Mirage F-1s Arrive at Tyndall Air Force Base

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01/18/2021

By defenceWeb

The Airborne Tactical Advantage Company (ATAC) has started flying its fleet of Mirage F1 fighters, refurbished with assistance from Paramount Group company Paramount Aerospace, at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida.

Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB) made history on 14 December as a unit of Mirage F1 aircraft arrived at the base in support of an Air Combat Command mass training effort in partnership with ATAC, the US Air Force said.

For the next year or two, Tyndall AFB will house and support the contracted unit of about six aircraft, five pilots and 30 maintenance personnel.

“At Tyndall, we have all the right requirements in place so we could operate on time and not have to wait,” said Lieutenant Colonel Jason White, 325th Operations Support Squadron Director of Operations. “Tyndall’s recent Environmental Impact Study allowed us to support the additional aircraft without a waiting period, unlike our brothers and sisters at Eglin.”

ATAC was awarded a government procurement contract under Combat Air Forces to deliver an alternative airframe, the Mirage F1, which is projected to replace Tyndall’s current fleet of T-38 Talon aircraft.

This new partnership will enable F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning pilots to engage in tactical airborne training, adversary air live training at Tyndall and other US Air Force bases such as Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico and Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, the US Air Force said.

“Adversary air is the most efficient training aide and this is something that (Air Combat Command) has been working toward for a couple of years now,” said White. “The aircraft will use non-live munitions, launch, and meet in the air space for simulated training including radio and radar operations for the purpose of training. The pilot would acquire the target, or the adversary, simulate engaging the adversary and then simulate firing missiles at the aircraft.”

Pilots are expected to begin training in January 2021 utilising Tyndall’s air space.

“Tyndall’s shared air space is just South of Tyndall and extends all the way to almost Tampa and West to about the Alabama border out over the water and some land,” said White. “The Gulf of Mexico is one of the largest air spaces used for air-to-air training and live fire missiles. It is a national resource; having this training air space of this size and dimension which allows us to host an entire, simulated air war.”

ATAC’s Mirage training programme is anticipated to fly more than 1 100 sorties over the next several years to provide adversary air support to the 43rd Fighter Squadron, which is the schoolhouse for the F-22s, and the schoolhouse for the F-35s, the 58th Fighter Squadron.

“Generally speaking, fighter (units) have to use their flying hours to practice, which takes away from training,” said White.

According to White, that means fighter units typically have to use their allotted flying hours to be both the good guy and the bad guy in the air.

“Tyndall’s airspace is the best place to fight air-to-air either over water or over land because of the un-obstruction,” said Lieutenant Colonel Erik Gratteau, 325th OSS assistant director of operations. “We have 1 000 to 60 000 feet of space to fly and there are no mountains to have to navigate or encroachment issues.”

Air Force Special Operations Command Joint Terminal Air Controllers will also benefit from the programme.

ATAC provides live air-to-air, air-to-ship and air-to-surface training for multiple branches of service across the Department of Defence.

“ATAC is excited to have been selected to provide adversary training… and we stand ready to serve additional future operating locations and customer as their needs evolve,” said Scott Stacy, ATAC general manager.

In July 2020 ATAC said it had been selected to provide two US Air Force bases with adversary air live training under the Combat Air Forces (CAF) Contracted Air Support (CAS) programme, worth up to a combined $240 million.

ATAC’s first refurbished Mirage F1 performed its initial flight in the United States on 22 August 2019. The company acquired 63 ex-French Air Force Mirage F1s – of these, 32 of these are in good condition and can be restored to flying status with little effort. The other 31 need major work to be restored to flight, or are suitable for spare parts.

ATAC acquired the F1s specifically for the US Air Force’s adversary air training programme. The company was assisted by Paramount in providing Mirage F1 training. ATAC’s Mirages received several upgrades for US operations, including a new GPS, air-to-air TACAN, new radios, and a new attitude indicator. They will be able to carry an electronic warfare training pod, captive air-to-air missiles, chaff and flares.

