The Amphibious Fleet in Maneuver Warfare: The Return to the Sea and Bold Alligator

01/24/2022

By Robbin Laird

I am crafting a series on mobile basing as a strategic capability for the joint force.

The strategic importance of mobile basing goes up with the importance of complicating your adversaries’ targeting solutions and force projection targets.

Seabasing is clearly a key part of being able to do mobile basing, but with the shift from a classic understanding of amphibious operations to enhancing the expeditionary capabilities of the joint and coalition force, what kind of seabases might be crafted in the years ahead?

In this part of the series, I will address re-imaging how to use the extant amphibious force very differently for missions like sea control and sea denial.

There is no area where better value could be leveraged than making dramatically better use of the amphibious fleet for extended battlespace operations.

This requires a re-imaging of what that fleet can deliver to sea control and sea denial as well as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) offense and defense.

In the midst of the land wars, the USMC leadership understood that they needed to prepare for the return to the sea as a primary domain for the way ahead for USMC combat operations. It is difficult to overstate how dominant the warfighting experience ashore has been for shaping this generation of Marines.

But it is also an overstatement that the return to the sea started with call of the current Commandant to enhance naval integration capabilities for the USMC itself.

That call to return to the sea was crystallized in the launching of the Bold Alligator series of exercises beginning with Bold Alligator 2011.

We attended several of the Bold Alligator series exercises and witnessed how the USMC, the U.S. Navy and a number of allies and partners joined in the relaunch in many ways of the next generation of amphibious warfare. For that relaunch was happening, as the Osprey was joining the fleet.

Bold Alligator 2012 (BA-12) was a training exercise for the expeditionary strike group, and the shaping of a new template for the amphibious task force with the coming of the Osprey and the anticipated arrival of the F-35. The template introduced in BA-12 provided a lay down within which force modernization associated with the F-35B and the VM-22 unfolded.

What was evident in that exercise, and the Bold Alligator exercises which followed, was that the amphibious fleet was shifting from using the ships to function largely as a Greyhound bus carrying Marines ashore to becoming a strike force at sea, and from the sea. At that 2012 exercise we discussed the effort being generated at the time to lay down a new template with officers involved with that exercise

Capt. Sam Howard at the time of the exercise was Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk VA. Marine Col. Phil Ridderhof, senior Marine Corps adviser to U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Va. Capt. Howard began his career in destroyer operations and most recently before his Norfolk Assignment was the skipper of the USS Bataan. During his time on Bataan, he participated in the Haiti relief efforts.

Capt. Howard emphasized that one of the opportunities generated by the exercise was to familiarize other services with the key advantages provided to the joint force by seabasing. “A seabase is a concept that regrettably is foreign to the other services, at least in real practice; and we were able to certainly demonstrate it in real practice in real-time in the case of Haiti and will be able to expand on the exercise.” Howard underscored the importance of the exercise as a combined arms approach and useful to re-shaping military doctrine. “It’s a combined arms endeavor, and so getting to that thought process of making it a combined arms thing is certainly very important to us.”

Col. Ridderhof picked up on the combined arms theme introduced and discussed by Capt. Howard. He emphasized that the exercise was built in part around operating at a different level than an Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) was capable of operating. “The ARG and the MEU are very important, very capable. When you start getting bigger than the ARG and the MEU an amphibious operation is not simply a quantitative increase. There’s a qualitative difference in how you think about organizing the task force.

“The ARG-MEU is built around three core ships and the MEU is of a regimental size, with a battalion landing team, combat logistics, battalion, and the composite squadron. The MEB being used in this exercise is a different animal. One of our challenges in the Marine Corp is how do you describe the MEB? It can be anywhere from 10,000 to 17,000 soldiers, but in general, it is a regimental landing team with at least three battalions, plus a Marine air group size of an aviation combat element and combat logistics regiment-sized support element.

“One of the key things is that to do all six functions of Marine Corp Aviation, to do command and control, is central to the operational capabilities. A MEU has little pieces, but to do the big Marine Corp Aviation Command and Control pieces is a significant jump in capability. You need all of the pieces of Marine aviation, and then all the logistics to sustain that for 30 days plus.”[1]

And the large-deck carrier is shifting its approach as part of this operational construct. Col. Ridderhof underscored: “Bold Alligator is testing today’s capability but because we haven’t done this this way, the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) has typically not been considering the littoral as a whole, going all the way to that objective ashore as his battle space. He’s influencing it surely but hasn’t been thinking of it all the way there. Just as the ARG MEU would be first on the scene, how does the Carrier Strike group fold into the scalability of the operation?”

Capt. Howard emphasized: “The reality is, all this is in the context of a joint war fighting organization. And among the lessons we will take from this is how to develop further the unique war fighting relationship between Navy and Marine Corp and how does that best plug into the total force, joint force.”

Obviously, the refocus on the strategic shift from the primacy of the land wars to engaging peer competitors was already underway in this Bold Alligator 2012 exercise. In our interview with Brig. Gen. Owens, the 2nd MEF Commander, held after that exercise, he highlighted how he saw the exercise effort. “One of the things that was different in this exercise from many previous amphibious large-scale exercises is we executed in what we called a medium threat, anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment. The threat focus is primarily on the area denial piece, which is closer in, but which is more realistic for the timeframe of the exercise.

