The King Stallion Works Interagency Tasks

09/08/2025

U.S. Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Fred Miller, from Nevada and a CH-53K King Stallion crew chief with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, looks out of a CH-53K near Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, July 21, 2025.

Marines with 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing and 2nd Distribution Support Battalion are training with elements of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to refine humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities while also refining the CH-53K’s ability to support distributed aviation operations in a joint environment.

(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Mya Seymour)

Admiral Nicolas Vaujour Provides a French Navy Perspective on Global Dynamics

By Pierre Tran

Paris – The Chinese navy was large, growing fast, and led by a complex command structure which showed an aggressive approach in operations at sea, the navy chief of staff, Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, told the Association des Journalistes de Défense (AJD) Sept. 3.

Meanwhile, the Russian navy had lost much of its access to the open seas in the West, following its invasion of Ukraine, he said.

The senior navy officer met the press club at the service headquarters at Balard, on the edge of the capital. Ship anchors were on display in the leafy courtyard of the navy building, and there were aircraft parts artfully displayed by a neighbouring building in the vast office complex of the ministry of the armed forces.

“China’s arming up is more than significant,” he said. “They have built their ships fast, with the numbers of frigates, (and) aircraft carriers.”

There was a good quality build of warships in the Chinese navy, which was making “fairly fast progress in acquiring know-how,” he said. The fleet was large, growing fast, and mostly deployed as a coastal service.

China showcased its extensive military kit Sept. 3, with a vast parade to mark the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the second world war. Chinese President Xi Jinping was flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, seen as a political signal of opposition to U.S. President Donald Trump.

Meanwhile, a summit meeting Sept. 4 of the coalition of the willing led to an offer of security guarantees on land, sea or air from 26 allies of Ukraine, in the event of a ceasefire with Russia. France and the U.K. co-led the coalition, of which some 35 nations met.

China Sails Toward Blue Water

A French assessment of Chinese naval know-how has paid close attention to the “blue water” capability of sailing aircraft carriers, particularly the catapult launch of aircraft without access to a landing strip, a complex operation, he said.

“It has to be said, they are not far off – and they are entering that (blue water) category,” he said. That could be seen at a Chinese demonstration of maritime capability in an exercise with Russian forces in the economic zone of Hawaii, he said.

The Russian and Chinese navies conducted a joint anti-submarine exercise, flying respectively IL-38 and Y-8 maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters, to hunt and kill a designated “enemy” submarine in the Sea of Japan, Reuters reported Aug. 6.

That Chinese-Russian exercise came just days after Trump said he had ordered two U.S. navy nuclear submarines closer to Russia.

Vaujour said the Chinese navy has been largely a “coastal” service, and the navy was heading for “the high seas and projection.” The aim was to secure the shipping routes for the Chinese commercial fleet, he said.

What China appeared to lack for now was a high level of “integration of joint services,” namely army, air force, and navy working together, closely “coordinated,” he said. The forces  appeared to lack a complex multi-domain approach, as its “highly centralized command structure” impeded greater coordination.

But the Chinese forces held many exercises, and they would boost their level of coordination soon, he said.

The significance of the Chinese navy went beyond Beijing’s ambitions to take control of  Taiwan, and was set out in its 2049 Initiative, he said. This was a strategic plan on maintaining the living standard of the Chinese middle class, with pursuit of annual five pct economic growth.

Such growth required raw materials and mineral reserves in Africa, and a navy would guarantee access to the resources, he said. That pointed up the importance of the Chinese naval base in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. There was a rail link there, for land transport.

China was building a fourth aircraft carrier, pointing up the navy’s role in its aim to be a world power, he said.

An Aggressive Approach

There was a notable difference between the Chinese and Western navies, he said, with the former making a “physical manoeuvre” against vessels of foreign flag. Such “aggression” could be seen in videos of Chinese naval vessels intercepting Philippine ships, he said.

That concept of operations might stem from China’s lack of naval partners, he said, in contrast to Western fleets, where commanders copy allies’ tactical moves.

The navy chief of staff told the press club when he attended a Western Pacific Naval Symposium, he met his Chinese counterparts, which included the navy political commissar, and the navy chief of staff. Those two senior naval posts – one political, the other military – prompted the question: who leads, he said.

