Battalion Landing Team 1/1, 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, serves as the Ground Combat Element for the 11th MEU’s Marine Air-Ground Task Force.
The reinforced infantry battalion is responsible for missions such as heliborne raids, amphibious assaults, tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel and embassy reinforcement.
PACIFIC OCEAN
07.30.2021
Video by Cpl. Ian Simmons
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit
In early September 2021, the U.S. Navy set up a new task force to deliver usable unmanned systems for enhanced maritime capabilities in the 5th Fleet Area of Operations.
In a story written by MC1 Roland Franklin and published on September 9, 2021 by the U.S. Navy:
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) established a new task force, Sept. 9, to rapidly integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence with maritime operations in the 5th Fleet area of operations.
Task Force 59 is the first U.S. Navy task force of its kind.
The U.S. 5th Fleet region’s unique geography, climate, and strategic importance offer an ideal environment for innovation.
“The bottom line on why we’re doing this is so that we can develop and integrate unmanned systems and AI as a means to do two things,” said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of NAVCENT, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. “One, enhance our maritime domain awareness, and two, increase deterrence.”
Cooper also stated the task force would rely heavily on regional and coalition partnerships.
“The launch of Task Force 59 really invigorates our partnerships around this region as we expand our common operating picture.”
Cooper appointed Capt. Michael D. Brasseur, an expert in maritime robotics, as Task Force 59’s first commodore during a commissioning ceremony onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Thursday. Brasseur served as a founding member of the NATO Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative prior to arriving in Bahrain.
“It’s an honor to be named commander of this historic and innovative task force,” said Brasseur. “As we continue to adapt and implement cutting edge technology, I fully expect our talented team will enrich and enhance the 5th Fleet mission.”
Brasseur’s staff includes experienced operators with region-specific expertise, including directors for unmanned systems; unmanned exercises; task force integration; cyber, AI and space; and partnership opportunities.
In the coming weeks, the task force aims to build trust and confidence in human-machine teaming through a series of operations at sea. International Maritime Exercise (IMX) 22, slated for next year, will provide NAVCENT a real-world opportunity to demonstrate the resiliency and scalability of human-machine teaming technologies.
IMX-22 will include more than 60 nations and international organizations and features the extensive use of unmanned systems in various operational scenarios designed to challenge the technology in a dynamic environment and ultimately enhance partner capabilities through manned and unmanned teaming.
The U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations encompasses nearly 2.5 million square miles of water area and includes the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean. The region is comprised of 21 countries and includes three critical choke points at the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb at the southern tip of Yemen.
And in in a story written by John. W. Miller and Ari Cicurel published on October 6, 2021, this is how the Task Force’s role was explained:
“By increasing the Fifth Fleet’s unmanned operations in the Middle East, TF-59 will realize more persistent and capable intelligence coverage and more capacity to deter, detect, prevent, and respond to Iranian maritime aggression than conventional manned platforms currently produce.
“Incorporating surveillance and attack unmanned platforms above, on, and under the sea into a sensor network will provide earlier warning of Iranian intentions and attacks, further enabling a secure maritime environment throughout the region. The persistence of unmanned vehicles serves as a force multiplier at a time when America needs to repurpose manned ships and aircraft in support of emerging national.”
The authors noted: “TF- 59 will have unmanned platforms, such as the unmanned surface vehicles Sea Hunter and Seahawk, the MQ-9B Sea Guardian, and the MQ-8B Fire Scout autonomous helicopter.”
But notably,. the Task Force featured in a recent video the “little engine that could” as a key capability they were exercising now, the MANTAS T-12 which is part of a family of USVs avaialbe right now for the U.S. and allied Navies.
According to the Command:
“MANTAS T-12 unmanned surface vessels operating in the Arabian Gulf alongside U.S. Navy crewed assets.
“This was the first unmanned/manned teaming activity underway for U.S. 5th Fleet’s new Task Force 59. The task force was established Sept. 9 to accelerate the development and integration of new unmanned systems across the fleet.”
