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I had a chance to talk with LtCol Howard DeCastro, the first CO of MAWTS-1 and LtGen Barry Knutson, the eighth commander of MAWTS-1, the day before the change of command ceremony at MAWTS-1.
We talked about the approach of MAWTS-1 from the beginning and the importance of continuing the tradition and approach going forward for the USMC to operate effectively in today’s conflicts and combat situations.
DeCastro started with this comment: “We told people from the beginning, MAWTS does not fight wars.
“We are here to make people as good as they can be when they go to war.
“It is the squadron and the fleet marine force that is doing the work.
“At the beginning, some wanted MAWTS to have distinct uniforms and I said that was a bad idea.
“We are part of the force, but just focused on making them better.
LtGen Fred McCorkle on the left and LtCol DeCastro on the right attending the change of command ceremony at MAWTS-1 May 3, 2024.
“We are training the trainers who go to the squadrons and proliferate the best combat practices to the force.
“We are Marines.
“We are here to make the USMC better.
“Nothing less and nothing more.”
LtGen Knutson reinforced this point as follows: “Some brilliant people like Howard developed Project 19 and the idea of training the trainers. The trainers who come out of MAWTS are the training gurus of the squadron in the ops department to lead the training program and every squadron would have one or maybe two WTI graduates.
“Prior to MAWTS, training was divided between East Coast and West Coast Marines receiving different training. MAWTS-1 was established to have uniform training for the Marines.
“With MAWTS, we brought in the professionals, who knew what they were doing, and they were forged into an integrated force. It was from the beginning a center of excellence for training the trainers.
“The capability has only accelerated over the past thirty years. Now they are doing things we never even dreamed about doing and in all domains.
“The approach is to add on modules of new capabilities over time as the force has evolved. When I was here, I added a loadmaster course for the C-130, and we added a ground based air defense course for the Hawk and IR guys.
“Originally, we did not teach air-to-air tactics. To get a WTI patch, fighter pilots would go through Top Gun and MAWTS. But we could not get enough pilots through Top Gun to do so. To deal with that we added an air-to-air course after the WTI course so that the fighter pilots would work on their air-to-air tactics as well.”
Major General Bobby Butcher, the second commander of MAWTS-1 on the left with LtGen Barry Knutson, the eighth commander of MAWTS-1, on the right, attending the change of command ceremony at MAWTS-1 on May 3, 2024.
This was the template created from the beginning at MAWTS-1 and because of the modular structure of training – adding modules to the training regime dependent on need and adding of capabilities – it is a template that has been able to grow into today’s variant of MAWTS-1 and also explains why there is clear continuity from its founding until today.
LtGen Knutson characterized MAWTS as “an operational petrie dish. We go out there and we put a FARP 60 miles out, we have F-35s overhead, we integrate all six functions of aviation, and we look at the logistics required.
“New technology gets inserted into a very, very complex and very realistic scenario, and Marines learn how to use any new gear. It’s like a crucible or like a petri dish. It’s a brilliant approach.”
Because of such a dynamic training template, a discussion with the first and eighth commanders of MAWTS-1 is very similar to the current COs of MAWTS which I then had two hours later on the MCAS Yuma base.
Paris – The armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, is due to make an official visit to Vietnam to attend French and Vietnamese commemoration on May 6 and 7 of the bloody battle of Dien Bien Phu, which marked the defeat of French colonialism in the southeast Asian nation.
The memorial events mark the 70th anniversary of that military siege, and the ministerial visit to Hanoi points up the importance Paris sets on developing close ties in the strategic Indo-Pacific region, ministry officials said.
A letter of intent is due to be signed, setting out a structure for defense cooperation between the two nations, a ministry official said.
Vietnam is seen as looking to strengthen ties with France, and although military cooperation is at a modest level, there is a perception there is a good base to work on.
The pursuit of closer links with Paris include Vietnamese interest in renewing its stock of arms, which depend largely on Russia.
There will be three major events this year for armaments, namely the Eurosatory trade show for land weapons in June, the Euronaval show in November, with the first two in France, and the Vietnam International Defense show in Hanoi in December, and there is also Forum for Franco-Vietnamese defense industry in November, also in the Vietnamese capital.
France will listen closely to what Vietnam seeks, an official said.
There are French navy ships making calls at Vietnamese ports, and there is a shared view of the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The latter is in the face of Chinese claims of sovereignty over disputed waters close to Vietnam.
