U.S. Marines with Charley Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, Marine Rotational Force Darwin 21.2, prepare to conduct a night insertion as a part of Operation Sea Raider during Talisman Sabre 2021 in Townsville, Queensland, Australia, July 23, 2021.
TOWNSVILLE, QLD, AUSTRALIA
07.23.2021
Video by Lance Cpl. Alyssa Chuluda U.S. Army Pacific Public Affairs Office
By Pierre Tran
Paris – Australia has paid most of the €900 million (US$1 billion) due for work on the initial design studies for the Shortfin Barracuda attack submarine, with some payment still to be made, a French defense ministry official said Sept. 21.
“There remains some to be paid,” the official said in a telephone press conference held by the armed forces ministry, which sought to lay out arguments against Canberra’s cancellation of the French submarine for the Australian navy.
“Discussions have started” for seeking compensation from Australia, with advisors for Naval Group (NG) and the government working on the claim, the official said. The Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office and the French navy had worked closely with industry on the Australian project.
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation reported in 2019 that NG would be paid A$404 million if the French shipbuilder delivered a detailed submarine design and Australia decided “to go no further,” The Australian daily reported.
The French compensation claim refers to Canberra effectively cancelling Sept. 15 a project for NG to design and build a 12-strong fleet of attack submarines for the Australian navy. The French designed diesel-electric boat would have been built in Adelaide, south Australia, if the program had gone ahead.
Instead, Canberra told France the Barracuda project was dropped as Australia planned to acquire nuclear powered submarines as part of its joining a strategic partnership with London and Washington, dubbed AUKUS, to counter a perceived threat of China in the Indo-Pacific.
The three allied nations set 18 months to draw up a detailed plan to build the boats for Australia.
Naval Group (NG) received a letter from the Australian authorities on the same day of the announcement that the company had cleared the system functional review and received “the stamp of approval,” the defense official said.
That approval in the system functional review was seen as a milestone and would have cleared the way for an Australian contract worth €1.4 billion for the basic design stage, with a further two years of studies.
Instead, Canberra was opting out of the French project to pursue a nuclear powered submarine fleet reported to be eight strong.
NG, as prime contractor, passed on some of the Australian payment to subsystem suppliers. The French company would have supplied the platform, while Lockheed Martin was supplier of the combat management system.
Australia had previously said a modified Barracuda boat, in the class of a 5,000-6,000 ton boat, met its requirement for long range capability, the official said.
NG was studying how to modify the nuclear-powered Barracuda being built for the French navy into the diesel-electric Shortfin version for the Australian service, at the request of Canberra.
The Australian navy would also have to wait to 2040, or 10 more years than the delivery set for the Shortfin Barracuda, the French official said, as U.S. engineers were fully engaged with orders for the Virginia nuclear attack and Ohio nuclear ballistic missile submarines for the US navy.
A June 2021 report from the U.S. Congressional Research Service said the production cost of the last two Virginia class nuclear attack submarines would be $6.91 billion, or $3.46 billion (€3 billion) per unit, which was three times more expensive than the Barracuda, the French official said. The Australian navy also stood to face a “colossal” problem in finding the crews needed to run those boats.
The U.S.-designed boats will be nuclear powered, but Australia has “zero” capability in atomic energy, the official said, indicating the nuclear boiler rooms will be built and maintained in the U.S., and fitted into the boats. There may be American sailors required on the Australian submarines.
Australia will need to build nuclear infrastructure to support the submarines, which will be “very costly and complex,” the official said, and raise questions on whether Australian public opinion would support the nuclear program.
The Australians had never asked France for a nuclear submarine, the official said, and if there had been a request, that would have undergone a strict review procedure.
The French defense minister, Florence Parly, had sought to stay in close contact to her Australian counterpart, Peter Dutton, the official said, and when problems emerged on the project, she had sought to give “clarification” which Dutton had found “reassuring.”
There had been problems on the French project, but the switch to the nuclear option had never been evoked, the official said.
France and Australia held a 2+2 ministerial meeting on Aug. 30, with Parly and foreign minister Jean-Yves Le Drian in talks with their Australian counterparts, Dutton and Maryse Payne, and there was no sign of a decision in favor of nuclear.
Le Drian, the top French diplomat who was defense minister when NG won the 2016 competition to build an Australian ocean-going conventional submarine, went on national television on Sept. 19 and accused Canberra of lies, duplicity and contempt. Le Drian, on instruction from president Emmanuel Macron, recalled the French ambassadors to Australia and the U.S,. and left the ambassador to the UK in place, as Britain was no more than the superfluous “fifth wheel on the carriage.”
The Australian Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, has denied lies were told, and said the Barracuda boats would not meet the threats in the region when they entered service.
The French official sought to play down concerns of French offers in the export market, with Indonesia, the Philippines and the Netherlands looking to buy boats.
The French navy has close ties to the UK and US navies.
