Payloads, Lift, Autonomous Systems and EABOs

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03/06/2024

By Robbin Laird

The Marines in focusing on EABOs have two key lift assets which can deliver autonomous systems payloads to an EABO and to do so with the reduced signature goal which has been highlighted by LtGen Heckl.

Maritime autonomous systems can be delivered to an EABO via an Osprey/CH-53K combination. The payloads for the maritime autonomous systems could be delivered to an EABO by a single Osprey which would land and offload the Marines, the payloads for the maritime autonomous systems and the support which the Marines would need for a short duration mission. The Osprey could deliver the payloads and land the Marines and leave rapidly.

An incoming CH-53K – both the Osprey and the CH-53K are air refillable and could land at the remote location operating as a transient EABO in a wide variety of locations determined operationally significant by the Navy/Marine Corps command element.

The CH-53K as Col Fleeger, the head of NAVAIR’s PMA-261 which manages the cradle to grave procurement, development, support, fielding, and disposal of the entire family of H-53 heavy lift helicopters,  has noted can be thought of in these terms: “I would argue we should be putting the new age into the back of our helicopter. I’m talking about new technology and new capabilities in roll-on/roll-off packages and inserting them into the back of our helicopter which should be the next logical conceptual leap. We carry cargo in the back, we just we just need to think differently about the type of cargo we’re carrying and the capabilities of the cargo itself.”

The Osprey could carry C2, ISR, Counter-ISR or weapons payloads to the transient location for the EABO. The CH-53K could bring maritime autonomous systems such as those provided by the family of systems built and operated today by MARTAC and the Marines could use one of the boats provided to leave the EABO if rapid turn around and maximum reduction of the signature is a key requirement, or the Marines could simply depart onboard the CH-53K after having launched the MARTAC wolfpack of autonomous systems.

I asked the CEO of MARTAC, Bruce Hanson, after carefully examining the cargo capability of the CH-53K, what could be carried by the aircraft to an EABO. The answer: On the hook, carried beneath the aircraft could be one of the larger boats, the T-38, or a T-50 or T-60 with the number suggesting the length of the boat. Inside the aircraft could comfortably carry three T-18s and 6 T-12s. This means that if the Marines departed by the CH-53K a wolfpack of the larger boat with an additional nine boats could be launched with a decent range to set up a C2 mesh network, and ISR mesh network or a counter-ISR deception network or if desired weaponized with either torpedoes or UAVs such as longer-range loitering munitions on the boats. In addition, most of these vessels can hide undetected for long periods of time in “Gator Mode” awaiting instructions.

The Marines could choose to reduce signature by leaving some of the boats.  The quantity of boats would be correlated to how many Marines are necessary to marry the payloads to the boats.

I have provided extensive detail in my book on The Coming of Maritime Systems to be published later this month of the payloads in relationship to the wolfpack boat operations.

But C2, ISR, Counter-ISR payloads have all been tested on these boats, and the wolfpack operating capabilities of the boats working together with various sizes have been clearly demonstrated. Weapons have also been demonstrated but I think for the near term, the focus is on mesh networks of C2, ISR or counter-ISR payloads.

The importance of counter-ISR is especially significant. As LtGen Heckl put it about his desired EABOs: The real value proposition we are putting forward as the Stand in Force  for the joint force is our sensing capability. The insertion of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) of a sensing capability that can link with other assets, such as the F-35, allows us to sense, connect, and operate even in the face of the denial of space-based assets.

This is an additional way to do this which reduces the time on station for the Marines to do so, thereby enhancing signature management.

The central importance of counter-ISR was underscored in a meeting I had last year with a senior Admiral involved in Pacific operations. This is what he told me:

“Counter-ISR is the number one priority for me, to deny the adversary with to high confidence in his targeting capabilities. I need to deceive them and to make a needle look like a needle in a haystack of needles. It is important to have the capability to look like a black hole in the middle of nothing.”

Dropping in numbers of MARTAC wolfpacks makes for a lot of cost-effective haystacks.

A combined arms operations of Marine air with maritime autonomous systems is one way to do that now and provide a key building block for shaping future operations.