There has also been French cooperation in providing humanitarian aid in natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific region.
Foreign Interest in Vietnam
That western interest in strengthening ties with the southeast Asian nation could be seen in the visit by president Joe Biden last September to Hanoi, with the U.S. head of state signing agreements with Vietnam on semiconductors and minerals in a bid to cut America’s dependence on China.
The Vietnamese foreign minister, Bui Thanh Son, visited U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken in Washington in March, and the two senior diplomats discussed expanding cooperation on semiconductors and widening the supply chain, Reuters reported.
That military interest in Vietnam extends to Moscow.
The Reuters news agency reported Sept. 10 it had seen documents setting out talks between Vietnam and Russia, with Moscow offering an $8 billion credit facility to allow Hanoi to order anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine aircraft and helicopters, and anti-aircraft systems and fighter jets.
France supplies those types of weapons, and recently upgraded its anti-submarine aircraft. There is also a French project for a new generation anti-submarine aircraft.
Meanwhile, China also has reached out to Vietnam, with the Chinese defense minister, Dong Jun, telling his Vietnamese counterpart that Beijing was ready to raise the “strategic mutual trust” between the two militaries to a new level, the British news agency reported April 12.
There should be higher cooperation at sea, the Chinese minister told Vietnamese defense minister Phan Van Giang.
In that geopolitical arena, Lecornu is due to meet on the morning of May 6 the Vietnamese prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, the defense minister, and the president of the foreign relations committee of the Vietnamese Communist party, Le Hoai Trung.
In the afternoon, the French minister is due to fly to Dien Bien Phu, in the remote hills in northwest Vietnam, for memorial visits of key sites of the battle.
Thousands of Vietnamese troops fell in the assault before the French army surrendered on May 7, 1954. Vo Nguyen Giap, a former history teacher, led the siege, which included the unforeseen deployment and use of artillery in hills looking down on the French base.
That eight week siege by the Vietnamese forces saw the loss of 3,000 French and African soldiers, 4,000 wounded, and some 20,000 prisoners of war.
That Vietnamese defeat of a western power was later seen as a precursor to the struggle with the U.S., which led to the victory of North Vietnam over the then Saigon government in 1975.
Commemoration Of A Battle
The French minister is due to visit an exhibition of the French veterans association, Office National des Combattants et des Victimes de Guerre on the site of the battle.
Lecornu is also expected to visit the command post of brigadier general Christian de Castres, who led the paratroopers, foreign legionnaires, and other French-led forces at the camp.
A French commemoration ceremony is planned in the evening, with veterans due to attend.
Lecornu is due to attend in the morning of May 7 the Vietnamese national ceremony marking the victory. That will be the first time a French defense minister has been invited to the military parade.
A rehearsal of the 12,000-strong parade was held on May 3 in the stadium of Dien Bien Phu, Le Courrier du Vietnam magazine reported.
Public interest in past Vietnam conflicts appears strong, with a television adaptation of a novel, The Sympathizer, by Vietnamese-American author Viet Thanh Nguyen. That is a thriller tale with dark humor of a Vietnamese double agent, in the wake of the U.S. war with Vietnam.
U.S. Air Force Airmen assigned to the 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, prepare to depart Luleå-Kallax Air Base, Sweden, Feb. 29, 2024, during Bomber Task Force 24-2.
The Air Force routinely operates across the globe and remains flexible and agile to respond to the changes in the operational environment. BTF operations provide U.S. leaders with strategic options to assure Allies and partners, while deterring potential adversary aggression across the globe.
LULEA, SWEDEN
02.29.2024
Video by Staff Sgt. Jake Jacobsen
28th Bomb Wing Public Affairs
After returning to the United States from Australia on April 25, 2024, I buckled up again for a flight to Yuma, Arizona to have the privilege of witnessing the MAWTS-1 change of command ceremony.
In the process of finishing up our forthcoming book on MAWTS-1, this seemed a good way to close out our effort.
One of the architects of the MAWTS-1/WTI concept and the first MAWTS-1 Commanding Officer, LtCol Howard DeCastro, had written to me suggesting the idea, and the CO of MAWTS-1, Col Purcell kindly agreed to invite me.
This would give me the chance to meet with several of the earlier Commanding Officers of MAWTS-1, meet the three 3 Star USMC Generals attending the ceremony and meet the new CO of MAWTS-1 as well.
