Expeditionary Basing

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Expeditionary Basing
12/09/2020

U.S. Marines across 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Airmen with 1st Special Operations Squadron, demonstrate expeditionary advanced basing capabilities Oct. 7-8, 2020, as part of Exercise Noble Fury, from Okinawa to Ie Shima and across surrounding waters.

Marines rapidly inserted via an air assault, secured an airfield, and established defensive positions around the island to enable follow-on operations in support of the navy including a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Rapid Infiltration mission under the cover of darkness.

This exercise showcased survivability and lethality of Navy and Marine Corps forces while operating in a distributed maritime environment.

IE SHIMA, OKINAWA, JAPAN

10.06.2020

Video by Cpl. Josue Marquez

3rd Marine Division

Sustaining the Integrated Distributed Force at Sea: The Military Sealift Command Challenge

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Sustaining the Integrated Distributed Force at Sea: The Military Sealift Command Challenge

By Robbin Laird

With the strategic shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management, the sea services face the challenge of prioritizing maneuver warfare at sea.

But it is impossible to execute maneuver warfare at sea if you have no fuel, or go Winchester with regard to weapons.

That challenge needs to be met by the logistical enterprise write large.

This means that as the fleet distributes across the maritime maneuver space and prepares to execute its offensive and defensive capabilities, a logistics enterprise has to function at full tilt to provide for the kit needed for operational effectiveness.

In the land wars, Fed Ex and commercial shipping could provide inputs to the land-based depots.

This is hardly the support model facing high tempo combat operations, where the supply chains themselves are key targets for adversaries.

If you distribute the force, then the question becomes not simply how do you supply the fleet from external assets, but it also means that the fleet can shape ways to cross support as well, notably with high value supplies which a combat force might need.

With the coming of the CMV-22B to the fleet, the focus has been upon the C-2 being replaced by the new asset to do carrier support.

But there is no reason, that an Osprey cannot do cross fleet support, by air transporting WITHIN the fleet of critical supplies.

And for that matter, the assets which the Marines have bought for ship to shore force insertion, could as well.

With the coming of the much more capable CH-53K to the fleet, there is little doubt that it could play a role in intra-fleet support as well if so desired. This then raises questions about the numbers of such assets within the fleet as well.

With the reimagining of the amphibious fleet, such a role surely could be considered.

And we have also seen in recent months, new roles for the USAF in supplying ships at sea as well, such as C-17 support to boomers at sea.

When one considers the wider question of the logistics enterprise, shaping the demand side is crucial as well.

One good example of this is the Littoral Combat Ship which was never designed to support itself, and has challenged the logistics enterprise to do so.

This needs to be a consideration as well for any shipbuilding plans in terms of sustainability: how would I sustain this new ship or class of ships?

And If they are relying on external support primarily, how likely is this to happen in times of significant conflict?

And design of new combat ships to ensure more rapid transfer of supplies is key as well.

During my visit to the USS Gerald R. Ford, we learned that the ship has been designed to take on pallets rather than simply bulk cargo. With those pallets offload to the new carrier, they go below deck by elevators and where appropriate can be loaded directly into refrigeration units.

The time scale is measured in hours with regard to the time necessary to do resupply at sea for the Ford versus the Nimitz class because of this new design feature onboard the USS Gerald R. Ford.

But the bulwark of support at sea will be delivered by the Military Sealift Command and its ships and its contracted commercial fleet as well.

The shift from the land wars to support of a distributed blue water fighting force is a significant one for MSC.

A measure of the change is that the last two commanders of MSC come from strike groups, and very familiar with the demand side of the support equation.

After my recent visit to the USS Gerald R. Ford, I had a chance to visit with the current commander of MSC, Rear Admiral Michael Wettlaufer.

Wettlaufer previously commanded the Dambusters of VFA-195, USS Denver (LPD 9), USS John C Stennis (CVN 74) and Carrier Strike Group 3 during the 2018-19 around-the-world deployment.

He deployed multiple times to the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf flying the A-6E Intruder with VA-85 and Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 1 aboard USS America (CV 66) including Operation Desert Storm. Forward deployed from Japan aboard USS Independence (CV 62) and USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) as a Dam buster department head and CVW-5 operations officer, he flew the FA-18C and he deployed to the Pacific as executive officer aboard USS John C Stennis (CVN 74).

In his current role, Wettlaufer is serving as commander, Military Sealift Command.

Wettlaufer has 3,800 hours flying 50 different aircraft types and over 900 arrested landings on 14 carrier decks and conducted developmental Joint Strike Fighter flight control trials aboard HMS Invincible.

I can tell you from talking with him, he is no shrinking violet.

He and his team clearly understand the magnitude of the challenge facing the MSC reset to deal with blue water combat support operations, and are working hard to deliver the best capability which the current system allows to the blue water fighting force.

We started by going back to World War II and discussing the big blue blanket and the vast certainly by modern times support fleet, which included more than 30 fleet oilers in the Pacific alone.

The Rear Admiral underscored: “We cannot do that today.

“But we have to be able to distribute logistical support to a maritime distributed force.

“There will certainly be no maneuver if you do not have a solid logistics tail.

“You have to be able to have logistical support at the scale, the scope and scale, and more importantly, the tempo, required to support maneuver warfare.”

He emphasized the nature of the challenge by underscoring that several variables which have to be synchronized: “There’s distance, there’s time, and there’s the appropriate number of assets to be able to span the distance in the time required to meet the requirements, whatever those requirements are and then to be able to adjust to the operational realities.”

