Marines with 3d battalion, 12th Marine Regiment carry out Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 at the Shoalwater training area, Queensland, Australia, July 18.
This is the 9th iteration since 2005 further strengthening the bond between Australian and the U.S. military.
07.29.2021
Video by Lance Cpl. Garrett Gillespie
Joint statement, European Intervention Initiative, Meeting of the ministers of Defence in Stockholm, Sweden, 24. September 2021.
Since the launch of the European Intervention Initiative in 2018, it has grown to include thirteen European states who share the aim to develop a common strategic culture to meet the challenges facing Europe. These challenges are becoming more severe and urgent than in decades.
Today, Ministers of Defence, or their representatives, of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom met in Stockholm, Sweden, to exchange views on current security and defence challenges.
The Ministers or their representatives shared important lessons so far identified after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, including views on the implications for European coordination and capability requirements, and for transatlantic cooperation.
The Ministers or their representatives were briefed by France on the security situation in Mali. They underlined the importance of the political transition in Mali and that elections are held within the agreed time frame. They also expressed serious concern over possible cooperation between Malian authorities and foreign mercenaries. Furthermore, they discussed their continued commitment to the fight against global and regional terrorism and the contribution EI2 can make through exchange of information and analysis.
The Ministers or their representatives received a timely update by Portugal on the situation in Cabo Delgado, and the process of launching the European Union training mission in Mozambique and took note of the initial positive results.
The Ministers or their representatives were briefed by Sweden on the Russian-Belarusian military exercise Zapad-21, and by Finland on the first results of the Working Group on Disinformation.
Lastly, the Ministers or their representatives discussed the future of EI2 cooperation, and how to strengthen its capacity to tackle current and future security challenges and deliver concrete outputs by streamlining the flow of information between its various components.
As published on the Norwegian Ministry of Defence website on September 24, 2021.
Featured Photo: EI2-Meeting in Stockholm Credit: MoD
By Robbin Laird and Pierre Tran
The European Union’s pursuit of military and security capabilities can be seen in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) project, a cooperative framework for the 25 EU member states which have signed up to work together.
One of the largest PESCO projects is the European Patrol Corvette, with partner nations cooperating in the design and development of a prototype light warship. Member states would be able to acquire a common modular, multi-mission vessel, with the research and development prospectively funded by the EU and national budgets.
Italy is the lead nation on the European corvette project, backed by France, Greece, and Spain.
Navaris, a Franco-Italian joint venture, signed a memorandum of understanding to boost industrial cooperation with Navantia, the Spanish shipbuilder said in a Feb. 11 statement. Navaris is a 50/50 joint venture between the Italian firm Fincantieri and its French partner Naval Group. That cooperation is intended to deliver “innovative solutions” and ease “co-development and interoperability, the efficiency of the vessels in operations and the digital data management,” Navantia said.
Some 46 projects have been signed up for development under PESCO, covering training, land, sea, air, cyber, and joint “enabling” projects. Among those projects is a European medium-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle, led by Airbus in Germany.
Other European cooperative programs include the Sept. 1 standing up of a Franco-German squadron of C-130J transport aircraft at the Evreux air base, northern France, which includes a joint training center. Mixed crews of French and German pilots will fly those planes, while retaining the option of working on purely national operations.
However, there have also been signs of national interest over cross-border cooperation.
Berlin is reportedly considering opting out of a planned Mk3 midlife upgrade of the Franco-German Tiger attack helicopter, with an offer of the US AH-64 Apache in the pipeline. There is French concern that Germany baling out would drive up the cost and cut the number of upgraded Tigers for the French army. The upgrade would arm the Tiger with a new air-to-ground MAST-F missile and FlytX flight control system.
Germany is also lining up to buy five P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft in a deal worth €1.1 billion ($1.3 billion) as an interim solution, rather than order with France a planned Maritime Airborne Warfare System. One of the options on that MAWS project was a military adaptation of an Airbus A320 Neo airliner.
France would ditch the MAWS project and order a fleet of Falcon 10X in an all-French deal, with Dassault Aviation supplying the aircraft and Thales the electronic systems, if Berlin ditched the partnership on the MAWS project, business website La Tribune reported.
Pooling of resources in lift and tanking is already happening in part but can be enhanced by buying more assets with common funds and allowing individual nations to pay leasing costs when used in crisis management situations. For example, there is the European Air Transport Command which was established in 2010.