On the day before the ceremony, I had the chance to sit down and interview two of the first commanding officers, LtCol DeCastro and LtGen Barry Knutson. In the afternoon, I was able to interview the outgoing CO, Col Purcell, and the incoming CO Col Joshua Smith.
Col Smith on the left and Col Purcell on the right at the change of command ceremony, May 3, 2024. Credit Photo: Robbin Laird
What was amazing about the two sets of interviews is how connected in time they were.
The first and eighth CO of MAWTS focused on the approach they built towards combat innovation, namely, inserting technology into con-ops rather than having technology existing outside of the organizational changes needed to use relevant technologies.
It was the warfighters driving innovation in terms of real warfighting improvements, rather than some contractor or acquisition official pushing technology down their throats.
Then two hours later, I had the same conversation with Purcell and Smith.
It was about technology that did not exist at the time when DeCastro and Knutson were in charge, but it was the same mentality and same drive for combat excellence which we discussed.
And I would conclude with just one thought – don’t change the course.
The drive for warfighting excellence in the operating force is not nice to have, it is what we need if our country continues to field a warfighting force respected by the world, both allies and adversaries.
Well I am not a Marine, but it is hard to not listen to the USMC hymn at the ceremony and not say Semper Fidelis.
Featured photo: Purcell returns from his last flight as CO of MAWTS-1. Credit Photo: Robbin Laird
An aspect of modern Western strategic thinking has been a focus on gray zone conflict.
This is an area I have always found confusing.
In a world which I would characterize as one of the rise of multi-polar authoritarian movements and states, their constant conflict efforts have indeed been in the gray zone punctuated with direct periods of violence against the West and its legacy of a “rules-based order.”
But as this is going on, it would be difficult not to factor in the domestic conflicts in both the UK and the United States which affects the AUKUS partners of Australia. So how well is Australia doing in the gray zone or information or cognitive warfare areas?
The is a major aspect affecting any credible strategy involving a “ whole of government” strategy or a whole of society effort to deal with threats in the region.
The West over the past few years has done considerably better in the cyber-war domain, but given the penetration of authoritarian movements and states within our social networks, and the extensive disruption in the West with regard to migration, I do not think we can make the same judgement with regard to information or cognitive war.
At the Williams Foundation Seminar on April 11, 2024, the subject of information war was addressed by Major General Anna Duncan, Commander Cyber Command. Her talk highlighted the importance of gaining information advantage in conflict.
Major General Anna Duncan, Commander Cyber Command, presents at the Williams Foundation Seminar, April 11, 2024.
She started with this definition: “What is information advantage? From a military perspective, information advantage, ideally occurs through the integration and through the use of the moral and information informational elements of fighting power. We would seek to gain an information advantage over an opponent by targeting their understanding and thus degrade their will to fight.”
She cautioned that was not new in warfare but clearly what is new is the nature of information networks in liberal democracies and how conflict has escalated within these societies by the emergence of tribal clubs which operate within social media which has challenged the ability of democracies to shape consensus.
When I attended a UNESCO event in Barcelona in 1996 which focused on the new information society, I highlighted this danger associated with an internet society. But the extent to which the tribes have grown to disaggregate democracies was certainly not my thought at the time. The point is important – precisely in the 1990s when many were trumping the global ascendency of democracies, we were building tools which would in fact undercut that ascendency.
Gray zone conflict in my view goes hand in hand with information warfare. Western militaries are building more flexible militaries which can operate as a more distributed force but we have not seen the adaptation of the political class to how in fact confront adversaries in the gray zone effectively nor how to use penetration of authoritarian societies or movements to our advantage.
Duncan provided a professional treatment of how the ADF is working through how in conflict to gain an information advantage over adversarial forces. A military officer dealing with cyber and information warfare scopes the focus on information advantage over adversarial forces in a conflict.
This is obviously crucial, but the actual conduct of information war occurs every time an authoritarian government or movement defines the perceived geopolitical reality inside Western societies.
A murderous organization like Hamas defines the ideas for a protest at my former school, Columbia University, due to their information war capabilities.
I would close by including an article I published in December 2021 which underscored gray zone conflict which I also thinks expand the notion of what is entailed in the kind of information war which the West is not very good at engaging in.
Western analysts have coined phrases like hybrid war and gray zones as a way to describe peer conflict below the level of general armed conflict.
