircraft, maintaining the tradition of aerial victory markings that has persisted throughout aviation history. The psychological and morale aspects of this practice should not be underestimated, as it reinforces the human element in what has become an increasingly technological conflict.
The tactical innovations continue to evolve as both sides adapt. Sometimes pilots get close enough to use their plane’s wings to physically tilt the drone’s wings and send them off course, a tactic British pilots used in World War II against Germany’s V-1 flying bombs, widely considered the world’s first missiles. This demonstrates how historical precedents remain relevant in modern warfare when adapted to contemporary circumstances.
Combat missions can be extraordinarily demanding and dangerous. In one documented engagement, Maestro and Ninja spent 40 minutes trying to destroy an Orlan drone that began flying in tight circles after they approached. Maestro flew the Yak underneath the Orlan, matching its movements on a wider radius to allow Ninja time to line up his shot. Eventually, they scored a hit, sending the Russian craft spiraling to the ground.
Technological Arms Race and Countermeasures
The success of Ukrainian drone hunters has not gone unnoticed by Russian forces. Russia is continually updating its technology and tactics, including adding cameras to the rear of Orlan drones that allow them to spot approaching planes or missiles and trigger evasive action. This represents the kind of rapid technological evolution that characterizes modern warfare.
The antidrone squadron’s aircraft have also become targets for Russian forces, whose air-defense missiles now cover as much as half of Ukraine. The Yaks venture closer to front lines because they are more maneuverable than helicopters, but this increased proximity brings additional risks. In May of one year, the crew reported their plane came under attack from a Russian air-defense missile, forcing them to descend at speeds of up to 450 miles per hour in an evasive maneuver.
The targeting has extended beyond tactical engagement to strategic strikes. Russia has deliberately targeted the squadron, and in July, its commander, Kostyantyn Oborin, was killed when the hangar he was in was struck by a ballistic missile. The famous drone-hunting Yak-52 operating over Odesa was also reportedly destroyed in a Russian Iskander ballistic missile attack on their air base, though Ukrainian forces have since acquired replacement aircraft.
Russian Adaptation and Reverse Engineering
Perhaps the most significant validation of the Ukrainian approach came when Russia decided to copy it. The first images of Russia’s Soviet-era Yak-52 trainer aircraft modified to the Yak-52B2 standard for airborne intercept of Ukrainian long-range attack UAVs emerged in 2025. This development represents a clear case of battlefield innovation being reverse-engineered and adapted by the opposing force.
The Russian adaptation goes beyond simple imitation. The Yak-52B2 includes sophisticated enhancements not found in the Ukrainian version. The aircraft features a PEGRAM S400 comprehensive surveillance system to detect UAVs, a modified cockpit, and a Saiga-12 12mm automatic shotgun mounted under the wing. The modified aircraft also includes a sensor turret under the left wing that can operate in air-to-air, air-to-ground, and weather-avoidance modes.
Other equipment reportedly includes an onboard fire-control computer that generates targeting information, while a navigation system allows operations at night and in poor weather conditions. This represents a significant technological advancement over the Ukrainian approach, which relies on daylight operations and handheld weapons.
The Russian development came after previous experiments using American-designed Cessna 172 four-seat propeller aircraft and the Yak-18T four/five-seat propeller utility aircraft. The Yak-52B2 is intended to defeat both purpose-designed long-range one-way attack drones like the AN-196 Liutyi, as well as propeller aircraft that have been adapted to operate pilotless and deliver explosive payloads deep within Russia.
Strategic Implications and Cost-Effectiveness
The economic mathematics of drone hunting with propeller aircraft are compelling. Shooting down a $100,000 Russian drone with an air-defense missile might cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars. Shooting it down with a shotgun from a light plane might cost only a few thousand dollars. This cost differential represents a fundamental asymmetry that favors the defender when properly exploited.
The Yak-52, which costs mere hundreds of dollars per flight hour, presents a cost-effective solution against drones valued around $100,000. In a remarkable three-month period starting in May 2024, one aircraft reportedly shot down at least a dozen Russian drones. The increasing kill markings documented the aircraft’s effectiveness and demonstrated the viability of the approach.
Ukraine has some of the West’s most advanced air defenses, including the Patriot missile system, and F-16 jets that are sometimes used to down missiles and drones. However, it has also developed a series of lower-cost tactics to counter aerial threats, ranging from nets to signal jamming. The propeller-driven drone hunters represent one element of this layered defense approach.
The success has been sufficient to inspire expansion of the program. Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate has been so impressed with the Yak-52’s performance that they have begun training gunners to hunt Russian unmanned aerial vehicles using locally-made Aeroprakt A-22 sport planes. This suggests the approach is being systematized and scaled rather than remaining a one-off innovation.
Operational Challenges and Limitations
Despite its successes, the drone-hunting approach faces significant operational limitations. The Yak-52’s basic systems create multiple constraints on its effectiveness. The aircraft has no radar of its own and must operate during daylight hours when crews can be guided by radio before visual contact. The cockpit becomes extremely cold in winter, requiring crews to wear thick jackets, gloves, and old-school, fur-lined flying helmets.