As noted on the EATC website:
“The European Air Transport Command is a single multinational command. Its headquarters is located at Eindhoven air base in the Netherlands. The fleet is composed of over 170 assets located at the national air bases through the seven member nations.
“The EATC is a unique organisation for military air mobility, including transport, air-to-air refuelling and aeromedical evacuation within Europe. The overall objective is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the member nations military air transport efforts.”
Pooling of weapons is a clear need, for no European nation has an adequate stockpile of weapons in case of serious conventional conflict in Europe.
There have been bilateral or consortium operational cooperation efforts as well, but these clearly can be replicated in other domains and leveraged for more capability for states that take a crisis management initiative, to have access to community wide resources.
At the European Air Group based at RAF High Wycombe, originally designed to house the RAF Bomber command in the late 1930s, the member nations have pursued more operational commonality, including the notable gap in operational Eurofighter cooperation.
The importance of such operational cooperation was noted recently by Lieutenant General Gerhartz, the head of the German Luftwaffe with regard to Air Policing Missions: “With our enhanced UK-German NATO air policing mission and our advanced concept of interoperability, we have reached a new level of cooperation within the NATO Air Power community.
“Now, together with the RAF we are deepening our cooperation in various fields. In future, we will cooperate even closer, operating our Eurofighter fleets together wherever possible to exploit effectiveness and efficiency. An alliance is only as strong as the allies’ mutual support.”
The two Eurofighter air forces are working in a way which the European Air Group had underscored was important, moving ahead. When doing an air policing operation, why do the various Eurofighter nations need to bring their discrete national support equipment? Why can they not cross support? And in this case, the German Eurofighters will be supported by the RAF’s 121 Expeditionary Wing.
Rebuilding of infrastructure in Europe, not for the green revolution, but the defense of Europe solution is crucial as well. Reshaping various kinds of infrastructure to use analog, not cyber disrupted digital systems would make sense.
Building more interoperable systems to move military equipment around Europe in times of crisis by rail and to have in place agreements for rapid mobility is crucial as well.
But what actually can the European Union do in terms of European defense?
After the Biden Administration Afghan Blitzkrieg strategy, we saw the predictable outpouring of calls for an EU alternative to the United States-led military efforts. But of course, we have heard this for many years, even decades.
Why does an EU army or EU integrated military force never follow? Simply because military logic and Brussels dictated unity do not coincide.
We saw this in our interview with a very experienced crisis management French officer who has worked in coalitions all of his life. This is how Army General (retired) Didier Castres put it in our interview: “A key challenge for Western states is there is a heavy reliance on coalitions to shape engagements.” The problem was seen in Afghanistan, said Castres, where the Americans focused on the cohesion of a coalition of 30 or 40 nations. As he noted: “There may be cohesion but there is no longer a common objective for the operation.”
“Coalitions are built around interoperability. On the one hand, there is the question of military interoperability, for the forces of the various nations being able to work together. On the other hand, there is the more difficult challenge of cultural interoperability.
With regard to cultural interoperability, Castres underscored, different nations have different traditions, different histories, different expectations with regard to the use of military force. What this means is that the nature of the coalition which is put together will define what military objectives can really be obtained.
He noted that for the military it was important to have clarity and objectives for the use of force. The military understands that it is not engaged to simply eliminate an enemy, but “to create conditions for a political resolution of a crisis. This means that there needs to be a blunt and honest discussion between politicians and military leaders about what is realistic in terms of what the military can achieve. We do not want military leaders to engage in vagueness and duplicity with regard to what the military can and cannot do.”
For an organization which could not clarify on how to deal with COVID-19, dealing with Russian hybrid war is hardly going to generate the kind of coalition clarity for which Castres is calling. And with the Nordics and Poland on the same page with regard to the Russian threat as an immediate action item, why does anyone think that a German-led EU is going to respond at a time and pace which those who see a most imminent threat will demand?
Defense is national and nations looking to defend themselves and their interests will work those states aligning with those interests or for their own reasons finding it useful to align with that nation’s actions. Full stop.
The EU as an organization is the very opposite of what is demanded for defense forces in a crisis. That is why calling for greater European autonomy cast in such terms will not succeed. But shaping an infrastructure which enables clusters of states to be able to operate effectively against threats to Europe as seen by those particular states is not only possible but happening in part.
