USS Somerset in Strait of Hormuz

04/14/2021

Amphibious transport dock ship USS Somerset (LPD 25), with embarked 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), transit the Strait of Hormuz, Feb. 5.

Somerset, part of the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group, and the 15th MEU are deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and Pacific through the western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points.

STRAIT OF HORMUZ

02.05.2021

Video by Lance Cpl. Brendan Mullin

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit

Next Generation Autonomous Systems: An Australian Perspective

04/13/2021

On April 8, 2021, the Williams Foundation held its latest seminar, one that was originally scheduled for March 2020.

It was an in person conference for Australians, but we will be highlight the seminar in a report on the conference as well as providing presentations as well as interviews with participants.

This is how the seminar was prologued in the run up to the seminar itself.

Since 2013 the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminars have focused on building an integrated fifth generation force.  Recent seminars have evolved from the acquisition of new platforms to the process of shaping and better understanding the environment in which the integrated force will prepare and operate.  Moreover, they have highlighted the challenges of acting independently at an accelerated tempo and in sustained, high intensity, complex Joint operations. 

While COVID-19 prevented the Foundation from hosting any seminars in 2020 the narrative remains.  The 2021 seminars will therefore continue to develop the ideas associated with an increasingly sophisticated approach to Joint warfighting and power projection as we face increasing pressure to maintain influence and a capability edge in the region. 

Following on from the October 2019 seminar titled ‘The Requirements of Fifth Generation Manoeuvre’, the 2021 series of seminars and lunches will examine:

  • the emerging requirements associated with trusted autonomous systems, and
  • the growing importance of Space as an operating domain. 

In doing so, they will each address how the Australian Defence Force must equip, organise, connect, and prepare for multi-domain operations.  As ever, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation has identified pre-eminent speakers from across the Australian and international defence communities, as well as invited industry representatives to reflect the integral role they will play in the national framework of future operational capability. 

April 2021 Seminar Outline – Next Generation Autonomous Systems

Building upon the existing foundations of Australian Defence Force capability, the aim of the April seminar is to explore the force multiplying capability and increasingly complex requirements associated with unmanned systems. From its origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of increased autonomy across the enterprise are now expected to fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations. Defence industry can and will play a major part in the transformation with opportunities extending beyond platforms to the payloads and enabling systems which underpin the necessary risk management and assurance frameworks demanded by Defence. The importance of industry is reflected in the design of the seminar program and the speakers identified.      

The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance.  Often described as the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions, unmanned systems have now provided the commander with a far broader range of options for the application of force against even the most challenging target sets.  However, ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea and trusted autonomy in manned and unmanned teaming arrangements in each environmental domain is emerging as the game changer. 

The narrative is now forming across defence which has progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned systems in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto.  The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards ‘and’, rather than ‘or’.  Manned and unmanned teaming leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles, and the challenges of integration to generate the desired overwhelming firepower. 

This capability will require a complex web of advanced data links and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system.  Designing and building the ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics. However, the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. 

The aim of the April 2021 seminar, therefore, will be to promote discussion about the near and far future implications of autonomous systems, and to build an understanding of the potential and the issues which must be considered in the context of the next Defence White Paper and Force Structure Review.  It will investigate potential roles for autonomous systems set within the context of each environmental domain, providing Service Chiefs with an opportunity to present their personal perspective on the effect it will have on their Service.

The seminar will also explore the operational aspects of autonomous systems, including command and control and the legal and social implications that affect their employment. And finally the seminar will examine the current research agenda and allow industry an opportunity to provide their perspective on recent developments in unmanned air, land, surface and sub-surface combatants.  Each of which are opening new ways of warfighting and creating opportunities to reconceptualise Joint operations and move away from the platform-on-platform engagements which have traditionally characterised the battlespace. 

