“It is Not My Father’s Second Fleet”: Excerpts from Chapter Eight of “A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making”

07/14/2022

With the strategic opportunity for rebuilding Nordic defense, the project begun in 2018 in Norfolk in reshaping the U.S. and allied navy’s command structures and force design can find its real impact and meaning. The Nordic defense renaissance provides an opportunity for disruptive change and strategic redesign to deal with the challenges facing both European direct defense and North American defense.

Whether the United States fully embraces this opportunity rests in part on whether the strategic shift launched in 2018 can be maintained and leveraged over the next few years.

In our just published book, A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making: Deterrence and Warfighting in the XXIst Century,  we have provided analysis of how the maritime forces can work together to deliver the kind of defense capabilities appropriate to 21st century threats from the authoritarian powers.

When one combines this book with our earlier book,The Return of Direct Defense in Europe: Meeting the Challenge of XXIst Century Authoritarian Powers, one can see how we have been focusing on both strategic changes, and the changes in both the art of warfare and the art of warfighting required as we move beyond the land wars of the past twenty years. We have argued that this is not only a strategic shift but a strategic shock, and Russian actions in Ukraine certainly have underscored those key points.

What follows is an excerpt from chapter eight in our new book:

The U.S. Navy is shaping an integrated distributed force. Working connectivity throughout the force and working new ways to shape modular task forces provides the capability for the U.S. Navy to be more lethal, survivable, and effective and lays down the foundation for working new technologies into the fleet along the lines of the payload/utility kill web approach which we discuss in the next chapter.

The standup of new fleets in Norfolk to deal with the Russian threat starting in 2018 provides a case study of such change. We spent time with the command as well as with the North Carolina-based Marines to understand how the relaunch of Second Fleet and the standup of a new NATO command in the United States drive and reflect the changes in fleet operations shaping a way ahead for a distributed force within integratable kill webs.

Second Fleet and Allied Joint Force Command Norfolk were placed under the command of Vice Adm. Lewis to launch the new approach and to shape the initial way ahead. According to his original deputy, Vice Adm. Mustin, who is now head of the Naval Reserves, “What made us successful over the last 20 years, post 9/11, is not what’s going to make us successful into the next few decades.

Working with Vice Adm. Lewis has been important as well. As Second Fleet Commander, he clearly understands that we need to shape a new approach. When I was in High School in the 80’s, my father was Second Fleet Commander, so I can legitimately say that “The new Second Fleet is not your father’s Second Fleet.” He went on to add that “What Vice Adm. Lewis wants and what we are offering started with a clean sheet of paper as it relates to the design of the reserve force for C2F.”

The opportunity which the U.S. Navy has had to standup a new fleet in Norfolk to deal with North Atlantic defense as well as to work interactively with the standup of the only NATO operational command on U.S. territory has clearly allowed for shaping an innovative way ahead for fleet operations, and joint and allied integration to deal with the Russian, not the Soviet threat.

We have discussed the standup of the commands and their interaction in crafting a fully operational fleet with the leadership of both commands as well as with the Marines who are working with them. It is clear that from the outset, the approach has been to work from the ground up to have a distributed integrated force.

As Vice. Adm. Lewis put it to us: “We had a charter to re-establish the fleet. Using the newly published national defense strategy and national security strategy as the prevailing guidance, we spent a good amount of time defining the problem. My team put together an offsite with the Naval Post-Graduate school to think about the way ahead, to take time to define the problem we were established to solve and determine how best to organize ourselves to solve those challenges.

“We used the Einstein approach: we spent 55 minutes of the hour defining the problem and five minutes in solving it. Similarly, we spent the first two and a half months of our three-month pre-launch period working to develop our mission statement along with the functions and tasks associated with those missions. From the beginning our focus was in developing an all-domain and all-function command.

“To date, we clearly have focused on the high-end warfighting, but in a way that we can encompass all aspects of warfare from seabed to space as well.”

In a speech in early 2021 to DSI’s Fifth Annual Joint Networks Conference, Vice. Adm. Lewis underscored how he viewed the central role of allied and joint integration in shaping a way ahead for the commands.

“At C2F, we have integrated officers from multiple allied nations directly into the fleet staff. The U.S. Marines, reserve component officers, and foreign exchange officers are fully functioning staff members—not just liaison officers—and they include a two-star Royal Canadian Navy officer as the vice commander of C2F.

“At JFCNF, an initial team of fewer than ten individuals stood up the command with the help of reserve, joint, and international officers—a testament to integration from its inception. We are also integrating the staff by functional codes (C2F N-codes in the same building with their JFCNF J-codes), and we aspire to use NATO standards for everything from classification to mission orders and associated command-and-control systems to realize our full potential.”

In that speech, Vice. Adm. Lewis highlighted the importance of interoperability and interchangeability in working fleet capabilities. “Interoperability is defined as ‘the ability to act together coherently and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objects,’ often involving the ability to exchange information or services by means of electronic communications. We must then be integrated—the ability of forces to not only work toward a similar mission, but to do so as one unit.

“An example of this is the Mendez Nunez, who deployed as part of the Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group in 2019. The final step in the spectrum of relationships is interchangeability. That is the ability to accomplish the mission, regardless of which nation is executing a particular role.”

The launch of the C2F saw the addition of Lewis’s Vice Commander to be a Canadian Rear Admiral. One clearly important fact cannot be missed when visiting VADM Lewis, is that one finds his office flanked on one side by a Canadian Rear Adm. and on the other by a British Rear Adm. The first is his C2F deputy, and the second is his NATO deputy.

It is hard to miss the point: this is a command focused on integration of maritime capability across the North Atlantic. The importance of having a Canadian Rear Adm. within the American command cannot be overstated. Rear Adm. Waddell brings experience from commanding Canadian forces in the Pacific and the Atlantic.

According to Waddell: “We will not be as large a command as other numbered fleets. We are designed to max out at about 250 people and currently are around 200 now. We must be different and innovative in how we get after the missions. We need to make sure we’re using tools and alternative resources, because we don’t have that depth and capacity of people, so you have to find a different way.”

As a startup command that is FOC, they are not emulating other numbered commands in many ways. “We are not primarily focused on the business of force generation, but we focus on how to use assigned forces to shape a desired outcome. We don’t want to get in the space of those responsible for force generation: we just want to be able to advocate for timely, effective outputs that optimize the use of the fleet.”

