USS Nimitz, part of Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, returned to Naval Base San Diego, Feb. 26, 2021, after a more than 10-month deployment to U.S. 5th Fleet and U.S. 7th Fleet, which included freedom of navigation operations and participation in Operations Freedom’s Sentinel, Inherent Resolve and Octave Quartz.
02.26.2021
Video by Lance Cpl. Levi Voss
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
We have heard a good deal about the desire to work Navy and USMC integration.
What can be forgotten in this discussion is how important USMC air is in such an effort.,
It is not surprising for as the U.S. Navy refocuses on the high-end fight, at the heart of such an effort is refocusing on air-sea battle.
This means as well that a priority on USMC aviation in any transformation of the USMC remains at the heart of the effort.
But for such an effort to succeed, continued focus on the ability of the USMC and its naval aviators to have the resources and capabilities they need are crucial to play an effective role in shaping a way ahead.
But this effort almost did not happen and that near failure reminds one of the need for a renewed effort as well.
The partnership of the Marines with the Royal Navy can clearly be seen in current HMS Queen Elizabeth operations.
Because of seeing through the F-35B to deployments and now significant operations, it is possible for the Marines to publish a story like this one published by 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing on May 10, 2021.
US and UK Special Relationship Strengthened by CSG-21 Deployment
(ABOARD HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH, Irish Sea) — With the arrival of F-35B stealth fighters, the United States’ tri-maritime support to the United Kingdom (UK) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 21 is underway. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 aboard Her Majesty’s Ship (HMS) Queen Elizabeth, DDG-68 USS The Sullivans, and U.S. Coast Guard engineers on exchange programs round out the United States support to the strike group, for their upcoming deployment. This will be the first time US F-35’s have deployed on another countries carrier.
“This deployment highlights the global reach of the U.S. and UK armed forces and their interoperability,” said Col. Simon Doran, US Senior National Representative (SNR) to the CSG. “The UK stands amongst our most stalwart and capable allies and this deployment enhances the deterrence and defense capabilities of the NATO Alliance.”
“We are proud to represent the United States on this historic deployment reinforcing the longstanding and unbreakable alliance and defence relationship between the U.S. and U.K,” said CDR.David Burkett, the commanding officer of USS The Sullivans. “The deployment is the culmination of a decades long cooperation effort to deepen U.S. and U.K. interoperability in an unprecedented way.”
USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) is homeported out of Mayport, Florida. This multi-mission destroyer is capable of conducting Anti-Air Warfare, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and Anti-Surface Warfare.
The Sullivans is named to honour five brothers from Waterloo, Iowa who served together on the USS Juneau during World War II. The Sullivan brothers: George, 28; Francis, 27; Joseph, 24; Madison, 23; and Albert, 20; lost their lives during the Battle of Guadacanal on November 13, 1942. They were adamant about serving together in spite of the Navy wartime policy to separate family members.”
“We are excited to operate from the deck of the Royal Navy’s Flagship alongside 617 Squadron, supporting a unique, historic opportunity” said Lt. Col Andrew D’Ambrogi, the commanding officer of VMFA-211. “Marines are expeditionary, we exist to operate forward and to provide rapid response capabilities in support of national and allied defense.”
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA)-211 is based out of Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona and assigned to Marine Aircraft Group 13, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing. Their mission is to destroy surface targets and enemy aircraft, day or night under all weather conditions during expeditionary, joint or combined operations.
VMFA-211 can trace its lineage to January 1, 1937 when Marine Fighting Squadron 4 -was activated at Naval Air Station San Diego, California. The “Wake Island Avengers” were the second operational squadron to transition to the F-35B and were the first unit to fly the F-35B in combat. The F-35 combines next-gen fighter characteristics of low observability, sensor fusion, fighter agility and advanced logistical support with the most powerful and comprehensive integrated sensor package of any fighter aircraft in history, providing unprecedented lethality and access to highly-contested environments.
VMFA-211 is also supported with U.S. Navy personnel assigned to USS John C. Stennis. The Sailors, all aviation ordnancemen, will be assembling ordnance in support of VMFA-211 for the duration of the deployment.
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 211 and USS The Sullivans are humbled and proud to continue the special relationship with the United Kingdom through the deployment of Carrier Strike Group 21. Their interoperability with the United Kingdom, The Netherlands and additional international allies will preserve military advantage and reinforce rules-based international order. The United States and United Kingdom’s forward-deployed forces remain ready to respond to crises globally as a combined maritime force.
But looking back, this partnership almost did not happen.