Paramount Group in October 2017 announced it had acquired four ex-French Air Force Mirage F1Bs from the French government “to enhance its pilot training capabilities”. The company said its subsidiary Paramount Aerospace Systems would use the twin-seat aircraft as part of its pilot and maintenance technician training services.

Paramount said it has extensive capability on the Mirage F1 with full airframe and engine overhaul capability, as well as the ability to upgrade, modernise avionics and mission systems.

Paramount has also assisted Draken International get its ex-Spanish Air Force Mirage F1Ms airworthy. They will also be used for adversary air training by the US Air Force. Draken International also acquired 12 ex-South African Air Force Cheetah jets for training in the United States.

Published by defenceWeb on January 7, 2020.

Australia and the Chinese Challenge: The Perspective of Brendan Sargeant

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By Robbin Laird

Recently, I continued my discussion with Brendan Sargeant, the well-known and well-regarded Australian strategist about how best to understand the challenge posed by the regime of President Xi to Australia and the Indo-Pacific region. We focused on how he would characterize the nature and focus of the strategy of the Xi regime as a Communist Authoritarian state and then focused on how Australia was responding to this strategy. This raised the question then of how the allies of Australia, notably the United States, and Europe and most significantly the states of the Indo-Pacific were responding to the Xi regime policies and strategy.

It became clear in the discussion that Europe and the United States have a golden opportunity to work with the Indo-Pacific states and to take advantage of Australian initiatives to provide a clear counterstrategy to Xi and his authoritarian regime. Europe otherwise known as the European Commission wishes for a geopolitical role. It is difficult to see how embracing an authoritarian regime with global reach and ambitions as Xi’s China provides more than legitimization and support to Chinese policy, rather than seizing the opportunity to work with the Indo-Pacific states working to counter the Chinese strategy as shaped and executed by Xi’s government.

We started by discussing Chinese strategy and how Sargeant viewed that strategy as formulated and executed by Xi’s regime.

“What is China’s strategy? What are they seeking to achieve? What do the actions that they are taking actually mean?

“I think that China’s fundamental goals are straightforward. They don’t try and hide them. The first key element is the role and dominance of the Communist Party. The Communist Party is the foundation of the contemporary Chinese state, and the legitimacy and political survival of the Communist Party is the overriding strategic priority for the current leadership. This perspective drives much of China’s internal and external policy.

“With regard to how they present themselves to the world, Taiwan is a challenge to the legitimacy of the governing model that the Chinese Communists have developed. It is quite a significant challenge, as was Hong Kong, because it presents an alternative Chinese model to that of Communist Party dominance. It is an alternative that is more powerful in the context of the Communist Party’s refusal to acknowledge its own history and to deal with some of the  terrible things that they have been responsible for.

“To be clear we are not friends with Xi’s China. We are not partners. These are not useful terms to characterize the relationship. We must deal with China, but we always need to deal with a recognition that we are in a situation of long-term political conflict. If you look at strategic policy, most policy in relation to China is concerned with challenging China’s legitimacy in terms of its actions in areas that bump up against Western or regional interests. The South China Sea is a good example,  but the really significant area is in relation to Taiwan.

“The second driver of their strategy is that China is resource-hungry. It needs resources, because it has to sustain levels of growth to deliver economically to its people; in a sense, sustaining economic growth is one foundation for the current legitimacy of the Communist Party.

“The third element is because they are hungry for resources, they are looking at ways of guaranteeing supply. Belt and Road; the relationship with the countries that are close to them, in Southeast Asia, Cambodia, Laos, and so on; their alignment with Russia at the moment; all can be seen as an attempt to guarantee resource flows into China, and to give China diversity of supply.

“I think one of the issues for Australia is that we have been complacent about being a monopoly provider to China in certain areas. In my view the Chinese don’t like that. It represents risk. They will wear some pain in order to reduce their risk in relation to countries like Australia. Of course, we have created strategic risk for ourselves by having so much of the economy dependent on a narrow range of exports to China.