He noted that the assumption that the Second Fleet was going to be the Second Fleet of old was misplaced. “The old Second Fleet was interested in sea lines of communication. But the new Second Fleet is focused on strategic lines of communication. This is an all-domain perspective, and not just the convoy missions of past battles of the Atlantic.” He referred to C2F as the maneuver arm in providing for defense, deterrence, and warfighting but as part of a whole of government approach to defending the United States, Canada, and NATO allies against threats.

He underscored that “we are flexible and unconcerned with regard to whom we will work for. Operationally, we work for NAVNORTH (Fleet Forces Command) for the Homeland Defense Mission, but we can seamlessly transfer and work for NAVEUR/ EUCOM to defend forward, or to work in the GIUK Gap for an Allied Joint Force Command.”

How did we end up with a Vice Commander who is Canadian?

As Rear Adm. Waddell tells it, “Vice. Adm. Lewis was asked to stand up Second Fleet and given much latitude to do so. He went to a senior Canadian official to ask for a Royal Canadian Navy officer to serve as his deputy.”

Waddell felt that bringing a Canadian officer into the force made a lot of sense for a number of reasons.

First, because of the partnership nature of operations in the area of interest.

Second, because the Canadians have experience in operating in the high north, which could be brought to the renewed efforts on the part of the United States side to do so.

Third, as Waddell himself works the C2F experience he can weave what he learns into Canadian approach to operations. “It’s not lost on me that we as a Canadian service honed our teeth in the battle of the Atlantic in the Second World War in the North Atlantic and then in the ASW fight through the Cold War. Those competencies, although we were collectively distracted a little bit from iterations to CENTCOM and in the Persian Gulf for some time, are crucial going forward. I think we’ve reinforced those capabilities and are investing in new capabilities at home in Canada, such as with the Type 26 surface combatant program, a very robust platform.”

He discussed various tools and approaches being used to understand how to scope the challenges and priorities, including hosting a Battle of the Atlantic tabletop exercise. The goal of efforts like these are to scope out the various interactions across an extended battlespace to understand how fights influence one another.

All of this leads to a very significant conclusion about the U.S. Navy and allies integrating across an extended battlespace and operating distributed forces. “For the web of capabilities, you need to be ready to fight tonight, you need to be able to seamlessly integrate together across the fleet, inclusive of U.S. and allied forces. You fight as a fleet.”

That means fundamental change from a cultural assumption that the U.S. Navy has run with for many years. “You need to understand and accept that a fighting force needs to be reconfigurable such that others can seamlessly bolt on, participate in, or integrate into that force. That might mean changes from the assumptions of how the Navy has operated in the past to successfully operate with allies.” Reconfigurable across a coalition is clearly enabled by kill web capabilities to operate as flexible modular task forces.

The standup of Allied Joint Forces Command occurred shortly after that of the new C2F. And the concept from the outset was that both commands would work together under the leadership of a single U.S. Admiral to find ways to shape more effective leveraging of U.S. and Allied capabilities and to be able to operate as a much more effective integrated force than in the past.

JFC Norfolk was created at the 2018 Brussels Summit as a new joint operational-level command for the Atlantic. It reached an important milestone in September 2020 when it declared Initial Operational Capability. JFC Norfolk is the only operational NATO command in North America and is closely integrated with the newly reactivated U.S. Second Fleet.

JFC reached its initial operating capability in September 2020. Royal Navy Rear Adm. Betton, who was the first commander of HMS Queen Elizabeth, is the Deputy Commander of Allied JFC.

According to a discussion we had with Betton in March 2021, “Coming here 18 months ago has been a really exciting professional opportunity, and genuinely a pleasure to have another run at setting up a team pretty much from scratch. The Second Fleet team was well on the way by the time I got here, but the NATO team was just about at conception, but not much beyond that.”63 The geography and three-dimensional operational space of the NATO zone of responsibility is very wide indeed.

As Betton put it: “SACEUR’s area of responsibility, goes all the way from the Yucatan peninsula in the Gulf of Mexico to the North Pole. I’ve always loved the phrase from Finnmark to Florida, or Florida to Finnmark. But it is also important to realize all domain challenges and threats that we face. It’s everything from seabed infrastructure, through the sub-sea water column, the surface, the airspace above it, and up into the satellite constellation above that.”

The allies are bringing new capabilities to the fight, such as P-8s, and F-35s, and new combat ships as well. Finding ways to integrate evolving allied capabilities by the “relevant nations” is crucial to shaping a more effective allied deterrent and warfighting strategy in the North Atlantic.

As Betton put it: “The U.S. is by far the dominant figure of NATO, but it’s not the only piece. And it’s not always just the heavy metal that is relevant. It’s the connectivity, it’s the infrastructure and the architecture that enables the 30 nations of NATO to get so much more than the sum of the parts out of their combined effort.

“But it’s particularly the relevant nations in the operational area and their ability to work together which is an important consideration.”

The Rear Adm. underscored the importance of the only operational NATO command on U.S. soil. “The idea of integrating it with the second fleet headquarters under a dual-hatted command was a fantastic move because it emphasizes bluntly to Europe that the U.S. is fully committed to NATO. It’s not NATO and the U.S. The U.S. is part of NATO. And having an operational headquarters here in CONUS really emphasizes that point in both directions.”

He noted that there are 16 nations at the command currently with three more arriving in the next few months, namely, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria. And reworking how to create the most effective defense is also a work in progress.

As Rear Adm. Betton put it: “One of the key efforts we are pursuing in this integrated command is not just stitching together NATO and U.S. assets, but it’s also stitching together teams within teams. It could be the U.S. cooperating with Norway, Sweden, and Finland, with Admiral Lewis commanding a multinational command.

“And a crisis might grow and evolve into something that the North Atlantic Council agree to respond to and therefore activate the JFC to command in a NATO sense. But because the Commander has that flexibility to go from a unilateral U.S. only under second fleet, through a growing coalition, there’s the opportunity to coordinate activity with a whole diverse range of entities before it becomes a formal NATO response.”

It is clear that agility and scalability are a key part of the way ahead for 21st century full-spectrum crisis management. And the JFC working in an integrated manner with C2F certainly is working such capabilities. This is a case of startup fleets working core capabilities which are clearly needed across the combat force….

