The 40th Anniversary of the Falklands War: ‘Global’ Britain and Reality

06/22/2022

By Kenneth Maxwell

On 14 June 2022, the UK remembered the 40 year anniversary of the Falklands War. Looking back provides insights as well with regard to the state of “global” Britain.

In the age of the Brexiters self-proclaimed “global Britain’ two very distinguished British historians, the late Michael Howard and Max Hastings, disagree about the relevance and the meaning of the British victory 40 years ago over Argentina in the Falklands War.

Sir Michael Howard (1922-2019) who served with distinction in the Italian campaign during the WW2 founded the war studies department at King’s College, London, and was one of the founders of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He was the Regis Professor of History at Oxford. He died in 2019 at the age of 97. He saw the Falklands War as perpetuating the “silly illusion about brave little Britain.

Sir Max Hastings, the distinguished military historian, who was the first journalist to enter Port Stanley after the British victory in the Falklands War, writing last week in The London Times said that it is “unlikely that a Latin American junta will again provide us with a pitch on which to achieve a cup-winning triumph against an adversary which was exactly the right size for Britain to defeat in 1982.”

Max Hastings is no friend of British Prime Minister Boris Johnson now seeking political salvation though his avid support for Ukraine in its war against the Russian invasion. Max Hastings believes that Britain needs a “future” not a return to “imperial weights and measures” which is among Johnson’s latest wish list.

Max Hastings called Johnson, who he had known since the 1980s when he was the editor of The Daily Telegraph and Johnson was his correspondent in Brussels, “a cavorting charlatan who will be an unfunny joke as PM.”

Mrs. Thatcher whatever else she may have been was certainly no charlatan. Nostalgia about the Falklands War is all right up to a point. No one would deny the heroism of the British armed forces involved in the Falklands campaign nor Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s determination to launch and sustain the military campaign over 8000 miles away from Britain in the far South Atlantic.

Some in the U.S. at the time believed that the British task force was doomed to failure. The circumstances at the time, however, were very special, both in the U.S. and in Europe. Britain obtained the support of the UN Security Council where only Panama supported Argentina. Both China and the Soviet Union abstained. Britain was also supported by French President Francois Mitterrand.

The quiet but essential support of Ronald Reagan to Margaret Thatcher was essential. Reagan had initially sought a compromise and sent Secretary of State Alexander Haigh on a South Atlantic shuttle. The U.K. was totally unprepared for the Argentinian invasion. John Nott, the UK Defense Secretary, did not even know where the Falklands were located.

The American Ambassador to the UN, the formidable Jeane Kirkpatrick, had argued that the U.S. needed to have strong relations with the Latin American military regimes. She was dining at the Argentinian embassy in Washington on the very evening that the Argentinian armed forces invaded the Falklands.

Kirkpatrick had evidently missed the not too subtle hints from the Argentinian ambassador at the UN who had ended each lunch with Kirkpatrick by standing and shouting loudly “Malvinas, Malvinas” which greatly puzzled the American Ambassador who did not seem to know what he was talking about. The Malvinas was what the Argentinians called the Falkland Islands.

But Admiral Sir Henry Conyers Leach, the First Sea Lord, who had been fighting John Notts plans to phase out the Navy’s “out of area” capacity, gate crashed the meeting Thatcher was holding on how to respond to the Argentinian invasion and persuaded the PM that a task force could be assembled within a week and could indeed retake the Falklands.

Mrs. Thatcher regarded the support of Ronald Reagan essential, The U.S. had airport facilities at the Wideawake airfield on the British overseas territory of the Ascension Island in the mid-Atlantic. The U.S. had used the base during the WW2 but abandoned it at the end of the war. In 1956 the Americans returned and the airfield was expanded in the 1960s and a joint U.K. government communications HQ and US National Security Agency was set up. Reagan found General Leopoldo Galtieri, the Argentinian dictator, drunk and intransigent.