For a report drawing the four articles in the series together, see the following:

Featured Photo: A U.S. Marine Corps CH-53K King Stallion helicopter, assigned to Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, conducts an external lift at Auxiliary Airfield II near Yuma, Arizona, March 28, 2023. The CH-53K King Stallion performed the heaviest lift by a U.S. military helicopter outside of developmental testing with a total load weight of 36,000 pounds. HMH-461 is a subordinate unit of 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, the aviation combat element of II Marine Expeditionary Force. (U.S. Marine Corps still image extracted from video by Cpl. Jaye Townsend),

USS Abraham Lincoln: Aircraft Maintenance

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Sailors conduct aircraft maintenance in the hangar bay of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72). Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group is underway in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations conducting advanced tactical training that increases warfighting capability and tactical proficiency across all domains.

01.31.2024
Video by Petty Officer 3rd Class Thaddeus Berry
USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)

French Weapons for Ukraine: March 2024 Update

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on French Weapons for Ukraine: March 2024 Update
03/04/2024

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The French armed forces ministry published March 4 a list with the value of weapons, military kit, and financial support provided in Ukraine’s bloody struggle against Russia, claiming a total of some €3.8 billion ($4.1 billion).

The French official list showed military gear shipped to Kyiv worth €2.62 billion, covering kit sent between Feb. 24 2022 and Dec. 31 2023, the ministry said on the inventory.

The list withheld the number of various French missiles sent to Ukraine, which two senior defense specialists said was standard procedure on missile deals, with the authorities seeking to avoid giving vital operational information to the Russian forces.

“In total, France delivered military equipment to the total value of €2.615 billion to Ukraine, to which is added €1.2 billion sent to the European Peace Facility, namely more than €3.8 billion between 24 February 2022 and 31 December 2023,” the ministry said.

The European Peace Facility is the European Union’s funding for military and defense projects tied to the EU common foreign and security policy.

That French official valuation of weapons and military kit was a great deal more than the €640 million estimated by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, a German think tank. The Kiel institute, in addition to dispatch of weapons, estimated a French financial contribution of €800 million, with the total amount of military and financial aid of €1.44 billion placing France 15th in world rankings – below Finland – for support of Ukraine, out of a total 42 donors.

The Kiel think tank’s Ukraine support tracker shows the U.S., Germany, and the U.K. as the top three donors of military equipment to Kyiv, in value.

There has been public criticism on the relatively low level of kit France has been seen to send to Ukraine, compared to the donation of other allies, such as Poland and the Baltic states.

The French authorities have replied that it harmed the Ukrainian forces if too much tactical information were released.

The French official valuation of weapons sent to Kyiv has also drawn criticism, with some seeing the amount as artificially inflated, using the cost of replacing aging equipment such as the AMX 10RC armored vehicle with the higher price tag of new vehicles from the army’s Scorpion modernization program.

Publication of the French list was “good news,” said Camille Grand, distinguished policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank, and “replacement value” was one of the ways for accounting for the value of weapons.

While it was difficult to set a value on armaments, the focus should be on the usefulness for the Ukrainian forces, he said. Grand was previously assistant secretary general for defense investment at Nato.

One of the reasons for confidentiality was concern the Russians could better assess the threat in the field, based on detailed information on allied shipments of weapons.

It remained to be seen if the Kiel institute would update its ranking of France or challenge the French data set, Grand said. It was also unclear the methodology used for valuation of shipments from the U.S.,  U.K. and other donor nations.

France has shipped 38 AMX 10RC vehicles to Ukraine, the official list said.

The specialist publication Défense & Sécurité Internationale was among those who noted on social media the official list omitted the MMP/Akeron, an anti-tank missile shipped to the Ukrainian forces, while other close observers pointed up the list misspelling – CM instead of GM – the GroundMaster 200 radar system.

The list omitted the number of the Scalp airborne cruise weapon dispatched. The president, Emmanuel Macron, said in January France has sent 40 Scalp missiles to Ukraine, while the total number has been reported to be around 100.

Macron has also said France would send Kyiv hundreds of bombs.

There was a long standing discretion on the numbers in arms orders, a defense specialist said.

“That is the order of the day,” the specialist said.

That discretion can be seen with the official list giving the number of missile firing systems, but not the number of missiles.

The list shows France sent three Milan anti-tank firing units, but withholds the number of Milan missiles. There were also 1,002 AT4 rocket launcher systems, without details on the number of rockets.