“The threat we faced at sea started with submarines, missile patrol boats, fast-attack craft, fast inshore attack craft, and some asymmetric threats with commandeered fishing boats, low slow-flyers, and some tactical air. But of greater concern was coastal defense cruise missiles, initially fixed sites, as well as mobile, and then ultimately, just a threat of additional mobile sites.

“And then, the most ubiquitous threat that we’re going to face is mines. In the exercise, we faced a very robust mine capability. We had a wide range of capabilities on the Navy side to help deal with those threats, but we also integrated the MEB in that, particularly our air. These assets were used both in targeting threats to the amphibious task force ashore, as well as providing defense of the amphibious task force primarily with our aviation asset. But we also involved some of our ground combat elements when they were aboard the ship.

“That continued even after we went ashore. And this is something that we really haven’t practiced; this full integration, of the Marine capability in the overall ability to both to project force, and to protect those naval assets that are projecting that force.”

The exercise was focused on redesign of the current force structure to achieve the desired combat effect in order to lay down a template for the changes to come. As Brig. Gen Owens put it: “I think flexibility is a key word. In this exercise, we focused on today’s forces for today’s fight. What it really was about was getting the greatest impact, the greatest benefit out of the capabilities we have. For example, in our countermine effort, we recognize that in order to do countermine work here on the east coast of the U.S., it’s going to involve coalition participation. So, we had Canadian mine hunters out working with U.S. divers in conjunction with Dutch divers, Canadian divers supported by the Coast Guard providing a cutter to help provide force protection for the mine hunters.

“And our Navy forces provided close in protection for both the mine hunters, and then subsequently, for some of our maritime sealift command shipping that was coming into the same areas. Thus, in addition to integrating the Marine and Navy pieces, we also expanded our search to what other capabilities that other countries, other services, for instance, the coast guard, and even the interagency could provide. We didn’t really touch on the inter-agency aspect too much in Bold Alligator 12, but it is an aspiration for the future. We want to be able to tap into capabilities that will help us defeat some of these asymmetric threats, in particular, in order to project force ashore.”

Brig. Gen Owens underscored a very key point about shaping a way ahead with the force you have to shaping the future force. “From this point of view, the goal of the exercise was to shape an effective concept of operations with current capabilities. We’ve got to have the concept of operations in place as we integrate new capabilities going forward.”

The latest capability which was included at the time was the Osprey. In fact, while journalists waited on shore for the insertion force, the Osprey team had led an assault deep into the battlespace. And even more interestingly, the Ospreys launched from a range of seabases, including a Military Sealift Command ship. At the time, we highlighted how the coming of the Osprey impacted thinking about the amphibious assault force. “An assault raid was conducted from the seabase deep inland (180 miles) aboard the Ospreys with allied forces observing or participating. The Osprey was the key element operating in this exercise, which was not there during the last big “amphibious” exercise. [2]

And with the launch from an MSC ship, the Osprey was highlighting the next phase, rather than focusing on the ARG-MEU, one could think in terms of an amphibious task force.

This is how Brig. Gen Owens highlighted the importance of the event. “The T-AKE is bringing in our dry cargo. So they bring in beyond what the amphibious ships carry, they’ll bring in food, water, and they are ships that bring in our ammunition. That was what we exercised using the V22s to land on the T-AKE, and we had our logistics regiment Marines posted aboard the TAKE to work on the distribution piece.”

In fact, the “return to the sea” energized by the training efforts in the Bold Alligator exercises came at the same time that the Osprey was making its broader impact on the USMC. There is no more dramatic case of a platform introducing disruptive change in a service than the Osprey to the USMC.

The USMC is the only tiltrotor-enabled combat force in the world, and it has introduced significant change throughout the redesign of the USMC and is continuing to do so as the USMC works its evolving approach to integration with the U.S. Navy in blue water expeditionary operations.

After an initial learning curve of how to integrate the Osprey with the Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Force, the speed and range of the Osprey changed the ARG-MEU and reshaped how the amphibious ships would deploy in support of combatant commanders.[3]

In Bold Alligator 2013, the working relationships between the U.S. Navy and the USMC were strengthened as the U.S. Navy began to focus more on how to support sea-based power projection with USMC force mix.

As Col. Bradley Weisz, Deputy Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group TWO, commented at the time about Bold Alligator 2013: “We are getting away from the legacy stove-pipe systems and moving to better collaboration, more integration with our entire fleet force. This is absolutely essential in today’s complex and constantly evolving operating environment; especially when you start talking about the increased anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) threats that we will face and encounter in the littoral regions. Yes, we are developing and shaping some innovative approaches to deal with these emerging threats.