But such language creates a cottage industry of think tank analysts, rather than accurately portraying the international security environment.
Peer conflict notably between the liberal democracies and the 21st century authoritarian powers is conflict over global dominance and management. It is not about managing the global commons; it is about whose rules dominate and apply.
Rather than being hybrid or gray, these conflicts, like most grand strategy since Napoleon, are much more about “non war” than they are about war. They shape the rules of the game to give one side usable advantage. They exploit the risk of moving to a higher intensity of confrontation.
Russia is doing this right now in Ukraine. China, likewise, is doing it in the South China Sea and in the Sea of Japan. It’s critical to understand this point, and terms like gray zone operations and hybrid war don’t capture the challenge of escalation control.
There are two games being played. One game is over the immediate contentions of the major powers. Ukraine and Taiwan must be protected from attack.
But the second game is just as important, it asks what limits should be crossed to manipulate the risk of going to a higher intensity of competition?
In the Cold War these limits defined the “system dynamics” of the competition. Shaping them was important, because they were the foundation for winning a war that might erupt, or toward stabilizing a competition in a way that gave advantage to one side or the other.
Seen this way Korea, Vietnam, Berlin, etc. were about winning those local wars. But they were more importantly about shaping the global competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Quite elaborate rules were worked out for this. It took substantial time during the evolution of the Cold War (to make sure that it was indeed was a cold war from a global conflagration point of view) for this learning curve to develop. Limited wars, like Korea, produced know how about escalation control and dominance.
The problem today is that we are only at the earliest parts of this learning curve for our age. We’re in a long term competition with authoritarian powers, but it’s like it was 1949 in terms of our know how for managing this rivalry to our advantage. The problem isn’t simply to defend Ukraine and Taiwan; it’s to do it in such a way that doesn’t lead to crazy escalations or that doesn’t scare the daylights at of our allies.
Taiwan and Ukraine are not sideshows to global conflict; they are the early test cases of competition in a second nuclear age.
Recently, I discussed the question of how best to describe the terminology to describe peer conflict with my colleague Dr. Paul Bracken the author of The Second Nuclear Age.
According to Bracken, it is preferable to use the term “limited war” to describe the nature of conflict between the authoritarian powers and the liberal democracies. “A term was invented in the Cold War which is also quite useful to analyze the contemporary situation, namely, limited war. This term referred to conflict at lower levels and sub-crisis maneuvering. And that is what is going or today in cyber and outer space, to use two examples. But it also applied to higher levels of conflict like limited nuclear war.”
“The notion of limited war focuses escalation as a strategy. What is the difference between limited and controlled war?
“That’s a really important question with enormous implications for command and control. Today, for example, limits are determined in a decision making process whereby the Pentagon goes to the White House and says we’d like to do this operation. The White says yes or no.
“Left out of this is any discussion of building a command and control system for controlled war. This means keeping war controlled even if things go wrong — as they always do. Without an emphasis on controlled war, and not just limited war, I would estimate that the United States will be highly risk averse, that is, the fear of an escalation spiral will drive the United States toward inaction.
“Look at the Ukraine. The first U.S. reaction to the Russian buildup was to immediately take military options off the table. The White House refocused its strategy on financial sanctions instead. It looked as if the United States was desperately searching for ways not to use force. Soft power, gray zone operations, the weaponization of finance — these are clearly important and I think we should use them.
“But they look like a frantic attempt to any use of force, like British foreign policy in the 1930s.
“Our language shapes our strategy. An image of war that blows up, that’s unlimited, or that you’ve declined to fight because of your fear that it would become so is where we are. In academic studies and think tanks the focus is overwhelmingly on “1914” spirals, accidental war, entanglement, and inadvertent escalation.
“If it’s going to be controlled or limited, how are you defining that it is limited? Is it limited by geography? Is it limited by the intensity of operations? Is it limited by the additional political issues that you will bring into the dispute?
“These are never specified in discussions that I see of hybrid or gray zone warfare. To use a very sensitive example. In a Taiwan scenario, will the United States Navy and Air Force be allowed to strike targets in China? I see a real danger that this isn’t being thought through. If we think it through only in a crisis we’re likely to find a lot of surprises in how the White House and Joint Chiefs of Staff see things differently.
These expressions – hybrid war and gray zone conflict – are treated as if they self evident in term of their meaning. Yet they are part of a larger chain of activities and events.
