By Robbin Laird

During my recent visit to Warsaw to attend the Defence 24 conference on Polish defense, I had a chance to talk with Dr. Jacek M. Raubo, an Assistant Professor at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań and noted journalist as well.

We discussed a number of issues regarding Polish defense and its strategic environment, and in this article, I will highlight the main themes which Dr. Raubo highlighted in the discussion.

The first and a major theme throughout was the importance of Polish history in shaping contemporary attitudes and approaches to national defense.

He argued that the Poles are deeply committed to their national defense, in a way that is not seen in most cases in contemporary Western Europe.

And I would add that, the level of commitment which can be seen in Poland currently is being seen in Europe largely in the Nordic states.

The second theme was that because of this core commitment which the Poles have to national defense, significant defense spending is not at the core of political competition in Poland.

But the approach to do so is. The current government (lead by the Law and Justice party) is committed to a more expansive and more armored enabled defense force than the opposition party, Civic Platform is. They have emphasized the need as well for more diverse capabilities for territorial defense, using lighter more mobile forces.

The third theme follows from the second but revolves around the question of the role of Germany.

The Civic Platform party when in power, followed German leads on defense.  The Germans are Poland’s key economic partner, and there is a challenge for Poland in terms of how to deal with both the economic power of Germany and the military threats posed by Russia at the same time.

The fourth theme flows from the German challenge.

The embracing by the Germans of Russian energy policies, backed by the Biden Administration, is seen by the current government as a major challenge. This is viewed as well by a number of Polish analysts as part of a Russian flanking action affecting Polish defense and security as well.

The fifth theme flows from the fourth.

The Poles understand that conventional defense is not enough in today’s world where the authoritarian powers have rewritten the book on how to use security tools to challenge the cohesion of liberal democratic societies internally and in terms of their alliance structures.

Raubo underscored that there was a strong and growing commitment of Poland to working cyber defense and offense as part of the Polish capability to defend their society. He noted that cyber capabilities are being generated throughout the Polish educational and commercial structures and is becoming a core focus of Polish national defense capability as well.

The sixth theme was growing realization that the Poles do not have to sit back and cower before Russian anti-access and area denial capabilities.

They and their closest allies can go after these capabilities and challenge them in times of conflict and to work to degrade them in such conditions.

The significant commitment to air modernization via the F-35 and in terms of air and missile defense in terms of their own national programs plus adapting the U.S. IBCS system are seen as key parts of such an effort.

And associated with this is a seventh theme, namely, taking a more realistic look at Russian capabilities and countering Russian propaganda and information war about their capability’s vis a vis Poland.

We discussed the most recent Zapad exercise. In contrast to earlier periods, there was a more realistic assessment of the state of Russian forces. Rather than simply noting that the Russians deployed a large number of tanks it was underscored that most of these tanks are T-80s, and not the latest versions of Russian tanks.

Raubo cited as an example of this trend of realism the publication of a recent Polish piece on the state of the Russian Air Force.  In this article, the Polish analyst argued that Russian air power was in decline. The Russians immediately responded and went out their way to attack this article directly.  In other words, realistic assessment by a Pole needs to be countered by Russian information war, for the Russians want to intimate Poland.

Finally, we returned to the theme about the twin challenges of facing modern Germany and modern Russia.

Obviously, facing these two states and dealing with them is not a new situation for Poland, but the 21^st century strategic context is. Germany follows a passive defense strategy vis-à-vis the Russians, and follows an economic driven approach to defense, which means that directly challenging the Russians is not part of modern Germany’s approach to power.

Such a stance is troubling for Poland who along with the Nordics see the Russians as posing a wide range of direct threats and are seen as well as in the process of ramping up the threat envelope. Raubo noted that Russia would like Poland to become more like Germany in its defense approach.

It might be noted that while visiting Poland, shortly before the Finns released their defence white paper and the Nordics announced plans for expanded operational collaboration to deal with the Russian threat.