In 1982 Ascension Island became the major staging area for the British Task Force and the airfield was a base for the British Vulcan Bombers and for a time because the busiest airfield in the world. The U.S. provided critical fuel to resupply the empty storage tanks there as well as provided the British with satellite intelligence. The British task force was composed of 127 ships, submarines, and requisitioned merchant ships, carrying troops, aircraft and equipment, including two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible, and two nuclear powers submarines, HMS Conqueror and HMS Courageous, and four other submarines.

The French provided training to British Harrier pilots to counter the Argentinian French supplied Super Etendard jets carrying Exocet missiles. Four were used to great effect by the Argentinians in attacks on the HMS Sheffield and the SS Atlantic Conveyor and severely damaging both ships which eventually sank. A technical support team from Dassault, however, had remained in Argentina throughout the conflict. At least seven Royal Navy ships were damaged by Argentina’s Exocet and bomb attacks.

The British nuclear powered submarine HMS Conqueror sank the Argentinian cruiser the ARA General Belgrano with the loss of over 300 crew. Four Royal Navy ships sank. On HMS Sheffield 20 were killed and 24 injured. And two Royal Navy Fleet auxiliary ships also sank after Argentina attacks. The British landed 4000 troops and after intense fighting over 11,000 Argentinian troops surrendered and were repatriated. In the end 907 lives were lost, 649 Argentinians, 255 British, and 3 Falkland islanders.

Mrs. Thatcher told Ronald Reagan in 1982 that “If you allow dictators to march in to take over, no small country is going to be secure.” The Falkland campaign proved to be Thatcher’s finest hour.  It is doubtful, however, that Britain could today launch a similar task force and successfully repel another attack on the Falklands by Argentina.

Nor does it have a Ronald Reagan in the White House. Nor is Boris Johnson in 10 Downing Street a Mrs. Thatcher.  And in the Ukraine, Vladimir Putin, evidently did not hear the Thatcherite admonition about dictators invading neighboring countries.

Featured Photo: Avro Vulcan Bomber on display at the National Museum of Flight Scotland at East Fortune Airfield. XM 597, was involved in the Falklands war and attacked Port Stanley Airport in the famous Black Buck Raids.

The Australian Army and UASs

06/20/2022

9th Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery assembled UAS operators at Murray Bridge Training Area for qualification, competency and currency training.

UAS operators were able to employ the three systems available to the Regiment to conduct realistic training through the use of range facilities and other range users.

This training included operating out of the Urban Operations Training Facility as well as image capture of the concurrent Mortar Operator course deploying into firing positions.

Jun 9, 2022

Australian Department of Defence.

China’s Informal Empire in Latin America: The Challenge for the Biden Administration

06/18/2022

China has focused under the regime of President Xi on building out its global informal empire.

By trade and investment, China has become a key player in Africa and Latin America. Its practices in doing so have a number of questionable dimensions, but instead of highlighting the reality of Chinese informal empire practices, Western states have largely ignored the opportunity to do so. They have focused on issues like Taiwan and the South China Sea, both very important but not part of the informal empire geopolitical strategy.

But the reality is that China poses a global threat to the Western order underwritten by its economic, cultural, and third world narrative efforts along with an expanding fleet of both military and commercial shipping and ports as well.

The concept of informal empire was developed by John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson in a 1953 article published in The Economic History Review, as Kenneth Maxwell has underscored in his discussions about Latin America and China. Ronald Robinson was Maxwell’s tutor at Saint John’s College at Cambridge University.

China’s Belt and Road initiative and its engagement in both Africa and Latin America follow the model of shaping a global informal empire. The narrative that accompanies this was most recently seen in President Xi’s presentation to Vladimir Putin’s Economic Forum inaugurated earlier this week.

This is how the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs summarized President Xi’s presentation:

On the evening of June 17, President Xi Jinping attended and addressed the plenary session of the 25th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in virtual format upon invitation.