A double command structure, replicated in each of the services, could complicate management of crises, which were already complex, he said.

French officers were invited to the Pacific symposium, as there were French naval bases in Nouméa and Papeete. The French light “surveillance” frigates Vendémiaire and Prairial were based respectively in Nouméa and Papeete, and patrolled the region.

Limited Integration

While Chinese ships sailed next to Russian vessels in the exercise near Hawaii, the admiral said, there was limited “integration” between the two navies.

That was in contrast to close operational ties between European and U.S. navies, he said, pointing up a French frigate sailing as escort for a U.S. carrier in the Persian Gulf when tension was high with Iran.

A U.S. admiral, when asked how he found working with the French navy, said it was “challenging,” Vaujour said.

Vaujour said the American admiral had said where other allies said “yes, yes” on operational requests, the French just said “no.”

The French admiral said there needed to be clear political authorization for an action, and when that was in place, the French navy was “ultra reliable” as an operational ally. The U.S. navy took an “offensive” approach, when the French service took a “defensive” attitude, he said.

Russian Navy Loses Out

On the Russian navy, it was clear Moscow has “lost a great deal at sea,” he said. The Russian service has lost the use of most of its points of naval access in the wake of the Feb. 22 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Moscow previously relied on four naval bases for access to Western seas, he said, with Murmansk up in the High North, Saint Petersburg on the Baltic Sea, Sevastopol on the Black Sea, and Tartus in Syria, on the Mediterranean, he said.

Finland and Sweden joining Nato turned the Baltic Sea into a “Nato lake” when previously it was a “Neutral lake,” he said. Russia lost access to Tartus in the wake of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, and Turkey has closed down Russian access for Sevastopol, which suited the Western allies, he said.

Turkey, a Nato member, is part of the coalition of the willing, and Ankara’s mission will be  to guarantee security in the Black Sea, he said. There will be need for de-mining to clear the way for commercial shipping.

The U.S. carrier Gerald R. Ford was sailing in the High North, putting pressure on Murmansk, the sole Russian access to the Atlantic, he said.

The Russian navy lost warships in the Black Sea, he said. Russian ships had to sail from Saint Petersburg, following the loss of the Tartus base, to support operations in Africa, he said. That Russian taking the long way round allowed Western allies to track the Russian ships, making Moscow more vulnerable.

On submarines, the Russian navy sailed a nuclear-powered attack boat, which the French navy tracked, working closely with allies, notably the U.S., British, and Norwegian services, he said, with a French interest in protecting its nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

Aerial Drones for the New Carrier

The French navy was working with contractors to develop an automatic landing capability for the planned new generation aircraft carrier, the admiral said.

It was fairly simple to launch drones, he said, but it was “complicated” for automatic landing.

“Today we are already working with Dassault, Naval Group, and others on automatic landing for the F5 version of the Rafale…” he said. That automatic landing was needed for future aerial drones for the new carrier, due to replace the Charles de Gaulle flagship in 2038.

Other than the catapult, there was no limit on the size of future aerial drones for the carrier, he said, other than price – “it should not cost too much.”

U.S. navy carriers had the MQ-25 drone for inflight refuelling, he said, and that uncrewed aircraft was large, weighed heavily, and was much like a plane.

The concept was for “single mission” uncrewed aircraft, with the new French carrier carrying separate drones designed for surveillance, attack, inflight refuelling, and protection, he said.

The official launch of the program for the new carrier was due this year, but there was deep political uncertainty as Prime Minister François Bayrou was expected to lose a Sept. 8 confidence vote in parliament.

There was also doubt as France suffered from problems with a budget deficit of 5.4 pct of gross domestic product, exceeding the European Union’s 3 pct limit. Spending cuts were seen to be needed, but governments have been unable to find support from a divided parliament.

Work has started on the “critical path,” of the project, with contractors Framatome and TechnicAtome working on the carrier’s nuclear propulsion, he said.

Building a carrier took some 15 years, and the complex know-how to build a carrier needed to be maintained, he said. That meant it was important to launch “fairly quickly,” he said, to “guarantee to the president this instrument of power and sovereignty, which allows France to pull its weight in the world.”