We use the term peer competitor but that is a bit confusing as well as these authoritarian regimes do not have the same ethical constraints or objectives as do liberal democratic regimes. This core cultural, political and ideological conflict who might well escalate a conflict beyond the terms of what we might wish to fight actually.
And that really is the point – escalate and the liberal democracies withdraw and redefine to their disadvantage what the authoritarian powers wish to do.
Bracken noted: “That’s a good distinction too, because it brings in the fact that for 20 years we’ve been fighting an enemy in the Middle East who really can’t strike back at the United States or Europe other than with low-level terrorist actions. That will not be the case with Russia, China, and others.
“The challenge is to define limited war, and I would add, controlled war. Is it geographic or Is it the intensity of the operations? How big of a war is it before people start unlocking the nuclear weapons?
“Every war game I’ve played has seen China declare that its “no first use” policy is terminated. The China player does this to deter the United States from making precision strikes and cyber attacks on China. This seriously needs consideration before we get into a real crisis.
“Russia and China’ are trying to come in with a level of intensity in escalation which is low enough so that it doesn’t trigger a big Pearl Harbor response. And that could go on for a long time and is a very interesting future to explore.”
Limited war requires learning about escalation control i.e. about controlled war, which when one uses that term, rather than hybrid war or gray zone conflict, connects limited war to the wider set of questions relating political objectives of the authoritarian powers.
Bracken concluded: “I believe using those terms adds to the intellectual chaos in Washington. It prevents us from having a clear policy discussion of what the alternatives for escalation control and management are in any particular crisis. This is a lot more dangerous than mishandling the Afghan exit, or the COVID pandemic.”
Although the Australian Defence Strategic Review and the recent Surface Fleet Review indicated that the threat environment was deteriorating in the here and now, the major investments are being made for a force that will not arrive for a decade.
How then to enhance the ADF in the next three to five years?
Or in the words of Keirin Joyce: “The Defence Strategic Review (DSR) did not address how to give us a focused force to deal with today’s threats. And the Fleet Review did not deal with how we can deal with the real threats of today with new capabilities we might affordably incorporate into today’s maritime force.”
Currently, WGCDR Keirin Joyce is a visiting senior fellow at ASPI. According to his bio on the Australian Strategic Policy Institute website:
WGCDR Joyce is an Australian Defence Force Academy graduate with an Honours Bachelor of Aeronautical Engineering. WGCDR Joyce has spent the last 18 years in support of the ADF Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) capability including deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.
WGCDR Joyce is a Chartered Professional Engineer, holds a Masters in Aviation Management (specialising in Human Factors), a Masters of Aerospace Engineering, a Masters in Military and Defence Studies, a Graduate Diploma in Secondary Education (Mathematics) and has researched part time as a Doctorate of Philosophy student through ADFA.
He is currently the Chief Engineer for RAAF RPAS MQ-4C Triton. Before that, WGCDR Joyce was the Australian Army UAS Sub-Program Manager responsible for all Australian Army UAS activities, including Army Drone Racing, and then the Royal Australian Air Force Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) Sub-Program Manager.
We started by focusing on maritime autonomous systems.
He pointed out that this technology is now a decade old, Australia has extensively experimented with this technology, and the technology can be used now. He also cautioned that obviously not only the West is working this technology and with competitors and adversaries working with this technology, there is a clear need to know how to deal with adversary threats in this area as well, which will come only with extensive use and experience with remotely operated and autonomous system technologies.
Not only is the technology here, but much of it is also Australian and which the government can directly leverage. “With the exception of batteries and silicon, almost all of the technology necessary for an autonomous systems industry already exists in Australia.”
In other words, not only does technology exist to enhance ADF capabilities in the near to midterm, but it also be part of a resilient defence structure. Joyce argued: “That gives us a clear opportunity to enhance the current force and carve out the future.”
We then discussed air systems, and in particular the opportunity to leverage the coming of Triton.
He noted that “we are the only QUAD member that does not have armed persistent UAV strike. We will have the Triton which can provide the ISR and targeting data to a persistent airborne strike node, but we simply do not have armed persistent strike capability. This is clearly something which can be done to add to the kind of capability which the Air Force can provide to the Navy for maritime strike.”
