USS America (LHA 6) 10 Year Commissioning Anniversary
JAPAN
10.11.2024
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Sade Wallace
USS America (LHA 6)
USS America (LHA 6) 10 Year Commissioning Anniversary
JAPAN
10.11.2024
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Sade Wallace
USS America (LHA 6)
Allied fighter jets participating in NATO exercise Ramstein Flag 24 fly in formation over the west coast of Greece, Oct. 4, 2024. Over 130 fighter and enabler aircraft from Greece, Canada, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States are training side by side to improve tactics and foster more robust integration.
10.04.2024
Video by Tech. Sgt. Emili Koonce
48th Fighter Wing
There is a shift in how the maritime warfighting force is evolving and with that significant elements for a paradigm shift in the maritime force.
One aspect of that paradigm shift has been spearheaded by the Danes with their focus on a new generation of modular shipbuilding.
That approach is discussed in detail in a report and podcast we posted on Defense.info on 27 November 2024.
And we generated a podcast to discuss that report as well which can listened to here.
But why is there so much resistance to the paradigm shift by Western navies?
After all, talking advantage of the paradigm shift is crucial to being able to compete effectively with the Chinese.
That question is answered by an insightful article by Poul Skadhede, Chairman of OMT.
He posted this article on his Linkedin account and we are publishing it with his permission.
Modularity! Everyone talks about it when discussing future surface combatants. It seems to be on everybody’s wish list. And rightfully so. But yet – so little is actually happening with regards to this topic.
In this article, I would like to briefly explore current state-of-affairs regarding functional modularity in naval surface ship and also look into WHY it may be that change towards increased modularity is happening so slowly.
I will not discuss why modularity is beneficial to Navies – much has already been written on this topic. But it may be worthwhile to dwell on what at least OMT Group A/S and CubedIn A/S defines as naval modularity:
• Design modularity: How a family of products (e.g. from corvette to large frigate) can be created using common components (e.g. machinery) or concepts (e.g. engine room lay-out or maintenance concepts).
• Build modularity: How design-for-manufacturing enables a distributed and flexible build process that will enable faster builds and less congestion of the limited ship-yard capacity that we have available.
• Functional modularity: How we increase the functional spectrum a given vessel can solve over its lifetime through integrated and standardised modules.
I will propose that functional modularity (the topic of this article) can be described in 3 levels:
• Tactical: Expanding the capabilities of a vessel short term through fast adaption of additional capacities (e.g. a minelaying module) or the fast replacement of a dysfunctional module (e.g. a canon)
• Operational: How a given vessel can be kept up-to-date through its lifetime at less cost and with less downtime because upgrades can happen faster and with higher quality through built-in modularity.
• Strategic: How Navies (and even allies) can increase naval firepower through interchangeable sensors or effectors – in theatre or over time.
The lack of this common vocabulary means that that we as a ship designer/producer/user community of Naval ships are only at the very initial understanding of what modularity is and what it can do for us in decades to come. Basically, modularity describes a way to get to an end – and we could consider if we should become better in describing the end rather than the way. Is a word like e.g. adaptability more concise in describing what we are trying to achieve?
For instance, for many commentators, modularity seems to equal containerisation of (additional and non-core) payloads. And yes, containerization is one component of modularisation – but far, far from all of it. The majority of the containerized application we have seen requires stand-alone operation of the asset in question, and the integration into the ships “operating engine” (symbolized by the IPMS system) or its war-fighting nerve (symbolised by the CMS system) is totally lacking. So yes, containerisation will help a lot to modularize simpler application – but more functionality and integration needs to happen for it to take the next step.
For others, modularisation seems to be all about how you can change or add applications in a few hours. Again, very nice if it is about simpler applications. But the real benefits are measured by the adaptability of the vessels in question over decades. How can you upgrade your radars without is being a massive undertaking requiring years at a shipyard? How can you add more energy to the ship that will allow it to act as a platform for directed energy weapons? How can a new vessel receive used but still up-to-date sensors or effectors from the ships they are replacing? Etc etc. These are the real questions to be answered – this is where the real value of modularisation lies.
For most commentators, modularisation is a domain (naval) specific topic. Why? Why don’t we think about how e.g. the ship-based Harpoon or SM2 missiles (and launching mechanisms) can be used from on-shore installations or on-shore mobile platforms? Imagine the versatility that would give.
