The Role of Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4

05/31/2025

By Petty Officer 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer

When you combine mission focus, teamwork, technical expertise, and creativity, the results are remarkable if not predictable. Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4 is no exception.

The 70-person team comprised of four training support vessels operating under the umbrella of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 is one of the most visible and impactful organizations on Atlantic coast. However, very few know the remarkable story or the team of veterans and civilian mariners that bring it to life.

“TSVRON 4 is a tremendous asset for our warfighters,” said Rear Adm. Max “Pepper” McCoy, commander, Carrier Strike Group 4. “These ships provide a wide range of capabilities that enable the right balance of Live-Virtual-Constructive training in a complex, integrated at-sea environment for our naval and joint forces plus partners and allies.”

TSVRON 4’s training mission includes exercise mine-laying and recovery, maritime interdiction operations training, and live-fire event support. They also team with Naval Air Systems Command’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) to deliver targets, and to expand Fleet opportunities for unmanned systems training and Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training.

“Our TSVRON team is comprised of 100 percent civilian personnel who are passionate, mission-focused and dedicated to ensuring our warfighters receive the best training opportunities available. They are our greatest asset,” said Gil Birklund, the executive director of CSG-4 who oversees TSVRON 4 operations and maintenance. “Like many organizations, balancing limited resources and maintenance for ships to meet an ever-increasing demand signal for training is difficult. However, our people are the professional difference makers who work through them to meet training objectives safely every day.”

So how did a single boat from U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Carrier Group 4, a predecessor to Strike Force Training Atlantic now CSG-4, become a multi-platform squadron that provides training opportunities to the Fleet from basic through integrated phase?

Theirs is a story of teamwork and innovation focused on achieving the mission with a steady eye on emerging Fleet training demands. From the delivery of a Mobile Sea Range Program decades before, TSVRON delivers expanded training capability and readiness to the Navy and Marine Corps team today.

Humble Beginnings & Steady Progress

“At that time they [Cmdr. Mike Hull, Fleet Forces N7 staff, and Capt. Mark Noll, CARGRU 4 N7] sat down and said, let’s put this together. So they spoke with Rear Adm. Lindell Rutherford [then-Commander, CARGRU 4] and his successor to help arrange to get the Prevail – a surplus T-AGOS 8 asset that was being made ready for disposal,” said Wayne Gittelman, TSVRON 4 Program Manager.

“They got the Prevail and took it to Colonnas Shipyard under a SUP SHIP [Supervisor of Shipbuilding] contract and decided to build it out with all kinds of electronic components on it to make the range work.”

To make early strides in what became the Mobile Sea Range Program, CARGRU 4 intervened to divert then-CWO3 Gittelman from his orders to CARGRU 8 to bring him onto their team. Since retiring from service in uniform, Gittelman continue to serve as the Mobile Sea Range Program Manager.

After arriving at CARGRU 4, CWO3 Gittelman and team quickly learned that having a boat in the shipyard was vastly different than having personnel with the experience and expertise to fully realize the concept.

In 2005, Fleet Forces Command formally directed Strike Force Training Atlantic (SFTL), the successor to Carrier Group 4, to establish the Mobile Sea Range Program. To do this they brought together all of the training support vessels (TSV) then-operated by Norfolk Naval Shipyard and NAVAIR under one unique team. Beginning with Prevail (TSV 1), the program grew in capacity to four ships – Prevail, Hugo (TSV 2), Hunter (TSV 3), and Narragansett (TSV 4).

TSVs are formidable multi-role, multi-mission platforms. Based on each TSV’s original specifications, they developed unique capabilities used to meet training requirements. Their versatility is what makes them uniquely suited to support training throughout the East Coast’s Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP), from basic phase training through high-end warfighting.

For example, TSVs provide effective support for basic phase training events, Helicopter Sea Combat (HSC) live-fire events, HSC Weapons School training, exercises in support of II Marine Expeditionary Force’s Expeditionary Operations Training Group (EOTG), as well as high-end fight training exercises such as Amphibious Ready Group / Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercises (ARGMEUEX), Group Sails, and Carrier Strike Group Composite Training Unit Exercises (COMPTUEX), the Joint Force’s most complex training event.

“While we are fundamentally part of CSG-4 and support integrated phase training events, the reality is that nearly fifty percent of the work our team does is outside of CSG-4 exercises,” said Gittelman. “The FFAECC [Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center] prioritizes our schedule, and that’s a good thing. We have a significant demand signal for training support that exceeds capacity, and having Fleet prioritization is important.”