The inherent vulnerability of the Yak-52 limits the areas in which it can conduct drone-hunting missions.⁴² While Russia doesn’t face this problem when using the Yak-52B2 for homeland defense in largely uncontested airspace, Ukrainian operations must contend with Russian air defenses covering much of the country.
Training requirements present another significant challenge. While the aircraft itself is relatively easy to maintain and operate, forming effective units of aerial drone-killers requires substantial training investment. The skills needed for close-quarters aerial combat with handheld weapons are specialized and cannot be quickly developed.
Availability also constrains expansion of the program. In Ukraine, there are reportedly only around a dozen Yak-52s available for counter-drone work. While these aircraft are relatively common at flying clubs and civilian organizations, converting them for military use and training crews takes time and resources.
Broader Context of Drone Warfare Innovation
The Yak-52 drone hunters represent just one element of the broader drone warfare revolution occurring in Ukraine. The conflict has become a critical “innovation hub” for drone warfare, accelerating advancements in the scale, speed, and range of drone operations. Both Ukrainian and Russian forces have benefited from the vast knowledge base in the civilian FPV (First-Person View) community, using forums, video tutorials, and trial-and-error engineering to optimize performance for combat scenarios.
Unlike conventional military drones requiring lengthy procurement processes, commercial FPV drones can be purchased directly by soldiers and modified in the field. Their open-source nature allows for rapid customization, whether by attaching explosives, installing thermal optics, or enhancing maneuverability for combat scenarios. This accessibility has democratized drone warfare in ways that traditional military procurement systems cannot match.
The conflict has demonstrated that innovations in drone technology can change the balance of power in air defense, especially when combined with effective countermeasures. Electronic warfare in the form of jammers, spoofers, and high-energy lasers has become crucial for preventing drones from reaching their targets. Both sides continue investing in and adapting electronic warfare tactics to counter their adversary’s innovations.
Future Implications and Lessons Learned
The Ukrainian experience with vintage aircraft converted for drone hunting offers several important lessons for military planners and defense analysts. First, it demonstrates that innovative tactics can emerge from resource constraints rather than abundance. The Civil Air Patrol of Ukraine developed this capability not because they had access to advanced systems, but because they didn’t.
Second, the approach highlights the value of preserving and maintaining older military systems that may find new relevance in changed operational environments. The Yak-52 was designed as a training aircraft in the 1970s, but its characteristics, low speed, good maneuverability, two-seat configuration, proved ideal for a mission that didn’t exist when it was created.
Third, the rapid adaptation and counter-adaptation cycle demonstrates the accelerated pace of military innovation in the modern era. What began as a Ukrainian improvisation was reverse-engineered and improved by Russian forces within months. This compression of the innovation timeline has implications for military procurement, training, and doctrine development.
The success of simple, cost-effective solutions against sophisticated threats also challenges assumptions about the direction of military technology development. While there’s an understandable focus on advanced, high-technology solutions to military problems, the Ukrainian experience suggests that sometimes the most effective approach combines old platforms with new missions.
Looking forward, the lessons from Ukraine’s drone hunters may prove applicable to other domains and conflicts. The fundamental principle, namely, using available assets in innovative ways to create cost-effective solutions to emerging threats, has universal relevance. As drone proliferation continues globally, military forces worldwide may find themselves adapting similar improvised solutions to counter aerial threats.
The psychological and morale dimensions should not be overlooked either. The image of pilots in vintage aircraft taking on modern drones with shotguns captures something essential about human ingenuity and courage in warfare. As one Russian military blogger lamented, “No, this is not footage from World War II… this is just the enemy… appearing in the viewfinder of our UAV.” The combination of historical continuity and technological adaptation resonates beyond its tactical effectiveness.
Conclusion
The story of Ukraine’s vintage drone hunters represents more than a curious footnote in military history. It illustrates fundamental principles about innovation, adaptation, and the human element in warfare that remain constant even as technology evolves. The sight of a 1970s training aircraft pursuing a 21st-century drone may seem anachronistic, but it reflects timeless military virtues: resourcefulness, courage, and the ability to find solutions where others see only problems.
As the conflict in Ukraine continues to evolve, the lessons from these unlikely aerial warriors will undoubtedly influence military thinking far beyond the current battlefield. The success of Maestro, Ninja, and their fellow drone hunters proves that in warfare, as in many human endeavors, innovation often comes not from having the most advanced tools, but from using available resources in unexpected and creative ways.
The fact that both sides have now adopted variations of this approach suggests it has moved beyond novelty to become an established counter-drone tactic. Whether this represents a permanent addition to the military toolkit or a temporary adaptation to specific battlefield conditions remains to be seen. What is certain is that the vintage drone hunters of Ukraine have already earned their place in the annals of military innovation, proving once again that in war, necessity truly is the mother of invention.