Xi Jinping pointed out that the world is faced with major changes and a pandemic both unseen in a century, economic globalization is facing headwinds, and there are unprecedented challenges to the implementation of the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. At a time when the international community is so keen about achieving more equitable, sustainable and secure development, we should seize opportunities, meet challenges head-on, and work on the implementation of the Global Development Initiative to build a shared future of peace and prosperity.

First, we need to foster an enabling environment for development. It is important that we follow true multilateralism, respect and support all countries’ pursuit of development paths suited to their national conditions, build an open world economy, and increase the representation and voice of emerging markets and developing countries in global economic governance, with a view to making global development more balanced, coordinated and inclusive.

Second, we need to strengthen development partnerships. It is important that we enhance North-South and South-South cooperation, pool cooperation resources, platforms and networks of development partnerships, and scale up development assistance, in order to forge greater synergy for development and close the development gap.

Third, we need to advance economic globalization. It is important that we strengthen “soft connectivity” of development policies and international rules and standards, reject attempts at decoupling, supply disruption, unilateral sanctions and maximum pressure, remove trade barriers, keep global industrial and supply chains stable, tackle the worsening food and energy crises, and revive the world economy.

Fourth, we need to pursue innovation-driven development. It is important that we unlock the potential of innovation-driven growth, improve the rules and institutional environment for innovation, break down barriers to the flow of innovation factors, deepen exchanges and cooperation on innovation, facilitate deeper integration of science and technology into the economy, and make sure the fruits of innovation are shared by all.

Xi Jinping pointed out that the fundamentals of the Chinese economy—its strong resilience, enormous potential and long-term sustainability—remain unchanged. We have full confidence in China’s economic development. China will continue to promote high-quality development, expand high-standard opening-up with firm resolve, and pursue high-quality Belt and Road cooperation. China stands ready to work with Russia and all other countries to explore development prospects, share growth opportunities, and make new contributions to deepening global development cooperation and building a community with a shared future for mankind.

This pitch and the economic, cultural and political engagement of China in Latin America is growing, robust and in direct conflict with the U.S. engagement in the region.

And the recent Summit of the Americas hosted by President Biden did not overtly discuss China, nor how to deal with its challenges in the region to Western interests.

In a recent column by The Times diplomatic commentator, Roger Boyes argued that “Joe Biden is in danger of losing Latin America to China.” He noted that there are two reasons why this is occurring. First is a growing distrust globally of American leadership. “Biden’s muddled exit from Afghanistan demonstrated to the global south that Washington wasn’t ready to fight for any cause.”

And second, there is a “pink tide” underway in Latin America. With the election of left-wing governments in Latin America and the willingness of China to work with anyone willing to support its economic and political interests, China is seeing an upsurge in their influence in the region.

“It is increasingly China rather than Washington that offers patch-up solutions for Latin American governments in distress. China’s Covid diplomacy generated 300 million vaccines for Latin America. Some countries were offered help with local production.”

Boyes concluded his article with this general stark warning: “For them (the pink tide countries)  the U.S. does not present a persuasive enough model of the future. It remains a largely incurious neighbour. China, despite all of its human rights abuses, its repression and bossiness, can at least claim to have found a formula for escaping poverty.

“That is the true danger of the leftward shift in Latin America and other parts of the global south: a sense among emerging young leaders that the flawed Chinese model offers a plausible idea of progress; that the North American gringo has become irrelevant.”

Kenneth Maxwell, the noted historian and former Program Director of the Tinker Foundation, Inc., underscored the importance of Boyes assessment.

Roger Boyes in his comments on Biden and Latin America, China, and the “Pink Tide” in the region is certainty right about the frailties of Biden’s Latin American policy and the “big flop” of his “Summit of the Americas” in Los Angeles, and the opportunity for China that this presents. Or rather it exposes the powerful position within Latin America that China already occupies. 

 Ironically the upcoming Brazilian presidential election will be a key battleground. Lula it is true, as Boyes points out, is an old trade Union leftist. But Lula was never a Marxist, and he had in his early years of trade union militancy in São Paulo a lot of support from the America’s once powerful (and anti-communist) United Auto Workers Union. But on foreign policy he is surrounded by a group of advisers led by his former foreign and defense minister, Celso Amorim, who are fundamentally distrustful of the US. And under a new Lula administration Brazil would certainly seek a closer and better relationship with China. 

 Jair Messias Bolsonaro the current Brazilian right-wing president who is after all known as the “tropical Trump” and enjoys the fervent support of Brazilian evangelicals which have strong connections to U.S. evangelicals, who are strong supporters Trump.  And Bolsonaro was very close to president Trump, and his sons are close to Trump’s former adviser, Steve Bannon.

Bolsonaro, a former army captain, is also close to the Brazilian military and to the shadowy politically connected “militias” which dominate large areas of Brazil major cities. He is the most pro-American candidate which is not good for Biden, and he is already setting the stage to deny the result of the election Trump style if he is defeated, which seems most likely according to the latest Brazilian public opinion polls. 

 China cares little about the particular domestic politics of Latin America. It can and will work with whoever is in power. And it cares even less about the environment, the Amazon rain forest, or the human rights of the indigenous population. China cares much more about trade, Brazilian cattle and pigs, Brazilian soya, and Brazilian petroleum, and therefore in infrastructure and ports facilities, access to minerals, and investment in electricity networks and telecommunications.

And it has in Latin America no history of the multiple imperialist interventions and support for right wing military regimes in Latin America which is a heavy burden the U.S. cannot escape.

Roger Boyes is quite right:  Biden’s U.S. is on the back foot in Latin America and China already quietly holds many of the cards. 

The featured photo: People taking pictures in front of mark of the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation BRF in commercial street of Beijing, China. The Belt and Road Initiative is a major push by China`s President Xi Jinping to expand foreign trade and raise China`s international status. The summit is held April 25-27, 2019.

 For Ken Maxwell’s own assessment of the recent Summit of the Americas, see the following:

The Summit of the Americas 2022: An Assessment

The Shaping of Amphibious Task Forces Within a Wider Maritime Kill Web Force

06/17/2022

By Robbin Laird

The evolution of the amphibious force and shaping amphibious task forces can contribute significantly to expanded capabilities for maneuver warfare at sea. By leveraging the new air capabilities, adding new defensive and offensive systems on the fleet, and expanding the C2 and ISR capabilities of the fleet, the contribution of the amphibious task force can be reimagined, redesigned, and thereby enhance the combat power of the U.S. Navy in maneuver warfare at sea.

In a way a shift is underway from the amphibious fleet operating an Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit to an amphibious task force whereby the reach and range of the Osprey-F3F-B-CH-53K combination, certainly built around the new class of LHAs can operate as modular task forces supplementing the classic carrier strike group to an expeditionary action group which can exercise sea control and sea-denial leveraging capabilities from the sea and to the sea integrated with the joint and coalition force. And building out the expeditionary seabasing enterprise can provide an additional way ahead for mobile basing as a strategic joint and coalition force capability,

As Jim Strock has highlighted, the U.S. Navy’s hull description system provides the following symbols to highlight the relevant ships in the build out of expeditionary seabasing.

Cluster 1

  • SD: Dock Landing Ship
  • LPD: Amphibious Transport Dock
  • LHA: Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose)
  • LHD: Amphibious Assault Ship (Multi-Purpose)
  • LCC: Command Ship

Cluster 2

  • ESD: Expeditionary Transfer Dock (formerly known as MLP:
  • Mobile Landing Platform)
  • ESB: Expeditionary Sea Base (one that correlates!!!)
  • EPF: Expeditionary Fast Transport (formerly known as JHSV: Joint
  • High-Speed Vessel)

Cluster 3

  • T-AKE: Dry Cargo and Ammunition Ship
  • T-AO: Fleet Replenishment Oiler

The classic ARG-MEU has been built around Cluster 1 ship classes sustained at sea by Cluster 3 ship classes. With the transformation of the ARG-MEU under the impact of the Osprey. the F-35B, and the CH-53K, the LHA has certainly been revolutionized and has become more aircraft carrier like, as seen in the concept of the Lightening carrier.

But the purpose has been different as than a large deck aircraft carrier – the focus is upon the extended reach of the ground troops as a projection force, with the ability to move back and forth from the sea to the land and back again. And the cluster 1 package has sustainability built into it which extends the duration as well as the reach with the new aircraft capabilities, which will only be further enhanced as the CH-53K comes into the force.

But with the U.S. Navy creating a new ship grouping called “Expeditionary Support and Seabasing Support” a new operational capability is being presaged, namely, the creation of modular task forces which  can support both the joint force as well as the USMC operating from the sea. To unleash the capability of this new ship class requires not simply focusing on the hull form but how that hull forms fits into the broader evolution of the force, in terms of kill web integrability, and modularity.

The new class of ships can enable this transition but are empowered by it. Kill webs rely on networks, wave forms, connectivity, distributed C2, and platforms which can leverage all the former. Platforms are the time-space entities which enable the force; integrability allows a distributed force to deliver the desired combat effect. The kill web is about networks of sensors that can provide assessment data for shooters operating over an extended battle space.

The kill web provides enhanced resilience and more capability to respond deliberately as needed, not as forced to respond in terms of loss of capability. It also allows for target assessments being coupled with evolving risk assessments in terms of deterrence risks and consequences.

As the Navy rethinks how to use its aircraft carriers, how to use its amphibious forces and how to use the whole gamut of its surface and subsurface forces to fight as a fleet, an opportunity for change is clear: Why not rework how air assets move across the sea bases to provide the fleet with a wider variety of combat capabilities tailored to specific combat scenarios?

Notably, moving helicopters and tiltrotor assets across the fleet provides for a wider variety of options than simply having a set piece of equipment onboard each class of ship.

The mobility of the fleet is a baseline capability which the seabase brings to a more agile combat force. Ships provide for presence, but mobility at sea, with variable degrees of speed and stealth. But added to this are a range of other mobility capabilities which can work effectively with the fleet to expand its reach, range, and lethality. This is certainly part of the wider kill web approach.

The featured photos highlight two U.S large deck carriers and two amphibious ships operating together along with their escorts and 26 F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters drilled with a Japanese large deck warship earlier this year in the Philippine Sea.

The exercises held earlier this year were the largest drills involving aviation-capable ships since the October exercise with the U.S Navy’s Ronald Reagan and Carl Vinson carrier strike groups, the Royal Navy’s Carrier Strike Group 21 (CSG21) and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) Escort Flotilla 2.

01.19.2022

Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Peter Burghart 

USS Tripoli (LHA 7)

For more on the emergence of the maritime kill web force, see the following:

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making

Raid Force Training at WTI-2-22

U.S. Marines assigned to 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Division, conduct a night raid as part of Assault Support Tactics 4 (AST-4), during Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, at Range 210, Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California, April 19, 2022.

AST-4 provides the prospective WTIs the opportunity to plan, brief, and execute a night, long range battalion air assault to multiple objectives simultaneously in a medium threat environment while conducting five of the six functions of Marine Aviation.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CA

04.19.2022

Video by Lance Cpl. Noah Braswell Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Venom Gun Support Training at WTI-2-22

06/15/2022

A U.S. Marine Corps UH-1Y Venom assigned to Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), conducts day and night gun tactics during Assault Support Tactics 4 (AST-4), Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course 2-22, near Yuma, Arizona, April 19, 2022.

AST-4 provides the prospective WTIs the opportunity to plan, brief, and execute a night, long range battalion air assault to multiple objectives simultaneously in a medium threat environment while conducting five of the six functions of Marine Aviation.