In 2015, the Mobile Sea Range Program was renamed to its name today – Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4.

A Winning Team – TSVRON 4 and ATMO

A key element of TSVRON 4’s success and ability to adapt to emerging requirements is its enduring relationship with NAVAIR’s ATMO team. Both bring unique capabilities on the foundation of a mission-focused culture. An outside observer would not be able to point out ATMO or TSV mariners supporting a common mission.

“While it rarely happens within our day-to-day operations, I often have to remind people who aren’t familiar with the history of our work with ATMO that we aren’t in each other’s chain of command,” said Gittelman. “Our relationship is just that – an important, mutually beneficial partnership that supports Fleet training and force generation.”

ATMO supports Fleet training with TSVRON 4 in many ways.

For example, they support each of CSG-4’s Force Protection exercises on the East Coast. In these events, ATMO small boat operations deliver multiple presentations to shipboard teams that drive the ship’s force protection team to practice their pre-planned responses and activate defense countermeasures.

During many of CSG-4’s COMPTUEXs, ATMO provides service from the TSVs, as well as on land-based detachments. Just a few of the events ATMO directly supports in COMPTUEX include strait transits, counter-piracy training, live fire gunnery exercises, and unmanned surface vessel operations.

ATMO also supports multiple helicopter squadron training events from the TSV within exercises including crew-served weapons training, as well as the use of guided and unguided missiles at stationery targets or unmanned high-speed maneuvering surface targets (HSMST) towing a target.

A Steady Eye Toward the Future

In 2024, Vindicator (TSV 5) became the latest addition to the TSVRON 4 team, replacing Hugo (TSV 2).

The addition of Vindicator brought with it enhanced capabilities such as endurance, a larger mission deck to hold more HSMSTs, capability to support Helicopter Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (HVBSS) operations, dynamic positioning capability, portable accommodations for larger detachments, and increased on-station time.

“Our job here at TSVRON 4 isn’t to dictate what the customer wants,” said Gittelman. “Since day one, our job was to take leadership demand signal for Fleet training requirements – the what – and to figure out the how. The amazing part about our team is the number of people we have that can figure just about anything out if they have the time and resources – it’s core to the culture that we’ve built here over time.”

It didn’t take long to take advantage of Vindicator’s new capabilities. She completed support to her first HVBSS training mission during the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) (Special Operations Capable) ARGMEU Exercise on May 18, 2025.

“I think the future of the TSVs is with larger vessels like the Vindicator which provide greater capability and capacity,” said Michael Schoeller, master of Vindicator and former master of Narragansett (TSV 4), whose desire to drive ships steered him toward TSVRON 4 in 2018.

Schoeller has a background in oceanography and marine research as a master of vessels from the Harbor Branch Oceanographic Institution and Bermuda Institute of Ocean Sciences, and before that, he wore a Navy uniform as a Quartermaster, Boatswain’s Mate, and a Signalman.

TSVRON 4 will continue to deliver increased readiness and warfighting capability to the fleet, while rapidly innovating to meet numbered fleet commander requirements. And while TSVRON’s decades of service to the Fleet are often seen and heard if not recognized, many on the team are happy to keep it that way.

“For me it’s all about the people we have within our team. We don’t have PRDs (rotation dates), and our team has a tendency to make a career out of being here. We lose more people from getting older and not being able to get out to sea for stretches of time as much as we do anything else. We’re the unknown asset that everybody knows – and that’s not a bad thing,” said Gittelman.

This article was first published on DVIDS on May 29, 2025.

Featured image: Photo By Sgt. Tanner Bernat | U.S. Marines with Maritime Special Purpose Force, 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit, board a vessel in rigid-hull inflatable boats while conducting maritime interception operations aboard U.S. Navy training support vessel USNS Vindicator (TSV5) in support of Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group Marine Expeditionary Unit Exercise (ARGMEUEX) while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, May 18, 2025.

During ARGMEUEX, the 22nd MEU, aboard IWO ARG shipping, conducts various mission essential tasks that enhance operational readiness and lethality as a unified IWOARG/22 MEU team. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Tanner Bernat)

The images below in the slide show:

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va. (Feb. 24, 2025) – Master of Training Support Vessel (TSV) 5 Vindicator Mike Schoeller, right with hand raised, discusses the ship’s capabilities and TSV operations with Vice Adm. John Gumbleton, commander, Task Force 80 and deputy commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, fourth from left, during a fleet visit to Vindicator (TSV 5), assigned to Training Support Vessel Squadron (TSVRON) 4, at Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Va., Feb. 24, 2025.