10.20.2021
Video by Sgt. Thiem Huynh
U.S. Naval Forces Central Command / U.S. 5th Fleet
The featured photo: Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, left, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, shakes hands with Capt. Michael D. Brasseur, the first commodore of Task Force (TF 59) during a commissioning ceremony for TF 59 onboard Naval Support Activity Bahrain, Sept. 9. TF 59 is the first U.S. Navy task force of its kind, designed to rapidly integrate unmanned systems and artificial intelligence with maritime operations in the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations. (Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Dawson Roth).
Also, see the following:
https://defense.info/system-type/martac-maritime-autonomous-systems/
Battle Group Poland’s British Army contingent, Poacher Troop, practiced reconnaissance firing and maneuvering during a live-fire exercise at Bemowo Piskie Training Area, Poland, September 1, 2021.
Poacher Troop is Battle Group Poland’s primary intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance asset.
BEMOWO PISKIE TRAINING AREA, POLAND
09.01.2021
Video by Sgt. 1st Class Adrian Patoka
Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup Poland
By Robbin Laird and Pierre Tran
On September 22, 2021, we had a chance to meet Army General (retired) Didier Castres and discuss the evolution of military operations and strategy under president Macron.
Castres is a highly experienced staff officer who has been engaged in activities associated with crisis management and the French forces.
He is a graduate of Saint Cyr military college and spent most of his operational career in the Infanterie de marine. He became deputy to the chief of staff of the president of the Republic from 2005-2009 with presidents Chirac and Sarkozy, and then commanded for five years from 2009-2011 the Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations (CPCO), the planning cell for operations attached to the Etat Major des Armées (EMA), or general staff. He then was appointed deputy chief of staff for operations from 2011 to 2016 with the general staff.
While at the EMA, Castres participated in a number of operations either led by France or with France working within EU, NATO or UN coalitions, in Afghanistan, the Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic, Iraq, and Syria. He worked on the planning and command of the Serval and Barkhane operations. Then in 2016, he was appointed Inspecteur général des armées. He retired in 2020 from the French army and created a consulting firm focused on defense, notably with regard to African issues.
We had a wide-ranging discussion with Castres, looking at many aspects of the challenges facing crisis management for French forces and for those of French allies.
His deep knowledge of both national and coalition operations informed his discussion of the significant challenges which the Western states face in defending their interests in the context of strategic change.
Towards the end of our discussion, we focused on president Macron and how he has approached crises, after discussing the evolving strategic context for military operations. But we will start our article by starting with the Macron element of the discussion.
It has been often noted that when Macron became president, he was 39 years old and the youngest president in French history and the youngest French head of state since Napoleon. But Castres added some key points from a military officer’s point of view.
Macron is of the new generation which did not serve in national conscription, which also applies to the younger generation in parliament. This is in stark contrast to the then president Chirac who served in the Algerian war, and based on his own experience, warned then President George W. Bush of what would happen if the United States led an invasion of Iraq.
Macron is the first French president born in the age of globalization. Globalization of the economy was a given for Macron and his generation. His predecessors saw it arrive; he was born into it and it is a baseline assumption.Macron inherited crises and participated in coalition actions, but he engaged in modifying or reshaping engagements, rather than initiating ones of his own.
Macron has been engaged in crisis management from the beginning of his mandate and has taken an approach which the British and Americans call a “whole of government” approach. His national security council sessions, or conseil de défense et sécurité nationale, have not been limited to the military or foreign policy or intelligence apparatus. They have included ministers of justice, education, and others dependent on the particular crisis. From Macron’s perspective, crisis management was not primarily a military only or military led operation.
But that raises the broader question of how to engage in crisis management of the world as it is and not the world that we might wish.
Here Castres had many insights to share, as well as highlighting how he saw the specific French advantages in crisis management.
The strategic environment is significantly changing in which authoritarian competitors or adversaries are working to use information war, cyber conflict, gray zone operations, and other means to gain their tactical and strategic objectives. How will we respond? How will we use military and other means to counter such operations?
One way to look at the challenge is to focus on the adversary using lethal force up to the level necessary to achieve their objectives, but stopping short of generating significant conventional military conflict. How to counter lethal operations and successfully master escalation management?