With the end of the Cold War, and the past two decades of fighting the land wars, there was a shift to commercial logistics and just in time deliveries.

But in the strategic shift what was considered operational efficiency can now become a combat disadvantage.

The need now is to sustain combat operations are distance and in maneuver space.

How do you do this?

As the Rear Admiral put the challenge: “We need to cascade supplies to get them to the scale required at the time required and delivered to the point of need. Or before point of need.”

And the cascade that the Rear Admiral highlighted is based on working appropriate arrangements between the commercial sector and the military.

“This cascade doesn’t work without effective commercial integration with the military, and that includes the commercial mariner, the operating company side and commercial industry side.

“We are so integrated with commercial industry at MSC because of our operation model that was delivered in 1991, essentially, to be commercially reliant, which has risk.

“And that commercial reliance is on repair, processes, and shipyards in the United States actually to deliver the combat logistics force.

“Integration with the commercial sector and the civilian workforce is the only way that we can make this work.

“And to do this, we are masters at contracting. We can shoot more contracts than any country can shoot missiles, in a day.”

I then raised a question about upgrades to the fleet.

When Ed Timperlake, and I visited MSC several years ago, the coming of the T-AKE ship was a key piece of the puzzle being introduced to upgrade and update MSC capabilities.

Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Supply (T-AOE 6) conducts a vertical replenishment with nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise (CVN 65). Enterprise and embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 1 are underway on a scheduled deployment. (U.S. Navy Photo/mass communication specialist Petty Officer 2nd Class Stacee Fitzgerald)

I asked him is there a ship coming soon that would have a similar effect?

Rear Admiral Wettlaufer: “We are part of the requirements generation process for ship building that supports logistics or other special mission support requirements.

“We’re scheduled to put 20 new ships to sea in the next five years.

“We are replacing the tankers, and that new ship fits the bill of what your question posed.

“The T-AO-205 class, the John Lewis class ship is going to make a difference for us. The first one gets delivered in September of 2021. There are significant advancements on the new ship with regard to modernization of the equipment onboard the vessel, both in terms of reliability and redundancy.

“We will be able manage more fuel, and heavier loads as well.

“This will give us more capability to support a distributed fleet.”

The Rear Admiral and his team see significant strides in unmanned support systems as well.

By this they referred to the support for manning the ships and repairing the ships, not the multiplication of maritime remotes.

The Rear Admiral noted: “The commercial industry based simply upon financial imperative will reduce manning. COVID-19 obviously has been a big challenge, but what it has highlighted is there are new, innovative ways to deliver repair support through virtual means.

“The workflow changes as you leverage automation and virtual support.

“We have used our virtual capacity to get to virtual attendance on our ships.

“Whether it’s an inspection for a post repair requirement from ABS, the American Bureau of Shipping or it’s a tech rep going and attending the Mercy, while she was doing her mission in Los Angeles to make sure that O2N2 plant was up and operating, we did those things virtually and we’ve transformed into that remote support model where we can. That’s the future.

“It’s also the future of ship repair, from a battle damage perspective, potentially as well. If a ship is battle damaged some place, we already have measured the inside of the ship. We understand what that design is inside that vessel. And remotely we can develop the repair plan and deliver that forward.”

The Rear Admiral then discussed digital twinning in the MSC fleet.

“We have digital twin technology in our Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) fleet formerly known as the Joint High-Speed Vessel.

“Instead of time-based maintenance, we are targeting condition-based maintenance. And we are taking this model onto our new classes of ships as they come to the fleet. Digital twinning is part of our warfighting effectiveness approach.”

We discussed as well the C2 side of the effort and he underscored that the US Navy and MSC are working hand in hand for C2 integrability across the fleet as well.

Obviously, this is a key element of being able to bring the logistics enterprise and fleet operations into the kind of synchronization crucial to combat success.

We then shifted to the training side of the equation.

Next year, I am publishing a book entitled: Training for the High End Fight: The Strategic Shift of the 2020s.

What the Rear Admiral underscored, that a key part of such training needed to encompass the logistics integrability with the kill web maritime force.

“If we are both a civil service and commercial mariner fleet operating government owned and contractor owned vessels in some mix, delivering logistics, the training for that entire ecosystem is just as critical as the front-line combat force.

“They’re going to have to transit whatever the level of contestation the environment is, whether it’s leaving a port in CONUS, that may have a cyber-attack or some other challenge against it, to delivering to the LHA that maybe is in a less contested environment, that whole piece has to be supported by training and it’s training of all those mariners who are sitting in, euphemistically sitting in a union hall some place, or under a union waiting to get hired for the job, or to get pulled to get picked up on a ship, as well as MSC’s training processes to make sure our workforce is up to date on what those requirements may be. Because they have to operate in the same space. At different levels, zones of contestation.”

The Rear Admiral concluded by highlighting the significance of the five Rs and underscored that MSC is working efforts in all five Rs.

“Admiral Williamson talks about the five Rs: Refuel, Re-arm, resupply, repair and revive. If we can’t do those things at the scope, scale, tempo required to support distributed maritime operations then we’re not going down the right path. And we have lines of effort in each of the five Rs.”

The featured photo of the Rear Admiral was shot last year during his service as commander of a carrier strike force.

U.S. Navy Rear Adm. Michael Wettlaufer, commander, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 3, speaks to Sailors during an all-hands call on the fo’c’sle of the guided-missile destroyer USS Stockdale (DDG106) in the Arabian Gulf, March 31, 2019. The Stockdale is deployed to the U.S. 5th Fleet area of operations in support of naval operations to ensure maritime stability and security in the Central Region, connecting the Mediterranean and the Pacific through the western Indian Ocean and three strategic choke points. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Abigayle Lutz).