The comment made in the recent Finnish White Paper is clearly not only believed by the Poles but is a foundation for their emphasis on defense and security modernization efforts.

Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland’s neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces, and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations.

The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals. Russia has demonstrated its ability to use this wide selection of methods in a coordinated manner, with military force still playing a central role.

It would be hard to find Polish dissent from this Finnish assessment.

Dr. Jacek M. Raubo

Jacek Raubo Ph.D. (@JRaubo – Twitter account) is a security and defense expert closely collaborating with Warsaw-based “Defence24 Group”, a provider of professional websites about the military and geopolitics (Defence24.pl and Defence24.com), internal security and counterterrorism (Infosecurity24.pl), cybersecurity (Cyberdefence24.pl), space technology (Space24.pl) and energy issues (Energetyka24.com).

This group of websites is one of the biggest in the East and Central Europe region.

He also works as a senior lecturer at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań.

Note: The article to which Dr. Raubo referred was written by Maciej Szopa and was published by Defence 24 on September 3, 2021.

Russian Air Force. Last Moments Before a Grand Regression

The Russian Air Force still remains the second air power globally. Nonetheless, their position is year by year, becoming weaker. Hundreds of aircraft inherited from the Soviet Union would soon be decommissioned, with no replacement in sight. Due to finances, technology, and the weaknesses of the Russian industry.

At the beginning of this year, the Russian Air-Space forces operated 380 heavy Su-27 fighter aircraft, 267 MiG-29s in a variety of variants, 131 MiG-31 interceptors, 274 Su-24, and 125 Su-34 bombers, and 193 Su-25 CAS platforms: 1370 aircraft in total. The inventory above is complemented with 124 heavy bombers (16 Tu-160, 42 Tu-95, and 66 Tu-22M), and 91 combat aircraft belonging to the Navy (22 MiG-29K/KUB, 43 Su-27/33, 22 Su-24, and 4 Su-25). This means that Russia currently operates 1585 aircraft, leading the pack and overtaking the PRC – but still being behind the US.

These numbers are far less impressive when one realizes that a certain part of this potential has been inherited from the Soviet Union. We know that the Soviet Union fell in 1991 – 30 years ago. Three decades are often defined as a term within which the expected lifecycle of MRCA comes to an end. This applies to the MiG-29 for instance – that is still being operated by Poland, to a limited extent, and with numerous challenges ahead. The manufacturing of the MiG-29 had begun in 1981. Some of the aircraft in Russian service may be 30 to 40 years old then.

The lifecycle extension process is one solution here – that may be in-depth and costly, as shown by the American example of the extension of the life cycles of the 4th generation platforms. A similar process was adopted for the fleet of 289 MiG-29s between 2009 and 2020, but only 74 aircraft underwent the procedure (24 naval fighters, and 50 land-based aircraft), including several “brand new” export aircraft that were not commissioned by Algeria, because contrary to what was agreed, Russia delivered second-hand airframes to its customer.

The above means that more than 200 of these aircraft did not undergo any works, or those works may have been limited, with their status being not much better from the 30 Polish Fulcrums, some of which have been grounded, while some are still flying, but with very limited capabilities. The replacement of the aforesaid platform may also be problematic. The MiG-35 exists.

However, only 6 examples of this aircraft have been ordered, solely to be publicly displayed as a part of the air force’s aerobatic display teams, as a marketing tool for selling the MiG-35 on the export markets. The Russians have no optimal light fighter that would meet the requirements they define. The replacement – maybe in the form of the single-engined Su-75 Checkmate – is still a plan for the distant future. No specific timeline may be mentioned here, apart from the fact that the manufacturing may be potentially launched in the 2030s.

The frontline bomber fleet is just a bit better. The Russians have managed to build 127 examples of the Su-34 over the decade (counterpart of the US-made F-15e). 296 obsolete Su-24 jets are also still operated. These aircraft were being manufactured between 1967 and 1993.

