By Tony McCormack

The world has changed rapidly over the past 18 months and the way Australia’s defence organisation trains its people needs to change with it, or skills and readiness will surely decline.

A combination of the Australian Defence Force’s involvement in responding to natural disasters over the summer of 2019–20 and Covid-19 restrictions throughout 2020 resulted in the cancellation of major military exercises such as Hamel, and the scope of those that did proceed was reduced. Pitch Black 20, initially cancelled, was eventually held as a scaled-down virtual exercise. This pattern was consistent across the Five Eyes, with RIMPAC also drastically reduced in scale and scope.

Despite this reduction in activities, military personnel were still required to retain their individual skills and the ADF to maintain its readiness and preparedness levels. However, the lack of realistic training opportunities no doubt resulted in some atrophy of the ADF’s operational ability.

Despite the availability of a vaccine, Covid restrictions are going to remain with us for a while yet, precluding a return to large-scale training activities and preventing international travel to exercise with allies and partners. Greater investment is needed in alternative approaches that leverage emerging trends in simulation to rectify the deficiencies that the reduction in training will produce.

Live, virtual and constructive training, or LVC, is a taxonomy used mainly for military training, where there’s a mix between real people, simulated capabilities and environments, and computer-generated elements. Imagine a soldier in the field in the Northern Territory, calling in a simulated airstrike from an F-35 pilot seated in a simulator at a Royal Australian Air Force base in New South Wales against a computer-generated threat.

The holy grail of LVC is the ability to integrate all the individual components to conduct complex multidimensional training at varying levels of complexity and security, with widely dispersed personnel and platforms. The ultimate goal is an event that links all components together, giving the participants the maximum training benefit in as realistic an environment as possible.

The ADF conducts LVC to a limited extent. During 2020, the ADF participated in virtual exercises such as Coalition Virtual Flag, Wirra Jaya and Fleet Synthetic Training, to name a few. While all were international, they were constrained to a narrow focus on elements in the air, land and sea environments.

Unfortunately, LVC hasn’t yet reached its potential. The main obstacles are the cost of implementation and of service-specific training systems and, up until last year, the abundance of live training activities and exercises. The changed environment wrought by 2020 has provided the opportunity for a more considered approach to LVC for the ADF.

Covid-19 isn’t the only catalyst for change; the complexities of contemporary military equipment necessitate and complicate the development and implementation of LVC. The combat systems and weapons on high-end platforms such as the F-35 joint strike fighter and air warfare destroyer operate on manufacturers’ proprietary systems at high levels of classification and consume and create massive volumes of data. Stringent security protocols are required to protect both the source codes and the data that is carried, as well as access to a large amount of secure bandwidth.

These weapon systems are also expensive to operate. Combat aircraft cost tens of thousands of dollars per hour to fly, so every hour flown in a simulator means a flying hour saved, a longer period between maintenance cycles and a longer airframe life.

While increasing the scope, quantity and frequency of LVC activities would undoubtedly maximise training opportunities for the ADF and improve the skills and competencies of personnel, it will be difficult to achieve. However, there are some steps that could be taken to improve LVC opportunities.

To begin with, all relevant simulators and computer-based training systems need to be compatible with the LVC network. This will take a change to procurement processes, as current training systems often support only the needs of a particular weapon system, with little thought given to broader interoperability. Where appropriate, new and emerging systems should have LVC compatibility mandated. An extant system should be modified only if it will provide a proven return on investment.

Next, a stand-alone, multi-security, layered IT network should be established. This would remove the added bandwidth demands required to operate LVC from daily operating systems, reduce the chance of data spills and remove any possibility of a simulated scenario being mistaken for an actual event. A robust network may also help to assure manufacturers that their proprietary information won’t be shared with a competitor.

Importantly, an LVC network must be easy to join. A system that’s difficult to get into and navigate will be underutilised and likely provide no training benefit. The system needs to be built for the user and not the IT specialist.

Finally, LVC should not and cannot be pursued by Defence alone. LVC needs a balance of contributors: those who build and maintain the environment, those who provide the training expertise and those who use it. It must be a combination of military and civilian personnel with a broad mixture of qualifications and practical experience.

