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Sailors and Marines attached to the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24) conduct a replenishment-at-sea with the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ammunition ship USNS Medgar Evers (T-AKE 13), Sept. 3, 2021.
Arlington is deployed to U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts in Haiti following a 7.2-magnitude earthquake Aug. 14, 2021.
U.S. Navy video by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class John Bellino/Released
Marines in two CH-53K King Stallions from Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron, executed the recovery of a downed Navy MH-60 helicopter on 4-5 Sept. 2021 in Bishop, California.
The two day operation was the first official fleet mission for the CH-53K King Stallion, as it undergoes operational assessment while the Marine Corps modernizes and prepares to respond globally to emerging crisis and contingencies.
The CH-53K King Stallion successfully recovered a Navy MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter from Mount Hogue in the White Mountains of California on Sunday, September 5.
The two-day operation was the first official fleet mission for the Marine Corps’ new heavy lift capability, which is in the midst of Initial Operational Test and Evaluation with Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, Ca.
“VMX-1 received a request for assistance from the Naval Safety Center about an MH-60S Knighthawk that suffered a hard landing near Mt. Hogue, Ca., at an elevation of 12,000’ Mean Sea Level (MSL) in July,” said LtCol Luke Frank, CH-53K Detachment Officer in Charge for VMX-1.
The MH-60S Knighthawk was sitting on a high altitude ridge in very rugged terrain near the California-Nevada line on July 16 following a hard landing. The helicopter was supporting a search and rescue effort for a lost hiker. All four crewmembers survived without injury and were rescued the following day.
According to Frank, both the MH-60S unit and the Naval Safety Center had exhausted all other resources for recovery, including Army National Guard, Navy and Marine Corps fleet squadrons. “They all lacked the capability to lift the aircraft without an extensive disassembly,” he said.
VMX-1’s CH-53K detachment quickly examined the environmental conditions and conducted a quick feasibility assessment of support and determined that the CH-53K could conduct the lift. The CH-53K fulfills the heavy lift mission of the Marine Corps as it greatly expands the fleet’s ability to move equipment and personnel throughout its area of operations.
A Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion lowers a Navy MH-60S Knighthawk helicopter to the ground after recovering it from the nearby mountain ranges after it conducted a hard landing near, Bishop, California, Sept. 5, 2021. The two-day operation was the first official fleet mission for the CH-53K King Stallion, as it is currently undergoing an operational assessment while the Marine Corps modernizes and prepares to respond globally to emerging crises or contingencies. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Colton Brownlee)
“After two weeks of exhaustive planning and assembling a team of more than 25 Marines and sailors from VMX-1 and 1st Landing Support Battalion from Camp Pendleton, Ca. we deployed two CH-53Ks to Bishop, Ca., and got to work,” he said.
The CH-53K was designed to lift nearly 14 tons (27,000 lbs) at a mission radius of 110 nautical miles in high and hot environments; a capability that expands the service’s range in supporting joint and coalition forces against potential adversaries.
The MH-60S weighed approximately 15,200 lbs. and was positioned in a tight ravine at nearly 12,000’ MSL and needed to be transported over 23 nautical miles to the Bishop, Ca. airport.
“After six months of flight operations with the CH-53K, the detachment had every confidence in the aircraft’s abilities to conduct the mission safely. Our main concern was the environmental factors ground support personnel would have to endure,” said Frank.
“This is exactly what the K is made to do,” he said.
“Heavy lift is a unique and invaluable mission for the Marine Corps. Horsepower is our weapon system and the CH-53K is armed to the teeth.
“The entire team of Marines at VMX-1, 1st Landing Support Battalion, and NAS Fallon Search and Rescue were extremely motivated to execute this mission and we are all very proud to have completed this one flawlessly.
“To be the first group of professionals to complete a real-world, heavy lift/high altitude mission in support of a unit who thought all options were off the table is extremely rewarding,” said Frank.
“This is sure to be the first of what will be many, many successful missions for this aircraft and for heavy lift squadrons.”
In this special report, we bring together some initial assessments of the Morrison Administration’s decision to move on from conventional to nuclear submarines.
These articles were published in September 2021.
The recent announcement of the decision by the Australian government to cancel their diesel submarine contract and to acquire nuclear attack submarines is a significant one. There is much already written about the announcement and its consequences, but what can get lost in the noise is really the key point: this decision launches the next phase of Australian strategic development, but down a path which has been evolving for some time.
At the heart of the reason the Aussies have done so is clearly the Chinese behavior and virtual war with Australia. Australia as a continent is a key challenge for Chinese ambitions in the region. They are a continent which can stage long-range forces against Chinese military operations. The Chinese Communist leaders have done what they should not have: Awakening the quiet power in the Pacific to shaping a longer-range defense force, closely allied with the major competitors of China.
Only Australia really counts in terms of deterring China in a fundamental geographical way: they are a firmly liberal democratic country which rejects Chinese Communism. And as such, the Chinese economic and political engagements in Australia, coupled with the political and cyber warfare that the Chinese have engaged in with the clear desire to destabilize Australia has been met with firm resolve. And the Chinese have responded by escalation up to an including direct military threats against Australia.
This is the driver of the decision. Full stop. It is not about not loving the French, and an inability to work with France or ignoring their contractual obligations under the contracts signed earlier. When Australia made the decision to go with the French Naval Group and build a long ranger diesel submarine, the strategic context was very different than it is today.
In this report, I have brought together my pieces (with one exception) on the CH-53K published since mid-2020. The one exception? II start the report with a NAVAIR press release about the event highlighted on the cover page photo.
All of these articles show steady progress towards the CH-53K coming into the fleet. The dates entered after the headline for the article are from when those articles were published either on defense information or second line of defense.
This new aircraft is part of the next phase of the transformation of the USMC, one which integrates sea bases, expeditionary bases, and land bases into a seamless logistical whole.
And such a capability is clearly necessary for shaping the way ahead. In a recent meeting and interview with logisticians in the Pacific, we discussed the core challenge facing the logistical system of the USMC in the Pacific.
U.S. Marines assigned to 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, 3d Marine Division, and Marine Wing Support Squadron 172, 1st Marine Air Wing conduct forward arming and refueling point operations during Indo-Pacific Warfighting Exercise in the Northern Training Area on Okinawa, Japan, August 31, 2021.
This force-on-force exercise demonstrated the ability to seize and defend key-maritime terrain and provided an opportunity to employ techniques to rapidly establish FARPs. 2/3 is currently attached to 4th Marines as a part of the Unit Deployment Program.
During my visit to France in the Fall of 2021, I had a chance to talk with my old friend and colleague, Jean-Louis Gergorin. Jean-Louis is a noted European strategist with many years of experience both in government and in the private sector. We first met in September 1980 when he was Director of Policy Planning in the French Foreign Ministry.
As I am in throes of finishing my reader of French defense policy under President Macron, I discussed with him how to understand and characterize this period of French history. We started by discussing the intellectual influences on Macron which shaped his policy framework. We then discussed his effective use of symbolism in placing France within the evolving strategic context. And finally, we discussed the various aspects of his policy initiatives which make up his legacy to date.
The Intellectual Framework
According to Gergorin, the intellectual framework for Macron is within European social democracy. “He was always convinced that the French economy has to be free market oriented.” But he had two significant left-wing influences.
The first was the socialist Michel Rocard. As Gergorin put it: “Rocard was in favor of a free market but wanted to adjust it so that greater equality of opportunity could be created.” Rocard is deceased so his influence is in terms of legacy, not current influence.
The second is a politician still rather influential, namely, Jean-Pierre Chevènement. As JLG underscored: “Chevènement is a socialist Gaullist. He is very much attached to national independence, is rather euro skeptical, and very much tempted to come back to some policy of balance between the West and the Russians. Indeed, this idea that it is possible to balance French Western alliances with a special dialogue with Russia is central to Macron’s thinking. But at the same time, Macron believes as have most French leaders in the Fifth Republic, that France’s relationship with Germany is very essential.”
We then discussed the Macron style as Gergorin sees it. “He often talks in terms of contradictory initiatives which have to be pursued at the same time.
“He likes to propose two contradictory policies, and say, “We should pursue both simultaneously. He does so in his speeches by using the French phrase “en même temps.”
In his 2017 campaign, he was the only strongly pro-European candidate. He started from the outset in terms of arguing for an expanded European agenda, including in defense and security policy.
Symbolism and Policy
Macron has been very sensitive to the use of symbolism in his Presidency to set in motion his policy agenda. A key example is hosting Putin at Versailles prior to the 2017 G-7 meeting. Russia had been tossed out of the G-8 thereby making it the G-7. Despite that, Macron hosted Putin prior to the meeting and notably at Versailles.