Even the youngest Fencers are reaching their thirties now. The Su-34 is not a solution here, even in a situation with another 30 jets joining the currently operated fleet soon. Even if money is available to procure more, one needs to remember that over the last decade the Russians had managed to manufacture 18 aircraft as such per year, whereas the manufacturing peaked in the mid-2010s. Only a few jets per year were rolled off the production line in recent years.

Manufacturing of the Su-30 MRCA partially fills in the capability gap expected to appear after the Su-24s are withdrawn. Only 134 examples have been built so far. Employing the Su-30 as a replacement would mean that they would not be able to carry out other missions.

The fleet of heavy fighters belonging to the Su-27 family seems to be in the best shape – relatively. During the recent decade, 134 Su-30 and 98 out of 128 procured Su-35 platforms have been manufactured. This should also include 22 modernized Su-27s – 247 aircraft in total, that may remain in the active service for a relatively long time, with satisfying availability. The Russian Air Force operates 380 Su-27 jets now.

The above means that more than 130 are legacy aircraft, that would need to be imminently replaced. 30 of them would be replaced by the not-yet-manufactured Su-35S jets. What would be used to replace the remaining 100 examples?

Theoretically – the Su-57. This would happen only if the series manufacturing of the new generation platform does not suffer from further delays. So far, 78 aircraft as such have been ordered. They are to be delivered over the upcoming 7 years. So far, a single example was handed off, even though the PAK-FA/Su-57 programme has been active since several years.

The MiG-31 interceptors’ fleet is also facing some issues. The last aircraft of the type was handed off in 1994 – it is 27 years old. The MiG-31s are upgraded to the MiG-31BM, or MiG-31K variant – the latter is a carrier platform for the Kh-37M2 Kindzhal hypersonic missile. This does not change the fact that most of those aircraft are more than 30 years old, gradually reaching the end of their lifecycle.

Only the development of a replacement platform – expected to happen within the PAK-DP/MiG-41 programme – is a viable solution here. Considering the problems emerging in the Su-57 programme, it is difficult to assess when a platform as such could be born, and whether the technical challenges, related to the engines, for instance, would be overcome

Similar circumstances also emerged in the case of the PAK-FA programme. Would proper technology be available for the PAK-DP platform (missing in the case of the Su-57 engines)? Would funds be available as well?

The CAS platforms are also in relatively bad shape – here, the Su-25 is the primary asset, 197 of which currently remain in service. Even though officially the manufacturing plant is still operational, and derivatives of the design are being offered, not a single brand new platform of the type has been delivered to the Russian Forces since 2010. Yak-130 combat trainer aircraft may be a solution here – 113 examples were delivered to the Russian Armed Forces between 2010 and 2020. However, it is far more probable that MALE UCAVs and jet UCAVs (such as the S-70 Okhotnik, utilizing a flying wing design) would replace the Su-25s.

 No replacement exists for the strategic bombers. Tu-22Ms were being manufactured until 1997 – however, no specific plan has been put into place, when it comes to a potential successor. The Russians are currently running the PAK-DA new generation bomber programme, with the maiden flight of the prototype expected in 2023.

The timeline, however, seems to be highly optimistic. Even if the prototype makes its maiden flight on time, it could take years before these aircraft become a part of the Russian inventory. Not only is the PAK-DA bomber expected to replace the Tu-22M, as it would also replace, in the longer run, the Tu-160 Blackjacks. The manufacturing of the latter has been restarted, but only one or two examples have been delivered, with the use of components dating back to the times of the USSR.

 The support aircraft fleet also seems to suffer. Russia currently operates 15 AEW platforms. Only one has been delivered during the last decade. Out of 19 Il-78 tankers, 6 have been delivered during the last 10 years. In the case of 114 Il-76 airlifters, only six are less than 10 years old. The attempt to restart manufacturing of the An-124 has turned out to be a failure.