More than a decade ago, the UK government announced that they were pulling out from the F-35B program to buy F-35Cs, and to redesign their new carriers to use catapults, namely, the new electronic catapults planned by the US Navy for the USS Ford class.
As part of the UK’s 2010 strategic review, the government committed to rebuilding their new carriers to enable “cats and traps” as the launch mechanism, and the purchase of F-35Cs versus F-35Bs.
This decision left the USMC in a very difficult situation within the Pentagon at the time, ramping up pressure on their F-35B purchases.
As Asian allies have now joined the F-35B effort, the importance of the USMC commitment to allies is certainly clear and those allied Pacific F-35Bs will be key contributors to the kind of air-sea integration necessary in the Pacific and working collective defense.
As fixed airfields become higher risk propositions, an ability of an aircraft to fly from a wide variety of sites which can operate as airfields in a crisis, has become not a nice to have capability but a necessary one and a key part in the way ahead in conducting successful distributed operations for an air-sea integrated force.
Also, see the following:
Aboard the USS Wasp: Participants in Operational Testing Provide a Progress Report
USMC Deployment Onboard HMS Queen Elizabeth: The Partnership Which Almost Did Not Happen
By Denis Mole
In Adelaide’s The Advertiser newspaper on 7 March, former defence minister Christopher Pyne said, ‘Then there is the nonsensical argument that the Attack Class submarines are no good because they aren’t nuclear. Almost all of these arguments are driven by people who either know nothing at all about submarines and defence or have outdated information that is no longer relevant.’ Pyne must therefore believe that Australia’s current and recent submarine commanding officers know nothing about submarines.
The 2016 defence white paper called for Australia’s future submarines to be ‘regionally superior’. As a former commander of the submarine force, I don’t know any submarine commanding officer over the past 30 years who has any doubt that, overall, nuclear-powered submarines are superior to diesel submarines of similar vintage. Australia’s new Attack-class submarines will probably be superior to most diesel submarines in our region, but they won’t be superior to China’s nuclear-powered submarines entering service in the 2040s and beyond. China’s navy is numerically larger than the US Indo-Pacific fleet now and is forecast to be more powerful than the American fleet by 2035. Australia’s 12th Attack-class submarine won’t enter service until around 2054 and will be in service until about 2080.
Pyne went on to say, ‘Australia does not have a nuclear industry. One cannot be created overnight.’ Pyne might have the cart before the horse. The Americans had their first nuclear-powered submarine in service before their first nuclear power station. The nuclear power station program in the US had been languishing until Captain, later Admiral, Hymen G. Rickover was appointed to head the nuclear reactor development for both naval and civil applications. In the early years, it was trained nuclear submariners leaving navy service and going into the commercial power sector that allowed that industry to grow rapidly.
The claim that Australia can’t have nuclear-powered submarines because it doesn’t have a nuclear industry has never been tested. An Australian ability to manufacture and reprocess nuclear fuel wouldn’t be essential in order to own and operate nuclear-powered submarines. Modern American and British submarines are built with nuclear fuel to last the life of the vessel. Japan has 33 nuclear reactors in power stations but doesn’t manufacture or reprocess nuclear fuel. This is also true of many countries in Europe and the Middle East that have nuclear power. Australia buys advanced combat aircraft and weapons that are manufactured overseas, so why not nuclear reactors and the whole-of-life fuel they require? Nuclear-powered submarines could be built in Australia with imported reactors.
Notwithstanding that reactors and fuel can be purchased from other countries (the OPAL reactor at Lucas Heights is from Argentina), why doesn’t Australia have a larger and more diverse nuclear industry? Of the top 20 economies (Australia is 13th), 17 have nuclear power. Australia, Italy and Saudi Arabia are the three exceptions. Italy imports 16% of its electricity from adjacent countries, more than half from France where it is produced from nuclear power. Saudi Arabia is acquiring nuclear power. And, as various countries commit to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, it’s noteworthy that no major economy intends doing so without nuclear power in the mix.
Diesel submarines have been around for about 120 years and nuclear submarines have been around for about 65 years, so neither form represents new technology. With a choice between the two technologies, the leading Western maritime powers of the US, UK and France all adopted the nuclear option with no diesel attack submarines, because nuclear power is the more effective and superior technology.
At the time when replacements for Australia’s Oberon-class submarines were being developed in the 1980s, it’s almost certain that neither the US nor UK would have sold nuclear submarines to Australia. With the Cold War at its peak, their focus was on the Soviet Union and the possibility of maritime warfare in the North Atlantic. France was just starting to develop its first nuclear-powered attack submarines. But what about when it came time to explore options to replace the Collins-class submarines?
