Strategic Realignments in South Asia: The New Power Dynamics Shaping Regional Order

08/06/2025

By Pasquale Preziosa

South Asia, long considered the epicenter of geopolitical rivalry — particularly between India and Pakistan — is now entering a new era of heightened complexity.

The region’s established fault lines are being reshaped not only by traditional animosities but also by global shifts: the redefinition of United States interests, the tightening China-Pakistan strategic partnership, and India’s relentless pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Compounding these patterns, new regional challenges such as China’s ambitious plan to build the world’s largest hydroelectric dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (also known as the Brahmaputra) exert significant pressure on the regional balance.

U.S. Tactics: Transactionalism Over Strategy

U.S. policy in South Asia, once animated by Cold War logic or the post-9/11 “War on Terror,” now appears increasingly reactive, short-term, and transactional. Washington’s retreat from Afghanistan marked the start of this shift, creating both power vacuums and new opportunities for regional actors.

Current U.S. engagement often oscillates unpredictably between India and Pakistan. With India, Washington has issued economic pressure such as tariffs, threats of sanctions, and even mediation suggestions over the disputed Kashmir region while simultaneously calling for closer security and technological cooperation as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy. With Pakistan, U.S. overtures have taken the shape of energy agreements and renewed interest in counter-terrorism collaboration, despite its history of frustration with Islamabad’s policies in Afghanistan.

Such inconsistency has eroded American leverage.

By failing to articulate a coherent, long-term stance, the U.S. has unintentionally widened the maneuvering space for regional powers, who can now recalibrate their alignments and extract greater concessions from an unpredictable Washington.

Russia Re-emerges as Arms Partner

Amidst these shifting dynamics, Russia sees an opening to revitalize its historical defense relationship with India. Demonstrating strategic flexibility, Moscow has reactivated its offer for India to acquire the Su-57E, an advanced stealth fighter jet.

More importantly, Russia is not simply offering an arms sale but is proposing a comprehensive co-production arrangement with substantial technology transfer utilizing Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)’s manufacturing capabilities in Nasik. To address India’s immediate needs, Russia has also advanced the Su-35 fighter as an interim solution to maintain the Indian Air Force’s operational edge.

This move fits within a wider sphere of technological competition. India is determined to retain freedom of action, refusing to become overly dependent on any single foreign supplier, even as it seeks critical military technologies. This approach enables New Delhi to carefully balance the competing demands and pressures it faces, particularly from the U.S., by retaining options and negotiating from a position of greater autonomy.

China’s Dual Approach: Hydropower as Geopolitical Leverage

China’s role in South Asia is expanding along two major strategic vectors. The most significant development is Beijing’s plan to construct a colossal hydroelectric dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo. This is an upriver structure that will have outsized influence on water flows into the Brahmaputra, which sustains millions in India’s northeast.

While publicly framed as a developmental project to generate energy and combat climate change, the dam is also a potent instrument of silent coercion. By controlling a vital water source—a life artery for agriculture, livelihoods, and population stability in India’s northeast—China can subtly but powerfully influence India’s strategic calculations.

This form of infrastructural coercion complements Beijing’s broader pattern of “calibrated management” of its relationship with New Delhi: constantly testing Indian resolve, creating new dilemmas, and seeking to blunt India’s independent foreign policy by introducing new dependencies.

Turkey’s Aspirations: Neo-Ottoman Influence and Islamic Solidarity

Turkey, drawing from a revived neo-Ottoman ambition and leveraging its entrenched ties with Pakistan, is seeking to carve out a greater role in South Asia. Ankara’s engagement is especially pronounced in the Kashmir conflict which is a fraught issue that has become a rallying point in Turkish calls for Islamic solidarity.

Keen to position itself as an influential “middle power” within the Islamic world, Turkey is deploying both rhetoric and diplomatic capital to gain relevance in the region’s turbulent power games.

Regional Fallout: Middle Powers Seize the Initiative

The Indo-Pakistani-Afghan subregion which is the geographic core of South Asia has now emerged as one of the most unpredictable theaters in global geopolitics. Old alliances are in flux, and new axes are emerging. Fueled by rising nationalism, the breakdown of multilateral forums, and intensifying great power competition, regional states are busy redefining what it means to be a “power” in the 21st century.

India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is perhaps best exemplified by its hedging between Washington and Moscow. It has deepened defense and technology ties with the U.S. —most visible in initiatives like the Quad — while simultaneously retaining its traditional defense relationship with Russia, mindful of energy, economic, and legacy weapons dependencies.

This balancing act gives India added leverage, as it refuses to be boxed in by any external power’s priorities.

At the same time, Pakistan is working to maximize gains from its “all-weather” friendship with China, while remaining open to selective engagement with the U.S. especially where economic and security assistance is available.

Chinese investment under the CPEC corridor and security ties with Beijing have clearly elevated Pakistan’s clout. However, Islamabad is careful to keep some diplomatic channels with Washington open, hedging against a total strategic dependency on China.