TSVRON 4 is an element of Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 4 that delivers training opportunities and supports CSG, amphibious ready group, and independent deployer preparation for global combat against peer competitors.

The squadron delivers support to all CSG-4 integrated, at-sea training events and scheduled training in basic and advanced phase training through the Fleet Forces Atlantic Exercise Coordination Center. TSVRON 4 works closely with NAVAIR’s Atlantic Targets and Marine Operations (ATMO) for aerial and seaborne target engagements.

TSVRON 4 functions as a Mobile Sea Range and integrates the Navy’s Continuous Training Environment and enables Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training while also delivering opportunities for other training such as live fire exercises, unmanned system launches and recoveries, mine laying operations, maritime interdiction operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) training.

(U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Chelsea Palmer / released)

 

I Marine Expeditionary Force

05/30/2025

U.S. Marines with I Marine Expeditionary Force have conducted a multitude of exercises and operations across the Indo-Pacific throughout 2024. I MEF provides the Marine Corps a globally responsive, expeditionary, and fully scalable Marine Air-Ground Task Force, capable of generating, deploying, and employing ready forces and formations across the Pacific.

CAMP HM SMITH, HAWAI

01.08.2025

Video by Lance Cpl. Blake Gonter 

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific  

Rethinking Australian Defence: The Perspective of Ross Babbage

05/27/2025

Stephen Kuper of Defence Connect  in an interview with Dr. Ross Babbage held before the recent Federal elections discussed the changing global order.

The pair discussed a range of subjects following Babbage’s recent trip to the United States, including:

  • Australia’s need to prepare for a more direct involvement in kinetic regional conflict in the Indo-Pacific – including recognising that we are no longer on the periphery of geopolitical competition.
  • The multidimensional depth and facets of the challenges being posed by the People’s Republic of China: Babbage emphasises that China’s strategy includes economic coercion, hybrid conflict and soft power, and that Western assumptions about China’s integration leading to liberalisation have proven wrong.
  • How Western governments have failed to effectively communicate the strategic risks to their populations: Babbage argues that public awareness is essential for national resilience and policy support, and that many in the public are willing to act once properly informed.
  • Australia’s urgent need to expand and rethink its defence and industrial capabilities to meet the growing expectations of the new US Trump administration.

You can listen to this interview below:

The Osprey Down Under: The MV-22 Operating in Australia

By Robbin Laird

In this article, we are highlighting photos of the MV-22 recently operating in Australia in the Northern Territory. The aircraft comes along wtih the Marines in their regular rotation to work with the ADF each year.

The first photos show the Osprey participating in Pitch Black 24.

Exercise Pitch Black 24 is the Royal Australian Air Force’s biennial capstone international engagement exercise, with forces drawn from a wide range of regional, coalition, and allied nations. Held from 12 July to 2 August 2024, the exercise concentrated on military airspace in the Northern Territory, with participants flying from RAAF Bases Darwin, Tindal, Amberley, Curtin, and regional airfields in the Kimberley region.

Exercise Pitch Black 24 is the largest iteration of the exercise since first held in 1981, with 20 participating nations and over 140 aircraft involved, and approximately 4400 personnel from Australia and overseas participating. Activities such as Exercise Pitch Black help Australia to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific region, build connections around the globe, bolster regional security, and build regional resilience to transnational threats.

The second group of photos highlight the United States Marine Corps V-22 Osprey arriving at RAAF Base Townsville, in preparation for Exercise Southern Jackaroo 2025. Exercise Southern Jackaroo is held within Exercise North Queensland Warfighter and includes Australian Army personnel from 3rd Brigade, the Japanese Ground Self Defence Force and the United States Marine Corps to strengthen interoperability.

The Osprey is part of what I have called the Tiltrotor enterprise as it is evolving with the new addition of the U.S. Army variant of the aircraft underway.

And perhaps, the Australian Army will be operating the new variant itself one day in performing its littoral operations.

This is how the Australian journalist, Gregor Ferguson, described the possibility in a March 25, 2025 article:

While it may not be available to export customers for five or 10 years, says Greg Elliott, Bell Textron Australia’s Canberra-based manager for military sales and strategy, it’s not too early to talk about the things that set the FLRAA apart from traditional troop-lift helicopters such as the Black Hawk.

“It’ll go twice the distance at nearly twice the speed carrying the same payload,” he says. The FLRAA’s combat range is up to 800 nautical miles, and it cruises at 280 knots compared with the Black Hawk’s 320nm and 150kts. 

Its ferry range of more than 2100nm is sufficient to cross Australia in a single flight or it could self-deploy to most destinations in our region from somewhere like Darwin or Townsville. Being able to conduct casualty evacuations or raids on enemy forces faster and much further away than an ordinary helicopter can do is potentially game-changing, says Elliott.

The new, 14-passenger aircraft – which doesn’t even have an official Pentagon name yet – will enter Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in 2028 and is due to enter service in about 2030, says Elliott. 

“We’re expecting (US Foreign Military Sales) pathways for international partners by the early 2030s,” he adds.

US Army leaders have been providing their views on the right mix of Black Hawks and FLRAAs and the benefits the latter might provide. Major General Brett Sylvia, commander of the iconic 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), was interviewed last year by online publication The Aviationist and commented: “We can’t perform large-scale, long-range air assaults at the speed and distance modern missions demand.”

In an exercise last year, he said, the division moved about 3000 combat troops nearly 1000km from Kentucky to Louisiana using conventional helicopters. The exercise took three nights, two mission support bases, no less than six forward refuelling points and 1000 logisticians and security personnel. General Sylvia said that using the FLRAA you could move those troops in a single night with just half the support infrastructure.

The Marines’ Hub-Spoke Strategy: The Importance of U.S.-Australian Military Cooperation

Australia’s Littoral Defense Strategy and Regional Security

And this year, I am publishing a two volume study of the tiltrotor enterprise based on many interviews and experiences with the aircraft since 2007.

As seen on Amazon Australia:

 

A Blueprint for Action for the USAF: How to Enhance Combat Readiness to Meet the Strategic Challenges Facing the U.S. and Its Allies

05/26/2025

By Robbin Laird

The United States Air Force stands at a critical crossroads. After decades of counterinsurgency operations and peacetime bureaucracy, America’s air arm faces an uncomfortable reality: it may not be adequately prepared for the high-intensity conflicts that could define the next decade. This sobering assessment comes from one of the service’s most experienced leaders, retired General T. Michael “Buzz” Moseley, the 18th Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force

We asked General Moseley after his comprehensive presentation on airpower at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar on May 22, 2025, to provide a follow up on that presentation to highlight his recommendations for shaping a way ahead for recrafting effective airpower.

General Moseley provided a thoughtful response to this request. His central thesis is both urgent and actionable: the Air Force must fundamentally restructure itself from a peacetime organization optimized for stability operations to a combat-focused force capable of deterring—or if necessary, defeating—peer adversaries in an increasingly dangerous world.

The strategic environment facing the Air Force today bears little resemblance to the relatively stable post-Cold War period that shaped much of its current structure. Moseley identifies several converging challenges that demand immediate attention:

  • Operational Overstretch: Current operational tempo continues to strain an already aging force structure. Aircraft and personnel are deployed at unsustainable rates while facing increasingly sophisticated threats worldwide.
  • Technological Adaptation: Adversaries are rapidly adopting innovative technologies, creating new vulnerabilities in existing U.S. command and control systems. The comfortable technological superiority America once enjoyed is eroding.
  • Resource Constraints: Despite growing threats, defense spending remains at approximately 3% of GDP—a level Moseley argues is fundamentally inadequate for current security challenges.
  • Cultural Drift: Perhaps most concerning, the Air Force has experienced what Moseley describes as a “minimalization” of warfighting culture through years of non-combat focused policies and peacetime governance structures.

Rather than proposing abstract strategic concepts, Moseley offers eleven concrete reforms that could be implemented within a single leadership tenure. These fall into several key categories:

Organizational Restructuring

The Air Force must align its peacetime organizational structure with wartime deployment requirements. This means building around the squadron—the essential unit of deployed air power—rather than the complex bureaucratic structures that have evolved over decades of peacetime operations.

“The essential building block of deployed air/space forces is the squadron and multiples of squadrons,” Moseley writes. “The peacetime template must match the wartime deployed template.”