Gergorin outlined why Versailles was so important as a symbol for Putin. In short, when Peter the Great visited Europe in the time of Louis XIV, the king refused to host him at Versailles. When his successor was king, the regent convinced him to host Peter the Great at Versailles, in part because Russia had defeated Poland and Sweden and had become the dominant Eastern power. Versailles denied then granted to Peter the Great and the red carpet to come to Versailles for the man who sees himself in the tradition of great Russian leaders was not missed by Putin.
The Russian leaders have been preoccupied throughout Russian history for recognition by Western leaders as an equal power. The conscious effort by Macron to bring Putin to Versailles was a clear statement by him that he recognized Russia as an equal partner, but as Gergorin put it: “Whatever that would then mean in concrete terms.”
French First Lady Brigitte Macron, French President Emmanuel Macron, U.S. President Donald J. Trump, and First Lady Melania Trump walk through a colors cordon during the commemoration ceremony of the 75th anniversary of D-Day at the Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial, June 6, 2019.06.06.2019 Photo by Master Sgt. Andy Kin Regional Media Center AFN Europe
At the same time, the invitation to President Trump to come to the Bastille Day Parade in 2017. Trump was very appreciative of the opportunity and was a contributor to how Macron would work with Trump. Indeed, Trump was very helpful to Macron as the rhetoric used by Trump with regard to Europeans was useful to the European sovereignty agenda of Macron. At the same time, the practical efforts to shore up European defense provided significant opportunities for Macron to increase collaboration between American and French forces worldwide.
Policies Pursued by Macron
Symbolism aside, Macron has been very blunt with Putin over the years. Notably, there is increasing pressure on Russia with regard to cyber issues. According to Gergorin, “a hot line has been created between Moscow and Paris on such issues, but of limited success to date. There is a cyber security group which has been created of top officials which meets every year since it was established in 2018. The good news is that it has been useful for a better understanding on the cyber security policies of the two countries. The disappointing news is that neither the dissemination of malware in French infrastructures nor the continuous rise of ransomware attacks by Russian speaking groups has yet been impacted by this dialogue.”
But Macron understands that with Russia, what counts is the balance of power. According to Gergorin, “To do so, he has basically tried to accelerate European defense integration, to build the famous European pillar of NATO, not against NATO, but to build a strong European pillar, all the more because of the worries about America being less committed, which started with Obama, confirmed in a different manner from Trump, and but now with Biden.”
Gergorin also noted that “President Macron has committed his Administration to defense spending, and has focused on regular growth of the defense budget.”
Macron in his 2017 Sorbonne speech called for an accelerated effort to build enhanced European defense capabilities and sovereignty. But progress has been slow on this front but doing so is a key agenda item for Macron’s defense agenda. With the Biden Administration Blitzkrieg withdrawal strategy, and the collapse of the Australian submarine deal, caused in part by the Americans, this key element of Macron’s strategy is clearly reinforced. Whether it will meet with more success going forward is an open question.
The legal and political constraints on German defense are a key barrier seen from the French side. Gergorin mentioned the example of cyber defense. He underscored that “the legal limitations on German defense policy with regard to cyber-attacks are real and problematic. The position is that Germany can retaliate legally only if these attacks are above the threshold of open aggression as defined by NATO. But because all cyber attacks have been so far below this threshold (e.g. ransomware attacks), this means Germany will never complement resiliency by selective retaliation to have a deterrence component in its policy.”
This German position on cyber responses to intrusions may induce France to work with other Western partners to achieve anything realistic.
But he concluded: “In spite of the challenges, the relationship with Germany is better under Macron than before. And President Macron was extremely effective in convincing the Germans that it was necessary to take all necessary measures to support European nations to face the impact of the pandemic.”
And with regard to working with other allies, France under Macron has very active within NATO and working within the NATO Commands. Both at the NATO Transformation Command, in Norfolk, VA., headed by a French officer or at the NATO Joint Forces Command also in Norfolk, the French are heavily involved. They have expanded their engagement in defense efforts in Northern Europe and have spearheaded major efforts in fighting terrorism in North Africa. French special forces have worked closely with American ones in terms of supporting the Kurds in Syria and have engaged in military training assistance in Iraq.
What then is the legacy to date of Macron in defense?
My own view is that it Macron’s first term or perhaps only term is characterized by transition. The authoritarians are changing, the Americans are changing, and Europe is in significant flux.
What then is France’s role?
It cannot be settled in a world in strategic upheaval, and that is why in part Macron’s formula “en même temps” makes a great deal of sense for France.
The featured photo: During the Putin visit to Versailles, the two Presidents are seen at their podiums with paintings highlighting Charles VII’s entrance intoNapes in 1495 and the battle of Fleurus in June 26,1794. Credit: AFP
U.S. Marines with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 232 deployed to Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, June through September 2021.
They deployed to Guam as part of the Aviation Training Relocation program, designed to increase operational readiness while reducing the impacts of training activities.
The opportunity to attend the Defence 24 conference on Polish defense provided a significant opportunity to learn about Polish assessments of the current strategic situation and ways Poland should shape a way ahead.
In addition to attending the conference, I had a chance to talk to Polish defense analysts as well, including Igor Szczęsnowicz a prominent Polish journalist and editor of Gazeta Polska Codziennie and Gazeta Polska.
Certainly, Poland is in a unique situation in today’s Europe, which faces significant challenges of post-pandemic recovery, and dealing with the dynamics of change within the European Union itself.
And it faces a very active Putin-led Russia, which is engaged in ways to expand its power, its territory, and its ability to coerce Europe to get what it wants.
In Szczęsnowicz’s view, Poland plays a key role in shaping a way ahead for Europe in dealing with all of these challenges.
He underscored in our conversation that Poland is a very patriotic nation, and one which is still working through its post-Communist approaches to change. He believes that the Brussels led supra-state efforts undercut Poland’s legitimate right to work through how to shape its post-Communist future.
He noted often in the conversation that the rules generated from Brussels often are targeting Poland rather than reworking how Europe as a community of nations can work more effectively together to shape a resilient and viable future.
Notably, much of Europe is simply ignoring how direct the Russian engagement in Europe is, and the willingness of Putin’s Russia to use coercion to get what they want.
The land grab in Georgia in 2008 has never been reversed. Certainly, the same is true of Crimea. And now the Russians are working to use Belarus as a battering ram opening up more seams within Europe and doing so in ways that directly threaten the Baltic states and Poland.
In a recent piece which Szczęsnowicz wrote, he highlighted how the Russian seam warfare approach can work, and how their approach really gets around the Article V agreement within the NATO treaty. In a piece which he wrote on September 7, 2021, he posed some interesting questions about how the Russians might approach the Zapad exercise.
“Anticipating a bit of future events, I am very curious to see how NATO will react to possible military provocations of Belarusian-Russian troops during the Zapad 2021 strategic maneuvers starting on Friday (10-16 September). only 3 km from the Polish border and there is a high probability that such provocations will take place.
“It may turn out, for example, that a unit of Russian soldiers “gets lost” and unexpectedly appeared on the Polish or Lithuanian side. Then what?
“Theoretically, an incursion of a branch of a NATO enemy state on the territory of a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization triggers certain procedures of cooperation. And we are very curious together with Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin whether in this case all these procedures will work properly. “
Well this did not happen, but what his question poses is at the heart of the real dilemma facing Polish defense along with her allies: if the Russians are not focusing on a classic land-air invasion of Poland or the Baltic states or of Ukraine, this does not mean that they cannot get results from salami tactics and seam warfare.
This then means in turn, that Poland needs to be prepared for frontal attacks in terms of a situation of war, but also, dealing with Russian seam and hybrid warfare, which is designed to further fragment the cohesion of the European alliances and put Putin in a pole position to get what he wants.
And the Polish government and nation have no wish to be those allowing Putin to get into such a “pole position.”
Szczęsnowicz underscored his concern about time.
Putin has momentum. How do we stop that momentum and avoid a major conflict?
He clearly is concerned that within Europe there is a complacency about Russia and Putin’s strategy which is simply not justified.
Defense is not a line item in a European budget; it needs to a core social commitment to ensure the future for a Europe free and whole, to quote a late U.S. President.
In his view, this is the case in Poland which makes it somewhat the odd man out.
But the Russian realities simply are too troubling to ignore.
Note: The quotations above from Szczęsnowicz are translations which we have made, and we have provided the link to the original piece for greater clarity.