A key challenge for Western states is there is a heavy reliance on coalitions to shape engagements. The problem was seen in Afghanistan, said Castres, where the Americans focused on the cohesion of a coalition of 30 or 40 nations. As he noted: “There may be cohesion but there is no longer a common objective for the operation.”
Coalitions are built around interoperability.
On the one hand, there is the question of military interoperability, for the forces of the various nations being able to work together.
On the other hand, there is the more difficult challenge of cultural interoperability.
With regard to cultural interoperability, Castres underscored the different nations have different traditions, different histories, different expectations with regard to the use of military force. What this means is that the nature of the coalition which is put together will define what military objectives can really be obtained.
He noted that for the military it was important to have clarity and objectives for the use of force. The military understands that it is not engaged to simply eliminate an enemy, but “to create conditions for a political resolution of a crisis.”
“This means that there needs to be a blunt and honest discussion between politicians and military leaders about what is realistic in terms of what the military can achieve.
“We do not want military leaders to engage in vagueness and duplicity with regard to what the military can and cannot do.
:The objectives set in Afghanistan were completely unrealistic in terms of transforming the country; a realistic objective lies in reducing the capability of terrorists to operate outside Afghanistan, and there are military means to do so. But transforming a country is not a military operation per se.”
Castres argued that the battle space is being transformed with information war, cyber engagements, and other means about winning the war without fighting.
This means that the French engagement in Africa, for example, is as much about engaging and winning an information war as it is about controlling territory and eliminating terrorist strongholds.
He argued that with regard to France’s African operations, Macron’s goal has been to support African nations to create the conditions whereby their territories do not function as international safe havens for jihadism, and to do so without a strong permanent presence of Western forces.
This goal is difficult, but this has been pursued through three missions.
The first is along the lines of the U.S. SOCOM in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, namely, to hunt down terrorist leaders.
The second is to build and support operational partnerships with French and EU troops going into combat with African troops. This has been seen in both the French Barkhane and EU Takuba operations.
The third is to provide a French guarantee of support to African nations with quick reaction troops and support from drones, fighters and helicopters.
The French are able to conduct such intervention because of the DNA of expeditionary operations inherent within the French forces. Castres quoted a famous British statement that captures the expeditionary spirit: “move now, orders to follow.” The French forces are capable of doing so and this means that the French forces are able to move more rapidly than other European nations after a presidential decision to go to an area of interest.
He also noted the ability of the French forces to adapt to local populations and situations in Africa as an advantage which the French have.
In short, President Macron has been president as globalization has faltered, conflict with ISIS and other terrorist organizations has been persistent, and coalition dynamics have been defined by Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa.
The challenge lies with shaping a way ahead for France within its coalition-based alliances with the EU and NATO.
What is clear is that ensuring that military and coalition logic is crucial to shaping a way ahead for France to meet its national interests.
The featured photo is taken from the following source:
https://www.voltairenet.org/article190403.html
U.S. Marines with Company B., 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (Reinforced), Marine Rotational Force – Darwin, participate in a mechanized infantry assault with Australian Army soldiers during Exercise Koolendong at Bradshaw Field Training Area, NT, Australia, Aug. 28, 2021.
The mechanized infantry assault allowed Marines to work alongside Australian M113AS4 Armored Personnel Carriers and M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks to seize an objective point.
BRADSHAW FIELD TRAINING AREA, NT, AUSTRALIA
08.28.2021
Video by Cpl. Lydia Gordon
Marine Rotational Force – Darwin
By Robbin Laird
During my visit to Europe earlier this Fall, the surprise announcement of the Morrison Administration’s decision to shift from their French alliance to deliver a long-range diesel submarine to acquiring nuclear submarine capability through an alliance with the United States and Britain was made. I talked with both French and Australian analysts and provided my initial assessment in a series of articles which highlighted the decision and the dynamics of change associated with that decision.
But what was clear that the strategic environment has changed dramatically from when the Australian government made its decision to stay with a conventional submarine capability. The nature of the Chinese threat as well as the actions of the Xi Administration has clearly driven a shift in Australian thinking and perceived needs for longer range operational capability in the Indo-Pacific region.