04.19.2022

Video by Cpl. Shane Linder Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron-1

Australia and France: New Governments and Next Steps

06/14/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Australia seeks to calm troubled waters by paying shipbuilder Naval Group (NG) €555 million (US $581 million) for sinking a large French submarine deal, with Canberra pledging to resume close relations with Paris.

That desire to be mates again with France follows the Australian Labor party winning last month’s general election, with Anthony Albanese taking up the prime minister’s office after the departure of Scott Morrison, leader of the conservative Liberal party.

It remains to be seen how Australia will rebuild those ties with France, in the wake of severe turbulence brought on by Canberra’s cancellation last September of the Shortfin Barracuda  project, once seen as the multibillion deal of the century for NG.

There may be political will to rebuild links between the two nations, but there remains bitterness at the business level in certain circles. A French executive who worked on the Australian project expressed deep skepticism on the outlook for cooperation.

“Just words,” the executive said, “there are no competitions, no concrete ideas, no details.”

On tenders, Australia is holding a competition for unmanned autonomous systems for a maritime mine countermeasures and military survey program, dubbed Sea 1905 MCM Tranche 1. The unmanned system will be fitted on ships based on the Arafura class of offshore patrol vessels, with media reports of a budget of A$3.3 billion -A$5 billion for the fleet of future mine warfare ships.

ECA group, a French underwater specialist, said May 2021 it has teamed up with a local partner, Total Marine Technology, for that competition. Saab Australia said last month it has partnered with Leidos, SeeByte, and Sonartech Atlas.

A restricted tender for the mission management system for that program comprises four bidders, namely Atlas Electronik, ECA, SeeByte, and Thales Australia, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, an Australian magazine, reported last month.

Australia stands to lose submarine capability, national sovereignty, and jobs due to the cancellation, the executive said. It looks likely the Australian navy will wait 20 years to sail a nuclear-powered boat, seen effectively as under joint U.S. control.

If the submarine deal were the price Australia was willing to pay for U.S. security, there is uncertainty over U.S. political leadership to consider, the executive said.

The U.S. program for nuclear powered boats is fully committed, as is the U.K. with its Astute class of nuclear submarines, leaving little room to supply boats for the Australian navy, the executive said.

Australia had considered ordering two Virginia class submarines by 2030, Peter Dutton, the former defense minister, wrote June 9 in The Australian daily, sparking a row with the Labor government.

“You don’t defend your country and our national security with a media release,” Albanese told June 11 a press conference. “You defend it with operational capability. My government intends to concentrate on delivering rather than the statements that Peter Dutton has made that contradict all of the statements that he made while he was defense minister.”

The Australian navy is in bad shape, the executive said, with the Collins class of submarines aging, and there is a delayed start to building the Hunter class of frigates, based on the Type 26 frigate from BAE Systems.

Perhaps there might be Australian interest in the Airbus A400M transport aircraft, which has greater reach than the C-130, a defense specialist said. The A400M could tackle Australia’s lack of long-range capability.

The Australian air force flies seven Airbus A330 multirole tanker transport aircraft, badged as KC-30A and based at Amberley air base, near Brisbane, eastern Australia. A further two more units were considered in the 2016 defense white paper, the website of the Royal Australian Air Force reported.

That reach for long range was a key reason for Australia switching to the requirement for nuclear power on the submarine, dropping the diesel-electric Shortfin Barracuda, which would have been a modification of the nuclear-powered Barracuda built for the French navy.

The Suffren, the first of class of the six Barracuda boats, entered service June 3, and the newly appointed armed forces minister, Sébastien Lecornu, attended the high profile event at Brest naval base, northwestern France.

Lecornu met June 11 his Australian counterpart, Richard Marles, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La security conference in Singapore, after president Emmanuel Macron and Albanese had agreed the settlement on NG.