The 2009 defence white paper announced that the Collins class would be replaced and Australia’s submarine force would be expanded to 12 boats. The defence minister at the time, Labor’s Joel Fitzgibbon, directed the department that, in developing options, it was not to bring forward any nuclear proposal. Three years later, when he was no longer defence minister, Fitzgibbon admitted it was a mistake ruling out a nuclear option; however, neither of his successors altered the ‘no nuclear’ guidance to the department. Consequently, when the Coalition government came to power in 2013, only conventional options had been developed.
The notion of conventionally powered submarines’ suitability for Australia in the second half of this century needs to be challenged. The Attack-class program should proceed as replacements for the six Collins-class submarines to avoid a capability gap; however, options to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for the additional six boats and eventually replacements for the six Attack-class submarines should be pursued immediately.
Submarines could lead to a broad nuclear industry in Australia.
Denis Mole served in the Royal Australian Navy for more than 35 years, commanding submarines and attaining the rank of commodore. He has recently retired from the commercial marine and defence support sector.
This article was published by ASPI on April 15, 2021.
The featured photo: WATERS OFF GUAM (Dec. 11, 2020) The Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Asheville (SSN 758) steams off the coast of Guam during a photo exercise with the French Navy Rubis-class nuclear powered submarine (SSN) Émeraude. Asheville and Émeraude practiced high-end maritime skills in a multitude of disciplines designed to enhance interoperability between maritime forces. Asheville is one of four forward-deployed submarines assigned to Commander, Submarine Squadron 15. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger)
By Robbin Laird
The terms C2, ISR and training are changing significantly in the shift from the land wars to the high-end fight. C2 is migrating from hierarchical direction to mission command and distributed operations; ISR is moving from intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance to INFORMATION to decision making for an integrated distributed force; and training is open ended learning process of how to shape modular task forces that can work together to deliver the desired crisis management and combat effects.
We have written a great deal in the past months about the very significant changes in these domains, and I have recently published a book which highlights some of these changes.
But as the Marines work with the Navy towards more effective integration for the high-end fight, both sides face significant challenges to work with one another. On the one hand, the US Navy has added new ISR capabilities in the form of P-8s and Tritons which have not been designed in any way to support the kind of maneuver operations which the Marines are built to do. On the other hand, the excellent C2 which the Marines have built to operate ashore are not built to work with the at sea maneuver force.
There is no magic technological wand which can be waved over the two forces and create integratability. This must be worked from the ground up on each side and the ultimate purpose of doing so needs to be shaped in very concrete ways and in very clear mission areas. Why are they integrating? For which crisis management or combat effect? Against which adversaries and for what demonstrated positive outcome?
During my visit to II MEF, I had the chance to discuss the way ahead on the Marine Corps side with a very experienced SIGINT officer, who is the head of II MEF G-2 and is the senior intelligence officer for the MEF, Col. William McClane. He joined the Marines towards the end of the Cold War, and as I have seen in both Marine Corps and Navy interviews, there are a smattering of such officers towards the end of the careers who bridge the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the new phase of peer competition.
Obviously, the bulk of their careers have been through the land wars period, but these officers understand how very different those wars are from facing an adversary with full spectrum forces able to conduct contested operations across the battlespace, up to and including nuclear weapons.
I have referred to this as the strategic shift, but in many ways, this is more of a strategic shock than a strategic shift. The Navy is shifting from support to land operations to blue water maneuver warfare; the Marines are shifting from being best mates of the U.S. Army to reworking into a maneuver force for full spectrum crisis management. In my own view, the question of being reworked as a maneuver force for full spectrum crisis management is only partly subsumed under an effort for enhanced integration with the Navy. Land-based operations even in the conditions of maneuver warfare is only partly part of the maritime fight.
In effect, what is happening is that as the Navy reworks its locus from the land wars to blue water expeditionary operations, the Marine Corps is reworking how it can assist in such a shift but also, how it can operate from afloat and ashore mobile bases to shape a way ahead in their ability to work with allies in interactively shaping more effective support for allied defense, on the one hand, and more effective allied integration with the Marine Corps and the joint force’s ability to operate across the extended and contested battlespace.
I had a chance to talk with Col. McClane on several issues but will highlight three major ones. The first one is the return of Russia as a definer of North Atlantic defense. The second is the intelligence to information transmutation of ISR. And the third is the challenge of working more convergence between Navy and Marine Corps ISR systems.
But the overview point made by Col. McClane was clearly articulated by him: “We are in a campaign of learning to shift from COIN operations to great power competition.”