We discussed the absence of discussion as well in Australia and elsewhere for that matter of the unique quality of what NATO now has at the Sigonella base in Italy. NATO flies the Global Hawk, the U.S. now operates Triton, and the Reaper armed UAV is operating there as well. This creates the kind of combat cluster which a remotely piloted can deliver to the combat force complementary to manned air assets.
A key aspect of the impact which introducing and accelerating autonomous systems into the ADF is the workforce issue.
The ADF like virtually all Western militaries face recruitment and retention challenges. The autonomous systems are significant generators of data both ISR and C2 systems. A civilian workforce or military cadre with enhanced flexibility on work hours and location can support such efforts. In effect, a data and an AI eco system is being generated and crafted which can be managed by innovative new ways for recruiting, developing and retaining workforce.
The final issue we discussed was acquisition.
I interviewed a U.S. Navy three-star Admiral last year, and he focused on his need to identify gaps which needed to be met and he and his staff could identify the bits and pieces which were needed which would fill the gaps.
But the organizational structure is not there for him to do that. And he emphasized that autonomous systems continuous redesign would be one way to fill gaps rather than going through the traditional lengthy and in the case of software and AI defined systems simply irrelevant acquisition process.
As Joyce underscored: “We have demonstrated we can do this. For example, in Iraq and Afghanistan we got very good at rapid acquisition to fill the gaps. Autonomous systems are almost by operational reality rapid acquisition systems, whereby the warrior works with the industrial code writer on changes he sees as possible or deems necessary. It is a different kind of demand driven operational development cycle: not a traditional acquisition, requirements driven approach.”
My conclusion from my book on the coming of maritime autonomous systems is brutal and straightforward: the technology has arrived, but our organizational culture and structures are not changing to be able to use it. It is a form of structural disarmament.
Featured Photo: A MQ-4C Triton taxis at Andersen Air Force Base. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Michael S. Murphy)
When I met with LtGen Heckl earlier this year, we discussed the way ahead for the USMC in operating a distributed force, and he underscored it all starts with logistics.
“The pacing factor for everything we are doing in shaping the distributed force is logistics and to do so in a contested environment. We are focused on our ability to move ourselves organically.
“The CH-53K, the KC-130J and the Osprey can provide basic timely lift with support by surface connectors crucial as well. We need to be resilient. If one component of our ecosystem of moving and supporting a distributed force is not available or will not work with the current situation, then we need to have another component available.”
The significance have having the right kind of organic lift support defines the reach and range of what a maneuver force can do.
The featured picture certainly highlights the reality of what the CH-53 K can do. Not only is it carrying an F-35C airframe, it is doing so while being refueled.
This is what the Pax River folks said in their caption to the photo: “U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
“A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.”
I was clearly reminded of that when looking at the limits the Australian Army has when working to address their new core mission, namely littoral maneuver from the north of Australia out to their first island chain. They only have a Chinook with its limited range and lack of refueling capability.
Contrast that with the USMC and its CH-53K which not only can carry a wide range of capability in support of the deploying and deployed Marines but can be refueled extending their range of operation.
Your lift and support define what you can do as an insertion force: and define what a distributed force can deliver in terms of sustainable impact.
Having just returned from Australia where the government is arguing that their new strategy will deliver “impactful projection” which revolves around buying longer range strike weapons, a perceptive Aussie analyst questions the concept.
Stephen Kuper argued: “In order to avoid repeating history, it is clear that Australia and the ADF must begin to view expeditionary capability and the underlying doctrine, force structure, and platforms as a fundamental component of the nation’s new strategic paradigm.
“Only our capacity to deploy to defend and support our regional partners and in defence of our interests through “impactful presence” will ensure that Australia’s critical sea lines of communication remain unmolested in the era of great power competition.”
“Impactful presence” requires sustainable support at range for the ADF. They should consider the CH-53K as even more important than acquiring TLAMS.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24. A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
U.S. Marines flying a CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopter transported an F-35C Lightning II airframe from the F-35 Integrated Test Force at Patuxent River (Pax ITF) to a Navy unit located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey, April 24.
A Marine aviator from Marine Test and Evaluation Squadron 1 (VMX-1) piloted the most powerful helicopter in the Department of Defense that carried the inoperable airframe, which was without mission and propulsion systems, outer wings, or additional equipment, to the Prototype, Manufacturing and Test (PMT) Department of the Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) Lakehurst for use in future emergency recovery systems testing.
