By Robbin Laird

Air Commodore Alun Roberts, Head Air to Air Missiles Royal Air Force, outlined in a virtual presentation to the seminar, Britain’s ambitious defence transformation in response to evolving global security challenges.

The United Kingdom’s recently published Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025 represents nothing sa paradigm shift in British defence thinking. He argued that is one driven by the harsh realities of contemporary warfare and an increasingly dangerous global security environment.

The Strategic Imperative: A World Transformed

The SDR’s genesis lies in what Roberts described as the definitive shattering of “optimistic notions” about global stability. The illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 served as a brutal awakening, demonstrating that the post-Cold War era of relative peace was over. The review explicitly identifies Russia as the primary threat, noting that Moscow’s aggression has become “more sophisticated and more basic” across all operational domains—land, sea, air, space, and crucially, cyberspace.

This threat assessment has driven what Roberts characterised as a “NATO-first approach,” representing a fundamental recalibration of British strategic priorities. However, this European focus should not be misunderstood as isolationist. As Roberts emphasised, “a strong, secure Europe creates greater stability, freeing up capacity and capabilities to contribute to global security challenges.” This philosophy underpins the UK’s continued commitment to global partnerships, particularly with Indo-Pacific allies like Australia.

The strategic review acknowledges that modern security challenges extend far beyond traditional military capabilities. Today’s threats encompass cyber warfare, hybrid operations, economic coercion, and what military analysts term “grey zone” activities—those actions that fall below the threshold of conventional warfare but nonetheless pose serious security risks. The recent incidents along Russia’s eastern borders serve as stark reminders of how quickly situations can escalate in this new strategic environment.

Historic Defence Investment: Backing Words with Resources

The government has announced plans to increase defence expenditure from the current 2.3% of GDP to an ambitious 2.5% by 2035, a trajectory that Roberts described as “clear and irreversible.” More significantly, the UK anticipates core defence spending rising toward 3.5% of GDP, with an additional 1.5% allocated for broader national security investments encompassing cyber defence, counter-terrorism, and critical infrastructure protection.

This represents one of the largest defence spending increases in NATO since the end of the Cold War. To put this in perspective, reaching 2.5% of GDP would place the UK among the highest defence spenders in the alliance, demonstrating genuine commitment to burden-sharing that goes far beyond political rhetoric. The sustained nature of this investment signals to allies and adversaries alike that Britain is serious about its security responsibilities.

The investment serves multiple strategic objectives beyond simple capability enhancement. It will modernise the Armed Forces with cutting-edge equipment and technology, strengthen the UK’s defence industrial base, and create thousands of high-skilled jobs across the country. As Roberts noted, a robust defence industry is “not just an economic asset for it’s a strategic imperative.” This investment will drive innovation, ensure domestic capacity for equipment production and maintenance, and reduce dependence on potentially unreliable foreign suppliers.

Industrial Renaissance: Lessons from Ukraine

The conflict in Ukraine has provided sobering lessons about the importance of industrial capacity in modern warfare. Even highly advanced military forces can rapidly deplete their stockpiles during high-intensity operations, making sustained production capabilities absolutely critical. This realisation has prompted a significant expansion of the UK’s domestic munitions production capacity.

The SDR announces the establishment of six new munitions factories across the United Kingdom, representing substantial investment in national security infrastructure. These facilities will focus on producing diverse ranges of critical munitions including artillery shells vital for ground operations, anti-tank missiles, and sophisticated air-to-air missiles. The strategic importance of this investment cannot be overstated. It ensures the UK can maintain prolonged operations while contributing to collective defence efforts across NATO.

This industrial expansion serves dual purposes: enhancing national security while boosting economic prosperity. The new factories will create thousands of high-skilled manufacturing jobs, supporting local economies and fostering engineering expertise that has strategic value beyond defence applications. Moreover, it positions the UK as a reliable supplier for allied nations, strengthening diplomatic relationships through practical defence cooperation.

Royal Air Force Transformation: Next-Generation Air Power

The SDR outlines an ambitious transformation of Royal Air Force capabilities, built on what Roberts termed “several interconnected, mutually reinforcing key pillars.” This represents the most comprehensive modernisation of British air power since the jet age, designed to ensure the RAF remains among the world’s most capable and technologically advanced air forces.

At the heart of this transformation lies the F-35 Lightning programme. The government has confirmed a crucial enhancement to the UK’s F-35 procurement strategy, deciding to acquire the conventional F-35A variant alongside the existing F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing fleet. This mixed approach offers significant strategic advantages: the F-35A provides greater range and payload capacity while serving as a key component of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft nuclear mission, underscoring Britain’s deep integration into alliance nuclear burden-sharing arrangements.