Below is the handbook distributed to participants at the seminar which highlighted the goals of the seminar and the major presentations as well:

WFNGAS0421HandbookFINAL5April21

For an e-book version of the handbook, see below:

Shaping a 21st Century U.S. Navy: The Perspective from Second Fleet

04/12/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

The advantage of visiting two startup commands – C2F and Allied JFC Norfolk – under one Vice Admiral is that one can see how the 21st century navy is being shaped.  We started our March visit by meeting with VADM Lewis’s Chief of Staff for C2F, CAPT Hallock Mohler, who gave us a tour d’horizon of the challenges of setting up the new command and navigating a way ahead.

Captain Mohler is a four-decade U.S. Navy veteran whose significant experience has been crucial in setting up the command. When we asked him which ship was his favorite one on which to serve, his answer came quickly: The USS Wisconsin. Going from a battleship to shaping the newest command in the Navy is definitely an interesting path.

When we visited his office, he was working from an old desk and with no secretary. The command wishes to be lean, and frankly, everything we saw when visiting it, was that the command clearly is focused on driving innovation from the standpoint of having a lean command structure.

We followed up with the visit on-site with a phone interview this month to discuss the startup approach and to look back at his career, as he is retiring from the Navy this month.  He has very significant leadership management experience at all ranks in the U.S. Navy and his experience has been a key part of what he has brought to the process of standing up the new command. Among those assignments: Director of Management at JFC Norfolk, Department of Defence, Executive Security in the office of OSD, and Director for Training and Quality Assurance, Navy Recruiting command.

We started by asking him, how one went about finding the right talent for a new command.

Captain Mohler: “You start by looking for the right people in terms of having vision, and capabilities to shape something new and innovative. What you don’t do is pigeonhole people in terms of this person is a human resources person, this one is a public affairs person, and so on. You are looking for people who have experienced growth and would nurture it in the command. Not every starting quarterback from a college football team can go to the pros and play quarterback in the pros. Sometimes they’re a wide receiver.

“We were given no blueprints. We were given no resources. We were just told to do it. And it’s all about relationship building, and that’s all it is. And we’re not going to know how good we really are until about 20 years from now.

“We have lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and commanders working alongside of officers and enlisted from foreign nations who will take that experience to their next jobs and will build in a capability for foreign officers to work more effectively with us or vice versa.

“And I think that’s really what’s Admiral Lewis’ vision, namely getting the people that have gumption, the people that don’t mind working hard, the people that don’t mind figuring out how to work together to shape new capabilities for the United States and our allies.”

We then asked him to go back to his long career and highlight what he considered major changes which have energized the Navy as an institution. He had pride in his service that recognizes a constant quest for meritocracy is a touchstone for the future.

Captain Mohler: “That it doesn’t matter what color skin you have. You can do anything you have to. It doesn’t matter that you’re a female, male, or what your gender says, or your deers marker says, you can do a job. It doesn’t matter. Sailors can do anything, and the opportunity’ to do so in the Navy is incredible.

A key lesson of leadership is the saying “if you cannot delegate you are dead.”

“But you have to allow for creativity. We have too much micromanaging because of social media and because of electronics, And I think eventually we’re going to get rid of that, and we’re going to start going back to letting people be leaders. The zero-defect accountability on leadership, I think that’s going to go away eventually.”

“And during my Naval career, every command I’ve ever gone through, it’s been a different chapter in my career life book. It’s about ready to close, but it’s not going to close for good because it continues on because I feel like I’m a recruiter for the United States Navy and for the military until I have no more breath.

“I have seen incredible change during my 41-year career. But one thing has not changed – we need to be the best fighting force, and that means shaping a meritocratic force which draws from our innovative society going forward.”

The Marines Work F-35B in Expeditionary Warfare Training

04/11/2021

Multiple F-35B Lightning II’s with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 122, Marine Aircraft Group 13, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, conduct vertical landings at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, April 6, 2021. 3rd MAW and I Marine Expeditionary Force continue to pave the road for the rest of the Marine Corps by providing relevant training with real-world applications to develop recognition primed decision making in preparation for future conflicts.

And the photos in the slideshow below show the Marines working narrow road expeditionary landing training at MCAS Yuma.