“Nothing has changed, said Captain Eric Lavault, French navy spokesman. “We are continuing our operations and training both with the Royal Navy and the US Navy.”
There is a French nuclear-powered attack submarine and the Aquitaine multi0m-ission frigate presently sailing in the Cutlass Ferry anti-submarine warfare exercise with the US navy off the Baltimore coast, he said.
“The longest standing ties the French navy has are with the U.S. navy,” he said.
The French aircraft carrier, the nuclear-powered Charles de Gaulle, led the U.S. naval task force 50 in May-June, flying the Rafale fighter jet against Daesh insurgents in Iraq and Syria, he said.
The French flagship was supported by a carrier strike group which included the Provence multi-mission frigate, Chevalier Paul air defense destroyer, Var fleet auxiliary, and the Belgian frigate Leopold 1. That was the second time the US navy asked the French navy to lead task force 50, with the first French leadership in 2015.
French naval pilots train for carrier take-offs in the U.S., and U.S. Navy officers sail on the Charles de Gaulle, as the catapults on the capital ship were built in the U.S.
The French navy and arms industry are studying the next generation carrier, which will likely use U.S.-built electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear, potentially extending the transatlantic relations to the future capital ship.
The French and U.S. navies maintained close operational links despite the frosty political relations after Paris declined to take part in the Iraq war. Bilateral relations fell to a low then, prompting The Simpsons television show to deploy taunts of “cheese-eating surrender monkeys” and the adoption of “freedom fries” in Congressional cafeterias.
There are close ties with the British Navy that date back well before the Lancaster House treaty and St Malo agreement, Lavault said.
The two bilateral agreements, respectively in 2010 and 1998, were attempts to forge close ties between the services and arms industry in Britain and France, but there are signs the spirit of cooperation has faded, with a lack of fresh initiatives in joint weapons programs.
There are five French naval officers on the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier, the British carrier which sailed in July with a task force in the Pacific, flying the flag for a Global Britain.
There are also French officers sailing on the Type 45 destroyer, he said.
NG won in 2016 a competition to supply 12 attack submarines, beating rival offers from ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems and a Japanese joint venture between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, backed by Japan.
The Australian deal was then reported to be worth A$50 billion ($36 billion) over 50 years, with a share for NG reported to be worth €8 billion.
Australian reports that the Barracuda budget had since risen to A$90 billion contributed to a decision to cancel the French project, and there was greater concern over China, leading to a partnership with the U.S. and the UK, and supply of a nuclear powered submarine fleet.
Featured photo: This handout picture taken on February 11, 2019 and released by the Australian Department of Defence shows Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison (C) shaking hands with Australia’s Defence Minister Christopher Pyne (L) and France’s Defence Minister Florence Parly (R) after signing a 66 billion USD submarine Strategic Partnership Agreement in Canberra. (Photo by JAY CRONAN / AUSTRALIA DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE / AFP
Also, see the following:
French and US Naval Cooperation in the Persian Gulf: The Key Role of Carriers
Australia Changes its Submarine Acquisition Path: French Reactions
By George Galdorisi
At the highest levels of U.S. intelligence and military policy documents, there is universal agreement that the United States remains at war, even as the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan conclude. As the cost of capital platforms—especially ships and aircraft—continues to rise, the Department of Defense is increasingly looking to procure comparatively inexpensive unmanned systems as important assets to supplement the Joint Force.
As the United States builds a force structure to contend with high-end threats, it has introduced a “Third Offset Strategy” to find ways to gain an asymmetric advantage over potential adversaries. One of the key technologies embraced by this strategy is that of unmanned systems. Both the DoD and the DoN envision a future force with large numbers of unmanned systems complementing manned platforms.
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have spurred the development of unmanned air vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles to meet urgent operational needs. As a result, the lion’s share of previous years DoD funding for unmanned systems has gone to air and ground systems, while funding for unmanned maritime systems (unmanned surface vehicles and unmanned underwater vehicles) has lagged.
However, this balance is shifting, as increasingly, warfighters recognize the need for unmanned maritime systems in the fight against high-end adversaries, as well as against nations or groups to whom these adversaries export their weapons systems. Like their air and ground counterparts, these unmanned maritime systems are valued because of their ability to reduce the risk to human life in high threat areas, to deliver persistent surveillance over areas of interest, and to provide options to warfighters that derive from the inherent advantages of unmanned technologies.
Operating as it does in five domains (air, surface, subsurface, ground and cyber) the Navy and Marine Corps recognize the potential and the promise of unmanned systems to deliver asymmetric advantages to U.S. forces, especially in areas where adversaries have extensive anti-access and area denial capabilities.
