Spain Invests in the European MALE UAV Program

01/28/2022

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Spain formally approved Jan. 25 a total budget of €3.17 billion ($3.5 billion) for its share of development, production and service of a European medium-altitude, long-endurance drone, clearing the way for a contract to be signed with industrial partners Airbus, Dassault Aviation and Leonardo.

That financial pledge from Madrid allows a long-awaited launch of a program for an unmanned aerial vehicle, backed by partner nations France, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

The industry ministry has set aside an initial €1.43 billion for 2022-28 for its part of the unmanned aerial vehicle program, the Spanish government said on its website. That pledge included €293 million in 2022.

The budget marks 23 percent of total program funding, with Spanish industry receiving at least 19 percent of work share, the government said.

The defense ministry will provide €1.74 billion in 2029-35, the government said. In that period, there will be funding of €125.65 million in 2029. A further €150 million has been earmarked for logistical support.

That funding covers Spain’s order for four UAVs, with options for two units, and five years of service, the government said.

Michael Schoellhorn, chief executive of Airbus Defence and Space, said Jan. 25 on social media the Spanish budget approval paved the way for signing a launch contract for this “key collaborative programme, which strengthens Europe’s strategic autonomy & sovereignty.”

German-based Airbus DS will be the prime contractor, with Dassault and Leonardo as industrial partners. The Spanish Airbus unit will also work on the program.

That announcement from Madrid was the last funding commitment from the four-nation group, allowing the European OCCAR arms procurement agency to present a contract to industry. The agency acts on behalf of the partner nations.

That launch contract might come in the next few weeks, a defense official said.

Airbus DS declined to comment on the timing.

France earmarked in its 2022 budget €2 billion for an order for six European UAV systems, comprising 18 drones, with an initial order of four systems, followed by two more systems, as set out in the budget document Programme 146, Equipment for the Forces.

An initial French order had been planned in 2021, with the following order after 2022, but delay on the Spanish budget authorization held up the launch contract.

Germany is due to receive seven UAV systems, comprising 21 drones, while Italy is due to receive five systems, comprising 15 drones.

Difficulties over agreeing a budget and finding government funding slowed a launch of the MALE UAV project, which the French defense minister, Florence Parly, has hailed as a sign of European autonomy and sovereignty – but not at any price.

Industry, led by Airbus DS, initially pitched the UAV project for some €10 billion, prompting France to insist the budget should be capped at €7.1 billion, media reports said.

Delay in securing the funding pushed back delivery of the drone to 2028, three years late, as set out in the French budget document.

The four partner nations backed the European UAV project in a bid to resist a reliance on U.S. and Israeli UAVs, which dominate the world market. But that European support was long half-hearted, with previous drone projects landing in the waste paper basket.

The French air force flew the US-built Reaper drone in the sub-Saharan Sahel region, but US approval was needed if France wanted to fly the drone elsewhere, a French analyst said. Such reliance partly explained the call for greater autonomy and sovereignty.

The importance of Reapers flown by the French air force could be seen in the June 19 2021 video report from the spokesman of the French armed forces ministry at Cognac air base, southwest France. Hervé Grandjean pointed up the French Reapers have been capable of dropping bombs since 2019 and were due to be armed with missiles.

Spain is seen as a key ally for France.

“Spain and France are also conducting joint core capacity projects, notably the European MALE drone project and the (Tiger) attack helicopter modernisation project,” said a July 2019 French senate report.

“Spain is a major political, operational and industrial partner for France, one we must rely upon in order to advance European defence,” said the report, titled European Defence: The Challenge of Strategic Autonomy.

Europeans and the 2022 Ukraine Crisis

01/27/2022

Some recent news stories highlight a variety of European actions and reactions in the current Russian-generated Ukraine crisis.

Ukraine is composed of a variety of ethnic groups, and those ethnic groups are largely from its proximate neighbors. The graph below provides an overview.

Source: https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/major-ethnic-groups-of-the-ukraine.html

The Hungarian government is one of the most-pro Russian states within NATO. And the government highlights its concerns over the Ukrainian government not protecting Hungarian minorities for its stance in the conflict,

According to an article published by EURACTIV, the author underscores  that the current Ukrainian government’ minority rights stance limits any support which Hungry can provide in the conflict.

If Ukrainians do not back down from their anti-minority policy, it will very much limit the Hungarian government’s ability to provide any kind of support, even in this conflict, Foreign Affairs Minister Péter Szijjártó said in an interview with pro-government Magyar Nemzet outlet on Wednesday (26 January), Telex reported.