There’s already a community of Australian companies providing expertise and services in this area. Cubic Australia, for example, currently provides support to all three services across Australia and Milskil, mainly focuses on supporting the fighter force at RAAF Williamtown. Teaming and agreements are already in place and non-defence investments are being made. The North Queensland Simulation Park, or NQ SPARK, is a collaborative activity involving government, industry and academia that’s aimed at providing a multi-user simulation facility.

A more nuanced approach to LVC is needed but it won’t happen unless it is given a higher priority. Resources (particularly budgetary ones) and personnel need to be devoted to building the LVC enterprise. Importantly, LVC needs to be championed at the highest levels to ensure its implementation is promoted and enforced.

While the holy grail will likely never be achieved, circumstances have changed and the requirement to conduct more blended exercises creates opportunities to improve the quality and availability of LVC for the ADF. Training is about people and not just simulators or computers. Any LVC solution needs to be simple to use and provide a training benefit, not a burden.

Tony McCormack joined ASPI’s professional development staff in April 2018 after an extensive career in the Royal Australian Air Force. Image: Department of Defence.

This article was published by ASPI on February 10, 2021.

Also, see our recent book on training for the High-End fight:

In his recent review of the book, Air Vice Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown had this to say:

For the last 20 years high-end training has continued to be a feature of major USN/USMC and USAF exercises.

However the emphasis and the training has always been modified to take account of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

While this was a necessary requirement of the times, it did lead to a stagnation in high-end warfighting concepts as the exercises and training have remained largely unchanged for the last 20 years.

The proliferation of 5th generation technology and the threat posed and encompassed in the cyber and EW domains has continued to evolve rapidly to the point that the latest generation SAMs are not necessarily or even the most significant threats posed to the deployment of Allied Air Power.

The emphasis on operations in the Middle East has meant that the high-end exercises have not evolved as quickly as the technology or the threat.

While the U.S. has continued to develop and deploy leading edge technology for the high-end fight, the training concepts and virtual environments have not necessarily kept pace with the requirements of this new technology.

High quality and realistic training has always been and will continue to be the major determinant in military success.

Training for the High-End Fight is the only recent significant work that looks in detail at this issue.

Robbin Laird uses his significant research over the last seven years and his unprecedented access to USN, USAF and USMC senior warfighters to detail the major shift in thinking that is underway as the U.S. works through the training requirements of Allied Air Power when all the domains are contested by a capable adversary.

By Ed Timperlake

Joint By Design, The Evolution of Australian Strategy is a very important new book by Robbin F.Laird.

As the author sagely points out in his preface that  “this book although focused on Australia, is not just about Australia.”

There is a strategic shift underway as land wars are left behind and alliance forces refocus on the Peoples Republic of China’s  modernization and even mobilization of all aspects of the Peoples Liberation Army.

Please do not let the term “army” lose sight of the growth of a real threat facing Australia, America and other Pacific rim countries and even India.

They put “army” in front of other services, the PLAN or Navy, PLAAF or Air force,  and the  2nd Artillery with ever increasing ICBM and IRBM missile forces all  beginning to sound General Quarters or simply get ready for combat.

The insights in the book, backed by direct evidence of a country and their National Security leaders with typical Australian courage in facing hard truths, is building out military force united in purpose using the most current combat platforms available combined with a  strategic and tactical  communication vision that pulls it all together to become the most platform for platform modern combined fighting force in the world.

Brilliant hard work went into making important acquisition decisions every step of the way and Joint by Design gives full credit to visionary leaders.

In reviewing the book I can make a very personal observation that is so important today about an Australian Navy ship known as the mighty Hobart fighting together with the American 7th Fleet in Vietnam waters in 1968.

I learned a very important lesson that is an echo from history that must always be remembered as a lesson learned in putting together complex military engagements and what is often called “the fog of war.”

HMAS Hobart DDG 39 was a true navy surface action gunfighter.