At the same time, its closest allies in the region the United States and Japan clearly recognize the need to expand their capabilities to operate throughout the region to complicate Chinese operational considerations, and to deter via more capability to operate throughout the wider Pacific as well.
The announced decision highlighted an 18-month period with Vice Admiral Jonathan Mead in charge on the Australian side of negotiating within the new nuclear submarine alliance to deliver Australian solutions. I interviewed Mead when he was head of Navy Capability in 2016. He then went on to be Commander Australian Fleet and then Chief of Joint Capabilities and Command of Joint Capabilities Group. He has a strong ASW background as well as working closely with the other member of the Quad, namely India. He is now the Chief of the Nuclear -Powered Submarine Task Force.
There is much to be determined with regard to how Australia will proceed, but given the dynamic changes in the strategic environment and the working relationships with allies in the region, there are a much wider array of options than with the short-fin Barracuda program.
With the United States clearly seeking to expand its operating areas in the Pacific, and with Australia building capabilities to operate its own nuclear submarines, it would be no surprise if nuclear submarines began operating within the Australian first island chain. It would be no surprise if there might be mixed manning solutions onboard U.S. or UK nuclear submarines in anticipation of the future Australian submarine. It would be no surprise if Australia sought alternatives to full build of nuclear submarines on Australian soil, and find something more akin to F-35 solution sets.
To be clear, this is a work in progress but one that will not be a replay of how the Australians addressed the replacement of the Collins class with a full build Australian vessel on Australian soil.
The pressures to defend Australia, and to engage the Japanese and Americans in a more effective undersea warfare set of capabilities is a pressing not long-range challenge.
I had a chance to discuss these issues on October 14, 2021, in a phone interview with Vice-Admiral (Retired) Tim Barrett, with whom I have had the opportunity to discuss maritime issues since 2015.
I look forward to pursuing these discussions and issues when I return to Australia in March 2021.
As the exact nature of what will happen in the program is a work in progress and not really open to public disclosure until that 18-month period is completed, we focused on the context and how one might assess that context.
Vice-Admiral (Retired) Barrett made three key points.
First, the nuclear submarine effort was a strategic one, which was about Australian defense and not primarily focused on a priority on ship building on Australian soil.
It is crucial to understand that this is about adding core defense capabilities earlier rather than later and would almost certainly encompass interaction between shaping the eco system for the operation of Australian nuclear submarines and the presence of allied nuclear submarines working with the Australian eco system.
The second key point was that the priority needed to be focused on adding nuclear submarine capability to the evolving USW or ASW capability which Australia was already building out.
The Australian government recently decided to add another squadron of Romeo helicopters to the fleet, and has procured P-8s and Tritons as part of an expanded ASW or USW warfighting capability.
The submarine is not a silver bullet for ASW or USW mission sets but part of the evolution of the kill web approach to ASW and USW missions going forward.
When I interviewed with Ed Timperlake the Second SubGroup Commander, he emphasized that for the evolving concepts of operations of ASW or USW which he referred to as a “team sport,” the submarine was not primarily focused on killing other submarines, but the U.S. Navy was expanding the submarine’s roles and missions and at the same time, they were expanding the tool kit for executing ASW an USW operations as well.
According to Barrett: “The submarine decision is part of a broader set of decisions with regard to how the ADF should respond to the challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
“This was a deliberate and considered position from the Navy’s perspective, but the political and geopolitical circumstances have changed.
“This is not the first time that Australia has sought or considered the acquisition of a nuclear submarine.”
The decision is based on the need to provide more capability to the coalition to conduct USW or ASW in the region.
In that way, it is analogues to the Growler decision taken a few years ago.
The third key point was that flexibility and innovations will be part of working out a way ahead and he noted that Mead had worked with him previously.
When Commander of the Australian Fleet, then Commodore Mead was instrumental in working an innovative plan to manage a temporary capability deficiency for fleet fuel tanking. To shore up a gap, the RAN ‘leased’ a Spanish Navy oiler for 8 months, and the RAN crews trained on the ship and operated the ship in support of the Australian Fleet.