Part of that learning is re-focusing on the Russians. When I went to Columbia University for my PhD in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the universities were committed to Russian studies. They certainly are not now. If there is a refocus on dealing with the Russians, the absence of analysts with Russian knowledge, language, and substantive, is a major problem.
This is certainly reflected in refocusing a force like the USMC. What Col. McClane noted was that our Nordic allies certainly have not taken a vacation from dealing with Russians, and that their domain knowledge is a key part of shaping a rethink of how to understand Russian behavior training, and operations. And clearly, it is the Russian military we are dealing with, not the Soviet Union.
This means that there is a double knowledge challenge. The first is that much of the residual U.S. knowledge remains under a Soviet hangover. And second that fresh knowledge of how the Russians operate under President Putin militarily needs to be built out.
The second is the intelligence to information shift in ISR. As Col. McClane put it: “We tend to get too fixated on the cyber piece to the determinant of working the information piece about how Russian decision makers operate and will operate in a crisis. That is a craft which we need to master.”
The information piece is about shortening the cycle from knowing to acting, as well as working information war. Col. McClane noted that “it is crucial we master the process whereby information can be tailored for messaging that affects the adversaries’ cognitive decision making. The messaging is key.”
The third key challenge we discussed is aligning USMC and US Navy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. A key example is that the P-8 which is being operated by the US Navy and our allies in the North Atlantic is not generating data easily usable by the USMC. In fact, in the recent Dynamic Cape 21 exercise, the Marines were able to work much more effectively with USAF unmanned aerial systems than Navy assets in terms of ISR missions.
This means, for Col. McClane: “We need naval capability development not just US Navy, and USMC separate acquisitions in the ISR area. If we are truly going to fight a naval campaign, the Marines will need to be able to tap into U.S. Navy systems useful to a Marine air-ground task force. Fixing and resourcing the Naval ISR enterprise is a key part of shaping the way ahead.”
Featured Photo: U.S. Marine Corps CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters, assigned to the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepare to retrieve U.S. Marines during a simulated air assault as part of exercise Trident Juncture 2018 in Keflavik, Iceland, Oct. 17, 2018. Trident Juncture, a NATO-led exercise, hosted by Norway, will include around 50,000 personnel from NATO countries, as well as Finland and Sweden, and will test NATO’s collective response to an armed attack against one ally, invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jonathan Nelson)
DEFENDER-Europe 21 is a large-scale U.S. Army-led exercise designed to build readiness and interoperability between the U.S., NATO allies and partner militaries.
This year, more than 30,000 multinational forces from 26 nations will conduct nearly simultaneous operations across more than 30 training areas in 14 countries.
GERMANY
03.11.2021
Video by Robert Sekula
U.S. Army Europe and Africa
Trojan Footprint is the premier Special Operations Forces exercise in Europe.
While the exercise is focused on improving the ability to SOF to counter myriad threats, it also increases integration with conventional forces and enhances interoperability with our NATO allies and European partners.
Most importantly, however, Trojan Footprint builds upon already strong relationships, grows trust and develops lasting friendships that promote European peace and stability.
Georgia is serving as the host nation for US Special Operations Command Europe’s (SOCEUR) premier SOF exercise – called Trojan Footprint 21. US Army Green Berets assigned to 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) will train and continue to build interoperability with Georgian Special Operations Forces (GSOF) in tactical training events throughout the region.
“While the exercise is focused on improving the ability of SOF to counter a myriad of threats, it also increases integration with conventional forces and enhances interoperability with our NATO allies and European partners,” said Col. Marc V. LaRoche, Deputy Commander, US Special Operations Command Europe. “Most importantly, Trojan Footprint fortifies military readiness, cultivates trust, and develops lasting relationships which promote peace and stability throughout Europe.”
Trojan Footprint 21 also helps to strengthen NATO military relationships in Europe, and establish a common sight-picture for combat and peacekeeping missions abroad.
US Army Green Berets assigned to the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) will train and continue to build interoperability with Georgian Special Operations Forces (GSOF) in tactical training events throughout the region, the US Embassy to Georgia has reported.
The SOCEUR-led exercise will provide an opportunity to test and improve upon multi-domain tactics, techniques and procedures. These operations will leverage the professional skillsets of air, land and sea forces to execute a complex mission, and increase the readiness of Special Operations Forces in the Black Sea region,” said the US embassy.
The embassy said that the Trojan Footprint 21 also helps to strengthen NATO military relationships in Europe, and establish a common sight-picture for combat and peacekeeping missions abroad.
In a separate meeting with US Ambassador to Georgia Kelly Degnan, Prime Minister Garibashvili thanked the US for the visit of Legend-class US Coast Guard national security cutter, making its first port call in Batumi after conducting series of exercises with the Georgian Coast Guard, US Naval Forces Europe-Africa.