“As far as leveraging our sea basing capabilities in direct support of our amphibious forces, we will aggressively employ and utilize nine military sealift command ships, MSC ships, as part of our logistics task force. We will have three fleet oilers (T-AOs) that can hold and carry a sizable amount of class I (subsistence) and class III (POL). We will also have two highly capable dry cargo/ammunition ships (T-AKEs) that can haul and deliver substantial amounts of class III (POL) and class V (ground/aviation ammunition) products.

“Along with the T-AOs and T-AKEs, we will have one fast combat support ship (T-AOE) that can provide significant class I (subsistence), class III (POL) and class V (ground/aviation ammunition) capabilities in support of our CSG and ATF forces. Additionally, we will employ and utilize one Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB) that will provide crucial aviation intermediate maintenance support and repair services to all of our landing force aircraft afloat. This includes all fixed wing, rotary wing, and tilt rotor aircraft afloat.”

Bold Alligator 2014 was a crisis response exercise and continued the work of Bold Alligator 2012 and Bold Alligator 2013. The exercise involved working with an evolving C2 capability to manage forces operating throughout key objective areas. The presence of the Osprey allowed the U.S. and its allies to operate against longer range objective areas as well as other objective areas reachable by rotorcraft and reinforced by landing forces.

The seabases involved in the exercises were characterized by logistical integrity meaning the insertion forces can be supported by the seabase, and it is not necessary to build forward operating bases or to land significant supplies ashore in order to prosecute missions. It is a force tailored to crisis management, as opposed to having to rely on bringing significant forces ashore along with their gear in order to mount operations.

A key part of the Bold Alligator 2014 exercise was a major effort to rework command and control for force insertion from the seabase able to work with the maneuver forces ashore.

Follow up interviews in 2015 with Maj. Gen. Richard L. Simcock II, Commanding General, 2d MEB, and Maj. Marcus Mainz, lead 2d MEB planner for Exercise Bold Alligator 2014 highlighted the evolving approach. They underscored those innovations in aviation allowed the Marines to extend their reach and provide greater flexibility for amphibious operations. The reworking of the amphibious fleet to deliver capabilities to project power from the sea and the ability of the infantry to implement innovations in maneuver warfare and force insertion require creativity in operational design and C2.

2d MEB exercises C2 of scalable and modular forces by delegating it to a level where tactical operations are more effective. This construct facilitates mastery of the operational environment in a fluid combat situation by keeping focus at the appropriate levels. It gives the MEB CE (command element) the capability to focus on the operational art that bridges the strategic and tactical levels for political objectives.

Execution of the mission, empowerment of subordinate leaders at the appropriate level, and maintaining situational awareness of the overall situation is a key challenge for C2. The complexity begins with incorporation of joint and coalition forces for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), operations.

Given that joint and coalition capabilities enhance response time and effectiveness of global operations, C2 takes on a whole new meaning when shaping the appropriate composite force for missions across the ROMO (Range of Military Operations), which makes it central to effective Marine Corps Operations.

Maj. Gen. Simcock explained in his interview that the importance of “providing the Combatant Commander with a force capable of plugging into various joint, coalition, and interagency requirements is essential. The realities of the 21st century security environment demand a smart power approach inclusive of all services of the military, our partners and interagency organizations, which play an integral role in fulfilling National Security Strategy.”

Integration of allied and partner nation operational capabilities and systems with the U.S. amphibious fleet will develop, in effect, a global U.S.-Allied amphibious fleet capability. Maj. Gen Simcock also discussed emerging demand for partnership with 2d MEB in global security “since the Marine Corps has revitalized the MEB concept capable of world-wide deployment, we have been contacted by many of our coalition partners, allies and other nations interested in training and operating with 2d MEB.”

The way Maj. Mainz explained it: “Composite forces are created when you take disparate forces, which are underneath different command and control structures, and place them underneath one commander tasked with a specific mission. The 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade is ‘a receiver of forces.’ We work various compositing options and shape the C2 for those forces coming together to perform the mission.”

Maj. Mainz likened the 2d MEB Command Element (CE) to a Swiss army knife.

“We want to be the Swiss Army knife of command and control. We want to morph or adapt into whatever environment we’re in—coalition or joint. 2d MEB sees itself as a scalable CE capable of C2 for disparate forces, coalition and/or joint, to address the unique requirements of Combatant Commanders in uncertain environment.

“The unique term we used during Bold Alligator is we can become a Commander of MAGTFs, not a MAGTF Commander. What that means is we see our Command Element as so flexible we don’t have to go into a normal Marine construct.”

I will stop with Bold Alligator 2014, but the key point is that prior to significant withdrawals from the Middle East engagement, USMC leaders focused on the return to the sea and reworking with the Navy, how to deliver an integrated force from the seabase to project force ashore and to support it afloat.

[1] The six functions of Marine Corps Aviation are offensive air support, anti-air warfare, assault support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles.

[2] Robbin Laird, “Bold Alligator: A Glimpse of Marine, Navy Future,” Breaking Defense (March 21, 2012), https://breakingdefense.com/2012/03/bold-alligator-a-glimpse-of-marine-navy-future/

[3] Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, The Osprey and Disruptive Change: The Operational Impact of the Osprey on the USMC, draft manuscript in progress.