Paris – The French and German defense ministers signed April 26 a memorandum of understanding, with a target of signing contracts by the end of the year to launch phase 1A of designing and building a new tank, dubbed main ground combat system (MGCS).
The French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, and his German counterpart, Boris Pistorius, gave a news conference on the planned weapon system, which will include manned and unmanned vehicles armed with conventional and laser weapons, and working in a combat cloud network of advanced communications.
Phase 1A will set out the architecture of the project and decide the companies’ leadership, including how the eight industrial pillars will be shared, an official of the French armed forces ministry said after the news conference.
The two defense ministers were speaking just a day after the French president, Emmanuel Macron, gave a keynote speech, calling on the European Union to pursue European military capability, backed by heavy financial and political investment in the arms industry.
“We must produce more, we must produce faster, and we must produce as Europeans,” he said at the élite Sorbonne university.
The head of state also called for reform of European central bank policy to support spending to tackle climate change, and investment in new technology, including artificial intelligence. There was no guarantee Europe would live on.
“We have to be lucid that our Europe today is mortal — it can die — and it depends on the choices that we make now,” he said.
The German chancellor, Olaf Scholz, promptly welcomed Macron’s speech.
“France and Germany want Europe to be strong,” the leader of the German coalition said on social media. “Your speech contains good ideas on how we can achieve this.”
That warm response from Scholz was reported as a break from a previous chill in relations between the two political leaders. Strained ties at the highest level were seen as hampering cooperation on major arms projects, namely the future combat air system (FCAS), and the MGCS, due to replace the German Leopard 2 and French Leclerc in 2040.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the possible return of Donald Trump to the White House are seen as key factors in Macron’s call for a stronger European military and industrial capability, with the EU working with Nato.
It remains to be seen if the 27 EU member states will take up the measures to boost European sovereignty outlined by Macron, who has led the charge for strategic autonomy.
Fresh Dynamism
The joint press conference with the French and German defense ministers appeared to show restored political ties between Berlin and Paris, key members in the EU.
Pistorius made his opening remarks in fluent French before speaking in German in the elegant room, mostly filled by German journalists.
France and Germany were close, the German minister said, and there was a “new dynamic” between the two nation states.
There would be difficult, complex negotiations in drafting contracts on the MGCS – the negotiating teams have a great deal to do – but the deal would be sealed by the end of the year, he said. Asked if the Bundestag would endorse the agreement, he was confident the German parliament would back the deal.
French and German parliamentarians sat on the front row, which had been reserved for them by French officials.
Lecornu pointed up how work on the MGCS showed a European lead over the U.S. and Russia, as neither had started work on replacing the Abram and Russian army tanks.
There had been a difference of approach on the MGCS compared to the FCAS, he said, with the priority given to French and German army officers agreeing on common military requirements on the former. That was in contrast to the time consumed by French and German industry in competing claims to win project leadership on the latter.
Germany will be the lead nation on MGCS, and German authorities will sign contracts with the companies working on the project.
Work on MGCS will be shared 50/50 between the partner nations, and Italy has signed up as observer nation. There is interest from other countries, including those in Eastern Europe, on work on the new tank, the ministry official said.
There has been French concern on whether there would be equal share of work, as Rheinmetall, a German builder of weapons and shells, had won a place on the work plan. That might have reduced the French share of work.
Work had previously been reserved for the French and German units of the KNDS joint venture, until Rheinmetall lobbied successfully for its share.
Rheinmetall, Thales, and other companies will work on MGCS, Lecornu said, with the French electronics company due to work on the connectivity.
The MGCS contracts relate to studies on eight industrial pillars:
platform: German leadership. This will include the chassis and navigation system;
conventional firepower: Franco-German shared leadership. This includes the cannon, turret, and ammunition, with national development of systems, trials, and a selection after test firing;
innovative firepower: French leadership on secondary weapons, including guided missiles;
active protection: German leadership, includes anti-drone measures
infrastructure: Franco-German leadership, includes logistics, service, and infrastructure.
The work will be shared out on a 50/50 basis. Phase 1A will be followed by phase 1B, which will build a prototype.
The French 2024-2030 military budget law pledges some €500 million to support the MGCS project, the French minister said.
There had been plans for MGCS to enter service in 2035, but that was pushed back to 2040.
The core of the future combat air system is a new fighter jet, to replace respectively the Eurofighter Typhoon for Germany and Dassault Aviation Rafale for France, in 2040.