History reports that on 13 and 14 June 1968 in a running gunfight against NVA costal batteries the HMAS Hobart knocked out one gun while collecting shrapnel from their upper-deck in the exchange.

Now that is truly “guns guns guns” combat.

Sadly soon after that successful dueling gun fight tragedy struck in the dark hours of June 17 when HMAS Hobart’s crew detected incoming air and marked it as friendly.

However, it soon became one of the ugliest “friendly fire” mistakes at sea during the entire Vietnam war.

A section of USAF Phantoms let fly with their Aim-7 Sparrows without doing a visual identification (VID).

The Aim-7 is a semi-active AA missile that requires a lock on until impact.

The surface movement of ship can give a radar lock in the cockpit but without an “eyeball” VID the  missile payload once fired has no idea if it is a ship or low flying attack or recon helicopter.

A failed human operator with bad  intel created this tragedy.

In one respect the HMAS Hobart was fortunate that one of the missile warheads did not explode.

However, the missiles killed and wounded members of the crew.

Showing courage and skill under fire HMAS Hobart managed to get off five rounds of 5in shells as the Phantoms left.

The lesson of this incident rings forward from over half a century ago and is extremely important as the  U.S., Australia and other Allies begin to “train train train” to forge scalable “kill webs” to fight and win any Pacific engagement.

The attack on the HMAS Hobart cannot be written off simply as a ’fog of war” or a tragic friendly fire incident.

It was much more; it was a gross deadly failure of tactical and strategic intelligence.

How do I know because I was present afloat also on the gun line serving as a Naval Academy Midshipman serving on the Fleet Amo ship the USS Great Sitken, AE-17, and after the incident, we also tied up in Subic Bay when the HMAS Hobart made port to assess damage.

Leading up to the attack, all elements of  the 7^th Fleet and 7^th AF were receiving flash traffic that the North Vietnamese were running helicopters up and down their coast at night.

Such important actionable intelligence put all units on extra vigilant air defense combat alert.

What was not known at the time because it was kept highly classified (or even worse simply American cowboy time) that the helicopters were actually CIA missions more than likely flown by their secret AF “Air America.”

It must always be noted there is always a key challenge facing force integration, namely ensuring that the intelligence that is shared provides for a common perspective.

In trying to forge together an effective modern combat force taking full advantage of revolutionary 21^st Century ability to fight at the speed of light for target acquisition and target engagement to have the best payload effectiveness to kill the biggest threats working at cross purposes can defeat the allied force.

I learned this at a very young age; there is something worse than no intelligence and that is bad intelligence.

Australian leaders know this and there is a graceful end that tells me Australia is still such a U.S. special ally.

Years later as a Presidential Appointee Envoy for President Bush (41), I represented America at the dedication of the Australian Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

After Annapolis I qualified as a Naval Aviator and USMC Fighter Pilot and returned to SEA in 1973 serving as a squadron pilot in Task Force Delta trying to stop the Khmer Rouge from overrunning  Cambodia.

With the U.S. Congress ending all combat support on Aug 15 1973, the Cambodian killing fields began.

It was a very dark time, but years later my visit to Australia gave me great hope for the future.

With the never to be forgotten beat of a Huey flying out of the mist while every family who had lost someone during the Vietnam War marched in front of the dedication parade carrying their National Flag while  the band played “Waltzing Matilda,  it was a moment in time never to be forgotten.

I managed to find some of the sailors who served on HMAS Hobart many with families present.

The pride they expressed in serving on HMAS Hobart with the 7^th Fleet was so evident.

The war was over for all and healing had taken place but a tragic mistake had been paid for in blood.

The battle damage of HMAS Hobart after the “friendly fire” incident is seen in the featured photo.

Robbin Laird visited the new HMAS Hobart in Sydney Harbour in 2018.

Visiting HMAS Hobart: A Key Building Block in the Remaking of the Royal Australian Navy

Joint by Design: The Evolution of Australian Defence Strategy

At times, the advocates for maritime autonomy systems seem like a church. Believers, advocates and true believers expressing anger that the ghost fleet has not yet arrived.