The Charles de Gaulle carrier essentially ships the naval version of the Rafale multimission fighter, Hawkeye spy plane, and NH90 helicopter. The new carrier will fly the new generation fighter (NGF), the core part of a European project for a future combat air system (FCAS), as well as the legacy aircraft.

The French navy had an 80 pct availability of its fleet of 15 first rank frigates, and 60 pct availability for the nuclear attack subs, he said, compared to 30-40 pct for Royal Navy frigates. That French high availability was due to two crews available for the warships, contractors supplying spares, and access to infrastructure.

France had naval bases among allies and overseas territories and departments, which allowed dry dock repairs and service. Russia was looking for such access to overseas bases rather than just a visit to a friendly port.

The two priorities of the French navy were lethality and information superiority, he said, with the latter drawing on electronic warfare, jamming, artificial intelligence, and collecting and processing data.

HMH-461 Aviation Expo

09/05/2025

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 461, Marine Aircraft Group 29, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, showcase a CH-53K King Stallion as part of Fleet Week New York 2025, at Perth Amboy High School, Perth Amboy, New Jersey, May 21, 2025.

America’s warfighting Navy and Marine Corps celebrate 250 years of protecting American prosperity and freedom. Fleet Week New York 2025 honors the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard’s enduring role on, under, and above the seas.

05.21.2025

Video by Lance Cpl. Matthew McDonnell 

Communication Directorate

Putin’s War: How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Triggered a Scientific Exodus

When Vladimir Putin launched his “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he envisioned a swift victory that would restore Russia’s great power status.

Instead, the invasion has triggered one of the most devastating scientific brain drains in modern history, systematically dismantling the mathematics and physics capabilities that Russia had built over centuries.

What emerges from this catastrophe is a stark illustration of how authoritarian aggression can backfire spectacularly, weakening the very foundations of national strength it purports to defend.

Russia has long prided itself on its scientific heritage. From Dmitri Mendeleev’s periodic table to Andrei Kolmogorov’s contributions to probability theory, from Lev Landau’s groundbreaking work in theoretical physics to the Soviet space program’s early triumphs, Russian science has produced world-changing discoveries.

The country’s mathematical traditions, in particular, have been legendary as Soviet mathematicians dominated international competitions and made foundational contributions to fields ranging from topology to number theory. This legacy made Russia a global center of excellence in mathematics and physics, attracting international collaboration and respect.

Today, that legacy lies in ruins, scattered across European and American universities and research institutes where Russian scientists have sought refuge from Putin’s increasingly authoritarian regime.

The Great Exodus Begins

The scope of the scientific exodus that began with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is staggering. According to reports from multiple sources, at least 2,500 scientists have fled Russia since February 24, 2022, with experts describing the phenomenon as a “disaster” for Russian science. This figure likely represents a conservative estimate, as many departures go unreported and the true scale of the exodus may be several times larger.

Among those who have left are at least 34 physicists and mathematicians from Russia’s most prestigious institutions.2 These are not marginal figures but acclaimed scientists with established careers. Up to a quarter of the departing scientists have citation H-Index scores of 10 or higher a metric indicating successful careers spanning decades of research experience. Many maintained ties to foreign universities, making their departure not just a loss of individual talent but a severing of crucial international networks that had taken years to build.

The human stories behind these statistics are particularly poignant.

Yevhen Makedonsky, a mathematician born in Ukraine’s Melitopol, had built a successful career in Russia, obtaining his PhD from the Higher School of Economics and spending over five years at Skoltech studying representation theory. When Russian tanks began assaulting his hometown, he realized “that the Russia I knew was over, the Third Reich has begun.” He managed to escape Russia in late February 2022, eventually finding refuge at the Max Planck Institute for Mathematics.

Vladimir Marakhonov, a physicist who worked at the prestigious Ioffe Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the 1980s and 1990s, left Russia for Finland in September 2022. “We discussed the situation after February 2022 with my colleagues and agreed that a catastrophe and madness is happening,” he explained. His observation about the nature of the exodus is particularly telling: “The trouble is that it is primarily smart people who leave.”