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making

Expeditionary Seabasing and Expanding the Maritime Kill Web Force

07/13/2022

We have just published our book A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making which highlights how mobile and sea basing provide key components for an integrated distributed force.

As we noted in the chapter in the book entitled “the expeditionary sea basing force in maneuver warfare”:

“The U.S. Navy will never have enough ships to dominate as it did in World War II with the strike force that hit Saipan. And with the naval build-up of the Chinese and the Russians, the threat envelope is expanding at the same time. This means that the U.S. Navy will need to get full value out of the ships they have and to leverage flexible basing options in maritime maneuver warfare, shape enhanced integratability with the USAF and find more effective ways to operate with allies and partners.

“Shaping an integrated distributed force for maneuver warfare at sea, operating through interactive kill webs, is not a nice transformation to have but a requisite one. There is no area where better value could be leveraged than making dramatically better use of the amphibious fleet for extended battlespace operations.

“This requires a re-imaging of what that fleet can deliver to sea control and sea denial as well as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) offense and defense.

“Fortunately for the sea services, such a re-imaging and reinvention is clearly possible, and future acquisitions which drive new connectors, new support elements, and enhanced connectivity could drive significant change in the value and utility of the amphibious fleet as well. In addition, as the fleet is modernized new platform designs can be added to the force as well.

“This entails shaping variant payloads as well to be delivered from a distributed integrated amphibious fleet. As building out the evolving fleet, larger capital ships will be supplemented and completed with a variety of smaller hull forms, both manned and autonomous, but the logistics side of enabling the fleet will grow in importance and enhance the challenges for a sustainable distributed fleet.

“That is certainly why the larger capital ships – enabled by directed energy weapons as well – will see an enhanced role as mother ships to a larger lego-like cluster of smaller hull forms as well.”

Recently, I continued my discussions with Jim Strock, a leading expert on expeditionary sea-basing, about how such an approach is enabled by the new class of expeditionary sea-basing ships, the Lewis B. Puller-class expeditionary sea base ship.

But prior to focusing on that discussion, here is  a very good explanation of this class of ship provided in a June 16, 2020, video where the captain of USS Lewis B. Puller explains how this ship contributes to the enablement for the force operating from a sea base.

And this is how Naval Sea Systems Command describes the ESB:

“The Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) ship class is highly flexible that may be used across a broad range of military operations supporting multiple operational phases, similar to the Expeditionary Transfer Dock (ESD) class. Acting as a mobile sea base, they are part of the critical access infrastructure that supports the deployment of forces and supplies to provide prepositioned equipment and sustainment with flexible distribution.

“The ships were originally called the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) and the MLP Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB), respectively. In September 2015, the Secretary of the Navy re-designated these hulls to conform to traditional three-letter ship designations. The design of these ships is based on the Alaska class crude oil carrier, which was built by General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO). Leveraging commercial designs ensures design stability and lower development costs.

“The USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), USS Hershel “Woody” Williams (ESB 4), and follow on ships USNS Miguel Keith (ESB 5), John L. Canley (ESB 6), and Robert E. Simanek (ESB 7) are optimized to support a variety of maritime based missions, including Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Airborne Mine Counter Measures (AMCM). The ESBs, which include a four spot flight deck, mission deck and hangar, are designed around four core capabilities: aviation facilities, berthing, equipment staging support, and command and control assets.

“In August 2017, upon arrival in the U.S. 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility, ESB 3 was re-designated from USNS and commissioned as a USS. As a commissioned Navy ship, USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3) is commanded by a Navy O-6 with a permanently embarked military crew. This re-designation provides combatant commanders greater operational flexibility as to how the platform is employed in accordance with the laws of armed conflict.

This is how Strock then described how the ESB can operate to support an integrated distributed fleet and deliver kill web capabilities.

“Let me give you an overview of what the ship can do in its current configuration and with potential modifications. Right now, it has inherent features that can support Marine Corps MAGTF capabilities and mission sets in the near term. Its current organic capabilities support aviation, troop movement, equipment staging, and have significant command and control spaces.

“And it has already demonstrated the ability already to embark and operate a wide variety of modular capabilities for mission tasking well beyond what the ship was originally designed to do.

“For example, it provides for unmanned systems operation and support. As you know, the Navy and the Marine Corps are considering adding unmanned surface vessels, unmanned under sea vehicles, and unmanned aerial vehicles as fundamental capability sets in current and future operating environments.

“They’re already out there. Once operational, those systems need to be supported without encumbering other high-value ships, such as surface combatants and amphibious ships with additional duties.

“The ESB in its current form and with modifications could support a wide variety of surface, aerial, and undersea unmanned systems to include launch and recovery, fueling, repair, and data and information fusion, as well as unmanned aerial systems that could be employed as airborne repeaters.

“The latest ESB that is under construction and will be christened on 25 June in honor of the late Sergeant Major John L. Canley, USMC, has a new boat davit launch and recovery system made by Vest Davit. This system can launch and recover surface craft up to 20-ton weight, a significant increase in the ship’s lift-on, lift-off capabilities

“Another capability which the ESB can provide is to operate as an alternate aviation operations and support platform. The ESB has the third-largest flight deck in the Navy’s inventory. The flight deck and hangar are currently certified to support H53, H60, V22, H1 aircraft operations. It’s currently operating unmanned aerial systems off of the flight deck. It’s able to enhance the ARG by providing increased aircraft operating spots and maintenance support services.

“For example, selected ARG aviation elements originally embarked on amphib ships could be transitioned to the ESB, thereby enabling the ARG’s large deck amphibious ship to be configured as an F-35 lightning carrier, if required. And as you know, the USS Tripoli just completed that test of a pure JSF mix.

“Moreover, the ESB has more than sufficient space, weight, and power reservations to accommodate the installation of ship modifications and enhancements that would enable the launch recovery of F-35 aircraft in vertical takeoff mode and landing mode, along with selected maintenance and support requirements.

“There is interest in determining whether or not you could modify one of the operating spots on an ESB to support JSF pure vertical launch and recovery. That would mean that a JSF, without armament and without full fuel load, could hopscotch to and from a big deck, if you needed to cross deck the airframes.

“What is not known right now is whether or not actual shipboard testing has been completed by NAVAIR for a JSF in a pure vertical launch and recovery mode operating off of a ship, and whether or not the ESB wind envelopes would support that. That is to be determined, but the physical structure the ESB can certainly support it.