“He (Lecornu) expressed the wish that this agreement and the change of the government team will make it possible to overcome the crisis of confidence with Australia,” the French defense ministry said in a statement.

“France, Australia’s neighbor in the Pacific, namely because of New Caledonia, will listen to Australian proposals to project the bilateral defense relationship into the future, on the basis of operational cooperation and structuring projects,” the ministry said. There will be work meetings in Paris, it was noted.

Both sides, Albanese and NG,  used the phrase “fair and equitable” on the settlement on the  submarine deal.

Thales has its Australian unit, which supplies Bushmaster and Hawkei protected vehicles, and works on underwater systems and mine countermeasures. The Australian unit has generated exports worth A$1.6 billion over 10 years.

Thales holds 35 percent of NG, with the French state owning 62.3 percent.

Airbus Helicopters has fallen on hard times in Australia.

Australia last December decided to ditch its fleet of NH90 military transport helicopters, known locally as the Multi-Role Helicopter 90 Taipan, to be replaced by the Sikorsky Black Hawk and Seahawk. Airbus Helicopters is partnered with Leonardo Helicopters and Fokker Aerostructures on the NH90.

Australia is also replacing the Airbus Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter with the Boeing Apache attack helicopter.

A Clean Slate

Just three weeks in office, Albanese told journalists June 11 he had talked to his French counterpart, Macron, and agreed financial settlement of €555 million to wipe the slate clean with NG, and how it was important to renew close ties with France.

“I thank him (Macron) for those discussions and the cordial way in which we are re-establishing a better relationship between Australia and France,” Albanese said, pointing up the cost of the cancellation, which he saw as a fumbled move.

“It brings the total cost of the former government’s failed policy to A$3.4 billion (US $2.3 billion). This is a saving from the A$5.5 billion that Senate Estimates was told would result from that program.”

France is a long standing ally, having fought side-by-side in two world wars, and also had a “significant presence” in the Pacific, amid tension in the Indo-Pacific region, he said.

Labor, then the opposition party, had backed the switch to a nuclear-powered submarine.

The financial settlement is intended to clear the decks with NG, which won a competition in 2016 and had expected to be approved for the next design stage last September. Instead, Australia sent notice of cancellation.

“Importantly, this draws a line under this issue, and I thank the Naval Group for the way in which they have conducted the relations,” Albanese said. “This procedure has gone through our appropriate approvals processes and ensures that we can now reset the relationship without this clouding that relationship going into the future.”

The settlement payment of €555 million follows the €840 million of sales NG booked for its work on the Australian future submarine project since 2016.

Details of the settlement are confidential for commercial reasons, Albanese said.

It is understood NG will pay subcontractors out of that settlement, as it closes down its Australia future submarine office, which is down to 50 staff, with 45 Australians and five French, after previously employing some 350 personnel.

“Naval Group and the Commonwealth of Australia have reached a fair and equitable settlement to bring a conclusion to the Future Submarine Program,” NG said in a June 11 statement, which declined to give an amount for the settlement.

“Naval Group also recognises the important work of those who contributed to the discussions leading to this agreement.”

NG has its Naval Group Pacific office in Sydney, working in research and development.

In 2016, the then Australian prime minister, Malcom Turnbull, said the French submarine project would create 2,800 local jobs and use Australian steel for the ocean-going boats.

Last September, NG had been expecting to sign an Australian two-year contract worth €1.4 billion for the basic design stage, having received approval on the system functional review.

Instead, Australia told NG the Shortfin Barracuda was cancelled. Talks started on financial settlement.

That cancellation was due to Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. setting up the AUKUS alliance, opening the way for Canberra to order nuclear-powered attack submarines, with help from its British and American allies.

Albanese said Macron has invited him to a Paris meeting, and that was “absolutely vital to resetting that relationship, which is an important one for Australia’s national interest.”

Unmanned Integration at Sea: A Perspective on Task Force 59

06/13/2022

By Robbin Laird

We are working on a longer term effort examining how autonomous systems can be integrated into fleet operations.

Most analysis of the way ahead with regard to maritime unmanned, remote or autonomous systems has focused on the challenge of shaping acceptance of trusted autonomous systems, which makes a great deal of sense.

But it is the mission purpose served for the FLEET which needs to be emphasized as well by such systems, and how the fleet evolution itself changes as mission delivery is performed by a redesign of the fleet as it does its distributed maritime operations differently from the past.

We are building our analysis around the kill web concept of operations approach.

With such an approach payloads within a cluster of combat capability are a key building block of operational capability, rather than simply focusing on the core platform defining a task force.

What autonomous unmanned surface vessels can provide, for example, are payloads for mission purpose, rather than being looked at as simply unmanned platforms.

Rather than a platform centered focus for concept of operations, we are focusing on distributed kill web operations which provide nodes in an overall integrated force.

This is how Ed Timperlake has described this aspect of the dynamics of change associated with a kill web operating force:

“In both an offensive and defensive combat engagement moment, successfully getting “weapons on” is essential.

“Using the famous OODA loop equation can bring a clear understanding of the complex dynamics in building a scalable combined fleet kill web payload utility (PU) function.

“Observe/Orient (O/O) is target acquisition (TA) and Decide Act (DA) is target engagement.

“Both TA and TE can be expressed in a very simple formula.

“The conceptual formula is TA and TE with more effective employment of all payloads available to the battle commander.

“It is the process of understanding and applying in combat the huge complexities of such a formula that is the challenge.”

And the Task Force 59 exercises last Fall can be seen as precisely engaging in “the process of understanding and applying” the payload utility function.

This is how a 5th Fleet press release on October 26, 2021 described their approach:

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, BAHRAIN. On Oct. 26, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) completed exercise New Horizon, the first at-sea evolution for its new unmanned task force.

During the two-day training exercise, Task Force 59 integrated and evaluated new MANTAS T-12 unmanned surface vessels (USV) that operated alongside manned U.S. patrol craft and Bahrain Defense Force maritime assets.

This marked the first time NAVCENT integrated USVs with manned assets at sea in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations. New Horizon was also the first time for NAVCENT’s integration of USVs with manned assets at sea alongside partner forces.

“Working with our regional partners on unmanned systems integration is crucial to enhancing collective maritime domain awareness,” said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of NAVCENT, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. “Bahrain, as our first regional partner to collaborate with Task Force 59 during an at-sea exercise, demonstrates the strengthening of our strategic relationship.”

The first phase of New Horizon, conducted Oct. 20, featured operators controlling the USVs aboard patrol coastal ship USS Firebolt (PC 10), while the vessels conducted high-speed maneuvers in formation.

The final phase on Oct. 26 brought together a larger force of manned and unmanned maritime and aerial assets from NAVCENT, the Royal Bahrain Naval Force (RBNF) and Bahrain Coast Guard. Participating units also included patrol boat USCGC Maui (WPB 1304), an SH-60S helicopter, a V-BAT unmanned aerial vehicle and RBNF patrol craft.

Both U.S. and Bahraini forces practiced operating the vessels in formation to strengthen mutual understanding and interoperability.

“This is a significant milestone for our new task force as we accelerate the integration of unmanned systems and artificial intelligence into complex, cross-domain operations at sea,” said Capt. Michael Brasseur, commander of Task Force 59. “Real-world evaluation is essential.”

NAVCENT established the task force Sept. 9. To focus U.S. 5th Fleet efforts on unmanned systems and artificial intelligence integration.

The U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations encompasses about 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The expanse is comprised of 21 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait.

Featured Photo: Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, left, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, shakes hands with Capt. Michael D. Brasseur, the first commodore of Task Force (TF 59) during a commissioning ceremony for TF 59 onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Sept. 9. TF 59 is the first U.S. Navy task force of its kind, designed to rapidly integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence with maritime operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations.

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making