As we can see – the tempo of replacement of the legacy aircraft with new ones in the Russian Air Force, and in the Russian Navy – even though portrayed as the model replacement rate, as opposed to USAF – is still fairly insufficient. The manufacturing of 4+ generation jets is not a wise alternative for the 5th generation programmes – such as F-35 or F-22. It is rather an expression of a lack of ability to manufacture more advanced platforms.

Despite the investments and financial efforts – that have led to the introduction of almost 400 brand new, or modernized combat aircraft into service in the Russian Air Force – it stills seems that maintaining the current potential would remain impossible.

Decreasing Numbers

This would not happen even in the case of the heavy MRCA/air superiority platforms, with the best available funding. The fleet would suffer from a 10-20% quantitative decrease. However, given the launch of the series manufacturing of the Su-57 here, the situation may not be that bad. Radical cuts, however, can be expected in case of the strike component of the air force – currently operating almost 300 legacy Su-24 Fencers, and only a bit more than 100 new Su-34 Fullbacks.

A complete crash may be expected in the case of the light fighter platforms, as no replacement of the MiG-29 exists. Despite the loud Su-75 premiere, there is no relevant Fulcrum successor in sight. Meanwhile, employing the MiG-35 in that role is costly (two engines), and not prospective, as the performance of that aircraft is, in the best-case scenario, comparable to F-16 Block 70/72. The situation is similar for the fleet of interceptors. However, the MiG-31BM upgrade may extend the Foxhound’s lifetime.

New Designs

The Russian Air Force currently bases its potential solely on designs dating back to the times of the USSR – belonging to the 4+ generation. The Su-57 may be an exception here – maybe the heavy fighter fleet would consist of the 5th generation aircraft. The remaining programmes (Su-75, PAK-DA, MiG-41, PAK-VTA/Il-106 airlifter programme) seem to lack the feasibility needed, at least in the immediate future. In some cases, technical problems may be expected. In all cases, the funding would also pose a major problem.

Due to the cost, the USA or China also would not be able to handle all of the aforesaid programmes at once. Especially if quality comparable to the US platforms would be expected.

The R&D cost is one thing, ordering hundreds of new aircraft to ensure 1:1 replacement of the legacy platforms, reaching the ends of their lifecycles, is another burning issue here.

Export prospects could be viewed as a potential opportunity – Russia could potentially find prospective, reliable customers, or even partners, for its development programmes. So far, Moscow did not succeed here, especially in the era of the US embargo imposed on countries importing the products of the Russian defence industry. The HAL FGFA programme, pursued jointly by India and Russia, and revolving around the PAK FA platform, may be a good example here, similarly to the announcement of a project aimed at the development of a light fighter jointly with the UAE, based on the MiG-29.

Decreasing Numbers and Significance

It seems then, that in the upcoming future we would be witnessing major cuts in Russian military aviation, resulting on the grounds of technological and financial deficiencies. The quantitative shape of the frontline bomber units would suffer from major cuts (even by 50%), the light fighter units would also suffer from reductions (this refers to the MiG-29), while the fleet of the interceptors may suffer from stagnation – in the best-case scenario. The gaps may be filled to some extent by unmanned platforms – such as the S-70 Okhotnik, flown and tested in 2018, or less advanced MALE platforms. Regardless of the above, it seems that the Russian deterrence capability is being and will be gradually reduced.

The Russian aircraft’s status, and the status of the Russian defence budget, also influence the level of training for the Russian pilots. They accumulate much fewer flying hours than their Chinese, or NATO counterparts for instance. This may have a positive impact on the number of air crashes – that were quite common over the last decade. From early 2010, Russia has lost 46 aircraft, including 8 that were brand new: 11 Su-24s, 10 MiG-29s (including two lost by mercenaries in Libya), 7 Su-27s, 6 Su-25s, 3 Tu-22s, 3 Su-30s, 3 Su-34s, 1 Su-35S, 1 Su-33, and 1 Su-57.