Cultural Transformation

Equally important is restoring what Moseley calls the Air Force’s “warfighting ethos.” This requires comprehensive changes to personnel policies, training programs, promotion criteria, and educational curricula. The goal is to advance the “best qualified” personnel for combat effectiveness rather than bureaucratic management.

Training Revolution

Current training approaches are insufficient for the threats the Air Force may face. Moseley advocates for increased actual flying time and hands-on field training, noting that while simulations and procedural trainers are useful for skill development, they cannot replace real-world exposure to complex combat environments.

Resource Reallocation

The former Chief of Staff calls for increasing defense spending to a minimum of 5-5.5% of GDP, arguing that current funding levels cannot adequately address personnel needs, infrastructure requirements, operations and maintenance, research and development, and modernization demands simultaneously.

Acquisition Reform

One of Moseley’s most specific recommendations involves centralizing acquisition, contracting, and sustainment activities at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, leveraging existing capabilities to create a more efficient and responsive procurement system. He also calls for updating the Goldwater-Nichols Act to streamline acquisition timelines and authorities.

Beyond organizational changes, Moseley identifies specific equipment and capability priorities that demand immediate attention:

  • Fighter Aircraft: Mid-life upgrades for F-22 Raptors, comprehensive avionics and engine improvements for F-35As, and acceleration of the F-47 program to ensure adequate numbers on required timelines.
  • Support Systems: Resolution of ongoing problems with the KC-46 tanker and T-7 trainer programs, either through fixes or new procurement initiatives.
  • Strategic Systems: Accelerated fielding of the B-21 bomber and investigation of the Navy’s Next Generation Air Dominance program for potential Air Force applications.
  • Legacy Systems: A systematic review of older aircraft for potential retirement, particularly non-survivable fourth-generation platforms that may become liabilities in high-threat environments.

General Moseley highlighted concerns with regard to vulnerabilities in global communications systems. He advocates for utilizing the full electromagnetic spectrum to provide forces with “parallel, reliable, resilient, survivable” communication paths. Notably, he identifies upgrades to HF communications as the most available and cost-effective solution—a recommendation that takes on added significance given recent concerns about space-based communication vulnerabilities.

The former Chief of Staff also addresses the critical issue of defense industrial capacity, calling for actions to incentivize growth in aerospace, propulsion, munitions, and sensor manufacturing. His recommendations include fuller utilization of multi-year procurement contracts and establishment of dedicated funding streams similar to the Navy’s shipbuilding accounts.

Moseley’s analysis extends beyond internal Air Force reforms to broader strategic considerations. He calls for a comprehensive review of service roles and missions, suggesting that an updated “Key West Agreement” may be necessary to address overlapping capabilities and ensure each service’s contributions align with current national security requirements.

This recommendation reflects an understanding that effective military reform cannot occur in isolation—it must be coordinated across the joint force and aligned with broader national security objectives.

Perhaps most importantly, Moseley argues that these reforms are achievable within the tenure of a single Air Force leadership team. This emphasis on practical implementation timelines reflects his experience with the bureaucratic challenges that often derail military reform efforts.

The general’s approach recognizes that perfect solutions implemented too late are less valuable than good solutions implemented immediately. His “doable do’s” philosophy prioritizes actionable steps that can create momentum for broader transformation.

General Moseley’s analysis arrives at a critical moment for U.S. air power. The comfortable assumption that American technological and operational superiority will persist indefinitely is increasingly questionable. Meanwhile, potential adversaries continue developing capabilities specifically designed to challenge U.S. strengths.

The reforms Moseley proposes represent a return to first principles of military effectiveness combined with practical adaptations to contemporary realities. The question is not whether these changes are necessary, but whether current leadership has the will to implement them before external events force more drastic adaptations.

As Moseley concludes, tomorrow’s challenges center on “preparing for potential combat on a theater and global scale against highly lethal opponents in an age of strategic uncertainty and increasing lethality.” The time for incremental adjustments may be passing. What remains is the opportunity—and responsibility—to act on lessons that experience has already taught.

The Air Force that emerges from such reforms would be leaner, more focused, and better equipped to fulfill its primary mission: controlling the air and space domains that underpin America’s broader defense strategy. Whether that transformation occurs proactively or reactively may determine not just the future of American air power, but the broader trajectory of U.S. national security in an increasingly contested world.

ACE Exercise at Ebbing Air National Guard Base

Countering Asymmetric Attrition Strategies: Optimizing the Combat Approach of the Ready Force

05/24/2025

By Murielle Delaporte

For thousands of years, military commanders have considered mass — having more troops and equipment than the enemy — a critical factor in winning battles.

The last fifty years have seen a shift from mass to precision, a trend that has accelerated since the end of the Cold War.

The period of peace dividends and the era of expeditionary operations that prevailed for thirty years were based on the concept of technological superiority.

Today, we are witnessing the collapse of this binary distinction between mass and precision, with emerging technologies now making it possible to deploy numerous and precise systems simultaneously, particularly in the field of drones, as current conflicts continue to demonstrate.

Both in Ukraine and in the Middle East, we are seeing this trend, which could in many ways be described as an asymmetric attrition strategy. At the start of the war in Ukraine, Ukrainian forces used a few Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones. Two years later, they are deploying a multitude of autonomous systems.

Another illustrative theater is the Red Sea, where the Houthis have targeted numerous commercial and military vessels, severely disrupting international maritime traffic. According to the French expertise center MICA Center for Maritime Information Cooperation & Awareness, in 2024 alone, the Houthis used approximately 700 munitions for their attacks, including 40% ballistic missiles, 2% cruise missiles, 56% aerial drones, and 2% surface drones.

This transformation fundamentally changes the cost-effectiveness of military operations, as relatively inexpensive missile or drone strikes can force the mobilization of much larger defense expenditures, thereby creating an unsustainable financial imbalance in the long term solely for defensive purposes.

From a strictly military point of view, this crisis highlights the characteristic equation of 21st-century conflicts, namely, how to balance the need for mass — or to counter mass —with the need for technological superiority: two strategies that seem to be at odds with each other in terms of defense spending.

Here I am exploring some of the hybrid strategies that Western countries are beginning to put in place to shape a new approach, first highlighting some examples of operational optimization that have already proven their worth in the past, then describing two concrete examples of adaptation: one by the French Army Aviation during Operation Barkhane in Sahel and the other, more recent, by the U.S. armed forces in response to the Houthis’ capacity for disruption.

Operational Optimization: A Few Proven Examples

There are, of course, many examples of innovative operational optimization of existing resources, both on the offensive and defensive sides, if we examine the lessons learned from a number of past conflicts.

Here are a few examples in the following areas:

The Use of Mines: Historically, relatively simple and inexpensive naval mines have often posed significant challenges to sophisticated and expensive warships. This is a classic example of low-cost asymmetric technology that has been able to counter effectively much more expensive systems.

Increased strike capability by adapting naval rockets for use against land targets: During the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy modified Harpoon anti-ship rockets to strike land targets. This inexpensive adaptation significantly expanded strike capabilities without requiring new weapons systems.

Countering Improvised Explosive Device (IED): Faced with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan, the armed forces equipped their vehicles with jamming capabilities. These jammers were designed to disrupt remote detonation signals, offering a much less expensive (and often more tactically effective) protection than the acquisition and deployment of specialized armored vehicles.

Counter-Drone Solutions: The number of examples in this field continues to grow.

  • Portable anti-drone devices such as the DroneDefender and DroneGun use RF jamming to neutralize commercial drones without destroying them. These systems cost only tens of thousands of dollars, compared to the hundreds of thousands of dollars required to purchase conventional military systems.
  • Precision rifles against drones: Snipers have been deployed as a cost-effective solution against small drones. This approach uses existing skills and equipment rather than investing in expensive anti-drone technologies.
  • Modified commercial drones: Ukraine has converted recreational drones into reconnaissance and attack platforms. These modified drones, costing a few thousand euros, have proven effective against Russian military equipment worth millions.
  • Nets and eagles against drones: Some security forces have experimented with very low-cost, low-tech methods of capturing drones, such as nets fired from hand-held launchers or training eagles to intercept small drones.
  • Directed energy anti-drone weapons: Low-power portable laser systems have been developed as a cost-effective alternative to interceptor missiles in anti-drone warfare. These systems can engage multiple targets at a much lower cost per shot than conventional missiles.

24/7 “participatory” intelligence or low-cost surveillance networks: Ukraine has developed a mobile app that allows civilians to report Russian troop and equipment movements. This participatory intelligence system runs on ordinary smartphones and provides valuable information at a much lower cost than traditional military surveillance systems required for permanent coverage.

These examples illustrate how ingenuity and adaptation can often provide effective and economical solutions to emerging threats by fine tuning the response in proportion to the value of the targets to be neutralized, where possible.