Budapest and Kyiv have been locked in a row over minority rights since Ukraine’s parliament in 2017 adopted the law “On Ensuring the Functioning of the Ukrainian Language as the State Language,” which Budapest says tramples on the rights of the Transcarpathian ethnic minority to study in Hungarian.

The number of ethnic Hungarians in Ukraine, most of whom live in the Transcarpathia region, is estimated at 140,000.

In turn, Hungary continued to block Ukraine’s cooperation with NATO and the holding of Ukraine-NATO Commission talks.

President Macron with France now assuming the rotating presidency of the EU council for the next six months has taken the opportunity in the crisis to highlight his agenda for European sovereignty.

According to an article published on January 20, 2002 in the EUObserver:

Macron in his speech returned to his theme to call for a more autonomous and sovereign EU.

He said Europe needs to set up its own security framework, and further talks with Moscow.

“In the next months, we should come up with a European proposal, building a new order of security and stability, we must build it among Europeans, then share it with our allies in Nato and then propose it to negotiation with Russia,” Macron said.

Then Europe should “propose it for negotiations with Russia”, he added, saying “we need this dialogue”.

Macron also said the EU cannot be satisfied with only reacting to international crises.

He said the EU should better defend its external borders, and promised to push ahead with an EU rapid reaction force, arguing that Europe needs to better equip itself, and “battle against illegal migration”.

Then in an article published on January 21, 2022 by EURATIV, another element of the French position was highlighted:

France’s plan to possibly deploy troops on NATO’s Eastern flank as fears rise of a Russian attack on Ukraine can be seen as a bid to clarify the ‘misunderstandings’ created by French President Emmanuel Macron, who recently called for the EU to forge its own security pact with Russia, experts say.

French President Emmanuel Macron on Wednesday (19 January) expressed France’s “readiness to go further, and within the framework of NATO to commit to new missions … in particular in Romania”.

The move was welcomed by Romanian President Klaus Iohannis, who on Thursday said this meant “the Romania-France strategic partnership will thus be strengthened on the eastern flank, in the Black Sea region”.

Romania, a NATO member since 2004 and which already hosts around 1,000 US troops on its territory, also said it was ready to welcome more American soldiers.

And in that EURATIV article, a French expert was quoted as saying:

“It is a message we are sending to Romania, which is rather a Francophile and has fairly difficult relations with Russia”, Edouard Simon, research Fellow for European security and defence at the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS), told EURACTIV France.

He also noted that this would signify that “Europeans are increasingly interested in each other’s security interests”.

Macron’s plan “is not to replace NATO or to detach oneself from the United States” but to “simply rebalance” the relationship, said Morcos.

Let us hope Putin understands this subtle message.

And a not so subtle message was expressed by the recent head of the German Navy whose remarks made in India were a cause for him to resign.

An article published on Military.com highlighted this event:

The head of the German navy resigned late Saturday after coming under fire at home and abroad for comments he made on Ukraine and Russia.

Speaking at an event in India on Friday, vice admiral Kay-Achim Schoenbach had said Ukraine would not regain the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia annexed in 2014.

Schoenbach also said it was important to have Russia on the same side against China, and suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin deserved “respect.”

The Baltic states are sending U.S.-made anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine.

The defense ministers of the three Baltic states said in a joint statement published January 21, 2022 that they “stand united in our commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity in face of continued Russian aggression.”

Meanwhile, Germany is blocking such transfers involving German made weapons.

And the Ukrainian defense minister highlighted what he thinks about this as follows:

“They continue to build the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and at the same time block our [purchases of] defensive weapons. This is very unfair,” Ukraine’s defense chief Oleksiy Reznikov stressed in his comments to Financial Times while referring to the Russian gas pipeline that runs through the Baltic Sea to Germany.

The Wall Street Journal provided an overview on the German position seen from the optic of their reliance on Russian gas imports.

Germany’s dependence on Russian gas has left Europe short of options to sanction Moscow if it invades Ukraine—and itself vulnerable should Russia stop gas exports to the West.

A two-decade-old decision to phase out nuclear power and more recent moves to cut reliance on coal in an effort to bring down CO2 emissions mean Germany is now more reliant on Russian gas than most of its neighbors, not just for heating but also for power generation.

This year, the country’s last three nuclear power plants will be closed, just as Germany faces some of the highest energy prices in the developed world. All German coal plants are due to be closed by 2038.

With cheap gas reliably flowing from Russia for decades, successive governments never built an infrastructure to import more expensive liquefied natural gas from major exporters such as the U.S. or Qatar. The country currently has no LNG terminal of its own.

