Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The LVC Revolution

Posted on September 29, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/29/2025

This video previews our forthcoming report entitled: THE LVC DYNAMIC A KEY FORCE FOR CHANGE IN COMBAT PILOT TRAINING which has been generated as a guide to our upcoming visit to the Italian International Flight Training School in October 2025.

The landscape of military aviation training stands at a critical juncture. As combat aircraft have evolved into increasingly sophisticated platforms bristling with advanced sensors, networked communications, and complex mission systems, the challenge of preparing pilots to operate these systems effectively has grown exponentially. The emergence of fifth-generation fighters has fundamentally altered the calculus of pilot training, creating demands that traditional methods struggle to meet. These aircraft represent not merely incremental improvements over their predecessors but quantum leaps in capability that require entirely new approaches to training and skill development.

At the heart of this training revolution lies Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training methodology. This approach seamlessly integrates three distinct training environments: actual aircraft operations (Live), high-fidelity simulation (Virtual), and computer-generated forces and scenarios (Constructive). When properly implemented, LVC training creates comprehensive training ecosystems that can replicate the full complexity of modern combat operations while maintaining safety and managing costs. The convergence of these three training domains represents perhaps the most significant advancement in military aviation training since the introduction of jet aircraft itself.

The Live component encompasses all training conducted using actual aircraft, with real pilots experiencing the physical demands, sensory inputs, and operational realities of flight. This element provides irreplaceable value in developing muscle memory, stress tolerance, and the intuitive decision-making that comes only from actual flight experience. However, live training imposes substantial constraints: high operational costs, safety considerations, limited airspace availability, and the practical impossibility of replicating certain threat environments or tactical scenarios. A single advanced fighter can cost tens of thousands of dollars per flight hour, making extensive live training economically challenging for most air forces.

The Virtual component utilizes sophisticated ground-based simulators that replicate aircraft cockpits and flight characteristics with remarkable fidelity. Modern virtual training systems have achieved levels of realism that were unimaginable just decades ago, incorporating motion platforms, high-resolution visual systems, and accurate modeling of aircraft systems and performance. Virtual training offers crucial advantages: the ability to practice dangerous scenarios without risk, unlimited repetition of specific maneuvers or procedures, and the flexibility to pause, rewind, or modify scenarios for instructional purposes. Yet virtual training has historically struggled to provide the complete sensory experience and physical demands of actual flight, potentially limiting its effectiveness for certain training objectives.

The Constructive component provides computer-generated forces, threats, and environmental factors that populate training scenarios with entities that would be impossible or prohibitively expensive to provide using live assets. Sophisticated artificial intelligence enables these synthetic forces to exhibit realistic tactical behaviors, creating complex, dynamic training environments. Constructive elements can represent everything from individual aircraft and ground vehicles to entire integrated air defense systems and strategic-level assets. This capability allows for training scenarios of unprecedented scale and complexity, preparing pilots for the overwhelming informational and tactical demands of modern combat operations.

The true power of LVC training emerges not from these individual components but from their integration. When seamlessly connected, live aircraft, virtual simulators, and constructive forces can participate in unified training scenarios that transcend the limitations of any single approach. A pilot flying an actual aircraft can engage with threats represented by computer-generated forces while coordinating with wingmen operating in ground-based simulators, all within a scenario managed and modified in real-time by instructors. This blended approach provides training experiences that approach the complexity and unpredictability of actual combat while maintaining safety and managing costs.

The technical challenges of achieving effective LVC integration are substantial. Different systems must communicate using common protocols, maintain synchronized timing despite network latencies, and present consistent tactical pictures to all participants regardless of whether they are in actual aircraft or simulators. Security considerations add another layer of complexity, as training systems must handle classified information while potentially supporting coalition training with partners at different security clearance levels. The development of Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture has been crucial in enabling realistic training that incorporates sensitive tactics and procedures while maintaining appropriate security boundaries.

The strategic imperative driving LVC adoption extends beyond mere cost savings to address fundamental questions about force readiness and operational effectiveness. Modern military operations increasingly occur across multiple domains simultaneously—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace—with success depending on effective coordination and information sharing across these domains. Preparing pilots for this reality requires training environments that can replicate multi-domain complexity, something impossible using traditional methods. LVC training provides the only practical means of creating sufficiently complex and realistic scenarios to develop the skills necessary for multi-domain operations.

The cost-effectiveness of LVC training has proven particularly compelling in an era of constrained defense budgets and increasingly expensive aircraft. By enabling a significant portion of advanced training to occur in simulators or using embedded training systems rather than requiring extensive live flying hours, LVC approaches can dramatically reduce training costs while maintaining or even improving effectiveness. Studies have demonstrated that optimal blending of live, virtual, and constructive training can reduce total training costs by thirty to fifty percent compared to traditional live-only approaches, while actually improving student performance and readiness.

International cooperation in training represents another area where LVC capabilities provide transformative potential. The ability to connect training systems across geographical distances enables coalition partners to train together without the logistical burden of deploying personnel and aircraft to common locations. This capability is particularly valuable for maintaining alliance interoperability and shared tactical proficiency. Several nations have established international training centers built around LVC capabilities, demonstrating the viability of collaborative training approaches that reduce individual nation costs while improving collective effectiveness.

The evolution of LVC training also reflects broader changes in military doctrine and operational concepts. The shift from platform-centric to network-centric warfare emphasizes information sharing, distributed operations, and coordinated effects across multiple systems. Training pilots to operate effectively in this paradigm requires exposure to networked operations and multi-platform coordination that LVC training is uniquely positioned to provide. As concepts like Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) mature, LVC training systems will become increasingly essential for developing the skills and cognitive frameworks necessary for effective execution.

This report examines the revolutionary impact of integrated LVC training on military aviation, exploring both the technical foundations that enable effective implementation and the operational advantages that result. Through analysis of current systems, international programs, and comparative approaches, the report demonstrates how LVC training has transformed pilot preparation for modern combat operations while addressing the economic and practical constraints facing military aviation training programs worldwide.

Investing in War Winners: Transforming Naval Aviation Training for Future Dominance

Posted on September 29, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Robbin Laird

Modern warfare has reached an inflection point. As technology accelerates and battlespaces become increasingly complex, military aviation faces a fundamental truth: the next generation of military superiority will belong not to those with the most aircraft, but to those who make the smartest investments in their human capital. The recent insights from Tom Webster of Textron Aviation Defense illuminate this reality with striking clarity — the future belongs to forces that can produce “war winners, not war fighters.”

This distinction is more than semantic. It represents a paradigm shift from training pilots who can execute predetermined missions to developing strategic quarterbacks flying incredibly complex aircraft capable of synthesizing information, making autonomous decisions, and orchestrating distributed effects across vast battlespaces. As Webster emphasizes, “You don’t get any rewards for being the second-best Air Force,” and achieving that superiority requires fundamentally reimagining how we develop aviators.

The transformation underway in naval aviation training reflects this imperative. By moving beyond traditional stick-and-rudder skills toward mission system mastery and cognitive agility, Naval Aviation – both the U.S. Navy and the USMC — is positioning itself to dominate not just today’s threats, but those that haven’t yet emerged. This evolution represents the ultimate smart investment in human capital. One that transforms promising pilots into strategic decision-makers capable of winning wars before they’re fought.

The Paradigm Shift: Training Strategic Quarterbacks

The new training paradigm represents a fundamental reconceptualization of what it means to be a military aviator. As Webster explains, modern pilots must evolve from being “nodes in a network” to becoming “quarterbacks” of distributed forces. As Webster underscored, this shift recognizes that in an F-35, a pilot might “become aware that some system has been activated that is very vulnerable to some cyber effect” and need to “communicate, whether it’s via link or voice, into the network so the effect can be applied.”

This quarterback mentality requires a completely different skill set than traditional flying. Pilots must master information processing, strategic thinking, and autonomous decision-making while maintaining the basic airmanship that keeps them alive. They must be prepared to coordinate effects across multiple domains, air, land, sea, space, and cyber, and make strategic decisions that could have theater-wide implications. In a way, says Webster, the evolving world of airpower is redefining what is meant when we say an aviator has, “air sense,” or an, “airman’s perspective.”

The training implications are profound. Instead of focusing solely on technical proficiency, the new paradigm emphasizes cognitive flexibility, information management, and strategic agility. Pilots learn to process vast amounts of data, synthesize information from multiple sources, and make rapid decisions under extreme pressure. They develop the “mental furniture,” as Webster calls it, to adapt to new technologies and evolving threats throughout their careers. To meet this training demand requires different toolsets than have been available in the past.

Integrated Training Ecosystems

The cornerstone of this transformation is what Webster terms the “integrated training system” or a seamless blend of live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training environments that began to emerge around 2010. This represents a quantum leap beyond the traditional model where pilots alternated between aircraft and simulators in discrete, unconnected sessions.

In the integrated system, live flying, virtual simulation, and constructive scenarios are “knitted together” using data links to create comprehensive training environments that mirror the complexity of modern combat. A trainee in an aircraft and a trainee in a simulator might fly a mission together operating in a combined live and virtual battlespace with constructive or simulated adversaries and friendly forces.

This integration enables training scenarios that would be prohibitively expensive or dangerous in purely live environments. As student aviators progress through training, the can practice responding to electronic warfare, coordinating with distributed forces, and managing complex multi-domain operations in a safe, controlled setting that nonetheless provides the cognitive stress and decision-making challenges they’ll face in combat. These are tasks which traditionally would have been reserved for the most advanced training in operational aircraft during complex large force exercises.

Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the LVC approach is the constructive element or the ability to create artificial entities and scenarios that push pilots beyond what’s possible in traditional training. As Webster notes, this allows instructors to “give you a challenge, whether you’re in an airplane or a simulator, using data links and this constructive force generation that is excellent for learning the type of skills you need to have in a fourth or fifth generation operational airplane.”

Constructive training enables aviators to experience the full spectrum of modern warfare before they encounter it operationally. They can practice such tasks as coordinating with allied forces, responding to cyber attacks, managing contested electromagnetic environments, and operating in GPS-denied conditions. They can also do it in a building block type approach which can be tailored to each student’s learning style and learning pace, an approach impossible in the complex world of live large force training. This exposure builds the cognitive frameworks and decision-making patterns that will serve them throughout their careers.

The safety implications are equally significant. Pilots can practice complex emergencies, navigate electronic warfare and, “live fire,” scenarios, and experience multi-domain operations without the inherent risks of live training. This dramatically reduces training-related mishaps while simultaneously improving the quality and realism of the training experience.

Mission System Mastery

The shift from basic flying skills to mission system proficiency represents perhaps the most fundamental change in pilot training. While traditional airmanship remains important, it now serves as the foundation for much more complex cognitive tasks centered on information management and strategic decision-making.

Modern military aircraft, particularly fifth-generation platforms, are essentially flying information systems. The F-35, for instance, processes and displays vast quantities of data from multiple sensors, creating a comprehensive picture of the battlespace that extends far beyond what any pilot could perceive through traditional means. Mastering these systems requires pilots to develop new cognitive skills that go far beyond basic aircraft operation.

This mission system focus transforms pilots from aircraft operators into information managers and strategic decision-makers. They must learn to interpret sensor data, manage information flows, coordinate with networked forces, and make strategic decisions based on synthesized intelligence. As Webster emphasizes, this creates pilots who can serve as “quarterbacks” of distributed forces rather than simply skilled aviators.

The emphasis on mission systems reflects a broader cognitive revolution in combat aviation. Modern pilots must process information at unprecedented speeds, manage multiple data streams simultaneously, and make strategic decisions while maintaining basic flight safety. This requires a level of cognitive flexibility and information management capability that traditional training never addressed.

Webster describes the need for different cognitive progression as follows: “In basic pilot training in a turboprop, you teach me basic airmanship; tasks such as how to communicate with air traffic control, how to get from point A to B and takeoff/land an airplane, how to do aerobatic maneuvers, and how to fly formation with other airplanes. Then, in more advanced jet training, you teach me many of the same things at higher speed, I can get to the point where I can do these basics really, really, well, but those are likely not the only core skill sets that I need to excel in my F-35 training.”

Instead, modern pilots need to master the cognitive skills that enable them to operate in information-rich, contested environments. They must be comfortable processing data from multiple sources, coordinating with distributed forces, and making autonomous decisions that could have strategic implications. This represents a fundamental shift from mechanical skill to cognitive agility.

Pilots as Strategic Assets

The new training paradigm recognizes that modern pilots are strategic assets whose decisions can shape entire campaigns. In distributed maritime operations, a single pilot might identify a critical vulnerability, coordinate a multi-domain response, and execute effects that alter the strategic balance of a conflict. This level of responsibility requires preparation that goes far beyond traditional flight training.

Webster’s observation about F-35 operations in contested environments illustrates this perfectly: pilots operating “nowhere near each other” can provide “the same mutual support that I had in an F-16 when I was a mile and a half or two or three miles from each other.” This represents a fundamental change in how air power operates and requires pilots who can think differently about force employment and tactical coordination.

The training implications are significant. Pilots must learn to operate independently while maintaining connectivity with larger force structures. They must be prepared to make strategic decisions without traditional command oversight and coordinate effects across multiple domains. This requires developing judgment, strategic thinking, and decision-making capabilities that traditional training never emphasized.

Future-Proofing Through Adaptability

Perhaps most critically, the new training paradigm prepares pilots for threats and technologies that don’t yet exist. As Webster notes, the training system must be “future proof” with “an adaptable, open tool set” that can evolve with changing requirements. This means developing pilots who can master not just current systems, but the process of continuous adaptation itself.

This adaptability imperative is driven by the pace of technological change and the unpredictable nature of future threats. The pilot graduating today will likely encounter technologies, tactics, and threats throughout their career that are currently unimaginable. Traditional training, with its focus on specific skills and systems, cannot prepare them for this reality.

Instead, the new paradigm emphasizes meta-skills, learning how to learn, adapting to new systems, processing novel information, and making decisions in unprecedented situations. These cognitive capabilities provide the foundation for continuous adaptation throughout a pilot’s career, ensuring they remain effective as technology and tactics evolve.

The Human Capital Investment Imperative: Building War Winners

The transformation in pilot training reflects a broader shift from quantity-focused to quality-focused force development. As Webster emphasizes, the goal is not simply to produce more pilots, but to create “war winners” who can dominate any environment they encounter. This represents a fundamental reorientation of how military aviation thinks about human capital development.

The economic logic is compelling. Modern military aircraft represent massive investments. The F-35 program alone costs hundreds of billions of dollars. The pilot operating that aircraft, however, receives a relatively modest investment in training and development. Yet that pilot’s decisions and capabilities will determine whether the massive investment in hardware achieves its intended strategic effect.

By investing more heavily in pilot development, through advanced training systems, experienced instructors, and comprehensive curricula, military aviation can achieve dramatically better returns on its hardware investments. A pilot who can fully exploit an aircraft’s capabilities is worth far more than multiple pilots who can only operate at basic proficiency levels.

The Multiplier Effect of Experienced Instructors

One of the most critical elements of the new training paradigm is the integration of experienced fifth-generation pilots as instructors. As Webster notes, there are not a lot pilots with operational F-35 experience who are teaching at basic training level due to the demand for their knowledge and skillsets in other places. This scarcity makes their contribution extraordinarily valuable.

These experienced instructors bring something that no simulation or textbook can provide: authentic knowledge of what modern, “5^th generation,” combat aviation actually requires. They can distinguish between academic understanding and operational reality, ensuring that training focuses on skills that matter in actual combat. Their presence transforms training from theoretical preparation to practical preparation for known realities.

The multiplier effect is significant. One experienced instructor can shape hundreds of students throughout their teaching career, transmitting hard-won operational knowledge that would otherwise take years to develop independently. This creates a compounding return on the investment in human capital that extends far beyond individual training cycles.

Resource Efficiency and Strategic Returns

The new training paradigm also delivers significant resource efficiencies that enhance its strategic value. By leveraging simulation and LVC training, the approach reduces reliance on expensive live flight hours while actually improving training quality. Pilots can practice complex scenarios repeatedly in safe environments, building proficiency that would be impossible to achieve through live training alone.

This efficiency enables more comprehensive training within existing resource constraints. Instead of limiting training to what can be accomplished safely and affordably in live aircraft, the integrated approach opens up the full spectrum of scenarios pilots might encounter operationally. The result is better-prepared pilots at lower cost—a combination that delivers exceptional strategic value.

The safety benefits compound these advantages. By enabling pilots to practice dangerous scenarios in simulated environments, the new approach reduces training-related accidents while improving operational readiness. This not only preserves valuable human resources but also maintains training tempo and morale.

Building Adaptive Capacity

One of the most forward-thinking aspects of the new training paradigm is its emphasis on open, adaptable architectures that can evolve with changing requirements. As Webster explains, the system provides inherent flexibility becoming like “a multi-tool that I bought years earlier that can still be relevant, that is easy and relatively affordable to adapt as training needs continue to grow and evolve.”

This adaptability is crucial in an era of rapid technological change. New aircraft, sensors, weapons, and tactics emerge continuously and some are revolutionary and not just evolutions, and training systems must be able to adapt to these developments quickly and efficiently. Traditional training systems, with their fixed curricula and rigid structures, cannot keep pace with this rate of change.

The open architecture approach solves this problem by building flexibility into the fundamental design of training systems. Instead of requiring wholesale replacement when new technologies emerge, the system can be updated incrementally, preserving previous investments while incorporating new capabilities. This approach dramatically reduces the cost and complexity of maintaining current training while enabling rapid adaptation to new requirements.

Perhaps most significantly, the new training paradigm actually enables faster deployment of new aircraft technologies by preparing pilots to master them more quickly. Traditional training required extensive retraining when new systems were introduced, creating delays between technology availability and operational capability.

The mission system focus of modern training changes this dynamic fundamentally. Pilots who master the cognitive skills of information processing, strategic decision-making, and system integration can adapt to new platforms much more quickly than those trained only in specific aircraft operations. They possess the mental frameworks and cognitive capabilities needed to understand and exploit new technologies rapidly.

This capability has profound strategic implications. Military advantages are often temporary. Early adopters gain significant benefits, but these erode as adversaries develop countermeasures or acquire similar capabilities. Training systems that enable rapid mastery of new technologies help maintain and extend these temporary advantages, creating sustained competitive benefits.

Decision Superiority in Contested Environments

The ultimate test of any training paradigm is its impact on operational effectiveness, and the new approach delivers profound advantages in the most demanding scenarios. Pilots trained as strategic quarterbacks with mission system mastery possess what can only be described as decision superiority or the ability to observe, orient, decide, and act faster than adversaries in complex, contested environments.

This advantage manifests in multiple ways. First, pilots can process and synthesize information more quickly, gaining situational awareness that enables proactive rather than reactive decision-making. Second, they can coordinate distributed effects more effectively, leveraging assets across multiple domains to achieve objectives that would be impossible through traditional, stove-piped approaches. Third, they can adapt to unexpected developments more rapidly, maintaining initiative even when initial plans become obsolete.

These capabilities are particularly crucial in contested environments where traditional command and control structures may be degraded or disrupted. Pilots who can operate autonomously while maintaining strategic coherence provide commanders with flexible, resilient capabilities that can adapt to changing circumstances without constant oversight.

Distributed Lethality and Multi-Domain Operations

The training transformation directly enables the distributed maritime operations that define modern naval warfare. By emphasizing mission system mastery and networked information management, the new paradigm prepares pilots to coordinate effects across widely dispersed forces which is a capability that’s essential for survival and success in contested maritime environments.

This distributed approach multiplies combat effectiveness by enabling smaller, dispersed forces to achieve effects previously requiring large, concentrated formations. Pilots who can coordinate with distributed assets, integrate information from multiple sources, and execute complex, multi-domain operations provide commanders with dramatically enhanced operational flexibility.

The training system’s emphasis on team and joint integration further amplifies these advantages. Pilots who train in networked environments develop natural habits of collaboration and coordination that translate directly to operational effectiveness. They understand how to leverage allied capabilities, integrate with joint forces, and operate seamlessly in coalition environments.

Preparing for Future Warfare

Perhaps most importantly, the new training paradigm prepares pilots for warfare scenarios that haven’t yet emerged. By emphasizing adaptability, strategic thinking, and continuous learning, the approach creates pilots who can master new technologies, tactics, and threats as they appear.

This future-readiness is crucial in an era of rapid change and strategic competition. Adversaries are continuously developing new capabilities and tactics, and the side that can adapt most quickly gains decisive advantages. Training systems that emphasize adaptability and continuous learning provide the foundation for maintaining superiority in this dynamic environment.

The integration of artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and other emerging technologies will require pilots who can understand, integrate, and exploit these capabilities effectively. The cognitive skills emphasized in modern training, information processing, strategic thinking, and adaptive decision-making, provide the foundation for mastering these future technologies as they become available.

Conclusion: The Strategic Imperative of Human Capital Excellence

The transformation of naval aviation training represents more than an educational evolution. It embodies a strategic recognition that human capital excellence is the ultimate determinant of military effectiveness. As Tom Webster’s insights make clear, the choice facing military aviation is stark: invest in developing war winners or accept the consequences of fielding merely competent war fighters.

The evidence is overwhelming that traditional training paradigms, however well-intentioned, cannot prepare pilots for the cognitive demands and strategic responsibilities of modern warfare. The information-rich, multi-domain, rapidly evolving nature of contemporary conflict requires aviators who can think strategically, adapt continuously, and coordinate effects across vast battlespaces. These capabilities cannot be developed through traditional stick-and-rudder training alone.

The integrated training ecosystem emerging from this recognition with its emphasis on mission system mastery, LVC integration, and strategic thinking represents the smartest possible investment in human capital. It produces pilots who can fully exploit the massive investments in modern aircraft while providing the adaptability needed to master future technologies and threats.

The strategic implications extend far beyond individual pilot development. Nations that embrace this training transformation will possess air forces capable of winning conflicts before they escalate, deterring aggression through demonstrated superiority, and adapting rapidly to emerging threats. Those that cling to traditional approaches will find themselves outmatched by adversaries who have made the intellectual and financial investment in human capital excellence.

The choice is clear: invest in developing war winners through transformative training or accept the strategic consequences of maintaining outdated approaches. For naval aviation, embracing this transformation isn’t just an opportunity but it’s an imperative for maintaining the superiority that has defined American air power for generations.

As Webster concludes: “At the end of the day, you want to win the war before it’s fought.” The new training paradigm provides the tools to do exactly that, creating aviators who don’t just operate aircraft but dominate the cognitive and strategic dimensions of modern warfare. The investment in such human capital excellence represents the ultimate strategic advantage, one that compounds over time and provides the foundation for sustained military superiority in an uncertain world.

The future belongs to those who recognize that in an age of technological revolution, the most sophisticated aircraft are only as effective as the pilots who operate them. By transforming training to develop strategic quarterbacks rather than mere aviators, naval aviation positions itself not just to meet future challenges, but to define the very dynamically changing nature of air power.

A Strategic Investment in Marine Corps Heavy-Lift Capabilities

Posted on September 28, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/28/2025

By Robbin Laird

On September 26, 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense and Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company, signed one of the largest helicopter procurement contracts in military history. The five-year, multi-year procurement (MYP) agreement, valued at up to $10.855 billion, authorizes the production and delivery of up to 99 CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopters for the U.S. Marine Corps between 2029 and 2034. This landmark deal represents far more than a simple aircraft purchase for it embodies a strategic commitment to modernizing America’s expeditionary forces while strengthening the defense industrial base for the next decade.

The contract structure itself demonstrates sophisticated defense acquisition planning. Described by the Department of Defense as a fixed-price incentive (successful-target) and firm-fixed-price modification, the agreement definitizes production Lots 9 and 10 while adding scope for Lots 11 through 13. By combining five separate aircraft orders into a single multi-year procurement, the contract provides unprecedented stability for both the government and industry partners while delivering substantial cost savings to taxpayers.

The multi-year procurement approach offers significant financial advantages over traditional annual contracting methods. The agreement is projected to generate $1.5 billion in savings between 2025 and 2029, demonstrating the power of long-term contracting strategies in defense acquisition. Colonel Kate Fleeger, Program Manager for the H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopters Program Office (PMA-261), explained the mechanism behind these savings: “The contract allows Sikorsky to take advantage of a long-term, stable demand signal and bundle purchase orders from suppliers to achieve better pricing. That savings is then passed on to the government.”

This cost reduction strategy reflects broader defense acquisition reform efforts aimed at maximizing taxpayer value while ensuring military readiness. The multi-year structure enables Sikorsky to optimize its production planning, secure better pricing from suppliers through volume commitments, and reduce the administrative burden associated with annual contract negotiations. These efficiencies translate directly into lower unit costs for each helicopter while maintaining quality and delivery schedules.

The financial benefits extend beyond immediate cost savings. Long-term contracting provides predictable revenue streams that enable industry partners to invest in manufacturing improvements, workforce development, and technological advancement. This virtuous cycle of investment and efficiency gains benefits both the defense contractor and the government customer over the life of the program.

One of the most significant aspects of this contract is its impact on the defense industrial base. The CH-53K program involves an extensive network of suppliers, with 267 suppliers across 37 states and an additional 17 international suppliers from eight countries. This geographic distribution ensures that the economic benefits of the program reach communities across America while maintaining critical manufacturing capabilities in key industrial regions.

The multi-year structure provides unprecedented stability for this supplier network. Rather than facing uncertainty about future orders, suppliers can now plan investments, maintain skilled workforces, and optimize their own production processes based on predictable demand signals. This stability is particularly crucial for smaller suppliers who might otherwise struggle to maintain specialized capabilities during periods of uncertain demand.

Colonel Fleeger emphasized this benefit, stating that the contract provides “the ability to provide dependable delivery to the fleet and a consistent and predictable timeline for the transition from the CH-53E to the CH-53K.” This predictability enables the Marine Corps to plan its force modernization efforts with confidence while ensuring that aging CH-53E Super Stallions can be retired on schedule without capability gaps.

The contract also reinforces American manufacturing capabilities at a time of increasing global competition. By sustaining thousands of production roles at Sikorsky and across its nationwide supply chain, the agreement helps maintain the skilled workforce necessary for advanced aerospace manufacturing. These capabilities have applications beyond military helicopters, supporting broader American competitiveness in global aerospace markets.

The CH-53K King Stallion represents a revolutionary advancement in heavy-lift helicopter technology, far exceeding the capabilities of its predecessor, the CH-53E Super Stallion. The aircraft is designed to carry 27,000 pounds at a mission radius of 110 nautical miles under Navy high/hot conditions, nearly triple the capability of the CH-53E, with a maximum external lift capacity of 36,000 pounds. These specifications make the CH-53K the most powerful helicopter in the U.S. military inventory.

The aircraft’s advanced capabilities were dramatically demonstrated in 2022 when a CH-53K successfully landed an externally-loaded Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) at the summit of an 8,000-foot ridge in the Marine Corps’ 29 Palms training range in the California desert. This achievement highlighted the helicopter’s ability to operate in extreme conditions that would challenge or defeat other aircraft, providing Marine commanders with unprecedented operational flexibility.

Beyond raw lifting power, the CH-53K incorporates cutting-edge avionics and flight control systems. The aircraft features fully digital, fly-by-wire flight controls making it the first conventional helicopter in Marine Corps service to incorporate this technology. These advanced controls enhance safety, reduce pilot workload, and enable precision operations in challenging environments. The system allows the aircraft to maintain position within one foot of its intended hover point in all directions, critical for operations in confined or austere environments.

The helicopter’s digital backbone also enables advanced fleet management capabilities similar to those Sikorsky has implemented with its commercial S-92 helicopter fleet. This system allows for tracking individual aircraft components and predicting maintenance needs based on data-driven analysis rather than fixed schedules, crucial for maintaining high readiness rates in distributed operations.

The CH-53K procurement must be understood within the broader context of Marine Corps force modernization and evolving strategic requirements. As military operations increasingly focus on distributed operations across vast distances, particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific region, the ability to rapidly transport heavy equipment and supplies becomes paramount. The CH-53K’s enhanced range and payload capabilities directly support the Marine Corps’ transition to distributed operations concepts.

Colonel Fleeger identified a critical challenge in maximizing the CH-53K’s potential: overcoming the perception that it is simply an upgraded CH-53E. “I think it actually encourages, unfortunately, people to view the platform as a replacement platform instead of a revolutionary, key element of a really forward-thinking concept of operations,” she explained. This perspective highlights the importance of integrating new capabilities into operational concepts rather than simply replacing older equipment with newer versions.

The aircraft’s capabilities enable entirely new operational approaches. Where the CH-53E required extensive preparation and carried significant risk when lifting 20,000-pound loads, the CH-53K handles such operations routinely, fundamentally changing how ground commanders can plan and execute missions. This capability transformation extends beyond simple logistics to enable new tactical and operational possibilities.

The CH-53K also supports the Marine Corps’ role as both a crisis response force and a key component of joint distributed operations. The aircraft’s ability to operate from both land and sea bases, including austere sites and amphibious shipping, provides essential flexibility for rapid response scenarios and sustained operations in contested environments.

The multi-year contract builds on significant program momentum. Sikorsky has already delivered 20 CH-53K aircraft to the Marine Corps, with an additional 63 aircraft from earlier production lots (Lots 4-8) currently in various stages of production and assembly. The Department of the Navy declared Full Rate Production for the CH-53K program in December 2022, marking the program’s transition from development to sustained production.

The Marine Corps has successfully transitioned one fleet squadron to the CH-53K, while additional aircraft are flying in developmental test, operational test, and training squadrons to support ongoing requirements and capability development. This phased approach allows the service to build operational experience while continuing to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for the new aircraft.

The program of record remains at 200 CH-53K helicopters for the Marine Corps, suggesting potential for additional contracts beyond the current multi-year agreement. The current contract’s flexibility to support international military customers also opens possibilities for foreign military sales, which could further reduce unit costs through increased production volumes.

Israel has already committed to purchasing CH-53K helicopters, with recent contracts including eight aircraft bound for the Israeli Air Force through foreign military sales. The Israeli purchase validates the international appeal of the CH-53K’s capabilities and provides a model for potential future international partnerships.

The contract’s provision for international military customers represents a significant opportunity for both cost reduction and strategic partnership building. The agreement allows the U.S. Government to use the contract structure to fulfill orders from international military customers, potentially reducing unit costs for all participants through economies of scale.

Israel’s commitment to the CH-53K demonstrates the aircraft’s appeal to allied nations facing similar operational challenges. The Israeli Air Force plans to use the helicopters to replace their aging fleet of modified CH-53D Yasur helicopters, which have been in service for over 50 years. This replacement cycle highlights the long service life expected for modern military helicopters and the importance of investing in advanced capabilities that will remain relevant for decades.

The potential for additional international sales could significantly impact program economics. Foreign military sales typically contribute to lower unit costs for U.S. military customers while strengthening defense relationships with allied nations. The CH-53K’s advanced capabilities and the stability provided by the multi-year contract make it an attractive option for nations requiring heavy-lift capabilities.

The program’s transition to full-rate production also represents a significant risk reduction milestone. Development programs typically face their highest risks during the design and testing phases. By achieving full-rate production, the CH-53K program has demonstrated mature manufacturing processes and validated performance capabilities, reducing the likelihood of major program disruptions.

The $10.9 billion CH-53K multi-year procurement contract represents more than a helicopter purchase. It embodies a strategic investment in American defense capabilities, industrial base strength, and allied partnership opportunities. By providing cost savings, supply chain stability, and predictable production schedules, the contract benefits taxpayers, industry partners, and military end-users simultaneously.

The agreement ensures that the Marine Corps will receive the world’s most advanced heavy-lift helicopter on schedule while maintaining the industrial capabilities necessary for long-term sustainment and potential future developments. As global security challenges continue to evolve, particularly in the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific region, the CH-53K’s capabilities will prove invaluable for maintaining American military effectiveness and supporting allied operations.

The Coming of the CH-53K : A New Capability for the Distributed Force

U.S. Marine Corps Sgt. Nathan Pjecha, aircraft avionics technician, Marine Fighter Attack Training Squadron 501, Marine Aircraft Group 31, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, examines the F-35B Lightning II aircraft, after an external lift operation at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, Aug. 27, 2025. The F-35B Lightning II aircraft, known as BF-1, was the first F-35B Lightning II delivered to the Marine Corps at MCAS Beaufort and will now serve as a permanent static display aboard the air station. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Isabella Renaud)

U.S. Marines with Marine Corp Air Station Beaufort prepare the F-35B Lightning II aircraft known as BF-1 to be towed to its static display position at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, Aug. 27, 2025. The F-35B Lightning II aircraft, known as BF-1, was the first F-35B Lightning II delivered to the Marine Corps at MCAS Beaufort and will now serve as a permanent static display aboard the air station. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Isabella Renaud)

A U.S. Marine Corps heavy-lift Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, off-loads a F-35B Lightning II after a long-range external lift operation at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, Aug. 27, 2025. The F-35B Lightning II aircraft, known as BF-1, was the first F-35B Lightning II delivered to the Marine Corps at MCAS Beaufort and will now serve as a permanent static display aboard the air station. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Isabella Renaud)

A U.S. Marine Corps heavy-lift Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, conducts a F-35B Lighting II long-range external lift operation at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, Aug. 27, 2025. The F-35B Lightning II aircraft, known as BF-1, was the first F-35B Lightning II delivered to the Marine Corps at MCAS Beaufort and will now serve as a permanent static display aboard the air station. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Isabella Renaud)

A U.S. Marine Corps heavy-lift Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, depart Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort after conducting an F-35B Lighting II long-range external lift operation at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, Aug. 27, 2025. The F-35B Lighting II aircraft, known as BF-1, was the first F-35B Lightning II delivered to the Marine Corps at MCAS Beaufort and will now serve as a permanent static display aboard the air station. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Isabella Renaud)

A U.S. Marine Corps heavy-lift Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopter with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, prepares to depart Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort after conducting an F-35B Lightning II long-range external lift operation at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, Aug. 27, 2025. The F-35B Lightning II aircraft, known as BF-1, was the first F-35B Lightning II delivered to the Marine Corps at MCAS Beaufort and will now serve as a permanent static display aboard the air station. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Isabella Renaud)

U.S. Marine Corps heavy-lift Sikorsky CH-53K King Stallion helicopters with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, land after conducting an F-35B Lighting II long-range external lift operation at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, South Carolina, Aug. 27, 2025. The F-35B Lightning II aircraft, known as BF-1, was the first F-35B Lightning II delivered to the Marine Corps at MCAS Beaufort and will now serve as a permanent static display aboard the air station. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Isabella Renaud)

Osan DFT

Posted on September 26, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/26/2025

U.S. Marine Corps F-35B Lighting II aircraft with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 214, Marine Aircraft Group 12, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing conduct flight operations during a deployment for training at Osan Air Base May 13 – May 31, 2025.

VMFA-214, an F-35B Lighting II squadron from Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Arizona, deployed to augment MAG-12, 1st MAW under the Unit Deployment Program, which provides U.S.-based units with operational experience in the Indo-Pacific.

Marines with VMFA-214 traveled to Korea to gain experience operating with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and share knowledge and tactics during their participation in the UDP.

OSAN AIR BASE, SOUTH KOREA

05.29.2025

Video by Lance Cpl. Micah Taylor

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

The Contraband Economy That Built Brazil’s Independence

Posted on September 26, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Robbin Laird

In the shadowy world of 18th-century colonial Brazil, monks conducted business through holes in convent walls, French diplomats openly discussed bribing governors, and British ships feigned distress to access forbidden ports.

This wasn’t the chaotic underworld we might imagine. It was a sophisticated economic system that would ultimately reshape the Portuguese Empire and create the foundation for Brazilian independence decades before any political revolution began.

The new book by Professor Ernst Pijning reveals a startling truth: Brazil achieved virtual independence not through dramatic political upheaval, but through the quiet, persistent growth of what he terms “institutionalized illegality.”

By 1800, powerful Brazilian interests had effectively broken free from Lisbon’s economic control, creating a de facto sovereignty that would only later be formalized in law.

The story begins with a fundamental misunderstanding of what “illegal” meant in colonial Brazil. Modern observers often assume clear distinctions between legal and criminal activity, but 18th-century Portuguese authorities operated under a much more flexible system. Smuggling wasn’t necessarily seen as an ethical problem; rather it was a practical tool of governance.

Portuguese officials distinguished between two types of contraband: the kind they condemned and the kind they permitted. Whether something was truly illegal depended largely on who was doing it, their social status, and critically, whether it served the interests of the Portuguese crown. Trade with Buenos Aires to obtain silver, for instance, was technically forbidden but often encouraged because it brought precious metals into Portuguese coffers.

This selective enforcement created remarkable scenes: Benedictine monks in Rio de Janeiro conducting illegal trade through a hole in their convent wall with smugglers on the beach below, while officials looked the other way. As one contemporary put it, “breaking the law was seen as something very positive” when it served the right purposes.

The arbitrary nature of this system becomes clear when comparing how different foreign captains were treated in Brazilian ports. In 1748, the captain of the French warship Arkansas arrived in Rio, paid proper respects, followed protocol, and received full cooperation from Governor Gomes Freire de Andrada including free supplies, use of a country house, and freedom to move about the city.

Twenty years later, Captain James Cook arrived with the Endeavor and experienced an entirely different reception. Unfamiliar with local protocols and secretive about his mission, Cook saw his first officer arrested, guards board his ship, and himself placed under house arrest. He was accused of being a smuggler and forced to buy supplies through official intermediaries.

The difference wasn’t in their legal status but in their understanding of the unwritten rules which was a diplomatic chess game played out in every Brazilian harbor.

This flexible approach to legality wasn’t born from Portuguese benevolence but from weakness. Portugal found itself caught between more powerful European nations, dependent on British, French, and Dutch support to prevent Spanish conquest. This vulnerability forced massive concessions: foreign powers gained special rights and sovereign jurisdictions within Portugal itself, while Portuguese gold flowed to Britain through technically illegal but widely condoned exports.

Portugal had become, in Pijning’s striking phrase, “virtually a British colony itself.” French diplomats like Duverger openly pushed for access to Brazilian ports and suggested that governors could be persuaded with “appropriate compensation.” Bribes became an open secret of colonial administration.

Foreign ships developed theatrical methods to gain access to Brazilian markets. British and North American whalers were notorious for feigning distress — claiming damaged ships or scurvy-ridden crews — just to enter ports for illicit trading, even when they carried supplies for twenty months of sailing.

By the late 18th century, this institutionalized illegality had created a self-perpetuating system of corruption that reached every level of society. Officials whose job descriptions required them to combat illegal trade had become its biggest facilitators. Their power came not from stopping smuggling but from controlling it by deciding which illegal acts were acceptable and which weren’t.

The incentives were overwhelming. Governors received low official salaries, creating massive pressure to engage in private trading despite official prohibitions. The municipal council in Rio, responsible for paying the governor’s salary, used this leverage to complain about governors who were too strict in suppressing illegal trade, calling them “despotic” for actually doing their jobs.

Government positions could be purchased through the donativo system, while customs officials, especially secretaries with individual regulatory authority over contraband, commanded high salaries precisely because they controlled this lucrative gray market.

By 1806, the system had broken down completely. The customs judge in Rio reported that his officials faced actual threats, not just from smugglers, but from common people, if they tried to confiscate goods. The public had become invested in the illegal economy. Officials became “evasive in their work,” closing their eyes to contraband to avoid trouble.

The final blow came when a new law required all confiscated goods to be publicly burned rather than allowing officials to keep one-third as incentive. With financial rewards removed and physical threats increasing, enforcement collapsed entirely.

This widespread corruption provided rich material for satirists and critics, even under censorship. Writers like Diogo do Couto, the anonymous author of “Arte de Furtar” (The Art of Thieving), and poets Gregório de Matos and Tomás Antonio Gonzaga created scathing critiques of the system.

These works reveal deep public awareness of systemic rot. They explicitly blamed Portuguese administration and policies for what they saw as Brazil’s decline, arguing that corruption seeped through every level of society “from the King himself right down to the street peddler.”

Meanwhile, Brazilian economic thinkers began pushing back against the official Portuguese philosophy that whatever benefited the mother country automatically benefited the colony. By the late 18th century, influenced by ideas like Adam Smith’s free trade theories, Brazilian intellectuals started distinguishing Brazilian interests as separate from Portuguese ones. The intellectual foundation for future independence was being laid.

Everything changed when Napoleon’s 1807 invasion forced the Portuguese court to flee Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro. This wasn’t simply moving a capital. It was a fundamental shift in Atlantic power structures that formalized what had already happened economically.

The immediate result was the official opening of Brazilian ports to friendly foreign nations, legalizing overnight a huge amount of trade that had operated in gray zones for decades. As Brazilian merchant Salvador Correia Sá immediately recognized, Rio de Janeiro had become the center of the empire while Portugal was now on the periphery.

This was, of course, a complete reversal of traditional colonial relationships.

For local officials whose power had been built on regulating illegal trade, this transformation was catastrophic. Their leverage disappeared when trade became legal, fundamentally altering governance structures throughout Brazil.

This history challenges our basic assumptions about how law, power, and economics interact. It shows that economic realities, even underground ones, can shape national destinies more powerfully than official decrees or political declarations.

The Brazilian case reveals how systems of governance can adapt to and even depend on activities they officially prohibit, creating complex webs of institutionalized contradiction that ultimately reshape entire societies. When the Count of Arcos, the last viceroy in Rio, wrote that “the crime of contraband trade is so prevalent as to have lost the taint of criminality,” he was documenting not just administrative failure but societal transformation.

Brazil’s path to independence wasn’t forged in revolutionary assemblies or dramatic declarations, but in the daily decisions of merchants, officials, and ordinary people who created an alternative economic reality that eventually became the foundation of a new nation.

It reminds us that history’s most profound changes often happen not through grand political gestures, but through the accumulation of countless small acts that gradually redefine what’s possible and what’s legal.

In our own era of rapid economic and technological change, this colonial Brazilian experience offers a powerful reminder: the future is often built not by those who follow the rules, but by those who understand when and how the rules have already changed.

In my dissertation which I wrote to complete my process of receiving my PhD from Columbia University, my dissertation sponsor, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, let my explore a path unusual for a dissertation effort. I went a voyage of discovery to think about how historical change actually occurs. It was successful in part; but left open-ended in a sense.

But what I clearly took away is that even when there seems to be historical stability, the forces for change are already operating. At any point in history, the forces of continuity contain the seeds of the next iteration of history. What intrigued me about Ernst’s book was a clear demonstration of what I learned when I worked on my dissertation.

It was therefore a pleasure for our Second Line of Defense team to publish his book in our series on Amazon which is entitled: “Portugal and Brazil Confront the Contemporary World.”

Controlling Contraband: Mentality, Economy, and Society in Eighteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro

UK Strategic Defence Review 2025: Transforming Air Power for a New Era of Threats

Posted on September 25, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/25/2025

By Robbin Laird

Air Commodore Alun Roberts, Head Air to Air Missiles Royal Air Force, outlined in a virtual presentation to the seminar, Britain’s ambitious defence transformation in response to evolving global security challenges.

The United Kingdom’s recently published Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025 represents nothing sa paradigm shift in British defence thinking. He argued that is one driven by the harsh realities of contemporary warfare and an increasingly dangerous global security environment.

The Strategic Imperative: A World Transformed

The SDR’s genesis lies in what Roberts described as the definitive shattering of “optimistic notions” about global stability. The illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 served as a brutal awakening, demonstrating that the post-Cold War era of relative peace was over. The review explicitly identifies Russia as the primary threat, noting that Moscow’s aggression has become “more sophisticated and more basic” across all operational domains—land, sea, air, space, and crucially, cyberspace.

This threat assessment has driven what Roberts characterised as a “NATO-first approach,” representing a fundamental recalibration of British strategic priorities. However, this European focus should not be misunderstood as isolationist. As Roberts emphasised, “a strong, secure Europe creates greater stability, freeing up capacity and capabilities to contribute to global security challenges.” This philosophy underpins the UK’s continued commitment to global partnerships, particularly with Indo-Pacific allies like Australia.

The strategic review acknowledges that modern security challenges extend far beyond traditional military capabilities. Today’s threats encompass cyber warfare, hybrid operations, economic coercion, and what military analysts term “grey zone” activities—those actions that fall below the threshold of conventional warfare but nonetheless pose serious security risks. The recent incidents along Russia’s eastern borders serve as stark reminders of how quickly situations can escalate in this new strategic environment.

Historic Defence Investment: Backing Words with Resources

The government has announced plans to increase defence expenditure from the current 2.3% of GDP to an ambitious 2.5% by 2035, a trajectory that Roberts described as “clear and irreversible.” More significantly, the UK anticipates core defence spending rising toward 3.5% of GDP, with an additional 1.5% allocated for broader national security investments encompassing cyber defence, counter-terrorism, and critical infrastructure protection.

This represents one of the largest defence spending increases in NATO since the end of the Cold War. To put this in perspective, reaching 2.5% of GDP would place the UK among the highest defence spenders in the alliance, demonstrating genuine commitment to burden-sharing that goes far beyond political rhetoric. The sustained nature of this investment signals to allies and adversaries alike that Britain is serious about its security responsibilities.

The investment serves multiple strategic objectives beyond simple capability enhancement. It will modernise the Armed Forces with cutting-edge equipment and technology, strengthen the UK’s defence industrial base, and create thousands of high-skilled jobs across the country. As Roberts noted, a robust defence industry is “not just an economic asset for it’s a strategic imperative.” This investment will drive innovation, ensure domestic capacity for equipment production and maintenance, and reduce dependence on potentially unreliable foreign suppliers.

Industrial Renaissance: Lessons from Ukraine

The conflict in Ukraine has provided sobering lessons about the importance of industrial capacity in modern warfare. Even highly advanced military forces can rapidly deplete their stockpiles during high-intensity operations, making sustained production capabilities absolutely critical. This realisation has prompted a significant expansion of the UK’s domestic munitions production capacity.

The SDR announces the establishment of six new munitions factories across the United Kingdom, representing substantial investment in national security infrastructure. These facilities will focus on producing diverse ranges of critical munitions including artillery shells vital for ground operations, anti-tank missiles, and sophisticated air-to-air missiles. The strategic importance of this investment cannot be overstated. It ensures the UK can maintain prolonged operations while contributing to collective defence efforts across NATO.

This industrial expansion serves dual purposes: enhancing national security while boosting economic prosperity. The new factories will create thousands of high-skilled manufacturing jobs, supporting local economies and fostering engineering expertise that has strategic value beyond defence applications. Moreover, it positions the UK as a reliable supplier for allied nations, strengthening diplomatic relationships through practical defence cooperation.

Royal Air Force Transformation: Next-Generation Air Power

The SDR outlines an ambitious transformation of Royal Air Force capabilities, built on what Roberts termed “several interconnected, mutually reinforcing key pillars.” This represents the most comprehensive modernisation of British air power since the jet age, designed to ensure the RAF remains among the world’s most capable and technologically advanced air forces.

At the heart of this transformation lies the F-35 Lightning programme. The government has confirmed a crucial enhancement to the UK’s F-35 procurement strategy, deciding to acquire the conventional F-35A variant alongside the existing F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing fleet. This mixed approach offers significant strategic advantages: the F-35A provides greater range and payload capacity while serving as a key component of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission, underscoring Britain’s deep integration into alliance nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.

The decision reflects sophisticated strategic thinking about air power requirements. While F-35B aircraft will continue their vital role operating from the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and expeditionary bases, F-35A aircraft will enhance land-based combat capabilities and provide improved training opportunities. Crucially, this approach offers greater interoperability with the majority of NATO allies who operate the F-35A variant.

Existing Typhoon aircraft will undergo rigorous upgrades to ensure their continued relevance well into the next decade. The most significant enhancement involves integrating the Enhanced Electronic Warfare (EW) system known as ECRS Mark 2, transforming the Typhoon into a formidable electronic attack platform alongside its traditional air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. This capability is increasingly vital in modern warfare, where electronic dominance often determines battle outcomes.

Future Combat Systems: GCAP and Beyond

The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), also known by various names including Future Combat Air System and Tempest, represents one of the most ambitious international defence collaborations in decades. This groundbreaking effort between close partners aims to develop next-generation fighter aircraft designed specifically for highly contested environments expected in future conflicts.

GCAP aircraft will embody cutting-edge stealth technology, advanced sensors, and unprecedented connectivity, providing decisive technological advantages against peer adversaries. The programme represents the future of air power projection and deterrence, designed to complement and eventually replace both the F-35 and Typhoon fleets. While ambitious and complex, GCAP demonstrates how international cooperation can achieve capabilities that would be prohibitively expensive for individual nations.

Supporting this next-generation platform, the UK is developing advanced standoff weapons including the SPEAR 3 missile and Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon (FCASW). The SDR also introduces Britain’s ambition for next-generation air-to-air capabilities through the Future Air Superiority Effects (FASE) programme. FASE will develop advanced air-to-air missiles ensuring British combat aircraft maintain decisive advantages in aerial engagements, covering everything from sophisticated high-threat targets to the high-volume, low-cost threats demonstrated by Russian forces.

Autonomous Revolution: Embracing Uncrewed Systems

Perhaps no aspect of the SDR is more forward-looking than its embrace of autonomous and uncrewed systems. The conflict in Ukraine has vividly demonstrated the transformative power of drones, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems in modern warfare. The Royal Air Force is committed to what Roberts called an “autonomous revolution” with ambitious plans for autonomous combat aircraft complementing crewed platforms.

The strategic vision involves creating a “high-low capability mix” where uncrewed systems comprise a substantial proportion of air platforms. This approach offers increased agility, enhanced resilience, and critically, the ability to operate in contested environments with reduced risk to human life. It addresses the “mass problem” that has concerned military planners for decades, freeing up expensive crewed platforms for the most demanding and complex missions.

To accelerate this transformation, the UK is investing significantly in establishing a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre by 2026. This facility will focus on the rapid adoption and seamless integration of autonomous technologies across all services, ensuring Britain remains at the forefront of military innovation.

Air and Missile Defence: Addressing Capability Gaps

After decades of what Roberts frankly acknowledged as poor policy decisions leading to disinvestment in air defence, the UK is making a decisive reversal. The SDR allocates £1 billion specifically for homeland air and missile defence—a critical investment given increasingly sophisticated aerial threats ranging from ballistic missiles and hypersonic vehicles to the proliferation of low-cost, high-volume drone threats evident along Europe’s eastern borders.

This investment will create a layered, adaptive defence system capable of responding to the full spectrum of aerial threats. The urgency of this requirement has been highlighted by recent events, demonstrating how quickly air defence can become a matter of national survival rather than merely military capability.

Ukraine: The Defining Conflict

Central to the SDR’s strategic framework is unwavering support for Ukraine. Roberts was unequivocal in describing the conflict not as a regional dispute but as “a profound battle for the fundamental principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and the very future of the international rules-based order.” This perspective drives much of the review’s analysis and recommendations.

Britain has already committed billions in military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, with these commitments set to increase in line with rising defence spending. The UK is actively contributing to international initiatives leveraging seized Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s recovery, ensuring Russia pays for the damage it has inflicted. More fundamentally, the lessons from Ukraine are directly shaping British defence thinking, highlighting the importance of adaptable innovation, robust industrial bases, and whole-of-society approaches to national security.

Global Implications and Allied Cooperation

While the SDR emphasises European security, Roberts was careful to reinforce that this focus complements rather than detracts from broader international partnerships. The UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt remains intact, with the recognition that global challenges—from state aggression to cyber threats—require coordinated international responses.

The review strengthens collective resolve by demonstrating that shared values and common threats can drive effective cooperation on a global scale. For allies like Australia, a stronger, more secure Europe provides stability that enables greater focus on other regions and challenges.

Conclusion: Strength Through Unity

The UK’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 represents a comprehensive response to an increasingly dangerous world. It demonstrates how nations can adapt to evolving threats while maintaining core principles and international partnerships. Through unprecedented investment, industrial expansion, technological innovation, and unwavering support for allies under attack, Britain is positioning itself not just to deter aggression but to help shape a more secure global future.

As Air Commodore Roberts concluded, this transformation stems not from any desire for conflict but from a profound understanding that strength, unity, and unwavering support for those under attack represent the most effective means of deterring aggression and safeguarding shared values. In an era where the international rules-based order faces its greatest challenge since 1945, the UK’s response offers a model for how democracies can adapt, modernise, and prevail against authoritarian threats.

Featured image: Air Commodore Alun Roberts, Head Air to Air Missiles Royal Air Force, as seen on the video hookup with the seminar.

Learning from History: Australia’s Defence Industrial Mobilization Imperative

Posted on September 24, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

09/24/2025

By Robbin Laird

In an era of unprecedented global uncertainty, Australia faces a critical question: Can the nation mobilize its industrial base quickly enough to meet emerging security challenges?

According to Matt Jones (seen above in the featured photo), Head of Future Business Defence Delivery at BAE Systems Australia, the answer lies not in waiting for crisis to justify action, but in learning from history’s most successful and failed attempts at defence industrial mobilization.

Speaking at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation symposium on combat readiness at the “speed of relevance,” Jones delivered a compelling case for immediate action, drawing on lessons from World War II industrialists and Ukraine’s recent transformation to argue that Australia’s defence industrial mobilization cannot wait for bullets to fly.

The Urgency of Now

Australia finds itself navigating what Jones describes as “the most uncertain and unsettling period of our lifetimes.” Strategic pressures are multiplying from Europe and the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, where China remains a persistent threat. The required pace of capability development is accelerating while operational risks increase exponentially.

In this context, Jones argues, Australian industry must evolve beyond its traditional role as a transactional supplier to become “an enabler of national combat power.” This transformation requires what he calls both urgency and historical perspective which requires understanding not just what needs to be done, but learning from those who have faced similar challenges before.

The fundamental lesson Jones extracts from history is stark: “Waiting for crisis to justify investment leaves us with money, but no time.” This principle underpins his entire argument for proactive industrial mobilization, supported by three compelling historical examples that offer both inspiration and warning.

Bill Knudsen: The Power of Unified Purpose

The first lesson comes from America’s “Arsenal of Democracy” during World War II, orchestrated by Bill Knudsen, the General Motors president thrust into wartime industrial leadership by President Roosevelt in 1940. Knudsen’s approach offers a masterclass in rapid industrial mobilization under pressure.

Leading the hastily formed National Defence Advisory Commission, Knudsen harnessed America’s industrial giants —General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler — leveraging their management capabilities, workforce, and production expertise to scale military capability at unprecedented speed. His genius lay in understanding that winning wars required more than battlefield strategy; it demanded mobilizing industry at extraordinary pace.

Knudsen’s key innovations were revolutionary in their simplicity. He forged early partnerships between government and industry, creating coordinated efforts that prepared production lines before war arrived. Most importantly, he prioritized mass production and standardization over perfection. His philosophy that “100 good enough aircraft today would save more lives than one perfect aircraft next year” transformed how America approached wartime production.

The results speak volumes: America’s mobilized industrial base produced 70% of all Allied military equipment. Knudsen had correctly identified war as fundamentally “a production problem” and solved it through industrial might rather than seeking perfect solutions.

Essington Lewis: The Cost of Delayed Action

Australia’s own wartime industrial experience offers a more sobering lesson through Essington Lewis, BHP’s managing director who became Director-General of the Department of Munitions and later Aircraft Production. Lewis faced a reality starkly different from Knudsen’s—attempting to mobilize Australia’s industrial base before conflict began, only to be frustrated by governmental inaction.

From 1935 onwards, Lewis lobbied increasingly urgently for Australia to prepare for war mobilization. His foresight proved accurate, but his warnings fell on deaf ears in Canberra. When conflict finally arrived, Australia was underprepared despite having adequate funds. The nation lacked the industrial experience needed to build both capability and culture under wartime pressure.

Lewis’s experience crystallizes a fundamental truth: “foresight without action is useless.” His later reflection that “money cannot buy lost time” serves as a warning for contemporary Australia. Despite accomplishing remarkable feats such as expanding steel production, building aircraft and munitions plants, innovating under financial constraints, his efforts were continually slowed by bureaucracy and underfunding.

The comparison between Knudsen and Lewis is instructive. Knudsen had government backing and urgency; Lewis had vision and capability constrained by bureaucracy. Lewis’s experience demonstrates that industrial mobilization in constrained environments requires exceptional leadership, innovation, and the ability to navigate political obstacles while working “with what you have, not what you wish you had.”

Ukraine: Modern Lessons in Adaptive Mobilization

Perhaps the most relevant contemporary example comes from Ukraine’s transformation following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Rather than assuming NATO would provide adequate deterrence, Ukraine began modernizing its defence industry and detaching itself from Soviet industrial legacy.

Ukraine’s state-owned Ukroboronprom transformed from a corrupt, inefficient Soviet-era concern into a transparent, investor-friendly entity capable of leading large defence projects and full-scale production. Hundreds of small and medium enterprises entered the market, many focused on drones, advanced electronics, and AI-enabled capabilities. Crucially, Ukraine shifted away from Russian supply chain dependence, pursuing joint ventures with countries like Turkey and Poland.

The transformation wasn’t perfect, inefficiencies, corruption, and gaps remained. However, Ukraine’s crucial advantage was starting mobilization eight years before Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion. This head start proved enormously valuable when conflict erupted.

By 2022, Ukraine possessed engineers and innovators capable of adapting commercial drones into formidable battlefield weapons. The nation had built capacity to sustain artillery fire and manufacture unmanned systems even as Western ammunition supplies fluctuated. Partnerships with Poland and Turkey yielded battlefield-leading systems like the Bayraktar TB2 drone.

Most importantly, Ukraine had cultivated “a culture of innovating at wartime speed.” Civilian scientists and small businesses weren’t standing on sidelines but they were integral to the fight. When battlefield problems emerged, solutions were prototyped in days and fielded in weeks, not decades.

Australia’s Current Reality

These historical lessons frame Australia’s contemporary challenges starkly. The nation’s geography, alliance relationships, and regional change pace mean that if crisis comes, it may arrive fast. Industrial mobilization cannot wait for emergency justification.

Australia currently operates what Jones terms “a two-speed economy,” requiring simultaneous investment in immediate readiness and expensive future force structure pillars. This dual demand strains defence budgets significantly, even with projected increases over coming years.

The hard truth is that peacetime publics rarely demand higher defence spending. Every dollar faces scrutiny while bureaucracy and oversight, though protecting accountability, slow innovation and mobilization. Markets reward efficiency and shareholder returns, not readiness thereby creating fundamental tension with defense requirements.

Australia’s current industrial base, while modernizing, remains underweight, fragmented, and reliant on extended global supply chains. The Defence Strategic Review acknowledges this poses significant risk. If conflict disrupts supply lines, substantial gaps exist in specialized electronics for guided munitions, advanced materials for aerospace and high-speed weapons, and essential machining capabilities for military-grade production at scale.

Additional challenges include duplication of effort across multiple organizations conducting similar work, consuming precious resources unnecessarily. Competition often stifles effective outcomes, forcing small and medium enterprises to operate under fragmented demand signals and compliance pressures threatening their long-term viability.

Budget pressures risk undermining capabilities built carefully over decades. Once capability is lost, regaining it becomes extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming. This reality demands closer government-industry collaboration, sharing affordability challenges and jointly developing solutions.

Building on Strengths

Despite these challenges, Jones maintains optimism based on Australia’s demonstrated capabilities. The nation has repeatedly proven that when incentivized, it can advance and build sophisticated technologies quickly.

The Counter-IED Task Force supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplifies this potential, where Defence, DSTO, industry, and academia collaborated to deliver leading-edge capability into the field, saving soldiers’ lives. This success model demonstrates Australia’s capacity for rapid innovation when organizational barriers are removed.

Australia’s industrial base already possesses hundreds of innovative SMEs designing and building weapons and drones, many operational in Ukraine and exported globally. The nation maintains robust munitions capabilities at facilities like Mulwala and Benalla, producing high-quality ordnance reliably at scale.

Advanced aircraft sector achievements include projects like the Ghost Bat, showcasing Australian ability to produce high-end aviation systems. Next-generation shipbuilding at 21st-century facilities like Osborne make traditional shipbuilders envious globally. World-leading advanced capabilities exist in hypersonics, over-the-horizon radar, electronic warfare technologies, and underwater sensing and autonomous systems.

Underlying all achievements is Australian engineering quality, renowned globally for achieving remarkable solutions efficiently. These strengths provide solid foundations for accelerated growth if properly coordinated and resourced.

The Path Forward

Drawing from historical successes and failures, Jones proposes specific actions for strengthening Australia’s industrial base rapidly. These recommendations synthesize lessons from Knudsen’s coordination success, Lewis’s bureaucratic struggles, and Ukraine’s adaptive transformation.

• First, Australia needs a government-led industry steering council with real authority and incentives, similar to what Lewis advocated. This council, ideally led by experienced industrialists, would transcend contract-by-contract decision-making to orchestrate whole-of-nation industrial effort. It would integrate SMEs, advanced manufacturers, software companies, and non-traditional sectors, following models demonstrated by Australia and the U.S. decades ago and Ukraine more recently.

• Second, dedicated funding must be carved from the 2026 Integrated Operations Plan to strengthen industrial base capabilities. Following UK experience, budget portions should be allocated top-down, guided by the steering council toward areas of greatest strategic need. This approach mirrors Lewis’s wartime aircraft focus and Ukraine’s drone emphasis.

• Third, Australia must select and develop capabilities suitable for large-scale manufacturing. This requires identifying what Jones calls “the skipping missile”—capabilities that can be produced efficiently at scale while providing genuine military advantage.

• Fourth, a strong export strategy is essential for sustaining sovereign capabilities during peacetime. Exports keep production lines running, skills sharp, and innovation alive. They’re not merely about GDP enhancement or export rankings—they sustain sovereign capabilities ready to pivot when domestic requirements arise. The Australian Defence Strategic Sales Office provides a good foundation, but every government official should advocate for Australian industry to secure deals strengthening capability base.

• Fifth, policy settings must adjust to enable rapid peacetime mobilization. While public money deserves scrutiny, rigid policies can stifle urgent capability decisions. Sole source selections are often justified, yet current policies can prevent them. Rather than viewing audit bodies as barriers, their compliance role should inform policy improvements serving mission requirements.

• Finally, companies must develop contingency plans for crisis response. This requires streamlined internal governance, minimized bureaucratic hurdles, and maintained agility for when demand signals arrive. Strategic preparation includes stress-testing delivery pipelines, planning manufacturing ramp-ups, and validating alternate Australian suppliers. Effective communication and leadership must align internal and external stakeholders, ensuring readiness to operate under emergency protocols while prioritizing mission-critical outputs over business-as-usual tasks.

The Mobilization Culture

Perhaps most importantly, Australia must cultivate what Jones calls “a mobilization culture”, one that dials up risk appetites while clearly defining risk ownership in every situation. This culture enables deployment of minimum viable capabilities rather than waiting for perfect solutions that arrive too late.

This cultural transformation requires leadership at every level, government officials who understand industrial mobilization urgency, company executives who prepare for rapid scaling, and engineers who prioritize speed and effectiveness over bureaucratic compliance. It demands recognition that in crisis, good enough today beats perfect tomorrow.

The Ukrainian example demonstrates this culture’s power. When battlefield problems emerged, solutions appeared within days because the entire system was oriented toward rapid response rather than perfect processes. Australia needs similar agility built into its peacetime industrial preparation.

A Decisive Moment

Australia stands at what Jones characterizes as “a decisive moment.” The nation possesses ingenuity, talent, and industrial foundations necessary to deliver sovereign capability when required. What’s needed now is urgency, coordination, and leadership to align industry and defence in a truly national endeavor.

The lessons from Knudsen, Lewis, and Ukraine’s transformation are clear: early action, wise investment, and clear organizational purpose determine success when crisis arrives. Australia cannot afford to repeat Lewis’s frustration with governmental inaction or assume that crisis will provide sufficient justification for mobilization.

If Australia acts early, invests wisely, and organizes itself with clarity and purpose, when the call comes, the nation will be ready to fight tonight, not just in rhetoric, but in reality. The choice is stark: begin serious industrial mobilization now during relative peace, or face the consequences of unpreparedness when strategic patience runs out.

History’s lessons are unambiguous. The question now is whether Australia will heed them before it’s too late.

Also, see the following:

Re-Thinking Australia’s National Security Strategy – Lessons from the 1930s for the 2030s

The Australian Defence Strategic Review: Lessons from the Past

Atlantic Trident 25

Posted on September 24, 2025 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

A U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, RAF Mildenhall, England, conducts aerial refueling operations with F-35A Lightning IIs from the 48th Fighter Wing, RAF Lakenheath, England, and Finnish Air Force F/A-18 Hornets during exercise Atlantic Trident 25 over Finland, June 16, 2025.

Atlantic Trident 25 is a recurring multinational training exercise between the U.S., U.K. and France to train in an interoperable environment, refining operational integration and ensuring Allied forces can seamlessly secure the Euro-Atlantic region. Finland hosted this iteration of the training series for the first time.

FINLAND

06.18.2025

Video by Senior Airman Christopher Campbell

U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Air Forces Africa