The EU looks like making sense in approaching their R and D funding through the European Defence Fund, which focuses on common stockpile funding. Stockpiling various defense supplies, which could include energy, could then be tapped by individual states and their partners.
European defense is not a collective decision; it is the decision by lead states coalescing the coalition of the wiling to respond rapidly and effectively to a crisis event.
We face in the period ahead developments in Germany and France which will clearly shape whatever EU approach is taken in defense. In Germany, the composition of a new coalition government is being formed by the Social Democrat SPD, Green party, and business-friendly Free Democrats. Those talks over the broad planks of future policy are being hashed out, and defense will be among the big issues to be decided.
And in France, elections will unfold in April/May with the role of French president Emmanuel Macron and his policies, including defense, playing a key part of the electoral campaign. But while Macron is running for re-election and a new National Assembly parliament will be elected, starting January 1, 2022, France will chair the six-month rotating presidency of the European Union, for which Macron has long pursued the aim of strategic autonomy.
France will likely promote the concept of a European strategic compass in a bid to boost greater independence in the realm of defense.
What we do not need is just another round of verbal white-boarding with regard to European autonomy. The reality is that defense is national, but defense is also executed in a semi-sovereign coalition environment.
There will almost always be a lead nation which sees the need to galvanize others to defend its interests and those of the coalition partners. Castres’ warning about the need for clear military objectives not being derailed by having a coalition without an ability to have such objectives is a crucial guide to the way ahead for European defense.
European defense clearly is led by nations with their ways of life and interests threatened; but not every European nation will see it that way and will not be willing to participate. An EU-led coalition of multiple veto nations is not a prescription for effective crisis management operations.
Featured photo: U.S. President Joe Biden, right, speaks to French President Emmanuel Macron during a plenary session during a NATO summit at NATO headquarters in Brussels, June 14, 2021. © Brendan Smialowski, AP
By Indian Strategic
New Delhi. The sea phase of maiden Tri-Service exercise ‘Konkan Shakti 2021’ between the Armed Forces of India and United Kingdom is being held off the Konkan coast in the Arabian Sea.
On completion of harbour planning phase, the sea phase of the exercise commenced on October 24 and will continue till October 27.
All participating units were split into two opposing forces with the aim of achieving sea control to land Army ground-troops at a pre-designated site.
One force was led by the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet and comprised the flag ship INS Chennai, other warships of the Indian Navy and HMS Richmond, the Royal Navy’s Type 23 frigate.
The other force operated under the UK Carrier Strike Group comprising aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, other UK and Netherland naval ships and Indian warships.
The two forces integrated within their groups with exercises such as replenishment at sea approaches, air direction and strike operations by fighter aircraft (MiG 29Ks and F35Bs), cross control of helicopters (Sea King, Chetak and Wildcat), transiting through war-at-sea scenarios and gun shoots on expendable air targets.
Simulated induction of Army troops was also undertaken, followed by setting up of a joint command operations centre.
Thereafter, the two forces effected a rendezvous at sea with advanced air and sub-surface exercises.
The air operations included strikes on the combined formation by Indian maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) Dornier, fighters of the Indian Navy (MiG 29Ks), Royal Navy (F35Bs) and Indian Air Force (SU-30 and Jaguars) as well as a composite fly past over the formation.
Sub-surface exercises with an Indian Scorpene class submarine and underwater remote controlled vehicle EMATT, operated by the Royal Navy, were undertaken through the night. Indian MPA, P8I also participated in the exercise.
This article was published by India Strategic in October 2021.
U.S. Marines with 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, British Royal Marine Commandos with 40 Commando, Japan Ground Self Defense Force soldiers and Australian Army soldiers with 3rd Royal Australian Regiment conduct an amphibious landing during Exercise Talisman Sabre 21 in Ingham, Queensland, Australia, July 29, 2021.
Amphibious operations provide a Combined-Joint Force Commander the capability to rapidly project power ashore in support of crisis response at the desired time and location.
INGHAM, QLD, AUSTRALIA
07.29.2021
Video by Staff Sgt. Laiqa Hitt
U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office
According to an Australian Department of Defence article published on October 24, 2021, Australia and Indonesia are conducted combined maritime patrols.
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) have completed a coordinated maritime patrol to enhance security along our shared maritime border as part of AUSINDO CORPAT 2021.