What if it was called the CH-55? Transformation in the Vertical Heavy Lift Fleet

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on What if it was called the CH-55? Transformation in the Vertical Heavy Lift Fleet
12/08/2020

By Robbin Laird

To the casual observer, the Super Stallion and the King Stallion look like the same aircraft.

One of the challenges in understanding how different the CH-53K is from the CH-53E is the numbering part.

If it were called CH-55 perhaps one would get the point that these are very different air platforms, with very different capabilities.

What they have in common, by deliberate design, is a similar logistical footprint, so that they could operate similarly off of amphibious ships or other ships in the fleet for that matter.

But the CH-53 is a mechanical aircraft, which most assuredly the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is not.

In blunt terms, the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is faster, carries more kit, can distribute its load to multiple locations without landing, is built as a digital aircraft from the ground up and can leverage its digitality for significant advancements in how it is maintained, how it operates in a task force, how it can be updated, and how it could work with unmanned systems or remotes.

These capabilities taken together create a very different lift platform than is the legacy CH-53E. In a strategic environment where force mobility is informing capabilities across the combat spectrum, it is hard to understate the value of a lift platform, notably one which can talk and operate digitally, in carving out new tactical capabilities with strategic impacts.

The lift side of the equation within a variety of environments can be stated succinctly. The King Stallion will lift 27,000 lbs. external payload, deliver it 110 nm to a high-hot zone, loiter, and return to the ship with fuel to spare.   What that means is JLTV’s (22,600-lb.), up-armored HMMWV, and other heavier tactical cargos go to shore by air, rather than by LCAC or other slower sea lift means.  For less severe ambient conditions or shorter distances than this primary mission, the 53K can carry up to 36,000 lbs.

With ever increasing lift requirements and advancing threats in the battlefield, there is no other vertical lift aircraft available that meets emerging heavy lift needs. There are a lot of platforms that can blow things up or kill people, but for heavy lift, the CH-53K is the only option.

For the Marines, this is a core enabling capability. The CH-53K is equipped with a triple external hook system, which will be a significant external operations enabler for the Marine Air Ground Task Force.  The single, dual and triple external cargo hook capability allows for the transfer of three independent external loads to three separate supported units in three separate landing zones in one single sortie without having to return to a ship or other logistical hub.

The external system can be rapidly reconfigured between dual point, single point loads, and triple hook configurations in order to best support the ground scheme of maneuver.

All three external hooks can be operated independently supporting true distributed operations. For example, three infantry companies widely dispersed across the battlefield can be rapidly resupplied with fuel, ammo, water or other supplies directly at their location—during the same sortie—eliminating the requirement for the helicopter to make multiple trips or for cargo from a helicopter to be transloaded to ground vehicles for redistribution—saving ground vehicle fuel and MAGTF exposure to ground threats.

The CH-53K’s triple external hook system is a new capability for the Marine Corps and an improvement in capability and efficiency over the legacy aircraft it replaces making it a game changer for providing heavy lift in support of combat, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations, notably in a distributed operational space.

The CH-53K design integrates the latest technologies to meet the USMC requirement for triple the lift of the predecessor Super Stallion while still maintaining the size and footprint to remain compatible with today’s ships and strategic air transport platforms.

The aircraft is fully marinized for shipboard operations, including automatic blade fold and design robustness to meet new and extreme requirements for salt-fog and corrosion.  It is already certified for transport in C-5 (2 x 53Ks) and C-17 (1 x 53K) aircraft and also includes an integral aerial refueling probe for long range missions or self-deployment.

The work process is very different as well, because of support for palletization. This may sound like logistic geek language, but it is about speed to deliver to the force for its operating efficacy. Given that speed to operation is a key metric for supporting the strategic shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management, the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) is a key enabler for the new work flow essential to combat success.

The digital piece is a foundational element and why it is probably better thought of as a CH-55. This starts with the fly-by-wire flight controls. The CH-53K is the first and only heavy lift fly-by-wire helicopter.

The CH-53K’s fly-by-wire is a leap in technology from legacy mechanical flight control systems and keeps safety and survivability at the core of the Kilo’s design while providing a portal to an optionally piloted capability and autonomy.

The CH-53K’s fly-by-wire design drastically reduces pilot workload and minimizes exposure to threats or danger, particularly during complex missions or challenging aircraft maneuvers like low light level externals in a degraded visual environment allowing the pilot to manage and lead the mission vice focusing on physically controlling the aircraft.

The fly-by-wire design further complements safety and survivability through physically separated Flight Control Computers, separated cockpit controls with an Active Inceptor System, and load limiting control laws that will extend component lives. Other cargo Helicopters originated in the late 50s/early 60s, predating the emergence of Aircraft Survivability as an engineering discipline.

Not leaving anything to chance, the overall CH-53K survivability process includes an extensive, ongoing Live Fire Test Program, which started at a component level, and culminates with a full-up aircraft test with turning rotors.  The CH-53K is the only heavy lift helicopter designed from the ground up to survive in battle, reflecting a 21st century level of survivability.

In addition, the CH-53K was designed from the start in an all-digital environment, taking advantage of virtual reality tools to optimize both manufacture and support of the aircraft throughout its life cycle.  Fleet Marine personnel were engaged from the beginning of the design process to ensure the aircraft was designed for supportability and reduced O&S costs–from component access, support equipment, animated work instruction and electronic publications to the system integration with Sikorsky’s fleet management tools that were originally developed to support its commercial S-92 aircraft fleet.