The aforesaid figures constitute several percent of newly produced aircraft, even though they refer solely to the disclosed unrecoverable losses – including ones pertaining to combat. They do not depict wear and tear, and damage that – in the longer run – may also contribute to decommissioning of the air force’s assets.

The featured photo: The Polish Minister of Defence addressing the Defence 24 conference in Poland on September 29, 2021. Credit: Defence 24

According to a news release on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website, the Finnish government has released its latest defence white paper.

At its meeting on 9 September 2021, the Government approved the Defence Report to be submitted to Parliament.

The Report and its implementation ensure that Finland’s defence capability meets the requirements of the operating environment. The Report and its implementation will extend until the end of decade.

Finland’s defence environment remains tense and difficult to predict. In addition to the land, sea and air domains, cyber and information environments and space are highlighted. The importance of the neighbouring Arctic regions is growing.

The defence administration prepares to counter broad-spectrum influencing, together with other actors, as part of the evolving national comprehensive security model. Interagency cooperation must be further developed in the fields of cyber defence, strategic communication and information defence. Threats to the cyber operating environment and related national development needs will be assessed in more detail in a new study. 

The Defence Report will reorganize the force structure of the Defence Forces wartime units. In the future, wartime troops will be divided into operative and local troops.  The number of local troops will be increased from 2025 by transforming the majority of the regional troops into local troops. At the same time, the range of duties of local troops will expand and the standards will rise. The importance of cooperation between authorities and the role of reservists will be emphasised.

The cost savings obligations directed at the Defence Forces during previous years and the currently available resources make it challenging to maintain activities and readiness on the current level. This also restricts preparations for a crisis or warfare of long duration.

The maintenance of readiness, training of conscripts and the development of new capabilities require a gradual increase in the number of personnel in the Defence Forces by 500 person-years by the end of the 2020s.

Close international defence cooperation strengthens Finland’s defence capability. Finland must have the ability to work together with key partners, based on a separate decision, in all security situations affecting Finland, including during a crisis.

While the President and the Ministerial Committee guided the preparation of the Government’s Defence Report, it was prepared as in a cross-governmental cooperation and the Parliamentary Monitoring Group was consulted. This is the second Government Defence Report; the previous one was completed on 16 February 2017.

In the white paper, the nature of the Russian threat was underscored and highlighted as follows:

Russia maintains significant conventional warfighting capabilities in Finland’s neighbouring areas and has, during the past few years, increased its military capacity in particular in its western region. It has continued the modernisation of its armed forces, and has developed their operating procedures by incorporating combat experiences from recent operations.

The ability to make rapid decisions and the high readiness of its armed forces enables Russia to carry out rapid and unexpected operations. Different methods, such as prolonging conflicts, are used to achieve desired goals. Russia has demonstrated its ability to use this wide selection of methods in a coordinated manner, with military force still playing a central role.

Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and maintained the conflict it started in Eastern Ukraine. In the spring of 2021 Russia concentrated a large number of military forces in Crimea and on its border with Ukraine. Its activities, for example, in Georgia, Ukraine and Syria demonstrate that the threshold for threatening to use or using military force to try and reach a political goal has lowered.

During the last few years, Russia has positioned some of its most technologically advanced weapons systems and increasingly more capable forces close to Finland. It regularly conducts joint service exercises, and its ability to project military force in a swift and surprising manner has improved. Long-range weapon systems, such as cruise missiles, enable Russia to extends its military capabilities beyond its borders, and restrict the freedom of action of other actors.

Russia conducts exercises and operates actively outside its territory, which could escalate tensions. Furthermore, it has strengthened its strategic nuclear deterrent, and hardened its nuclear rhetoric.

If you wish to see a similar view in Europe, one can go to Poland where the deep concern with the border operations of Belarus are highlighted as well as part of a broader Russian strategy.

The report was published in full on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website.

Or it can be read in e-book form below:

Finland is a key player in the strengthening of Nordic defence cooperation and provides a signifiant example of a state and people focused on resilience as a key element of defense capability.