The decision reflects sophisticated strategic thinking about air power requirements. While F-35B aircraft will continue their vital role operating from the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers and expeditionary bases, F-35A aircraft will enhance land-based combat capabilities and provide improved training opportunities. Crucially, this approach offers greater interoperability with the majority of NATO allies who operate the F-35A variant.

Existing Typhoon aircraft will undergo rigorous upgrades to ensure their continued relevance well into the next decade. The most significant enhancement involves integrating the Enhanced Electronic Warfare (EW) system known as ECRS Mark 2, transforming the Typhoon into a formidable electronic attack platform alongside its traditional air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. This capability is increasingly vital in modern warfare, where electronic dominance often determines battle outcomes.

Future Combat Systems: GCAP and Beyond

The Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP), also known by various names including Future Combat Air System and Tempest, represents one of the most ambitious international defence collaborations in decades. This groundbreaking effort between close partners aims to develop next-generation fighter aircraft designed specifically for highly contested environments expected in future conflicts.

GCAP aircraft will embody cutting-edge stealth technology, advanced sensors, and unprecedented connectivity, providing decisive technological advantages against peer adversaries. The programme represents the future of air power projection and deterrence, designed to complement and eventually replace both the F-35 and Typhoon fleets. While ambitious and complex, GCAP demonstrates how international cooperation can achieve capabilities that would be prohibitively expensive for individual nations.

Supporting this next-generation platform, the UK is developing advanced standoff weapons including the SPEAR 3 missile and Future Cruise Anti-Ship Weapon (FCASW). The SDR also introduces Britain’s ambition for next-generation air-to-air capabilities through the Future Air Superiority Effects (FASE) programme. FASE will develop advanced air-to-air missiles ensuring British combat aircraft maintain decisive advantages in aerial engagements, covering everything from sophisticated high-threat targets to the high-volume, low-cost threats demonstrated by Russian forces.

Autonomous Revolution: Embracing Uncrewed Systems

Perhaps no aspect of the SDR is more forward-looking than its embrace of autonomous and uncrewed systems. The conflict in Ukraine has vividly demonstrated the transformative power of drones, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems in modern warfare. The Royal Air Force is committed to what Roberts called an “autonomous revolution” with ambitious plans for autonomous combat aircraft complementing crewed platforms.

The strategic vision involves creating a “high-low capability mix” where uncrewed systems comprise a substantial proportion of air platforms. This approach offers increased agility, enhanced resilience, and critically, the ability to operate in contested environments with reduced risk to human life. It addresses the “mass problem” that has concerned military planners for decades, freeing up expensive crewed platforms for the most demanding and complex missions.

To accelerate this transformation, the UK is investing significantly in establishing a new Defence Uncrewed Systems Centre by 2026. This facility will focus on the rapid adoption and seamless integration of autonomous technologies across all services, ensuring Britain remains at the forefront of military innovation.

Air and Missile Defence: Addressing Capability Gaps

After decades of what Roberts frankly acknowledged as poor policy decisions leading to disinvestment in air defence, the UK is making a decisive reversal. The SDR allocates £1 billion specifically for homeland air and missile defence—a critical investment given increasingly sophisticated aerial threats ranging from ballistic missiles and hypersonic vehicles to the proliferation of low-cost, high-volume drone threats evident along Europe’s eastern borders.

This investment will create a layered, adaptive defence system capable of responding to the full spectrum of aerial threats. The urgency of this requirement has been highlighted by recent events, demonstrating how quickly air defence can become a matter of national survival rather than merely military capability.

Ukraine: The Defining Conflict

Central to the SDR’s strategic framework is unwavering support for Ukraine. Roberts was unequivocal in describing the conflict not as a regional dispute but as “a profound battle for the fundamental principles of sovereignty, self-determination, and the very future of the international rules-based order.” This perspective drives much of the review’s analysis and recommendations.

Britain has already committed billions in military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, with these commitments set to increase in line with rising defence spending. The UK is actively contributing to international initiatives leveraging seized Russian assets to fund Ukraine’s recovery, ensuring Russia pays for the damage it has inflicted. More fundamentally, the lessons from Ukraine are directly shaping British defence thinking, highlighting the importance of adaptable innovation, robust industrial bases, and whole-of-society approaches to national security.

Global Implications and Allied Cooperation

While the SDR emphasises European security, Roberts was careful to reinforce that this focus complements rather than detracts from broader international partnerships. The UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt remains intact, with the recognition that global challenges—from state aggression to cyber threats—require coordinated international responses.