The S-92 has demonstrated greater than 95% availability for a fleet of over 300 aircraft which now boast near 1.5 million flight hours, in harsh North Sea and other off shore Oil & Gas environments.  Use of data analytics (“big data”) has proven to save money in the commercial fleet and these same tools are already in place for the CH-53K and being proven on the CH-53E in the interim.

The CH-53K’s triple redundant fly-by-wire design improves maintainability significantly through fault Detection and isolation capability providing the ability to detect failures in actuators and other electrical and electromechanical components including hydraulic leak detection with fault isolation.

While the CH-53K is bigger and far more capable in many important ways, it’s also smaller in terms of its logistics footprint and provides a best O&S value over its entire lifetime. The CH-53K’s logistics footprint is 1/3 less by volume with a 5,000 cubic feet reduction and 1/4 less by weight with a 25, 000 reduction compared to the legacy CH-53E. That’s equivalent to the storage volume of a 2-car garage and the weight of a two up-armored HMMWVs. In the cargo world, that’s 2 standard shipping containers, which is space and available payload on a ship or less equipment to transport to an austere support base.

The design reduces the maintenance workload as well.  With no mechanical rigging requirement and fewer moving parts leading to fewer failures, the CH-53K provides a significant reduction in maintenance man hours, a 35% improvement in Mean Time to Repair, and ultimately increased readiness and availability to the warfighter.

Organizational-level maintenance peculiar support equipment for the CH‑53K is based on common and CH-53E support equipment in order to reduce the new peculiar support equipment required for the CH-53K. Only 150 items of peculiar support equipment were developed to support organizational-level maintenance, which is 146 less pieces of support equipment or a 52% footprint reduction compared to the CH-53E. Additionally the CH-53K support equipment was designed to reduce and optimize equipment weight and life cycle cost while material selection and coating changes from legacy aircraft to eliminate use of hazardous materials and provide better environmental protection from corrosion.

The T408-GE-400 engine brings more capability to the CH-53K through 57% more horsepower with a smaller logistics footprint compared to the T64 it replaces in the same size package but with 63% fewer parts. The T408 supports engine on aircraft maintenance and was designed to maximize two levels of maintenance—Organizational to Depot—with all on-wing engine maintenance being performed using the common tools in flight line toolbox further reducing the logistics footprint and maintenance man hours while increasing availability and readiness of the CH-53K.

The CH-53K sets the standard and is the 1st and only true 21st Century Heavy Lift Helicopter.

To be more specific, the current heavy / upper medium lift cargo helicopters that the CH-53K replaces—legacy Chinook, CH-53 A/D/G Sea Stallion, CH-53E Super Stallion and their engines—were literally designed in the mid-20th century.

In the more than half century that has elapsed between the design of these legacy aircraft and the first flight of the CH-53K in 2015, there have been significant advancements in helicopter design and manufacturing.

The CH-53K is superior to its predecessors, not by engineering miracles, but by over a half century of steady engineering and technology progress that was designed and incorporated into the CH-53K from the ground up.

The King Stallion is a totally new helicopter that leapfrogs the CH-53E design to improve operational capability, interoperability, reliability, maintainability, survivability, and cost of ownership.

Finally, the CH-53K is nearing completion of testing and well into production.  The program remains on target for a 2021 IOC and 2023 deployment that meets the USMC’s operational needs.  The King Stallion is the only aircraft that meets the heavy lift requirements for the USMC, supports the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concept, and provides that safety, survivability, supportability and growth capability to meet the service’s needs for the many decades to come.

A good sense of how the CH-55 (aka as the CH-53K) intersects with the new operating environment was highlighted in interviews I did in both Pax River and Marine Corps Air Station Yuma.

In an interview earlier this summer with a senior MAWTS-1 officer, we discussed the coming of TAGRS and of the CH-53K to the Marine Corps and how these new capabilities would allow for enhanced FARP capabilities and expeditionary basing support.

In that interview with Maj Steve Bancroft, Aviation Ground Support (AGS) Department Head, MAWTS-1, MCAS Yuma, we discussed the way ahead on FARPs enabled by TAGR and CH-53Ks.

Excerpts from that interview follow:

There were a number of takeaways from that conversation which provide an understanding of the Marines are working their way ahead currently with regard to the FARP contribution to distributed operations.

The first takeaway is that when one is referring to a FARP, it is about an ability to provide a node which can refuel and rearm aircraft.  But it is more than that. It is about providing capability for crew rest, resupply and repair to some extent.

The second takeaway is that the concept remains the same, but the tools to do the concept are changing. Clearly, one example is the nature of the fuel containers being used. In the land wars, the basic fuel supply was being carried by a fuel truck to the FARP location. Obviously, that is not a solution for Pacific operations.

What is being worked now at MAWTS-1 is a much mobile solution set. Currently, they are working with a system whose provenance goes back to the 1950s and is a helicopter expeditionary refueling system or HERS system. This legacy kit limits mobility as it is very heavy and requires the use of several hoses and fuel separators.

Obviously, this solution is too limiting so they are working a new solution set. They are testing a mobile refueling asset called TAGRS or a Tactical Aviation Ground Refueling system.

As one source put it: “The TAGRS and its operators are capable of being air-inserted making the asset expeditionary. It effectively eliminates the complications of embarkation and transportation of gear to the landing zone.”