The New Unpredictability: Regional Order in Transition

What emerges is a volatile and interconnected geopolitical chessboard. Great powers compete for influence, while middle and even “small” powers (like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal) are learning to play major actors off each other, extracting material gains or security assurances.

The traditional center of gravity is shifting as new forms of assertiveness and competition such as technological, infrastructural, and narrative factors, reshuffle alliances and animosities.

Ultimately, the future configuration of South Asia’s political order will be written by how adeptly India, Pakistan, China, and ambitious middle powers navigate this disorder.

Their choices, alliances, and responses to mounting pressure will not only determine the regional balance of power but also inform the contours of the broader international order in the years ahead.

South Asia thus stands at a strategic crossroads, serving as both a stage for great power rivalry and a laboratory for new modes of regional diplomacy and competition where the old certainties are gone, and the game remains wide open.

This article is based on the August 4, 2025 article published by the author in Italian in PRP Channel.

Helicopter Evacuation Exercise

U.S. Marines with Marine Corps Air Facility Quantico conduct a helicopter medical evacuation exercise at MCAF Quantico on Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, June 4, 2025.

Marines conducts training consisting of loading and unloading ordnance and helicopter medical evacuations to increase mission readiness in the event of an emergency.

QUANTICO, VIRGINIA,

06.04.2025

Photo by Lance Cpl. Braydon Rogers  

Marine Corps Base Quantico    

The Porcupine Defense: How the Philippines is Revolutionizing Maritime Security with “Small, Cheap, and Independent” Capabilities

08/05/2025

By Robbin Laird

The Philippines is pioneering a revolutionary “porcupine defense” strategy that uses distributed maritime autonomous systems to create defensive geometries that complicate adversary attack profiles while providing multiple axis points for disruption — proving that innovative, cost-effective platforms can effectively challenge traditional maritime power projection.

A New Paradigm in Maritime Defense

As tensions escalate in the South China Sea, the Philippines has emerged as an unlikely innovator in maritime defense strategy. Rather than attempting to match China’s massive naval buildup ship-for-ship, Manila is implementing what former Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne describes as acquiring “small, cheap, and independent” capabilities—essentially growing more quills for their defensive porcupine.

This approach represents a fundamental shift from traditional naval thinking. Instead of concentrating power in expensive capital ships vulnerable to concentrated attack, the Philippines is distributing capabilities across networks of autonomous systems that create what defense analysts call “economy of force” missions with outsized strategic impact.

The Strategic Architecture of Porcupine Defense

The porcupine defense strategy operates on a simple but powerful principle: make the cost of attack prohibitively complex and unpredictable. By deploying numerous small, autonomous platforms across their 7,000-island archipelago, the Philippines creates defensive geometries that force adversaries to account for threats from multiple vectors simultaneously.

This strategy manifests in several key ways:

  • Distributed Sensor Networks: Philippine unmanned surface vessels (USVs) equipped with advanced ISR capabilities create persistent maritime domain awareness across vast ocean areas. These platforms, including the four MANTAS T-12 systems and the Devil Ray T-38, can operate independently for extended periods while feeding real-time intelligence to command centers.
  • Multiple Launch Points: Land-based anti-ship missiles positioned across the archipelago, combined with mobile maritime platforms, create dozens of potential attack vectors that adversaries must simultaneously monitor and defend against.
  • Asymmetric Cost Ratios: As Chris Morton of IFS observes, “Simply the fact that we can hold at risk Chinese manned vessels with USVs and Starlink is mind blowing.” A relatively inexpensive autonomous platform can threaten vessels worth hundreds of millions of dollars, fundamentally altering the cost-benefit calculus of maritime aggression.

Technology Integration: The Force Multiplier

The Philippines’ approach succeeds because it integrates cutting-edge technology with tactical innovation. The Maritime Security Consortium, providing up to $95 million annually through U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, enables rapid deployment of advanced systems without the decades-long acquisition cycles typical of traditional naval procurement.

Key technological enablers include:

  • Starlink Communications: Real-time data transfer and remote operation capabilities allow operators to control platforms beyond line-of-sight, extending the operational reach of defensive networks.
  • Autonomous Navigation: Advanced AI systems enable platforms to operate independently while maintaining network connectivity, creating persistent presence without constant human oversight.
  • Modular Payloads: Systems like the Devil Ray T-38, capable of carrying 4,000 pounds of payload at speeds exceeding 70 knots, can be rapidly reconfigured for different mission requirements.

Operational Implementation: Task Force Ayungin

The establishment of Task Force Ayungin — named after the Philippine designation for Second Thomas Shoal —demonstrates how this strategy translates into operational capability. Based in Palawan and operating within the Command and Control Fusion Center at Western Command, the task force provides technical assistance for Philippine USV operations while maintaining Philippine operational sovereignty.

This model addresses a critical challenge in modern alliance relationships: how to provide advanced capabilities while respecting partner nation autonomy. U.S. officials have clarified that while the task force provides training and intelligence support, actual missions remain “purely Philippine operations.”