Software modularity-enablement also seems to be a non-topic out there. We cannot really move modularity forward if we do not consider how advanced sensors, effectors or e.g. power supplies should be integrated into the ships core systems – the IPMS and the CMS. Metaphorically speaking: Imagine if the apps on your phone were not connected to the physical phones power supply, GPS or operating system (e.g. Android). Where would that leave us? And yet, this is the case when talking about naval modularity.
The biggest problem with current thinking, however, lies in the way naval ships are designed and operated/manned.
To really get the benefits of modularity, crew modularity is at the core. We need to sharply distinguish between platform crew and payload crew. And the later does not belong to the ship – they belong to the application (sensor/effector) in question.
And to really enable modularity-at-scale, ship designers have to rethink their approach to designing and become more payload centric. Number of applications (sensor/shooter) is at the centre of the design process. Ships have to be designed with much more logistical capacity and flexibility to enable launch and recovery of anything unmanned. To the air, to the sea, below the sea. Payload capacity should be the new black – not speed, not fit-for-one-purpose-ships. It’s really a mind-set thing (and a competence issue).
So again: We are currently cavemen when it comes to naval modularity. All of above-mentioned impediments needs resolve. And I guess that I am not the only one seeing that – so the big question is – why is so little happening? I will propose that three main themes must be addressed going forward:
Every technological breakthrough requires that standards are developed. Without them, nothing will happen at scale. Remember the video-format war between VHS and Betamax – had there not been a winner, the video industry would never have developed. Or imagine your smartphone without Android and Google Play. Imagine that each phone-producer developed their own interface to the apps in this world. Not scalable, right?
Standards will allow interoperability, lower costs, reduce lead-times and increase quality when discussing modularity. They need to come into play both in the physical world and in the digital world. Applications should be able to develop interfaces (API’s etc) against well-defined standards.
If we get to this stage, things will start moving. Who is taking the lead on that one?
The naval industry is currently dragging their feet when it comes to modularity. Yes, there are upcoming entities that tries to promote modularity. But the big players are not really.
Why?
Probably due to several factors. For one, true modularisation will disrupt many of the current revenue streams for major players. Why would e.g. a CMS supplier jeopardize the revenue stream that comes from lengthy, costly upgrades when new sensors or effectors are brought to a ship? If it was just as easy as it is to download an app from Google Play, where would all the lovely revenue then be? And the lock-in factor will be much less. Or why would ship-designers and shipyards be incentivised to think modularity? MLU’s will be simpler, smaller etc.
It probably also has to do with competence. We live in a world where we have hard-welded and hard-wired everything to the ship for centuries. Platform and applications are one-and-the-same. Naval vessels are – still to a large extent – made for specific purposes. So, we don’t know how.
Is there anything more traditional than a western navy? I doubt it. Navies want what they have always wanted. Fast ships. Made-for-purpose ships. Crews that belong to the ship. Etc. Yes – it would be great to add some modularity. But no, certainly not at the expense of anything that needs to be just as it was yesterday.
But resistance is not just about traditionalism. Functional modularity has the potential to change both doctrines and Naval organisations. Will we e.g. still need dedicated MCM-platforms – or can this mission type be solved differently with multi-purpose ships and an MCM organization that follows the modules? If yes – what happens to that part of our Navy? And will everybody like that?
Navies could actually enforce a change in mindset in the defence industry. They are, after all, the paying customers! And western Navies can together develop the standards required.
But it starts with the mindset in the Navies and there is still a long way to go.
Modularity is a key to ensuring that our navies continue to be relevant and cost effective. We are currently at the initial stages of understanding this, and there are many impediments to overcome to ensure that we pick up speed on this journey. The demands from navies to industry is all time high and shortage of industrial capacity is a prevailing problem.
It is a perfect storm. Smart use of modularity thinking allows industry and Navy’s to deliver programs faster and more efficiently to the benefit of both parties.
U.S. Marines assigned to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Marine Rotational Force-Southeast Asia, alongside Philippine Marines assigned to 4th Marine Brigade, load disaster relief supplies into MV-22B Ospreys attached to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 165 (Reinforced), 15th MEU, during foreign disaster relief operations at Laoag International Airport in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte, Philippines, Oct. 8, 2024.