During a visit with the Marines last year in at Yuma MCAS, the role of the F-35 in the evolving force capabilities of the Marines as a full spectrum crisis management force was highlighted.

Specifically, during my visit to MAWTS-1 in September 2020, we focused on two core questions:

How is the Marine Corps going to contribute most effectively to the Pacific mission in terms of Sea Control and Sea Denial?

And how to best contribute to the defensive and offensive operations affecting the SLOCs?

Prior to my visit, I discussed the mobile basing piece with Major Brian “Flubes” Hansell, MAWTS-1 F-35 Division Head. A key aspect of what we discussed was the capability which the F-35 to both empower their expeditionary bases as well as contributing to the wider integration in the fleet approach being worked.

As Major Hansell put it: “By being an expeditionary, forward-based service, we’re effectively extending the bounds of the kill web for the entire joint and coalition force.”

During the visit, I continued the discussion first with the Col Gillette, CO of MAWTS-1, an experienced F-35 pilot, whom I first met at Eglin AFB who then returned to YUMA and transitioned in the first F-35 operational squadron deployed to Japan.

My colleague Ed Timperlake once characterized the coming of the F-35 global enterprise, or the ability of a wide range of U.S. service and allied air forces to integrated together over the extended combat space as the 21st century “big blue blanket.”

The “big blue blanket” for the US Navy in World War II referred to the very large fleet deployed throughout the Pacific to deal with the tyranny of distance.

Such a fleet does not exist today, nor will it. Airpower is the key to shaping today’s “big blue blanket,” with the F-35 global enterprise as a key enabler.

As Col. Gillette put it: “It is not only a question of interoperability among the F-35 fleet, it is the ability to have common logistical and support in the region with your allies, flying the same aircraft with the same parts. And the big opportunity comes with regard to the information point I made earlier. We are in the early stages of exploiting what the F-35 force can provide in terms of information dominance in the Pacific, but the foundation has been laid.

“And when we highlight the F-35 as the 21st century version of what the World War II Navy called the big blue blanket with the redundancy and the amount of information that could be utilized, it’s pretty astonishing if you think about it.

“The challenge is to work the best ways to sort through the information resident in the F-35 force and then how do you utilize it in an effective and efficient way for the joint force. But the foundation is clearly there.

For the discussions during this visit as well as other warfighting centers in the United States during 2020, see the following:

Danish Air Force Receives First F-35: A Key Building Block for Defense Transformation

On April 7, Denmark’s first F-35A, L-001, was delivered to the Royal Danish Air Force. The Kingdom of Denmark commemorated the milestone with members of the Ministry of Defence, Danish Defence, the Danish Defence Acquisition and Logistics Organization, the Royal Danish Air Force, U.S. Military Services, and industry partners at Lockheed Martin’s Fort Worth, Texas facility.

“The roll-out ceremony of our first F-35 is a huge milestone for Denmark. The F-35 will play a major transformational role, not only for the Danish Air Force but for the Danish Armed Forces,” said F-35 Joint Program Office, Denmark National Deputy, Col. Jonas Ottosen.

Denmark is the fifth European NATO nation to fly and operate the F-35. Their addition strengthens NATO’s fifth-generation airpower and unites them with the air defenses of the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway.

“Denmark has been a partner in the F-35 program for more than 20 years. The F-35 partnership is an essential platform that unites its participants. Operationally and strategically, the F-35 will surpass anything we can do with our current inventory. It will continue to strengthen cooperation with our partners and allies. For our defense industrial base, the program has been a catalyst for technological development, closer industrial cooperation, and positioning Danish companies in a globalized supply chain,” continued Col. Ottosen.

L-001 made its first flight in January 2021 and completed a series of comprehensive tests to ensure that all systems function properly in the aircraft before delivery. The aircraft will arrive at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona next week to facilitae the training of Danish F-35 pilots and maintainers.

The construction of brand new Danish F-35 facilities at Air Base Skrydstrup in Vojens, Denmark, specifically designed to support the fifth-generation aircraft, began in 2020. In October of 2023, Denmark is scheduled to receive their First F-35 Aircraft Arrival in-country.

The F-35 is the premier multi-mission strike fighter of choice for three U.S. services, seven international partners, and six Foreign Military Sales customers. The F-35 routinely demonstrates its unmatched capabilities at the hands of our joint and international warfighters, performing combat operations from land and the sea. The F-35 system combines stealth, advanced weapons and sensors, and information sharing with joint and allied forces to dominate current and future threats.

This article was first published on April 7, 2021 by the F-35 Program Office.

This is how the then head of the Danish Air Force, Major General Anders Rex put it with regard to the coming of the F-35 to Denmark:

5th Gen Enablement and the Evolution of Airpower: The Perspective of Major General Anders Rex

10/25/2018

By Robbin Laird

During my most recent visit to Denmark, I had a chance to visit Royal Danish Air Force bases in the Jutland area.

This provided an opportunity to discuss the transition from an F-16 to an F-35 force as well as other changes involving connectivity and decision-making systems and approaches.

But prior to those visits, I had a chance to visit with the head of the Royal Danish Air Force, Major General Anders Rex.  In past discussions, we focused on coalition issues as well as fifth generation transition issues.

And in our most recent discussion, both came together in terms of the kinds of innovations which an all fifth-generation force like Denmark will need to make in terms of building its own capability and working those capabilities with Air Forces flying older aircraft as well.

Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Australia will become all fifth-generation fighter forces; which provides opportunities as well as challenges in working with older generation fighter aircraft and more generally working connectivity with other air, ground and sea assets to deliver what might be called a fifth generation enabled force.

The Australians have been more forward leaning than most in terms of trying to think through the impact of building a fifth-generation force understood not simply in terms of adding the F-35 but transforming the force to become a lethal and effective integrated multi-domain force.

In fact, I last met Major General Rex in Australia last March where he attended the Airpower Conference and he clearly has worked with and has high regards for the RAAF and its Plan Jericho approach.  One aspect of the F-35 global enterprise is precisely coalition partners cross learning from one another as they stand up their F-35 squadrons.

According to Major General Rex: “The goal for our coalition and our alliance is to get the best out of what we have as a coalition force.  During Red Flag, the experiences we have been briefed on, fifth-generation aircraft make fourth-generation more lethal and survivable, and more effective.

“We could focus on the significant kill ratios which a fifth-generation aircraft can deliver. But that is not the sole focus. It is about how fifth generation aircraft lift the whole force so that the kill ratio for the entire force goes up exponentially.”

He emphasized the importance of combat learning associated with the new aircraft.

“When we were running our competition for a new fighter aircraft, I witnessed the operation of a Super Hornet F-squadron on the USS Nimitz carrier off the coast of San Diego.

“This was the latest variant of the Super Hornet which had just received a new AESA radar on it.

“And when we talked to the pilots, they made the point that there was no way they could have thought up or analyzed what they can use this radar for. Every single day they learned new things.

“That is how I see the kind of learning we are going to have operating the F-35 and more broadly the kind of co-learning which other platforms in the air, ground and naval forces will need to have as well to leverage what a fifth generation enabled force can bring to the fight.”

In effect, what Major General Rex was discussing was the opening of a significant aperture of co-learning, for example, in Danish terms, how the frigates can use their future SM-2s and SM-6s in conjunction with the SA and targeting capabilities which the F-35 would bring to the Danish force.

“Co-learning across the forces and the F-35 to the legacy platforms is a major challenge but a task which we need to master to get where we need to go as a Danish force, but even more significantly at the coalition level.”

And working with coalition partners who are not going to buy the F-35, Major General Rex underscored that the challenge was then “how do we elevate the effectiveness of those coalition partners?

“We need to focus on the broad co-learning challenge and how to elevate the combat force as a whole as the F-35 becomes a key force for change.”

Major General Rex underscored that this needed to become a core focus of exercises and training objectives within exercises, namely, co-learning between the F-35 and ground, air and naval elements both within F-35 nations as well as working with forces which do not have F-35.

A key example is the cross-border training the Norwegians do with the Finns and the Swedes.

The point of the cross training currently is that Norwegian F-16s work with Finnish F-18s and Swedish Gripens.

The Norwegians are shifting to F-35 and perhaps the Finns will as well. The challenge then is to make sure that the Gripens can work more effectively as a result of the upswing in multi-domain capabilities which the F-35 brings to a force.

In short, it is less about fourth-fifth generation aircraft integration and much more driving an air force forward in terms of the capabilities which F-35 multi-domain aircraft can provide and as that is done shape co-learning with legacy aircraft as well as with key ground and naval systems.

It is about innovations in concepts of operation and the co-learning process unleashed by a fifth generation enabled force.

And we were there at the beginning of the discussion in Denmark regarding its F-16 successor aircraft.

At the launch point was a very unusual development, namely, partnering between an Australian and Danish institute to discuss airpower evolution.

That discussion can be found in Joint By Design, chapter three.

The book is available in e-book, paperback and hardback versions.

The Strategic Shift and the Role of Airpower: A Discussion with Ben Lambeth

04/10/2021

By Robbin Laird

I have been focused for several years on what I see as a clear and dramatic shift from how civilians and the military have looked at the land wars in the Middle East to now dealing with adversaries who have built forces for contested operations across the spectrum of operations.

We have a generation of civilian and military leaders who have not lived in the context of dealing with peer nuclear powers with significant conventional capability. It is not surprising that understanding of escalation management has atrophied.

The strategic shift has a very dramatic impact on maritime and airpower, which clearly should be the ascendent services in the Pentagon to sort through the way ahead. And integration of air and maritime power is the key to meeting the strategic interests of the United States.

But the U.S. Army still predominates with a Sec Def from the Army, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from the Army and two 4 Army Four Stars in a theater where the U.S. Army does not have the central, perhaps even a central role to play, namely in the Pacific.

So how do we make the transition?

How do we shape a relevant concept of operations?

And how do we stop ground pounders from thinking that they can put missiles into the first island chain or on allied soil ringing China without even considering their impact on escalation management with nuclear powers?

It is useful to remember that the Russians face three nuclear powers in the Atlantic; and the United States and its Pacific allies face three nuclear powers in the Pacific.

Recently, I reviewed the new book by Ben Lambeth which provide his assessment of the shift from the pure dominance over airpower of counterinsurgency operations to the fight against ISIS, a fight which required airpower to remove the Army’s shackles on its proper use against a state-like competitor.

I followed up from that review to talk with the author about how he came to write the book and his sense of the challenges moving forward beyond the land wars.

Question: Why did you write the book?

Lambeth: “Looking back on my collected work over the past two decades, I’ve made a productive career of writing in-depth air campaign assessments, starting out with my chapters that revisited both the Vietnam air war and Operation Desert Storm in a book of mine published in 2000 called The Transformation of American Air Power.

“In the years since then, I went on to produce even more detailed studies of NATO’s air war for Kosovo in 1999, of Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan that followed the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001, and of the air contribution to the three-week major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in early 2003 that finally toppled Saddam Hussein.

“In light of that background, it seemed only natural that once our initially anemic response to the rise of ISIS in August 2014 eventually expanded into a more effective and sustained air effort, that I should take on a critical assessment of that campaign as well.”

Question: I was working for Mike Wynne at the time when the Sec Def and the Bush and then the Obama Administrations clearly cut back on the role of airpower and reduced it to support for the ground operations.

Was this legacy finally being shed in Operation Inherent Resolve?

Lambeth: “Clearly, as counterinsurgency operations became the predominant American way of war after 2003, the USAF lost a lot of muscle memory for doing much of anything else by way of higher-end force employment.

“And the predominant Army leadership at U.S. Central Command continued to apply its long-habituated Army thinking going forward into an entirely different situation that was presented by the rise of ISIS. A more assertive leadership in CENTCOM’s air component at the time would have pressed for a different response to the challenge it was handed in 2014 by arguing for targeting ISIS not as an insurgency, but rather as a self-avowed state in the making.

“However, CENTCOM’s commander, U.S. Army General Lloyd Austin III, simply assumed ISIS to be a regenerated Islamist insurgency of the sort that he was most familiar with, which it was not at all, and accordingly proceeded to engage it as just another counterinsurgency challenge.

“Eventually, his air component’s second successive commander, then-Lieutenant General C. Q. Brown, finally prevailed in arguing for deliberate strategic air attacks against critical ISIS infrastructure targets in both Iraq and Syria, not just for on-call air “support” to be used as flying artillery for the ground fight.

“One must remember that the vast majority of today’s serving U.S. Air Force airmen are only familiar with Operation Desert Storm from their book reading.

“And even much of the USAF’s more senior leadership today has never really been exposed to higher-end aerial warfare as we last experienced it over Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. Only now are we slowly coming to realize the opportunity costs that were inflicted by this neglect for nearly two decades, during which time we fixated solely on less-intense counterinsurgency warfare..”

Question: Then how do you see the challenge of transition posed by the strategic shift?

Lambeth: “It is clearly a significant one.

“And the continued absence of proper understanding where it matters most is suggested by the recent Army bid to deploy long-range missiles into the Pacific as one of their contributions.

“This is simply a crass attempted roles-and-missions grab in order to stay operationally relevant, yet in a theater in which airpower – both land- and sea-based –clearly offers the only cost-effective tool for addressing the challenges presented in that arena.

“In a way, we find ourselves today much like where we were at the end of the Vietnam War.

“While we were consumed then by the eight-year distraction of that self-inflicted experience, the Soviet Union enjoyed essentially a free ride for modernizing its nuclear and conventional force postures without significant offsetting measures by us.

“It took nearly two decades of hard work in the force development and training arenas for us to compensate in full for that failure to hold up our end of the strategic competition with Moscow.

“Fortunately, we succeeded just in time to pave the way for our eventual success in Desert Storm and for the collapse of Soviet communism that followed shortly thereafter.

“I believe we face a similar challenge today looking into the third decade of the 21st Century, with a rising China and a resurgent Russia now dominating tomorrow’s threat horizon.

“We need to recognize this and wake up to the fact that the challenges we’re now facing are totally unlike the challenge we faced in fighting yesterday’s land wars in Southwest Asia.

“But in order for that to happen, the country needs an amalgam of leadership that sees and understands this newly-emerging big picture correctly.

“I have long felt, indeed ever since Desert Storm, that CENTCOM is organized incorrectly. CENTCOM’s area of responsibility has long been air-centric, in my opinion. And yet that organization has been consistently commanded by a succession of Army and Marine Corps four-stars.

“That, to my mind, has repeatedly entailed putting a square peg into a round hole.

“I’ve often felt that it would have been truly an inspired move after Desert Storm if its commander who largely swung that war’s successful outcome, U.S. Air Force General Chuck Horner, had been appointed CENTCOM’s next commander to replace U.S. Army General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. Or, that failing, had the successful air commander for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S. Air Force General Buzz Moseley, been tapped to become the next commander of CENTCOM.

“Either move would have finally broken the mold of the ground services’ long-held but increasingly anachronistic monopoly on that key position in today’s world.

“That, in turn, might have made a fundamental difference in our subsequent combat experience in that part of the world for the better.”

See below, Lambeth’s Mitchell Forum overview on his book:

Lambeth provided three other fascinating pieces from his work over the years.

The first is an interesting comparison of fighter pilots to submariners; the second is his report on the MIG-23; and the third is a look back at the lessons which the post-Cold War years should have taught us.

The first was published in 2015; the second in 2016; and the third in 2013.

Ben's fighter-sub comparison
Ben's MiG-23 flight report
Lambeth SSQ article

Allied Joint Forces Command Norfolk: The Uber Command

04/09/2021

By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

As NATO continues to work its capabilities as an alliance going forward, the common operating procedure protocols, and communication systems provide a 21st Century information based framework for each individual nation to work more effectively together. This also will allow as well for non-NATO European states to become effective coalition partners.