In January 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations issued CNO NAVPLAN (Navigation Plan) designed to chart the course for how the Navy will execute the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy Advantage at Sea. Not surprisingly, this short (18-page) document identifies unmanned systems as an important part of the Navy’s future plans, noting, in part:
“Advances in autonomous systems have shown promise for an effective and affordable way for the Navy to fight and win in contested spaces. We will modernize the fleet to harness these technologies and maintain our advantage at sea…Objective analysis confirms that America needs a larger, more lethal fleet. The Navy requires greater numbers of submarines, smaller and more numerous surface combatants, more lethal offensive capabilities, a host of integrated unmanned platforms—under, on, and above the sea
“Unmanned platforms play a vital role in our future fleet. Successfully integrating unmanned platforms gives our commanders better options to fight and win in contested spaces. They will expand our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantage, add depth to our missile magazines, and provide additional means to keep our distributed force provisioned…By the end of this decade, our Sailors must have a high degree of confidence and skill operating alongside proven unmanned platforms at sea.”
The Chief of Naval Operations announced the issuance of the CNO NAVPLAN at the January 2021 Surface Navy Association Virtual Symposium. In his remarks, he highlighted the importance of unmanned systems, and announced the impending release of a new Navy campaign plan focused on developing unmanned systems, noting, in part:
“Unmanned vessels also provide the service with affordable solutions as it works to grow its fleet…We need a hybrid fleet of manned and unmanned systems capable of projecting larger volumes of kinetic and non-kinetic effects across all domains…Additionally, the service will need its Sailors to be adequately trained to operate confidently alongside unmanned sea platforms.”
There is little doubt that the U.S. Navy is committed to making unmanned systems of various types and capabilities an important part of the Navy Fleet in the near-, mid- and especially long-term. As one indication of this commitment, industry is ramping up to deliver these capabilities, witness America’s largest shipbuilder, Huntington Ingalls Industries, purchase of Spatial Integrated Systems Inc., a leader in autonomous technology, in December 2020.
In March 2021, the Department of the Navy published its long-awaited UNMANNED Campaign Framework. Designed to coordinate unmanned systems efforts across the Department, the document lists ambitious goals designed to help make unmanned systems an increasingly important part of the Navy’s platform inventory. The framework has five goals:
The UNMANNED Campaign Framework met with some Congressional criticism for being short on details and measurable goals. That said, the 38-page report does provide an organizing impulse and guide for how the Department of the Navy intends to shepherd unmanned systems into the Fleet and Fleet Maine Forces.
The DoD, and especially the DoN, have lofty goals for the extensive use of unmanned systems to support the Joint Force. However, these goals are constrained by the sheer physics of the ways in which current unmanned systems are designed. For the most part, developers of today’s systems began with the objective to “take the operator out of the machine.” This means that they started with a current aircraft of ship hull, and then attempted to operate it either remotely or autonomously.
This approach as many merits, especially in cutting costs by using existing platforms that have undergone years—or even decades—of research, development, fielding and operating. And these platforms have the additional benefit of being familiar to those working in the S&T, R&D and acquisition communities, and, of course, being immediately available to developers. This has enabled a great deal of progress—up to a point.
This way of doing business represents a somewhat limited and less-than-innovative approach, but it has delivered a robust first generation of unmanned systems to warfighters. This has, in turn, resulted in valuable operator feedback as to what capabilities are desired in the next generation of unmanned systems. In many cases operators have asked for UxS that can operate beyond human capability.
While the current methodology of developing unmanned systems has some merits, it does have one major flaw. Those creating these UxS are constrained by the physics of those platforms they are modifying in that all of these aircraft or ships once had a crew onboard, and therefore could only be operated to the limits of human capability of the pilot in the cockpit or the mariner on the bridge.
As one small example of the limits of human capability, both versions of the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) can travel in excess of forty knots. In a Navy that has centuries of a tradition of bridge watchstanders actually standing for the entirety of their watch rotation, due to the high speed and the way it pounds the seas, watchstanders on the LCS must be buckled into their chairs to survive their watches.
The U.S. Navy is beginning to see the benefits of designing and fielding unmanned systems that can operate “beyond human capability.” This paradigm shift is important for a number of reasons. In the surface domain, it enables the use of unmanned maritime systems that can travel at a higher speed than humans can long endure, operate in higher sea states than conventional vessels, and make turns with G-forces that would not be tolerable by humans.
The benefits of such systems are clear. They can travel at high speeds to an operating area to complete a mission in far less time, outrun any manned surface vessels seeking to attack them, and in any conflict, outmaneuver adversary platforms through high G-turns. These attributes open up concepts-of-operations that give commanders options that they never had—or might not have even thought of—before.
As one example of how industry is now developing and fielding unmanned systems that operate beyond human capability, one Florida-based corporation, Maritime Tactical Systems, Inc. (MARTAC), demonstrated such a system in an international high-speed run. By way of background, MARTAC’s family of unmanned maritime vehicles evolved from a long line of catamaran-hulled racing boats that had achieved speeds of over 250 miles per hour and operated at high-Gs. Stepping down the size of these racing boats was an evolutionary—and revolutionary—process that has garnered the intense interest of U.S. Navy officials.
As one demonstration of this capability, this summer, MARTAC launched its Devil Ray T38 USV from Palm Beach, Florida Inlet with the goal of performing a fully autonomous run across the Florida Straits to West Bank, Bahamas in less than one hour, and then returning in the same time window.
During this demonstration, the Devil Ray T38 acquired its first alignment waypoint outside of the Palm Beach Inlet, Florida and began its high-speed run across the straits. The Devil Ray arrived at the Bahamas waypoint for a total run time of 57 minutes. During the transit, the Devil Ray achieved a top speed of 82 miles per hour, which included a four-minute stop to avoid shipping traffic in the straits.
The return trip from West End, Bahamas to Palm Beach Inlet, Florida followed a similar track with a total transit time of 59 minutes including a six-minute stop to avoid fishing boat traffic. During each round trip run, the Devil Ray maintained an average cruise speed of 70 miles per hour.
Importantly, in an environment where Congress is questioning the Navy’s ability to field unmanned systems that not only have strong operational capabilities, but also reliable basic mechanical and navigational systems, during these tracks the Devil Ray achieved an average tracking accuracy of +/- 1.3 degrees and a steady state cross track error of +/-3 m.
Here is how Bruce Hanson, MARTAC’s CEO, described this high-speed run:
“We are excited that our Expeditionary Class Devil Ray T38 is the first USV to fully autonomously perform a high-speed international run. This is a culmination of ten years of product development and thousands of hours testing and running our patented MANTAS-X Class and Expeditionary Devil Ray Class USV systems for reliability and accuracy. This is the first run in a series that will continue to vet and refine our technology to address the needs of our military, scientific and commercial customers’ missions and applications. MARTAC’s USV classes simply operate beyond human capability.”
Here is a short video showing the track to and from Palm Beach Inlet to West Bank, Bahamas as well as the way that the Devil Ray pounded its way through the waves. Two observers were strapped into the Devil Ray to operate as onboard safety observers and to ensure that all COLREGS requirements were being met in its fully autonomous run.
There is a popular quote making the rounds, “If you can imagine it, you can achieve it.” While this Bahamas run is just one example of what the next generation of unmanned systems can deliver, the Navy has been forward-leaning in inserting such systems in a series of exercises, experiments and demonstrations as a way to “imagine” how such platforms will support tomorrow’s Navy.
For example, the Devil Ray was featured during the summer of 2020 during the U.S. Navy’s Trident Warrior exercise in San Diego, as well as in the subsequent Inaugural Unmanned Systems Integrated Battle Problem 21 to showcase these innovative unmanned capabilities. Additionally, Devil Ray’s capabilities were demonstrated at this summer’s Navy League SeaAirSpace Symposium.
This approach bodes well for the Navy’s efforts to have unmanned systems make up a substantial portion of the Fleet. And it brings to mind the motto of Admiral Wayne Meyer, the “Father of Aegis:” “Build a Little, Test a Little and Learn a Lot.” The future may well be a U.S. Navy with large numbers of UxS that can truly operate beyond human capability. The result will provide an asymmetric advantage for U.S. warfighters.
U.S. Marines with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267, Marine Aircraft Group 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), drops a sonobuoy during the Advanced Naval Basing evolution of Summer Fury 21 at San Clemente, California, July 20, 2021.
Advanced Naval Basing offering forward logistics and support, as well as sensor and strike capabilities that make a significant contribution to undersea warfare campaigns in the Indo-Pacific region.
Summer Fury is an exercise conducted by 3rd MAW in order to maintain and build capability, strength, and trust within its units to generate the readiness and lethality needed to deter and defeat adversaries during combat operations as the U.S. Marine Corps refines tactics and equipment in accordance with Force Design 2030.
SAN CLEMENTE ISLAND, CA, UNITED STATES
07.20.2021
Video by Cpl. Nicolas Atehortua 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
By Robbin Laird
During my August 2021 visit to MARFORPAC, I had a chance to talk with the specialists in information operations within the command. In particular, I met with Mr. Justin Bogue, Information Maneuver Branch Deputy, Maj. Melissa Giannetto, MARFORPAC PsyOp Officer and Maj. Nick Mannweiler, COMMSTRAT Operations.
Clearly, one major change since my last visit to MARFORPAC in 2014-2015 has been a renewed focus on information operations.
With the Russian seizure of Crimea which involved significant use of information warfare, and the ramp up of information operations including cyber in the Pacific – China, North Korea and Russia – a focus on crisis management operations needs to incorporate information operations as a core capability.
It needs to be, in the words of one participant in the discussion, “not a bolt-on capability but a core integrated capability.”
A key change which the Marines have made to build out modern IO capabilities has been the formation of MEF Information Groups (MIG) in each Marine Expeditionary Force.
And those MIGS are operating as centers of excellence to shape the practical side of information operations, but also as magnets for change throughout the Marine Corps as a whole.
During a visit to 2nd MEF this past summer, I discussed why the formation of the MIGs was so important as part of the reshaping of the Marine Corps capabilities for full spectrum crisis engagement.
As Col. Brian Russell, the Commander of II MEF Information Group put it: “the MIG was borne out of the MEF Headquarters Group here. We had some of the components already, but they were reorganized under a different construct with some different capabilities, like the communication, strategy and operations company. Psychological operations capabilities, defensive cyber capabilities, were packaged in this MEF Information Group.
“I think the key for the MEF Information Group is taking all those capabilities and making them work together rather than having operational silos such as just coms and just intel; we need to work information operations as a whole.”
The participants in the conversation at Camp Smith with the information operations officers underscored Russell’s core point.
It was about forging a coherent capability to build in information operations elements within operations.
As one participant put it: “It has taken time but over the past few years, we have been able to get wider recognition of the importance of information operations for the Marines and there is now much greater practical focus on how to do this more effectively going forward.”
And one aspect of that challenge going forward is working through what the relationship between what has been traditionally called public affairs is with operational information war. Or put another way:
What is the relationship between COMSTRAT and Information Operations?
Another participant underscored that information operations were a key part of how the U.S. and allied militaries operated in the Cold War.
Some of these skill sets need to be recreated but to do so in the digital age and one where cyber war is a key reality as well.
In the briefing given by the information operations team, one slide highlighted “how the Marines fight in the information environment.”
And the focus was upon how the MIG was positioning itself as a core element within the MAGTF to shape a way ahead for integrated information operations.
Because the Marines are full spectrum crisis management force, IO needs to be addressed across the spectrum of operations from HADR ops, to higher end forcible entry operations.
In the briefing, the team highlighted this in the following slide:
With a focus on more joint force integration of the Marines with the Navy, in particular, it was increasingly important that coordination among service-based IO needs to be coordinated, and common approaches and language shaped to execute more effective joint operations.
And IO against peer competitors was at a very different scale than what has been learned and practiced in the Middle East land wars.
Events at the local level in INDOPACOM can become strategic in character rapidly: how best to handle the management of IO at local levels and ensure that they work hand in glove with effective strategic level decisions?
The exercise piece is of growing importance as well.
Training and exercises are becoming of increasing importance in shaping joint and coalition force capabilities. But they are messaging events as well. How to bring these two strands within exercises more effectively together, namely effective combat training and effective political impacts through messaging?
We discussed the crucial importance of collating information and lessons as well learned in crises, exercises or other information operational events.
And here the team highlighted that from the beginning the MIGS are working closely with one another, and there are clear efforts to shape a coordinated community which can indeed share experiences and knowledge gained from those experiences.
In short, part of the strategic shift which the Marines are undergoing from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management is learning how to master information operations.
And to do so in way that is integrated within kinetic operations as well.
The Role of II MEF Information Group: The Perspective of Its Commanding General
For an article by Col. Russell which discusses the challenges which the MIGS are addressing, see the following:
On the COMSTRAT and IO challenge, see the following article:
See also, the following story about the standup of the MIG in III MEF:
By Sgt.George Melendez
III MEF Information Group reached a historic milestone during the conclusion of the III Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise on Okinawa, May 10, 2019. It is ready to begin operating in the information environment, also referred to as the Initial Operational Capability, by supporting operations in the Indo-Pacific region. This operational level command and control focused exercise contains a fictional scenario developed with a real-world near-peer competitor in mind.
“MEFEX was the first time that we did this and it’s to try to show the value added from the Information Command Center,” said Col. Larry Jenkins, the commanding officer of III MIG. “Showing that we have made ourselves more lethal, more survivable and more flexible.”
The ICC is a new concept but is shaped similar to the Marine Corps’ ground, air and logistics command units. It will bring together information-related capabilities that have existed in the information domain prior to the MIG standing up and focus them in a unified effort on a singular objective to gain information superiority over an adversary.
“(We) want to change the way the Marine Air-Ground Task Force fights, and get it to think of the operations in the information environment as maneuver warfare in a different domain,” said Jenkins.
Examples of the IRCs working alongside of the ICC are cyberspace, electronic warfare, military deception, special technical operations, psychological operations, communications strategy and operations, and intelligence.
The intent of command in the ICC is putting information-related authorities at our level instead of where they traditionally reside in the higher units. Granting those authorities down provides a space to create tempo and speed for subordinate commanders in the information domain, explained Lt. Col. James McGrath, the III MIG operations officer.
In order to grant proper authorities to the ICC, staff members from different units needed to be trained to synchronize with the other IRC’s they may have never worked with before. The training took approximately six months and was executed by building tactics, techniques and standard operating procedures through battle drill rehearsals and staff exercises.
“So, if you look at it now there’s a spectrum of capabilities for the MIG. At the one end, the high end, is the MIG staff here; all the subject matter experts in all of the capabilities that we have been taught and come to understand and integrate into the information environment,” said Jenkins. “On the other end is the standup of tactical-level capabilities within the six battalions that we have in the MIG to execute operations.”
With one historic milestone reached, III MIG’s long term goal is to reach full operational capability by 2025 so they can continue to achieve information superiority throughout the information environment.
May 5, 2019
By Robbin Laird
During my recent visit to Hawaii, I had a chance to talk with Brigadier General Michael Winkler, Director of Strategic Plans, Requirements and Programs at the Pacific Air Force.
We discussed a wide range of subjects, but in this article, I will focus on our discussion of the way ahead for PACAF and the joint force in crafting a way ahead for Pacific defense.
The U.S. services and our allies are focused on shaping innovative ways to deliver effective warfighting and deterrent capabilities. For the USAF, a key focus is upon building out fifth generation airpower, leveraging that capability across the joint force, crafting, shaping and delivering a more distributed force labelled as Agile Combat Employment, and preparing the ground for the coming of the new bomber as a key weapon system for the Pacific.
BG Winkler underscored that PACAF is focused on the importance of operating as a joint force and doing so by learning from its ongoing operational engagements.
As he put it: “Our vision for the Pacific is to operationalize the Pacific AOR. In so doing, we need to take a proactive approach. Too often we operate in the Pacific theater at the speed of staff. What we need to do in the Pacific theater is to act at the speed of operations.”
With the current force, a key path to unleash enhanced capabilities is being able to leverage airpower in enhance the capabilities of the air-maritime force, up to and including the role of the USCG. The presence force throughout the Pacific, whether American, partner or coalition provides the baseline for engagement with competitors and adversaries.
Leveraging presence to connect to a wider integrated force is a key way ahead to deal with the challenges in the Pacific.
BG Winkler put it this way: “A United States Coast Guard National Security Cutter might be facing a challenge.
“And because we haven’t fully integrated their sensor suite in with the rest of the DoD capabilities, they aren’t going to be as informed as they need to be because we haven’t made those connections or able to leverage the full range of U.S. combat power.
“We are working towards enhanced integratability in the force. A game changing capability is based on ensuring that every sensor out there is connected to a network, and that network shares information with everybody that we allow access to it. And we would want to make sure that all of our allies and partners have access to that network.
“Certainly, all the U.S. forces forward deployed would have access to that network, as well.
“We’ve got a lot of work to get from where we are today to actually being able to build that capability, but that’s one of the things that we need to redouble efforts on. Access to the right information is going to be the key to the next conflict. I also think that both parties in the next conflict will probably be trying to prevent the other country from being able to have an information advantage. “
Throughout the discussion he highlighted the importance of what I have referred to as full spectrum crisis management capability.
The USAF needs to be able to contribute across the conflict spectrum, precisely because deterrence works only if demonstrated power is engaged from the lower to higher ends of conflict.
BG Winker argued: “The more we build out our phase zero peacetime capabilities, the more we organize, train and equip our force right now to be able to have that information advantage.
“We need to continue to practice those tactics, techniques and procedures in phase zero, as we’re doing normal training operations, or even normal real-world operations in phase zero.
“Every single HADR event is an opportunity to shape a mixed force that can then share that same type of data. I think that using those training reps as an opportunity to better build our joint interagency situational awareness is definitely a step in the right direction.
“We have tools to do that right now. We don’t have to wait for a 5-year, or 10-year advanced battle management solution. We’ve got Link 16 networks, we’ve got radios, we’ve got a lot of different ways that we can communicate information. To the degree that we can do that more machine to machine, I think that’ll be a more efficient way of doing it, because we’re going to start to develop large amounts of data.
“So much data that the human that’s trying to assimilate all that data now becomes the choke point in the process. So, the more that we can get the machines and the artificial intelligence finding the anomalies in the normal activity for us, the easier it will be for us to be able to process that data and start to capitalize on information advantage.
“But we certainly don’t need to wait for future capabilities; we can enhance joint capabilities across the spectrum of warfare now by working more integration with the key elements of air, sea and land power.”
PACAF is working the agile employment concept as a key part of shaping the ability of the Air Force to operate across the expanse of the Pacific and to do so in a more survivable mode.
When I met the current PACAF Commander in Australia, he was the commander of 11th Air Force. And during a 2018Williams Seminar, he discussed the need for what would now call Agile Combat Employment. I wrote about his assessment in my book on the evolution of Australian Defence strategy published earlier this year.
At the Williams Foundation Seminar in Canberra in March 2018, the 11th Commander, Lt. General Kenneth Wilsbach, highlighted the nature of the challenge requiring the shift to mobile basing as follows:
“From a USAF standpoint, we are organized for efficiency, and in the high intensity conflict that we might find ourselves in, in the Pacific, that efficiency might be actually our Achilles heel, because it requires us to put massive amounts of equipment on a few bases. Those bases, as we most know, are within the weapons engagement zone of potential adversaries.
“So, the United States Air Force, along with the Australian Air Force, has been working on a concept called, Agile Combat Employment, which seeks to disperse the force, and make it difficult for the enemy to know where you are at, when are you going to be there, and how long are you are going to be there.
“We’re at the very preliminary stages of being able to do this but the organization is part of the problem for us, because we are very used to, over the last several decades, of being in very large bases, very large organizations, and we stove pipe the various career fields, and one commander is not in charge of the force that you need to disperse. We’re taking a look at this, of how we might reorganize, to be able to employ this concept in the Pacific, and other places.”
Now PACAF Commander, Wilsbach has made this a core effort.
And this is how BG Winkler underscored the effort: “PACAF has done a pretty decent job over the last three years of getting the Air Force to embrace this idea of agile combat operations and to export it to Europe as well.
“The whole idea, if you rewind the clock to the mid 80s, early 90s, was that every single base in the United States Air Force that was training for conflict would do an exercise where you’d run around in chemical gear.
“At that point in time, there was a large chemical biological threat, and the Air Force recognized that it needed to be able to survive and operate in that chemical threat. So, we trained to it.
“I think the new version of that chemical biological threat is the anti-access area denial umbrella. The idea of agile combat employment is our capability to survive and operate and keep combat momentum underneath the adversary’s anti-access area denial umbrella.
“Basically, we are focusing on our ability to survive and operate in a contested environment.
“PACAF has taken a realistic approach that is fiscally informed because it would be very difficult for us to go try to build multiple bases with 10,000-foot runways, and dorms, and ammunition storage all over the Pacific. ”
“What we’ve done instead is concentrated on a hub and spoke mentality, where you build a base cluster. That cluster has got a hub that provides quite a bit of logistic support to these different spoke airfields. The spokes are more expeditionary than most folks in the Air Force are used to.
“The expeditionary airfield is a spoke or a place that we operate from. It’s not 10,000 feet of runway, it’s maybe 7,000 feet. We’re probably not going to have big munitions storage areas, there’s probably going to be weapons carts that have missiles on them inside of sandbags bunkers.
“And we’re going to look a lot more like a Marine Expeditionary base than your traditional big Air Force base. It’ll be fairly expeditionary.”
We then discussed the challenge of reducing the number of USAF personnel necessary to sustain air operations, along the lines which the Marines have focused upon. “The MOS challenge is a very real problem for us. And I think we’re starting to figure out how we’re going to get around that. We’re calling it multi capable airman, where we do some degree of cross training. So, your average crew chief now can actually do other flight line tasks like load missiles, and vice versa, your fuels folks actually can do some minor maintenance tasks. It is very much more along the lines of the USMC model.
“The goal is to have airmen do more things, which then means we don’t need to deploy as many of them to one location to still get the job done. And then, we’ll work a logistics schema maneuver from the hubs to the spokes to do the things you’d mentioned previously, the fuel resupply, the munitions resupply, any other expendables.”
We then focused on the shift of ISR from intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance to information, surveillance, reconnaissance, and the shift to decision making at the tactical edge.
As BG Winkler underscored: “Our allies and partners are a huge part of everything that we’re going to end up doing out here in theater. We like to think that they are an asymmetric advantage, and the more that we can get the coalition plugged in. It’s not just U.S. sensors that are out there feeding the rest of the joint coalition force, but it is important to tap into the allied and partner sensors.
“I do think that we’re at a precipice for information warfare, and the fact that some of the forward based sensors that we have like the F-35, can generate way more intelligence data then our traditional ISR fleet, like the E3. Australia’s flying the E7, fairly modernized, very robust ISR capabilities on those.
“I think there’s been some discussion within the United States Air Force about whether or not we need to up the game and maybe make an E7 purchase, as well.
“But we are getting to that point where the forward base fighters actually are so much more technologically advanced than our ISR fleet, that it makes you question where the ISR node should be. I agree, it doesn’t necessarily need to be all the way back in Hawaii. It could be somewhere else in the theater.
“But the Air Force, as you’re aware, has traditionally operated with AOC as the central node for command and control in the Pacific. We’re trying to figure out as an Air Force what the future looks like.
“But I don’t think that future is going to be five years from now. I think it might be 10 years from now.
“And in the short term, what you’ll probably see is a something that allows us to operate from the AOC, protect our capabilities to operate from the air operation center, to be able to help synchronize fighters throughout the entire AOR, but then set up subordinate nodes that are probably forward of the AOC.
“If the AOC does get cut off or shut down, for some reason, you do still have subordinate C2 nodes in the theater that can keep the continuity of operations, and keep some battlefield momentum up, to continue to take the fight to the enemy.
“And I think we’re all getting more serious about electronic warfare.