The U.S. Department of Defense is supporting the Republic of the Philippines at the request of the Government of the Philippines during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations in the aftermath of Typhoon Krathon (Julian) in Northern Luzon.
LAOAG CITY, PHILIPPINES
10.08.2024
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit
The King Stallion as the latest major aviation addition to the USMC has come to MCAS Yuma in two major ways.
VMX-1, the key Marine Corps operational test squadron, based at MCAS Yuma and they received their first King Stallion last June. This brought together all the key aricraft which the Marines are operating for the use of VMX-1. As the Marines are moving ahead on their evolving approach to basing operations, having the new heavy lift helo onboard is crucial. For although it is labelled a “heavy lift” helicopter in the evolving approach of the Marine Corps to distributed operations it is better understood as a major provider of distributed capability for a force dedicated to delivery distributed martime effects, with or without the use of a capital ship in creating that effect.
In this interview, U.S. Marine Corps Lt Col Warren Crittenden, CH-53K lead operational test director, and Master Gunnery Sgt. Charles Sasser, maintenance chief, both Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron (VMX) 1, discuss the arrival of the CH-53K King Stallion at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Yuma, Arizona, June 14, 2024.
The second major way is that the King Stallion is now a regular participant in the core activity of MAWTS-1, namely the WTI events held twice a year. MAWTS-1 trains the instructors for the USMC’s operational squadrons and are at the heart of the ongoing evolution of the combat tactics and procedures for the USMC.
In this video, the King Stallion at WTI I-25 is highlighted.
By Pierre Tran
Paris – The French aerospace industry was entering 2025 with an “exceptional” geostrategic and political outlook, seeking to respond to strong demand for products and services, while bracing for a gathering storm of U.S. trade tariffs expected from an incoming administration, Guillaume Faury, chairman of Gifas, an aerospace trade association, said Jan. 9.
“There is an accumulation of instability, exceptional uncertainty, and a broad lack of visibility in government guidelines,” Faury told a news conference tied to the French tradition of presenting best wishes for the new year.
Faury is chairman of Groupement des Industries Françaises Aéronautiques et Spatiales (Gifas), and also chief executive of Airbus, the European aerospace company.
There was “geostrategic instability in Ukraine and the Middle East, commercial threat in the space sector from Elon Musk, and American protectionism in a form yet to be defined, but already announced by Donald Trump,” he said.
François Bayrou, a centrist politician recently appointed as prime minister by President Emmanuel Macron, was seeking to persuade a fractured parliament to approve the 2025 budget. The draft 2025 defense budget was due to rise to €50.5 billion from €47.2 billion in 2024, but the divided deputies had yet to approve the bill needed to release the funds.
Trump, the president-elect due to take office Jan. 20, has said the administration would impose a 10 percent tariff on all foreign imports and a 60 percent tariff on Chinese imports, in a bid to narrow the U.S. trade deficit.
French aerospace companies also had to face competition from emerging markets such as China, India, and other nations, which were “stronger and gaining in importance every day,” Faury said. The world was in deep transformation, and while there were strong, clear trends, there was also “a great deal of uncertainty.”
There was a great deal of uncertainty on the expected U.S. “tariff measures,” with lack of clarity on timetable, products, and conditions, he said, in answer to a question. Those expected measures will not lead to a change in the “competitiveness of our products,” he said, but they could lead to “change in the competitiveness of certain geographical zones.”
In terms of industrial investment by European companies, the U.S. had an attractiveness that was “extremely difficult to resist,” he said, citing the case of opening factories for new battery technology. Meanwhile, there was “non-attractiveness” of Europe due to a lack of certainty, he said.
This was not “delocalization,” or shutting down factories, he said, but “localization” of fresh investment, where there was the prospect of greater certainty and higher return on capital.
The 27 European Union member states spent five times less than the U.S. on arms, he said, and Washington spent almost all its military budget on U.S. equipment, outside Europe, he said. The conditions for European economies of scale should be created, he added.
“We need a Europe which sparks confidence, which supports its actors, but also a Europe which supports exports, with national decisions and support from the (member) states,” he said, adding there was a contradiction to manage.