Captain Timothy Cronin, Commanding Officer of the vessel, and his crew were greeted at a welcoming ceremony by Head of Adjara Government Tornike Rizhvadze, and Head of Interior Ministry’s Coast Guard Department Captain Ramaz Papidze.
“The US Coast Guard looks forward to more opportunities where we can work with the Georgian Coast Guard and Our Black Sea partners to advance the rule of law on the sea,” stated Captain Cronin.
NATO ally, Romania, is hosting an integrated contingent of U.S. Army, Air Force, and Naval special operations forces to train and build interoperability during Trojan Foot-print 21. On May 3rd, 2021, Special Operations Command-Europe’s (SOCEUR) premier SOF exercise kicked off. Allies and partners will include, Bulgaria, Germany, Georgia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom for combined, joint exercises in training locations across Romania and Europe.
“While the exercise is focused on improving the ability of SOF to counter a myriad of threats, it also increases integration with conventional forces and enhances interoperability with our NATO allies and European partners,” said Col. Marc V. LaRoche, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). “Most importantly, Trojan Footprint fortifies military readiness, cultivates trust, and develops lasting relationships which promote peace and stability throughout Europe.”
The SOCEUR-led exercise will provide these units an opportunity to test and prove multi-domain tactics, techniques and procedures. All-domain operations leverage the professional skillsets of air, land and sea forces to execute a complex mission, increasing the lethality and readiness of these forces in the Black Sea region.
This exercise will allow NATO allies and other regional partners to continue to build upon and strengthen the relationships within this joint, combined training in Europe and establish a common sight-picture for combat and peacekeeping missions abroad.
The FREMM DA Alsace was launched April 18, 2019 at the Naval Group shipyard of Lorient thirteen months after its keel laying. It is the ninth FREMM frigate built by Naval Group and the seventh one for the French Navy.
According to Naval Group: “On April 12, 2021 in Toulon, in the presence of Florence Parly, Minister of the Armed Forces, Naval Group delivered, in accordance with its calendar commitments and expected performance, the FREMM DA Alsace.
“Intended for the French Navy, it is the first of the two air defense frigates of the FREMM program.
“This is the seventh European Multimissions FREMM Frigate ordered by the General Directorate of Armaments (DGA) for the benefit of the French Navy, and whose program management has been entrusted to OCCAR 1.”
The video below provided by Naval Group highlights the build of the new frigate.
Paris – An early French order for a third frigate for defense and intervention helped Naval Group boost competitiveness on its offer of the FDI warship to Greece, executive chairman Pierre Eric Pommellet said March 30.
“It is good news for the competitiveness of our shipyards,” he said in a video press conference.
Pommellet was referring to the March 29 announcement by the armed forces minister, Florence Parly, that France was bringing forward the delivery of two FDI warships by a year to 2025.
“I have the pleasure to announce that we will speed up the delivery of the FDI 2 and 3, the frigates Admiral Louzeau and Admiral Castex,” she said at Naval Group’s shipyard at Lorient, western France. “In this way, we will have three intervention frigates a year earlier than planned.”
Earlier production of a third FDI will help a cost cutting drive, with NG seeking to shed €124 million ($145 million) of costs. Competitiveness could always be improved, Pommellet said, declining to give a value on that French order, reflecting Parly’s withholding that information.
Those second and third FDI vessels will be delivered nine months apart in the first and last quarter of 2025, specialist website Mer et Marine reported. Delivery of the remaining FDI 4 and FDI 5 vessels remained 2027 and 2029.
Delivery of the first FDI, the Admiral Ronarc’h ordered in April 2017, was due in 2024, the Direction Générale de l’Armement procurement office said in a March 29 statement.
That first FDI had been scheduled for delivery in 2023, but NG had temporarily closed shipyards last year due to the pandemic crisis.
The FDI, bearing a brandname of Belharra, is aimed at the highly competitive export market, seen as necessary for the financial health of the company.
A cut in costs was needed, as Greece had last July found NG’s €2.5 billion offer for two frigates too expensive, business website La Tribune reported March 23.
Naval Group made a fresh offer mid-March of four FDI warships, with the first to be built at Lorient and three in a Greek shipyard, a defense source said. Those frigates would be armed with the MBDA naval cruise missile, a weapon absent from the five-strong order for the French navy.
France has also offered Greece two secondhand frigates from the French navy for free, to bridge the gap until delivery of the first FDI, the source said.