The five-day patrol conducted by Armidale Class Patrol Boat HMAS Ararat and TNI-AL vessels KRI Kerapu and KRI Sura was the eleventh iteration of AUSINDO CORPAT and reflected the enduring defence partnership between Australia and Indonesia.
AUSINDO CORPAT took place in the waters between Australia and Indonesia, with a specific focus on the deterrence of illegal fishing.
Commander of the Australian Fleet, Rear Admiral Mark Hammond, said the coordinated patrol demonstrated Australia’s enduring commitment to the Indo-Pacific region.
“Indonesia is an essential partner for Australia. We share security challenges and a firm commitment to a rules-based maritime order, underpinned by adherence to international law,” Rear Admiral Hammond said.
“AUSINDO CORPAT tested and proved our shared mariner skills, techniques and procedures and refined our ability to work together in cooperative maritime surveillance, security and interdiction.”
“By working together, we improve regional maritime security and promote a stable, inclusive and resilient region based on international law.”
The coordinated patrol was conducted in a contactless manner to help prevent the spread of COVID-19.
Featured photo: Armidale Class Patrol Boat HMAS Ararat (centre) sails with Indonesian Navy vessels KRI Sura (top) and KRI Kerapu (bottom) during AUSINDO CORPAT 2021
By Robbin Laird
The decision by the Morrison Administration to shift from a conventional submarine to a nuclear submarine is part of the strategic reset underway in Australia since 2018. With the Chinese threat ramping up, the Australians have been looking to refocus their defence efforts on the Indo-Pacific region and to find ways to expand the reach of their forces in the region. That re-focus started with an emphasis on building longer range strike weapons and to shape capability within Australia to build out their own capabilities to build guided weapons, including over time, longer range strike weapons.
The Japanese when launching the war in the Pacific understood from the outset that Australia was the outlier continent which could influence the outcome significantly. The key was to isolate the continent and deny use of that continent to the United States. The Chinese Communist regime certainly understood this and approached the Australian problem by economic, cultural, and political means to reshape the Australian perspective and to isolate the United States from Australian defence.
President Xi has dramatically failed.
Now the Australians are working through how best to shape a way ahead to craft an integrated force capable of longer-range reach and providing more credible deterrent capabilities going forward. I have chronicled the ADF journey with regard to building out a joint force over the past few years through the perspective of the Williams Foundation seminars held from 2014 until the 2020 pandemic shutdown in my book Joint by Design published earlier this year.
With the new strategy announced in 2020, there is a re-set underway within which the nuclear submarine decision is a key part. But a re-set is not built in a day, and as my former boss, Secretary Michael Wynne, often commented, “you have 80% of your force 20 years from now, right now.” So rebuilding is about re-shifting, it is about leveraging new capabilities that get you where you want to go; but it is not about working from a blank slate.
To discuss the transition and its challenges, I recently spoke with Marcus Hellyer of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute about his take on the decision.
From Marcus’s perspective, this decision “is the most important one in his lifetime.” It is about putting a stake in the ground, and rescoping the reach of the ADF and how it will operate in the Indo-Pacific region.
We both agreed that the head of the Nuclear-Powered submarine task force, Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead, had his work cut out for him, but an essential point is for the government and the Navy to ensure that the effort, although crucial, would not dominate the efforts to re-orient the overall ADF effort itself.
As Hellyer put it: “ It is important to let Jonathan Mead, do his work, and everybody else needs to focus on what we can be doing right now. I don’t have an issue with going with SSNs, but we can’t afford to sit back and say the SSNs are coming to save us. There are many, many things we can be doing to make the ADF a much more robust force. The SSNs effort could suck all the oxygen out of the room and taking all the decision makers’ time and energy and headspace. But the focus, while Mead gets on with his job, needs to be on how to get a much faster return on a much more modest investment if we pursue the right things now and figure out the right ways to use them.”
A key problem facing the government is the challenge of shaping the defence narrative in a credible and effective manner.
Certainly, when looking at the effort surrounding the future submarine program designed to deliver a new conventional submarine, that narrative was largely missing in action. That cannot be repeated if Australia is to make an effective strategic transition.
According to Hellyer: “When the defence update came out last year, there was broad agreement that the observations about the strategic environment and the kinds of actions needed to shape new capabilities to deal with that environment were spot on. Notably, the need not to simply sit back and respond to Russia and China, but to shape new capabilities like long-range strike to create problems for them.