In surface-to-air missiles, there were two Crotale NG and six Mistral firing units delivered, but the number of Crotale NG and Mistral missiles was undisclosed. One SAMP/T firing system was sent, but the number of Aster missiles it fires was held as confidential.

France shipped 6,200 helmets and 6,500 bullet proof vests to protect Ukrainian soldiers, the list showed. Other deliveries included 3,700 first aid kits, 30 Caesar truck-mounted artillery pieces, six TRF 1 towed cannons, and four multiple launch rocket systems. Ten 120 mm mortars were also sent.

France provided training for 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers in Poland and France, the ministry said, and also contributed to security on the European eastern flank, with French troops deployed in Romania and Estonia, a temporary air deployment in Lithuania, and permanent naval presence in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas.

Meanwhile, there was criticism of the German forces, following media reports of the Russians releasing 38 minutes of a recording of four German senior officers discussing over an open line how the Ukrainians could use the Taurus cruise missile if Berlin agreed to send around 100 of the German-built long-range weapon.

The Russian recording revealed the German officers were discussing how the British troops were deployed in Ukraine, and how the British Storm Shadow and French Scalp cruise missiles were deployed in Ukraine, Reuters reported, adding the U.K. forces were handling for France the satellite data the Ukrainian personnel needed to program those cruise missiles.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz has ruled out sending the Taurus missile, amid concerns German personnel would be needed to support the weapon in Ukraine. There is concern Ukrainian forces would use the weapon to strike targets in Russia, broadening the conflict.

Featured Photo: The Caesar self-propelled artillery system. Credit: Ministry of Defence of France

EABOs, the U.S. Navy and Reshaping Combat Clusters for Insertion of Effective Force

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The Marines are building new capabilities for force insertion which complement more traditional ways of operating.

How do you insert force in various locations to hit the enemy where he isn’t?

The basic concept of “hit where the enemy isn’t” was well articulated in an interview, I did with the II MEF commander after a Bold Alligator Exercise in 2012.

This is what BG Owens said in that interview:

“On the Navy side we need to show the agility and the flexibility to maneuver. We’ve got to use our shaping capabilities for both kinetic and non-kinetic operations; we’ve got to use solid deception operations, demonstrations and so forth.

“And we’ve got to basically show the enemy that we can hold his entire coastline at risk, and force him to make decisions to spread his forces out that will allow us to find a weak spot. Or force him to concentrate forces in the wrong area, in which we can go into an area that he either hasn’t reached yet or simply can’t cover because he doesn’t have enough forces. We’ve got to hit them where they’re not.

Marines from the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) depart an MV-22 Osprey at Fort Pickett, Virginia, during an amphibious assault exercise as part of Bold Alligator 2012. Credit: USN

“In doing so, we get away from that image of amphibious assault where we’re going into a limited area, and that you have limited places you can land, so the enemy knows you’re coming to one of these two places.  And once they know you’re coming to the island, there is no surprise left.

“In most situations, we’re not going to be assaulting an island less than ten miles in length; we’re going to be holding a larger coastline at risk. And we will force the enemy to make decisions, and through that, hopefully make mistakes that we can exploit.

“And that’s kind of how the scenario played out in Bold Alligator. We ended up landing where the enemy was not quite able to reach us yet, and even though we did have some threats in the beach area, we were able to mitigate those so that the forces came ashore without taking casualties.”

As the Navy and the USMC are shaping their approach to distributed operations a decade later, they are leveraging new technologies and new concepts of operations to find new ways to achieve the objective of “We’ve got to hit them where they’re not.”

With a kill web approach, the focus is leveraging payloads from various points of operation to create the effects needed and to do so in ways where you combine distributed forces to create greater aggregate combat effect.

You are creating combat mass from aggregation of effects delivered by various combat clusters interwoven into a combined force.

One illustration of how the Navy is working such an approach was highlighted in an interview which I did last year with Rear Admiral Jablon in his office in Hawaii.

Rear Admiral Jeffrey Jablon at the time of the interview was the Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC) commander.

This how he highlighted the nature of a combat cluster in our discussion which we had.

The role of the submarine in the joint and coalition force is being expanded. The submarine force is part of the joint fires solution. The submarine force can operate independently or work with the joint or coalition force in providing joint or coalition force combined effects.

As the joint force works enhanced kill web capabilities, combat clusters can operate together to deliver joint fires solutions.

As Ed Timperlake and I have argued in our book on the evolution of the maritime kill web: “Force packages or combat clusters are deployed under mission command with enough organic C2 and ISR to monitor their situations and integrate the platforms that are part of that combat cluster and to operate effectively at a point of interest. Within that combat cluster, the C2 and ISR systems allow for reachback to non-organic combat assets which are then conjoined operational for a period of time to that combat cluster and becomes part of an expanded modular task force.

“With the right kind of security arrangement, and C2 and ISR capabilities, the presence force, now an expanded modular task force, need not be American to expand the reach and effectiveness of the operational force in the extended battlespace. Such an approach and capabilities are the essence of what a kill-web enabled force is and how such integratability can close the geographical and combat seams which 21st century authoritarian powers are focused on generating.

“This allows for the kind of escalation management and control crucial for the competition with the 21st Century authoritarian powers. It is not about getting to World War III as rapidly as possible or generating nuclear exchanges early in a widening conflict. It is about escalation control and management, and an ability to close seams which adversaries seek to open to gain significant escalation dominance as they expand the reach and range of those 21st century authoritarian powers.”

Rear Admiral Jablon underscored the nature of the shift as follows: “The submarine force is now becoming part of the ‘combat clusters’ that you’re talking about instead of an independent operator.  In the Cold War, we operated independently, alone, and unafraid. During the land wars, we started becoming part of the joint force as we provided land fires via the TLAM. Now, we are fully integrated with the joint force in terms of targeting and communications. But, of course, we can also conduct independent operations as the ‘silent service’ when directed.”

The broadening of the submarine’s role within joint warfighting is being expanded by the arrival and then growth in capability of autonomous systems. In my own view, rather than seeing autonomous systems in the short- or medium-term creating ghost fleets, their role will be to expand the range, capability, and lethality of capital assets. Rather than looking simply at the organic capability on a specific platform, we will consider surface ships using such capabilities as becoming mother ships and submarines will share in this development as well.

Rear Admiral Jablon specifically mentioned two types of autonomous developments of note for the submarine fleet. One is the ability to operate a UUV out of a torpedo tube, with the UUV coming back after its mission to offload data specifically onboard the submarine.

The second autonomous development is the ability to launch a UAV while submerged to enable joint fires. Rear Admiral Jablon said that they had specifically worked this with the USMC as the force develops its Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) solution set.

But the USMC can leverage autonomous systems in other ways to support their EABOs and to deliver combat effects from their distributed forces inserted in the chessboard of operations,

I will turn to such an approach in the next article.

Featured Photo:  The CH-53K King Stallion successfully plugs into a funnel-shaped drogue towed behind a KC-130J during aerial refueling wake testing over the Chesapeake Bay. USN photos by Erik Heldebrandt. April 6, 2020.

Testing Unmanned Ground Vehicle Prototype

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U.S. Marines with 3d Littoral Logistics Battalion, 3d Marine Littoral Regiment, 3d Marine Division, test an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) prototype at Marine Corps Training Area Bellows, Hawaii, Dec. 14, 2023.

The purpose of this training was to test the UGV in order to provide data for a Marine Corps Systems Command-led foreign comparative test (FCT) and insight for 3d LLB on the utility of the equipment. Results from the UGV FCT will help inform the Marine Corps requirements development process.

MARINE CORPS TRAINING AREA BELLOWS, HI,
12.14.2023
Video by Cpl. Malia Sparks
3rd Marine Division

Maritime Autonomous Systems in a Combined Operation with Manned Aircraft

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03/03/2024

Maritime autonomous systems can be used a variety of ways to support the combat force.

My book to be published this month, The Coming of Maritime Autonomous Systems: Empowering and Enhancing the Kill Web Force discusses how they can complement, supplement or supplant a manned force in specific combat situations.

This report looks at one special case, namely how manned aircraft can work with maritime autonomous systems.

Featured Photo: The CH-53K King Stallion successfully plugs into a funnel-shaped drogue towed behind a KC-130J during aerial refueling wake testing over the Chesapeake Bay. USN photos by Erik Heldebrandt.

The United Kingdom Frames a New Uncrewed Systems Strategy

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Recently, the UK Ministry of Defence announced its new strategy to accelerate the development of uncrewed systems for its armed forces and to generate products for export as well.

In a 22 February 2024 press release by the UK MoD, this new strategy was introduced as follows:

A new strategy backed by at least £4.5 billion of investment over the next decade will accelerate access to uncrewed systems for the UK Armed Forces, rapidly equipping them with innovative technology across air, sea, and land. 

The UK Defence Drone Strategy, born from lessons learned in Ukraine, will harness innovative capabilities across UK defence. It will enable the rapid experimentation, testing and evaluation of uncrewed platforms, unifying the approach of the British Army, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, integrated by UK Strategic Command, while crucially working in lockstep with industry.

Drones are a game-changing technology that are constantly evolving, and it is crucial that the UK continues to invest in and maintain our position on the cutting edge of drone development to stay one step ahead of our adversaries.

The new approach will see uncrewed systems delivered at pace into the hands of the British Armed Forces, equipping personnel with critical intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, strike and logistical capabilities. This will leave behind long development timelines and lengthy requirement discussions. Once operational, the systems will be able to be developed and upgraded – or ‘spiralled’ – to keep pace with the rapid evolution of technology and changing threat picture. 

Our initial priority remains the successful delivery of the Ukraine-UK uncrewed systems initiative, building on the UK’s donation of over 4,000 drones for Ukraine. The UK Defence Drone Strategy will help Armed Forces personnel meet the relentless cycle of battlefield adaptation, as has been repeatedly underpinned as Ukraine continues to successfully resist the Russian invasion. 

Minister for Defence Procurement, James Cartlidge said:

“The conflict in Ukraine has been an incubator for new ways of war and we need to learn and implement those hard-fought lessons.  

“Rapidly being able to develop and upgrade uncrewed systems will be key to gaining battlefield advantage and we must seize this opportunity to grow and sustain such skills and capabilities in the UK. 

“The strategy brings together a clear, unified focus – backed by billions in funding – while providing the flexibility to meet different requirements in the air, over land and at sea.

“Ultimately, this is about learning the lessons from the Ukrainian frontline to procure drones at scale for the UK’s Armed Forces.”

Of the £2.5 billion pounds to be spent on supporting Ukraine this coming financial year, more than £200 million will go towards supplying Ukraine with uncrewed systems. As the Defence Secretary announced last week, the UK will include work to scale up the Drone Capability Coalition’s provision of ‘first-person view’ (FPV) drones to Ukraine. This will help to scale the UK’s domestic drone industry across manufacturing and software development whilst giving Ukraine cutting-edge, battle-tested capabilities to defend their citizens and target the invading Russian forces. 

Working with international partners and leading uncrewed systems designers, the UK’s ambition to be a world-leader in uncrewed systems will enable exports in a rapidly growing global market and create onshore investment opportunities, supporting UK jobs and backing the Prime Minister’s priority to grow the economy. 

Commander of UK Strategic Command, General Jim Hockenhull said:

“This strategy, backed by significant investment, offers the opportunity to transform our approach to the acquisition, integration, and exploitation of uncrewed systems.

“The partnership with industry will be vital to ensure we harness innovation and generate world-leading capability. 

“Integrating advanced uncrewed systems into our suite of capabilities will protect the force, deter our adversaries and, when necessary, help us to fight and win.”

Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), the procurement arm of the UK MOD, has played a key role in helping develop the new UK Defence Drone Strategy and will be pivotal in ensuring its successful ongoing delivery.

Chief Executive, Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S), Andy Start said:  

“DE&S has supported the rapid procurement of large numbers of uncrewed aerial systems for Ukraine, and it is clearer than ever that unhindered access to battle-winning uncrewed systems is absolutely crucial in modern day combat. 

“We are delighted to be working with frontline commands and industry partners to identify, test and deliver platforms that will give the UK Armed Forces the competitive edge they require to protect the nation and support our allies.”

A comprehensive partnership with industry is at the core of the Drone Strategy, and building on the UK’s extensive industrial, robotics and digital heritage. Through regular, clear industry engagements, we will incentivise industry to support the rapid manufacture and adaptation at a scale and capability able to deliver operational advantage for our Armed Forces.

As part of the Strategy, we will work across government to make the UK more competitive in the global export market for uncrewed systems and their development. 