Infrastructure Supporting Innovation

The Philippines’ strategy is supported by strategically positioned infrastructure designed for rapid deployment. The new fast boat base in Quezon, just 160 miles from Second Thomas Shoal, exemplifies this approach. Designed to launch watercraft within 15 minutes, the facility supports distributed operations while maintaining the flexibility to respond to emerging threats.

Similarly, the upgraded Naval Detachment Oyster Bay includes maintenance capabilities specifically designed for unmanned platforms, ensuring sustained operations without dependence on major naval bases that present attractive targets for adversaries.

Beyond Traditional Deterrence

The porcupine defense strategy represents more than just a cost-effective alternative to traditional naval power.It fundamentally changes the nature of maritime deterrence. By creating defensive networks that are difficult to target comprehensively, the Philippines makes the cost of successful attack extremely high while keeping their own investment relatively modest.

As Secretary Wynne notes, “You need to buy more quills, and you can’t grow them fast enough for the porcupine defending itself.” This insight captures the strategic advantage of distributed defense: adversaries must plan for threats from dozens of potential sources, while defenders can add new capabilities incrementally and rapidly.

Regional and Global Implications

The Philippine model is attracting attention from allies and partners worldwide. Recent visits by Italian and German naval forces demonstrate growing international interest in this approach, while the trilateral framework developing between the United States, Japan, and Philippines suggests broader adoption of distributed defense concepts.

This strategy also aligns with evolving U.S. military doctrine emphasizing distributed operations and allied innovation. Rather than depending solely on American platforms and presence, the Philippine approach creates indigenous capabilities that complement rather than compete with traditional allied assets.

The Economics of Innovation

Perhaps most significantly, the porcupine defense demonstrates that technological innovation can overcome resource disparities. The Philippines cannot match China’s naval shipbuilding capacity or defense spending, but they can deploy systems that hold Chinese assets at risk while operating within sustainable budget constraints.

The Maritime Security Consortium model, using joint exercises like Balikatan to demonstrate and deliver systems rapidly, represents a new paradigm for defense cooperation that emphasizes capability delivery over traditional arms sales.

A Blueprint for Small Nation Defense?

The Philippine experience offers a blueprint for other nations facing similar strategic challenges. By focusing on “small, cheap, and independent” capabilities integrated into coherent defensive networks, smaller nations can create credible deterrence without bankrupting their defense budgets.

This approach may prove particularly relevant as maritime tensions increase globally and traditional naval platforms become increasingly expensive and vulnerable to emerging threats.

The porcupine defense strategy emerging in the Philippines represents more than tactical innovation. It’s a fundamental reimagining of how smaller nations can maintain sovereignty in an era of great power competition. By growing more quills faster than adversaries can plan to remove them, the Philippines is proving that strategic creativity can overcome material disadvantages.

As Chris Morton’s observation suggests, the ability to hold major naval assets at risk using relatively inexpensive autonomous systems represents a “mind blowing” shift in maritime power dynamics—one that may define the future of naval warfare in contested waters worldwide.

Note: For the Special Report which discusses the porcupine defense concept, see the following:

Shaping a Porcupine Defense Strategy for the Philippines: The Role of Maritime Autonomous Systems

For a podcast which discusses this report, go here

Congress Revolutionizes Combat Readiness with Osprey Nacelle Modernization

08/04/2025

By Robbin Laird

In combat, reliability isn’t just important. It’s everything. Seconds count and missions hang in the balance.

So it’s good news that Congress just made a $160 million investment in combat readiness with the Osprey Nacelle Improvement Program, which will keep America’s most versatile aircraft in the fight.

The global strategic landscape isn’t waiting for 2035. While future force planning matters, the urgent priority is crystal clear: maximize the combat readiness of the warfighters we have deployed right now. The “fight tonight force” needs solutions that work today, not a decade from now.

Enter Congress’s strategic masterstroke: a $160 million authorization to accelerate the V-22 Osprey nacelle improvement program in the recent budget reconciliation package.

This isn’t just another upgrade – it’s a force multiplier that transforms one of the military’s most critical assets.

Here’s the stunning reality: 60% of all V-22 maintenance actions happen in the nacelle area. Think about that. More than half of every maintenance hour, every grounded aircraft, every delayed mission traces back to this single component system.

The Nacelle Improvement Program doesn’t just tinker around the edges. It makes targeted improvements to attack fleet needs, taking into consideration fleet maintainer’s input during the design of the nacelle’s modification. Bell’s redesign tackles these areas head-on by improving wiring harness and wiring architecture, redesigning hinges, latches, and access panels for ease of maintenance, and reusing repairable components which also contributed to the cost savings benefit of the modification. These aren’t minor inconveniences; they’re items that, when improved, will reduce maintenance man hours spent on the aircraft and significantly increase overall aircraft readiness.

The proof isn’t in promises. It’s in performance. Thirty CV-22s have already received the nacelle modernization, and the results are transformational:

  • Nearly 9,000 flight hours accumulated
  • Over 20,200 maintenance hours saved to date
  • Dramatically reduced maintenance requirements across the board

But statistics only tell part of the story. What about real-world impact?

Air Force maintainers report that when an upgraded Osprey flags a fault during pre-flight, they can have it mission-ready in about an hour. The same fault on a legacy nacelle? That aircraft is grounded for the entire day.

One hour versus one day.

That’s not just improved efficiency – that’s the difference between mission success and mission failure. That’s the difference between getting troops the support they need – when they need it – or leaving them hanging when it matters most.

Understand what these numbers really represent: This isn’t just about wrench time; it’s about operational confidence. When maintainers know they can get aircraft back in the fight quickly and reliably, it changes everything. Mission planners can count on their assets. Commanders can commit their forces with confidence. Warfighters know their lifeline won’t let them down.

In a time when every defense dollar faces scrutiny, Congress made the smart play. Rather than chase flashy new programs that won’t see combat for years, they invested in the force that’s deployed today. They recognized that a $160 million investment in proven reliability improvements delivers immediate returns in combat effectiveness.

This is what strategic thinking looks like: identify the critical bottleneck, apply resources where they’ll have maximum impact, and deliver enhanced capability to the operators who need it now.

One caveat, however: It is imperative Congress, and the Department of Defense follow through on this down payment on readiness. Funding for nacelle improvement must be maintained at a consistent level until the job is done.

The Osprey Nacelle Improvement Program represents more than technical enhancement. It’s a force multiplier that transforms maintenance nightmares into operational advantages. Every hour saved in the hangar is an hour gained in mission capability. Every readiness and reliability improvement are steps toward mission success. A nacelle improvement program that could generate a 10-12% readiness increase is a huge first step.

Adding a CMV NI program to the end of the AFSOC run would also provide the USMC and perhaps our Japanese partners the needed decision space to enter a NI program. If the USMC intends to fly the MV-22 to 2055, nacelle improvement could be an essential part of any future V-22 readiness and modernization program.

Congress didn’t just authorize an upgrade. They committed to victory for the “fight tonight” force that stands ready to defend American interests wherever and whenever called upon.

Featured image: U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 20th Special Operations Squadron familiarize themselves with the new nacelle improvement modifications on a CV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft at Cannon Air Force Base, N.M., Jan. 7, 2022. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Drew Cyburt)

Note: And if your looking for why, the Osprey-enabled force is crucial in today’s and tomorrow’s fights, look at this recent example:

Japan Establishes a New Osprey Base: A Strategic Move to Counter China’s Expansionist Policies

This year, I have brought my experience with the Osprey nation, in a way which allows readers to think through how new technologies and re-worked concepts of operations drive change in both directions, in two books which highlight the tiltrotor enterprise.

A Tiltrotor Perspective: Exploring the Experience

A Tiltrotor Enterprise: From Iraq to the Future

 

Shaping a Porcupine Defense Strategy for the Philippines: The Role of Maritime Autonomous Systems

This report analyzes the Philippines’ “porcupine defense strategy,” emphasizing its reliance on maritime autonomous systems (MAS) and distributed lethality to deter aggression in the South China Sea.

It highlights the Taiwan-Philippines-Japan strategic triangle and the critical importance of the First Island Chain and Luzon Strait for regional security and global trade.

The report details how U.S.-Philippines military cooperation, including fast boat bases and the deployment of unmanned surface vessels (USVs), is transforming naval operations through a “kill web” paradigm and mesh fleet concept.

Ultimately, the strategy aims to make the Philippines a formidable barrier by distributing defensive assets and leveraging technology, offering a blueprint for smaller nations facing similar geopolitical challenges.

Maritime autonomous systems (MAS) play a pivotal role in transforming naval warfare and enhancing deterrence by shifting away from traditional, capital ship-centric operations towards distributed, networked approaches. This fundamental reimagining of naval strategy allows for greater resilience, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness in contested environments.

Here’s how MAS contribute to this transformation:

Shifting Paradigms in Naval Operations

  • From Linear Kill Chains to Maritime Kill Webs: Traditional naval operations relied on a linear “kill chain” (find, fix, target, engage, assess), which is vulnerable to sophisticated anti-access/area-denial capabilities. The “kill web” paradigm, enabled by MAS, shifts to distributed, networked warfare, where sensing, decision-making, and strike capabilities are spread across multiple platforms operating as an integrated network. The loss of a single element in a kill web does not compromise the entire operation.
  • Mesh Fleets for Distributed Awareness: The “mesh fleet” concept involves scalable networks of autonomous surface vessels (USVs) that operate both independently and collaboratively. Companies like MARTAC have pioneered this with systems like the MANTAS T-12 and Devil Ray platforms. This approach shifts from “large blue water boats providing concentrated awareness to distributed awareness” through swarms of unmanned vessels.
  • Distributed Maritime Effects (DME): The transformation involves moving away from concentrating power in capital ships to distributing capabilities across a network of assets. DME are the effects created by this distributed force, often supplementing or operating independently of traditional capital ship operations. MAS, coupled with manned air assets, can generate “combat clusters” to deliver DME.
  • Re-thinking Maritime Strategy: The sources argue for a rethinking of maritime strategy that embraces autonomous technologies, distributed forces, and innovative acquisition models.

Enhancing Deterrence through “Porcupine Defense”

“Small, Cheap, and Independent” Capabilities: The Philippines has adopted a “porcupine defense strategy,” which fundamentally disrupts traditional attack calculations through innovative use of MAS. This strategy focuses on acquiring “small, cheap, and independent” means to execute enhanced defense.

  • Multiple Axis Points for Disruption: The Philippines is deploying networks of USVs, UAVs, and land-based missile systems to create a new defense geometry with multiple axis points from which to launch disruptive capabilities. This approach makes it increasingly difficult for an adversary to execute a well-planned, timely defeat strategy.
  • Altering Cost-Benefit Calculations: The porcupine defense alters the cost-benefit calculation for aggressors. Each autonomous platform is relatively inexpensive but can pose significant threats to much more valuable manned vessels. As Secretary Wynne noted, aggressors would need to “buy more quills” than they can quickly grow for the defending porcupine.
  • Asymmetric Advantages: MAS offer an asymmetric advantage, as they can operate in contested environments where human-crewed vessels would face unacceptable risks. They can maintain persistent presence, operate in swarms, and are more rapidly replaced if destroyed than legacy capital ships. This allows smaller nations to create credible deterrence without bankrupting their defense budgets.
  • Complicating Attack Plans: The porcupine defense is designed to complicate and disrupt potential Chinese maritime attack plans by creating multi-axial complexity and enabling rapid response deterrence and unpredictable counter-attacks from distributed, missile-equipped fast boats and drone swarms.

Key Operational and Technological Contributions of MAS

  • Enhanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA): Uncrewed vessels (USVs) significantly expand ISR coverage in archipelagic territories. The Philippine Navy’s USV Unit, for instance, focuses on improving ISR capabilities and MDA. The distributed network of sensor-equipped platforms creates comprehensive surveillance, making it difficult for hostile forces to mask movements or conduct covert operations.
  • Rapid Deployment and Shortened Acquisition Cycles: MAS offer much shorter routes for credible defense by combining land-based missiles with maritime ISR and counter-ISR from USVs, UAVs, and future UUVs. The acquisition of MAS represents a “credible 3–5-year program of rapidly enhancing Filipino defense,” in stark contrast to decades-long traditional defense procurement cycles.
  • Payload Agnosticism and Scalable Deployment: Mesh fleet platforms are flexible carriers for diverse payloads, including sensors, communications equipment, and weapons, allowing for rapid reconfiguration. Larger vessels can deploy smaller ones (e.g., Devil Ray T-38 carrying MANTAS T12s), extending operational reach without additional infrastructure.
  • Distributed Launch Points: Unlike traditional naval operations dependent on major ports, mesh fleet vessels can launch from virtually anywhere, eliminating concentrated vulnerabilities.
  • Crisis Management and Escalation Control: MAS enhance the kill web’s role in crisis management by enabling graduated responses, from passive ISR to active weapons carriers. This provides military commanders with precise, scalable options tailored to specific threat levels, crucial for “controlled war”.
  • Affordability and Attritable Platforms: MAS offer an affordable, capable, and persistent addition to naval forces. The introduction of “attritable” platforms, like MARTAC’s M18 “MUSKIE,” which are designed for one-way missions and can overwhelm enemy defenses through sheer numbers, showcases a move toward “$50,000 weapons, not just million-dollar weapons”.

U.S.-Philippines Cooperation as a Blueprint:

The U.S. is investing in new infrastructure (like fast boat bases) and providing cutting-edge unmanned systems and training to the Philippines. This “Maritime Security Consortium” provides significant annual funding for unmanned systems, demonstrating a new model for rapidly deploying advanced military technology to allies.

This cooperation supports the Philippine “porcupine defense” and could serve as a blueprint for similar partnerships across the Indo-Pacific, emphasizing capability delivery over traditional arms sales.

In essence, MAS are driving a “mind blowing” shift in maritime power dynamics by democratizing advanced naval capabilities, making it possible for nations to create formidable defensive networks that are resilient, cost-effective, and capable of holding much larger adversaries’ assets at risk, fundamentally reshaping deterrence and the future of naval warfare.

 

a CH-53K King Stallion Visits Perth Amboy High School

Perth Amboy High School students tour a CH-53K King Stallion from Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing during an aircraft expo at Perth Amboy High School, Perth Amboy, New Jersey, during Fleet Week New York 2025, May 21, 2025.

America’s warfighting Navy and Marine Corps celebrate 250 years of protecting American prosperity and freedom. Fleet Week New York 2025 honors the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard’s enduring role on, under, and above the seas.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo taken by Cpl. Diana Salgado)

Eyes in the Sky: Japan’s Historic Intelligence Leap

08/03/2025

When Putin decided upon a “special operation” in Ukraine, his focus was on Europe and his way ahead in his effort to emulate Catherine the Great.

Only it has not turned out that way.

The conflict has enhanced pressure on the multipolar authoritarian world which had been making significant gains with a relatively quiet game of advancement.

But his invasion has led to his reawakening Europe to its defense future and has triggered actions which affect its partners in Asia, not positively.

An example of this are actions which Japan is taking triggered both by Chinese and Russian actions, and given the uncertain relationship between Russia and China over the future of Manchuria this has to be of concern to the Kremlin as well.

And the story of the coming together of Japan in support of Ukraine by providing satellite intelligence is part of the spin off created by Putin’s misguided and unacceptable actions.

The story goes something like this.

The secure conference room at Kyushu University’s Institute for Q-shu Pioneers of Space (iQPS) buzzed with nervous energy on a cold February morning in 2025.

Dr. Shunsuke Onishi, the CEO who had transformed a struggling academic spin-off into Japan’s most promising commercial satellite operator, sat across from Ukrainian intelligence officials whose nation had been at war for nearly three years.

What transpired in those discussions would mark a watershed moment but not just for Ukraine’s intelligence needs, but for Japan’s carefully constructed post-war identity as a pacifist nation that kept its advanced military technologies at arm’s length from foreign conflicts.

The catalyst for this unprecedented meeting had arrived just weeks earlier, when the United States temporarily suspended its intelligence sharing with Ukraine

Ukrainian officials, who had grown accustomed to the steady flow of American satellite imagery and signals intelligence, suddenly found themselves partially blind on the digital battlefield.

As Ukrainian officials reached out to allies across Europe, they discovered a harsh reality: no single European operator could match the quality and quantity of intelligence traditionally supplied by American satellites.

Germany’s SAR-Lupe and SARah systems, Finland’s ICEYE constellation, and Italy’s COSMO-SkyMed satellites were all providing imagery, but the coverage remained incomplete.

That’s where Japan’s iQPS satellites, each equipped with synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, offered something unique in the crowded satellite intelligence market.

Unlike optical satellites that required clear skies and daylight to function, SAR satellites could see through clouds, darkness, and even dense foliage by bouncing microwave pulses off the Earth’s surface.

For Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR), this capability was a game-changer. The ability to monitor Russian positions during the harsh Ukrainian winter, track supply convoys through forest cover, and assess bomb damage through smoke and debris could provide crucial advantages in a conflict where information superiority often determined success or failure,

But the technology came with a compelling economic argument as well. iQPS claimed its satellites cost just one-hundredth the price of traditional SAR platforms. This dramatic cost reduction had allowed the small Japanese company to deploy five operational satellites by April 2025, with plans for a seventh by late 2026 and a full constellation of 24 satellites by 2027.

The decision to share Japan’s most advanced surveillance technology with a foreign military represented a dramatic departure from decades of cautious policy.

Since World War II, Japan had maintained strict limitations on defense exports and intelligence sharing, preferring to keep its technological capabilities within carefully controlled boundaries.

The 2024 Noto Peninsula earthquake had provided a preview of iQPS’s capabilities when the satellites delivered high-resolution images that helped emergency responders track landslides and infrastructure damage.

But using the same technology to help Ukraine target Russian forces was an entirely different proposition.

The practical challenges of implementing the agreement were substantial. Ukrainian intelligence officers would need to adapt their systems to receive, process, and analyze SAR data from iQPS satellites This is a task that would stretch technical resources but promised significant battlefield advantages.

The integration process was expected to take two to three months, during which iQPS would install programming tools and image reception systems at Ukrainian intelligence facilities.

The goal was to create seamless data flows that would allow Ukrainian analysts to access near-real-time radar imagery alongside existing intelligence streams from European partners.

SAR technology’s unique capabilities made it particularly valuable for Ukraine’s military operations. The radar could reveal heat signatures from running engines, detect camouflaged vehicles, and map changes in terrain caused by artillery strikes.

In a 2024 report, Ukraine’s intelligence service noted that SAR satellites were being used to “directly prepare strikes on the enemy,” with nearly two-fifths of imagery from Finland’s ICEYE satellites contributing to attacks that caused billions of dollars in damage.

The agreement represented more than just technical cooperation for it signaled Japan’s willingness to take a more assertive role in international security affairs. As tensions continued to rise in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan’s participation in the Quad alliance with the United States, Australia, and India had already suggested a shift toward more active security cooperation.

In other words, the spill over impact from the war in Ukraine to the Indo-Pacific is significant.

For Ukraine, the Japanese satellite partnership offered crucial redundancy in intelligence sources. Even after U.S. intelligence sharing resumed in mid-March, Ukrainian officials remained determined to diversify their capabilities. The experience of being temporarily cut off from American intelligence had underscored the risks of over-dependence on any single ally.

The timing also coincided with broader European efforts to support Ukraine’s intelligence needs.

France had confirmed on March 6, 2025, that it was providing military intelligence to Kyiv, while General Patrick de Rousiers, former President of the Military Committee of the European Union, advocated for forming an intelligence coalition among Ukraine’s allies.

The Japan-Ukraine satellite agreement emerged against a backdrop of shifting geopolitical dynamics. The temporary suspension of U.S. intelligence support had highlighted the fragility of Ukraine’s information lifelines, while also demonstrating the growing importance of commercial satellite operators in modern warfare.