The Australians are clearly looking at ways to enhance resilience as well as Poland in Europe. The return of Norway to a “total defence concept” goes down the same lines.

As the post-pandemic recovery process takes hold, what place will secure supply chains play in the way ahead for the European Union states?

As we wrote in our book on the Return of Direct Defense in Europe:

The Finns are shaping a way ahead for themselves, with their neighbors and are a key stakeholder in shaping a new approach to Nordic and Northern European defense. This is a long way from “Finlandization.”

Also, see the following:

https://defense.info/featured-story/2021/10/enhanced-nordic-operational-cooperation-september-2021-declaration-of-intent/

 

 

By Robbin Laird

My colleague John Blackburn has focused for some time on the importance of the Australian defence forces becoming more sustainable from Australian sources. He then broadened his look at resilience to the energy and then maritime sectors. This was PRIOR to the pandemic.

With our societies facing a major challenge in re-launching after the pandemic, the question of resilience, and secure supply chains is now a key part of any effective or successful project for the recovery of the liberal democratic societies.

Recently, I have interviewed Blackburn on the launch of a new study which focuses on the challenges facing Australia in shaping a resilient society. And I will publish that interview in the near future.

Notably, this week the final report of the project is being released.

According to the team which generated the report:

“In early 2020, the International Institute for Economic Research – Australia (IIER-A), in partnership with Global Access Partners (GAP), embarked on an 18-month long project to consider Australia’s resilience in the face of a changing world. Over 250 people participated in 40 activities which included Taskforce meetings, workshops focused on specific issues, and the GAP Summit on National Resilience.

“This politically independent effort involved participants from all sectors, including retired Federal and State politicians and the heads of major peak bodies.

“This report presents an integrated view of the National Resilience Project’s nine component studies.”

The executive summary of the report highlights the findings of the report and follows:

The COVID-19 pandemic was a dual shock to our health and economic systems. The ongoing widespread lockdowns, the troubled vaccination rollout, interstate rivalries and social dislocation exposed vulnerabilities in many systems that underpin our society.

In 2021 Australians are faced with concurrent, and in some cases existential, challenges. These include climate change and the urgent need to reduce emissions, growing global and regional security risks, a global pandemic which will have persistent societal and economic impacts, a global energy transformation where we are lagging the developed world, and a global market model that has resulted in reduced resilience, as evidenced in the face of recent crises.

Our National Resilience Project posed three fundamental questions to our workshop participants: What is a resilient society? Are we resilient enough? Can we make ourselves more resilient? We postulated three key attributes of a resilient society: shared awareness and shared goals; teamwork and collaboration; and the ability to prepare and mobilise in the face of a crisis.

The Project has highlighted our lack of resilience in all three areas. Faced with a crisis that it had not prepared for; the Federal Government closed the nation down and then applauded its’ brilliance in preventing outbreaks of the scale seen overseas.

However, 18 months later we remain closed to the outside world, reactive, and crisis managing the present whilst failing to prepare for the significant health and economic challenges we will face in the next few years. We are not unique; the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed a global lack of resilience because of a collective failure of preparedness and mobilisation.

We observe that there is a lack of shared awareness and shared goals in Australia and limited honesty and directness from some Australian politicians about our future challenges. This situation is exacerbated by our Federation’s political systems which has not been able to address our risks and vulnerabilities in a coherent, systemic manner.

Political reactions are often too little, too late, and too short-sighted. A complicating factor is that our Federation structure may have been fit for purpose a century ago, but it cannot deal with the constellation of challenges we face today.

Unfortunately, the prevalence of political spin in lieu of substance over the past decade has also dulled our senses to the point of complacency. Neither side of politics is blameless in this respect. Social cohesion enables and derives from social activity, especially collaborative and supportive activity built on a foundation of trust.