“I’ll be interested to see how those capabilities mature over the next 10 years. I think we’re at a situation right now, where electronic warfare a lot of ways still is a supporting force to the kinetic stuff.
“The big question in the electronic warfare is, knowing you’ve got a limited number of assets that can do it. Where do you want to prioritize that?
“And that question drives you back right to, who is doing the command and control? How are you integrating the most effective electronic warfare to support the highest priority kinetic warfare?
“That’s a commander’s decision, so the important part of that is the Joint Force Commander or the Joint Task Force Commander, or whoever is running the fight, needs to very clearly articulate to his subordinate commanders, who is the supported commander for synchronizing those joint fires?
“Because without knowing that ahead of time we may possess all of the capability in the world as a joint force but we will never employ it as effectively as we could.”
We then discussed training.
And with the coming of the B-21 in the mid-term, preparing for the coming of the B-21, not as a platform, but a weapons system, notably integrated in the air-maritime fight is a key consideration. The role of an expanded ability to work in the synthetic environment is important, but BG Winkler felt that progress has not been rapid enough in this domain, and live training is critical and to do so in ways that better emulate the Red side threat.
Here he noted that building new capabilities in Alaska, on the U.S. side, and in Australia, on the Australian side, were key ways ahead. And, although we did not discuss this, in my view, being able to operate the new bomber from these two trajectories as an air-maritime asset, or one that can work with the tactical air forces, or the fleet is a key leverage for the mid-term for the United States and the allied forces.
BG Winkler closed by linking the training discussion with where we had started the conversation, namely, working from operations to con-ops evolution. “Admiral Aquilino, INDOPACOM commander, believes that entire Pacific Ocean right now should be our training space. Every single time that China sails a Surface Action Group, out here into the Philippine Sea, we ought to be working as a joint force to integrate and bring in additional assets that maybe we haven’t used in the past.
“For example, maybe that’s an opportunity for us to partner with the Coast Guard to figure out how we can get them added into a Link 16 network to share situational awareness.
“But we need to take advantage of the opportunities our adversaries provide us by getting out and about in the Pacific.
“And that’s how you get that training level down to the operators that are going to be pulling triggers, and assimilating information in a combat environment as you let them train.
“Do it every single day in their weapons platform. I think any situation in this theater is an opportunity for us to practice.
“It’s just a matter of us taking the same mentality that we have in the CENTCOM AOR, where you are operating every single day and driven by what is going on in the theater and putting that into practice.”
Featured Photo: U.S. Air Force F-15C Eagles assigned to the 44th Fighter Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan, fly in formation during RED FLAG-Alaska (RF-A) 21-3, near Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, Aug. 23, 2021. RF-A is the world’s premier tactical joint and coalition air combat employment exercise, designed to replicate the stress that warfighters face during combat sorties. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Aaron Larue Guerrisky).
A recent example of expanded exercises with allies in the Pacific has been the “Heifara-Wakea” engagement with the French Air Force.
By Lieutenant Gordon Carr-Gregg
More than 2000 troops from the Australian Defence Force and Marine Rotational Force-Darwin (MRF-D) have completed a high-end live-fire warfighting exercise at Bradshaw Field Training Area in the Northern Territory.
Commander 1st Brigade Brigadier Ash Collingburn said Exercise Koolendong confirmed the ability of United States and Australian forces to quickly respond to crises in the region if needed.
“Exercise Koolendong was the culminating activity of MRF-D 2021 and a key training event for the Australian Army’s 1st Brigade in enhancing security cooperation between USMC and the ADF through combined-arms live fire,” Brigadier Collinburn said.
“It is a tangible demonstration of ADF and USMC capability to respond to a crisis in the region as a coalition force land component with an integrated coalition command structure.”
Commanding Officer MRF-D Colonel David Banning said Koolendong demonstrated that the US and Australia alliance was as strong as ever.
“The ability of MRF-D and the ADF to conduct this exercise during a pandemic is testament to the strength of our partnership,” Colonel Banning said.
“We’ve brought together all the assets of a marine air-ground task force and an equivalent ADF force, including more than 2000 troops, 500 vehicles and 20 airframes.”
2021 marks 70 years since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty with Australia’s most important defence partner.
“The Australia-US Alliance has never been more important as we look ahead to our shared strategic challenges in the region,” Colonel Banning said.
This article was published by the Australian Department of Defence on September 6,2021.
The featured photo: ADF and Marine Rotational Force – Darwin personnel on Exercise Koolendong at Bradshaw Training Area in the Northern Territory. Photo: Corporal Rodrigo Villablanca .
U.S. Marines with 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (3/6), 2d Marine Division, conduct multiple exercises as Marine Rotational Force-Europe 21.1, Oct. 2020, through April 2021.
The deployment strengthened the interoperability, mobility, expeditionary readiness and warfighting excellence of 3/6 and the Norwegian military.
NORWAY
10.15.2020
Video by Cpl. Andrew Smith 2nd Marine Division