On the plan to build 12 attack submarines, NG has committed to ensure 60 percent of local content from the Australian supply chain, said Pommellet, with that commitment applying from today and respected “by the end of the program.”
There has been media pressure for a pledge on local content, and that topic was high on the agenda when Pommellet flew to Australia last month for high level talks.
The submarine project pointed up the shift of NG from essentially a French company to becoming a global actor with an Australian industrial base.
There would be significant industrial investment and Australia would be part of the global supply for NG, he said.
NG was already working with local partners, including family owned firms and engineers, to build facilities at Adelaide port, he said, with the Thales Australian unit among the partners.
BAE Systems was also at the harbour, he said, working on its Australian navy frigate.
There will be “no worries” for local content on the submarine project, he said, pointing up the significance of Australian sovereignty.
NG was in negotiation for the next stage in the project, which is basic design and likely to last two to three years, followed by detailed design, and then manufacture, he said. Long-term programs were managed in stages, and it was up to the government to decide it had chosen the right partner as each phase came up. That reflected national sovereignty.
NG’s Australian unit has committed to at least 60 percent local content, created almost 300 jobs, and plans to double its local workforce this year, the company said in a March 23 statement. That recruitment was part of preparation for building a hull qualification section in Adelaide in 2023 and building the first submarine pressure hull in the following year.
More than 120 local firms have registered interest to be tier one capability partners, to build major parts for the boat, the company said. That was in response to announcement of the first local manufacturing package worth almost A$900 million.
The DGA awarded March 19 a two-year contract to NG, Chantiers de l’Atlantique, a commercial shipyard, and TechnicAtome, a nuclear engineering company, to conduct further studies on a next generation aircraft carrier, the procurement office said in a March 29 statement.
The study follows previous preliminary studies which led the president, Emmanuel Macron, to opt for a nuclear powered carrier to replace the Charles de Gaulle carrier.
When these studies are completed in 2023, a more detailed, three-year study will follow, to allow industry to make an offer for building the carrier, the DGA said. There will also be a safety study for the nuclear engine.
The aim is to start building the ship in 2025, hold sea trials in 2036, and enter service in 2038, to avoid a capability gap before the Charles de Gaulle is retired from service, the DGA said.
NG has formed a joint venture with Chantiers de l’Atlantique to work on the new carrier, with the former to receive 2/3 of revenue and the latter 1/3, Pommellet said.
That joint venture, named MO PA for aircraft carrier prime contractor, will be 65 percent held by NG and 35 percent by Chantiers de l’Atlantique. That JV company name evoked memories of a previous project, named MO PA 2, which worked on studies for a sister ship to the Charles de Gaulle. That MO PA 2 project was cancelled for lack of funds.
The joint venture aims to be clear on management of the program, with each partner clear on what the partners will manage.
NG will be overall architect, and integrator for combat, navigation and aviation systems, catapults and arresting cables, subsystems for the nuclear boilers, and integration of the boilers into the ship.
Chantiers de l’Atlantique will build the ship and manage major systems such as electric propulsion, living quarters and auxiliary systems.
A speeded up order for a third frigate for the French navy reflected the need for NG to plug a looming gap for work at Lorient and winning state support.
NG had been waiting for that announcement for some time, Pommellet said
The government holds 62.5 percent of NG, while Thales, an electronics company, holds 35 percent.
The shut down of the yards in the first half last year hit 2020 sales and profit, and hurt the company’s export drive.
That lock down led to 2020 revenue falling to €3.3 billion from €3.7 billion in the previous year, with a profit margin dropping to 2.6 percent compared to 7.6 percent.
The 2021 target for the profit margin was 7.5 percent of sales, the company said.
The pandemic crisis cut down export prospects, hampered by cancellation of the Euronaval trade show last year and the Paris air show this year, Pommellet said. Trade shows were an important means of pitching directly to prospective clients.
Domestic deals accounted for 70 percent of 2020 sales, with 30 percent from exports, he said. The 2021 target was 60:40 percent, and Australia was a major factor.
Pommellet said he took note of business magazine L’Usine Nouvelle challenging the company for withholding a press release on 2020 financial results, which were published in a March 24 interview with La Tribune.
By Robbin Laird
The Russian seizure of Crimea set in motion the return of direct defense for both Europe and the United States. With Putin’s Russia reshaping it defense capabilities and concepts of operations, there is a significant reset in terms of how the United States and the allies are working force integration in the North Atlantic. With the Nordics leading the way in terms of European responses to the Northern Flank, the reestablishment of Second Fleet and the standup of a NATO command on U.S. soil, Allied Joint Forces Command, have set in motion a Norfolk led effort for reworking how the United States Navy works with allies in shaping the way ahead in what has been called the “Fourth Battle of the Atlantic.”