The third takeaway was that even with a more mobile and agile pumping solution, there remains the basic challenge of the weight of fuel as a commodity.  A gallon of gas is about 6.7 pounds and when aggregating enough fuel at a Forward Air Refueling Point or FARP, the challenge is how to get adequate supplies to a FARP for its mission to be successful.

To speed up the process, the Marines are experimenting with more disposable supply containers to provide for enhanced speed of movement among FARPs within an extended battlespace. They have used helos and KC-130Js to drop pallets of fuel as one solution to this problem.

The effort to speed up the creation and withdrawal from FARPs is a task being worked by the Marines at MAWTS-1 as well. In effect, they are working a more disciplined cycle of arrival and departure from FARPs. And the Marines are exercising ways to bring in a FARP support team in a single aircraft to further the logistical footprint and to provide for more rapid engagement and disengagement as well.

The fourth takeaway is that innovative delivery solutions can be worked going forward.

When I met with Col. Perrin at Pax River, we discussed how the CH-53K as a smart aircraft could manage airborne MULES to support resupply to a mobile base. As Col. Perrin noted in our conversation: “The USMC has done many studies of distributed operations and throughout the analyses it is clear that heavy lift is an essential piece of the ability to do such operations.”

And not just any heavy lift – but heavy lift built around a digital architecture.

Clearly, the CH-53E being more than 30 years old is not built in such a manner; but the CH-53K is. What this means is that the CH-53K “can operate and fight on the digital battlefield.”

And because the flight crew are enabled by the digital systems onboard, they can focus on the mission rather than focusing primarily on the mechanics of flying the aircraft. This will be crucial as the Marines shift to using unmanned systems more broadly than they do now. For example, it is clearly a conceivable future that CH-53Ks would be flying a heavy lift operation with unmanned “mules” accompanying them. Such manned-unmanned teaming requires a lot of digital capability and bandwidth, a capability built into the CH-53K.

If one envisages the operational environment in distributed terms, this means that various types of sea bases, ranging from large deck carriers to various types of Maritime Sealift Command ships, along with expeditionary bases, or FARPs or FOBS, will need to be connected into a combined combat force.

To establish expeditionary bases, it is crucial to be able to set them up, operate and to leave such a base rapidly or in an expeditionary manner (sorry for the pun). This will be virtually impossible to do without heavy lift, and vertical heavy lift, specifically.

Put in other terms, the new strategic environment requires new operating concepts; and in those operating concepts, the CH-53K provides significant requisite capabilities. So why not the possibility of the CH-53K flying in with a couple of MULES which carried fuel containers; or perhaps building a vehicle which could come off of the cargo area of the CH-53K and move on the operational area and be linked up with TAGRS?

As this potential development highlights, if we called it a CH-55, we would grasp which the coming of the CH-53K has a significant impact on the way ahead for mobile expeditionary basing, which is itself a key building block in the way ahead for the integrated distributed force. Or put another way, multiple basig is a key capability required for operations in the extended but contested battlespace; and the CH-55 can provide a significant capability to enable multiple basing,

The featured photo is credited to NAVAIR. 

The CH-53K being refueled in air while carrying an external load. Credit Photo: Sikorsky
The CH-53K being refueled in air while carrying an external load.. Credit Photo: Sikorsky
Building the CH-53K on the digital manufacturing line at Sikorsky's Connecticut plant. Credit Photo: Sikorsky
CH-53K pilots in the flight simulator. Credit Photo: Sikorsky

The Next Phase of Australian National Security Strategy: Noise Before Defeat 3

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on The Next Phase of Australian National Security Strategy: Noise Before Defeat 3
12/07/2020

By Robbin Laird

I am in the throes of finishing up my book on the evolution of Australian defence strategy over the past several years, from 2014 until now.

With the announcement of the new government defence strategy by Prime Minister Morrison on July 1, 2020, it seemed a good time to draw together the work I have done over the past several years in Australia.

The book provides a detailed narrative of the evolution over the past few years of how Australia got to the point where it currently is with regard to national defense.

Hopefully, the book will provide a helpful summary of that evolution. It is based on the Williams Foundation Seminars over this period, and highlights the insights provided by the practitioners of military art and strategy who have presented and participated in those seminars.

In that sense, this book provides a detailed look at the strategic trajectory from 2014 through 2020.

During my visits to Australia during this time, one of my interlocutors in discussing Australian and global developments has been Jim Molan, retired senior Australian Army officer and now a Senator. I have included in the book, the interviews I did with Senator Molan in the appendix to the book as a good look into the dynamics of change being undergone over the past few years.

Recently, Senator Molan has launched a podcast series looking at the way ahead and how Australia might address the challenges which its faces.

This is the third podcast in his series.

He starts each podcast with this introduction:

“Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist tells us that strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory.

“But tactics without strategy is just noise before defeat.

“My name is Jim Molan and welcome to our Noise Before Defeat podcast.”

Markets Produce Prosperity, Not Security

This podcast will look at why Australia is so vulnerable to a national security shock. And of course, we’ve just had an enormous one of those in the form of COVID and we’re still living through it. It’ll look at why Australia lacks self-reliance as a nation. And as a result, Australia is not prepared for an uncertain future that may involve conflict and war. Australia’s very sovereignty, our independence and perhaps our existence as a nation would be seriously threatened unless we start to prepare.