“The fourth key element is that they work to create buffers. The Xi regime wants to maximize the distance between China and potential threats. China is a country with many land borders with other countries. They are trying to push outwards and increase their strategic space.

“They do that in two ways. One is what you see in the South China Sea; a much more aggressive extension of boundaries with their territorial claims, island-building and occupation and militarization of claimed areas. Another is to try to bring close countries within a Chinese sphere of influence or, in the case of India, establish primacy.

“The final element of their strategy which affects Australia quite significantly is to break alliances. They seek to make themselves the center of the Indo-Pacific regional order. They don’t want to face any form of alliance or coalition of the willing that is going to, in a sense, reduce their capacity to control the agenda and to establish patterns of behavior across the strategic system in ways that support China’s interests. In this respect, the QUAD is an important strategic intervention because it signals that China’s cannot unilaterally establish the future strategic order. It must take account of other countries in the Indo Pacific.”

With regard to China’s approach to the United States, a key element of Xi’s strategy is to “raise the cost of the United States operating in the Indo-Pacific region.

“They do that in two ways. One is through diplomacy to make it harder for the United States to operate here. The other way is to push the U.S., and everyone else, out beyond the First Island Chain. And that means that if they control the South China Sea, and they control Taiwan, they have unimpeded access to the Pacific, and they can establish a more capable future deterrent capability against the United States.”

How then did Sargeant see Australia and its allies and partners countering this strategy with one of their own?

He started by underscoring the importance of recognizing that the Xi regime is not the equivalent of China itself. “We talk about the friendship with China, but that confuses China with the Chinese government. The Chinese government is not our friend. It is as simple as that. We should not assume that it is.”

Sargeant argued that Australia along with its ally and partners need to expand the reach of its defense capabilities to operate within the Indo-Pacific region. The challenge highlighted in COVID-19 of supply chains needs to be met with what John Blackburn has called “smart sovereignty” whereby Australia works with allies and partners to shape supply chains not dependent upon China, and by working “coalitions of the willing” in supply chain areas, one can build up the kind of alternative to reliance on Chinese markets that Xi’s regime needs to remain in control of China itself.

“We clearly will work with China, but we need to do so from the standpoint of understanding that we are dealing with a government with priorities and interests very different to ours. We need to conduct a diplomacy with China that seeks to identify areas of common interest and to work in those areas. We need to establish boundaries in areas where our interests diverge. We need to operate on the pragmatic assumption that the relationship will be limited. To describe the Chinese government using terms like friend or partner is misleading. We work to support common interests and to minimize problems where interests diverge, and it doesn’t mean anything more than that.”

He underscored the importance of setting in motions of a broader partnership and alliance strategy built on providing ways to influence China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific.

“What we haven’t seen with policy towards China is a more concerted strategic positioning with coalitions in response.”

“What I see at the moment is a lot of volatility and experiments, as people try to establish a framework, a strategic order, that is capable of solving problems, that allocates roles and power in a way that doesn’t, in a sense, concede everything to China or embody a nostalgia for a U.S. as it might have been, not as it is now.”

“We need to push back against initiatives by China, or any of the other authoritarians, that are going to work against our interests.”

“This is a real challenge for Australia. We’ve always had an approach of separating economics from strategy. Our statecraft has been immature in that respect. In the future, in dealing with China, and with the other authoritarians, we need to understand that how we do all aspects of policy internationally has to be congruent with our strategic interests.

“We can’t separate economics from strategy. We can’t assume that there’s a set of rules in common with the authoritarian powers that we are following as well. I think that that’s what the Europeans have done, and that’s their faith, a faith in the rules-based order being supported by the authoritarians. That world has gone.”

He cautioned that although European nations pursue economic interests, those are not related in any fundamental way towards dealing with China and the Indo-Pacific as a whole.