The Institutional Collapse

The brain drain has not affected Russian scientific institutions uniformly but it has struck hardest at the most prestigious and internationally connected universities. The Higher School of Economics (HSE), which Vladimir Putin himself had praised in 2010 as “cutting-edge in every respect,” exemplifies this institutional collapse. The university has lost approximately 700 faculty members since the war began, causing it to plummet almost 100 spots in global rankings, from 305th to 399th position.

The HSE’s decline began even before the invasion, as authorities increased pressure on faculty members who showed insufficient loyalty to the regime. The university received a new rector in 2021 who launched a gradual purge of faculty members. “As his team grew, the pressure within the university was becoming more and more systemic,” recalled Ilya Inishev, a Doctor of Philosophy who worked at HSE from 2010 until 2022. Inishev was eventually dismissed for “serious damage” his antiwar comments “inflicted on the university’s reputation” and moved to Germany in April 2023.

The pattern extends far beyond HSE. Research by Novaya-Europe identified at least 270 university staff members from Moscow and St. Petersburg’s high-ranking universities who have severed ties with Russia since the war broke out. Among these, 195 are considered Russian scientists, while the rest are foreigners who had been working in Russia. The HSE leads with 160 departures, followed by St. Petersburg State University with 35, and the Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology with 32.

These figures represent only the verified cases from open sources. The actual number is likely much higher, as many departures are not publicly documented. Former HSE Professor “Mikhail” (a pseudonym) noted that in his department, “all PhDs, except for one, all senior researchers, and foreigners” eventually left.

The International Scientific Boycott

Putin’s invasion did not just trigger an internal exodus. It also provoked an unprecedented international scientific boycott that has systematically isolated Russian institutions from global research networks. The response was swift and comprehensive, affecting everything from major international collaborations to routine academic exchanges.

One of the most symbolic casualties was the $300-million Skoltech program, a joint initiative between MIT and Russian partners that represented one of the most ambitious East-West scientific collaborations of the post-Cold War era. The program was dissolved within one day of the invasion, with no foreseeable restart in the future. This termination eliminated not just funding but also the institutional framework that had enabled hundreds of researchers to collaborate across national boundaries.

The European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), which had served as a bridge between East and West even during the darkest days of the Cold War, made the unprecedented decision to bar all Russian observers and terminate the contracts of approximately 1,000 Russian scientists or about 8% of its workforce when their agreements expired. This move was particularly significant given CERN’s historic role as a meeting place for scientists from opposing blocs, a function it had maintained even during the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979.

The boycott extended across the academic spectrum. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, various Australian universities, and the European Association of Universities, which unites 850 institutions, announced the complete cessation of all interaction with Russian organizations. Nordic countries, Finland, Germany, Poland, Denmark, and Norway, refused to continue joint research and education programs. Mathematical societies in several countries announced they would not participate in the International Congress of Mathematicians, which had been scheduled to take place in St. Petersburg in July 2022 but was forced to go virtual instead.

The isolation extends to research infrastructure and publishing. Many firms outside Russia, particularly in the European Union, have refused to supply scientific equipment to Russian institutions for fear of violating sanctions. Access to Western scientific journals has been compromised due to financial problems and the devaluation of the ruble, with the Russian Foundation for Basic Research unable to pay subscription fees to major publishers like Springer.

The Quality of the Loss

What makes this brain drain particularly devastating for Russia is not just its scale but its quality. The scientists who are leaving represent the most internationally connected and productive segments of the Russian research community. This follows a pattern observed in other historical episodes of scientific migration: the most talented and networked individuals are often the first and most able to leave.

Research on software developers which is a closely related high-skilled community illustrates this dynamic clearly. Analysis of GitHub data shows that by November 2022, 11.1% of Russian developers had listed a new country, compared with only 2.8% of developers from comparable countries not directly involved in the conflict. More tellingly, the 11% of developers who left Russia had been responsible for 20% of the country’s international collaborations in the software development community.

This pattern reflects a broader truth about brain drain: it is not random.

Those who leave tend to be better connected both domestically and internationally. In the global collaboration network, 43.0% of departing developers had ties with colleagues in other countries, compared with only 24.3% of those who remained. The same dynamics likely apply to academic researchers, meaning that Russia is losing not just individual scientists but the crucial nodes that connected Russian science to the global research community.