Meanwhile, the French armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, said Jan. 7 that France had won in 2024 arms export orders worth “more than €18 billion,” which he said was the second-best year for the nation, with close to €10 billion stemming from foreign orders for the Rafale fighter jet, and attack submarines.
That compared to 2023 export orders of €8.2 billion and 2022 foreign orders of €26.97 billion
The minister was speaking at the formal event of presenting new year wishes to the services, in the main courtyard at Les Invalides.
The new year has started well, he said, with Iraq’s contract signed in September with Airbus Helicopters for 14 Caracal H225M military helicopters going into effect. Two of those helicopters were upgraded second-hand units. Those helicopters would replace the Russian-built Mi-17 helicopters.
The minister said he was looking for another record year in 2025, notably orders for the frigate for defense and intervention (FDI), as well as submarines, radar, artillery, helicopters, and the Rafale fighter.
There would also be particular focus on the SAMP/T new generation surface-to-air missile, he said, which would respond to “ballistic threats from Iran and Russia,” he said.
On the fighter front, Dassault Aviation reported 2024 delivery of 21 Rafale, up from 13 units shipped in the previous year. The company had previously forecast delivery of 20 of the fighters. Fourteen of the shipments went to France, with seven for export clients, the company said.
The company won 30 orders for the twin-engined jet, all of which were for foreign clients, down from the 60 orders in 2023, of which 42 were for France, and 18 for export.
The 2024 order book stood at 220 Rafale, comprising 164 for export and 56 for France. That compared to 211 units in the order book in the previous year.
The value of those 2024 orders and deliveries will be given March 5, when the 2024 financial results will be reported, the company said.
The European Commission approved €300 million ($309 million) of E.U. funding for five cross-border arms projects, seeking to boost coordination in weapons procurement, the Brussels-based executive said Nov. 14.
That E.U. funding represented “a combined procurement value exceeding €11 billion,” the commission said, adding that was the first time the executive had given financial support for common arms procurement.
The funding came from the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement instrument (EDIRPA), and allocated $60 million toward each of the five projects, bringing a total of €300 million E.U. funding, the commission said.
“EDIRPA’s €300 million investment has incentivized a commitment over 36 times larger, demonstrating the programme’s effectiveness in driving substantial defence investments across the E.U.,” the commission said.
“Bringing greater value for money through economies of scale, the common procurement will make critical defence capabilities more affordable for Member States’ armed forces. With products procured in common, Member States’ armed forces will have improved interoperability,” the commission said.
The procurement consisted of two joint air and missile defense systems comprising the Mistral and Iris-T missiles; a common armored system, namely a troop carrier; and two projects on 155 mm shells, namely common procurement of various types of the artillery ammunition, and high explosive 155 mm shells.
Airbus, the airliner builder based in Toulouse, southern France, reported in the early evening of Jan. 9 its delivery of 766 passenger aircraft in 2024, up from 735 in the previous year.
The European company, which also has a major plant in Hamburg, Germany, also reported net orders of 826 last year, down from a record 2,094 in 2023.
Airbus has two U.S. plants, with one in Mobile, Alabama for assembly of the A320 line, and a helicopter plant in Columbus, Mississippi, for the UH-72A Lakota light utility helicopter for the U.S. army.
Airbus also has a plant in Tianjin, China, with plans for opening a second assembly line in early 2026.
Airbus is winning in the airliner business, but it is ailing in the space sector, and is in talks with Thales and Leonardo for a cooperation deal. Airbus also needs to find orders for its A400M military airlifter to keep its Spanish assembly line open.
Boeing reported net orders after cancellation of 370 units at the end of November. The U.S. company is due to report 2024 fourth quarter financial results on Jan. 28.
Boeing has been struggling with production problems on its 737 Max airliner, a labor strike, and seeks a Texas court approval on a guilty plea deal on two 737 Max crashes. Families of the 346 victims of those crashes in 2018 and 2019 have filed objection to that plea deal, seeing it as too lenient in view of court sentencing guidelines.
Credit featured graphic: ID 351337003 | 2025 © Paradee Paradee | Dreamstime.com
U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lightning II aircraft with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 225, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), arrive at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan, Aug. 13, 2024.
Marines with VMFA-225 are temporarily operating from MCAS Iwakuni, Japan, in support of forward deployed elements of the 15th MEU, as well as other operations and training in the region while integrated with Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.
MCAS IWAKUNI, YAMAGUCHI, JAPAN
08.07.2024
Video by Lance Cpl. Eliza Fremont
AFN Iwakuni
By Richard Weitz
Maintaining access to space is critical for advancing U.S. sovereignty, prosperity, and security. Americans rely on space for navigation, reconnaissance, communications, weather forecasting, and other essential economic and security functions.
Space capabilities are inherently “dual use.” They can support military as well as civilian missions. Commercial space firms now possess capabilities previously available only to national governments. Year after year, they launch larger payloads at lower costs. Whereas a decade ago governments executed most space missions, now only effective public-private partnerships can preserve U.S. space security.
But the United States is facing a more threatening space environment. Russia and China continue to expand, modernize, diversify their space and counterspace capabilities. They possess advanced anti-satellite capabilities designed to disrupt, degrade, or destroy U.S. space networks. Their direct-ascent kill vehicles destroy targets through force of impact, while their “co-orbital” systems maneuver near objects to grab, hack, stalk, or smash them. Though both systems require rockets to propel them into space, Russia and China are developing directed energy, electronic warfare, and cyber weapons. These can attack targets above the atmosphere while still on Earth.
The Kremlin aspires to dominate the strategic high ground and exploit the U.S. military’s dependence on space. The Defense Department has confirmed that Russia is developing the capacity to deploy nuclear-armed space weapons. In exchange for abetting its aggression against Ukraine, Moscow has also advanced the military space programs of Iran and North Korea.
The Chinese Communist Party plans to make the PRC preeminent in space to achieve economic and military dominance on Earth. China now has more satellites in orbit than Russia, second only to the United States. Their number increases as the PRC develops larger carrier rockets to send heavier payloads deeper into space. Like Moscow, Beijing aims to build space-enabled kill chains to paralyze the United States in a conflict.
Although Russian and Chinese counterspace capabilities present independent challenges to the United States, the threat increases as they combine their resources, experience, and technologies. Russia and China have purchased important space technologies from each other, linked their space navigation systems to better compete with the U.S. GPS network, and coordinated planetary exploration missions. Further Sino-Russian collaboration could potentially leverage Russia’s extended experience in space with China’s enormous resources to forge a formidable anti-Western partnership.
In the face of these threats, the United States needs enhanced space awareness to avert operational surprise, build more rapid launch capacity to restore critical missions even when attacked, and develop better tools to degrade adversaries’ counterspace capabilities.
Further efforts are needed to achieve tactically responsive space capabilities to execute urgent requirements. The Ukraine war offers insights for improving resilience of satellite constellations and their ground networks. Satellites have been critical for surveillance and dynamic targeting but have proven vulnerable to cyber and electronic assault.
Combining the Pentagon’s capabilities with commercial and allied systems yields superior results. Through frequent exercises, the Defense Department can bolster readiness and interoperability. Conversely, the United States should press allies to eschew projects with Russia and China that could have military space applications.
One essential advantage the United States enjoys over Russia and China is its robust space private sector. U.S. commercial companies have proven particularly useful for enhancing domain awareness, achieving technological breakthroughs, and responding to novel conditions.
However, the United States needs to diversify space suppliers. Presently, one contractor, SpaceX, conducts approximately four out of five U.S. space launches. Whatever its technical achievements, the company has experienced frequent setbacks. Its management is under investigation for alleged labor and regulatory violations, loose security procedures, and unreported contacts with foreign governments.
The United States needs assurance that its commercial partners are ready and willy to render support in conflicts and other crises. Following the example of U.S. Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement in the air and sea domains, respectively, the planned Commercial Augmented Space Reserve could empower the military to quickly access private sector satellites in an emergency.
Prudence warrants that the Defense Department prevent its major contractors from maintaining links with potential U.S. adversaries and expand its portfolio of national security launchers. Though overclassification remains a problem, the government must insist that allpartners adhere to security best practices. The Pentagon must also scrutinize space supply chains to ensure that its contractors do not rely on the same vendors for critical components.
Featured image: ID 136686433 © Siarhei Yurchanka | Dreamstime.com