Strong, trusting social bonds that survive and thrive in the face of differences of opinions, beliefs, life circumstances and living conditions are crucial for a society or community to be ‘resilient’, especially when confronted by sudden change or catastrophic threats or events. Federal, state and territory governments need to cooperate on a comprehensive, evidence-based national resilience framework to assess current capabilities and future threats and set national, state, territory, and local policy objectives as part of an overall resilience strategy.

Whilst the formation of the National Cabinet in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic was met with hope and optimism, that soon faded when the behaviour of Federal and some State leaders regressed into self-interest and power plays, compounded by the partisan elements in the media.

As Australia attempts to move on from the COVID-19 pandemic our immediate national challenges are ones of response and recovery. However, we must also prepare for future challenges.

A sovereign nation must buttress, rather than outsource, its self-reliance, and while State, Territory and Federal Governments have taken measures to protect and restore the economy in the wake of COVID-19, a broader long-term vision for domestic manufacturing and trusted supply chains would prepare the ground for a more sustainable recovery, and better prepare the nation for the future.

We are likely to see more compounding disasters on a national scale with far-reaching consequences. We need to be better prepared for these disasters. A nationally coordinated and, where appropriate, standardised, and interoperable disaster preparedness and mobilisation system needs to be developed. Business-as-usual, or more correctly businessas-was, is not an option.

Whilst this is a grim assessment there is some cause for cautious optimism. The actions we need to take are not beyond our ability to design and implement.

We have considerable expertise and resources in this country.

To address some of our resilience deficiencies, we are recommending the creation of an independent National Resilience Institute. The Institute could contribute to a deeper, apolitical, examination of the issues raised in this report.

The aim is to help inform the public policy debate, to improved shared awareness, and to offer ideas on how to improve our national preparedness.

The report can be found in PDF at the following two websites:

Global Access Partners and the Institute for Integrated Economic Research-Australia.

The report can be read in e-book form below:

By Robbin Laird

Warsaw

I am in Warsaw and have just attended the two-day conference held by Defence 24.

According to the organization: “Defence24 Group, the publisher of Defence24.pl portal, is organizing a third edition of Defence24 DAY & SOFEAST conference, focused on the major issues in the areas of defence, security and defence industry.

“This year, Defence24 DAY will take place in a two-day formula, combined with SOFEAST, a scientific conference dedicated to the Special Operations Forces as well as combat medicine.

“Defence24 Day is the leading defence and security sector conference, focused on the major issues of the sectors both in Poland and around the world.

“The event is a place where decision makers, senior administration & Armed Forces officials, defence industry representatives and experts may debate and share their experience.

“It is planned that Mariusz Błaszczak, the Polish Minister of National Defence, Paweł Soloch, the Head of National Security Bureau as well as numerous senior Polish Armed Forces commanders will take place in the conference.”

The agenda for the conference can be found on the Defence 24 website.

I will be reporting on the presentations and discussions which I attended at the conference as well as providing in depth interviews from Polish defence experts with regard to the challenges being faced by Poland and shaping a way ahead for Poland within the overall transition in direct defense in Europe.

In our book, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the 21^st Century Authoritarian Challenge, Murielle Delaporte and I focused on how the current phase of defense in Europe drew upon Cold War history but was very different in many ways as well. Notably, there is a broader challenge posed by both modern Russia and China in which shaping new joint defense capabilities across the European operational landscape needs to be combined with new approaches to security to deal with new infrastructure threats.

That clearly was the perspective provided by participants in the conference.

After 2014, Poland along with other states serious about defense, such as the Nordic states, shifted their focus from out-of-area forces, to reworking how to defend their own national territory against the authoritarian states and their challenges.

And in so doing, for the Poles, as a key state on the Eastern flank of Europe facing the unincorporated states in Europe, both Belarus and Ukraine, and the Putin driven Russian state revival, how to do so is an ongoing work in progress.

The conference provided a number of insights with regard to the agenda for the Poles in shaping a way ahead. I would note that Poland is certainly focused on the challenges of enhanced national security, akin to the concerns I have discussed while in Finland and in the Nordic region, and increasingly in Australia as well,

There is a core concern with dealing with what have been called hybrid threats, namely, the authoritarians working wedges within a society and within that society’s broader alliances by creating asymmetrical threats.

For Poland currently, the Belarusian use of migrants to breach the Polish border on their way into Europe more generally is such a case. This challenge was extensively discussed at the conference, and the Polish response in part has been to mobilize the territorial forces to provide a new brigade to support border security.

This has led to broader European concerns about how to secure European borders, with Poland receiving both criticism and support from a wider European community.

And the wider community aspect is a key one both discussed at the conference and in my interviews.

The Poles clearly see a Russian direct threat to them and to Europe. And they are closer to de Gaulle’s vision of Europe, one of nations cooperating on common interests than to the views of today’s European Commission which sees the way ahead as creating a single set of rules for the entire European community. Here Poland is on collision course with the Commission.

At the same time, there is growing concern among nations who believe that Russia and China pose direct threats to Europe and see the need for enhanced cooperation among like-minded states. Certainly, there is scope for enhanced cooperation with the Nordic states who have deepened their own cooperation as well.

There were references as well about the United States and the dramatic Biden Blitzkrieg withdrawal strategy in Afghanistan and the AUKUS announcements. And the elephant in the room clearly is what the Biden Administration is going concretely to do going forward with regard to defense, both globally and in Europe.

The Polish government has raised its defence budget and is considering additional capabilities for its operational approach to direct defense. The challenge will be to build a more integrated joint force going forward and one which can work effectively with allies.

How will the territorial force be shaped going forward? How will it intersect with more mobile capabilities, such as with its F-35 force?

In a period of time in which the allies of Poland are reworking their own defense templates, it is fair to say that there is no model for Poland to apply to its own direct defense which is congruent with what allies are doing themselves.

The Nordics for example, are reworking how to shape a more integrated territorial defense but one in which air and missile power can expand the perimeter for their defense. The F-35 consortia is a key part of reworking how Europeans will deliver multi-domain capabilities to drive greater force integration, and Poland buying the F-35 will be able to participate in this ongoing development.

The United States is facing a significant change from its preoccupation on the land wars in the Middle East to shaping a new 21^st century force, kill web enabled, and crafted to provide for force distribution and integration.

But this is a work in progress, one which I have focused on for a number of years with my colleagues.   

How does Poland then intersect with ongoing American and European allied warfighting developments, which are driving significant changes in the templates which will deliver relevant force capabilities against adversary forces, which themselves are undergoing fundamental change?

A notable challenge for Poland is how to both defend its national territory and to operate in its perimeter with mobile forces.

The opportunity to integrate more effectively with its Nordic partners and operate in the defense of the Nordic states is not a task for Abrams tanks.

How best to shape a realistic mobile force which can both operate in the perimeters and aid in the territorial defense?

This applies as well to working with the states in the Black Sea region and when necessary, in the Polish perspective being able to participate in the defense of Ukraine.

The challenge can be simply put: (1) Poland needs to combine credible territorial national defense, but (2) with an ability to participate with allies in breaking down the anti-access area denial approach of the Russians and (3) with credible mobile forces which can move to the point of attack by the Russians on the seams which they hope to open up by hybrid or direct warfare needs. The seam warfare piece of what is often called hybrid warfare is something I discussed recently with MARFORPAC in the Pacific.

In short, Poland is in the front lines of European defense.

How they work their own defense is a key part of the broader allied approach and will drive it as well.

When you are the front lines you tend to take the threat more seriously than when you are not, and that is one of the challenges clearly facing the vision of those like President Macron who champions “European Sovereignty” yet pursues his own vision of Russia in Europe.

Featured Photo: The panel held at the end of day one of the conference on “Technology Development in the Defence Sector: Key Success Factors for R and D and Technology Transfers.” Credit: Second Line of Defense