The UK defence minister provided a robust roll back on Putin’s narrative in a statement which the UK government released on January 17, 2022:

I have lost count of how many times recently I have to had to explain the meaning of the English term “straw man” to my European allies. That is because the best living, breathing “straw man” at the moment is the Kremlin’s claim to be under threat from NATO. In recent weeks the Russian Defence Minister’s comment that the US is “preparing a provocation with chemical components in eastern Ukraine” has made that “straw man” even bigger.

It is obviously the Kremlin’s desire that we all engage with this bogus allegation, instead of challenging the real agenda of the President of the Russian Federation. An examination of the facts rapidly puts a match to the allegations against NATO.

And NORDIC cooperation is deepening in response to the crisis, with the most visible aspect of this the revival of interest in both Sweden and Finland in joining NATO.

But whether they join or not, they are key partners in the process of significantly enhanced direct defense cooperation among the Nordic states since the Crimean seizure by Russia.

The crisis has certainly re-affirmed the Finnish decision to buy the F-35 which opens up direct cooperation with a state like Poland which also has the F-35 and is in line to work direct training with the Nordic F-35 states.

In our co-authored book on the return of direct defense in Europe, we highlighted the importance of enhanced Nordic defense cooperation and NORDEFCO as a coordinating forum, and the high probability that the UK post-Brexit would deepened its relationship with the Nordics as they, in turn, deepened their defense cooperation.

The Nordic cooperation piece was highlighted in the 21 January 2022 declaration Nordic declaration on the Ukrainian situation:

The Nordic Ministers of Defence met virtually on 21 January to discuss the deteriorating situation in and around Ukraine. The ministers monitor the security situation in Ukraine closely, and continue to consult with each other through the NORDEFCO Crisis Consultation Mechanism.

The ministers agree on the gravity of the situation, and the need to seek a diplomatic solution to the current situation. The ministers call on Russia to de-escalate through halting and reversing their ongoing military build-up in the region, and engage in dialogue.

The ministers reaffirm their support to Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and its right to decide its own foreign and security policy, free from outside interference. The fundamental principles underpinning the European security order remain non-negotiable.

The Nordic countries welcome dialogue on European security issues in relevant fora, including the EU, NATO, OSCE and the UN. The Nordic countries welcome the United States’ efforts in engaging Russia in resolving the current crisis.

This is what we wrote about the impact of Nordic defense cooperation in shaping a way ahead for the direct defense of Europe in our co-authored book on European defense:

Nordic defense and security cooperation are part of a broader global trend in which clusters of states are working together to enhance their ability to enhance their defense and security against the return of Russia and the rise of China. Clusterization is the next phase whereby liberal democracies do more for themselves in their joint defense rather than simply relying on diplomatic globalization initiatives through organizations like the EU or NATO to do that for them.

“Clusterization” is key to generating enhanced capabilities that can work interdependently with key allies outside of a regional cluster to reinforce the capabilities in a realistic and effective way to deter core adversaries. In the case of the Nordics, clearly the United States is the key outside power, with Brexit Britain and those states within continental Europe which have capabilities which can show up effectively to bolster the underbelly of the Nordic region are the key players that can reinforce Nordic defense.

But at its heart, the Nordics need to bolster their own capabilities as well to work more effectively with their offshore allies and their continental European partners.

But to be blunt: this requires looking more realistically at what the defense of the Nordic region means against the evolution of Russian policies, strategies, and capabilities rather than simply to assume that NATO as a multimember alliance will simply show up.

The Trident Juncture 2018 exercise in Norway is a good example of how a leading Nordic nation is rethinking its policies. On the one hand, Norway is working their national mobilization approach, and on the other hand, they hosted several allies within Norway, and in part, it is a question of what capabilities can be brought in a timely manner that would really make a difference in a crisis.

It is not simply a question of showing up; it is about blending those domestic and allied capabilities into an effective crisis management force against specific and targeted Russian threats.

But providing for enhanced Nordic capability within a broader transatlantic framework remains a work in progress, notably when measured against Russian activities, behavior, and evolving capabilities.

The Ukrainian crisis and the varied European responses underscore the significant differences in commitment to deal with specific crisis dependent on national interest, current government interpretations of those interests, and the proximity to the threat.

Hence, we a getting more realistic read of how the direct of defense of Europe plays out than simply reading NATO communiques of political statements from Washington. This is of course one of Putin’s key objectives as well.

Featured Graphic: Photo 50468756 / Ukrainian Crisis © Steve Allen | Dreamstime.com

F-35 2021 Year in Review

01/26/2022

The F-35 Enterprise continued to forge forward in 2021 to deliver the unmatched capabilities of the most lethal fifth-generation aircraft to warfighters around the world.

With more than 750 F-35s operating from 34 bases and ships around the globe and having flown nearly 470,000 cumulative flight hours, the F-35 plays a critical role in the integrated deterrence of the U.S. and our allies.