Featured Photo: A CH-53E Super Stallion takes off from Fort Pickett, Va., to return to the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), during an amphibious assault exercise as part of Bold Alligator 2012.

Exercise Bold Alligator 2012, the largest naval amphibious exercise in the past 10 years, represents the Navy and Marine Corps’ revitalization of the full range of amphibious operations. The exercise focuses on today’s fight with today’s forces, while showcasing the advantages of seabasing.

FORT PICKETT, VA.

02.07.2012

Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Christopher Lenart 

Expeditionary Combat Camera

Brigadier General Owens on Lessons Learned in Bold Alligator 2012 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

P8 at Sea

A P8-A Poseidon flies past the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ross (DDG 71) during a combat drill in the Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 27, 2021.

Ross, forward-deployed to Rota, Spain, is on its 12th patrol in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations.

12.27.2021
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Claire DuBois
Navy Public Affairs Support Element East Detachment Europe

Allied Resolve 2022 Exercise: Russia Brings Troops from Far East to Belarus

01/23/2022

A major Russian military exercise with Belarus is part of the evolving Russian narrative to pressure Europe and the United States.

And this Russian broadcast on 18 January 2022 highlighted an interview with a Russian military expert that explained that it was about defending its interests against the “aggressive West.”

“Any Belarusian-Russian military exercise is always under the scrutiny of the West, but today it acquires special military and political significance.  When NATO is building up its contingent in Ukraine, the Baltic States and Poland, when there is an unprecedented external pressure on Russia and Belarus, the joint exercises “Allied Resolve-2022″ will show everyone that we are together. This was pointed out by the military expert, political analyst Ivan Konovalov.”

In an interesting article published by Defence24 on January 20, 2022, the Allied Resolve 2022 exercise is analyzed.

Excerpts from that article follow but the complete article can be found here:

The exercise is to be organized in two stages. The first stage, already underway and scheduled to last until 9th February 2022, envisages that elements and assets of units involved would be deployed to the “threatened” regions.

Security and defence schemes for important state and military infrastructure would be organized.

Air defence activities, within the scope of joint regional Belorussian and Russian air defence systems, would be intensified. A readiness and capability test for the assets involved is also scheduled to happen. Belorussian-Russian combat training air defence center would participate in the above.

The main portion of the exercise is scheduled to happen between 10th and 20th February.

During the exercise, the border protection would be reinforced, to prevent illegal infiltration by armed groups, and to seal off the arms, ammunition, and other assets delivery channels that could be used to destabilize the internal situation.

Another scenario of the exercise would involve search and destroy activities targeting illegally armed groups and enemy recon/SOF units. All of those activities would be taking place in parallel to standard training.

Undoubtedly, the involvement of Russian military units from the Eastern Military District is the most interesting piece of news here. This is the most distant (geographically) military district located in Asia. Deployment of those units to Belarus would be another test for the Russian supply chain and logistics….

The unannounced exercise fits well in the Russian propaganda narrative.

Yet again, the operation is to demonstrate the alliance of some of the former members of the Soviet Union, along with the rapid deployment capability for designated units. The Russian Armed Forces, dispersed within the vast territory, are continuously getting ready to gather in the designated theater.

This year’s deployment of units from the Eastern Military District to Belarus would be a show of force of the Russian logistics.

It is also to show that units from all military districts can be deployed to Belarus, close to the Polish border.

The opportunity to seal off the Belorussian-Ukrainian border thanks to the Allied Resolve 2022 exercise may be worrying – should Russia decide to take adverse actions against Ukraine.

The featured graphic: Photo 53972702 / Belarus © Ebastard129 | Dreamstime.com

Allied Spirit Exercise Begins: January 2022

HOHENFELS, Germany – Exercise Allied Spirit 22 kicked off in earnest Jan. 21 as soldiers transitioned into the force-on-force phase at the 7th Army Training Command’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany.

Approximately 5,200 soldiers from 15 nations including Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are participating in the exercising from Jan. 21 to Feb. 5.

Joint Multinational Readiness Center hosts Allied Spirit, a training exercise designed to enable integration between allies and partners in a competitive combat training environment. Unlike the Saber Junction and Combined Resolve series at JMRC, which feature U.S. brigade combat teams in a lead role augmented by allies and partners, Allied Spirit places an allied unit as the main training audience.

Allied Spirit 22 is led by the German Army’s 1st Armoured Division, whose staff is providing command and control over a multinational brigade and other constructive elements. Based in Oldenburg, the division is part of NATO’s 1st German Netherlands Corps.

“Allied Spirit 22 is a very important exercise for 1st Armoured Division,” said Brig. Gen. Heico Huebner, the division’s commander. “It provides excellent training opportunities in an outstanding training environment for parts of the German 41st Mechanised Infantry Brigade as well as the command post of the Dutch 43rd Mech. Inf. Bde., both formations being part of 1st Armoured Div.”

JMRC is the Army’s only Combat Training Center outside the United States, providing a mobile training capability to Europe that trains leaders, staffs and units up to Brigade Combat Teams alongside allies and partners, to dominate in the conduct of Unified Land Operations anywhere in the world.