Eventually, the RAN acquired two new Spanish oilers, but the kind of innovation demonstrated in this example, will almost certainly be part of the way ahead in meeting the challenges of accelerating the operational acquisition of nuclear submarine capacity in support of Australian defense.
According to Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett: “The strategic environment has changed. We need to reconsider the balance between sovereign capability for a thirty-year build and the need for creation of capability in the near term. The earlier 30-year period build approach should not be the dominant approach; the capability and its presence to shape deterrent capabilities is crucial and work out over time how the build side of this effort is clarified and put in place.”
“The program needs to be driven by the need for creative capability options first.”
For my report on the recent Australian submarine decision, see the following:
By Robbin Laird
Recently, I had a chance to discuss with Air Vice-Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn the work he been engaged in since last I was in Australia in March 2020. The team has recently released a final report on the challenges facing Australia to become a more resilient society as well as their report on challenges facing Australia in the energy sector as well to build out resilient capabilities.
Prior to the pandemic, John was pursuing several issues affecting resilience, initially from a largely defense point of view, but then broadened his lens to a wider set of issues. Now with the nearly two-year pandemic impact, the issue is clearly not a niche issue.
Question: Your work on resilience preceded the pandemic, but obviously has now been informed as well by the impact of the pandemic on supply chains, medical manufacturing and fuel and energy issues as well. How would you describe your journey?
Blackburn: “In 2019, I was asked to present at the Australian Navy Institute in 2019 on maritime trade and the risks to that trade. I had previously worked on resilience issues in the energy, economy, and environment arenas. However, in preparing for the Navy Institute seminar I came to realise that we were in a similar situation with respect to maritime trade, i.e. little resilience to deal with potential trade interruptions.
“When we looked at the total system, the lack of resilience was clearly obvious. When SLD brought attention to the work of Rosemary Gibson on the dependence of the West on the supply of medicine by China, we started to focus on a medicine supply chains in Australia as well.”
Question: To be clear: prior to the pandemic you were focusing on the resilience issue. The impact of the pandemic was to bring in highlight the strategic significance of the issue. But there seems to be a desire to get “back to normal” without realizing that the pre-pandemic world is not coming back, notably with regard to how globalization with China at the epicenter was playing out prior to 2020. How do you see this shift?
Blackburn: “Politicians try to boost to the voter’s confidence in a crisis “Hey, we’ll get back to normal soon.” Unfortunately, that pre COVID “normal” is gone. That was business as was. We’re not going back there. You can’t. We’ve really got to say, “We’re uncertain of where we’re headed, but we know it’s not where we were before,” and here’s an opportunity. Do a reset, taking account of our resilience issues and vulnerabilities. We have to design the future that we’re heading towards very rapidly, because we can’t just go back.”
Question: But certainly, in the United States, the capacity to grasp reality through the vortex of current political rhetoric and debate is probably at an all-time low. How do we get back on track?
Blackburn: “You are right. I think the United Kingdom, at present, is probably one of the best examples of what you are pointing out. Because of the concerns that were raised about Brexit and where they have ending up, they seem to be in a state of denial and distraction. In Australia, it is an unusual situation because we essentially drew up the drawbridge and said, “Well, fine. We’re just going to isolate ourselves,” and then we pumped up debt at an incredible rate.
“But why did we do that? Because we didn’t have the hospital capacities, the medicine supply capabilities, the production capabilities to deal with widespread spread COVID-19. We had no choice, but to draw up the drawbridge and isolate ourselves. But we’re still not facing the reality because, faced with the risk of voter’s losing hope, the politicians are still not facing the full reality of the situation we are in and are not preparing adequately for the risks we are likely to face in the next few years. Specifically, COVID variants and supply chain failures.
“There’s a lot of positive spin about the end of the pandemic coming up shortly. ‘We’ll all be back to normal. Things will be great.’ So, we’re not able to have a very honest, apolitical conversation, which is the first point that we highlighted in our national resilience project. If you can’t have an honest conversation about where we are, what the assumptions are, what the risks are without blaming somebody else for being in that situation that we’re in together, then there’s no way you can work out where we need to go in terms of a more resilient and secure society.”