12.31.2021
Video by Travis Minyon
F-35 Joint Program Office

The Amphibious Fleet in Maneuver Warfare: The Return to the Sea and Bold Alligator

01/24/2022

By Robbin Laird

I am crafting a series on mobile basing as a strategic capability for the joint force.

The strategic importance of mobile basing goes up with the importance of complicating your adversaries’ targeting solutions and force projection targets.

Seabasing is clearly a key part of being able to do mobile basing, but with the shift from a classic understanding of amphibious operations to enhancing the expeditionary capabilities of the joint and coalition force, what kind of seabases might be crafted in the years ahead?

In this part of the series, I will address re-imaging how to use the extant amphibious force very differently for missions like sea control and sea denial.

There is no area where better value could be leveraged than making dramatically better use of the amphibious fleet for extended battlespace operations.

This requires a re-imaging of what that fleet can deliver to sea control and sea denial as well as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) offense and defense.

In the midst of the land wars, the USMC leadership understood that they needed to prepare for the return to the sea as a primary domain for the way ahead for USMC combat operations. It is difficult to overstate how dominant the warfighting experience ashore has been for shaping this generation of Marines.

But it is also an overstatement that the return to the sea started with call of the current Commandant to enhance naval integration capabilities for the USMC itself.

That call to return to the sea was crystallized in the launching of the Bold Alligator series of exercises beginning with Bold Alligator 2011.

We attended several of the Bold Alligator series exercises and witnessed how the USMC, the U.S. Navy and a number of allies and partners joined in the relaunch in many ways of the next generation of amphibious warfare. For that relaunch was happening, as the Osprey was joining the fleet.

Bold Alligator 2012 (BA-12) was a training exercise for the expeditionary strike group, and the shaping of a new template for the amphibious task force with the coming of the Osprey and the anticipated arrival of the F-35. The template introduced in BA-12 provided a lay down within which force modernization associated with the F-35B and the VM-22 unfolded.

What was evident in that exercise, and the Bold Alligator exercises which followed, was that the amphibious fleet was shifting from using the ships to function largely as a Greyhound bus carrying Marines ashore to becoming a strike force at sea, and from the sea. At that 2012 exercise we discussed the effort being generated at the time to lay down a new template with officers involved with that exercise

Capt. Sam Howard at the time of the exercise was Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk VA. Marine Col. Phil Ridderhof, senior Marine Corps adviser to U.S. Fleet Forces Command in Norfolk, Va. Capt. Howard began his career in destroyer operations and most recently before his Norfolk Assignment was the skipper of the USS Bataan. During his time on Bataan, he participated in the Haiti relief efforts.

Capt. Howard emphasized that one of the opportunities generated by the exercise was to familiarize other services with the key advantages provided to the joint force by seabasing. “A seabase is a concept that regrettably is foreign to the other services, at least in real practice; and we were able to certainly demonstrate it in real practice in real-time in the case of Haiti and will be able to expand on the exercise.” Howard underscored the importance of the exercise as a combined arms approach and useful to re-shaping military doctrine. “It’s a combined arms endeavor, and so getting to that thought process of making it a combined arms thing is certainly very important to us.”

Col. Ridderhof picked up on the combined arms theme introduced and discussed by Capt. Howard. He emphasized that the exercise was built in part around operating at a different level than an Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG-MEU) was capable of operating. “The ARG and the MEU are very important, very capable. When you start getting bigger than the ARG and the MEU an amphibious operation is not simply a quantitative increase. There’s a qualitative difference in how you think about organizing the task force.

“The ARG-MEU is built around three core ships and the MEU is of a regimental size, with a battalion landing team, combat logistics, battalion, and the composite squadron. The MEB being used in this exercise is a different animal. One of our challenges in the Marine Corp is how do you describe the MEB? It can be anywhere from 10,000 to 17,000 soldiers, but in general, it is a regimental landing team with at least three battalions, plus a Marine air group size of an aviation combat element and combat logistics regiment-sized support element.

“One of the key things is that to do all six functions of Marine Corp Aviation, to do command and control, is central to the operational capabilities. A MEU has little pieces, but to do the big Marine Corp Aviation Command and Control pieces is a significant jump in capability. You need all of the pieces of Marine aviation, and then all the logistics to sustain that for 30 days plus.”[1]

And the large-deck carrier is shifting its approach as part of this operational construct. Col. Ridderhof underscored: “Bold Alligator is testing today’s capability but because we haven’t done this this way, the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander (CFMCC) has typically not been considering the littoral as a whole, going all the way to that objective ashore as his battle space. He’s influencing it surely but hasn’t been thinking of it all the way there. Just as the ARG MEU would be first on the scene, how does the Carrier Strike group fold into the scalability of the operation?”

Capt. Howard emphasized: “The reality is, all this is in the context of a joint war fighting organization. And among the lessons we will take from this is how to develop further the unique war fighting relationship between Navy and Marine Corp and how does that best plug into the total force, joint force.”

Obviously, the refocus on the strategic shift from the primacy of the land wars to engaging peer competitors was already underway in this Bold Alligator 2012 exercise. In our interview with Brig. Gen. Owens, the 2nd MEF Commander, held after that exercise, he highlighted how he saw the exercise effort. “One of the things that was different in this exercise from many previous amphibious large-scale exercises is we executed in what we called a medium threat, anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment. The threat focus is primarily on the area denial piece, which is closer in, but which is more realistic for the timeframe of the exercise.

“The threat we faced at sea started with submarines, missile patrol boats, fast-attack craft, fast inshore attack craft, and some asymmetric threats with commandeered fishing boats, low slow-flyers, and some tactical air. But of greater concern was coastal defense cruise missiles, initially fixed sites, as well as mobile, and then ultimately, just a threat of additional mobile sites.

“And then, the most ubiquitous threat that we’re going to face is mines. In the exercise, we faced a very robust mine capability. We had a wide range of capabilities on the Navy side to help deal with those threats, but we also integrated the MEB in that, particularly our air. These assets were used both in targeting threats to the amphibious task force ashore, as well as providing defense of the amphibious task force primarily with our aviation asset. But we also involved some of our ground combat elements when they were aboard the ship.

“That continued even after we went ashore. And this is something that we really haven’t practiced; this full integration, of the Marine capability in the overall ability to both to project force, and to protect those naval assets that are projecting that force.”

The exercise was focused on redesign of the current force structure to achieve the desired combat effect in order to lay down a template for the changes to come. As Brig. Gen Owens put it: “I think flexibility is a key word. In this exercise, we focused on today’s forces for today’s fight. What it really was about was getting the greatest impact, the greatest benefit out of the capabilities we have. For example, in our countermine effort, we recognize that in order to do countermine work here on the east coast of the U.S., it’s going to involve coalition participation. So, we had Canadian mine hunters out working with U.S. divers in conjunction with Dutch divers, Canadian divers supported by the Coast Guard providing a cutter to help provide force protection for the mine hunters.

“And our Navy forces provided close in protection for both the mine hunters, and then subsequently, for some of our maritime sealift command shipping that was coming into the same areas. Thus, in addition to integrating the Marine and Navy pieces, we also expanded our search to what other capabilities that other countries, other services, for instance, the coast guard, and even the interagency could provide. We didn’t really touch on the inter-agency aspect too much in Bold Alligator 12, but it is an aspiration for the future. We want to be able to tap into capabilities that will help us defeat some of these asymmetric threats, in particular, in order to project force ashore.”

Brig. Gen Owens underscored a very key point about shaping a way ahead with the force you have to shaping the future force. “From this point of view, the goal of the exercise was to shape an effective concept of operations with current capabilities. We’ve got to have the concept of operations in place as we integrate new capabilities going forward.”

The latest capability which was included at the time was the Osprey. In fact, while journalists waited on shore for the insertion force, the Osprey team had led an assault deep into the battlespace. And even more interestingly, the Ospreys launched from a range of seabases, including a Military Sealift Command ship. At the time, we highlighted how the coming of the Osprey impacted thinking about the amphibious assault force. “An assault raid was conducted from the seabase deep inland (180 miles) aboard the Ospreys with allied forces observing or participating. The Osprey was the key element operating in this exercise, which was not there during the last big “amphibious” exercise. [2]

And with the launch from an MSC ship, the Osprey was highlighting the next phase, rather than focusing on the ARG-MEU, one could think in terms of an amphibious task force.

This is how Brig. Gen Owens highlighted the importance of the event. “The T-AKE is bringing in our dry cargo. So they bring in beyond what the amphibious ships carry, they’ll bring in food, water, and they are ships that bring in our ammunition. That was what we exercised using the V22s to land on the T-AKE, and we had our logistics regiment Marines posted aboard the TAKE to work on the distribution piece.”

In fact, the “return to the sea” energized by the training efforts in the Bold Alligator exercises came at the same time that the Osprey was making its broader impact on the USMC. There is no more dramatic case of a platform introducing disruptive change in a service than the Osprey to the USMC.

The USMC is the only tiltrotor-enabled combat force in the world, and it has introduced significant change throughout the redesign of the USMC and is continuing to do so as the USMC works its evolving approach to integration with the U.S. Navy in blue water expeditionary operations.

After an initial learning curve of how to integrate the Osprey with the Amphibious Ready Group-Marine Expeditionary Force, the speed and range of the Osprey changed the ARG-MEU and reshaped how the amphibious ships would deploy in support of combatant commanders.[3]

In Bold Alligator 2013, the working relationships between the U.S. Navy and the USMC were strengthened as the U.S. Navy began to focus more on how to support sea-based power projection with USMC force mix.

As Col. Bradley Weisz, Deputy Commander, Expeditionary Strike Group TWO, commented at the time about Bold Alligator 2013: “We are getting away from the legacy stove-pipe systems and moving to better collaboration, more integration with our entire fleet force. This is absolutely essential in today’s complex and constantly evolving operating environment; especially when you start talking about the increased anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) threats that we will face and encounter in the littoral regions. Yes, we are developing and shaping some innovative approaches to deal with these emerging threats.

“As far as leveraging our sea basing capabilities in direct support of our amphibious forces, we will aggressively employ and utilize nine military sealift command ships, MSC ships, as part of our logistics task force. We will have three fleet oilers (T-AOs) that can hold and carry a sizable amount of class I (subsistence) and class III (POL). We will also have two highly capable dry cargo/ammunition ships (T-AKEs) that can haul and deliver substantial amounts of class III (POL) and class V (ground/aviation ammunition) products.

“Along with the T-AOs and T-AKEs, we will have one fast combat support ship (T-AOE) that can provide significant class I (subsistence), class III (POL) and class V (ground/aviation ammunition) capabilities in support of our CSG and ATF forces. Additionally, we will employ and utilize one Aviation Logistics Support Ship (T-AVB) that will provide crucial aviation intermediate maintenance support and repair services to all of our landing force aircraft afloat. This includes all fixed wing, rotary wing, and tilt rotor aircraft afloat.”

Bold Alligator 2014 was a crisis response exercise and continued the work of Bold Alligator 2012 and Bold Alligator 2013. The exercise involved working with an evolving C2 capability to manage forces operating throughout key objective areas. The presence of the Osprey allowed the U.S. and its allies to operate against longer range objective areas as well as other objective areas reachable by rotorcraft and reinforced by landing forces.

The seabases involved in the exercises were characterized by logistical integrity meaning the insertion forces can be supported by the seabase, and it is not necessary to build forward operating bases or to land significant supplies ashore in order to prosecute missions. It is a force tailored to crisis management, as opposed to having to rely on bringing significant forces ashore along with their gear in order to mount operations.

A key part of the Bold Alligator 2014 exercise was a major effort to rework command and control for force insertion from the seabase able to work with the maneuver forces ashore.

Follow up interviews in 2015 with Maj. Gen. Richard L. Simcock II, Commanding General, 2d MEB, and Maj. Marcus Mainz, lead 2d MEB planner for Exercise Bold Alligator 2014 highlighted the evolving approach. They underscored those innovations in aviation allowed the Marines to extend their reach and provide greater flexibility for amphibious operations. The reworking of the amphibious fleet to deliver capabilities to project power from the sea and the ability of the infantry to implement innovations in maneuver warfare and force insertion require creativity in operational design and C2.

2d MEB exercises C2 of scalable and modular forces by delegating it to a level where tactical operations are more effective. This construct facilitates mastery of the operational environment in a fluid combat situation by keeping focus at the appropriate levels. It gives the MEB CE (command element) the capability to focus on the operational art that bridges the strategic and tactical levels for political objectives.

Execution of the mission, empowerment of subordinate leaders at the appropriate level, and maintaining situational awareness of the overall situation is a key challenge for C2. The complexity begins with incorporation of joint and coalition forces for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), operations.

Given that joint and coalition capabilities enhance response time and effectiveness of global operations, C2 takes on a whole new meaning when shaping the appropriate composite force for missions across the ROMO (Range of Military Operations), which makes it central to effective Marine Corps Operations.

Maj. Gen. Simcock explained in his interview that the importance of “providing the Combatant Commander with a force capable of plugging into various joint, coalition, and interagency requirements is essential. The realities of the 21st century security environment demand a smart power approach inclusive of all services of the military, our partners and interagency organizations, which play an integral role in fulfilling National Security Strategy.”

Integration of allied and partner nation operational capabilities and systems with the U.S. amphibious fleet will develop, in effect, a global U.S.-Allied amphibious fleet capability. Maj. Gen Simcock also discussed emerging demand for partnership with 2d MEB in global security “since the Marine Corps has revitalized the MEB concept capable of world-wide deployment, we have been contacted by many of our coalition partners, allies and other nations interested in training and operating with 2d MEB.”

The way Maj. Mainz explained it: “Composite forces are created when you take disparate forces, which are underneath different command and control structures, and place them underneath one commander tasked with a specific mission. The 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade is ‘a receiver of forces.’ We work various compositing options and shape the C2 for those forces coming together to perform the mission.”

Maj. Mainz likened the 2d MEB Command Element (CE) to a Swiss army knife.

“We want to be the Swiss Army knife of command and control. We want to morph or adapt into whatever environment we’re in—coalition or joint. 2d MEB sees itself as a scalable CE capable of C2 for disparate forces, coalition and/or joint, to address the unique requirements of Combatant Commanders in uncertain environment.

“The unique term we used during Bold Alligator is we can become a Commander of MAGTFs, not a MAGTF Commander. What that means is we see our Command Element as so flexible we don’t have to go into a normal Marine construct.”

I will stop with Bold Alligator 2014, but the key point is that prior to significant withdrawals from the Middle East engagement, USMC leaders focused on the return to the sea and reworking with the Navy, how to deliver an integrated force from the seabase to project force ashore and to support it afloat.

[1] The six functions of Marine Corps Aviation are offensive air support, anti-air warfare, assault support, air reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and control of aircraft and missiles.

[2] Robbin Laird, “Bold Alligator: A Glimpse of Marine, Navy Future,” Breaking Defense (March 21, 2012), https://breakingdefense.com/2012/03/bold-alligator-a-glimpse-of-marine-navy-future/

[3] Robbin Laird and Murielle Delaporte, The Osprey and Disruptive Change: The Operational Impact of the Osprey on the USMC, draft manuscript in progress.

Featured Photo: A CH-53E Super Stallion takes off from Fort Pickett, Va., to return to the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), during an amphibious assault exercise as part of Bold Alligator 2012.

Exercise Bold Alligator 2012, the largest naval amphibious exercise in the past 10 years, represents the Navy and Marine Corps’ revitalization of the full range of amphibious operations. The exercise focuses on today’s fight with today’s forces, while showcasing the advantages of seabasing.

FORT PICKETT, VA.

02.07.2012

Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Christopher Lenart 

Expeditionary Combat Camera

Brigadier General Owens on Lessons Learned in Bold Alligator 2012 from SldInfo.com on Vimeo.

P8 at Sea

A P8-A Poseidon flies past the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Ross (DDG 71) during a combat drill in the Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 27, 2021.

Ross, forward-deployed to Rota, Spain, is on its 12th patrol in the U.S. Sixth Fleet area of operations.

12.27.2021
Video by Petty Officer 2nd Class Claire DuBois
Navy Public Affairs Support Element East Detachment Europe

Allied Resolve 2022 Exercise: Russia Brings Troops from Far East to Belarus

01/23/2022

A major Russian military exercise with Belarus is part of the evolving Russian narrative to pressure Europe and the United States.

And this Russian broadcast on 18 January 2022 highlighted an interview with a Russian military expert that explained that it was about defending its interests against the “aggressive West.”

“Any Belarusian-Russian military exercise is always under the scrutiny of the West, but today it acquires special military and political significance.  When NATO is building up its contingent in Ukraine, the Baltic States and Poland, when there is an unprecedented external pressure on Russia and Belarus, the joint exercises “Allied Resolve-2022″ will show everyone that we are together. This was pointed out by the military expert, political analyst Ivan Konovalov.”

In an interesting article published by Defence24 on January 20, 2022, the Allied Resolve 2022 exercise is analyzed.

Excerpts from that article follow but the complete article can be found here:

The exercise is to be organized in two stages. The first stage, already underway and scheduled to last until 9th February 2022, envisages that elements and assets of units involved would be deployed to the “threatened” regions.

Security and defence schemes for important state and military infrastructure would be organized.

Air defence activities, within the scope of joint regional Belorussian and Russian air defence systems, would be intensified. A readiness and capability test for the assets involved is also scheduled to happen. Belorussian-Russian combat training air defence center would participate in the above.

The main portion of the exercise is scheduled to happen between 10th and 20th February.

During the exercise, the border protection would be reinforced, to prevent illegal infiltration by armed groups, and to seal off the arms, ammunition, and other assets delivery channels that could be used to destabilize the internal situation.

Another scenario of the exercise would involve search and destroy activities targeting illegally armed groups and enemy recon/SOF units. All of those activities would be taking place in parallel to standard training.

Undoubtedly, the involvement of Russian military units from the Eastern Military District is the most interesting piece of news here. This is the most distant (geographically) military district located in Asia. Deployment of those units to Belarus would be another test for the Russian supply chain and logistics….

The unannounced exercise fits well in the Russian propaganda narrative.

Yet again, the operation is to demonstrate the alliance of some of the former members of the Soviet Union, along with the rapid deployment capability for designated units. The Russian Armed Forces, dispersed within the vast territory, are continuously getting ready to gather in the designated theater.

This year’s deployment of units from the Eastern Military District to Belarus would be a show of force of the Russian logistics.

It is also to show that units from all military districts can be deployed to Belarus, close to the Polish border.

The opportunity to seal off the Belorussian-Ukrainian border thanks to the Allied Resolve 2022 exercise may be worrying – should Russia decide to take adverse actions against Ukraine.

The featured graphic: Photo 53972702 / Belarus © Ebastard129 | Dreamstime.com

Allied Spirit Exercise Begins: January 2022

HOHENFELS, Germany – Exercise Allied Spirit 22 kicked off in earnest Jan. 21 as soldiers transitioned into the force-on-force phase at the 7th Army Training Command’s Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hohenfels, Germany.

Approximately 5,200 soldiers from 15 nations including Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States are participating in the exercising from Jan. 21 to Feb. 5.

Joint Multinational Readiness Center hosts Allied Spirit, a training exercise designed to enable integration between allies and partners in a competitive combat training environment. Unlike the Saber Junction and Combined Resolve series at JMRC, which feature U.S. brigade combat teams in a lead role augmented by allies and partners, Allied Spirit places an allied unit as the main training audience.

Allied Spirit 22 is led by the German Army’s 1st Armoured Division, whose staff is providing command and control over a multinational brigade and other constructive elements. Based in Oldenburg, the division is part of NATO’s 1st German Netherlands Corps.

“Allied Spirit 22 is a very important exercise for 1st Armoured Division,” said Brig. Gen. Heico Huebner, the division’s commander. “It provides excellent training opportunities in an outstanding training environment for parts of the German 41st Mechanised Infantry Brigade as well as the command post of the Dutch 43rd Mech. Inf. Bde., both formations being part of 1st Armoured Div.”

JMRC is the Army’s only Combat Training Center outside the United States, providing a mobile training capability to Europe that trains leaders, staffs and units up to Brigade Combat Teams alongside allies and partners, to dominate in the conduct of Unified Land Operations anywhere in the world.

“Each rotation incorporates the most up-to-date techniques, tactics, and procedures to ensure the units have the best training environment available,” said U.S. Army Maj. David Allen, operations chief for JMRC.

JMRC is a component of 7th Army Training Command, the U.S. Army’s only overseas training command, setting the training environment and resourcing live, virtual and constructive training for all U.S. Army forces stationed and deployed in Europe and Africa, as well as select U.S. European Command allied and partner units.

“Allied Spirit provides U.S. units with the opportunity to train with allies and partners in a simulated combat environment,” said Allen. “This strengthens the alliance and facilitates the exchange of ideas, techniques, and procedures between militaries.”

As Allied Spirit has progressed since its inception, division headquarters from U.S. and Allied units have been integrated into the exercise to increase opportunities to execute division planning and maneuver.

“For the command post of 1st Armoured Division, it is a unique opportunity to act in a multinational environment by commanding an Italian and our own 43rd Dutch Mechanised Bde., which will enhance significantly our capabilities towards the Full Operational Capability as a Warfighting Headquarter in a high-intensity warfighting scenario,” said Huebner.

Approximately 1100 U.S. Soldiers will participate in Allied Spirit 22, including elements from the deployed Operation Atlantic Resolve armored brigade combat team and combat aviation brigade: 3rd Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas; and the 2nd Squadron, 227th General Support Aviation Bn., 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cav. Div., stationed at Fort Hood, TX. Elements from the Ansbach, Germany-based 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment will also participate.

“Allied Spirit gives us the chance to interact and work with important allies and partners,” said U.S. Army Col. Reggie Harper, commander of the 1st Air Cav. Bde. “This is an excellent training opportunity for Air Cav to improve as a unit and as a member of the combined arms team.

Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kansas; and the 2nd Squadron, 227th General Support Aviation Bn., 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cav. Div., stationed at Fort Hood, TX. Elements from the Ansbach, Germany-based 5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment will also participate.

“Allied Spirit gives us the chance to interact and work with important allies and partners,” said U.S. Army Col. Reggie Harper, commander of the 1st Air Cav. Bde. “This is an excellent training opportunity for Air Cav to improve as a unit and as a member of the combined arms team.

HOHENFELS, GERMANY

01.21.2022

Story by Sgt. Cory Reese 

7th Army Training Command

Featured Photo: Alpha Troop AH-64E Apache helicopters, 7th Squadron 17th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, on an airfield for training exercise Allied Spirit, Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

(U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Cesar Rivas, 164th Air Defense Artillery Brigade)