But for maritime autonomy systems to become key operating elements within the fleet, they will have to demonstrate their worth and that the cost in all senses of inclusion is not higher than exclusion from fleet operations.

A good sense of why this is so was highlighted in my interview with former Naval officer and naval analyst George Galdorisi.

We discussed  the infamous DASH system which he noted “failed spectacularly because the technology wasn’t robust enough.”

Then as the XO of the USS New Orleans, he had experience with the Pioneer UAV which they launched from the ship.

“We actually put small arresting wires on the deck and our commanding officer, who was a Vietnam-era A7 pilot, had one goal that week. His goal was that we left the pier on Monday morning with three Pioneers and he wanted to come back Friday afternoon with three Pioneers.

:We came back with one.”

But after a decade-and-a-half of widespread use of unmanned systems by U.S. and allied forces in the land wars, this experience has clearly reshaped the U.S. Navy’s approach to forging a way ahead for the use of autonomous systems technologies in the fleet.

And for the U.S. Navy, the missions which they envisage for such vehicles are the dull, dirty, and dangerous work where you are putting Sailors or Marines in harm’s way and would wish to outsource these missions to autonomous systems.

The Navy and Marine Corps have been using such systems in a wide range of exercises to shape proof of concept efforts in order to sort through what will most effectively meet their needs.

But key questions remain: how is the U.S. Navy addressing maritime autonomous systems in the operational maritime force?

And how best to do so to move forward?

Recently, I had a chance to discuss this challenge with LCDR (retired) U.H. “Jack” Rowley, the Chief Technology Officer and Senior Naval Architect and Ocean Engineer with Maritime Tactical Systems (MARTAC).

MARTAC is a maritime autonomous systems company to which Rowley has come after several years serving as a surface warfare officer and then working through several naval acquisition programs, including the introduction of  the LCAC program into the fleet, then followed by working on maritime autonomous systems.

With his background as a surface warfare officer, he has approached maritime unmanned systems from the standpoint of how they could best support surface warfare missions.

With his experience within the LCAC program, he gained an acute understanding of how to disperse force from a “mother ship” in the littorals.

“It was a way to put the forces ashore rapidly, directly on land, because with a hovercraft, you don’t have to worry about the waterline.”

With his time working on the DARPA unmanned maritime ASW-focused program, he gained understanding of both underwater maritime autonomous vessels and maritime unmanned surface vessels, and how they might work together as well.

As he put his experience working at SAIC/LEIDOS on the ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) or Sea Hunter program: “I worked the challenges of being able to put the ACTUV together, from the aspects of the hull, the propulsion system and the controls, and I had a full software team that was working the autonomy software end of it.”

That vessel is now operating with Surface Development Squadron One in San Diego.

A follow up second vessel, the SeaHawk, is under construction in Gulfport for delivery later this year.

He came to MARTAC in 2015 to work on their Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) involved in the Trident Warrior 2015 exercise.

The MARTAC boats are scalable and operate with common operating systems and at that exercise they brought their four, six and eight foot MANTAS craft to the demonstration.

In his time at MARTAC, they have evolved the baseline platform product offering to a 12 foot MANTAS now in production and a new 38ft prototype craft has already operated in Trident Warrior 2020 and is currently in the final buildout stage preparing for operation in IBP-21 San Diego scheduled for April.

This larger family of  24-foot, 38-foot and 50-foot unmanned surface vessels will be referred to as the DEVIL RAY.

Rowley’s background as a surface warfare officer but also working the L-class fleet provides domain knowledge to bridge the work of the surface fleet as they begin work using maritime unmanned autonomous systems.

For such systems can operate from the fleet, whether it be Military Sealift Command, L-class or large or small surface fleet manned vessels.

The real-world background piece which Rowley has in spades is important to me. For much of the literature about maritime unmanned systems and presentations and briefings seem more appropriate to a cult than to a warfighting community.

In my own view, the U.S. Navy will incorporate maritime unmanned systems as they see them executing tasks and solving problems, rather than providing niche capabilities which require excessive attention and pampering. They need to be robust, logistically sustainable, and require limited manpower dedicated to them within an integrated workforce.

And they need to operate within the limits of networks, rather than requiring levels of security and bandwidth beyond the capacity of today’s fleet.

They need to operate in ways where the manpower is tailored to key tasks and they deliver capability rather than drain crucial networking or data management capabilities within the fleet. They resolve combat tasks rather than ramping up demands on the force.

Otherwise, they are simply science projects.

Rowley highlighted a way ahead from his perspective.

“What is required to operate the USVs we are now working with would be for a couple of sailors whose whole purpose in life is to monitor the USVs. They would focus on monitoring the USVs, no different from how currently electronic warfare officers monitor their frequencies. Those USV monitors would then send the information to the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) or to the Combat Information Center (CIC) watch officer as the task performance indicates.”

In other words, Rowley highlighted that for the U.S. Navy to operate USVs as part of the fleet they need to fit into the workflow of the operational fleet rather than to disrupt it, or overwhelm it.

And he highlighted that as a former EW operator, the workflow of an EW watch stander in effect could be followed.

“What I envision is the operators as supervisory controllers of the operational USVs.  Let’s look at a sample ISR mission. The USVs operate their ISR mission per their preprogramming and scan the shoreline as required.

“However, if during the mission, based on the real time data being returned from the USV camera or radar, the operator determines that a change in tasking is required, they would have the authority and the capability to  modify the program of the mission of that USV or the group of USVs in response to a new situation/threat or simply a need for the USV to gather a different set of ISR information.”

We discussed the key importance of getting USVs into the workflow in order to shape a way ahead for maritime remotes to operate within a combat force.

Maritime unmanned systems are simply that until they fit into the warfare workflow and become part of the evolving concepts of operations of the fleet.

In Rowley’s view, the U.S. Navy has the opportunity now to do so.

According to Rowley: “The Navy has, in the past year, shown excellent initiative on the need for both USVs and UUVs within the Maritime Environment.

“To the point that they have set up a UUVRON-1 in Keyport, WA and the SURFDEVRON-1 in San Diego to start using them with fleet assets, not only in scheduled exercises, but to also begin looking at using them to visualize what they can do as a key player with manned fleet units.”

In other words, the U.S. Navy is moving closer to the opportunity to incorporate unmanned maritime surface vessels as part of its modular task force approach to operating the force as a kill web.

And these USVs can be fitted to do a variety of mission tasks going forward.

The featured photo is of a T-12 Mantas platform shipboard launch.

Jack Rowley

Mr. Rowley is an experienced and accomplished multi-disciplined engineering project and program management professional with over 35 years of project/program management of complex ocean, electrical, and mechanical engineering systems design.   As a retired U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer and Engineering Duty Officer, his experience base includes both Government and commercial sectors.

Mr. Rowley has a wide array of engineering and project management accomplishments in the areas of Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering.  Prior to his retirement from the U.S. Navy, he administered, and program managed the $1.2B Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) U.S. Navy Government shipbuilding contract.  In the past decade, while at SAIC/LEIDOS, he led the SAIC IR&D engineering design team to field a NOAA sanctioned SAIC Tsunami Buoy (STB) and successfully designed, constructed, tested and deployed 24 STB buoys in the international arena.

As the engineering technical director, naval architect and technical integrator for the DARPA ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV), now known as Sea Hunter, he was instrumental in the integration of the engineering solution and concept design of the ACTUV, a 131ft surface craft unmanned, autonomously controlled, trimaran with the mission to acquire and track diesel submarines.

Mr. Rowley holds the degrees of BSEE from University of Oklahoma as well as MSME and Degree of Ocean Engineer/Naval Architect from MIT.   He had been a key engineering consultant to MARTAC prior to joining them as their Chief Technology Officer (CTO) in 2015.

For a paper which expands on the themes in this article, please see the following:

https://defense.info/featured-story/2021/02/the-u-s-navy-prepares-the-way-for-unmanned-surface-vessels/

Also, see the following:

https://defense.info/system-type/martac-maritime-autonomous-systems/