“A core capability which the ESB can provide is for logistics support in a contested environment. If you look at the various supply packages that they could embark, and you couple that with the operational reach of both tilt rotor and rotary-winged aircraft, as well as surface connectors, ESBs can serve as a sea-based resupply and distribution hub in support of operating forces distributed over extended distances.

“With modifications to the empty ballast tanks that the ESBs already have —  remember the ships are built on a tanker platform —  engineers estimate that ESBs have the potential to store upwards of 11 million gallons of cargo fuel that could be distributed to forces ashore, or used for at-sea refueling of aircraft, connectors, and other sea-based platforms. To put it in perspective, LHA 6 and 7 carry around 1 million gallons of cargo fuel. The other big decks carry about 600,000 gallons of cargo fuel.

“But the ESB potentially could store and distribute 11 million gallons of cargo fuel without any substantial modification. ESB’s are constructed based on the Alaska Class Crude Carrier tanker design, and ESB production planners did not modify the tank rings that were part of the original ship general arrangements.  So today, selected tank rings could be returned to fuel storage capability with the addition of fuel distribution piping and pumping equipment.

“Additionally, ESBs can provide emergency health care support. The ESBs are already outfitted with container lockdown spots on the flight deck for resuscitative surgery suites. If emergency surgery for wounded is needed, you can bring them straight to the flight deck on a V22 and put them straight into an operating table.

“Another capability provided by ESB is that they can serve as an intermodal trans-shipment point. And this is really important to support the linkage between strategic, operational, and tactical logistics pipelines. The ESB could receive supplies and equipment from strategic sea lift shipping.

“Those could be commercial container ships. But this requires then reconfiguring those containerized assets into tailored support packages, and then delivering pre-planned or on-call supplies and equipment to forces ashore, certainly via manned systems and potentially unmanned systems, both vertical and surface.

“A core capability, notably with a kill web focus, is command and control. The ESBs are outfitted with three very large planning spaces that collectively have in the neighborhood of 40 individual tabletop planning desks, along with spaces to handle sensitive classified information.

“With the embarkation of modularized communication suites for additional connectivity on and off the ship, ESBs have significant flexibility in meeting increasingly dynamic afloat command and control requirements. And they can generate littoral battle space awareness through the use of embarked ISR assets, and the collection fusion and dissemination of that information across dispersed forces.

“And with regard to the ESB’s flexible mission deck, it has multiple container lock down spots and is configured with two megawatts of power. You can do a lot with two megawatts across a variety of functions.”

It is clear that the ESB then provides a significant opportunity to rethink how the fleet can leverage a capability that is both a support and littoral power projection vessel.

When considering the manning of the force, the ESB provides as well additional berthing spots for the operating force as well. Strock noted that the two ESBs under construction now have increased the berthing spots from 250 to 350.

And the ships provide a cost effective plus up of the fleet, notably when you take a distributed integrated kill web focus to how the fleet can operate in the evolving combat environment.

According to Strock, the first three ships delivered at around $650 million each which is about one-fifth the cost of a big deck amphibious ship and a little bit more than one-third the cost of an LPD-17 platform.

They also fit into the trend line of how the Navy is focusing on ship survivability.

The ship’s power generation capacity  could enable it to operate various ship self-defense systems.  Additionally, its hull form is inherently survivable against mine and torpedo strikes since it is based on a petroleum tanker design, which includes a center buoyancy box, and its subdued electromagnetic and acoustic signatures.

One of the key survivability factors is size.  To put size in perspective, the ESB is a 99,000-ton displacement warship.  That’s twice the tonnage of the LHA/LHD, and four times the tonnage of the LPD-17.

The ESB provides an excellent basing capability notably when considering basing as a key element of the dynamic and mobile chessboard which needs to be shaped as one builds out a force that is both more survivable and providing the kind of the lethality required notably through integratability.

This is how we put in our new book on shaping a maritime kill web force:

‘Military capabilities are being reshaped to operate in a contested environment involving peer competitors, and there is a clear opportunity to leverage new platforms and systems to shape a military structure more aligned with the new strategic environment. Mobile basing and re-crafting combat operational architecture are clearly key parts in shaping military capabilities for the new strategic environment.

“Mobile basing is an air-maritime-army effort to shape a chessboard enhancing mobile basing capabilities moving forward. Military capabilities are being reshaped to operate in a contested environment involving peer competitors, and there is a clear opportunity to leverage new platforms and systems to shape a military structure more aligned with the new strategic environment. Mobile basing and re-crafting combat operational architecture are clearly key parts in shaping military capabilities for the new strategic environment. Mobile basing is an air-maritime-army effort to shape a chessboard of capabilities which can deal with the threats of peer competitors which deploy into the extended battlespace.

“As Jim Strock, former Director of the Seabasing Integration Division at the USMC, put it in a recent interview:

“Sea control against adversaries that are relying on long-range fires to push our fleet back further is a key challenge. The carriers, the submarines, the DDGs provide significant firepower and can extend sea control in terms of firing solutions. But the expeditionary force based on the interconnected sea bases, from which one can project an air and ground integrated force, provides a very different but complimentary capability to the largely missile strike force.

‘I think what needs to be really brought into the conversation about these new operating environments is how Naval Expeditionary Forces with the current and evolving aviation capabilities can operate across all the warfighting functions: C2, fires, maneuver, logistics, force, protection, and ISR. How can you leverage their ability to extend sea power ashore in these new operating environments?”

Addendum:

 “The Navy awarded NASSCO a fixed-price incentive fee type contract for the detail design and construction of T-ESD 1 and T-ESD 2 in May 2011. A detail design and construction (DD&C) contract was awarded to NASSCO for T-ESD 3 in February 2012.

“The ship configuration was subsequently changed to ESB 3 mid-construction via an engineering change proposal in March 2014 after receiving JROC approval.

“A DD&C contract for ESB 4 was awarded on Dec. 19, 2014 and the construction contract for ESB 5 was awarded December 2016, and in August 2019, NASSCO was awarded the DD&C contract for ESB 6 and 7. T-ESD 1, T-ESD 2, ESB 3, ESB 4, and ESB 5 have delivered; in June 2020, ESB 6 began construction.”

 

General Characteristics, Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB)

Builder: General Dynamics – National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (GD-NASSCO)
Propulsion: Commercial Diesel Electric Propulsion
Length: 239.3 Meters (785 feet)
Beam: 50 Meters (164 feet)
Displacement: 90,000 tons (fully loaded)
Draft: 10.5 Meters (fully loaded); 12 Meters (load line)
Speed: 15 knots
Range: 9,500 nautical miles
Crew: 44 Military Sealift Command personnel
Military Crew: 101 military (Accommodations for 250)
Ships:
USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), Norfolk, Virginia
USS Hershel ‘Woody’ Williams (ESB 4), Souda Bay, Greece
Miguel Keith (ESB 5) – Delivered

John L. Canley (ESB 6) – Under construction

Robert E. Simanek (ESB 7) – Under construction

Featured Photo: In a recent article, I highlighted the coming of autonomous USVs as a fleet extender and enabler. A ship like the USS Lewis B. Puller class can easily launch, and recover such vessels.

And given the variety of payloads, for example, that the MANTAC MANTAS or DEVIL RAY can carry, the swapping out of payloads for a wide variety of missions can easily be enabled by the ship’s many working areas. 

The featured photo and slide show highlights the operation of the DEVIL RAY from the USS Lewis B. Puller in the 5th Fleet area of operations and the photos are credited to MARTAC.

And for our January 2022 report on mobile basing, see the following:

And for our just published book, see the following:

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making

Building a Platform for Wolfpack Unmanned Surface Vessel Kill Web Operations

07/12/2022

By Robbin Laird

As the U.S. Navy shifts to a priority emphasis on distributed maritime operations, the opportunity for maritime autonomous systems to play a growing role is opened up. That is for the simple reality that as distributed modular task forces deploy, autonomous capabilities can contribute to the lethality and survivability of the force.

The kill web is a collection of sensors netted with C2, able to pass critical data to the optimal delivery system in order to rapidly achieve the Commander’s intent.  Software technologies are key parts of the way ahead to allow for switching across multiple domains to provide for a secure operational web.

Autonomous USVs can provide wolfpack deployed ISR or relay systems to enhance the reach and survivability of the fleet in its distributed operational role. They can also provide an ability to move data to other deployed task forces to provide for enhanced integrability to do so.

This is about deploying autonomous USVs in a wolfpack to operate payloads appropriate to the mission assigned to them by the commander of the modular task force. This means that the nature of the payloads onboard the USVs and their ability to work as a mission team are key attributes of how an autonomous system wolfpack can contribute to the survivability of the fleet (situational awareness) and lethality (through target acquisition support).

But the nature of the platform is important to enable such a capability. The focus on autonomous systems may be often described as platform agnostic, but clearly the platform needs to be viable for the mission sets it carries the payloads for.

So what might such a platform look like?

And how might it be built, upgraded and maintained?

I would start from the simple point that an autonomous USV is not a morphing of a manned vessel to an unmanned one.  It is not simply replicating what a manned ship looks like, but simply operated by robotics or simply being a vessel remotely piloted.

Recently, I had a chance to talk with Bruce Hanson of MARTAC systems with regard to how they have built and are upgrading their platforms upon which various payloads are being operated. In the next piece, I will focus on the kinds of payloads which their platforms are already operating in the real world. The point being what MARTAC has delivered is an autonomous USV capability which navies and maritime security organizations can use to build their operational experience for enhanced defense and security capabilities now and to learn how to reshape the force going forward.

The company currently features two boats, one 12 feet in length (MANTAS) and the other 38 feet in length (DEVIL RAY). They have other sizes of boats in process, but the core point is that they have built the boats so that if one can be trained to operate one of them one can operate the others as well.

Hanson underscored that they built their boats since 2010 by building vessels of three feet in length so that they could operate several of them to test out systems and capabilities. This meant also that from the ground up they have focused on how the vessels can operate as a wolfpack. As he noted: “There is no point in simply looking at one of our boats in isolation: it is about they can operate as a wolfpack, operating in your terms within a broader fleet kill web or mesh approach.”

Hanson underscored that “the vessels talk to each other and can adjust to single platform failures or degradation.” As he put it: “They can operate as a self-healing commando team.”

The boats are built to provide a scalable fleet of USVs. And Hanson noted: “What you get with the different size vessels are differences in range and payload ranging from 18 to 16,000 pound payloads and ranges from 35 to 1000 nautical miles on vessels from 6 to 60 feet.”

The boats are built to interface with customer payloads, as the company has eschewed from the outset building their own payloads. From the beginning, they understood that customers would wish to operate their own payloads, whether that be a U.S. service preference, or for allies and partners.

The boats are catamarans. Hanson and his team hold the world speed records for catamarans and they have applied their real-world experience to building boats to operate as USVs for the maritime and security forces. The boats are built from carbon fiber and are very durable and able to operate through waves in high sea states.

The form factor of the boats is such that they can operate from standard navy RHIB launchers , and can be configured to fit into various Naval standard launch systems as well.

The company has its own core software team which builds the software to operate the vessel, the C2 and the interface with the payloads. As with all good smaller companies building a focused capability, they control the entire upgrade capabilities of their operating software systems for their boats.

The boats come standard with four independent C2 systems which allows for flexibility in operating the boats dependent on the mission sets. The boats have low / high bandwidth sat com, high bandwidth line of site, low bandwidth line of sight and 4G/5G communications capabilities. According to Hanson: “We have quite a bit of edge processing on the boat along with cyber protection systems.”

The boats have a unique dead zone capability as well. This means that boats will stop, slow down, return to base, continue or do some other response if communications are cut so that the MARTAC boats do not suffer from the “runaway” boat problem which other USVs have demonstrated in various exercises.

The control system is designed for handoffs for boat control among operators in the fleet or ashore. The system can allow coalition transfer as well which would mean that a European nation with a fleet of MARTAC boats in operation could transfer control of those boats for a period of time to a partner or ally for their mission.

The boats are built to operate together or separately dependent upon the mission requirements. But they built the boats with a nested dolls approach. This means that the 38-foot boat can launch autonomously a 12-foot boat to collaborate in the mission as well.

Nested Doll Configuration of MANTAS operating from DEVIL RAY at Autonomous Warrior 2022. Credit Photo: MARTAC

The company has a slogan which goes with their company moniker which is “Beyond Human Capability.”  What this bluntly means is that the users of the boats need to understand that these boats are not simply mimic replacements for what humans would do if operating on the boats. Rather, the boats operate differently from how a human could do so if on the boats. What this means, for example, is that the speed of the boats and the turning ratios of the boats are beyond what a human onboard could survive.

Getting navies to understand that autonomous systems are not remotely piloted is a challenge as well. Hanson tells the story of an exercise with the U.S. Navy where the MARTAC representative told the US Navy evaluator that he was going to lunch right in the middle of the live mission. The evaluator commented: “You can’t do that – who will run the boat?” “It’s Sea State 3+”The MARTAC rep said: “The boat is operating itself. See you after lunch.”  When he came back from lunch, the boat was performing as expected and the U.S. Navy evaluator said: “Your boat truly is autonomous!”

Building a robust platform from day one to be autonomous, with appropriate operational software, but allowing for flexible customer payloads is what MARTAC is focused on doing with regard to their USV boats. In the next piece, I will focused on demonstrated missions which they have been able to execute in working with the US Navy and allies.

The video below shows a clip of the MANTAS returning to the DEVIL RAY after performing an ISR mission during Autonomous Warrior 2022 (Credit MARTAC)

Featured Photo: Devil Ray operating in Jarvis Bay, Australia, during Autonomous Warrior 2022 Exercise held by the Royal Australian Navy in May 2022.

For an explanation of the nested doll concept of operations, see the following:

A Con-Ops Enabler: Scalable USVs in a Nesting Doll Approach

Also, see Chapter Four on “The Coming of Autonomous Systems” in

Defense XXI: Shaping a Way Ahead for the United States and Its Allies

And for a comprehensive examination of the shaping of the maritime kill web concept of operations:

A Maritime Kill Web Force in the Making

Finns Train with Estonian Forces

07/11/2022

Finnish troops teamed up with Estonia’s Scouts Battalion for Exercise Siil 22, a national defence exercise that tests the readiness of Estonian forces Synopsis Finnish troops are working side by side with the Estonian Army for Exercise Siil 22, a semi-annual exercise designed to test the readiness of the Estonian Defence Forces.

Named after the Estonian word for hedgehog – a small forest animal that packs a potent defence – Siil brought more than 200 Finnish infantry and engineer soldiers from the Pori Brigade to southern Estonia, where they integrated with the Estonian Scouts Battalion.

Working under an integrated command, Finnish and Estonian troops played the aggressor force, launching simulated attacks against Estonian defenders. Siil 22 saw the participation of 15,000 troops from 10 NATO Allies and partners.

A long-time NATO partner and frequent participant in NATO and Allied exercises, Finland applied for NATO membership in May 2022.

ESTONIA

05.24.2022

Natochannel

The French Army’s Titan Project: A July 2022 Update

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The French army is preparing for future high intensity warfare with its Titan project, working with the DGA procurement office to devise a high capacity information network to enter service after 2040.

Titan is seen as changing the game, based on the concept of “strategy of simultaneity,” a term used by army colonel Arnaud Goujon at the May 31 conference on land weapons organized by Fondation pour la Récherche Stratégique, a think tank.

Titan is “not just about platforms,” he said, as the project aims to deliver an “extremely different capability.”

The project seeks to extend a combat cloud for ground forces, a follow-on to the army’s €10 billion ($10.4 billion) Scorpion program. That modernization drive is delivering medium armored vehicles, notably the Griffon multirole troop carrier, Jaguar combat and reconnaissance vehicle, and Serval light multirole vehicle.

Scorpion includes a command and control network based on Atos SICS battle management system, and Thales Contact software-defined radio technology, as well as a training system in the vehicles. There will also be a vehicle to replace the VBL scout car.

Military planners and procurement officials of the Direction Générale de l’Armement are looking to deliver and manage a wider transmission of battlefield information, with greater density of data, to provide interconnection of joint military units.

Titan factors in a shift to fighting a high intensity war, moving away from a concept of operations based on troops deployed overseas for counter-insurgency, asymmetrical combat, as seen in Afghanistan and Mali.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the use of troops, armor, and artillery barrages to seize the Donbas region, eastern Ukraine, point up the significance of high intensity warfare, military analysts said.

A key feature of Titan will be to plug in a planned heavy tank and unmanned vehicles dubbed Main Ground Combat System (MGCS), a project pursued under Franco-German military and industrial cooperation.

That heavy armor in the Titan network will follow on from Scorpion’s focus on medium vehicles, although the latter includes upgrade of 200 Leclerc main battle tanks. The total Leclerc fleet is some 240 units strong, specialist magazine Defense Zone reported.

Artillery and the Tiger Mk3 attack helicopter will also be hooked into the information network, as part of the bid to boost air-land capability.

Scorpion works on collaborative combat, boosting command and control (C2), and bringing “an in-depth transformation,” Goujon said. That complex change will take years to complete, with new vehicles working in network and going on field exercises for certification. The plan is to field a Scorpion brigade in 2023 and a division in 2025.

The new fleets will change the culture and operations of the army, he said, as Scorpion vehicles will not be used the same way as the VAB troop carrier.

The Véhicule de l’Avant Blindé has been the workhorse for the army for some 45 years old, and has undergone various upgrades.

France has sent the VAB to help Ukraine, armed forces minister Sébastien Lecornu told June 27 daily Le Parisien, without giving the number of units.

That press interview confirmed a video clip that had run on social media, showing 14 VABs transported by road in Slovakia, prompting assumption they were bound for Ukraine.

In future combat there will be greater dynamic in the battlefield, Goujon said, with real time video from space satellites for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

“The battlefield will be very exposed,” he said. There will be changes in connectivity with high bandwidth in 5G fifth-generation telecommunications for soldiers and vehicles.

Finding a budget to fund the Titan project poses a problem, with rising inflation and the high cost of technology and service support, he said. Technology will take time to mature, and unmanned systems will be more costly than manned.

Titan To Replace Kit

Titan will also renew the equipment inventory, as well as boosting the information network.

Titan will start replacing weapons at the high end of the conflict spectrum from 2040, equipment which will be worn out by 2050, said Charles Beaudouin, a retired general who led Scorpion in the army technical section. He was on the general staff when the army chief of staff launched the Titan project in 2018.

The weapons to be replaced include the Leclerc tank, VBCI infantry fighting vehicle, Patroller tactical drone, and Tiger helicopter, he said. Artillery will be succeeded by the planned Franco-German Common Indirect Fire System, while a mobile ground-to-air, low-altitude missile system will replace Mistral 3.

A next generation information and communications system using broadband, artificial intelligence and drawing on metadata in the combat theater, will replace Scorpion SICS.

Those new weapons will be fitted with advanced automation and in some cases, intelligent robotics.

“The research budget relating to Titan will be decisive because this program of programs must offer total superiority in 2050 — and for a long time after,” he said.

Technological and capability breakthroughs in Titan will allow upgrade of the Scorpion vehicles — Griffon, Jaguar, and Serval — which will be entering mid-life service, he said. Titan will also address initial gaps in Scorpion, namely defense against anti-tank missiles and drones.

“With the return of wars between nations, the nature of war is changing,” he said, “and without abandoning asymmetric combat, it is now a question of finding a full spectrum of capabilities for symmetric high intensity combat, while acknowledging any combat, symmetric or asymmetric, may have high intensity peaks.

“In this sense, we are not experiencing a return to the Cold War paradigm but a much more complex aggregate combining Afghanistan, Syria-Iraq, Ukraine, to which can be added what we do not even think of today — because war always surprises,” he said.

There will certainly be major disorders and mass migrations due to shortage of raw materials and natural resources, he said.

“What is certain is that the enemy will use the equalizing power of technology and we must imperatively regain mass — symmetry warriors inflict strong human and material attrition,” he said.

“It is not by sacrificing technology to rusticity but by developing a lower cost digital technology and in its rightful place,” he said. “This is where we expect innovation.”

Beaudouin is chairman of Coges Events, organizer of the week-long Eurosatory trade show for land and air-land weapons, which closed June 17. Coges is a unit of the Gicat trade association for land weapons.

Beaudouin was speaking in his private capacity.

Superiority In the Field

“Titan is a major project seeking to guarantee operational superiority on the ground in face of a first rank adversary,” the DGA said.

The project seeks to address the return to high intensity combat in equipment and multi domain operations, the importance of new technology – such as drones – delivering a levelling effect, and the acceleration of change or breakthroughs, the procurement office said.

The architecture and preparation of key capabilities in high intensity warfare require a “top-down” approach, the DGA said. Titan is not a program guided by physical platforms and funding, but seeks to deliver a “strengthened capability,” based on coherence of air-land forces at the high end of the conflict spectrum.

The near term aim is to consider, compare and optimise architectures for air-land forces, the office said. Titan is not an equipment program with a budget.

The main factor in Titan is the MGCS project, which will replace the Leclerc and German Leopard 2 tank, the office said.

There are technical-operational studies which will steer research and technology studies and future programs. Those studies are worth “several million euros,” the office said, without giving details.

Besides those technical-operational studies, Titan draws on MGCS architecture studies, feasibility studies on robotics, and studies backed by the European Union on future artillery, such as FIRES and E-COLORSS, respectively the Future Indirect fiRes European Solution and the European COmmon LOng Range indirect fire Support System.

The latter two EU studies are two-year design studies backed by the 2020 European Defense Industrial Development Program, each study with a budget of €3.5 million.

FIRES examines next generation 155 mm artillery ammunition and rockets based on common technology, while e-COLORSS considers improved European artillery with a 155 mm cannon and rocket launcher mounted on a hybrid truck.

Doubts On the Main Ground Combat System

It remains to be seen how Titan will proceed if the MGCS project were scaled back from its planned Franco-German industrial cooperation.

Doubts over MGCS spring from Rheinmetall reported to be seeking a place at the top table with Krauss-Maffei Wegmann on the armor project. That German struggle for the leading role on the future tank system is seen as risking the work share for the French partner, Nexter.

KMW and Nexter had expected to share the work on MGCS on a 50-50 basis, reflecting their equal stakes in the cross-border KNDS joint venture formed in 2015. The MGCS tank and unmanned systems are due to enter service in 2035.

MGCS is important for France but also for the German army, the French army chief of staff, general Pierre Schill, told parliamentarians Oct. 12.

While there were industrial issues to take into account, “the army has a strategic need to have a MGCS delivered in 2035,” he said. “Despite the difficulties that go with a cooperative project, we must pursue our studies with our German allies on the operational needs that we share.”

Belgium is the only other European nation to have ordered Scorpion vehicles, he said, but there could be development of a “Scorpion community” through interoperability with Luxembourg and Netherlands, and perhaps Germany.

Belgium has ordered Jaguar and Griffon vehicles through its Capacité Mobilisé (CaMo) program.

Eurosatory provided a showcase for the competing corporate advances on the tank front, with Rheinmetall unveiling a technology demonstrator for its KF 51 Panther, while KNDS showed an updated demonstrator of its Enhanced Main Battle Tank (E-MBT).

Pitching the two competing tank prototypes to the world market signalled MGCS might be on borrowed time, a research note said.

“We are increasingly unable to escape the conclusion that both groups increasingly expect (or hope for?) MGCS to go the same way as the parallel SCAF/FCAS combat air “cooperation”, and collapse due to a combination of national political/industrial rivalries and technological over-ambition (= cost and time),” Agency Partners, an equity research company, said in a June 21 research note titled European Defence.

The army’s success in winning funding for its modernization drive stems partly from the use of a brand name – Scorpion – after a long backstory of finishing last in the inter-service race for the military budget.

The nuclear deterrent was ring fenced in the budget, while the air force and navy won funds for big ticket items such as fighter jets, nuclear ballistic missile submarines, frigates and an aircraft carrier.

That left the army behind as poor bloody infantry when it came to securing funds, unless a catchy program name could be found. Army planners came up with Scorpion, and secured some €10 billion.

Featured Graphic: Leclerc MBT, Serval VBMR-L, JAGUAR armoured vehicles, Griffon VBMR APC Source: nexter-group.fr

Defending Gotland: BALTOPS 22

07/08/2022

As Gotland is vital to securing the Baltic Sea, Swedish troops practise rapidly reinforcing the island during BALTOPS 22, a US-led maritime exercise.

The Swedish island of Gotland hosted defence drills as part of Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) 22, an annual United States-led maritime exercise.

Situated roughly 100 kilometres off the Swedish coast, Gotland has a commanding view of the Baltic Sea, which makes it strategically vital terrain for the Swedish Armed Forces.