For example, Norway, Finland and Sweden do joint airpower training based on NATO procedures. They do their common airpower training based on leveraging the common NATO language and operating con-ops. For example, in 2018, Laird visited Bodø  airbase where he discussed with Norwegian officers how they trained collectively with their two non-NATO air partners, Finland and Sweden.

Since 2015 the three air forces have shaped a regular flexible training approach which is driven at the wing and squadron pilot level.

According to Major Trond Ertsgaard, Senior Operational Planner and fighter pilot from the 132 Air Wing, “We meet each November, and set the schedule for the next year, but in execution it is very, very flexible. “It is about a bottom-up approach and initiative to generate the training regime.” Squadron pilots regardless of nationality are, if allowed creative tactical freedom, are a unstoppable force for innovation.

The impact on Sweden and Finland has been significant in terms of learning NATO standards and having an enhanced capability to cooperate with the air forces of NATO nations.

The Allied JFC Norfolk is working coalition integration and is very close to accomplish this approach. MoUs have been agreed upon with relevant nations, allowing nations to work more effectively during Joint Operations in concert with operating allied forces; this has been pursued through a collaborative integration approach rather than a top down hierarchical command centered approach.

Ed Timperlake interviewed RADM Stefan D. Pauly, JFCNF, Chief of Staff on March 5, 2021 during our visit to Norfolk. RADM Pauly is an experienced submariner with the German Navy with a strong intelligence background as well. He explained that they are a small command, with less than one hundred officers with a target goal of around 150.

As such, they will not have a top-heavy staff directing in a hierarchical manner. But because they report to the nations, distributed C2 becomes a natural focus of attention–national engagements with national C2 systems plugging-in into JFC Norfolk. The challenge is all nation’s combat assets need to be leveraged and coordinated synergistically with all partners in day-to-day operations.

How best to organize that to create convergent capability?

That is a key focus of how the command works. Similar to other aspects of innovation seen throughout the command cluster, VADM Lewis has focused on having his teams work through new ways to operate to deliver the appropriate combat effect. With regard to NATO, this has meant working new ways to shape coalition integratability, and by shaping agreements with key nations which facilitate such an approach.

They are far from being just a classic “maritime” command because they are focused on the 360-degree Joint Security and Combat Operational High North and North Atlantic Theater, from seabed to space. Critical infrastructure defense is a key point of attention for the command as well, which means that they are focused on the spectrum from peacetime vigilance to war.

RADM Pauly, based on his long service with well-earned submarine and Intel experience, argued that the command is focused on building a command network such that nations can more effectively contribute to a successful coalition combat campaign outcome.

The Admiral unmistakably pointed out that mission coordination across all warfighting domains will ensure that the North Atlantic community can increasingly continue to effectively defend its interests in the Joint Theater of Operations against Russia and other adversaries.

The Russians may have clients they sell weapons platforms and munitions to but do not have allies as do the Europeans or the Americans. Further than that, the Headquarters is already positioned to cope with future challenges within the HQ’s designated Vigilance Area.

The command is finalizing a Joint Operation Guidance.

This is not intended to be an order, but rather a guidance approach to providing coalition leadership. The focus is upon how best to leverage the “coalitionability” of the core MOU nations in the command.[1]

He noted: “The C2 and operational coordination is done in the nations. But how to take that effort cross-nationally and shape a more Joint effective coalition capability?” And that is a key focus of Allied JFC Norfolk.

This approach is clearly innovative and fully in line with how European nations who are serious about defense are addressing ways to enhance their capabilities to defend themselves.

He cited an American officer who suggested an Uber analogy. “UBER meets a need to deliver transport capability to a region. They don’t own the vehicles, but they coordinate those vehicles to deliver the capability.” Substitute “transport capabilities / vehicles” for “operational effects”, and you understood JFC Norfolk’s ambition.

So perhaps one might call this unique NATO Headquarters the Uber command.

[1] For the concept of “coalitionability,” see the presentation by Major General Rex at a Danish-Australian conference in 2015 in Robbin Laird, Joint by Design (2021), pp. 67-69.