The war in Ukraine has shown that one does need mass to counter mass, a reality that has been virtually absent from Western armed forces’ thinking on the nature of warfare since the end of the Cold War.

In a world where a growing number of actors can deploy drones and missiles and access inexpensive satellites and cutting-edge commercial technologies, many countries are demonstrating ingenuity in countering threats that are “not worth the cost” of sacrificing expensive missiles or ammunition or exposing valuable military assets to disproportionate risks, by combining mass and technological sophistication in a disruptive way.

This concept could be described as “smart mass,” by analogy to the concept of “precision mass” developed by some military analysts in the United States.

The tactical adaptation of French forces in Mali is an excellent example of operational innovation and optimization to deal with asymmetric threats using economic means. Such an approach of favoring the use of conventional weapons (cannons, machine guns) over expensive missiles is consistent with the more recent example of the U.S. F-16s using APKWS II rockets against Houthi drones.

In both cases, this is an adaptive and economical response to threats that do not justify the use of expensive ammunition at the risk of rapid attrition.

Providing a response proportionate to the value of the targets to be neutralized: the example of the French Army Aviation in Sahel.

During the Barkhane Operation in Sahel in the 2010’s, helicopters proved particularly effective against targets such as pickup trucks, thanks to their ability to loiter and engage such targets with more suitable low-cost weapons such as rockets, 30 mm cannons, and 20 mm cannons.

As the ALAT opted to use onboard cannons rather than expensive missiles to neutralize armed terrorist groups, Gazelle, Puma, and Cougar helicopters, as well as Tiger helicopters, were able to support operations in the Sahel and neutralize these groups.

One of the main tactics involved the use of the Puma “Pirate” equipped with a 20 mm gun in a gun port. This configuration has regularly provided valuable support to units in contact with armed terrorist groups in Mali. This was particularly the case during fighting in 2013.

An innovative weapon configuration in anti-drone warfare in the Red Sea: the example of the US Air Force against the Houthis.

To save expensive anti-missile weapons, the U.S. Air Force adapted its F-16s with laser-guided rocket pods, a combination that has led to economically viable anti-drone warfare F-16s operating in the Middle East were able to use their LITENING targeting pods to identify and neutralize targets with laser-guided weapons traditionally used in air-to-ground operations.

This new weapon configuration features F-16s carrying two seven-shot 70mm rocket pods on a single pylon under the right wing using a triple ejection rack (TER). These rockets are equipped with the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II), which converts standard unguided 70mm rockets into precision munitions by adding laser guidance kits.

The complete configuration includes:

  • 2 seven-shot 70mm rocket pods (14 rockets in total);
  • 2 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles;
  • 2 AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles;
  • 1 LITENING targeting pod;
  • 1 HARM Targeting System (HTS) pod;
  • 2 external fuel tanks.

What makes this configuration particularly noteworthy is that it significantly increases the aircraft’s strike capability compared to traditional air-to-air configurations. While a typical air defense configuration might include only 6 missiles in total, this adapted configuration offers up to 14 engagement opportunities with laser-guided rockets alone, plus additional conventional air-to-air missiles.

The economic benefits of this approach are considerable. Each APKWS II guidance kit costs approximately $15,000 to $20,000, with complete rockets totaling approximately $25,000 including warheads and motors. In comparison, traditional air-to-air missiles cost hundreds of thousands of dollars each: an AIM-120 AMRAAM missile costs approximately $1 million and an AIM-9X Sidewinder approximately $400,000.

This cost difference makes the APKWS II solution particularly attractive for engaging lower-value targets such as unmanned aerial vehicles, allowing forces to reserve their inventory of expensive missiles for higher-threat scenarios.

The targeting methodology uses the F-16’s LITENING pod to “light up” or designate targets. The pod’s sensor can be connected to the aircraft’s radar, enabling accurate tracking and engagement of relatively slow-moving targets such as drones and cruise missiles. The targeting system can also support wingman tactics, in which one aircraft designates targets while another performs the attack run.

These adaptations represent more than just a tactical solution to an immediate threat. They demonstrate how creativity and operational flexibility can leverage existing technologies in new ways to meet emerging challenges. By reconfiguring proven systems rather than developing entirely new platforms, armed forces achieve both cost savings and rapid deployment of capabilities.

This article was first published in French and English by Eurosatory.

The article was published on May 5, 2025 and is republished by permission of the author.