Well quite simply, I reckon there are five vulnerabilities. In essence, Australia is overly dependent on imports to run the nation. And as I say all the time, we’re not self reliant enough as we found out in COVID. We are overly dependent on one single market and the sea lines for exports and imports that make us prosperous. And China is using that against us now. In essence, Australia has a military developed for a different era and a different task. It’s very high quality. It’s the best that I have seen it in the 50 years that I’ve been exposed to the Australian military. It’s a fabulous base for development, but it’s incapable at its present size of defending the nation now or in the foreseeable future….

I suggest it goes a long way further than just the running shoes and t-shirts that we get from overseas because they’re cheap. We’re overly dependent on imports of manufactured goods and the import of information technology devices. We’re overly dependent on critical items, such as liquid fuels, fertilizer, pharmaceuticals, and many others. We need to import complex spare parts and industry. For example, the energy industry and the mining industry, defense items and spare parts and technical weapons such as missiles. And all of this could be denied to us by an increasing tension or by war. Liquid fuels for example, at the moment we import roughly 90% of our liquid fuels directly as crude oil or as a refined product. And where does it come from? One of the most unstable places in the world. It all comes from the Gulf, either as crude directly to Australia or as crude to other refiners in North Asia who then send it back to us.

We are totally vulnerable to that. But I do note that we have taken a major step forward very, very recently in that the minister for energy has started seriously to ensure that we keep our refining capability, and we start building reserves of liquid fuels in this country. Now, pharmaceuticals is another one that we should be worried about. 90% of our pharmaceuticals are imported. And during the initial stages of COVID, we did have some reserves and that was a great discovery that I was not aware of. We did have reserves in this country of pharmaceuticals, but we came close to running out in some areas. And of course, we saw recently some union bans on ports that are achieving exactly the same thing now. And that’s a real vulnerability for us….

It’s where we export it to and therein lies the problem. We are overly dependent on a single export market and that’s China. And if that was denied to us by one nation or by increases in regional tensions or actual war, our prosperity would drop significantly. Social tension would increase, our ability to fund recovery or adaption would decrease. And our ability for sustained defense would evaporate because we would run out of missiles and spare parts.

We don’t have a current comprehensive overall strategy. What the government of which I’m a part does brilliantly is solve problems one at a time. And even whilst working on COVID, I was blown away by the fact that the prime minister could come out and address a strategic update in terms of a defense strategy. And we’ve looked at cyber and we’ve looked at energy and we’ve looked at gas and we’ve looked at a vast range of things. It’s not as though we’re a one trick pony, but what I would say is that the basic thing that we must address is our self-reliance. And I use that term all the time. And in fact, everyone in government is using that term in relation to self-reliance because we’ve all realized it, but I think government and across the nation, that we need to be much more self-reliant.

Self-reliance I consider to be where a nation makes domestically what it needs for its security, but still buys everything else from the global market. Now, if you say that one particular thing is essential for us to be prepared to make in Australia, it doesn’t mean that you have to make all of it and you have to make it now. It does mean that you must be able to make enough of it. And then you buy the rest cheaper from overseas in Australia, so that if you have to expand at some stage when you are cut off from sea lines of communication, then you can actually do that. You have the technology and the base to expand and be self-reliant.

For the rest of it, until something happens, you can buy from overseas. In no way in the world am I ever suggesting that we back off from globalization. We just need to identify… And this is a job for government. We need to identify those items that are critical for us and how much we need to produce in Australia. So that in a certain period of time, when perhaps reserves that we’ve got run out, we are ready to produce much, much more.

If I look at the global market, I look at our inputs and I don’t care if we don’t have, as I said before, running shirts and running shoes, and t-shirts during a period of crisis. We don’t need them. But I do care if we cannot produce certain pharmaceuticals in Australia, or I do care if we can’t produce petroleum products in Australia. As a self-reliant nation, we must still be able to import and to export, we have just to identify across the nation, every single item that needs to be a bit produced in Australia and the time period that we need to have reserves in Australia of that particular item.

The Need for a National Security Strategy

Our national security system has no one organization responsible for developing national strategy. It doesn’t have this system to prepare our nation and it doesn’t have those professionals for advising the national leadership, particularly the prime minister during a serious ongoing crisis because we haven’t needed it in the past. And for 75 years, we haven’t had to do it.

We currently have a military not ready to go to war tomorrow. It could become much more prepared, relatively fast. And that’s the judgment that you’ve got to make, but that’s where the big money is. We need to examine that military and see whether its preparedness is high enough and what it would cost to raise that if we decided. But primarily it lacks serious and self-reliant lethality, mass and sustainability for the rapidly developing future.

And that military cannot in any way, defend this nation against the developing threats that most people agree are coming towards us now. I do acknowledge and I should to be fair acknowledge the extraordinary achievements within defense that the coalition government, since 2013 has embarked on particularly the shipbuilding programs, particularly the adequate resourcing of that military in order to provide the kind of military we’ve needed for the last 75 years. The point I make is that having done that, and it’s a great achievement and I personally thank them as someone who has a great love for our military. I personally thank our government, but now we need to look at the next step….

We should create a military that can defend the nation and support coalitions if we need to. And that military needs to be much stronger, much bigger and better supported so it can fight for longer. We need to create a government national security system, which is far more sophisticated and sophisticated enough to prepare us for conflict and a fast-moving war and manage 21st century crisis. And finally, realistically and publicly, we need to address the need for national security. And I can’t say it often enough. We must begin with a national security strategy to tie it all together.

 

 

 

Australian Support for Japanese Space Efforts

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Australian Support for Japanese Space Efforts
12/05/2020

The Department of Defence and the Australian Space Agency are supporting the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency’s (JAXA’s) Hayabusa2 mission to return the first ever sub-surface asteroid samples to Earth from the asteroid Ryugu. The Hayabusa2 sample return capsule landed in the Woomera Prohibited Area (WPA) on 6 December 2020.

Hayabusa2 departed Ryugu in November 2019, with the return journey taking just over one year to reach back to Earth. The capsule will return to the ground with samples from Ryugu while the Hayabusa2 spacecraft will re-join its interplanetary transfer orbit.
The samples from the 4.5 billion year old asteroid will help scientists study the origin and evolution of the solar system, including the origin of organic matters and water of Earth’s oceans and the source of life.

A team of mission specialists from JAXA will conduct the sample recovery mission in the WPA, supported by a specialist team from NASA who will conduct airborne observations of the re-entry.

The movie below was taken on February 22, 2019(JSTwhen Hayabusa2 first touched down on asteroid Ryugu to collect a sample from the surface.

It was captured using the onboard small monitor camera(CAM-H). The video playback speed is five times faster than actual time.

Credit: JAXA

(From left) DST Senior Principal Scientist, Doctor Nick Stacy; Head of Australian Space Agency, Doctor Megan Clark; and Deputy Director General of JAXA Institute of Space & Astronautical Science, Professor Masaki Fujimoto during the Hayabusa press conference at Woomera.
Media tour of the new Range Operations Centre at Woomera Test Range during the Hayabusa2 Return Mission.
Media tour of the new Range Operations Centre at Woomera Test Range during the Hayabusa2 Return Mission.
Media tour of the new Range Operations Centre at Woomera Test Range during the Hayabusa2 Return Mission.
Media tour of the new Range Operations Centre at Woomera Test Range during the Hayabusa2 Return Mission.
Media tour of the new Range Operations Centre at Woomera Test Range during the Hayabusa2 Return Mission.

Taiwan Trends and Scenarios: Challenge for the Next U.S. Administration

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on Taiwan Trends and Scenarios: Challenge for the Next U.S. Administration
12/04/2020

By Richard Weitz

One of the major issues confronting the next U.S. administration is to fortify Taiwan’s defense and deterrent capabilities against the growing threat from the People’s Republic of China.

The last few years have seen increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan, also known as the Republic of China.

There have been growing naval and air activity in the island’s vicinity, including repeated deep incursions across the Taiwan Strait Median Line and PLA Air Force circumnavigation flights around the island. The intent has been to both intimidate the Taiwanese and wear down the defender’s air fleet. The rhetoric emanating from Beijing regarding Taiwan has also become increasing bellicose.

A no-warning PLA assault on Taiwan is presently unlikely but possible. We have recently seen how the Chinese-Indian confrontation abruptly escalated earlier this year.

If an invasion were imminent, warning indicators could include Beijing-inspired riots, sabotage, and assassinations in Taiwan. The PLA would also probably mobilize its reservists and concentrate a flotilla of vessels on the PRC coast opposite the island.

Following the Russian example, the PLA might also try to lure Taiwanese defenders off guard by launching an invasion during one of its increasingly frequent military exercises around the island.

Although PRC policy making is opaque, certain “red lines’ as well as opportune circumstances may induce Beijing to attack.

Commonly cited red lines include major moves toward Taiwan independence, the island’s impending acquisition of nuclear weapons, or the stationing of large U.S. military forces permanently on the island.

Of course, PRC decision makers might change their red lines over time and might not fully know what would prompt military intervention. Chinese scholars sometimes site the Korean War as an example of how Beijing (and Washington) became entangled into a major regional conflict without much premeditation.

Regarding targets of opportunity, the PRC might see widespread internal unrest on the island as an invitation to attack.

A regional crisis, such as one involving North Korea, could provide the necessary distraction to encourage a PLA move against Taiwan.

A related tactic might be to exploit one of the joint Russian-Chinese military exercise to imply Moscow’s support for Beijing’s assault.

Conversely, Beijing might be restrained if its confrontations with its other neighbors—especially India and Japan—remain elevated to avoid the strains of managing concurrent multi-front campaigns.

But major PRC domestic problems could induce either caution or risk-taking, as seen in the classic example of the Argentinian junta launching the Falklands/Malvinas War to preempt (actually just delay) its impending overthrow.

In the interim, which may last as long as October 1, 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic, PRC policy makers are preparing the legal, political, diplomatic, intelligence and military battlefield for long term reunification.

Major steps include the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law, its renewed campaign to exclude Taiwan from international institutions like the World Health Organization, and its comprehensive intelligence gathering operations aimed at influential Taiwanese as well as their organizations, defenses, and networks.

In the military domain, the PLA is augmenting its network of ground sensor and reconnaissance satellites covering Taiwan and the surrounding sea and airspace.

Though the PRC has not (yet) aggressively building a large amphibious fleet, it has been militarizing its commercial fishing and maritime transport fleet to supplement its Navy and Coast Guard.

In a Taiwan scenario, the PRC’s maritime militia could function like Russia’s little green men, occupying Taiwan’s outlying islands with little notice. The PRC would likely describe the seizure as a police action or other non-military operation short of a state of war, which would make it harder for the Taiwanese and their American allies to respond militarily.

If Beijing encounters a weak response, as has been the case in the South China Sea, then the PLA could take a more direct role in seizing additional territories. Such a staged island-hoping operation would be easier to undertake than abrupt full-scale amphibious assault, which no country has undertaken since General MacArthur’s seizure of Inchon port in September 1950.

It is even possible that Beijing may change its future course and renounce military options. The current PRC leadership is substantially more confrontational and risk-acceptant than its predecessors. The next team might return to a more cautious, bide-your-time strategy.

A comprehensive regime change that engendered a liberal democratic China, an improbable if hoped-for development, might even make unification a popular option for the Taiwanese as well as reconcile Hong Kong and other occupied territories to a mutually beneficial partnership.

Barring a radical change at home, the PRC timeline for reunification might depend on decision makers’ expectation of future trends. They would consider the evolving military balance, economic trajectories, changes in Taiwanese popular opinion, and other variables to determine if time is on Beijing’s side.

Despite refining its disinformation assaults on Taiwanese politicians and other targets, PRC information managers have utterly failed to win over Taiwanese public opinion to unification. Polls show that support for unification is hovering in single digits, with young people especially seeking a future independent of Beijing.

Indeed, Beijing’s policies have done little to make one-China mergers attractive to the island’s voters. The PRC’s repressive policies toward Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang leave little to the imagination.

The PRC also has failed to exploit cross-strait economic ties to either attract substantial support in Taiwan or to pursue an Anaconda strategy to strangle the widespread opposition. Military threats and economic coercion have failed to enervate the resistance.

The Chinese Communist Party’s Unified Front strategy can no longer attract strong local allies into its PRC-controlled networks.

So if current trends continue, the PRC leadership, given the lack of viable alternatives will have to choose either to accept Taiwan’s de facto autonomy or use military force to end it.

If the PLA were to successfully seize Taiwan, the PLA could use the new territory to more effectively threaten Japan.

Furthermore, freed from preparing for a Taiwan contingency, the PLA could redeploy military forces to other theaters, such as against India to the west and against ASEAN states and Australia to the south.

Taiwan’s conquest would also embarrass and weaken the United States, which has offered Taiwan security guarantees and is seen internationally as the island’s most important military partner. The result would be to encourage U.S. allies and partners to appease the PRC or pursue alternative military paths, such as acquiring nuclear weapons.

So what to do?

Taiwan should continue its striving to be a net global security provider in areas such as global health. It should also spend more on defense to reverse years of decline.

The additional funds could help increase ground-force training to protect Taiwan’s approximately fifteen beaches suitable for invasion and exploit the island’s mountainous terrain to preclude easy PLA airborne assaults.

Reforming the system for mobilizing reserves should be another priority to compensate for Taiwan’s diminishing active duty personnel.

In terms of future weapons procurement, Taiwan needs to replace its aging fighters with F-35s as well as F-16s.

Investing more in both autonomous aerial and maritime drones would help compensate for the PLA’s more numerous warships and warplanes.

Additional naval enhancements could include acquiring more (anti-ship missiles, mines, and missile boats.

In essence, Taiwan should pursue a porcupine strategy to make Beijing understand that the costs of any aggression would exceed the benefits.

The United States can aide the Taiwanese by continuing to pursue a robust defense partnership with its military.

Although the focus of popular attention has naturally been on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the military partnership appropriately extends well beyond that to include military training, joint threat assessments, tabletop exercises, and helping Taiwan improve its indigenous defense industrial and technological capabilities.

In the information domain, U.S. messaging should make clear to the PRC that unprovoked aggression against Taiwan would reinforce the narrative that China’s ascent is presenting the same problems to the international system as the rise of Japan and China before World War II.

Conversely, to dampen Chinese overconfidence in military options, U.S. communications should emphasize that the PLA lacks any recent combat experience and could easily suffer defeat if it attempted an extremely difficult amphibious assault on Taiwan.

Featured Photo: A Chinese military training complex in Inner Mongolia, shown in this satellite image taken on Sept. 29, includes full-scale replicas of targets such as Taiwan’s Presidential Office Building.

Source: Satellite image 2020 Maxar Technologies

See, also the following:

Airpower When Directly Faced with the Authoritarian Powers: The International Fighter Conference 2019

Taiwan in Pacific Defense: Turning a New Page

The Next Phase of Australian National Security Strategy: Noise Before Defeat 2

FARP Refueling

Posted on | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment on FARP Refueling

U.S. Marine Corps Chief Warrant Officer 2 Jacob Almaguer, Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) officer in charge, and Sgt. Andrew Lohse, a noncommissioned officer in charge, both with Bulk Fuel Company, 9th Engineer Support Battalion (ESB), 3rd Marine Logistics Group (MLG) speak about FARP operations on Ie Shima, Okinawa, Japan, during Exercise Valiant Workhorse from Sept. 23-24, 2020.

During the exercise Bulk Fuel Company, 9th ESB, 3rd MLG, set fuel lines and manned the stations for a FARP in support of UH-1Y Venom, AH-1Z Viper, and MV-22B Osprey aircraft with 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawks.

Almaguer, a native of Dorr, Michigan, graduated from Hopkins High School in 2008 and enlisted out of Recruiting Station Grand Rapids in 2007.

Lohse, a native of Clinton, Iowa, graduated from Clinton High School in 2013 and enlisted out of Recruiting Station Quad Cities in 2013. 3rd MLG, based out of Okinawa, Japan, is a forward deployed combat unit that serves as III Marine Expeditionary Force’s comprehensive logistics and combat service support backbone for operations throughout the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility.

IE SHIMA, OKINAWA, JAPAN

09.21.2020

Video by Lance Cpl. Alpha Hernandez

3rd Marine Logistics Group