With the shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management, and with a new focus by the U.S. Navy on fleet combat operations, a new phase in working Marines with the evolving approach to Naval integration is underway.
This clearly affects the North Carolina-based Marines, and no force more so than the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade within II MEF.
During my visit to II MEF during the last week of April, I had a chance to meet with the acting commander of 2nd MEB, Colonel David Everly (see biography at the end of the article).
2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade is a very flexible force capability.
As their website highlights:
“The MEB Command Element (CE) provides a Marine Air Ground Task Force /Joint Task Force (MAGTF/JTF)-capable headquarters that can rapidly deploy and when directed composites with naval and / or land-based forward-deployed and/or rapidly deployable forces to form a MAGTF or the core element of a JTF headquarters in order to fulfill Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) operational requirements.”
But that force construct faces significant challenges as the effort to shape new approaches to naval integration unfolds. As Colonel Everly put it in our discussion: “We’re changing our culture. We’re shifting our culture back to align with the naval character of our force.”
He added that “understanding the Navy’s composite warfare concept is not something culturally ingrained in how the USMC has been trained and operates.”
But there is a cultural challenge on the Navy side as well. “Our expertise as a MEB is in composite warfare. How well does the US Navy fighting as a fleet, understand that expertise and how best to leverage that and shape new approaches to integration.”
In other words, a core challenge is co-evolution to create new combat capabilities. On the one hand, as the Navy reworks fleet operations, how best to leverage what the USMC can contribute? How should the USMC reshape to better support fleet operations, and reshape its approach to composite operations?
A key challenge is working two key elements: how to contribute as a task force element and how to be able to deploy as a self-sufficient force in a crisis?
On the one hand, what is being worked are new ways to shape modular task forces within which the Marines bring core competencies and capabilities. On the other hand, how to ensure that the Marines are a survivable force when they deploy as a unit?
For Colonel Everly, a key way ahead is to train and exercise together and to reshape interactively the kind of co-evolution which will lead to mission success. The MEB is clearly pursuing such an approach as seen in the recently completed Dynamic Cape 21 exercise. In this exercise, working how to shape expeditionary logistics as a key part of support to force projection in the North Atlantic was a key part of the effort.
Logistics is crucial as well as shaping the kind of distributed C2 which can be leveraged to craft flexible force integration as well.
That kind of effort was seen earlier this year when 2 MEB completed an Initial Response Team Exercise.
As a story released by the command indicated about this exercise:
U.S. Marines with 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade completed an Initial Response Team exercise, taking place on Camp Lejeune and Marine Corps Auxiliary Landing Field Bogue, N.C., Jan. 14, 2021. The Initial Response Team exercise simulated a forward theater deployment to establish a command and control communication node for 2nd MEB with support from Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263.
“We conducted an Initial Response Team fly away drill that consisted of Marines from core functional areas within the MEB,” said Maj. Jay Montgomery, G-3 future operations planner, 2nd MEB. “The team was given 24 to 96 hours to prepare for a simulated forward deployment and establish a command and control center.”
As 2nd MEB executed the exercise, they were air lifted to Marine Corps Auxiliary Landing Field Bogue and immediately began set up of their control center. This quick execution not only demonstrates the mobility and flexibility of the MEB, but also ensures proficiency of the Marines involved.
“From the moment we had boots on the ground we were able to set up communications for our staff within 20 minutes,” said Gunnery Sgt. Scott Brown, a network chief with 2nd MEB. “Being that fast to establish communications is essential to being able to enable and control units, anywhere at any given time.”
Being able to establish a command and control station on a short notice is one of the requirements for 2nd MEB’s goal of staying a force in readiness and projecting forward to prepare for an eventual II MEF deployment.
“One of the missions for MEB is to be rapidly deployable; deployments and drills like this help us rehearse the establishment of command and control,” said Col. Garrett Benson, assistant chief of staff, G-3 operations, 2nd MEB. “The Initial Response Team was a way of maintaining 2nd MEB’s proficiency in rapid deployment and getting out the door completely ready to go both administratively and medically.”
Benson said the drill showcased MEB’s ability to be anywhere, anytime. “The purpose of the exercise was to ensure we are ready at a moment’s notice in Europe, Africa or anywhere else in the world,” said Benson. “This training event was a success and it validated our ability to deploy on a short notice, furthered our capacity to incorporate aviation assets into our movement and reinforce our relationship with II Marine Expeditionary Force staff as we look to execute these exercises like these in the future.”