“European strategy has always seemed to me myopic and concerned with the economic positioning of the significant countries in Europe. It is not global. It doesn’t have a global vision. And when you look at Europe in the Indo-Pacific, everyone is rushing here to talk to India, to talk to China, and to open up branch offices because they think there’s money to be made. It has nothing to do with strategy; it has nothing to do with the defense of liberal democracy.”

“The agreement that they have come to with China, and the rhetoric around it, is just not credible. I agree with the Americans, it is not strategic. They needed to take more time and think more deeply about the implications of it. It is clearly a gift to President Xi.”

He highlighted as well that President Xi might mis-read the actual military situation he faces. With President Trump there was a more realistic assessment of American power and its inability to operate as a global policeman.  As Sargeant put it with regard to the United States: ”I think one of the challenges for the U.S. administration is to actually align its strategic policy in appropriate communication with its actual power.”

But working with the coalition partners in the Indo-Pacific region and the extensive engagement of the U.S. military in the region creates a formidable defense capability. “When I look at the China challenge, what worries me the most about China is that they overestimate their own power, and they underestimate U.S. power. We need to work to correct Xi’s understanding of what he actually faces in the region in response to his regime’s disruption of the region.”

With regard to shaping a way ahead for Australia, what is the key focus?

“We need a strategic policy that connects us with the world, where the instruments of economic power and the instruments of more traditional strategic power are operated in an integrated way to shape effective “coalitions of the willing” to try to shape China’s participation in the regional strategic system in ways that support all participants in that system. A regional strategic system dominated by an authoritarian China is not in Australia’s interests.

“Australia is building the capacity to create those coalitions that sustain the ability to exercise sovereignty, if that’s a term you want to use. We are potentially quite vulnerable, because of the way we have structured our economy, and our defense is probably not big enough to secure all our interests unilaterally. This means that we need to work effectively with other countries, the United States being a key ally, but also to work effectively with like-minded states in the region, in order to enhance our capacity to defend ourselves and exercise Australian sovereignty in ways that support our interests.

“But it’s not about traditional alliances; it’s about building capacity to work together to build and sustain capabilities appropriate to circumstances and to respond to problems when they occur.  It is about working with others to shape the strategic environment in ways that support our interests.”

Also, see the following:

China, Australia and Global Change: Why a European Agreement Now?

For my recent book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy:

Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy

And for a report on Senator Jim Molan’s perspective of the way ahead for shaping an Australian national defence and security strategy, see the following:

Shaping an Australian National Security Strategy: The Perspective of Senator Jim Molan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

France and the Barkhane Operation: Shaping a Way Ahead

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01/17/2021

By Pierre Tran

Paris – France should pull out of Mali. That is the French media message to the Macron administration, as fatalities rise in what is highlighted as a quagmire.

The new year began with a deadly start, when a homemade road bomb killed Jan. 2 two French soldiers in an armored car, just five days after three soldiers were similarly slain.

That brought to 53 the number of French soldiers killed since 2013 in the Serval and Barkhane operations in the Sahel region, sub-Saharan Africa.

The Barkhane mission seeks to hit armed groups linked to the al Qaeda and Islamic State.

An Ifop opinion poll showed a swing away from public support, for the first time showing 51 percent against the mission in Mali, Le Point weekly magazine reported Jan. 11.

That negative sentiment extended to the French deployment of 5,100 troops in the five allied nations in the Barkhane operation, namely Burkino Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauretania, and Niger, Ifop director Jérôme Fourquet said.

The poll showed a drop of nine percentage points from November 2019, and down 24 points from February 2013. The poll was conducted Nov. 28-29.

A video report on L’Opinion, a news website, set out clearly the case for withdrawing troops: there has been no terrorist attack on French soil from the Sahel region, intelligence chiefs said. The “insurrections” can only be resolved by talks, as the conflicts reflect disputes that date back to before the French colonialism.

A French intervention in Mali may have been needed in 2013, ordered by the then president François Hollande, but today’s problem is how to pull the troops out while avoiding making it look like a failure, the video report said.

“What is France doing in Mali?” a leader in afternoon daily Le Monde asked. Eight years after the intervention ordered by Hollande, the answer is “less and less clear.”

The French forces have killed leaders of the insurgent forces and just manage to hold the line between the Sahel and Libya, with the latter a hornet’s nest, the leader said.

But they are unable to prevent strikes into the heart of Mali, nor the “contagion” into Niger and Burkino Faso, the leader said. France is ready to hold talks with certain elements of the insurgents.

A withdrawal is not just a military matter but a political move which should factor in the needs of local communities and maintain democratic freedom dearly bought, the leader said.

Frosty media relations

The public discussion in France has not been helped by a testy exchange between the press and the armed forces, criticized for what was seen as a slow denial of allegations from Mali of a wedding party hit by a Jan. 3 French air strike.

Armed forces minister Florence Parly denied Jan. 10 the allegations, insisting two Mirage fighter jets killed armed insurgents in the village of Bounti, central Mali, and that no women and children were hit.

There was mystery over the alleged strike of civilians by a helicopter and it was hard to get any information, Euronews, a news channel, reported three days after the action in Mali.

That difficulty over reporting a military strike added tension to the already strained relations between the French press and the defense ministry.

A defense blog, Le Mamouth, reported the ministry had planned to send 20 reporters on a press trip to the Barkhane mission last year, but that was cancelled due to two lockdowns.

France will likely start pulling out troops of the Barkhane operation, with decisions to be taken at a summit in February of the five African allied nations and France, Parly said. That reinforcement of 600 troops was temporary.

Last year, France sent in 600 troops to strengthen the 4,500 in the Sahel, a region stretching across central and western Africa, as vast as Europe. France already had some 4,500 troops in the former colonies before stepping them up to the counter-insurgency mission.

France gets logistical support from European nations, including the British RAF’s  three Chinook heavy lift helicopters. There is a UN peacekeeping mission in Mali, but the fighting is left to the overstretched French forces.

Meanwhile, there is concern over the arrival of 300 Russian military personnel to train troops in the Central African Republic, a nation with close ties to France.

There is also Turkey, which looks like expanding its interests in Africa, with the signature last July of a military training and cooperation agreement with Niger, as noted by the Jamestown Foundation, a think tank.

One of the moves of the outgoing Trump administration has been pulling U.S. troops out of Afghanistan, which may be reconsidered with the arrival of president-elect Joe Biden.

Biden has nominated Lloyd Austin, an ex-army general, as defense secretary, and Antony Blinken as state secretary. The latter was deputy national security adviser in the Obama administration, and attended a bilingual school, here.

France pulled out of Afghanistan in 2012, two years earlier than expected. That withdrawal was one of François Hollande’s campaign promises when he ran for the presidency, and when he went out to Afghanistan as head of state and commander in chief, he told the French troops they would be home by Christmas.

It remains to be seen how Macron will shape the way ahead with regard to the Barkhane mission.

Featured Photo: Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/29/world/africa/france-sahel-west-africa-.html

Also, see the following:

The UK and France: Working together in the Mali Operation

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/us-military-support-in-sahel-allies-at-work/

 

Uptick in NATO Intercepts of Russian Military Aircraft in Europe

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Uptick in NATO Intercepts of Russian Military Aircraft in Europe
01/14/2021

NATO air forces across Europe scrambled more than 400 times in 2020 to intercept unknown aircraft approaching Alliance airspace. Almost 90 percent of these missions – around 350 – were in response to flights by Russian military aircraft.

This is a moderate increase from 2019. Russian military aircraft often do not transmit a transponder code indicating their position and altitude, do not file a flight plan, or do not communicate with air traffic controllers, posing a potential risk to civilian airliners. 

“In recent years, we have seen an increased level of Russian military air activity close to the Alliance’s borders,” said NATO spokesperson Oana Lungescu. “We are always vigilant. NATO fighter jets are on duty around the clock, ready to scramble in case of suspicious or unannounced flights near the airspace of our Allies. Air policing is an important way in which NATO provides security for our members,” she said. 
 
Across Europe, some 40 air surveillance radars and reporting hubs, and about 60 NATO jets, are on duty 24/7 to serve as a quick-response force for aircraft which fall into distress or defy international flying rules near Alliance airspace. NATO has operated a Baltic Air Policing mission for Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since the three countries joined the Alliance in 2004.

NATO also provides Air Policing coverage for Allies in the Western Balkans who do not have fighter jets of their own: Albania, Slovenia, and Montenegro. Talks are also underway to extend Air Policing coverage to North Macedonia. Allies have also helped to police the skies of Romania, Bulgaria and Iceland in 2020.

NATO jets respond to unannounced military flights, as well as to civilian aircraft losing communication with air-traffic controllers for any reason, which could range from technical problems to hijacking.

NATO has two air operations centers – one in Germany, covering northern Europe, and one in Spain covering the south – which monitor all air movements across Europe.  

Featured Photo: RAF Typhoon and Tu-142 Bear Maritime Patrol Aircraft bomber. Courtesy: UK Royal Air Force.

Published by NATO on December 28, 2020.

 

 

The UK Carrier Strike Group Reaches Initial Operating Capability

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The UK Carrier Strike Group Reaches Initial Operating Capability

According to an article published by the UK MoD on January 4, 2021, the new UK carrier strike group built around its unique strike carrier, the Queen Elizabeth, has reached IOC status.

The CSG has reached Initial Operating Capability (IOC), meaning all elements of the group from fighter jets to radar systems to anti-ship weapons have been successfully brought together and operated.

Both the air and naval elements of the CSG have now met this milestone, which includes qualified pilots and ground crews being held at short notice for carrier-based operations and trained to handle weapons and maintain the equipment.

Another marker of success at this stage includes the ability to deploy Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities such as frigates and destroyers, as well as both fixed and rotary wing aircraft including Merlin helicopters to operate alongside the carrier.

Defence Minister Jeremy Quin said:

This is a hugely significant milestone for HMS Queen Elizabeth, the Royal Navy and the whole country. This achievement is a testament to the determination of our service personnel and industry workforce who have delivered this first-rate military capability, a capability held by only a handful of nations. I wish the entire Carrier Strike Group well ahead of their first operational deployment this year.

Following the success of the NATO Joint Warrior Exercises last autumn, the Carrier Strike Group capability has reached the key IOC milestone for the programme on schedule.

The multinational deployment in 2020 focussed on incorporating all elements of the CSG with 13 of the UK’s allies including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Turkey, Japan, UAE and the US. Exercise Joint Warrior saw the largest number of aircraft on a British Royal Navy carrier since 1983, as well as the most F-35B jets at sea across the globe.

Full operating capability for the CSG is expected by December 2023.

And in this exclusive interview conducted during a visit to Portsmouth, England in 2018, the preparation for IOC was outlined in detail. This interview published on June 15, 2018 follows:

The coming of the HMS Queen Elizabeth to the UK combat force is a trigger for significant defense transformation.

Most of the analysis of the new carrier really focuses on the platform and what is necessary to get that platform operational but that is far too narrow an approach.

The carrier is a centerpiece, trigger or magnet for broader UK defense transformation within a unique historical context, namely, the broader strategic shift to dealing with higher end operations and the coming of Brexit.

At the heart of the focus of getting the HMS Carrier Strike Group to sea is its projected maiden operational deployment in 2021.

This is a significant challenge and the focus of attention of the Royal Navy and its industrial partners and a major element of my discussions while at Portsmouth.

During my visit to Portsmouth, I had the opportunity to talk with two key Royal Naval officers working hard to prepare the carrier for its first operational deployment. Captain Allan Wilson and Captain Mark Blackmore in Navy Command provided an overview on the way ahead with the carrier task force as well as a very insightful look at the challenge of working several intersecting programs coming together in the future maritime task force.

Captain Blackmore influences the Senior Responsible Officer for the Queen Elizabeth carrier and functions as Admiral Blount’s right hand man in delivering the carrier programme. They are not responsible for UK F-35 LTNG, which is the function of Air Command.

But with three new aircraft coming onboard the Queen Elizabeth, they are working with the integration of the other aircraft as well and closely with Joint Helicopter Command.

For example, the integration of the aircraft to fly on the carrier is part of the challenge as well, and includes three new aircraft, the F-35, Commando Merlin, and the Crowsnest.

And the carrier is shaping a shift from the current concepts of operations for the Royal Navy to a new one as well.

Currently, the key focus is upon targeted deployment built around a single ship to an area of interest.

With the carrier, a maritime task force is being built which will go together to an area of interest.

This change alone requires significant change as the shipyards will now have to manage the return of the task force and the maintenance cycle task-force driven as opposed to a cycle of dealing with single ships combing back from a targeted deployment.

The current goal is to have the HMS Queen Elizabeth deployed on its maiden operational deployment in 2021.

As Captain Blackmore highlighted the way ahead: “We accepted the ship last December and she will go off for the next two years to do fixed wing trials.

“We will do Developmental Test (DT) one and two this Autumn, DT three next Autumn, then Operational Test with the goal of achieving an initial operational capability (IOC) for carrier strike in December 2020 and then about four months later, we plan to deploy CSG-21.

“My focus is clearly on this end point, namely the first deployment wherever it is finally decided to do the initial deployment.

“Prince of Wales comes on about two years astern to Queen Elizabeth and she will be seen off the US Eastern Seaboard early next decade to do the rolling landing trials.

“We have a new landing aide called a Bedford array which is fitted to Prince of Wales which allows us to exploit the full enveloped of rolling landing and gives the pilot visual cues which enhance his capability to come back to the ship with more fuel and weapons as needed, The Queen Elizabeth will then be fitted with the new system.”

A key element for the carrier is clearly its integration with the F-35 for which the developmental test will expound this Fall off of the Virginia coast. 

The declaration of full operational capability for the carrier is correlated with the operation of the first 24 F-35Bs, which will occur by 2023.

The new carrier embraces both the carrier strike and amphibious assault roles.

As Captain Blackmore put it: “Carrier Enabled Power Projection (CEPP) is both an organization and a capability and it captures both the literal maneuver amphibious element and also the carrier strike element.”

The US is playing a key role in the UK working towards CSG21.

One aspect is clearly working with the USMC on F-35B and jointly training at MCAS Beaufort.

The Marines will be evident on the ship as well with their operating from the ship during DT trials as well.

A second aspect which came up in the discussion concerning the workup for the infrastructure was the participation of the US military sealift command in Portsmouth, a subject covered in a separate interview.

The third aspect is working with the US Navy on various aspects of preparation and training for carrier operations.

In 2012, an statement of intent was signed between the US and the UK providing a broad consensus on collaboration and joint training which has been evident throughout the workup of the Queen Elizabeth.

During my visit, I met with Lt. Commander Neil Twigg, who has just come from the USS George W. Bush we he operated as a Super Hornet pilot.  He is the resident fast jet expert on the staff at Navy command.

As Captain Blackmore put it: “We have been involved with the US Navy with regard to to the training of personnel and the concepts, the processes and the organizations that need to come together to make a carrier a carrier. As a US Admiral noted, “This is not a pickup game.  This is not something you just step onboard and just do.”

Working with the US has been a central piece of the activity to bring on line the Queen Elizabeth.

The new carrier is designed differently from a US large deck carrier and will operate differently from the US carriers, and part of the transition is sorting out a way ahead for the UK concept of carrier operations.

And that is clearly a work in progress.

But it is rooted in the design of the ship to operate F-35Bs and helicopter assault forces in varying combinations dependent on the mission.

It is also rooted in building out new ships and missiles to operate with the ship, and to be able to operate in the distributed operational battlespace being shaped by the US and other allied forces as well.

The new carrier both supports and interacts with all of these trends.

How will the carrier both contribute to and learn from these broader macro allied military transformation dynamics?

A core commitment of the UK government is to have a 100% available carrier strike capability.

This means that the maintenance and workup cycles for the two carriers need to be synchronized to ensure that this can be the case.

It is a significant challenge in that workforce, training, airpowers systems and maintenance of the carrier need to be synchronized and not just with the carrier but with the other elements of the maritime task force.

Given that the focus of the Royal Navy in the past few years has been very different, namely focused on deployment of single ships or maritime combinations built around a single non-carrier ship, shifting to the concepts of operations for a carrier strike group is very different.

Much of Captain Allan Wilson’s presentation and focus during the discussion was precisely on how to meet the challenge of the coming of a maritime task force.

The Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and MoD more generally have being adapting their organizational structure to ensure that the kind of integration, which a maritime task force enabled, by an F-35B will be successfully developed and delivered.

This is no easy task.

And Captain Wilson also noted that building out such a capability was a significant challenge but it must be met with a proper training regime to ensure a high level of readiness of the carrier maritime task force.

Captain Wilson noted: “We are redesigning force generation.

“In the past, and currently as we do with our amphibious task force, we deploy ships perhaps in a task force configuration and then they reach full operational readiness during the operation.

“When we come back to the UK, we do not maintain the task force at a high level of readiness.

“With the carrier task force approach, we are shifting our training focus to ensure that the task force is at a high state of readiness when it first deploys.”

“We bring the individual elements of the task force together to work together after they have done their initial training.

“We then integrate the jets with the task force in both synthetic and live training and get them up to certification before they go anywhere.

“We will certify the task force to high level of readiness prior to deployment and will deploy within that cycle.

“And we plan to keep that task force together for a defined period of time, which will require synchronization across the key elements of the task force in terms of maintenance, training and manning.

“That is not how we have done it in the past.

“The deployment has always been the headmark. We have surged units in and out of the task force.

“And we have worked the pieces individually.”

Captain Wilson underscored the challenge of aligning the work up of the carrier and its evolving task force approaches with the aircraft coming onboard the aircraft for its maiden deployment.

In this context, we discussed the Crimson Flag exercise to be held at RAF Marham in 2020.

Captain Wilson posed a key question: “How do you bring the other combat elements into a blended synthetic-live combat training environment to work with F-35?”

He provided an answer: “We have an exercise at RAF Marham scheduled for the Autumn of 2020, within which we anticipate USMC F-35s will participate.

“We are looking at what rotary wing assets will be available as well for this exercise.

“We bring ships crew into the exercise to work the exercise and to focus on combat capability generated from the deck of HMS Queen Elizabeth.”

In short, the new carrier is a key part of the overall dynamics of change within UK defense.

And the senior Royal Navy team is clearly approaching this from an integrated approach looking at the cross cutting changes throughout the navy and air force as well the ground assault forces as well.

It is clearly a very dynamic and innovative process, one which will see significant challenges along the way as a core new capability is crafted for the United Kingdom.

Note: There are several aspects of the new UK carrier of interest to broader considerations of the evolution of the airbase, including manpower requirements, weapons handling,

C2 capabilities and flexible command posts, electric power generation, building the infrastructure to handle the requirements of a data rich aircraft which is the F-35B, and building unique F-35 specific capabilities, such as the ski jump and the unique rolling landing capabilities.

The featured photo: ATLANTIC OCEAN (Nov. 25, 2019) The British Royal Navy aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth (RO 8) steams in the Atlantic Ocean off of USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) Starboard side. Elizabeth is currently deployed in support of WESTLANT 19 which involves mission planning, arming the aircraft using the ship’s Highly Automated Weapon Handling Systems, flying missions and debriefing on completion. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Angel Thuy Jaskuloski)