“But what is missing is a clear relationship between that narrative and force design narrative. When look at the force structure that was attached to new defence narrative, it’s essentially the same force structure that we’ve been working on in an absolutely glacial fashion since the 2009 white paper. There is a major disconnect between the timelines, the threat environment, and the actual capabilities that to date we are acquiring to deal with it.
“The government is acquiring new or additional capabilities for sure, but the narrative is not there with regard to how these capabilities are woven together and shaping the strategic relaunch. Tomahawks are being acquired for the fleet. A new squadron of Romeo ASW helicopters are being acquired. A co-operative program with the U.S. on hypersonic systems has been announced as well as one working with the U.S. Army on its ground launched long-range strike missiles. We are acquiring the longer-range JASSM.
“There are a number of announcements of new defence efforts, but there is a need for the narrative reflecting and guiding the ADF build out.”
It should also be noted that U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific are themselves in the throes of fundamental change, and one way ahead for Australia clearly is to be a key driver in that reshaping effort. And given its collaborative efforts in the region, those efforts can be key drivers in the transformation process as well.
I have identified in my own work, especially with Ed Timperlake, a number of such points involving the United States, namely, the reshaping of the U.S. Navy around a distributed force operating in kill webs. The USAF working how to deliver agile combat employment. The USMC working its flexible basing approach and leveraging its Osprey and F-35 transitions going forward.
Clearly, the United States military is a key element in the strategic re-shift but other allies are increasingly important as well, notably Japan.
One innovation which Hellyer noted that could be driven by the acquisition of a new squadron of Romeos is the need to find other ship or land-based solutions to hosting the new aircraft, as the inventory will exceed the number of Royal Australian Navy ships which can currently operate the aircraft. He suggested that the two Australian amphibious ships – the HMAS Canberra and Adelaide – might include this among their roles.
But the U.S. Navy has been experimenting with such an approach, as evidenced by the Black Widow exercise last Fall. During that exercise, the Navy used the USS Wasp as an ASW or USW platform.
Hellyer underscored that this sort of experimentation was what he would like to see the ADF engaged in during the period ahead as it reworks its approach going forward. And he noted that the experimentation which the USMC is doing in the Pacific, is perhaps a good model for how to do so.
Of course, there are a number of decisions to be made associated with the ability to operate nuclear submarines by the Royal Australian Navy or to operate them from an Australian support structure. Hellyer highlighted on key one, which is simply ramping up the number of submariners required to operate a nuclear submarine fleet. He cited the recent appearance by Chief of Navy before a Senate Committee where he needed at least 2,300 submariners, which would require an increase by two and half times over the current force. As Hellyer noted: “I think the issue is going to be how do we actually develop the crew for the SSNs and make them effective before the Collins class submarines essentially time out.”
He underscored that the challenge already being faced by the ADF, namely, the sunsetting of the Collins class submarine, has not been solved, but actually is worse because the delivery schedule for the SSNs is later than the now-cancelled Attack-class conventional submarine project.
So how will the RAN and the ADF deal with this?
The answer probably lies not simply in the question of when Australian built nuclear submarines hit the water, or nuclear submarines built for Australia are operational, but with other solution sets as well. But here we are entering the domain of how Australia crafts its working relationships with the United States and UK navies going forward.
And that is a final point. Hellyer found the fixation in the press with regard to whether the Australians would pursue a U.S. or UK nuclear submarine, Virginia or Astute, misplaced. If you are going down this route, obviously you are working with the dominant allied submarine force in the Indo-Pacific, the United States Navy.
Global Britain may be a nice marketing point, but not one on which to build the future of Australian defence.
As Hellyer put it: “The U.S. Navy is grappling every day with the same problems that we’re facing, which is how do you deal with an increasingly capable and aggressive Chinese military. And whatever the benefits or advantages of the Royal Navy, those are not the issues that the Royal Navy is grappling with every day. You want to be able to leverage what the U.S. military and the U.S. Navy in particular is doing going forward.”
Royal Australian Navy (RAN) Collins Class submarines have been captured in impressive imagery, whilst exercising off the West Australian coast. Credit: Australian Department of Defence.
Also, see the following:
Battalion Landing Team 1/1, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, serves as the Ground Combat Element for the 11th MEU’s Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
The reinforced infantry battalion is responsible for missions such as heliborne raids, amphibious assaults, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel and embassy reinforcement.
PACIFIC OCEAN
07.30.2021
Video by Cpl. Ian Simmons
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit