Japan-U.S.-France Trilateral Naval Exercise

04/20/2021

From December 15 to 17, the JMSDF conducted a trilateral exercise with the U.S. Navy and the French Navy around Okinotorishima Island.

JS Hyuga from the JMSDF participated in this anti-submarine warfare exercise alongside the U.S. Navy destroyer USS John S. McCain and P-8A aircraft as well as the French Navy’s submarine FS Émeraude.

Through the training, the JMSDF has improved its tactical skills and mutual understanding with the U.S. Navy and the French Navy, and the cooperation and unity among the three countries under the vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” were demonstrated.

Story from MoD Japan

Israel and the CH-53K Decision: Re-Baselining Heavy Lift Helicopters for Strategic Uncertainty

By Robbin Laird

Recently, the IDF selected the CH-53K to replace its legacy CH-53s.

In my last article on this subject, I highlighted one key factor in the decision, namely, the importance of having a new aircraft which reduced pilot training and operational load for reserve pilots.

As I concluded: “If you rely on reserves as a key part of force structure capabilities and rely on mobilization as part of your force augmentation strategy, it is crucial to have platforms which can be re-learned rapidly prior to operating them in an operational situation.

“Even more important, if you have a man-machine capability such as fly by wire, then the capabilities of those pilots who do not regularly operate the aircraft, their own safety, reliability and performance standards go up. And with regard to a heavy lift helicopter, many lives are at stake.”

Another important factor when the IDF looks at its strategic environment today is to build for strategic uncertainty.

The recent Abraham accords have reshaped the Israel strategic environment; but how will that environment evolve and what is next?

In other words, Israel faces a very uncertain strategic environment; what is today’s threat might be part of tomorrow’s solution to yet a very different threat environment.

That is why when looking at an air platform, growthability, and flexibility are key considerations.

What the CH-53K as a software upgradeable platform with new baseline for a heavy lift platform provides is a new baseline from which to shape capabilities for an uncertain strategic future.

Put bluntly, defining operational requirements for a replacement platform based on the past thirty years of experience or the current threat environment is simply inadequate.

What is necessary is to introduce a platform which works seamlessly with today’s IDF, fits into the current concept of operations, but can change over time to anchor changes in those concepts of operations and to deliver capability for tomorrow’s strategic environment.

And the CH-53K is a very different type of heavy lift helicopter, one built with a new baseline for upgradeability.

For example, as I wrote with regard to the CH-53K and its digital cockpit:

The CH-53K is shaping a new paradigm for heavy lift but it is doing so in the context of a new paradigm of warfare as well, or in the context, of a shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management.

 Crisis management is evolving significantly.

 And the Marines as the US’s premier crisis management force is evolving along with the changing demand set.

The Marines are reshaping their force structure to enable it to operate as an effective modular force with scalable force capabilities, which can be tailored to a particular crisis.

 The CH-53K is a key part of this modular force.

The aircraft brings new capabilities to the force which are in no way the same as the CH-53E.

One of those capabilities is the new cockpit in the aircraft and how digital interoperability and integration with the evolution of the MAGTF more broadly is facilitated by the operation of a 21st century cockpit.

The cockpits are very different and fit in with a general trend for 21stcentury aircraft of having digital cockpits with combat flexibility management built in.

Because the flight crew is operating a digital aircraft, many of the functions which have to be done manually in the E, are done by the aircraft itself.

This allows the cockpit crew to focus on combat management and force insertion tasks.

And the systems within the cockpit allow for the crew to play this function.

This means that the K and its onboard Marines and cargo can be integrated into a digitally interoperable force.

This means as well that the K could provide a lead role for the insertion package, or provide for a variety of support roles beyond simply bringing Marines and cargo to the fight.

They are bringing information as well which can be distributed to the combat force in the area of interest.

This kind of re-baselining of a heavy lift helicopter was a key part of the Israel decision to buy the CH-53K and to prepare to introduce it into a dynamically changing IDF, one which the CH-53K can make a major contribution to in terms of the dynamics of change for the force as well.

 

HMAS Adelaide and the Sydney Harbour Bridge: A Tight Fit

By Lieutenant Commander Christopher Thornton

Families of the crew of HMAS Adelaide were treated to a day on board to thank them for their support during a busy year for the ship’s company.

A highlight of the April 9 family day on Sydney Harbour was when the landing helicopter dock – one of Navy’s largest warships – sailed under the Sydney Harbour Bridge.

This was a tight navigational feat requiring extensive planning.

The flight deck was full of onlookers as the ship’s mast passed under the iconic bridge with only a few metres to spare.

Sub Lieutenant James Tomlinson’s family and partner were on the ship for the day.

“My family were amazed at the size of Adelaide and were thrilled to be on board for the day,” Sub Lieutenant Tomlinson said.

“We were treated to an awesome lunch and the chefs and support operation sailors provided outstanding hospitality that my family will not soon forget.”

Last year was a busy one for Adelaide’s ship’s company, beginning with support to Operation Bushfire Assist, then COVID-19 Assist and ending with deployment on Operation Fiji Assist after Tropical Cyclone Yasa.

Adelaide returned to Australia from Fiji in February.

The Sydney Harbour cruise was a way of thanking families for their support, particularly over the Christmas period when the ship was deployed.

Families also were treated to an embarkation via landing craft into the well dock, firefighting demonstrations and fantastic views of the harbour.

Adelaide will soon depart Fleet Base East to conduct training operations before going into a maintenance period for a few months.

This story was published by the Australian Department of Defence on April 16, 2021.

Featured Photo: HMAS Adelaide sails under the Sydney Harbour Bridge. Credit: Tara Morrison

The Latest Norwegian Building Block for European Direct Defense

04/19/2021

The build out of the re-established Second Fleet and the standup of Allied Joint Forces Command combined with the key efforts of the Nordic allies is a reshaping North Atlantic defense.

In our book on The Return of Direct Defense in Europe, we focused upon the key role which key European states were playing in shaping a way ahead for the direct defense of Europe in the presence of the challenge posed by the authoritarian powers. We looked at the U.S. role as complimentary to this effort, and not understood in the old Soviet deterrent terms.

The Nordics have certainly been key drivers of change and in the reshaping of direct defense capabilities.

As we put it in that book: “Europe and its defense are not one narrative but several. The Russians face an increasingly unified Nordic Northern Flank with enhanced UK focus on the region, backed by reach into North America.

“The central part of Europe is a mosaic of former Warsaw Pact states with varying degrees of concern about the Russian challenge, backed by a German French alliance with the nuclear-armed France in this key area.

“And the southern zone of Europe in which Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Italy have about as much solidarity today as they have had historically, which means that aggregation management is crucial to deal with any alliance-wide challenges.”

And the Nordic Northern flank and the redesign of direct defense is highlighted in that book as follows: “A key part of shaping a new approach to direct defense in Europe is winning the fourth battle of the Atlantic. (which rests on dealing with) a key aspect of the Russian challenge, which is crucial for the Nordics, namely, the need to hold the Russian Kola bastion at risk.

“For the United States and Canada, it is about reinforcing Europe and holding the Russians at bay, notably with Putin threatening a nuclear strike via his projected new hypersonic missile to be launched via a submarine. But for the Nordics, it is about homeland defense, and not letting the Russians have a free ride to use the Kola Peninsula and its extended perimeter defense without a significant capability by the West to attrite and destroy the Russian bastion.

“When you come out from the land into the air and sea corridors, is where the West for sure needs to be able to operate its own anti-access and area denial capability. Two can play at this game.”

Recently, Norway signed an agreement with the United States which enhances the ability of U.S. and allied air and naval forces to reinforce Norway for both training and crisis support.

“Under the Agreement, Agreed Facilities and Areas will be established at Rygge Military Air Station and Airfield, Sola Military Air Station and Airfield, Evenes Military Air Station and Airfield and Ramsund Naval Station.

These locations have been selected with the aim of strengthening cooperation with the U.S. in the air defence and maritime domains in years to come.

Infrastructure investments may be made at all four locations.

Projects within Agreed Facilities and Areas will be developed in consultation with the U.S., but funding must be allocated under the U.S. defence budget before projects can be initiated.

As a result, it will take some time before any planned projects are completed. Additional Agreed Facilities and Areas may be established at a later date if Norway and the U.S. agree. This will also require the approval of the Norwegian Government and the consent of the Storting.”

According to a story published on the Norwegian Ministry of Defence website on April 16, 2021:

“The United States of America is Norway’s most important ally, and we have shared more than 70 years of close, constructive defence cooperation. The Agreement both updates and further develops the agreements and cooperation already in place between Norway and the U. S. The Agreement will play a vital role in ensuring Norwegian security within the framework of NATO”, said Minister of Defence Frank Bakke-Jensen.

The Supplementary Defense Cooperation Agreement (SDCA) updates and regulates practical aspects of U.S. military activity in Norway, and supplements existing agreements between Norway and the U.S. The Agreement was signed today by Norway’s Minister of Defence. The Agreement must be submitted to the Storting (Norwegian parliament) for consent before it can enter into force.

‘Our cooperation with our Allies is under continuous development. The Agreement reaffirms Norway’s close relationship with the U.S. and confirms Norway’s key position on the northern flank of NATO. To ensure that Norway and our Allies can operate together in a crisis situation under difficult conditions, we must be able to hold exercises and train regularly here in Norway. The Agreement does not entail any changes to key Norwegian security policy principles. Our policies regarding the stationing of foreign forces on Norwegian territory, the stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons and port visits remain unchanged,’ said Minister of Foreign Affairs Ine Eriksen Søreide.

‘Norway’s defence rests on three main elements: the national defence capability, collective defence through NATO, and bilateral reinforcement plans with close allies. The ongoing development of defence cooperation with the US complements our own efforts to strengthen the capacity of the Norwegian Armed Forces,’ said Mr Bakke-Jensen.

The U.S. has entered into similar agreements with several Allied countries in Europe, to promote more predictable development of defence cooperation and ensure a robust and practical framework for providing reinforcements in the event of war or crisis.

The Agreement establishes and regulates Agreed Facilities and Areas, which are specified locations that may be used for military purposes. Under the Agreement, US forces will have unimpeded access to and use of these facilities and areas. All U.S. activities shall be conducted with full respect for the sovereignty, laws, and international legal obligations of Norway. This is how the Allied presence in Norway has been organised since the end of the Second World War. Any US military activity carried out in Norway will continue to be subject to close coordination between Norway and the US.

Under the Agreement, Agreed Facilities and Areas will be established at Rygge Military Air Station and Airfield, Sola Military Air Station and Airfield, Evenes Military Air Station and Airfield and Ramsund Naval Station. These locations have been selected with the aim of strengthening cooperation with the U.S. in the air defence and maritime domains in years to come. Infrastructure investments may be made at all four locations. Projects within Agreed Facilities and Areas will be developed in consultation with the U.S., but funding must be allocated under the U.S. defence budget before projects can be initiated. As a result, it will take some time before any planned projects are completed. Additional Agreed Facilities and Areas may be established at a later date if Norway and the U.S. agree. This will also require the approval of the Norwegian Government and the consent of the Storting.

The Agreement will be presented to the Storting in two propositions: one to request consent to ratify the Agreement and the other to propose necessary legislation to implement it in Norwegian law. Both propositions will be submitted to the Storting during the autumn 2021 session. The draft legislation and the Agreement will be circulated to the public in spring 2021, with a three-month deadline.

Facts about the Agreement:

The SDCA provides the basis for further developing Norway’s longstanding defence cooperation with the U.S. The Agreement supplements existing bilateral agreements with the U.S., as well as NATO’s Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces (NATO SOFA).

The Agreement regulates and facilitates U.S. presence, training and exercises in Norway, thus facilitating rapid U.S. reinforcement of Norway in the event of crisis or war.

The Agreement covers a wide range of rules that are important for regulating practical aspects of the activities of U.S. forces, such as entry and exit, jurisdiction, exemptions from taxes and duties, the use of contractors and welfare services, and prospective investments in infrastructure.

The Agreement provides a framework for close cooperation and consultations between Norwegian and U.S. authorities regarding activities and operational and security issues. The text explicitly states that ‘nothing in this Agreement alters Norwegian policies with regard to the stationing of foreign forces on Norwegian territory, and the stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory.’

The Agreement introduces the concept of Agreed Facilities and Areas, which are defined as locations that are central to the development of practical defence cooperation. Agreed Facilities and Areas will be established at Rygge Military Air Station and Airfield, Sola Military Air Station and Airfield, Evenes Military Air Station and Airfield and Ramsund Naval Station. This primarily encompasses military areas, with the addition of airfield facilities such as runways and taxiways. These areas will be used jointly by Norwegian, U.S. and other Allied forces, and the U.S. may decide to provide infrastructure investments at these locations.

An extensive dialogue will be conducted with the U.S. regarding the use of Agreed Facilities and Areas, and prospective activities to be carried out there. Buildings and other infrastructure constructed and financed by the U.S. at these locations in the future will become the property of Norway, while the U.S. will have right of unimpeded access and use. It is too early to predict the costs that the Agreement will entail for Norway, but these may include costs for security measures and the hire of private land for exercises. If activities under the Agreement lead to an increase in Norwegian expenditure, this will be dealt with as part of the normal budget process.

In principle, the Agreement is open-ended, but after an initial term of ten years, it may be terminated with one year’s notice.

Also, see our story on the 2018 agreement between Norway and the United States.

2018 Security of Defense Supply Agreement Between Norway and the United States

 

Exercise Cape Hope 2021

Air National Guard Capt Travis Carlson, a KC-135 Stratotanker pilot assigned to the 506th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, details that day’s support to the combat air force large force employment exercise during Exercise Cope North 21, February 18, 2021.

The goal of Cope North 21 is to improve combat readiness, develop integrated humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and increase interoperability of U.S. Forces, Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force, or Koku-Jieitai.

ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM

02.18.2021

Video by Master Sgt. Larry Reid Jr.

Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs

The Future of Anglo-French Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit

04/15/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – In the bad old days it was talk of perfidious Albion and Britain as a nation of shopkeepers, while in these times there are those in France who see the UK as strategic ally, a prize military partner despite London playing the Brexit card.

The issue of the UK cooperating with France in building weapons arises as the sceptred isle seeks to be an independent actor on the global stage while seeking close ties with the United States.

Britain and France, beset by the coronavirus crisis, marked Nov. 2 a low key 10th anniversary of the Lancaster House defense cooperation treaty and pushed back the annual Anglo-French summit into 2021.

France and the UK proudly point up close relations, share a martial culture of overseas intervention, cooperate in the field, and are the two European nations with nuclear weapons – the Unholy Grail sought by countries aspiring to be top military players.

The two allies also hold prized permanent seats on the UN security council and nurture their arms industry, seeking to boost capability and seal export deals, while in fierce competition.

Defense ministers, senior officers, officials, and top executives attended Nov. 26 a video defense conference held by the Franco-British Council, an independent organization promoting ties between the two nations. Airbus, European missile maker MBDA, and the two defense ministries backed the virtual gathering.

That event pointed up the need for political clarity in industrial cooperation, deploying the hardest hitting of diplomatic terms: “the relationship is not without challenges.”

Cultural Affairs

On the cultural front, the long awaited March 16 integrated review of British security, defense, development and foreign policy pointed up the value of the BBC as a “soft power” asset. There were raised eyebrows on that positive appraisal as the administration of Boris Johnson, a former journalist, had signalled clear intent to slash funding for the broadcaster.

The review, titled Global Britain in a Competitive Age, refers to France 11 times, Germany   gets seven references, while the UK views the US as its leading strategic ally, said a March 24 report from Institut Montaigne and Fondation pour la Récherche Stratégique.

An April 5 op ed in the afternoon daily Le Monde admonished the Emmanuel Macron government for issuing a new bilingual identity card in French and English, and called for the French regions to pick one of the languages of the other 26 European Union members in place of the language of the Brexit nation.

In business culture, there is a stronger sense of hierarchy and formality in a French office than a British one, said an executive who has worked in France and the UK.

The cross-Channel alliance is generally seen as a plus on the operational side and a minus on  industrial cooperation.

There is perhaps that fabled glass — half empty, half full.

Half Empty

There have been speeches but the reality is there has been little Anglo-French industrial cooperation in weapons in the last 30-40 years, a French defense specialist said.

“There has been more French development of arms programs and industrial cooperation with Germany and Italy,” the specialist said.

No, it is not about perfidious Albion, just that the UK has a very different approach.

“It is very sovereign, pro-European, and pro-American. There are different axes,” the specialist said. France is also tied to sovereignty and the search for prime contractor status.

The latter can be seen in Dassault Aviation seeking clear prime contractorship in the next generation fighter, a key part in the future combat air system backed by France, Germany and Spain. Airbus is on the other side of the negotiating table.

There has been real progress with interdependence in missiles, with centers of excellence shared by the British and French MBDA units, the specialist said. However, there would be deeper cooperation if those British and French companies built the same missiles accounting for half of MBDA’s production.

French and British requirements differ, a second French source said, with the French view  seen on the MMP anti-tank weapon, and the British on the Brimstone air-to-ground missile.

French rules of engagement require the MMP to have opto-electronics to allow the shooter “to look into the eyes” of the target, the second source said, while Brimstone is guided by radar and laser, and does not offer direct optical confirmation.

There is a project under the Lancaster House treaty for a future cruise/anti-ship weapon to replace respectively the Scalp/Storm Shadow, and Exocet and Harpoon missiles.

MBDA awaits a demonstration contract for the FC/ASW, having completed the €100 million ($119 million) concept phase. The Exocet is important for the French navy.

Almost Three Aircraft Carriers

Industrial cooperation was boosted in 2006 with creation of the high level working group, which had British and French ministerial representation, the first specialist said. Denis Ranque, the then Thales executive chairman and his counterpart at BAE Systems sat on that committee.

The then French president Jacques Chirac and then defense minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie were keen for France to acquire an aircraft carrier with the UK, which planned to build two carriers, the specialist said. That was a UK program, with the vessels to be built in British dockyards, not shared with French shipyards.

France and the UK signed 2006 a memorandum of understanding for a carrier project.

Then French elections brought in president Nicolas Sarkozy, who effectively axed in 2008 the  project for a second carrier to sail with the Charles de Gaulle flagship.

Alliot-Marie, keen to acquire a carrier with the UK, had agreed to pay a hefty sum for access to British design studies, the specialist said, while the French defense procurement office  advised a smaller payment.

The French national audit office said in 2014 Paris had paid €214 million ($252 million) for the British studies, with nothing to show for it other than to help fund the UK carrier project.

Back when it looked like three carriers — two British, one French – were to be built, Thales held a press conference, here, pointing up its role in the UK project, including submitting the winning design. That design came from a UK company, BMT, which has the water tanks used to develop the bouncing bomb flown by the Dambusters in the second world war.

Later, the then prime minister, David Cameron, switched from a catapult deck to a ski-lift design for the Queen Elizabeth carrier, to avoid a fiscal attack on the budget. The ski-lift deck was fine for the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing fighter, but French media highlighted the denial of catapult and arrestor gear for the French Navy’s Rafale jet fighter.

That choice of ski lift deck denied closer ties between the two fleet air arms.

Initially, there was significant cooperation after the Lancaster House agreement, but governments change and commitment ebbs away, the specialist said. Politics is people.

“People matter,” the specialist said.

On the French side and on a smaller scale, Paris opted for a Safran Patroller unmanned aerial vehicle rather than acquire the Watchkeeper from the Thales UK unit. That French order for a French UAV unwound a prospective swap deal for the UK to order a French infantry fighting vehicle, the VBCI, from Nexter and Arquus.

There was higher French content – and French jobs – on the Patroller than the Watchkeeper, and the labor factor was seen as winning votes when elections rolled around.

Enter Brexit

In 2016, Cameron announced the result of a divisive referendum on Britain and its membership of the European Union: leave. National sovereignty won the day.

Cameron, a former public relations executive for a TV company, had held that referendum to buy quiet from a clutch of anti-EU parliamentarians in the Conservative party.

Soon after, Britain put on hold and then cancelled a €2 billion project with France for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle, dubbed future combat air system demonstration program.

In 2017, president Emmanuel Macron and chancellor Angela Merkel surprised the world with a plan for a new Franco-German fighter jet to replace the Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon.

Airbus and Dassault teamed up to lead the industrial effort, and Spain joined the partnership

And in 2018, Britain announced at the Farnborough air show its Tempest fighter project, as part of a future combat air system. Italy and Sweden signed on as partners.

Perhaps there were budgetary reasons for the UK baling out of the UCAV project, maybe other priorities, perhaps Brexit, Dassault executive chairman Eric Trappier said back then. Perhaps British documents will show the reasons for dropping the UCAV project when they are declassified under the 30-year ruling.

Back in the 1990s, Dassault and BAE Systems announced plans for a joint venture for a prospective fighter jet, but Britain and France failed to green light that project. The UCAV project revived prospects of cooperation.

But it was not to be.

Cameron had been keen in 2010-11 to pursue the UCAV, which had “morphed” from a concept for a large unmanned aerial vehicle to replace the Reaper, a UK source said. The defense ministries had shown less enthusiasm.

There was back then tension between BAE and Dassault, which were “jealous” to protect  intellectual property and were reluctant to share stealth technology, the UK source said. There had been industrial resistance before the political change of direction.

Cameron resigned after announcing the Brexit leave result. Perhaps government pressure to pursue the UCAV might have continued had he stayed on, the UK source said. But with his departure there was little political support for the project.

Meanwhile, the UK forged ahead as the sole foreign nation on tier 1 partnership on the Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter, holding a 15 percent share of an estimated $100 billion program to build some 3,000 units.

The Dambusters 617 squadron received the first four F-35Bs in 2018.

Half Full

“Basically, nothing has changed,” a third French specialist said, referring to cooperation after Brexit. Britain and France share the same “strategic culture” based on force projection.

Both nations have nuclear capable navies, and France also has an airborne nuclear wing.

Britain also is close to the US, including nuclear weapons, the third specialist said.

France has basically three options on the future combat air system: continue cooperation with Germany, France goes it alone, or France teams up with the UK.

The two FCAS projects were still in the early stages. France and the UK had room for maneuver, and could take a modular approach on the aircraft, the specialist said. France and the UK had cooperated in the past, with the Concorde supersonic airliner and Jaguar fighter.

On the operational front, Britain and France have formed the combined joint expeditionary force for overseas projection, the specialist said, while Germany is essentially a “European power,” although there is German transport support for the French forces in Mali.

The UK seeks to project a presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Britain has boosted its special forces and has a key role on the Nato north flank in the North Sea.

France pursues Indo-Pacific projection and is present in Africa with the Barkhane mission.

“There is a sharing out of roles,” the specialist said.

A French account of the 1982 conflict over the Falkland Islands in the south Atlantic, La Guerre des Malouines (Docavia) by Charles Maisonneuve and Pierre Razoux, noted how the French trained British Harrier pilots on how to deal with the Super Etendard fighter jet and Exocet missile, as the Invincible and Hermes carriers led a task force to take on the Argentine forces. The French had previously trained the Argentine pilots.

The Sunday Times reported in 1982 a Dassault team in Argentina fixed a technical hitch on three of the five Exocets, allowing the missiles to hit the Sheffield destroyer and Atlantic Conveyor transport ship.

On the operational upside, there is close cooperation between British and French services. The combined joint expeditionary force is fully operational, the UK defense ministry said Nov. 2, with paratroopers of both nations training in the Wessex Storm exercise on Salisbury Plain, southern Britain. The CJEF is capable of deploying 10,000 personnel overseas, and there are plans to increase interoperability of future equipment, logistics, engineering, medical and energy systems.

The Queen Elizabeth carrier will sail with the Charles de Gaulle this year.

The UK defense minister, Ben Wallace, told the Franco-British Council the two carriers fulfilled a Lancaster House ambition of deploying a UK-French integrated strike capability: “proof that, in this more unstable and uncertain world, our nations will continue to keep the flame of freedom burning.”

The British supported the French in Mali with a C-17 heavy transport plane and Chinook transport helicopters, while declining to deploy troops to reinforce the Barkhane mission.

Besides the FC/ASW missile, the other Lancaster House project concerns maritime mine counter measures, a prototype for an underwater autonomous system against mines.

There has been for some years a 40 mm gun from CTA International, a joint venture between BAE and Nexter.

Could Do Better

The military cooperation is noted on both the French and British side, but there is a sense of missed opportunity on the industrial front.

“What is fascinating with Anglo-French collaboration is that the two countries are politically ready for expeditionary action,” said François Lureau of EuroFLconsult and a former head of French arms procurement.

“There is a strong mutual respect between the forces and two large defense industries covering the full spectrum of technologies and systems,” he said. “But the overall outcome does not match the promising potential.”

That sense of underachievement is shared by Peter Ricketts, former UK ambassador to France, who retired in 2016. He is strategic adviser to Lockheed Martin UK.

There has been a real loss of momentum on industrial cooperation since Brexit, with a lack of projects in the pipeline, he told the Anglo-American Press Association in a video discussion on April 7.

“A hit clearly from Brexit,” he said. The enthusiasm from Lancaster House has largely evaporated.

“What I notice is there are no new projects since our (Lancaster House) list in 2010,” he said. “We have not seen a new flagship UK-French project that will take us forward for the next decade. In a way we have seen the reverse.

“We have seen projects falling away, such as the future combat aircraft.”

The economics argue for pooling the two European FCAS projects, he said.

“The development costs of a new generation aircraft – more capable and more advanced than the F-35 – are so huge and the market so small, there will be pressure for Britain and its Italian and Swedish partners to join forces with France, Germany and Spain,” he said.

“I think the pressure over time will probably tie these two projects together,” he said. Development cost would be so high, it made sense to spread expense across a wider group of countries. It was not clear how and when that would happen, and in what industrial consortium.

“Fast jets are symbols of a country’s technical powers and symbols of sovereignty,” he said. The corollary is that when politicians change, priorities change.

Meanwhile, France is pursuing European strategic autonomy and cooperating with Germany.

The budget for the FCAS project backed by France, German and Spain could rise to €80 billion, a July 2020 French senate report said.

Two Positives

On the cooperative side, Britain is working “in one of the most sensitive areas,” namely checking nuclear warheads at the French facilities at Valduc, eastern France, as the UK lacks its own capability, Ricketts said.  The British “pooled their requirements and put faith in French facilities for 50 years, however bad the relationship gets.”

The importance of close operational ties was clear, he said.

“If the French wanted a European country with them in a serious crisis at short notice, there is only one country that could supply serious capacity — that is the Brits through the CJEF,” he said. “That is a success, that is full operational capability.”

“For Paris, two things are important: a large convergence of points of view and the British determination for a close and stable cooperation in foreign policy and security,” the Institut Montaigne and FRS report on the UK integrated review said.

“France also hopes the UK’s international ambitions will not be detrimental to closer cooperation with the European Union’s foreign policy.”

The UK is like France, seeking to be an  enterprising world power, and considers itself a guarantor for European security, the FRS report said.

“France is forever grateful” to Britain, the French ambassador to the UK, Catherine Colonna said Nov. 2 in Revue de la Defense. Macron awarded last year London the Légion d’Honneur, the highest order of merit, as a sign of that gratitude.

Britain gave shelter to the then general Charles de Gaulle and the Free French Forces in the second world war during the Nazis occupation of France.

De Gaulle made his call to arms on June 18 1940, broadcast to France by the BBC.

Also, see the following:

The 10th Anniversary of the Lancaster House Agreements: The Future of the Franco-British Defense Relationship

MV-22B And the ITS Cavour: Shaping a Way Ahead

04/14/2021

The Italians have been key players in the F-35 program.

They build the aircraft in Italy and their Air Force is buying both the A and B models.

In an interview conducted during a visit to Rome in 2013, the then head of the Italian Air Force, Lt General Preziosa, highlighted why he saw the Air Force buying Bs:

“We studied the issue carefully and for the kind of missions we face we needed the flexibility which the B can add to the fleet.  We need to go to the mission not the airfield.  We will operate in many areas where there are only short runways; the B allows us to operate in those conditions.

We can mix the fleet and operate at sea on land, on our own ships or own others.  It is the kind of flexibility, which we see as crucial to a 21st century setting.

I will give you an example of what we don’t want.  We planned to operate with the USMC in Afghanistan.  But we were three months later in the deployment than we intended because our Tornados could not operate in the same conditions as the USMC.  We had to take three months to build out the air base from which we would operate with them.

Time is crucial to many of the missions in which we will be engaged.  The Bs give me a more rapid insertion aircraft.”

The B has come to the Italian Navy’s ITS Cavour as it is finishing up its training and certification missions off of the East Coast of the United States.

The B could provide a powerful integrating capability between the Italian Navy and Air Force but cultural barriers remain which need to be dealt with.

In addition to completing its F-35B integration, the ITS Cavour welcomed MV-22Bs onboard their deck as part of training and certification as well.

As David Cenciotti of The Aviationist put it in an article published April 13, 2021:

The Italian Navy has recently declared the successful completion of the “sea trials” for the operational use of the F-35B, the STOVL (Short Take Off Vertical Landing) variant of the Joint Strike Fighter that will replace the service’s AV-8B+ Harrier II jet.

The “Ready for Operation” campaign included various compatibility tests carried out with two specially-instrumented U.S. F-35Bs belonging to VX-23 (Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 23) from Naval Air Station Patuxent River (NAS Pax River), Maryland. The “sea trials” lasted four weeks and ended on Mar. 26, 2021, with the return of the carrier to Norfolk.

Interestingly, the Italian Navy’s flagship was also involved in take-off and landing training with a U.S. Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft…. The interoperability between the platform and the Italian Navy’s flagship is needed to “increase interoperability between the USMC and the Italian Navy, and increase the operational reach of Naval forces for crisis or contingency response or in the event of conflict.”

A tweet from the Italian Navy commented: “This verified the flight deck with the American tactical transport aircraft as part of the Ready for Operations Campaign in the USA, aimed at expanding and strengthening the interoperability and the historic cooperation between the Italy Navy and the USMC.”