Question: Australia has been engaged in serious conflict with the epicenter for generating the pandemic, namely China. There has clearly been enhanced realization that China is not Australia’s friend in term of the survive of a liberal democratic society. How do you see the Chinese threat feeding into a resilience perspective within Australia itself?
Blackburn: “It clearly does but we have a compounding challenge to face, namely, the short-term perspective of politics here, driven by the three-year election cycle. The Chinese Government has implemented trade sanctions against us as they attempt to bully us into being subservient. That will not happen. However, the Chinese actions have been anticipated but we have lacked a long-term strategy to address this threat and so we are constrained to just reacting and pleading for help from the USA.
“We don’t have a coherent view of where we need to be in 10, 15 or 20 years. It’s all about the next election. It is very hard to develop a resiliency strategy and a strategy for dealing with China if your political focus is short term.
Question: How might we get to a place whereby we can take a longer view?
Blackburn: “As we conclude in our report, we don’t prepare for crises. That’s just not in our culture. We react. Unfortunately, a lot of our reactions, particularly at the political level, are too little too late and too shortsighted. We get caught in this reaction loop and you don’t get people with the brain space to step outside of that process.
“The military concept of preparedness doesn’t really exist in civil society in Australia. In our resilience project we highlighted that we could learn from the military. In my work on Plan Jericho, there were two things we focused on . First, was the need for vastly improved, shared situation awareness, and second, the ability to operate as an integrated team, because Plan Jericho wasn’t really about air force, it was about how do we trigger a joint force.
“So, what we did in the project was to take those two themes and add preparedness and mobilization. In the project report we suggest that there are three characteristics or attributes critical for a society to be resilient. One is shared awareness, by having an honest conversation about what the issues are, as well as the threats, the assumptions, and problems.
“The second characteristic is the need to work as a team. In our country, particularly with our federation structure, that has been a bit of a challenge. Thirdly, if you’ve got the first two, is the ability to prepare for a range of risks /scenarios.”
“In the military, we trained, simulated, and exercised; it’s not that you assume you’re going to exactly see what you have trained for but rather that you are building the skill sets and experience to be able to deal with a wide range of crises.
“For each of the nine areas we looked at in the project, the same challenges or blockages came up. We have individuals with incredibly deep expertise, but we don’t have shared knowledge in the society because it’s blocked either for political reasons, by bureaucracy or by IP issues in industry.
Blackburn then described an example of a strategic opportunity for Australia, given its robust ability to generate electric power from solar sources, or if the country faces reality, nuclear power. “If we’re going to be able to have control over our transport, our logistics, our basic systems that support our way of life, then we’re going to have to get off imported fuels as fast as we can, in terms of transport and logistics. Everything from trucks to vehicles, to trains, to ships, so that we can have control over the energy necessary to run the logistics of our society. We need to electrify our transport and logistics systems as much as possible.”
“From a wider perspective, electric cars are more about our security as a nation than just about emissions; BEVs , Hydrogen Fuel Cell vehicles and renewable ammonia powered ships can result in a significant reduction of our imported fuel dependency. We can have control over these parts of our national systems by having control over the energy used to power them. But the current electricity grid system in this country is very fragile. We’re going to need to grow it to two to three times its current size as we transform our energy systems through electrification.
“Most everything is connected. What I find is that the domain experts largely stay in their lane way. There are not enough whole of systems experts in this country. The result is that we don’t get that broader shared awareness we need to think strategically.”
For the recently released final report on Australia and resilience, see the following:
For the recently released final report on Australian energy resilience, see the following:
Meeting the Challenge: Australia’s Poor Energy Systems Resilience
Ukraine Marine Corps service members visit 2nd Marine Logistics Group on Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, September 2, 2021.
U.S. Marines and Sailors provided Ukrainian service members with a demonstration of Marine Corps logistical capabilities in order to further their understanding of combat support in a tactical environment.
09.02.2021
Video by Cpl. Seaira Moore
2nd Marine Logistics Group