“Each rotation incorporates the most up-to-date techniques, tactics, and procedures to ensure the units have the best training environment available,” said U.S. Army Maj. David Allen, operations chief for JMRC.

JMRC is a component of 7th Army Training Command, the U.S. Army’s only overseas training command, setting the training environment and resourcing live, virtual and constructive training for all U.S. Army forces stationed and deployed in Europe and Africa, as well as select U.S. European Command allied and partner units.

“Allied Spirit provides U.S. units with the opportunity to train with allies and partners in a simulated combat environment,” said Allen. “This strengthens the alliance and facilitates the exchange of ideas, techniques, and procedures between militaries.”

As Allied Spirit has progressed since its inception, division headquarters from U.S. and Allied units have been integrated into the exercise to increase opportunities to execute division planning and maneuver.

“For the command post of 1st Armoured Division, it is a unique opportunity to act in a multinational environment by commanding an Italian and our own 43rd Dutch Mechanised Bde., which will enhance significantly our capabilities towards the Full Operational Capability as a Warfighting Headquarter in a high-intensity warfighting scenario,” said Huebner.

Approximately 1100 U.S. Soldiers will participate in Allied Spirit 22, including elements from the deployed Operation Atlantic Resolve armored brigade combat team and combat aviation brigade: 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas; and the 2nd Squadron, 227th General Support Aviation Bn., 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cav. Div., stationed at Fort Hood, TX. Elements from the Ansbach, Germany-based 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment will also participate.

“Allied Spirit gives us the chance to interact and work with important allies and partners,” said U.S. Army Col. Reggie Harper, commander of the 1st Air Cav. Bde. “This is an excellent training opportunity for Air Cav to improve as a unit and as a member of the combined arms team.

Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas; and the 2nd Squadron, 227th General Support Aviation Bn., 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cav. Div., stationed at Fort Hood, TX. Elements from the Ansbach, Germany-based 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment will also participate.

“Allied Spirit gives us the chance to interact and work with important allies and partners,” said U.S. Army Col. Reggie Harper, commander of the 1st Air Cav. Bde. “This is an excellent training opportunity for Air Cav to improve as a unit and as a member of the combined arms team.

HOHENFELS, GERMANY

01.21.2022

Story by Sgt. Cory Reese 

7th Army Training Command

Featured Photo: Alpha Troop AH-64E Apache helicopters, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, on an airfield for training exercise Allied Spirit, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

(U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Cesar Rivas, 164th Air Defense Artillery Brigade)

The Nordics, the UK and the Ukrainian Crisis

In our co-authored book on the return of direct defense in Europe, we highlighted the importance of enhanced Nordic defense cooperation and NORDEFCO as a coordinating forum, and the high probability that the UK post-Brexit would deepened its relationship with the Nordics as they, in turn, deepened their defense cooperation.

The Nordic cooperation piece was highlighted in the 21 January 2022 declaration Nordic declaration on the Ukrainian situation:

The Nordic Ministers of Defence met virtually on 21 January to discuss the deteriorating situation in and around Ukraine. The ministers monitor the security situation in Ukraine closely, and continue to consult with each other through the NORDEFCO Crisis Consultation Mechanism.

The ministers agree on the gravity of the situation, and the need to seek a diplomatic solution to the current situation. The ministers call on Russia to de-escalate through halting and reversing their ongoing military build-up in the region, and engage in dialogue.

The ministers reaffirm their support to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its right to decide its own foreign and security policy, free from outside interference. The fundamental principles underpinning the European security order remain non-negotiable.

The Nordic countries welcome dialogue on European security issues in relevant fora, including the EU, NATO, OSCE and the UN. The Nordic countries welcome the United States’ efforts in engaging Russia in resolving the current crisis.

And the recent visit by the UK Minister of Defence, Ben Wallace, to the Nordic region highlighted the UK engagement with those states as well.

In a UK MoD press release from 15 January 2022, those discussions with regard to Ukraine and European defense were highlighted:

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace meets Nordic partners amid backdrop of aggressive Russian behaviour on the border of Ukraine. 

The Defence Secretary reaffirmed the UK’s determination to support European allies and uphold international stability on a three-day visit to Scandinavia this week.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace met with ministers in Sweden, Finland and Norway to discuss Russia’s continued aggression and military build-up on Ukraine’s border.

The ministers also discussed increasing competition in the High North and how access to the region can be managed responsibly.

Defence Secretary Ben Wallace MP said:

“The UK and our Nordic partners are united in our approach to upholding European security.

“My discussions this week have been directly about deepening bilateral relations, shared security and the consequences of Russian aggression towards Ukraine.

“Our discussions were clear that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would be a strategic mistake, violating the most basic freedoms and sovereignty.

“Britain and the Nordic countries have a long and shared history. Our European neighbours and allies remain vital partners as we work together to defend our common values, counter shared threats and build resilience in our neighbourhood – the UK will always stand with them.”

In Sweden, the Defence Secretary met with his counterpart Defence Minister Peter Hultqvist.

The Defence Secretary then travelled to Finland where he met with President Sauli Niinistö, Foreign Minister Haavisto and Defence Minister Antti Kaikkonen.

Finally, the Defence Secretary met with his Norwegian counterpart Odd Roger Enoksen.

The UK’s Integrated Review and Defence Command Paper set out the UK’s commitment to the High North.

As a close neighbour to the Arctic, the UK is committed to working with partners such as Sweden, Finland and Norway to ensure that increasing access to the region and its resources is managed safely, sustainably and responsibly.

Sweden, Finland and Norway are all members of the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – 10 nations working together to deliver forces at high readiness, across a range of roles, complementing NATO and European security.

Featured Photo: Defence Secretary Ben Wallace MP and Finnish President Sauli Niinistö. Credit: UK MoD

This is what we wrote about the impact of Nordic defense cooperation in shaping a way ahead for the direct defense of Europe in our co-authored book on European defense:

Nordic defense and security cooperation are part of a broader global trend in which clusters of states are working together to enhance their ability to enhance their defense and security against the return of Russia and the rise of China. Clusterization is the next phase whereby liberal democracies do more for themselves in their joint defense rather than simply relying on diplomatic globalization initiatives through organizations like the EU or NATO to do that for them.

“Clusterization” is key to generating enhanced capabilities that can work interdependently with key allies outside of a regional cluster to reinforce the capabilities in a realistic and effective way to deter core adversaries. In the case of the Nordics, clearly the United States is the key outside power, with Brexit Britain and those states within continental Europe which have capabilities which can show up effectively to bolster the underbelly of the Nordic region are the key players that can reinforce Nordic defense.

But at its heart, the Nordics need to bolster their own capabilities as well to work more effectively with their offshore allies and their continental European partners.

But to be blunt: this requires looking more realistically at what the defense of the Nordic region means against the evolution of Russian policies, strategies, and capabilities rather than simply to assume that NATO as a multimember alliance will simply show up.

The Trident Juncture 2018 exercise in Norway is a good example of how a leading Nordic nation is rethinking its policies. On the one hand, Norway is working their national mobilization approach, and on the other hand, they hosted several allies within Norway, and in part, it is a question of what capabilities can be brought in a timely manner that would really make a difference in a crisis.

It is not simply a question of showing up; it is about blending those domestic and allied capabilities into an effective crisis management force against specific and targeted Russian threats.

But providing for enhanced Nordic capability within a broader transatlantic framework remains a work in progress, notably when measured against Russian activities, behavior, and evolving capabilities.

 

The Czech Republic Rallies Support for Ukraine

“Czech Republic is, historically, politically, and alliance-bound to take the side of Ukraine. If Ukraine needs this, we will try to help”, said the head of the Czech MoD, Jana Černochova, stressing the help would be provided based on requirements expressed by the Ukrainian government.

The government in Prague noted that weapons and ammunition deliveries shall be coordinated with other Visegrad Group states, Germany, Austria, and the Baltic States.

In an article by Juliusz Sabak published by the Polish publication Defence 24 on January 20, 2022, the Czech initiative was highlighted.

The statement as follows was given by the Czech Minister of Defence, talking to Hospodarske Noviny daily: “I cannot speak on behalf of the remaining Ministers, however, I do a lot of consulting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Lipavský, and our views of support for Ukraine are aligned”. Jana Černochova is also talking to the Chief of General Staff of the Czech Army, General Aleš Opat, concerning the possibilities within the scope of supporting Ukraine. The information has been confirmed by Magdalena Dvořáková, spokesperson for the General Staff of the Czech Army.

In the upcoming days, the commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Valeriy Zaluzhny also scheduled a visit to Prague, to meet both General Opat and the head of the Czech MoD. We may be certain that General Zaluzhny would also present the expectations and requirements that Kyiv may have within that scope. Hence, the concrete statements made by Černochova, claiming that a relevant proposal would be presented to the government, once specific requirements are known.

This does not mean that nothing would be done at all, within that scope, until then. Six Czech SOF operators are getting ready to deploy to Ukraine between February and March, and they are to take part in an exercise in Ukraine. Prague is not planning to conduct any other military deployments. Černochova stated, speaking to Hospodarske Noviny that if a request as such emerges, relevant submissions would be made at the parliament and the government. She also said that activities as such shall be subjected to a broader scope of coordination, within structures such as the Visegrad Groups. Neighbours, such as Austria or Germany, as well as the Baltic States, should also be involved. Not only are they involved in supporting Ukraine, but they are interested in stopping the Russian pressure inflicted on Europe.

For the complete article, see the following:

https://defence24.com/strona-autora/juliusz-sabak

Featured Graphic: Photo 48774032 / Czech Republic Map © Sjankauskas | Dreamstime.com

The Ukrainian Situation: The Perspective of the UK Minister of Defence

On January 17, 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence published an article by Ben Wallace, the Minister of Defence, with regard to the Ukrainian situation.

That article follows:

Minister of Defence, Ben Wallace

I have lost count of how many times recently I have to had to explain the meaning of the English term “straw man” to my European allies. That is because the best living, breathing “straw man” at the moment is the Kremlin’s claim to be under threat from NATO. In recent weeks the Russian Defence Minister’s comment that the US is “preparing a provocation with chemical components in eastern Ukraine” has made that “straw man” even bigger.

It is obviously the Kremlin’s desire that we all engage with this bogus allegation, instead of challenging the real agenda of the President of the Russian Federation. An examination of the facts rapidly puts a match to the allegations against NATO.

First, NATO is, to its core, defensive in nature. At the heart of the organisation is Article 5 that obliges all members to come to the aid of a fellow member if it is under attack. No ifs and no buts. Mutual self-defence is NATO’s cornerstone. This obligation protects us all. Allies from as far apart as Turkey and Norway; or as close as Latvia and Poland all benefit from the pact and are obliged to respond. It is a truly defensive alliance.

Second, former Soviet states have not been expanded ‘into’ by NATO, but joined at their own request. The Kremlin attempts to present NATO as a Western plot to encroach upon its territory, but in reality the growth in Alliance membership is the natural response of those states to its own malign activities and threats.

Third, the allegation that NATO is seeking to encircle the Russian Federation is without foundation. Only five of the thirty allies neighbour Russia, with just 1/16th of its borders abutted by NATO. If the definition of being surrounded is 6% of your perimeter being blocked then no doubt the brave men who fought at Arnhem or Leningrad in the Second World War would have something strong to say about it.

It is not the disposition of NATO forces but the appeal of its values that actually threatens the Kremlin. Just as we know that its actions are really about what President Putin’s interpretation of history is and his unfinished ambitions for Ukraine.

We know that because last summer he published, via the official Government website, his own article “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”. I urge you to read it, if you have time, because while it is comprehensive on his arguments it is short on accuracy and long on contradictions.

We should all worry because what flows from the pen of President Putin himself is a seven-thousand-word essay that puts ethnonationalism at the heart of his ambitions. Not the narrative now being peddled. Not the straw man of NATO encroachment. It provides the skewed and selective reasoning to justify, at best, the subjugation of Ukraine and at worse the forced unification of that sovereign country.

President Putin’s article completely ignores the wishes of the citizens of Ukraine, while evoking that same type of ethnonationalism which played out across Europe for centuries and still has the potential to awaken the same destructive forces of ancient hatred. Readers will not only be shocked at the tone of the article but they will also be surprised at how little NATO is mentioned. After all, is NATO ‘expansionism’ not the fountain of all the Kremlin’s concerns? In fact, just a single paragraph is devoted to NATO.

The essay makes in it three claims. One: that the West seeks to use division to “rule” Russia. Two: that anything other than a single nation of Great Russia, Little Russia and White Russia (Velikorussians, Malorussians, Belorussians) in the image advanced in the 17th Century is an artificial construct and defies the desires of a single people, with a single language and church. Third, that anyone who disagrees does so out of a hatred or phobia of Russia.

We can dispense with the first allegation. No one wants to rule Russia. It is stating the obvious that just like any other state it is for the citizens of a country to determine their own future. Russia’s own lessons from such conflicts as Chechnya must surely be that ethnic and sectarian conflicts cost thousands of innocent lives with the protagonists getting bogged down in decades of strife.

As for Ukraine, Russia itself recognised the sovereignty of it as an independent country and guaranteed its territorial integrity, not just by signing the Budapest Memorandum in 1994 but also its Friendship Treaty with Ukraine itself in 1997. Yet it is the Kremlin not the West that set about magnifying divisions in that country and several others in the Europe. It has been well documented the numerous efforts of the GRU and other Russian agencies to interfere in democratic elections and domestic disputes is well documented. The divide and rule cap sits prettiest on Moscow’s head not NATO’s.

Probably the most important and strongly believed claim that Ukraine is Russia and Russia is Ukraine is not quite as presented. Ukraine has been separate from Russia for far longer in its history than it was ever united. Secondly the charge that all peoples in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are descendants of the ‘Ancient Rus’ and are therefore somehow all Russians. But in reality, according to historian Professor Andrew Wilson in his excellent essay for RUSI entitled “Russia and Ukraine: ‘One People’ as Putin Claims?” they are at best “kin but not the same people”. In the same way Britain around 900AD consisted of Mercia, Wessex, York, Strathclyde and other pre-modern kingdoms, but it was a civic nation of many peoples, origins and ethnicities that eventually formed the United Kingdom.

If you start and stop your view of Russian history between 1654 and 1917 then you can fabricate a case for a more expansive Russia, perhaps along the lines of the motto of the Russian Tsar before the Russian Empire “Sovereign of all of Rus: the Great, the Little, and the White” – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus respectively. And crucially you must also forget the before and after in history. You must ignore the existence of the Soviet Union, breaking of the Russian-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty, and the occupation of Crimea. Far more than footnotes in history, I am sure you will agree.

Ironically, President Putin himself admits in his essay that “things change: countries and communities are no exception. Of course, some part of a people in the process of its development, influenced by a number of reasons and historical circumstances, can become aware of itself as a separate nation at a certain moment. How should we treat that? There is only one answer: with respect!” However, he then goes on to discard some of those “historical circumstances” to fit his own claims.

Dubious to say the least, and not in anyway a perspective that justifies both the occupation of Crimea (in the same way Russia occupied Crimea in 1783 in defiance of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji in 1774) or any further invasion of modern Ukraine, as an independent sovereign country.

The last charge against the West by many in the Russian Government is that those who disagree with the Kremlin are somehow Russophobes. Leaving aside that GRU officers deployed nerve agents on British streets or that cyber hacking and targeted assassinations emanate from the Russian state, nothing could be further than the truth.

Russia and the UK share a deep and often mutually beneficial history. Our allegiances helped to finally defeat Napoleon and later Hitler. Outside of conflict, across the centuries we shared technology, medicine and culture. During the 18th Century Russia and Britain were deeply tied. Between 1704 to 1854, from age of Peter the Great through Catherine the Great and well into the 19th Century the British were to be found as admirals, generals, surgeons, and architects at the highest level of the Russian Court. The father of the Russian Navy – one Samuel Greig – was born in Inverkeithing in Fife.

That shared admiration is still true today. The British Government is not in dispute with Russia and the Russian people – far from it – but it does take issue with the malign activity of the Kremlin.

So, if one cold January or February night Russian Military forces once more cross into sovereign Ukraine, ignore the ‘straw man’ narratives and ‘false flag’ stories of NATO aggression and remember the President of Russia’s own words in that essay from last summer. Remember it and ask yourself what it means, not just for Ukraine, but for all of us in Europe. What it means the next time…

Featured Graphic: Photo 151366060 / Map Ukraine © Chernetskaya | Dreamstime.com

 

A Perspective on Ukrainian Security: The Changing European Order

https://sldinfo.com/2022/01/the-nordics-the-uk-and-the-ukrainian-crisis/By Robbin Laird

The current Ukraine situation is part of a chain of events.

And as such, the Russian threat to Ukrainian sovereignty is simply not about Ukraine.

It is about the stability of the current European order.

Of course, those with historical knowledge understand that any European order is an imprint on the dynamics of change which always have affected the European continent and made it such a generator of wars and forceful changes of borders, cultures and nations.

We are here again.

Not surprisingly so as the region cutting through the European continent from the Black Sea north has been an unsettled part of the post-Soviet European order.

To simply take this year, the Black Sea crisis of this summer where we saw significant information war and the “migrant” crisis generated by the Russians through Belarus against the Poles, the Balts, and the European order more generally are all part of the wider challenges which Russia is generating against the post-Soviet European order.

In my co-authored book with Murielle Delaporte, we highlighted Putin’s unwillingness to accept the current European order.

How Europeans and the United States shape their engagement with the Russians going forward will shape the next phase of the European order.

This is not simply a Ukrainian crisis; it is much broader than that.

This is not a static thing but a moving process, whereby Brexit and the Turkish de facto exit from NATO have been key parts of reshaping the European order and the Russian pressure on their former territories is now playing a forcing function to determine who is serious about maintaining the current European order and who is not.

It is also the case that Russia’s challenge to the European order is part of the wider challenge of 21st century authoritarian powers to the global order as shaped by the United States, the European Union, and the democratic powers in Asia.

Whatever transpires in the Ukrainian crisis is not limited to Europe.

As we wrote in our book on the return of direct defense in Europe:

“The leading authoritarian leaders seem to like being ruler for life, as the head of China, in 2019, received parliamentary approval to be able to run beyond the term limits which had been in place. The Parliament approved the removal of the two-term limit on the presidency, effectively allowing Xi Jinping to remain in power for life. Putin has redefined Russia’s place in the post–Cold War period, and shaped a comprehensive narrative which one might call Making Russia Great Again.

“And in reshaping Russia in his authoritarian image, Putin has shaped a narrative which is rooted in Russia being the victim of the West, led by the United States, and in returning to its roots to become a key authoritarian Euro-Asian power. Putin both contributed to and has been abetted by the rise of 21st century authoritarianism.

“With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Chinese becoming members of the World Trade Organization, globalization and democratization seemed to be evolving hand in hand.

“But rather than globalization leading to democratization, it has been shaped significantly by the 21st century authoritarian powers who have used that process to enhance their ability to operate within and without against the key powers driving the liberal democratic order.”

In short, we have entered a new historical epoch which will be shaped by the concrete actions of key states and what the results of such actions will be both in fact and perceived reality.

History is on the move once again, and with it the shaping of new global anarchy or order.

 

Featured Graphic: Photo 151366060 / Map Ukraine © Chernetskaya | Dreamstime.com

Also, see the following:

Allied Resolve 2022 Exercise: Russia Brings Troops from Far East to Belarus

The Nordics, the UK and the Ukrainian Crisis

The Ukrainian Situation: The Perspective of the UK Minister of Defence

The Czech Republic Rallies Support for Ukraine