The emigrants themselves represent a remarkable pool of human capital. Approximately 80% have higher education and work in fields requiring intellectual expertise, including IT, data analysis, business, science, and culture. They tend to be young, between 20 and 40 years old, representing the demographic cohort that would normally form the backbone of Russia’s future scientific leadership.

Historical Parallels: The Nazi Germany Precedent

The current Russian scientific exodus bears uncomfortable similarities to one of history’s most catastrophic episodes of scientific self-destruction: Nazi Germany’s purge of Jewish scientists in the 1930s. The parallels are not just metaphorical for they offer concrete insights into the long-term consequences Russia may face.

When Hitler declared he would rid German universities of Jews even if it meant “the annihilation of contemporary German science,” he achieved exactly that outcome. The 15% of German physicists who lost their jobs were the country’s most productive researchers, accounting for 64% of all physics citations in Germany. This was not just a loss of individual talent but a systematic dismantling of the research networks and institutional knowledge that had made German science a world leader.

Many of these displaced scientists found refuge in Britain and the United States, where they continued their groundbreaking work. Several would play crucial roles in the Manhattan Project which was a bitter irony that saw Germany’s scientific talent contributing to the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton became a particular beneficiary, housing scientists like Kurt Gödel, Hermann Weyl, and Albert Einstein.

The economic research on such episodes confirms their long-lasting impact. Studies of academic emigration from Nazi Germany and deaths of academics during World War II show that these shocks diminished local research productivity for decades. Human capital, unlike physical capital, cannot be quickly rebuilt or replaced. The loss of experienced researchers creates cascading effects: fewer mentors for graduate students, weakened research networks, reduced institutional knowledge, and diminished capacity to train the next generation of scientists.

The Authoritarian Escalation

What makes the current Russian brain drain particularly tragic is that it appears to be accelerating due to the government’s own actions. Rather than recognizing the damage being inflicted on Russian science and taking steps to retain talent, the Putin regime has doubled down on policies that actively drive scientists away.

Since 2015, at least a dozen Russian physicists have been arrested on charges of “high treason” for the simple act of working with foreign colleagues or publishing in foreign journals. These scientists were not directly involved in weapons work but their transgression was conducting research with international partners, the very activity that had historically made Russian science strong. The message to the scientific community could not be clearer: international collaboration, the lifeblood of modern research, is now grounds for imprisonment.

The Russian authorities have explicitly embraced what they call a policy of isolationism from the international scientific community, deliberately echoing the practices of the Soviet Iron Curtain era. This represents a fundamental reversal of the policies that had allowed Russian science to recover from the post-Soviet collapse and begin reintegrating with global research networks.

The pressure extends beyond formal arrests to systematic institutional harassment. Universities have been purging faculty members who express opposition to the war or insufficient enthusiasm for government policies. The HSE alone shut down at least six departments in the 18 months following the invasion. Faculty members report an atmosphere of fear and suspicion that makes serious research increasingly difficult.

The Economic Dimensions

The brain drain occurs against the backdrop of a broader economic crisis that had been undermining Russian science even before the war. Since 2008, funding for scientific research as a percentage of GDP has stagnated at around 1% for more than a decade. While Russia ranked ninth globally in absolute Research and Development expenses in 2020, it lagged far behind: 12.1 times behind China and 15 times behind the United States, with the gap continuing to widen.

Salaries for researchers remain dismally low. A senior researcher earns an average of 26,000 rubles (about €280) per month, while a professor earns 36,000 rubles (€390). Despite presidential decrees mandating salary increases to 200% of regional averages, no additional funding has been allocated to achieve this goal. Universities have responded by converting scientists to part-time positions, a bureaucratic sleight of hand that meets the letter of the presidential decree while actually reducing researchers’ total compensation.

The war has exacerbated these underlying problems. International sanctions have made it increasingly difficult to import scientific equipment, cutting Russian researchers off from the tools they need to conduct competitive research. The collapse of the ruble has made international travel for conferences effectively impossible for most researchers. Even basic access to scientific literature has become problematic as institutions struggle to pay subscription fees to international publishers.

The International Response: Selective Support

Numerous Western countries and institutions have launched programs to aid displaced Russian scientists, recognizing the humanitarian implications and the chance to bolster research capabilities in the West. These initiatives include research grants, fellowships, and institutional support expressly tailored for scientists fleeing Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine due to the war.

The London Institute for Mathematical Sciences did establish the Arnold Fellowships, which are three-year research positions specifically aimed at mathematicians and theoretical physicists from Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The program is named after Vladimir Arnold, the renowned Ukrainian-born Russian mathematician, and aims to “support Russian scientists, at the expense of Russian science,” emphasizing the strategic intent to attract talent and weaken hostile institutions. The Institute’s official announcement highlights the notion that “Russia’s brain drain is Britain’s gain,” reflecting the dual humanitarian and strategic motives behind such fellowships.

The European Union has publicly discussed repurposing frozen Russian assets, with figures as high as €320 billion under investigation for reconstruction efforts and potentially for supporting displaced researchers in Europe. These proposals remain under active consideration, with debate on the allocations and legal mechanisms, but they underscore the scale and intent of Western support for affected scientific communities.

National research bodies in various countries including Germany, France, and the United States have established formal programs to help displaced scientists, offering temporary positions, funding, and long-term career integration opportunities. These efforts provide both immediate humanitarian relief and contribute to sustaining scientific productivity beyond Russia’s borders.

Long-term Consequences

The full impact of this scientific exodus will likely take decades to manifest, but the early indicators are ominous for Russia. Research output has already begun to decline measurably. International collaborations with Russian scientists fell by 34% by 2024 compared to 2021 levels. The number of scientific articles published by Russian researchers, which had been declining even before the war, is expected to continue its downward trajectory.

More fundamentally, Russia is losing its capacity to train the next generation of world-class researchers. Graduate programs are being disrupted by faculty departures, while the most promising students are increasingly likely to seek opportunities abroad. This creates a vicious cycle: as the quality of Russian research institutions declines, they become less attractive to both domestic and international talent, further accelerating the brain drain.

The geographical distribution of emigrants suggests that many of these departures may be permanent. The United States is by far the most popular destination among Russian researchers, while significant numbers have also settled in Germany, Canada, and other Western countries. Greater distances impose significant costs on collaboration and communication, making it unlikely that these scientists will maintain strong ties to Russian institutions even if political conditions improve.

Russia’s loss is manifestly the world’s gain. A study titled “The Great Exodus: A Portrait of New Migrants from Russia” found that about a quarter of Russian emigrants already speak the language of their new country or are making significant efforts to learn it, suggesting successful integration into their host societies.9 Many are already thriving in their new environments, contributing to research programs and institutions that compete directly with Russia.

The Geopolitical Implications

The scientific brain drain represents more than just an academic problem. It has profound implications for Russia’s long-term geopolitical position. Modern military capabilities increasingly depend on advanced technologies that require sophisticated scientific research and development. The hypersonic weapons that Russia has deployed in Ukraine, for example, rely on precisely the kinds of physics research that the country is now losing the capacity to conduct at the highest levels.

More broadly, scientific prowess has become a key indicator of national power in the 21st century. Countries that lead in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced materials, and other cutting-edge fields will have decisive advantages in both economic competition and military conflict. By systematically dismantling its scientific capabilities, Russia is weakening its position in the very domains that will determine great power status in the coming decades.

The irony is particularly acute given Putin’s stated goal of restoring Russia as a great power. What he done is return Russian science to the Brezhnev years and the complaints of leading scientists like Andrei Sakharov.

The invasion of Ukraine was ostensibly launched to prevent Western encroachment and reassert Russian influence. Instead, it has accelerated Russia’s relative decline by driving away the human capital that represents the foundation of genuine national strength in the modern era.

Conclusion: The Price of Authoritarianism

Putin’s war in Ukraine has inflicted many costs on Russia, from economic sanctions to international isolation to military casualties. But perhaps none will prove as enduringly damaging as the scientific brain drain that began on February 24, 2022. In triggering the exodus of thousands of Russia’s most talented researchers, the invasion has achieved something that decades of Western pressure could never accomplish: the systematic weakening of Russian scientific capabilities from within.

The tragedy extends beyond Russia’s borders. Science is fundamentally a cooperative enterprise that benefits from the free exchange of ideas and the collaboration of talented individuals regardless of nationality. The barriers that now separate Russian scientists from their international colleagues represent a loss for human knowledge as well as a setback for Russia specifically.

Yet the responsibility for this catastrophe lies squarely with the Putin regime’s choices. By launching an unprovoked war of aggression, by persecuting scientists who maintain international contacts, and by embracing isolation over integration, Russia’s leadership has chosen policies that inevitably drive away scientific talent. The brain drain is not an unfortunate side effect of the war. It is the predictable consequence of authoritarianism applied to the inherently international enterprise of scientific research.

The mathematicians and physicists now working in European and American universities represent more than individual success stories. They are living proof that human talent transcends national boundaries and that the pursuit of knowledge cannot be constrained by authoritarian regimes. Their exodus from Russia and integration into Western institutions represents both a strategic victory for democratic societies and a powerful demonstration of the self-defeating nature of Putin’s imperial project.

As Russia continues to pay the price for its leader’s miscalculations and his pseudo-Tsarism, the global scientific community has gained an influx of talented researchers whose contributions will advance human knowledge for decades to come.

The only question is whether Russia will recognize the magnitude of its loss before it becomes irreversible or whether Putin’s war will be remembered as the moment when Russia chose isolation over excellence and authoritarianism over the free exchange of ideas that makes science possible.

SLTE 1-25

09/03/2025

U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461 conduct simulated troop insertion operations with 2nd Battalion 23rd Marines at Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms, California, Feb. 07, 2025.

HMH-461 and other squadrons assigned to 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing trained to integrate with and support Marine ground units during Service Level Training Event (SLTE) 1-25, a series of training events designed to prepare Marines for operations around the globe.

TWENTYNINE PALMS, CALIFORNIA

02.07.2025

Video by Cpl. Anakin Smith 

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing    

External Lift with CH-53K King Stallions

09/01/2025

U.S. Marines with 2nd Distribution Support Battalion, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, and Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron (HMH) 461, 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing, execute external lifts at Naval Air Station Key West, Florida, July 21, 2025. Marines with 2nd MAW and 2nd DSB trained alongside elements of the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to refine humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities while also refining the CH-53K King Stallion’s ability to support distributed aviation operations in a joint environment.

07.21.2025

Video by Sgt. Rowdy Vanskike

2nd Marine Aircraft Wing

See the interview with Col Fleeger:

The CH-53K in Action: Bridging the Gap Between Technology and New Operational Possibilities

 

Russia’s Yuan Pivot: How Sanctions Forced Moscow’s Currency Revolution

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, few predicted that within two years, Chinese yuan would become the dominant foreign currency in Russian markets.

Yet this dramatic shift represents one of the most significant unintended consequences of Western sanctions forcing Moscow into an unprecedented economic dependency on Beijing that reshapes global currency dynamics.

The transformation has been nothing short of remarkable. Between January 2022 and December 2024, the share of currencies from countries “unfriendly” to Russia plummeted from 87% to just 18% for exports and from 67% to 18% for imports. By December 2024, President Vladimir Putin announced that nearly 90% of Russia-China transactions were being settled in yuan and rubles.

This wasn’t a gradual transition. It was economic whiplash. Following the invasion, Russia “overnight became unable to transact in dollars and euros — the world’s dominant currencies” as Western sanctions severed Moscow’s access to the global financial system that had dominated international trade for decades.

The numbers tell a compelling story of rapid financial reorientation. On the Moscow Stock Exchange, yuan’s proportion skyrocketed from a mere 3% in 2022 to 54% by May 2024. After the Moscow Exchange itself was targeted by U.S. sanctions in summer 2024, yuan transactions reached an extraordinary 99.8% of all foreign currency trading.

By 2023, the yuan had achieved what seemed impossible just years earlier: it became the most popular currency on the Moscow Exchange, surpassing even the U.S. dollar. Russian banks held $68.7 billion in yuan by 2023, exceeding the $64.7 billion held in U.S. dollars.

The yuan’s dominance wasn’t accidental for it was the only viable option. Among potential alternatives like the Indian rupee or South African rand, China’s currency stood alone as “arguably the only relatively stable, widely traded currency issued by a non-sanctioning authority that enables Russia to make international transactions.”

Beijing facilitated this transition through currency swap agreements between central banks, allowing Russia to exchange rubles for yuan. Chinese banks accumulated Russian assets, increasing yuan circulation in the Russian economy. This infrastructure became crucial as Russia found itself cut off from SWIFT and other traditional financial networks.

However, Russia’s “yuanization” comes with significant vulnerabilities. The country has essentially “swapped its dollar dependence for reliance on the yuan”, creating new risks should relations with China deteriorate. Moscow now faces potential “reserve losses and payment disruptions” if Beijing’s policies change.

These concerns became reality in September 2024 when “the Russian market hit a yuan liquidity crisis as interest rates for ruble borrowing increased to 20%.” While officials reported the crisis was resolved by early 2025, yuan availability remains inadequate to meet demand for yuan-denominated loans for Russian businesses,

The relationship faces increasing strain from U.S. secondary sanctions threats. Chinese banks have grown reluctant to process yuan transactions with Russia, leading to significant payment delays. Some major Chinese financial institutions, including Ping An Bank, Bank of Ningbo, and China Guangfa Bank, have stopped accepting Russian payments entirely, while processing times for approved transactions stretched to eighteen days.

This caution reflects Beijing’s broader strategy of supporting Russia while avoiding actions that could trigger secondary sanctions or damage China’s access to EU and U.S. markets. Despite bold announcements of $200 billion in planned investments, most cooperation projects remain “only on paper.”

The economic relationship reveals a fundamental imbalance. While China has become essential for Russia, overtaking Europe as its most important trading partner, Russia remains “a relatively unimportant market” for China. This dynamic leaves Russia as the junior partner, “frustrated by its shift from being a major exporter of high-value goods to China to primarily exporting energy and commodities.”

Annual bilateral trade has reached $240 billion according to Chinese customs data, with Chinese goods now accounting for 38% of Russia’s imports. China has even acquired monopolies on whole categories of Russian imports, enabling it to charge higher prices to Russian consumers compared to other markets.

Russia’s forced pivot to the yuan represents more than bilateral economic adjustment—it signals a potential fracturing of the dollar-dominated global financial system. Yet there is concern that “higher yuan internationalization means that the Chinese government needs more dollar reserves” to support yuan stability. Rather than weakening the dollar, the yuan’s rise may complement rather than challenge dollar dominance.

The transformation also highlights the limits of sanctions evasion. While China has provided Russia an alternative currency lifeline, the constant threat of secondary sanctions creates ongoing instability and uncertainty for Russian businesses trying to operate in this new financial landscape.

As Russia continues to navigate its sanctions-constrained economy, its dependence on Chinese yuan appears set to deepen despite the challenges. The infrastructure for yuan-ruble transactions is “here to stay now, even if the war in Ukraine were to end tomorrow and Russia were to rebuild ties with the West”.

This currency revolution, born from geopolitical necessity rather than economic choice, demonstrates how quickly global financial relationships can shift when traditional systems become inaccessible.

Whether this represents a temporary wartime adjustment or a permanent realignment of global currency flows remains to be seen, but Russia’s yuan pivot has already reshaped the landscape of international finance in ways that will likely persist long after the current conflict ends.

Note: The quotes are taken from the sources indicated throughout the article.

F-35B Ordnance Load

U.S. Marines load air intercept missile ordnance and launch F-35B Lightning II aircraft assigned to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 242, 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, during flight operations aboard the amphibious assault ship USS America (LHA 6), in the Philippine Sea, June 3, 2025.

Marine F-35Bs bring a 5th generation multi-discipline strike capability to support combined-joint all domain operations in key maritime terrain. The 31st MEU is operating aboard ships of the USS America Amphibious Ready Group in the 7th Fleet area of operations, the U.S. Navy’s largest forward deployed numbered fleet, and routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

PHILIPPINE SEA

06.02.2025

Video by Cpl. Alora Finigan 

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit