Charting a Course for A Way Ahead for the U.S. Navy: Key Recommendations from the 2025 Notes to the New CNO Series

10/06/2025

In August 2025, Admiral Daryl Caudle assumed the role of the 34th Chief of Naval Operations, inheriting a U.S. Navy facing extraordinary pressures. From shipyard backlogs and workforce challenges to evolving threats in the Indo-Pacific, the service confronts demands that will test every aspect of its institutional capacity.

To mark this transition, the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) convened its “Notes to the New CNO series which is a collection of recommendations from naval officers, defense analysts, and maritime experts worldwide. The resulting contributions paint a comprehensive picture of the challenges ahead and offer concrete pathways toward solutions.

This article synthesizes the major themes and recommendations from this series, organizing them around five critical areas: institutional culture and reform, force structure and capabilities, warfighting development and readiness, strategic positioning and alliances, and the human dimension of naval power.

The Call for Radical Institutional Change

Perhaps the most urgent theme throughout the series is the need for fundamental cultural and institutional transformation. Lieutenant Chris Rielage’s contribution, “Sir, Be Radical,” sets this tone forcefully. Rielage argues that junior officers, those closest to tactics, closest to sailors, and least enculturated into Navy bureaucracy, overwhelmingly believe the current approach is insufficient for major power competition.

Rielage identifies a broken social contract: junior officers were encouraged to think innovatively about naval warfare, yet their ideas have rarely translated into meaningful institutional change. The result is a generation of officers who know promotion milestones but lack clarity on how the Navy will defeat China. This administrative obsession, Rielage argues, has created battlefield risk by prioritizing bureaucratic compliance over warfighting readiness.

Commander Paul Viscovich reinforces this critique in “The Foundry, Fleet, and Fighting Triad? Warfighting Focus,” comparing the Navy unfavorably to Naval Special Warfare communities. SEALs maintain laser focus on their mission by ruthlessly eliminating anything that doesn’t directly contribute to combat readiness. The conventional Navy, by contrast, has allowed eight decades without peer conflict to erode its warrior ethos, replacing it with an administratively-obsessed culture that conflates inspection performance with warfighting capability.

Viscovich’s prescription is direct: the CNO must cultivate a critical mass of reformers of independent-thinking junior admirals and captains willing to challenge calcified orthodoxy. He recommends establishing a blue-ribbon panel of retired officers, including SEALs expert in eliminating institutional bloat, to systematically cut non-essential programs. This approach recognizes that personnel policy drives organizational culture, and that sustained reform requires champions at multiple levels who can outlast any single CNO’s tenure.

Captain John Cordle’s “We Are At Risk of Forgetting the Lessons of the 2017 Collisions” provides sobering context for why institutional reform matters. The 2017 collisions that killed 17 sailors prompted the Comprehensive Review, which generated 112 corrective actions addressing fatigue, human-centered design, and the “can-do” attitude that had normalized dangerous practices.

Yet recent Class A mishaps suggest these reforms may not have taken root. Human Factors positions in the Surface Force remain vacant due to hiring freezes, essentially “unchecking the block” on key recommendations. Cordle warns that organizational drift toward failure remains constant, and that only sustained critical self-assessment prevents tragedy. His message to the CNO is clear: read complete mishap reports, not just summaries, and conduct holistic examination of whether reforms actually worked.

Reimagining Force Structure and Capabilities

The series features extensive debate about the platforms and capabilities the Navy needs for future conflict. Dmitry Filipoff’s “Fix the Navy’s Flawed System of Warfighting Development” provides essential context by arguing that 30 years of post-Cold War experience created fundamental atrophy in high-end warfighting skills. The Navy’s combat training program trained one warfare area at a time against opposition deliberately made to lose, producing certified forces whose actual readiness for great power war remained distorted by institutional pressure to meet deployment schedules.

This tactical literacy deficit undermines nearly everything else, Filipoff argues, because “almost everything the Navy does boils down to its tactical warfighting implications.” Without understanding the logic of how fleets are destroyed in combat, sound decisions about force structure, operational concepts, or personnel policy become nearly impossible.

Against this backdrop, several contributors address specific capability gaps. Dr. Shelley Gallup and Ben DiDonato make the case for small, lightly-manned warships in “Start Building Small Warships.” They argue that while submarines and naval aviation remain world-class, the surface fleet faces serious challenges.

The solution is not more large, expensive platforms but smaller, well-armed vessels that can provide persistent presence, reduce logistics burdens through greater endurance, and bring smaller shipyards into the industrial base. Their Lightly Manned Automated Combat Capability (LMACC) design envisions a crew of approximately 25 operating alongside unmanned systems, with commanding opportunities for O-3s that develop leadership earlier in officers’ careers. At under $200 million per platform, such vessels could be built in meaningful numbers to address China’s maritime militia while freeing destroyers for higher-end missions.

Dr. Craig Koerner takes a different approach in “A Navy for War in the Age of Intelligent Missiles,” arguing that the era of smart platforms delivering short-range weapons is ending. Modern missiles with capable seekers can penetrate defenses more effectively than aircraft, and at lower cost.

This shift demands moving from platform-centric to missile-centric operations, with long-range weapons launched from low-signature vehicles that never see their targets. Koerner emphasizes that survivable reconnaissance becomes paramount, satellites with improved resilience through large constellations, expendable drones, and specialized reconnaissance forces hidden in clutter. Unable to hide, conventional air and sea-surface platforms face grim prospects against competent opponents equipped with modern ISR and long-range fires.

Nicholas Weising’s “Anchor Acquisition and Force Development on Targeting China’s C4ISR” bridges platform debates by arguing that neutralizing Chinese command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance should serve as the organizing principle for Navy development. China’s anti-access/area denial strategy depends fundamentally on its C4ISR architecture or its ability to find and target U.S. forces.

The CNO should therefore prioritize layered approaches that target hostile sensing while reinforcing friendly networks, scaling up electronic warfare and cyber teams, investing in resilient communication architectures, and developing deception methods to complicate enemy targeting. This focus ensures that force structure debates remain grounded in the operational problem: defeating China’s kill chains before they can be executed.

Warfighting Development and Readiness

The series dedicates substantial attention to how the Navy trains, educates, and prepares its forces. Captain Paul Nickell’s “To Win the Fight, We Must First Win the Mind: Create NDP-1.1 Naval Warfighting” identifies a critical gap. The Navy possesses abundant technical manuals but lacks unifying warfighting philosophy that helps sailors think through friction, fluidity, and ambiguity inherent in combat.

Modeled on the Marine Corps’ transformative MCDP-1 Warfighting, Nickell proposes NDP-1.1 as a companion to existing doctrine. This publication should articulate clear philosophy valuing initiative and adaptation, provide strong conceptual foundations about the nature of naval warfare, and elevate leadership and decision-making as core competencies. Critically, publication alone is insufficient for the document must be integrated into curriculum, training, and fleet culture from accession to flag rank.

Commander Michael Posey’s “Accelerate Human-Machine Teaming in the Maritime Operations Center” addresses the technological dimension of readiness. Maritime Operations Centers serve as decision hubs for numbered fleets, integrating intelligence, operations, and logistics at scale. With the Navy fighting from seabed to space and through the electromagnetic spectrum, the volume of data demands AI-enhanced tools that augment rather than replace human judgment.

Posey emphasizes that AI literacy must be built in the Foundry, through education at Naval Postgraduate School, Maritime Warfighting Courses, and Fleet Tactical Training Groups. Watchstanders must arrive prepared to operate in vast, volatile, contested maritime domains that demand machine teaming, understanding both AI’s force-multiplying potential and its limitations in bias, contextual failures, and misinterpretation.

Captain Alan Brechbill takes a more specific focus in “Sink the Kill Chain: A Navy Space Guide to Protecting Ships and Sailors,” arguing that the next war at sea will be decided first in space. Ships operating inside lethal weapons engagement zones cannot survive China’s massed precision fires unless the Navy treats space operations and Counter-C5ISRT as foundational rather than auxiliary.

Brechbill outlines five lines of effort: treating space as a warfighting domain owned by trained sailors rather than outsourced to the Space Force; making Counter-C5ISRT the Navy’s first layer of defense; building platforms designed to operate when space enablers are degraded; training the fleet to disappear through emissions control and deception; and investing in dedicated Navy Space operators with the same rigor given aviators and submariners. His central argument is stark: a fleet that cannot hide cannot fight, and breaking the enemy’s kill chain is the Navy’s main line of defense.

Lieutenant Andrew Pfau and Bridger Smith address training gaps for submarine forces in “The Submarine Force Needs More Flexible Training Tools.” Shore-based attack centers provide high-fidelity training but are limited in number, leaving shipyard crews, often weeks between opportunities, struggling to maintain readiness. Their solution involves “attack center in a box” trainers: lower-fidelity, modular systems running on basic laptops that link tactical watchstanders in shared training environments. These would not replace shore trainers but provide higher training density and frequency. Combined with tabletop wargames for tactical decision-making, such approaches offer cost-effective ways to maintain perishable skills during extended shipyard availabilities while preparing crews to transition quickly to combat-ready status.

Strategic Positioning and Alliance Management

Several contributors address how the Navy should position itself strategically and leverage partnerships.

Dr. Peter Dombrowski’s “Change the Navy’s Narrative: The Future Fight and the Hybrid Fleet” argues that Admiral Caudle has an opportunity to realign strategic narrative with emerging operational reality. After years of distributed maritime operations experimentation and unmanned systems integration, the Navy must overcome headlines about past scandals to restore faith with the President, Congress, and the American people.

This requires emphasizing two pillars: how the Navy has adapted to shifts in maritime warfare based on Black Sea and Red Sea lessons, and how the American industrial base, in collaboration with partners and new entrants, will provide advanced systems enabling new operational concepts. By articulating a powerful vision through testimony, documents, and sustained communication, the CNO can help unify effort and provide insight to other services about naval operations for the next three years and beyond.

Lieutenant Vince Vanterpool focuses on a specific operational challenge in “Train to Win Below the Threshold of War.” The PRC and PLAN operate comfortably under their “Three Warfares” doctrine in gray-zone competition, growing bolder in day-to-day operations. While Integrated Deterrence has increased partnerships and exercises, these initiatives fall short of providing tactical-level personnel with training necessary to win in situations remaining just below hostile acts of war.

Vanterpool argues for robust tactics and techniques development through discussions and wargames guided by JAGs, warfare commanders, and personnel familiar with PRC coercion tactics. The Navy Deterrence Concept needs tactical-level operational guidance for units operating in this ambiguous space where China excels at exploiting policy seams.

Commander Jason Lancaster offers an unconventional approach in “Rugby and Rivalry: Use Sports Diplomacy to Counter China in the South Pacific.” Despite U.S. and allied development aid dwarfing PRC contributions in the South Pacific, China has made significant regional influence gains. The region’s 14 countries may be small, but their economic exclusion zones cover 20 percent of Earth’s surface in strategically vital locations.

Lancaster proposes systematic sports diplomacy through regular rugby matches, building on successful Naval Academy tours and learning from Australia’s $600 million agreement for an NRL expansion team in Papua New Guinea. This provides high-profile opportunities for key leader engagement, allows sailors of Pacific Island descent to connect with their heritage communities, and leverages competitive rugby teams, a capability the PRC cannot match, to demonstrate presence and benefit U.S. regional interests.

Captain Renato Scarfi and Captain Gian Carlo Poddighe address the broader alliance challenge in “The Indian Ocean: An Opportunity to Strengthen Alliances and Deter China.” They argue that Western presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the Indian Ocean, is essential for commercial and energy survival, especially for southern European countries vital to Euro-Mediterranean balance.

A permanent European naval presence in the Indian Ocean should interest the U.S. Navy greatly, potentially freeing American forces to focus on the Pacific in conjunction with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. The Italian Navy’s longstanding presence and Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre experience collecting maritime domain awareness data across half the Atlantic, the Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean positions it well for expanded roles. The U.S. Navy can catalyze this cooperation, manifesting strengthened friendship and representing a key deterrence factor while improving burden-sharing.

The Human Dimension of Naval Power

Throughout the series, contributors emphasize that platforms and concepts mean nothing without properly trained, educated, and cared-for personnel.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven Bancroft and Major Benjamin Van Horrick’s “The Imperative for Integrated Maritime Operations” discusses how the ARG/MEU team, while remaining vital, proves insufficient against modern threats. Twenty-first-century naval integration requires maritime networks accessing various platforms, sensors, and weapons systems enabling distributed forces to operate in concert. The Task Force 76/3 experiment merging Expeditionary Strike Group capabilities with Marine Expeditionary Brigade expertise demonstrates how integrated command structures enhance responsiveness and lethality. This integration, exemplified by formations like TF-76/3, TF-61/2, and TF-51/5, ensures maritime power projection remains ready for modern demands while maintaining the agility and expeditionary mindset that makes naval forces distinctive.

Jacob Wiencek’s “Three Focus Areas for the New CNO” addresses foundational personnel issues often overshadowed by platform debates.

  1. First, physical health: with nearly 70 percent of servicemembers classified as obese or overweight and the Navy exhibiting 20 percent obesity rates, improved food quality and daily physical training must become command priorities at all levels.
  2. Second, unifying naval education and training: despite the Education for Seapower report’s promise six years ago, the vision remains incomplete. Re-establishing the Chief Learning Officer position and creating a Naval University to unify efforts would help develop warfighter readiness among officers and enlisted.
  3. Third, revamping information warfare: Congress has expressed displeasure over cyberspace being subsumed without resident expertise to leverage specialized skillsets. The CNO should work with Congress to re-create Navy Cyber Forces as a Type Command separated from Navy Information Forces, enabling development of specialized talent necessary for maritime cyber operations.

Ryan Walker addresses industrial workforce in “Revisiting a Modest Proposal for Improving Shipyard Production and Repair Capacity.” While new shipyards won’t open until 2029 at earliest, current facilities concentrate too much work into first shift, creating bottlenecks and diminishing returns.

Walker proposes modified Dupont shift schedules (8-4-2-10) dividing labor pools into two ten-hour shifts across eight-day cycles, with crews working four days on, four days off. This could increase productive hours from 60-76 per week to potentially 140 while improving morale through predictable schedules, attracting new talent, and creating built-in training pipelines where experienced workers mentor new hires. Though requiring buy-in from unions, management, and policymakers, this approach offers realistic solutions rooted in World War II-era production tempo adapted for modern labor realities.

Strategic and Legal Frameworks

Several contributions address broader frameworks within which the Navy operates.

Professor James Kraska’s “Conduct Legal Preparation of the Battlespace” argues the Navy must rebuild capacity to shape international maritime law. From the first Code of Naval Warfare in 1900 through Law of the Sea Convention negotiations in the 1970s, the Navy led in establishing global ocean rules. This influence has greatly diminished as expertise dwindled and other nations, officials, and scholars with different priorities shaped rules for peacetime and armed conflict operations.

Kraska recommends three actions: mandating law of the sea and naval warfare be added to Naval War College core curriculum; engaging purposefully in bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ensure new rules don’t restrain naval commanders; and rebuilding maritime law expertise throughout the force. Legal preparation of the battlespace is not optional—it shapes the operational environment within which future conflicts will be fought.

Richard Mosier addresses a specific capability gap in “Expand the Navy’s Over-the-Horizon Targeting Solutions.” Since Harpoon in the 1970s and original Tomahawk Anti-ship Missile in 1982, over-the-horizon targeting has been insufficient. New weapons like Naval Strike Missile, SM-6 in anti-ship mode, LRASM, and Maritime Strike Tomahawk cannot be fully employed without supporting ISR-T. The Space Force’s Long-Range Kill Chains satellite program offers the Navy dramatic opportunities to improve fleet tactical situational awareness through continuous near-real-time moving target indicator tracks.

However, realizing this potential requires three actions: ensuring fleet requirements and wartime constraints are accepted in LRKC constellation requirements; modernizing MOC and major combatant capabilities for building common tactical pictures with LRKC inputs; and incorporating AI applications supporting rapid command understanding at operational and tactical levels. This investment in ISR-T architecture would help the Navy make the most of latest long-range weapons entering the fleet.

Nicholas Kristof’s “Technical Interoperability in Contested Environments is a Must” identifies a critical tension the Navy must resolve. Interoperability enables coalition and joint forces to share information and coordinate actions—essential when no single nation can address threats alone.

However, contested communications environments remain harsh reality, with adversaries employing electronic warfare, cyberattacks, and anti-access/area denial strategies to disrupt links. The challenge is designing systems that maximize interoperability when conditions permit while remaining effective when communications are degraded.

This demands modular open architectures, distributed C2 models, zero-trust cybersecurity, and bandwidth-efficient protocols sending only minimum bits required. Despite “interoperability” being a buzzword for years, the Navy has been slow to improve, with some recent acquisitions focusing on bandwidth-heavy, headquarters-focused systems doomed to fail in contested environments. Admiral Caudle must provide forceful direction that the acquisition enterprise prioritize systems capable of operating “alone and unafraid when necessary.”

Cognitive and Educational Development

Dr. Roshan Kulatunga’s “Navigate the Future Through Maritime Wisdom” takes the longest historical view in the series, arguing that subtle intellect remains the most essential trait for individuals steering maritime power. Maritime wisdom is cultivated through sustained engagement with centuries of thought from Sun Tzu and Thucydides through Kautilya, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, and others who profoundly influenced strategic evolution. These intellectual traditions encompass not just technical seamanship but political, economic, and military art integrated into comprehensive understanding.

For 21st-century officers and sailors confronting conventional challenges plus piracy, illegal fishing, climate-driven insecurity, cyber threats, and hybrid tactics, understanding this tradition proves vital. Cognitive preparation must be a key CNO consideration for knowledge alone is inadequate without intellect. Prominently embedding these traditions in military education ensures sailors become not just ship operators but custodians of enduring wisdom guiding humanity’s engagement with the sea.

This educational imperative connects to broader themes about how the Navy develops its people. The repeated emphasis on warfighting development, tactical literacy, human-machine teaming, and professional military education reflects recognition that technology and platforms matter far less than the humans employing them. The most advanced systems become liabilities in the hands of poorly trained operators who lack tactical understanding or cannot make sound decisions under pressure. Conversely, well-educated, tactically proficient sailors can maximize the potential of even imperfect platforms.

Synthesis and Path Forward

The “Notes to the New CNO” series reveals remarkable consensus on several key points, despite contributors’ diverse backgrounds and perspectives:

First, the status quo is insufficient. Whether discussing force structure, training, personnel policy, or institutional culture, contributors agree that incremental adjustments will not prepare the Navy for great power competition. The coming decade requires boldness matching the challenges it presents.

Second, tactical literacy matters more than technology. Sophisticated platforms and systems provide advantages only when operators understand the fundamental logic of naval combat. Without this understanding, the Navy cannot make sound decisions about force design, operational concepts, or resource allocation.

Third, resilience trumps exquisiteness. In contested environments against capable adversaries, expensive platforms optimized for permissive conditions become liabilities. The Navy needs forces that can operate when communications are degraded, that present harder targeting problems through dispersion and deception, and that can continue core functions autonomously when disconnected from networks.

Fourth, people remain the decisive factor. Physical health, education, training, command opportunities, career incentives, these human factors determine whether the Navy can execute any operational concept or employ any technology effectively. Platforms are replaceable; institutional knowledge and tactical expertise are not.

Fifth, alliances multiply power but require active cultivation. The Navy cannot meet global demands alone, and coalition operations provide strategic advantages. However, interoperability doesn’t happen automatically—it requires sustained investment in common systems, shared training, sports diplomacy, and persistent engagement.

Sixth, institutional reform is organizational imperative. Administrative overhead that doesn’t directly support warfighting consumes resources and attention that should focus on preparing for combat. Ruthlessly eliminating non-essential requirements isn’t about doing less—it’s about concentrating effort on what matters most.

For Admiral Caudle, these themes suggest several overarching priorities:

  • Establish warfighting as the organizing principle. Every decision about platforms, personnel, training, or administration should be evaluated against the standard: does this help us fight and win? The CNO’s voice and authority must consistently reinforce that passing inspections matters far less than defeating adversaries.
  • Invest in human capital systematically. Physical fitness, tactical education, technical training, leadership development, and career progression that rewards warfighting contribution—these must receive sustained attention and resources. The Foundry determines Fleet capability.
  • Reform warfighting development governance. Creating high-echelon warfighting development command with authority to truly integrate community tactics into fleet-level doctrine would address systematic problems in how the Navy develops forces. This structural change would enable implementing many specific recommendations about training, education, and readiness.
  • Accelerate acquisition and fielding timelines for critical capabilities. Whether long-range precision fires, ISR-T architecture, autonomous systems, or cyber capabilities, the Navy cannot wait for perfect solutions. Rapidly fielding good-enough systems and iterating based on fleet feedback beats prolonged development of exquisite platforms that arrive obsolete.
  • Cultivate reformers and protect institutional memory. Personnel policy should identify and promote independent-thinking officers willing to challenge orthodoxy. Retaining human factors expertise, establishing chief learning officers, and maintaining specialized communities like cyber warfare operators ensures institutional knowledge persists beyond individual tours.
  • Communicate strategic vision persistently. The CNO’s bully pulpit through testimony, documents, speeches, and sustained engagement can shape how the Navy, Congress, and the public understand the service’s role and needs. Articulating powerful vision unifies internal effort while building external support.

The recommendations in this series are not exhaustive, nor do all contributors agree on every point. Some tensions remain unresolved such between building more platforms versus improving existing capabilities, between standardization for interoperability versus specialization for contested environments, between distributing authority and maintaining unified command. These tensions reflect genuine complexity in modern naval warfare, not failures of analysis.

What emerges clearly, however, is that the U.S. Navy stands at an inflection point. Decisions made during Admiral Caudle’s tenure will shape the service significantly, determining whether the fleet can compete effectively with China, maintain global presence, honor commitments to allies, and deter or defeat aggression. The path forward requires courage to make hard choices, wisdom to learn from history and recent operational experience, and commitment to putting warfighting first despite competing demands.

Navigating the New Normal: A Paradigm Shift in Australian Defence Policy

10/05/2025

By Robbin Laird

The contemporary Indo-Pacific security environment presents a fundamental challenge to traditional alliance structures: how can middle powers maintain strategic autonomy while deepening military cooperation with major power partners?

This dilemma is particularly acute for Australia, which faces the competing imperatives of economic integration with China, security dependence on the United States, and growing regional leadership responsibilities. The intersection of these pressures reveals broader tensions about the future of alliance partnerships in an era of major power competition.

During my trip to Australia in September 2025, I discussed the dynamics of Australian defence and alliance issues with my colleague Stephan Frühling from the Australian National University.

The Erosion of Alliance Certainties

The comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era are dissolving. Australia’s traditional model of alliance partnership, providing ‘joint facilities’ and political support in exchange for American security guarantees, is proving inadequate for contemporary challenges. As Stephan Frühling observes, “despite the progress made since 2020, U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation remains limited by the lack of alliance institutionalization and political agreement, especially domestically in Australia, on its aims and objectives.”

This institutional gap reflects a deeper problem: alliance cooperation is proceeding faster than political consensus. Recent force posture initiatives, including submarine rotational deployments, bomber base upgrades, and combined logistics enterprises, represent significant operational progress. However, as Frühling notes, “there is no sign that this will bring U.S. and Australian national defense postures into closer alignment.” The disconnect between tactical cooperation and strategic integration reveals fundamental tensions in contemporary alliance management.

The experiences of Ukraine and Israel, where American support came with significant operational constraints and political interference, have reinforced Australian concerns about maintaining decision-making autonomy in potential conflicts. As one Australian strategic analyst observed to me, “we can’t rule out the possibility that we might actually have to conduct some operations, major operations, to deter and demonstrate capability to deter even China, but also cause enormous damage to the baddies if the United States decides it’s going to sit on its hands.”

This stark assessment reflects growing recognition that the reliability of any single patron, even the United States, cannot be taken for granted in an era of domestic political volatility and competing global priorities. The challenge lies not in abandoning alliance relationships but in restructuring them to account for new realities.

The Strategic Independence Imperative

Australia’s response to this challenge involves moving from alliance dependence toward what can be characterized as strategic independence or developing sufficient autonomous capability to deter aggression while maintaining productive partnerships. This transformation requires abandoning traditional military thinking focused on capital ships and large platforms in favor of what Australian analysts call “high-leverage capabilities.”

With a population of 25 million and constrained defense budgets, Australia cannot compete through numerical superiority. Instead, it must invest in systems that can “stop even a major aggressor in its tracks” through technological sophistication. The recently announced $1.7 billion investment in Ghost Shark autonomous underwater vehicles exemplifies this approach. Unlike traditional submarine programs that deliver small numbers of expensive platforms over decades, the Ghost Shark program is designed for rapid scaling and continuous technological evolution.

This modular, rapidly deployable approach creates multiple, simultaneous threats that complicate adversary decision-making while avoiding catastrophic loss scenarios associated with traditional platform-centric strategies. The difference between deploying 15 Ghost Shark systems versus 180 represents a qualitative shift in deterrent capability that potential adversaries must factor into their planning.

However, strategic independence requires more than advanced weapons systems. It demands industrial capacity to sustain those systems independently of vulnerable supply chains. The Ghost Shark program’s emphasis on domestic battery production illustrates this broader requirement. Producing sophisticated autonomous systems while importing all critical components from potentially hostile nations represents a fundamental strategic vulnerability.

Deliberate Incrementalism as Strategic Framework

Frühling proposes “deliberate incrementalism” as a framework for managing the tension between deepening cooperation and preserving autonomy. This approach acknowledges that alliance cooperation driven by “bottom-up, practical cooperation has a tendency to overstep political bounds, leading to tensions if such boundaries are then reestablished.”

The solution involves carefully managed steps toward greater cooperation that respect political realities and sovereignty concerns. Frühling recommends that allies “try to say a little more each time” in their strategic dialogues, gradually building shared understanding without rushing toward comprehensive integration that may prove politically unsustainable.

This approach requires several key elements: gradual development of shared strategic understanding without forcing perfect alignment; focus on overlapping operational needs rather than abstract strategic coordination; and development of graduated response mechanisms that provide decision-making flexibility during crises.

For the U.S.-Australia relationship specifically, deliberate incrementalism means focusing on “areas that reflect overlapping national interests in operations closer to Australia, and on strengthening deterrence by facilitating horizontal rather than vertical escalation.” This acknowledges that Australia’s primary strategic concerns center on its immediate region rather than broader global competition with China.

The Economics of Strategic Independence

Strategic independence cannot be divorced from economic considerations. The concept of “embedded logistics” offers a framework for addressing supply chain vulnerabilities while serving broader alliance interests. Rather than relying on expensive, vulnerable supply lines stretching from Hawaii to forward deployment areas, the United States could dramatically reduce Pacific logistics costs by supporting Australian industrial capacity development.

This approach serves multiple strategic purposes. It reduces Australian dependence on any single supplier, including traditional allies whose domestic politics might disrupt supply relationships. It provides the foundation for supporting regional partners who lack sophisticated defense industries. Most importantly, it enables Australia to maintain military operations during extended periods when great power politics might limit access to traditional suppliers.

The Chinese economic coercion playbook, demonstrated globally over the past decade, reinforces the importance of economic resilience. Australia’s experience of Chinese trade restrictions in 2020-2021 illustrates both the vulnerability and the potential for adaptation. Despite Chinese restrictions on coal, wine, and other exports, Australia’s economy proved more resilient than anticipated, finding alternative markets and strengthening partnerships with countries like India and Japan.

Operational Integration Without Strategic Subordination

Strategic independence does not mean strategic isolation. Australia’s future security depends on deepening operational integration with trusted partners while maintaining decision-making autonomy. The level of operational integration already achieved between Australian and American forces extends far beyond traditional alliance cooperation.

Current systems integration means, as one Australian strategic analyst noted to me, “if you’ve got a sensor saying, here’s a PLA task group here, what’s the best asset for actually striking that in 15 minutes time, if it’s an Australian F-35 flight… it’s a joint thing.” This represents genuine operational integration where tactical decisions are made based on capability and positioning rather than national boundaries.

Similar integration is developing with other regional partners. Australia’s expanding training relationships, from long-standing arrangements with Singapore to new partnerships with Germany, reflect a diversification strategy that reduces dependence on any single relationship while building interoperability across multiple partnerships.

The key insight is that operational integration can coexist with strategic independence when partners maintain genuine capabilities rather than depending solely on a dominant ally’s systems. Australia’s ability to contribute meaningfully to integrated operations depends on having independent capabilities to contribute, not just political willingness to follow American leadership.

Regional Leadership and Multi-Alignment Strategies

Australia’s evolving strategic role extends beyond self-defense to regional leadership through capability sharing and operational cooperation. The expanding relationship with the Philippines illustrates this potential. Australia’s new treaty arrangements and joint exercises with Manila represent more than bilateral cooperation for they demonstrate how middle powers can create alternative security networks that complement rather than compete with traditional alliance structures.

The autonomous systems focus provides particular opportunities for regional leadership. Maritime autonomous systems offer an ideal platform for sharing operational information and coordinating responses to gray-zone activities without requiring massive infrastructure investments associated with traditional military cooperation. Australia could position itself as a regional hub for autonomous systems development and deployment.

This regional role serves broader strategic purposes by creating multiple decision-making centers that complicate adversary planning. Rather than focusing solely on potential American responses to regional aggression, potential adversaries must account for Australian capabilities, Philippine responses, Japanese actions, and other variables that cannot be controlled through bilateral pressure on Washington.

The Challenge of Institutional Innovation

The limitations of traditional alliance structures have encouraged institutional innovation. Frühling points to NATO’s Graduated Response Plans as a model for developing alliance-level operational planning that respects sovereignty concerns while building collective capabilities. These plans identify “what reinforcements might be necessary given the geographic and strategic situations in different parts of the alliance, the logistics of how they could be deployed, the political and military decision points and their timing.”

For the U.S.-Australia relationship, this might involve developing contingency plans that outline decision points and operational requirements without predetermining political responses. By identifying when and where decisions must be made, allies can build collective capabilities while preserving decision-making autonomy.

However, institutional innovation must account for the reality that “the vast majority of Australian staff officers, defense planners, and public servants who must make myriad practical decisions that collectively shape Australian force posture and structure outcomes do so with less of an explicit policy framework on how Australia’s national objectives align with alliance cooperation than their predecessors had two decades ago.”

This institutional gap reflects broader challenges facing middle powers: maintaining the bureaucratic and political capacity for independent strategic thinking while deepening operational ties with major power partners. The risk is that tactical cooperation proceeds faster than political consensus, potentially creating vulnerabilities or misunderstandings during crises.

Managing Resource Asymmetries

Middle powers face stark resource asymmetries when competing with major powers for influence. China has more than doubled its ballistic and cruise missile arsenal in recent years and possesses the world’s largest shipbuilding capacity. These disparities create fundamental constraints on middle power strategic options, particularly when attempting to balance relationships with competing major powers.

However, resource limitations also create opportunities for middle powers to focus on areas where they possess comparative advantages. Rather than attempting comprehensive balancing strategies, countries like Australia can concentrate on specific domains such as technology standards, environmental governance, critical minerals, or regional stability mechanisms where their contributions carry disproportionate weight.

Australia’s approach to critical minerals illustrates this strategy. By leveraging natural resource advantages while building processing and value-added capabilities, middle powers can maintain strategic relevance despite overall resource constraints. This requires patient investment in research and development capabilities but provides the foundation for genuine strategic autonomy.

The Deterrent Effect of Uncertainty

The deterrent effect of strategic independence capabilities depends not only on their technical performance but on adversary uncertainty about their capabilities and employment concepts. The psychological impact of facing an unknown number of sophisticated autonomous systems operating in contested waters may exceed their direct military effect.

This uncertainty principle applies more broadly to strategic independence. Adversaries who could previously predict Australian responses based on American decision-making patterns now face genuine uncertainty about Australian capabilities and intentions. This uncertainty serves deterrent purposes regardless of the specific capabilities involved.

The Pacific Island “fingerprinting” campaigns by Chinese forces illustrate the importance of distributed response capability. Australia’s ability to respond independently to such provocations, without requiring American approval or support, provides options for graduated responses that might be impossible within traditional alliance frameworks where every action requires extensive coordination.

Implications for Alliance Architecture

The Australian experience suggests several principles that may guide successful alliance evolution in an increasingly multipolar world. First, economic diversification remains crucial for maintaining strategic autonomy. Countries that become too dependent on single major power relationships risk losing freedom of maneuver during crises.

Second, institutional flexibility proves more valuable than rigid alliance commitments. Middle powers benefit from arrangements that allow them to contribute to collective security without compromising their ability to make sovereign decisions about force deployment and strategic priorities.

Third, regional focus and comparative advantage strategies offer more sustainable approaches than attempts at comprehensive great power balancing. Countries that identify specific domains where their contributions carry disproportionate weight can maintain influence despite resource constraints.

The solution requires reframing alliance cooperation from patron-client relationships toward genuine strategic partnerships. This means American acceptance that capable allies will make independent decisions about capability employment, while Australian recognition that strategic independence requires genuine capability development rather than political posturing.

Conclusion: The Future of Strategic Partnership

Australia’s movement toward more strategic independence represents neither abandonment of alliance relationships nor pursuit of complete autonomy. Instead, it reflects adaptation to a strategic environment where traditional security guarantees are no longer sufficient for national survival. The goal is developing sufficient independent capability to deter aggression while maintaining the partnerships necessary for broader regional stability.

This transition requires sustained political commitment to capability development, industrial investment, and regional engagement. It demands American acceptance that genuine partners exercise genuine autonomy in strategic decision-making. Most importantly, it requires recognition that strategic independence and alliance partnership can reinforce rather than contradict each other when properly structured.

The stakes extend beyond Australian security to the broader question of whether democratic middle powers can maintain autonomy in an era of great power competition. Australia’s success or failure in developing genuine strategic independence while maintaining productive partnerships will influence similar efforts across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The path forward involves deliberate incrementalism, carefully managed cooperation that builds collective capabilities while respecting sovereignty concerns and political realities. This approach acknowledges that the comfortable assumptions of the post-Cold War era offered the illusion of permanent security through alliance dependence.

The emerging strategic environment demands the reality of security through capability and partnership. Australia’s challenge is managing this transition successfully while contributing to broader regional stability, a transition that is not only possible but essential for long-term security in an increasingly contested world.

The CMV-22B and Carrier Operations Across Two Oceans

10/02/2025

By Robbin Laird

When the CMV-22B Osprey touched down on the deck of USS Carl Vinson in August 2021, it marked more than just another aircraft delivery. It represented a fundamental transformation in how the United States Navy supplies carrier operations. The “Titans” of Fleet Logistics Multi-Mission Squadron (VRM) 30, flying their tiltrotor aircraft, embarked on a journey that would redefine naval logistics and demonstrate unprecedented capabilities in supporting 5th generation carrier aviation across the Indo-Pacific theater.

From 2021 through 2025, VRM-30’s partnership with the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group has been characterized by groundbreaking operational milestones, extensive international cooperation, and the successful integration of advanced logistics capabilities that are essential to modern naval warfare. This article reviews that operational history.

The Historic 2021-2022 Deployment

The deployment that began on August 2, 2021, was historic on multiple fronts. USS Carl Vinson departed San Diego as the first carrier to deploy operationally with both the F-35C Lightning II and the CMV-22B Osprey or what the Navy dubbed the “Air Wing of the Future.” For VRM-30, this represented the culmination of years of development, training, and preparation.

The CMV-22B, with a range of 1,150 nautical miles and the ability to carry up to 6,000 pounds of cargo, and an ability to land at night the Osprey exponentially expanded the carrier’s operational tempo. It could transport the F-35C’s F135 engine power module internally, a capability that would prove essential to maintaining the advanced fighter’s operational readiness at sea.

The squadron’s preparation had been meticulous. VRM-30 received its first operational CMV-22B at Naval Air Station North Island, California, in June 2020. Prior to receiving their own aircraft, squadron pilots and maintainers trained extensively with Marine Corps MV-22Bs, building the foundational skills that would be refined aboard the carrier. By November 2020, the Titans had achieved their first carrier landings aboard Carl Vinson off the California coast, demonstrating the aircraft’s compatibility with carrier flight operations.

Once deployed, VRM-30 wasted no time proving the CMV-22B’s worth. In February 2021, during pre-deployment workups, the squadron achieved a crucial milestone by successfully delivering an F-35C power module to Carl Vinson at sea, the Navy’s first such replenishment of this critical component. This capability addressed one of the primary drivers for the CMV-22B’s development: the C-2A Greyhound physically could not fit the larger F-35 engine, creating a potential operational vulnerability for carriers deploying with the advanced fighter.

The same month, VRM-30 participated in another first: the Navy’s inaugural medical evacuation exercise using the CMV-22B aboard an aircraft carrier. On February 22, 2021, the ship’s medical team transported a simulated patient to a Titans Osprey, demonstrating the aircraft’s flexibility beyond pure logistics missions. Lieutenant Andrew Nop, USS Carl Vinson’s nurse, noted that the aircraft provided medical providers with additional options for patient care, particularly for cases requiring rapid transport to advanced medical facilities ashore.

The carrier strike group’s deployment began with participation in Large-Scale Exercise 2021, a live, virtual, and constructive globally-integrated exercise spanning multiple fleets. This massive training event provided VRM-30 with its first opportunity to operate the CMV-22B in a complex, multi-domain combat scenario. The exercise tested modern warfare concepts and allowed the squadron to refine its tactics, techniques, and procedures in a high-tempo operational environment.

For the Titans, LSE 2021 demonstrated the CMV-22B’s ability to sustain carrier operations during extended periods at sea. The aircraft conducted regular carrier onboard delivery missions, maintaining the flow of parts, mail, personnel, and supplies that kept the entire strike group mission-ready. This sustained operational tempo validated the Navy’s decision to deploy three CMV-22Bs per detachment, compared to the typical two C-2A Greyhounds, providing increased flexibility and redundancy.

One of the defining characteristics of VRM-30’s deployments with Carl Vinson has been the extensive cooperation with allied and partner nations. The 2021-2022 deployment featured an unprecedented level of multilateral naval cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

In late August 2021, shortly after deployment, Carl Vinson conducted joint interoperability flights with the United Kingdom’s Carrier Strike Group 21, centered on HMS Queen Elizabeth. For the first time, F-35B Lightning IIs from both U.S. Marine Corps and Royal Navy squadrons operated alongside Navy F-35Cs from Carl Vinson, supported by the carrier’s complement of Super Hornets, Growlers, and Hawkeyes. While VRM-30’s primary role remained logistics support, the squadron enabled these complex air operations by ensuring the continuous flow of parts and supplies necessary to maintain such a diverse air wing at peak readiness.

The British cooperation highlighted a crucial aspect of the CMV-22B’s strategic value: its ability to support distributed maritime operations across vast distances. The Osprey’s extended range allowed it to conduct ship-to-ship transfers between American and allied vessels, facilitating the kind of integrated logistics that multilateral operations demand.

On October 3, USS Carl Vinson joined USS Ronald Reagan, HMS Queen Elizabeth, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s JS Ise in the Philippine Sea for a massive multilateral exercise. The event brought together more than 15,000 sailors from six nations, including ships from the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.

For VRM-30, operating in such a dense maritime environment presented unique challenges and opportunities. The squadron coordinated with logistics elements from multiple navies, demonstrating the CMV-22B’s ability to operate seamlessly in a truly joint and combined environment. The exercise validated concepts for distributed maritime operations that would become increasingly important in subsequent deployments.

The partnership with Japan proved particularly significant throughout the deployment. In October 2021, Carl Vinson conducted bilateral operations with the JMSDF’s Izumo-class helicopter destroyer JS Kaga in the South China Sea, the first time Vinson and Japanese forces had operated together in that contested region during the deployment.

These operations included coordinated tactical training between surface and air units, refueling-at-sea evolutions, and maritime strike exercises. VRM-30 supported these activities by maintaining the logistics bridge between Carl Vinson and shore facilities, ensuring the carrier could sustain operations in the South China Sea for extended periods. The squadron’s ability to reach shore bases across the vast Indo-Pacific region proved crucial to maintaining operational tempo far from traditional support infrastructure.

In mid-October, Carl Vinson participated in Maritime Partnership Exercise 2021 alongside naval forces from Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom in the eastern Indian Ocean. This high-end, multi-domain maritime training exercise focused on advanced capabilities including anti-submarine warfare, air warfare operations, live-fire gunnery, and complex replenishment operations.

The exercise allowed VRM-30 to demonstrate cross-deck flight operations and maritime interdiction support, showcasing the CMV-22B’s versatility beyond traditional carrier onboard delivery missions. The ability to land on various ship classes, combined with the aircraft’s substantial cargo capacity, made it an ideal platform for supporting the diverse requirements of multilateral operations.

The 2024-2025 Deployment: Lessons Applied

VRM-30’s next major deployment with Carl Vinson began in November 2024 and would prove to be one of the longest and most demanding in recent memory. The carrier strike group departed Naval Air Station North Island on November 18 for what was initially planned as a standard Indo-Pacific deployment. However, global events would transform this deployment into a 269-day marathon that would test both the carrier strike group and its logistics squadron to their limits.

By Christmas 2024, Carl Vinson was operating in the South China Sea, with VRM-30 maintaining the critical logistics lifeline that kept the carrier mission-ready. The squadron’s operations had matured significantly since the 2021 deployment, with established procedures for everything from routine parts delivery to complex cross-deck operations with allied forces.

In February 2025, VRM-30 participated in Exercise Pacific Steller 2025, a week-long French-hosted multilateral large-deck event in the Philippine Sea. This exercise brought together the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group, the French carrier strike group centered on FS Charles de Gaulle, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s JS Kaga.

The exercise represented another evolution in VRM-30’s operational capabilities. Working with French naval aviation and JMSDF forces, the Titans demonstrated interoperability across three different naval aviation traditions. The CMV-22B’s ability to operate from shore bases, carrier decks, and even potentially from allied ships showcased the flexibility that modern naval logistics demands.

The Pacific Steller exercise particularly emphasized the CMV-22B’s role in enabling distributed maritime operations, a concept increasingly central to U.S. naval strategy. By providing rapid, long-range logistics support across a widely dispersed force, VRM-30 allowed the three carrier groups to operate as a coordinated but distributed force, making them more difficult to target while maintaining combat effectiveness.

In March 2025, four months into what had been planned as an Indo-Pacific deployment, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth ordered the Carl Vinson Carrier Strike Group to U.S. Central Command. The carrier departed Guam on March 28 and transited through the Malacca Strait, arriving in the Middle East in April to support Operation Rough Rider in response to Houthi attacks in the Red Sea region.

For VRM-30, this sudden shift in operational theater demonstrated the CMV-22B’s strategic flexibility. The squadron maintained carrier operations through the transit and into three months of sustained Middle East operations. While the carrier remained in the North Arabian Sea rather than entering the Red Sea, VRM-30 ensured continuous logistics support, flying missions between the carrier, shore facilities, and support ships to maintain the strike group’s combat readiness.

The extended deployment, ultimately reaching 269 days at sea, placed unprecedented demands on VRM-30’s maintainers and aircrew. The CMV-22B’s reliability and the squadron’s operational expertise proved crucial in sustaining carrier operations far from home port for nearly nine months. When Carl Vinson finally returned to San Diego in August 2025, it was with USS Princeton and USS Sterett, having sailed over 275,000 nautical miles which is a testament to the logistical support that made such an extended deployment possible.

Impact on Naval Operations

VRM-30’s operational history with Carl Vinson has fundamentally demonstrated how the CMV-22B transforms carrier strike group logistics. The aircraft’s combination of helicopter-like vertical takeoff and landing capability with airplane-like speed and range creates operational flexibility that was simply impossible with previous carrier onboard delivery platforms.

The ability to rapidly deliver critical parts from distant shore facilities means carriers can operate farther from traditional logistics hubs while maintaining high readiness rates for their embarked air wings. This is particularly crucial for maintaining F-35C operations, where the aircraft’s advanced systems and unique power module requirements demand responsive logistics support.

Perhaps most significantly, VRM-30’s operations have validated the CMV-22B’s role as an enabler of distributed maritime operations, a concept that envisions naval forces operating across vast areas in a more dispersed formation to complicate adversary targeting while maintaining coordinated combat power.

The Osprey’s 1,150-nautical-mile range allows it to link widely separated naval forces, conducting ship-to-ship transfers, personnel movements, and time-critical parts delivery across distances that would challenge traditional helicopters. This capability has proven essential during multinational exercises where American, Japanese, British, French, and other allied forces operate together across thousands of square miles of ocean.

VRM-30’s extensive operations with foreign naval forces have demonstrated the CMV-22B’s value in combined operations. The aircraft’s ability to operate from allied carriers and support ships, combined with its substantial cargo capacity, makes it an ideal platform for the kind of integrated logistics that modern allied naval operations require.

The squadron’s work with the Japanese, British, French, and other allied forces during multiple exercises has established procedures and relationships that would prove invaluable in any future combined operations. This interoperability extends beyond simple logistics to encompass coordinated operations planning, shared communications protocols, and mutual understanding of capabilities and limitations.

Looking Forward

As VRM-30 continues its partnership with USS Carl Vinson, the lessons learned from these pioneering deployments continue to shape how the Navy employs the CMV-22B. The squadron has proven that the Osprey is not merely a replacement for the C-2A Greyhound, but rather a transformational capability that enables new operational concepts.

The Navy currently plans for a fleet of 44 CMV-22Bs across all VRM squadrons, though some experts argue that effectively supporting distributed operations in a contested environment could require up to 70 aircraft. As VRM-30 and its sister squadrons continue to demonstrate the platform’s capabilities, these discussions about future fleet size will be informed by real operational experience rather than theoretical projections.

From that historic first operational deployment in August 2021 through the grueling 269-day deployment that concluded in August 2025, VRM-30’s partnership with USS Carl Vinson has written a new chapter in naval aviation history. The Titans have demonstrated that the CMV-22B Osprey is not just an aircraft, but a force multiplier that extends carrier strike group reach, enables sustained operations at unprecedented distances, and facilitates the kind of multilateral cooperation that characterizes modern naval operations.

The squadron’s operational history encompasses groundbreaking firsts, from delivering F-35C power modules at sea to conducting complex logistics operations during massive multinational exercises involving forces from across the globe. Through extended deployments that tested equipment and personnel to their limits, VRM-30 has proven the reliability and flexibility that the CMV-22B brings to the fleet.

As the Navy continues to refine concepts for distributed maritime operations and expeditionary advanced base operations, the operational experience gained by VRM-30 aboard Carl Vinson provides the foundation for future employment of this remarkable aircraft. The Titans have not merely adapted to a new platform: they have pioneered new ways of sustaining naval power across the vast expanse of the Indo-Pacific and beyond, ensuring that wherever Carl Vinson sails, the logistical support necessary for mission success follows close behind.

Note: The photos in the slideshow highlight the CMV-22B operating in the Pacific and the CENTCOM area of operations during the 2024-2025 deployment.

A Tiltrotor Perspective: Exploring the Experience

 

Beyond Geography: Why the “Global South” Isn’t About Location Anymore

09/30/2025

When Russia, a nation whose territory extends into the Arctic Circle, positions itself as part of the “Global South,” it reveals something fundamental about how international relations have evolved beyond simple geographic boundaries.

The term “Global South,” increasingly used by organizations and coalitions worldwide, has become less about hemispheres and more about challenging established power structures.

The “Global South” emerged as a successor to terms like “Third World” and “developing nations,” but it carries distinctly different implications.

While its predecessors focused primarily on economic development levels, the Global South represents a political identity one that is defined by shared opposition to the Western world rather than shared latitude.

This shift reflects a changing global landscape where traditional metrics of power and influence no longer tell the complete story.

Countries like China and Russia, despite their significant economic and military capabilities, position themselves as leaders of nations seeking alternatives to Western-dominated institutions and development models.

The inclusion of northern hemisphere powers in Global South coalitions might seem contradictory, but it reflects strategic political alignment.

Russia’s participation in organizations like BRICS alongside Brazil, India, China, and South Africa demonstrates how a major power works its ways in an increasingly de-Westernized world.

China’s role is particularly illustrative. As the world’s second-largest economy, China hardly fits traditional definitions of a developing nation. Yet it consistently presents itself as the champion of Global South interests, offering alternative development financing through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and positioning the yuan as an alternative to dollar-dominated trade.

Global China is the goal, not equal participation in the BRICS as a responsible partner.

What unites these diverse nations isn’t geography but shared narratives of resistance to colonial or imperial dominance. While Russia was never formally colonized and itself was a colonizer, its Soviet experience and subsequent relationship with Western powers creates what it claims is a common ground with post-colonial nations. China similarly draws on its “century of humiliation” to connect with countries that experienced Western intervention.

This historical framing allows countries with vastly different current circumstances to find common cause in reshaping the global order away from the Western “rules-based order.”

Ironically, the globalization process which has so benefited China has been based precisely on this order, one which it is actively seeking to revise to its advantage.

Organizations identifying as Global South entities are effectively challenging the post-World War II international order.

The creation of alternative institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and various South-South cooperation frameworks represents concrete attempts to build parallel structures rather than reform existing ones.

The Global South concept also reflects the limitations of traditional North-South or East-West frameworks in describing today’s multipolar world.

Countries increasingly resist being pigeonholed into simple categories, instead choosing affiliations based on specific interests and values rather than geographic proximity or historical alliances.

This fluidity can be seen in how nations participate selectively in different coalitions. A country might align with Global South positions on trade and development while maintaining Western partnerships in security matters, reflecting the complex reality of modern statecraft.

As international relations become increasingly complex, the Global South identity represents an attempt to create solidarity among diverse nations based on shared aspirations for a more multipolar world rather than shared circumstances.

Whether this political identity can maintain coherence as member countries’ interests diverge remains an open question. The economic rise of key Global South nations may eventually challenge the very premise of their unified opposition to the existing order.

The debate over terminology reflects deeper questions about power, legitimacy, and representation in global governance.

As the world continues to evolve beyond simple geographic and economic categories, the Global South concept will likely continue adapting to serve the political needs of nations seeking alternatives to Western-dominated international systems.

In this context, Russia’s Arctic location becomes irrelevant to its Global South identity.

What matters is its commitment to challenging the Western world and building alternative international structures.

Geography, it seems, has taken a back seat to geopolitics in defining the world’s new coalitions.

And whether or not a member of the BRICS invades a sovereign country to include it in its empire seems to be also.

The LVC Dynamic: A Key Force for Change in Combat Pilot Training

09/29/2025

The landscape of military aviation training stands at a critical juncture. As combat aircraft have evolved into increasingly sophisticated platforms bristling with advanced sensors, networked communications, and complex mission systems, the challenge of preparing pilots to operate these systems effectively has grown exponentially. The emergence of fifth-generation fighters has fundamentally altered the calculus of pilot training, creating demands that traditional methods struggle to meet. These aircraft represent not merely incremental improvements over their predecessors but quantum leaps in capability that require entirely new approaches to training and skill development.

At the heart of this training revolution lies Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training methodology. This approach seamlessly integrates three distinct training environments: actual aircraft operations (Live), high-fidelity simulation (Virtual), and computer-generated forces and scenarios (Constructive). When properly implemented, LVC training creates comprehensive training ecosystems that can replicate the full complexity of modern combat operations while maintaining safety and managing costs. The convergence of these three training domains represents perhaps the most significant advancement in military aviation training since the introduction of jet aircraft itself.

The Live component encompasses all training conducted using actual aircraft, with real pilots experiencing the physical demands, sensory inputs, and operational realities of flight. This element provides irreplaceable value in developing muscle memory, stress tolerance, and the intuitive decision-making that comes only from actual flight experience. However, live training imposes substantial constraints: high operational costs, safety considerations, limited airspace availability, and the practical impossibility of replicating certain threat environments or tactical scenarios. A single advanced fighter can cost tens of thousands of dollars per flight hour, making extensive live training economically challenging for most air forces.

The Virtual component utilizes sophisticated ground-based simulators that replicate aircraft cockpits and flight characteristics with remarkable fidelity. Modern virtual training systems have achieved levels of realism that were unimaginable just decades ago, incorporating motion platforms, high-resolution visual systems, and accurate modeling of aircraft systems and performance. Virtual training offers crucial advantages: the ability to practice dangerous scenarios without risk, unlimited repetition of specific maneuvers or procedures, and the flexibility to pause, rewind, or modify scenarios for instructional purposes. Yet virtual training has historically struggled to provide the complete sensory experience and physical demands of actual flight, potentially limiting its effectiveness for certain training objectives.

The Constructive component provides computer-generated forces, threats, and environmental factors that populate training scenarios with entities that would be impossible or prohibitively expensive to provide using live assets. Sophisticated artificial intelligence enables these synthetic forces to exhibit realistic tactical behaviors, creating complex, dynamic training environments. Constructive elements can represent everything from individual aircraft and ground vehicles to entire integrated air defense systems and strategic-level assets. This capability allows for training scenarios of unprecedented scale and complexity, preparing pilots for the overwhelming informational and tactical demands of modern combat operations.

The true power of LVC training emerges not from these individual components but from their integration. When seamlessly connected, live aircraft, virtual simulators, and constructive forces can participate in unified training scenarios that transcend the limitations of any single approach. A pilot flying an actual aircraft can engage with threats represented by computer-generated forces while coordinating with wingmen operating in ground-based simulators, all within a scenario managed and modified in real-time by instructors. This blended approach provides training experiences that approach the complexity and unpredictability of actual combat while maintaining safety and managing costs.

The technical challenges of achieving effective LVC integration are substantial. Different systems must communicate using common protocols, maintain synchronized timing despite network latencies, and present consistent tactical pictures to all participants regardless of whether they are in actual aircraft or simulators. Security considerations add another layer of complexity, as training systems must handle classified information while potentially supporting coalition training with partners at different security clearance levels. The development of Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture has been crucial in enabling realistic training that incorporates sensitive tactics and procedures while maintaining appropriate security boundaries.

The strategic imperative driving LVC adoption extends beyond mere cost savings to address fundamental questions about force readiness and operational effectiveness. Modern military operations increasingly occur across multiple domains simultaneously—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace—with success depending on effective coordination and information sharing across these domains. Preparing pilots for this reality requires training environments that can replicate multi-domain complexity, something impossible using traditional methods. LVC training provides the only practical means of creating sufficiently complex and realistic scenarios to develop the skills necessary for multi-domain operations.

The cost-effectiveness of LVC training has proven particularly compelling in an era of constrained defense budgets and increasingly expensive aircraft. By enabling a significant portion of advanced training to occur in simulators or using embedded training systems rather than requiring extensive live flying hours, LVC approaches can dramatically reduce training costs while maintaining or even improving effectiveness. Studies have demonstrated that optimal blending of live, virtual, and constructive training can reduce total training costs by thirty to fifty percent compared to traditional live-only approaches, while actually improving student performance and readiness.

International cooperation in training represents another area where LVC capabilities provide transformative potential. The ability to connect training systems across geographical distances enables coalition partners to train together without the logistical burden of deploying personnel and aircraft to common locations. This capability is particularly valuable for maintaining alliance interoperability and shared tactical proficiency. Several nations have established international training centers built around LVC capabilities, demonstrating the viability of collaborative training approaches that reduce individual nation costs while improving collective effectiveness.

The evolution of LVC training also reflects broader changes in military doctrine and operational concepts. The shift from platform-centric to network-centric warfare emphasizes information sharing, distributed operations, and coordinated effects across multiple systems. Training pilots to operate effectively in this paradigm requires exposure to networked operations and multi-platform coordination that LVC training is uniquely positioned to provide. As concepts like Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) mature, LVC training systems will become increasingly essential for developing the skills and cognitive frameworks necessary for effective execution.

This report examines the revolutionary impact of integrated LVC training on military aviation, exploring both the technical foundations that enable effective implementation and the operational advantages that result. Through analysis of current systems, international programs, and comparative approaches, the report demonstrates how LVC training has transformed pilot preparation for modern combat operations while addressing the economic and practical constraints facing military aviation training programs worldwide.

The LVC Revolution

This video previews our forthcoming report entitled: THE LVC DYNAMIC A KEY FORCE FOR CHANGE IN COMBAT PILOT TRAINING which has been generated as a guide to our upcoming visit to the Italian International Flight Training School in October 2025.

The landscape of military aviation training stands at a critical juncture. As combat aircraft have evolved into increasingly sophisticated platforms bristling with advanced sensors, networked communications, and complex mission systems, the challenge of preparing pilots to operate these systems effectively has grown exponentially. The emergence of fifth-generation fighters has fundamentally altered the calculus of pilot training, creating demands that traditional methods struggle to meet. These aircraft represent not merely incremental improvements over their predecessors but quantum leaps in capability that require entirely new approaches to training and skill development.

At the heart of this training revolution lies Live, Virtual, and Constructive (LVC) training methodology. This approach seamlessly integrates three distinct training environments: actual aircraft operations (Live), high-fidelity simulation (Virtual), and computer-generated forces and scenarios (Constructive). When properly implemented, LVC training creates comprehensive training ecosystems that can replicate the full complexity of modern combat operations while maintaining safety and managing costs. The convergence of these three training domains represents perhaps the most significant advancement in military aviation training since the introduction of jet aircraft itself.

The Live component encompasses all training conducted using actual aircraft, with real pilots experiencing the physical demands, sensory inputs, and operational realities of flight. This element provides irreplaceable value in developing muscle memory, stress tolerance, and the intuitive decision-making that comes only from actual flight experience. However, live training imposes substantial constraints: high operational costs, safety considerations, limited airspace availability, and the practical impossibility of replicating certain threat environments or tactical scenarios. A single advanced fighter can cost tens of thousands of dollars per flight hour, making extensive live training economically challenging for most air forces.

The Virtual component utilizes sophisticated ground-based simulators that replicate aircraft cockpits and flight characteristics with remarkable fidelity. Modern virtual training systems have achieved levels of realism that were unimaginable just decades ago, incorporating motion platforms, high-resolution visual systems, and accurate modeling of aircraft systems and performance. Virtual training offers crucial advantages: the ability to practice dangerous scenarios without risk, unlimited repetition of specific maneuvers or procedures, and the flexibility to pause, rewind, or modify scenarios for instructional purposes. Yet virtual training has historically struggled to provide the complete sensory experience and physical demands of actual flight, potentially limiting its effectiveness for certain training objectives.

The Constructive component provides computer-generated forces, threats, and environmental factors that populate training scenarios with entities that would be impossible or prohibitively expensive to provide using live assets. Sophisticated artificial intelligence enables these synthetic forces to exhibit realistic tactical behaviors, creating complex, dynamic training environments. Constructive elements can represent everything from individual aircraft and ground vehicles to entire integrated air defense systems and strategic-level assets. This capability allows for training scenarios of unprecedented scale and complexity, preparing pilots for the overwhelming informational and tactical demands of modern combat operations.

The true power of LVC training emerges not from these individual components but from their integration. When seamlessly connected, live aircraft, virtual simulators, and constructive forces can participate in unified training scenarios that transcend the limitations of any single approach. A pilot flying an actual aircraft can engage with threats represented by computer-generated forces while coordinating with wingmen operating in ground-based simulators, all within a scenario managed and modified in real-time by instructors. This blended approach provides training experiences that approach the complexity and unpredictability of actual combat while maintaining safety and managing costs.

The technical challenges of achieving effective LVC integration are substantial. Different systems must communicate using common protocols, maintain synchronized timing despite network latencies, and present consistent tactical pictures to all participants regardless of whether they are in actual aircraft or simulators. Security considerations add another layer of complexity, as training systems must handle classified information while potentially supporting coalition training with partners at different security clearance levels. The development of Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture has been crucial in enabling realistic training that incorporates sensitive tactics and procedures while maintaining appropriate security boundaries.

The strategic imperative driving LVC adoption extends beyond mere cost savings to address fundamental questions about force readiness and operational effectiveness. Modern military operations increasingly occur across multiple domains simultaneously—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace—with success depending on effective coordination and information sharing across these domains. Preparing pilots for this reality requires training environments that can replicate multi-domain complexity, something impossible using traditional methods. LVC training provides the only practical means of creating sufficiently complex and realistic scenarios to develop the skills necessary for multi-domain operations.

The cost-effectiveness of LVC training has proven particularly compelling in an era of constrained defense budgets and increasingly expensive aircraft. By enabling a significant portion of advanced training to occur in simulators or using embedded training systems rather than requiring extensive live flying hours, LVC approaches can dramatically reduce training costs while maintaining or even improving effectiveness. Studies have demonstrated that optimal blending of live, virtual, and constructive training can reduce total training costs by thirty to fifty percent compared to traditional live-only approaches, while actually improving student performance and readiness.

International cooperation in training represents another area where LVC capabilities provide transformative potential. The ability to connect training systems across geographical distances enables coalition partners to train together without the logistical burden of deploying personnel and aircraft to common locations. This capability is particularly valuable for maintaining alliance interoperability and shared tactical proficiency. Several nations have established international training centers built around LVC capabilities, demonstrating the viability of collaborative training approaches that reduce individual nation costs while improving collective effectiveness.

The evolution of LVC training also reflects broader changes in military doctrine and operational concepts. The shift from platform-centric to network-centric warfare emphasizes information sharing, distributed operations, and coordinated effects across multiple systems. Training pilots to operate effectively in this paradigm requires exposure to networked operations and multi-platform coordination that LVC training is uniquely positioned to provide. As concepts like Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) mature, LVC training systems will become increasingly essential for developing the skills and cognitive frameworks necessary for effective execution.

This report examines the revolutionary impact of integrated LVC training on military aviation, exploring both the technical foundations that enable effective implementation and the operational advantages that result. Through analysis of current systems, international programs, and comparative approaches, the report demonstrates how LVC training has transformed pilot preparation for modern combat operations while addressing the economic and practical constraints facing military aviation training programs worldwide.

Investing in War Winners: Transforming Naval Aviation Training for Future Dominance

By Robbin Laird

Modern warfare has reached an inflection point. As technology accelerates and battlespaces become increasingly complex, military aviation faces a fundamental truth: the next generation of military superiority will belong not to those with the most aircraft, but to those who make the smartest investments in their human capital. The recent insights from Tom Webster of Textron Aviation Defense illuminate this reality with striking clarity — the future belongs to forces that can produce “war winners, not war fighters.”

This distinction is more than semantic. It represents a paradigm shift from training pilots who can execute predetermined missions to developing strategic quarterbacks flying incredibly complex aircraft capable of synthesizing information, making autonomous decisions, and orchestrating distributed effects across vast battlespaces. As Webster emphasizes, “You don’t get any rewards for being the second-best Air Force,” and achieving that superiority requires fundamentally reimagining how we develop aviators.

The transformation underway in naval aviation training reflects this imperative. By moving beyond traditional stick-and-rudder skills toward mission system mastery and cognitive agility, Naval Aviation – both the U.S. Navy and the USMC —  is positioning itself to dominate not just today’s threats, but those that haven’t yet emerged. This evolution represents the ultimate smart investment in human capital. One that transforms promising pilots into strategic decision-makers capable of winning wars before they’re fought.

The Paradigm Shift: Training Strategic Quarterbacks

The new training paradigm represents a fundamental reconceptualization of what it means to be a military aviator. As Webster explains, modern pilots must evolve from being “nodes in a network” to becoming “quarterbacks” of distributed forces. As Webster underscored, this shift recognizes that in an F-35, a pilot might “become aware that some system has been activated that is very vulnerable to some cyber effect” and need to “communicate, whether it’s via link or voice, into the network so the effect can be applied.”

This quarterback mentality requires a completely different skill set than traditional flying. Pilots must master information processing, strategic thinking, and autonomous decision-making while maintaining the basic airmanship that keeps them alive. They must be prepared to coordinate effects across multiple domains, air, land, sea, space, and cyber, and make strategic decisions that could have theater-wide implications.  In a way, says Webster, the evolving world of airpower is redefining what is meant when we say an aviator has, “air sense,” or an, “airman’s perspective.”

The training implications are profound. Instead of focusing solely on technical proficiency, the new paradigm emphasizes cognitive flexibility, information management, and strategic agility. Pilots learn to process vast amounts of data, synthesize information from multiple sources, and make rapid decisions under extreme pressure. They develop the “mental furniture,” as Webster calls it, to adapt to new technologies and evolving threats throughout their careers.  To meet this training demand requires different toolsets than have been available in the past.

Integrated Training Ecosystems

The cornerstone of this transformation is what Webster terms the “integrated training system” or a seamless blend of live, virtual, and constructive (LVC) training environments that began to emerge around 2010. This represents a quantum leap beyond the traditional model where pilots alternated between aircraft and simulators in discrete, unconnected sessions.

In the integrated system, live flying, virtual simulation, and constructive scenarios are “knitted together” using data links to create comprehensive training environments that mirror the complexity of modern combat. A trainee in an aircraft and a trainee in a simulator might fly a mission together operating in a combined live and virtual battlespace with constructive or simulated adversaries and friendly forces.

This integration enables training scenarios that would be prohibitively expensive or dangerous in purely live environments. As student aviators progress through training, the can practice responding to electronic warfare, coordinating with distributed forces, and managing complex multi-domain operations in a safe, controlled setting that nonetheless provides the cognitive stress and decision-making challenges they’ll face in combat.  These are tasks which traditionally would have been reserved for the most advanced training in operational aircraft during complex large force exercises.

Perhaps the most revolutionary aspect of the LVC approach is the constructive element or the ability to create artificial entities and scenarios that push pilots beyond what’s possible in traditional training. As Webster notes, this allows instructors to “give you a challenge, whether you’re in an airplane or a simulator, using data links and this constructive force generation that is excellent for learning the type of skills you need to have in a fourth or fifth generation operational airplane.”

Constructive training enables aviators to experience the full spectrum of modern warfare before they encounter it operationally. They can practice such tasks as coordinating with allied forces, responding to cyber attacks, managing contested electromagnetic environments, and operating in GPS-denied conditions. They can also do it in a building block type approach which can be tailored to each student’s learning style and learning pace, an approach impossible in the complex world of live large force training.  This exposure builds the cognitive frameworks and decision-making patterns that will serve them throughout their careers.

The safety implications are equally significant. Pilots can practice complex emergencies, navigate electronic warfare and, “live fire,” scenarios, and experience multi-domain operations without the inherent risks of live training. This dramatically reduces training-related mishaps while simultaneously improving the quality and realism of the training experience.

Mission System Mastery

The shift from basic flying skills to mission system proficiency represents perhaps the most fundamental change in pilot training. While traditional airmanship remains important, it now serves as the foundation for much more complex cognitive tasks centered on information management and strategic decision-making.

Modern military aircraft, particularly fifth-generation platforms, are essentially flying information systems. The F-35, for instance, processes and displays vast quantities of data from multiple sensors, creating a comprehensive picture of the battlespace that extends far beyond what any pilot could perceive through traditional means. Mastering these systems requires pilots to develop new cognitive skills that go far beyond basic aircraft operation.

This mission system focus transforms pilots from aircraft operators into information managers and strategic decision-makers. They must learn to interpret sensor data, manage information flows, coordinate with networked forces, and make strategic decisions based on synthesized intelligence. As Webster emphasizes, this creates pilots who can serve as “quarterbacks” of distributed forces rather than simply skilled aviators.

The emphasis on mission systems reflects a broader cognitive revolution in combat aviation. Modern pilots must process information at unprecedented speeds, manage multiple data streams simultaneously, and make strategic decisions while maintaining basic flight safety. This requires a level of cognitive flexibility and information management capability that traditional training never addressed.

Webster describes the need for different cognitive progression as follows: “In basic pilot training in a turboprop, you teach me basic airmanship; tasks such as how to communicate with air traffic control, how to get from point A to B and takeoff/land an airplane, how to do  aerobatic maneuvers, and how to fly formation with other airplanes. Then, in more advanced jet training, you teach me many of the same things at higher speed,  I can get to the point where I can do these basics really, really, well, but those are likely not the only core skill sets that I need to excel in my F-35 training.”

Instead, modern pilots need to master the cognitive skills that enable them to operate in information-rich, contested environments. They must be comfortable processing data from multiple sources, coordinating with distributed forces, and making autonomous decisions that could have strategic implications. This represents a fundamental shift from mechanical skill to cognitive agility.

Pilots as Strategic Assets

The new training paradigm recognizes that modern pilots are strategic assets whose decisions can shape entire campaigns. In distributed maritime operations, a single pilot might identify a critical vulnerability, coordinate a multi-domain response, and execute effects that alter the strategic balance of a conflict. This level of responsibility requires preparation that goes far beyond traditional flight training.

Webster’s observation about F-35 operations in contested environments illustrates this perfectly: pilots operating “nowhere near each other” can provide “the same mutual support that I had in an F-16 when I was a mile and a half or two or three miles from each other.” This represents a fundamental change in how air power operates and requires pilots who can think differently about force employment and tactical coordination.

The training implications are significant. Pilots must learn to operate independently while maintaining connectivity with larger force structures. They must be prepared to make strategic decisions without traditional command oversight and coordinate effects across multiple domains. This requires developing judgment, strategic thinking, and decision-making capabilities that traditional training never emphasized.

Future-Proofing Through Adaptability

Perhaps most critically, the new training paradigm prepares pilots for threats and technologies that don’t yet exist. As Webster notes, the training system must be “future proof” with “an adaptable, open tool set” that can evolve with changing requirements. This means developing pilots who can master not just current systems, but the process of continuous adaptation itself.

This adaptability imperative is driven by the pace of technological change and the unpredictable nature of future threats. The pilot graduating today will likely encounter technologies, tactics, and threats throughout their career that are currently unimaginable. Traditional training, with its focus on specific skills and systems, cannot prepare them for this reality.

Instead, the new paradigm emphasizes meta-skills, learning how to learn, adapting to new systems, processing novel information, and making decisions in unprecedented situations. These cognitive capabilities provide the foundation for continuous adaptation throughout a pilot’s career, ensuring they remain effective as technology and tactics evolve.

The Human Capital Investment Imperative: Building War Winners

The transformation in pilot training reflects a broader shift from quantity-focused to quality-focused force development. As Webster emphasizes, the goal is not simply to produce more pilots, but to create “war winners” who can dominate any environment they encounter. This represents a fundamental reorientation of how military aviation thinks about human capital development.

The economic logic is compelling. Modern military aircraft represent massive investments. The F-35 program alone costs hundreds of billions of dollars. The pilot operating that aircraft, however, receives a relatively modest investment in training and development. Yet that pilot’s decisions and capabilities will determine whether the massive investment in hardware achieves its intended strategic effect.

By investing more heavily in pilot development, through advanced training systems, experienced instructors, and comprehensive curricula, military aviation can achieve dramatically better returns on its hardware investments. A pilot who can fully exploit an aircraft’s capabilities is worth far more than multiple pilots who can only operate at basic proficiency levels.

The Multiplier Effect of Experienced Instructors

One of the most critical elements of the new training paradigm is the integration of experienced fifth-generation pilots as instructors. As Webster notes, there are not a lot pilots with operational F-35 experience who are teaching at basic training level due to the demand for their knowledge and skillsets in other places.   This scarcity makes their contribution extraordinarily valuable.

These experienced instructors bring something that no simulation or textbook can provide: authentic knowledge of what modern, “5th generation,” combat aviation actually requires. They can distinguish between academic understanding and operational reality, ensuring that training focuses on skills that matter in actual combat. Their presence transforms training from theoretical preparation to practical preparation for known realities.

The multiplier effect is significant. One experienced instructor can shape hundreds of students throughout their teaching career, transmitting hard-won operational knowledge that would otherwise take years to develop independently. This creates a compounding return on the investment in human capital that extends far beyond individual training cycles.

Resource Efficiency and Strategic Returns

The new training paradigm also delivers significant resource efficiencies that enhance its strategic value. By leveraging simulation and LVC training, the approach reduces reliance on expensive live flight hours while actually improving training quality. Pilots can practice complex scenarios repeatedly in safe environments, building proficiency that would be impossible to achieve through live training alone.

This efficiency enables more comprehensive training within existing resource constraints. Instead of limiting training to what can be accomplished safely and affordably in live aircraft, the integrated approach opens up the full spectrum of scenarios pilots might encounter operationally. The result is better-prepared pilots at lower cost—a combination that delivers exceptional strategic value.

The safety benefits compound these advantages. By enabling pilots to practice dangerous scenarios in simulated environments, the new approach reduces training-related accidents while improving operational readiness. This not only preserves valuable human resources but also maintains training tempo and morale.

Building Adaptive Capacity

One of the most forward-thinking aspects of the new training paradigm is its emphasis on open, adaptable architectures that can evolve with changing requirements. As Webster explains, the system provides inherent flexibility becoming like “a multi-tool that I bought years earlier that can still be relevant, that is easy and relatively affordable to adapt as training needs continue to grow and evolve.”

This adaptability is crucial in an era of rapid technological change. New aircraft, sensors, weapons, and tactics emerge continuously and some are revolutionary and not just evolutions, and training systems must be able to adapt to these developments quickly and efficiently. Traditional training systems, with their fixed curricula and rigid structures, cannot keep pace with this rate of change.

The open architecture approach solves this problem by building flexibility into the fundamental design of training systems. Instead of requiring wholesale replacement when new technologies emerge, the system can be updated incrementally, preserving previous investments while incorporating new capabilities. This approach dramatically reduces the cost and complexity of maintaining current training while enabling rapid adaptation to new requirements.

Perhaps most significantly, the new training paradigm actually enables faster deployment of new aircraft technologies by preparing pilots to master them more quickly. Traditional training required extensive retraining when new systems were introduced, creating delays between technology availability and operational capability.

The mission system focus of modern training changes this dynamic fundamentally. Pilots who master the cognitive skills of information processing, strategic decision-making, and system integration can adapt to new platforms much more quickly than those trained only in specific aircraft operations. They possess the mental frameworks and cognitive capabilities needed to understand and exploit new technologies rapidly.

This capability has profound strategic implications. Military advantages are often temporary. Early adopters gain significant benefits, but these erode as adversaries develop countermeasures or acquire similar capabilities. Training systems that enable rapid mastery of new technologies help maintain and extend these temporary advantages, creating sustained competitive benefits.

Decision Superiority in Contested Environments

The ultimate test of any training paradigm is its impact on operational effectiveness, and the new approach delivers profound advantages in the most demanding scenarios. Pilots trained as strategic quarterbacks with mission system mastery possess what can only be described as decision superiority or the ability to observe, orient, decide, and act faster than adversaries in complex, contested environments.

This advantage manifests in multiple ways. First, pilots can process and synthesize information more quickly, gaining situational awareness that enables proactive rather than reactive decision-making. Second, they can coordinate distributed effects more effectively, leveraging assets across multiple domains to achieve objectives that would be impossible through traditional, stove-piped approaches. Third, they can adapt to unexpected developments more rapidly, maintaining initiative even when initial plans become obsolete.

These capabilities are particularly crucial in contested environments where traditional command and control structures may be degraded or disrupted. Pilots who can operate autonomously while maintaining strategic coherence provide commanders with flexible, resilient capabilities that can adapt to changing circumstances without constant oversight.

Distributed Lethality and Multi-Domain Operations

The training transformation directly enables the distributed maritime operations that define modern naval warfare. By emphasizing mission system mastery and networked information management, the new paradigm prepares pilots to coordinate effects across widely dispersed forces which is a capability that’s essential for survival and success in contested maritime environments.

This distributed approach multiplies combat effectiveness by enabling smaller, dispersed forces to achieve effects previously requiring large, concentrated formations. Pilots who can coordinate with distributed assets, integrate information from multiple sources, and execute complex, multi-domain operations provide commanders with dramatically enhanced operational flexibility.

The training system’s emphasis on team and joint integration further amplifies these advantages. Pilots who train in networked environments develop natural habits of collaboration and coordination that translate directly to operational effectiveness. They understand how to leverage allied capabilities, integrate with joint forces, and operate seamlessly in coalition environments.

Preparing for Future Warfare

Perhaps most importantly, the new training paradigm prepares pilots for warfare scenarios that haven’t yet emerged. By emphasizing adaptability, strategic thinking, and continuous learning, the approach creates pilots who can master new technologies, tactics, and threats as they appear.

This future-readiness is crucial in an era of rapid change and strategic competition. Adversaries are continuously developing new capabilities and tactics, and the side that can adapt most quickly gains decisive advantages. Training systems that emphasize adaptability and continuous learning provide the foundation for maintaining superiority in this dynamic environment.

The integration of artificial intelligence, unmanned systems, and other emerging technologies will require pilots who can understand, integrate, and exploit these capabilities effectively. The cognitive skills emphasized in modern training, information processing, strategic thinking, and adaptive decision-making, provide the foundation for mastering these future technologies as they become available.

Conclusion: The Strategic Imperative of Human Capital Excellence

The transformation of naval aviation training represents more than an educational evolution. It embodies a strategic recognition that human capital excellence is the ultimate determinant of military effectiveness. As Tom Webster’s insights make clear, the choice facing military aviation is stark: invest in developing war winners or accept the consequences of fielding merely competent war fighters.

The evidence is overwhelming that traditional training paradigms, however well-intentioned, cannot prepare pilots for the cognitive demands and strategic responsibilities of modern warfare. The information-rich, multi-domain, rapidly evolving nature of contemporary conflict requires aviators who can think strategically, adapt continuously, and coordinate effects across vast battlespaces. These capabilities cannot be developed through traditional stick-and-rudder training alone.

The integrated training ecosystem emerging from this recognition with its emphasis on mission system mastery, LVC integration, and strategic thinking represents the smartest possible investment in human capital. It produces pilots who can fully exploit the massive investments in modern aircraft while providing the adaptability needed to master future technologies and threats.

The strategic implications extend far beyond individual pilot development. Nations that embrace this training transformation will possess air forces capable of winning conflicts before they escalate, deterring aggression through demonstrated superiority, and adapting rapidly to emerging threats. Those that cling to traditional approaches will find themselves outmatched by adversaries who have made the intellectual and financial investment in human capital excellence.

The choice is clear: invest in developing war winners through transformative training or accept the strategic consequences of maintaining outdated approaches. For naval aviation, embracing this transformation isn’t just an opportunity but it’s an imperative for maintaining the superiority that has defined American air power for generations.

As Webster concludes: “At the end of the day, you want to win the war before it’s fought.” The new training paradigm provides the tools to do exactly that, creating aviators who don’t just operate aircraft but dominate the cognitive and strategic dimensions of modern warfare. The investment in such human capital excellence represents the ultimate strategic advantage, one that compounds over time and provides the foundation for sustained military superiority in an uncertain world.

The future belongs to those who recognize that in an age of technological revolution, the most sophisticated aircraft are only as effective as the pilots who operate them. By transforming training to develop strategic quarterbacks rather than mere aviators, naval aviation positions itself not just to meet future challenges, but to define the very dynamically changing nature of air power.

A Strategic Investment in Marine Corps Heavy-Lift Capabilities

09/28/2025

By Robbin Laird

On September 26, 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense and Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin company, signed one of the largest helicopter procurement contracts in military history. The five-year, multi-year procurement (MYP) agreement, valued at up to $10.855 billion, authorizes the production and delivery of up to 99 CH-53K King Stallion heavy-lift helicopters for the U.S. Marine Corps between 2029 and 2034. This landmark deal represents far more than a simple aircraft purchase for it embodies a strategic commitment to modernizing America’s expeditionary forces while strengthening the defense industrial base for the next decade.

The contract structure itself demonstrates sophisticated defense acquisition planning. Described by the Department of Defense as a fixed-price incentive (successful-target) and firm-fixed-price modification, the agreement definitizes production Lots 9 and 10 while adding scope for Lots 11 through 13. By combining five separate aircraft orders into a single multi-year procurement, the contract provides unprecedented stability for both the government and industry partners while delivering substantial cost savings to taxpayers.

The multi-year procurement approach offers significant financial advantages over traditional annual contracting methods. The agreement is projected to generate $1.5 billion in savings between 2025 and 2029, demonstrating the power of long-term contracting strategies in defense acquisition. Colonel Kate Fleeger, Program Manager for the H-53 Heavy Lift Helicopters Program Office (PMA-261), explained the mechanism behind these savings: “The contract allows Sikorsky to take advantage of a long-term, stable demand signal and bundle purchase orders from suppliers to achieve better pricing. That savings is then passed on to the government.”

This cost reduction strategy reflects broader defense acquisition reform efforts aimed at maximizing taxpayer value while ensuring military readiness. The multi-year structure enables Sikorsky to optimize its production planning, secure better pricing from suppliers through volume commitments, and reduce the administrative burden associated with annual contract negotiations. These efficiencies translate directly into lower unit costs for each helicopter while maintaining quality and delivery schedules.

The financial benefits extend beyond immediate cost savings. Long-term contracting provides predictable revenue streams that enable industry partners to invest in manufacturing improvements, workforce development, and technological advancement. This virtuous cycle of investment and efficiency gains benefits both the defense contractor and the government customer over the life of the program.

One of the most significant aspects of this contract is its impact on the defense industrial base. The CH-53K program involves an extensive network of suppliers, with 267 suppliers across 37 states and an additional 17 international suppliers from eight countries. This geographic distribution ensures that the economic benefits of the program reach communities across America while maintaining critical manufacturing capabilities in key industrial regions.

The multi-year structure provides unprecedented stability for this supplier network. Rather than facing uncertainty about future orders, suppliers can now plan investments, maintain skilled workforces, and optimize their own production processes based on predictable demand signals. This stability is particularly crucial for smaller suppliers who might otherwise struggle to maintain specialized capabilities during periods of uncertain demand.

Colonel Fleeger emphasized this benefit, stating that the contract provides “the ability to provide dependable delivery to the fleet and a consistent and predictable timeline for the transition from the CH-53E to the CH-53K.” This predictability enables the Marine Corps to plan its force modernization efforts with confidence while ensuring that aging CH-53E Super Stallions can be retired on schedule without capability gaps.

The contract also reinforces American manufacturing capabilities at a time of increasing global competition. By sustaining thousands of production roles at Sikorsky and across its nationwide supply chain, the agreement helps maintain the skilled workforce necessary for advanced aerospace manufacturing. These capabilities have applications beyond military helicopters, supporting broader American competitiveness in global aerospace markets.

The CH-53K King Stallion represents a revolutionary advancement in heavy-lift helicopter technology, far exceeding the capabilities of its predecessor, the CH-53E Super Stallion. The aircraft is designed to carry 27,000 pounds at a mission radius of 110 nautical miles under Navy high/hot conditions, nearly triple the capability of the CH-53E, with a maximum external lift capacity of 36,000 pounds. These specifications make the CH-53K the most powerful helicopter in the U.S. military inventory.

The aircraft’s advanced capabilities were dramatically demonstrated in 2022 when a CH-53K successfully landed an externally-loaded Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) at the summit of an 8,000-foot ridge in the Marine Corps’ 29 Palms training range in the California desert. This achievement highlighted the helicopter’s ability to operate in extreme conditions that would challenge or defeat other aircraft, providing Marine commanders with unprecedented operational flexibility.

Beyond raw lifting power, the CH-53K incorporates cutting-edge avionics and flight control systems. The aircraft features fully digital, fly-by-wire flight controls making it the first conventional helicopter in Marine Corps service to incorporate this technology. These advanced controls enhance safety, reduce pilot workload, and enable precision operations in challenging environments. The system allows the aircraft to maintain position within one foot of its intended hover point in all directions, critical for operations in confined or austere environments.

The helicopter’s digital backbone also enables advanced fleet management capabilities similar to those Sikorsky has implemented with its commercial S-92 helicopter fleet. This system allows for tracking individual aircraft components and predicting maintenance needs based on data-driven analysis rather than fixed schedules, crucial for maintaining high readiness rates in distributed operations.

The CH-53K procurement must be understood within the broader context of Marine Corps force modernization and evolving strategic requirements. As military operations increasingly focus on distributed operations across vast distances, particularly relevant in the Indo-Pacific region, the ability to rapidly transport heavy equipment and supplies becomes paramount. The CH-53K’s enhanced range and payload capabilities directly support the Marine Corps’ transition to distributed operations concepts.

Colonel Fleeger identified a critical challenge in maximizing the CH-53K’s potential: overcoming the perception that it is simply an upgraded CH-53E. “I think it actually encourages, unfortunately, people to view the platform as a replacement platform instead of a revolutionary, key element of a really forward-thinking concept of operations,” she explained. This perspective highlights the importance of integrating new capabilities into operational concepts rather than simply replacing older equipment with newer versions.

The aircraft’s capabilities enable entirely new operational approaches. Where the CH-53E required extensive preparation and carried significant risk when lifting 20,000-pound loads, the CH-53K handles such operations routinely, fundamentally changing how ground commanders can plan and execute missions. This capability transformation extends beyond simple logistics to enable new tactical and operational possibilities.

The CH-53K also supports the Marine Corps’ role as both a crisis response force and a key component of joint distributed operations. The aircraft’s ability to operate from both land and sea bases, including austere sites and amphibious shipping, provides essential flexibility for rapid response scenarios and sustained operations in contested environments.

The multi-year contract builds on significant program momentum. Sikorsky has already delivered 20 CH-53K aircraft to the Marine Corps, with an additional 63 aircraft from earlier production lots (Lots 4-8) currently in various stages of production and assembly. The Department of the Navy declared Full Rate Production for the CH-53K program in December 2022, marking the program’s transition from development to sustained production.

The Marine Corps has successfully transitioned one fleet squadron to the CH-53K, while additional aircraft are flying in developmental test, operational test, and training squadrons to support ongoing requirements and capability development. This phased approach allows the service to build operational experience while continuing to refine tactics, techniques, and procedures for the new aircraft.

The program of record remains at 200 CH-53K helicopters for the Marine Corps, suggesting potential for additional contracts beyond the current multi-year agreement. The current contract’s flexibility to support international military customers also opens possibilities for foreign military sales, which could further reduce unit costs through increased production volumes.

Israel has already committed to purchasing CH-53K helicopters, with recent contracts including eight aircraft bound for the Israeli Air Force through foreign military sales. The Israeli purchase validates the international appeal of the CH-53K’s capabilities and provides a model for potential future international partnerships.

The contract’s provision for international military customers represents a significant opportunity for both cost reduction and strategic partnership building. The agreement allows the U.S. Government to use the contract structure to fulfill orders from international military customers, potentially reducing unit costs for all participants through economies of scale.

Israel’s commitment to the CH-53K demonstrates the aircraft’s appeal to allied nations facing similar operational challenges. The Israeli Air Force plans to use the helicopters to replace their aging fleet of modified CH-53D Yasur helicopters, which have been in service for over 50 years. This replacement cycle highlights the long service life expected for modern military helicopters and the importance of investing in advanced capabilities that will remain relevant for decades.

The potential for additional international sales could significantly impact program economics. Foreign military sales typically contribute to lower unit costs for U.S. military customers while strengthening defense relationships with allied nations. The CH-53K’s advanced capabilities and the stability provided by the multi-year contract make it an attractive option for nations requiring heavy-lift capabilities.

The program’s transition to full-rate production also represents a significant risk reduction milestone. Development programs typically face their highest risks during the design and testing phases. By achieving full-rate production, the CH-53K program has demonstrated mature manufacturing processes and validated performance capabilities, reducing the likelihood of major program disruptions.

The $10.9 billion CH-53K multi-year procurement contract represents more than a helicopter purchase. It embodies a strategic investment in American defense capabilities, industrial base strength, and allied partnership opportunities. By providing cost savings, supply chain stability, and predictable production schedules, the contract benefits taxpayers, industry partners, and military end-users simultaneously.

The agreement ensures that the Marine Corps will receive the world’s most advanced heavy-lift helicopter on schedule while maintaining the industrial capabilities necessary for long-term sustainment and potential future developments. As global security challenges continue to evolve, particularly in the vast distances of the Indo-Pacific region, the CH-53K’s capabilities will prove invaluable for maintaining American military effectiveness and supporting allied operations.

The Coming of the CH-53K : A New Capability for the Distributed Force