The proliferation of SAR technology had democratized space-based intelligence gathering, allowing smaller nations and private companies to compete with traditional intelligence superpowers.

This technological leveling had created new opportunities for partnerships like the one between Japan and Ukraine, where advanced capabilities could be shared outside traditional alliance structures.

As the war in Ukraine continues to evolve, the Japanese satellite partnership represents a new model for international security cooperation that is one where technological innovation and private sector capabilities could reshape the balance of power in conflicts around the world.

The success of this unprecedented arrangement would likely influence future decisions about intelligence sharing, technology transfer, and the role of commercial space companies in national security.

For Japan, it marked a significant step away from its post-war constraints toward a more active role in global security affairs.

For Ukraine, the partnership offered not just enhanced intelligence capabilities, but also a demonstration that the international community remained committed to supporting its defense against Russian aggression, even as traditional partnerships faced new challenges.

Additional Note:

Japan’s iQPS satellites, equipped with advanced synthetic aperture radar (SAR) technology, have swiftly carved out a unique position in the rapidly expanding domain of space-based intelligence. Unlike traditional optical satellites, SAR satellites can peer through clouds and darkness, providing high-resolution images regardless of weather or time of day which is a vital capability in Asia’s often cloudy skies.

But iQPS offers more than just imaging power; it has delivered a compelling economic and technological breakthrough. Thanks to a patented foldable 3.6-meter antenna and local Kyushu manufacturing partnerships, iQPS satellites weigh ~100kg and cost just one-hundredth as much as conventional SAR platforms. This radical cost reduction enabled iQPS to deploy five operational satellites by early summer 2025, each with enhanced in-orbit image processing, inter-satellite links, and radar resolution as fine as 0.46 meters.

The pace of deployment has only accelerated. After the successful launch of QPS-SAR-9 “SUSANOO-I” in March, QPS-SAR-10 “WADATSUMI-I” in May, and QPS-SAR-11 “YAMATSUMI-I” by Rocket Lab in June, iQPS now operates five active satellites and are on track for nine in space by year’s end and a planned 36-satellite constellation by 2027. This will enable near real-time Earth observation, with global revisit intervals as short as ten minutes which offers strategic responsiveness unmatched in the Asian region.

What sets iQPS further apart is its integration of artificial intelligence. The company’s satellites now perform onboard data analysis, enabling continuous monitoring of moving targets, prompt detection of infrastructure changes, and economic forecasting. Japanese government agencies, as well as new private-sector clients, are leveraging this next-generation intelligence for disaster response, smart city development, and, increasingly, security missions.

This commercial-military synergy reflects a major shift in Japanese policy. The government has moved to integrate private space startups into national security planning. By purchasing commercial satellite data, the government is supporting dual-use development, and treating space as a strategic growth industry. In 2025, over ¥3.5 billion was allocated to space in Japan’s record ¥8.7 trillion (approx. $55 billion) defense budget, including a new multibillion-yen satellite constellation for real-time tracking and a next-generation secure communications satellite.

iQPS is not alone. The Japanese synthetic aperture radar sector is booming. Synspective, builder of the StriX SAR satellites, recently partnered with JAXA for access to L-band ALOS-4 data, offering broader spectrum coverage. Global players like ICEYE, in collaboration with IHI, are building a separate 24-satellite SAR constellation tailored for Japanese government and defense needs. These constellations, already signing data-sharing deals with domestic and international agencies, are ushering in a new competitive space intelligence ecosystem shaped by public–private cooperation.

Perhaps the most dramatic changes have been in policy. After decades of self-imposed restrictions, Japan began reforming its defense export laws in 2025, lifting prohibitions on dual-use (commercial and defense) satellite technology. This opens the door for iQPS and its peers to expand globally and for Japan to deepen strategic intelligence-sharing with allies, from the US to Southeast Asia.

Meanwhile, the government is expected to amend the Space Activities Act and establish a “Space Operations Unit” within the Air Self-Defense Force. These steps mark a clear transition: from seeing space as a scientific frontier to treating it as a critical strategic high ground, where commercial ingenuity and national security now converge.

Driven by the tectonic events of recent years, Japan has moved decisively to close its space intelligence gap. The iQPS satellite constellation is on course to reshape not only Japan’s surveillance power but also its role in a rapidly transforming global security landscape. What was once a cautious, insular approach to space is now a leap forward—built on innovation, collaboration, and a new resolve to play a leading role in the world’s emerging space domain.

Among the sources consulted in writing this story were the following: 

Japan’s secret satellite weapon now in Ukraine’s ‘war hands’

Japan’s iQPS to provide Ukraine with satellite intel amid US support uncertainty

Japan to Share SAR Satellite-Based Data With Ukraine for the First Time

Satellite Warfare: Japan’s iQPS SAR Satellites Set to Strengthen Ukraine’s Intelligence Arsenal

Ukrainian intelligence will receive satellite imagery from Japan

 

Beyond Moral Judgment: How Modern Historians Navigate the Past

08/02/2025

By Robbin Laird

The challenge facing every historian is deceptively simple yet profoundly difficult: How do we understand people from the past without either excusing their actions or condemning them by today’s standards?

This methodological dilemma sits at the heart of historical scholarship, determining whether we produce genuine insight or mere moral posturing disguised as academic analysis.

Mary Beard, in her acclaimed study of Roman emperors, articulated this challenge with characteristic clarity. Historians, she argued, must resist the twin temptations of giving historical figures a “free pass” simply because they lived long ago, while simultaneously avoiding the trap of judging them purely by contemporary moral standards. The solution lies not in psychological speculation about historical actors’ inner lives — an impossible task — but in understanding the institutional frameworks, daily realities, and structural constraints that shaped their world.

This approach represents more than academic methodology; it’s a fundamentally different way of thinking about human behavior across time. Rather than asking whether historical actors were “good” or “bad” people, we should ask how their contexts made certain choices rational, necessary, or inevitable.

Ernst Pijning’s groundbreaking study of 18th-century Brazilian contraband trade demonstrates exactly how this methodological approach transforms our understanding of the past. Where previous historians had treated smuggling through moral lenses — either condemning it as corruption or romanticizing it as heroic resistance to colonial oppression — Pijning places these activities squarely within their institutional and political context.

His key insight revolutionizes how we think about “illegal” activity in colonial Brazil. Pijning reveals that contraband wasn’t simply lawbreaking; it existed in two distinct categories that colonial authorities themselves recognized. “Condoned illegal trade” was tolerated or even encouraged when it served Portuguese interests, while “proscribed illegal trade” was genuinely prosecuted when it threatened royal authority or was conducted by people lacking proper social connections.

This distinction wasn’t arbitrary. Indeed, it reflected the practical realities of governing a vast colonial empire with limited resources while navigating complex European power politics. Portugal, militarily and economically dependent on stronger powers like Britain and France, used trading privileges as diplomatic bargaining chips. What appeared as governmental weakness or corruption was often strategic flexibility designed to maintain control under difficult circumstances.

Rather than speculating about the moral character of individual smugglers, officials, or Portuguese administrators, Pijning analyzes the structural forces that made contraband an integral part of colonial governance. Social status determined who could engage in “illegal” trade with impunity. Wealthy merchants and well-connected officials rarely faced serious consequences, while lower-status individuals were prosecuted for similar activities.

This wasn’t simply unfairness; it reflected a deliberate system of control. Colonial authorities used their discretion in enforcing laws as a tool for managing local networks, generating revenue, and maintaining social hierarchies. The judicial system’s “tiresome procedures” and uncertain outcomes created leverage over individuals while allowing officials to regulate trade through selective enforcement rather than blanket prohibition.

Even international diplomacy shaped these seemingly local decisions. Foreign diplomats actively encouraged gold smuggling for their nations’ benefit, and Portugal’s ability to stop them depended entirely on its military and economic position in European politics. When that position weakened during the Napoleonic Wars, Portugal had little choice but to tolerate increased contraband which culminated in the 1808 opening of Brazilian ports that effectively legalized much previously “illegal” trade.

Pijning’s approach offers a model for how historians can navigate Beard’s challenge across different periods and topics. By focusing on institutional mechanics rather than moral evaluation, we can understand how historical actors operated within their constraints rather than imposing our values on their choices.

This methodology reveals patterns that moral judgment obscures. The flexibility between “condoned” and “proscribed” contraband wasn’t unique to colonial Brazil. Similar dynamics appear wherever formal rules clash with practical necessities. Understanding these patterns helps us recognize how power actually functioned in historical societies, beyond the official proclamations and legal codes that often mislead modern observers.

More broadly, this approach suggests that much behavior we might instinctively condemn or celebrate actually reflected rational responses to structural pressures. Colonial officials who participated in “illegal” trade weren’t necessarily corrupt in any meaningful sense. They were working within systems that made such participation logical or even necessary for effective governance.

This methodological shift has implications beyond academic history. In our current moment of intense moral and political polarization, the historical approach modeled by Beard and exemplified by Pijning offers tools for understanding human behavior across cultural and temporal divides.

Rather than rushing to moral judgment about past actors, we might ask what institutional pressures, resource constraints, or structural incentives made their choices comprehensible within their context. This doesn’t excuse harmful actions or eliminate the possibility of moral evaluation but it grounds such evaluation in understanding rather than presentist assumption.

The goal isn’t moral relativism but analytical precision. By understanding how historical actors navigated their world’s actual constraints and opportunities, we develop more sophisticated frameworks for thinking about human behavior, institutional design, and the relationship between individual choices and structural forces.

When historians successfully meet Beard’s challenge, they don’t just illuminate the past. They provide tools for understanding the present. Pijning’s analysis of how colonial authorities balanced formal rules with practical necessities offers insights relevant to anyone trying to understand how institutions actually function versus how they’re supposed to work.

The best historical scholarship thus serves a double purpose: recovering the authentic texture of past experience while developing analytical frameworks that help us navigate our own complex institutional and moral landscape. In avoiding both condemnation and celebration of historical actors, we paradoxically achieve a deeper and more useful understanding of both their world and our own.