Today’s Strategy builds on the UK’s rich history of developing and operating uncrewed systems, including the use of Reaper MQ-9s by the Royal Air Force, and small to medium uncrewed aerial systems by the Army and particularly the Royal Navy who have developed a growing array of surface and sub-surface capabilities, including autonomous minehunters.

The significance of the experience in the war in Ukraine is highlighted a driver of change in the report: “The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the ubiquity of uncrewed systems in contemporary conflict – initially focused on UAS and rapidly expanding to all forms of uncrewed systems. The frontline operational environment is the most challenging for operating these types of logistic, find, and strike systems, with previously unseen levels of Electronic Warfare (EW). High equipment attrition rates have demanded new types of capabilities, utilising technologies developed at scale for the commercial sector to enable a different cost model to deliver capability.”

But what systems to leverage in the near terms as a building block to the way ahead in introducing uncrewed systems into the force?

In the introduction to the strategy document, the UK Minister of Defence Procurement, James Cartlidge, highlights the initial focus for UK purposes of the following uncrewed systems: “We are harnessing this new approach for use in naval mine clearance; one way attack; heavy lift and Intelligence/Surveillance. Meanwhile, concerted focus is underway to ensure we can counter such threats and provide the protection from uncrewed vehicles that our forces require.”

With regard to maritime uncrewed systems the report highlights the experience of the UK to date as follows: “The Royal Navy has developed the use of Remus 100 and 300 Uncrewed Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) for mine detection, and M500 underwater Remote operated Vehicles for seabed operations; Learning the lessons from the Black Sea and our leadership of experimentation in the Maritime Coalition, UAS are deployed onto Royal Navy frigates, increasingly integrated into ship Combat Management Systems; and . HMS Prince of Wales has conducted a number of ‘firsts’, launching and landing a 9 metre long Mojave RPAS and the UK produced Windracer heavy lift logistic drone.”

Not surprisingly, BAE Systems has announced that they have acquired a company to enhance their involvement in drones and be better positioned to support this new UK strategy.

This February 22, 2024 announcement by them highlights their moves in this domain. “The UK Defence Drone Strategy will create a unified approach across all three military services and industry to enable the rapid experimentation, testing, evaluation and procurement of uncrewed platforms. BAE Systems who recently announced the acquisition of Malloy Aeronautics have invested in uncrewed systems across land, sea and air domains for many years and the new strategy is an important next step.
The strategy will help academia and industry to build on the UK’s already world-renowned leadership in this technology and increase the pace at which we can identify opportunities and collaborate to deliver new capabilities across all domains.”

One assessment of the strategy was published by Openshaw and Co on February 28, 2024, and it highlighted the importance of the ecosystem for such a strategy, not just the platforms.

Uncrewed systems are not limited to a single domain – such systems represent a cross-cutting technology area that extends across Air, Sea, Land and Space.  Often, we embody an uncrewed system as the delivery platform itself, such as the Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV) or Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) or Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV).  However, this ignores the wider software, supporting networks, integration, manufacturing, robotics, and digital capabilities that underpin the operational capability itself.  It was pleasing to see the broader ‘system’ aspects referred to in the Defence Drone Strategy.

As this company is focused on intellectual property issues, it is not surprising they raise this aspect of the challenge to innovate in this domain. They highlight the challenge as follows:

The strategic intent to innovate, as presented in the Defence Drone Strategy, would certainly appear to be in place.  What I wonder, is how the strategic intent transitions to a culture and environment where, commercially, it is ‘safe’ to innovate, and where you are incentivised to innovate.

Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Rights such as patents, can have a role to play in a “culture of delivery-focused innovation”.   A patent application filed for an invention can de-risk future collaboration by giving reassurance to the owner that the associated intellectual property is protected.  Patents can also make smaller businesses more attractive to investors and collaborators, and even provide a mechanism for recognising and rewarding inventors.

Ensuring sufficient IP protections are secured is one thing, but then understanding how best to realise their full potential through the successful navigation of the complex world of Defence contracts is quite another.

What is apparent, the future requirement for drone-based innovation and technology is of very high importance in the wider Defence realm, and one that should inspire the use of patents to protect and future-proof any potential wider commercial applications and revenue streams.

defence_drone_strategy_-_the_uk_s_approach_to_defence_uncrewed_systems