The C2 piece and the expeditionary logistics pieces are two key parts of adapting 2 MEB’s composite warfare capabilities to the new focus on integrated operations with the U.S. Navy, but they are a work in progress. A couple of examples of what the MEB can bring in the future to the maritime fight are ashore fires, such as HIMARS or the Naval Strike Missile. Another example is working signature management so that Marines operating in expeditionary base locations can provide ISR and other capabilities to the fleet.
Both face challenges. Col. Everly was part of the team that brought HIMARS to the land wars. When the HIMARS was introduced into the land wars, the focus was not on shaping them for a dynamic employment concept. I have seen at MAWTS-1, the Marines working integration of HIMARS with F-35s which is the kind of dynamic employment concept which makes sense for the way ahead for Marine Corps integration for the maritime fight.
The signature management piece is part of the larger challenge of working information warfare as part of force insertion and engagement which would enhance integratability as well. As Col. Everly put it: “The information domain is still something that both the MEB and the MEF are working to put their arms around.”
Another piece to the Marines working to enhance their ability to contribute to the 4th Battle of the Atlantic is enhanced integratability with the relevant nations in the areas of interest and operations. Col. Everly underscored that exercising and training in the region is a key part of enhanced integrability which enables the Marines working with allies can bring to the fight. “Our interoperability with the Nordics, the French and the British is a key part of our effort as well. And this is part of the co-evolution which we are experiencing as they are evolving as we are ourselves.”
An example of the kind of co-evolution underway between the Navy and 2nd MEB was highlighted in a recent composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX) lead by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group. The IKE CSG Commander is Rear Adm. Scott Robertson who I interviewed last year when he was head of the Naval Surface and Mine Warfighting Development Center (SMWDC), located in San Diego, California.
The kind of innovative thinking he was focused on in that command has been carried over in the rethinking of fleet warfare operations.
As Robertson put it in an interview on the COMPTUEX event: “We were able to actually test some of our draft C2 (command and control) elements on how would we actually fold in Marines in an EABO capacity into the [composite warfare commander] construct, which was a big step for us, figuring out how do we sit there and do mutual fire support irrelevant of whether it’s coming from an aircraft, a surface ship or an EAB established ashore somewhere.”
This is the kind of exercise effort which Col. Everly highlighted in our discussion as crucial to shaping the way ahead to deliver a more effective force going forward. But clearly, working co-evolutions of the Marines with the Navy and with the allies is a major strategic challenge, but one ripe with strategic opportunities as well.
Colonel Everly is a native of Inglewood, California. He graduated from the University of Southern California with a BS in Business Administration.
As a company grade officer, his operational assignments were Forward Observer, Guns Platoon Commander, Headquarters Platoon Commander, Assistant Executive Officer, Fire Direction Officer, Artillery Liaison Officer and Battery Executive Officer, 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines; Target Information Officer, 26th MEU (OPERATIONS NOBLE ANVIL and SHINING HOPE -Albania, OPERATION JOINT GUARDIAN –Kosovo, and OPERATION AVID RESPONSE –Turkey); Assistant Operations Officer, Operations Officer and Battery Commander, 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM -Philippines/Thailand, and the Unit Deployment Program (UDP) -Okinawa, Japan.
As a field grade officer, his operational assignments were Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 11th Marines (OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM); Operations Officer, 11th Marine Regiment; Commanding Officer, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines; Commanding Officer, The Basic School; AC/S G-5 Plans Officer, II MEF; Chief of Staff and Commanding Officer, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
His supporting establishment assignments include instructor and Staff Platoon Commander (SPC), The Basic School; Faculty Advisor and Expeditionary Operations Instructor, Expeditionary Warfare School; Ground LtCol Assignment Monitor and Ground Colonel Assignment Monitor, Manpower Management Division, HQMC.
His joint duties include Deputy J3 Operations Officer, Joint Inter-Agency Task Force for Former Regime Elements (OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM); Operations Directorate (J3), Current Operations (J33), Joint Staff. Junior Military Assistant to the 24th and 25th Secretaries of Defense.
Colonel Everly’s civilian and military education include: US Army Field Artillery Officer Basic Course (with honors), US Army Field Artillery Career Course (with honors), Marine Corps Command and Staff Seminar Program, MS in Management and Leadership from Webster University, MS in Financial Planning from Oklahoma State University and MA in Strategic Security Studies for the National Defense University.
Col Everly’s personal awards and decorations include: Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with Gold Star, Joint Service Commendation Medal, Navy and Marine Corps Commendation with Gold Star, Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal, Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal with Bronze Star and the Combat Action Ribbon.