As part of BALTOPS 22, Swedish soldiers practised the rapid reinforcement and defence of the island against a simulated enemy, played this year by the United States Marine Corps’ 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU).

Sweden is hosting this year’s exercise, which coincides with the 500th anniversary of the Swedish Navy.

BALTOPS 22 involves forces from 16 countries, with over 45 ships, more than 75 aircraft and 7,500 personnel participating. The exercise will end on 17 June 2022.

The exercise is led by the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet, headquartered in Italy, with Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO), based in Portugal, implementing command and control of the exercise.

07.06.2022

Natochannel

What the West Gets Wrong about Putin

07/07/2022

By Harald Malmgren

In 1999, Vladimir Putin suddenly sprang from bureaucratic obscurity to the office of Prime Minister. When, a few months later, Yeltsin unexpectedly resigned and Putin was voted in as President, governments around the world were taken by surprise yet again.

How could this unknown figure have amassed national voter support with so little media attention?

I had first met Putin seven years before and was not surprised by his rapid domination of the new Russia. We were introduced by Yevgeny Primakov, widely known as “Russia’s Kissinger”, who I had met in Moscow multiple times during the Cold War years when I advised Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford.

Primakov was a no-nonsense thinker and writer. He was also a special emissary for the Kremlin in conducting secret discussions with national leaders around the world.

When Yeltsin tasked his advisor Anatoly Sobchak with identifying and recruiting Russia’s best and brightest, Putin, then a local politician in his hometown of St Petersburg, was top of his list — so Primakov took Putin under his wing to tutor him in global power and security issues. Eventually, Primakov introduced Kissinger to Putin, and they became close.

That both Primakov and Kissinger took time to coach Putin on geopolitics and geosecurity was a clear demonstration that they saw in him the characteristics of a powerful leader. It also showed Putin’s capacity for listening to lengthy lessons on geopolitics — as I was soon to learn.

In 1992, I received a call from a meeting organiser at the CSIS think tank inviting me to join a US-Russia St Petersburg Commission to be chaired by Kissinger and Sobchak. The purpose would be to help the new Russian leadership in opening channels of business and banking with the West. Most of the Western members would be CEOs of major US and European companies, as well as key officials of the new Russian government. I would attend as an expert.

I was told that a “Mr Primakov” had personally asked if I could make time to participate. I could hardly refuse such a request, and I was intensely curious about the emerging Russian leadership, especially about Putin.

Arriving at the first meeting, I saw several people gathered around Kissinger and a man I was told was Putin. An official identified himself to me and said he had been asked by Primakov to introduce me to Putin. He interrupted the conversation with Kissinger to announce my arrival; Putin warmly responded that he was looking forward to chatting with me about how I see the world from inside Washington.

We spoke on several occasions between meetings, and he arranged to sit next to me at a dinner, accompanied by his interpreter. At that dinner, he asked me: “What is the single most important obstacle between your Western businessmen and my fellow Russians in starting up business connections?”

Off the top of my head, I responded: “The absence of legally defined property rights — without those there is no basis for resolving disputes.”

“Ah yes,” he said, “in your system a dispute between businesses is resolved by attorneys paid by the hour representing each side, sometimes taking the dispute to the courts which normally takes months and accumulation of hourly attorney fees.”

“In Russia,” he continued, “disputes are usually resolved by common sense. If a dispute is about very significant money or property, then the two sides would typically send representatives to a dinner. Everyone attending arriving would be armed. Facing the possibility of a bloody, fatal outcome both sides always find a mutually agreeable solution. Fear provides the catalyst for common sense.”

He used his argument in the context of disputes between sovereign nations. Solutions often require an element of fear of disproportionate responses if no deal is struck. The idea of forcing adversaries to face horrific alternatives seemed to excite him. In essence, he was describing to me the current Ukraine impasse between the US and Russia.

Putin knows Russia cannot afford a prolonged ground war with Ukraine. He also can see Biden is facing crucial midterm elections with a domestic congressional impasse, and cannot afford a major foreign crisis distraction. The two sides have no choice but to strike a deal.

On a different occasion, Putin asked me how decisions are really made in Washington, with its complex division of Presidential and Congressional powers. He said Kissinger could explain the broad parameters of a Presidential policy decision, but could not clarify how political consensus was achieved between the House, Senate, and the Executive Branch.

It was evident he had been given a deep intelligence brief on my career. He said Kissinger enjoys the public theatre of powerful people meeting in elaborate dinners or meetings with many aides ready to guide them. And he told me he had been informed that I preferred backroom meetings to shape consensus and provide room for negotiating details.

I tried to explain the elaborate process of balancing the interests of the many players in Washington, including Congress, the major agencies, and the intricate business arrangements that might be affected by any decision.

I told him of my first personal meeting with Nixon, who had said he was impressed that I had strong personal support from leaders of both major parties. However, he added, this raised worries among his staff in the White House — so he really needed to know whether I was a Republican or a Democrat. To which I replied: “Yes.”

When Nixon asked what that meant, I explained that I was not a partisan warrior, but rather a problem solver. To get a solution I would always be ready to work with key players of both parties depending upon the specific problem. This seemed to amuse Putin.

The impression of Putin that I was left with was of a man who was more intelligent than most of the politicians I had met in Washington and in other capitals around the world. I was reminded of my childhood: I grew up in a predominantly Sicilian neighbourhood, with a mafia maintaining order. No disorganised crime allowed.

Putin did seem to have the instincts of a Sicilian mafia boss: quick to reward but quick to pose mortal risk in the event of non-conformity to the family rules.

Looking back to those times of growing disarray in Russia’s leadership, I can recall the prolonged, multi-year paralysis of the Brezhnev Presidency, which was followed by the brief Presidencies of Andropov and Chernenko.

Gorbachev was not strong enough to impose his will. Yeltsin had good ideas but was easily distracted and lacked follow through. Russia was in urgent need of a strong leader — and so Putin stepped in.

As for how Putin sees himself, he did bring up several times his admiration for Peter the Great, so much so I was convinced he sees himself as his incarnation.

I have not been a guest of the Kremlin since 1988, but I am told Putin had portraits of Peter the Great hung in several important meeting rooms there — rather than portraits of himself, as would be more customary.

What this means for Biden, Nato and Ukraine is slowly becoming clear. There is more to Putin than meets the eye.

This article was first published UnHerd.com.

It is republished with the author’s permission.