The review strengthens collective resolve by demonstrating that shared values and common threats can drive effective cooperation on a global scale. For allies like Australia, a stronger, more secure Europe provides stability that enables greater focus on other regions and challenges.

Conclusion: Strength Through Unity

The UK’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 represents a comprehensive response to an increasingly dangerous world. It demonstrates how nations can adapt to evolving threats while maintaining core principles and international partnerships. Through unprecedented investment, industrial expansion, technological innovation, and unwavering support for allies under attack, Britain is positioning itself not just to deter aggression but to help shape a more secure global future.

As Air Commodore Roberts concluded, this transformation stems not from any desire for conflict but from a profound understanding that strength, unity, and unwavering support for those under attack represent the most effective means of deterring aggression and safeguarding shared values. In an era where the international rules-based order faces its greatest challenge since 1945, the UK’s response offers a model for how democracies can adapt, modernise, and prevail against authoritarian threats.

Featured image: Air Commodore Alun Roberts, Head Air to Air Missiles Royal Air Force, as seen on the video hookup with the seminar.

 

By Robbin Laird

The nature of warfare is fundamentally unchanged — it remains a contest of political will between adversaries. However, the character of how wars are fought has transformed dramatically.

In an era where conflicts can be decided before the first missile is fired or the first shot is taken, military forces worldwide are grappling with a critical challenge: how to synchronize non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains to achieve decisive advantage?

This challenge was the focus of a panel discussion at the Sir Richard Williams Foundation seminar where senior military leaders and defence experts explored the complexities of integrating these invisible yet potentially decisive capabilities. Their insights reveal both the immense potential and significant obstacles facing modern military forces as they prepare for conflicts that may be won or lost in domains most people cannot see.

The New Reality of Warfare

“Victory in the 21st century belongs to whoever can see, decide and act faster than their opponent,” observed Admiral Paparo, Commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, a sentiment that encapsulates the fundamental shift in modern warfare. The speed of relevance or the ability to generate effects at the pace of contemporary conflict has become the defining characteristic of military effectiveness.∗

Lieutenant General Susan Coyle, Chief of Joint Capabilities for the Australian Defence Force, put the stakes in stark terms: “My assertion is that the use of non-kinetic effects and our ability to defend against those effects prior to and during conflict will likely be the deciding factor in who prevails.”

This isn’t hyperbole; it’s a recognition that in an interconnected, technology-dependent world, the ability to disrupt, deny, or degrade an adversary’s systems without kinetic destruction may prove more decisive than traditional firepower.

The shift represents a fundamental evolution from the industrial-age concept of warfare, where victory was measured in terms of physical destruction and territorial control, to an information-age paradigm where victory may be achieved through the disruption of decision-making cycles, communication networks, and the technological systems that enable modern military operations.

Space: The Ultimate High Ground

Space has evolved from a supporting domain to a warfighting domain in its own right. Modern military operations are utterly dependent on space-based assets for communications, navigation, intelligence gathering, and precision strike capabilities. Yet this dependence creates vulnerabilities that adversaries are increasingly prepared to exploit.

“Any escalation into kinetic conflict in space risks denying access to all of our users with devastating consequences,” LTGEN Coyle warned, “not only for national security or the economy, but especially for our defence operations.” The challenge is that kinetic attacks in space create debris fields that can persist for decades, potentially denying space access to all users both for friend and foe alike.

This reality has driven military planners toward “scalable, reversible options to deter adversaries and deny them freedom of action in space.” Non-kinetic space operations, such as jamming satellite communications or temporarily blinding reconnaissance satellites, offer the ability to achieve military effects while maintaining the possibility of de-escalation.

The dual-use nature of space infrastructure complicates matters further. Unlike traditional military assets that are clearly identifiable and under military control, space capabilities increasingly rely on commercial systems and international partnerships. This creates both opportunities for resilience through diversity and challenges in command and control during crisis or conflict.

Cyberspace: The Soft Underbelly

Cyber operations represent perhaps the most misunderstood aspect of modern warfare. Popular culture often portrays cyber warfare as instantaneous or “warfare at the speed of light.” The reality, as Professor Justin Bronk noted, is quite different: “Counter military networks type cyber payloads are one of the slowest forms of warfare. You’re actually looking at between 18 months and three years, often to develop and embed a capability in an adversary Air Defence Network.”

This temporal disconnect between cyber capabilities and operational needs creates significant planning challenges. Unlike kinetic weapons that can be employed rapidly once available, cyber effects require extensive preparation, reconnaissance, and often pre-positioning of capabilities. The payload that could disable an enemy air defence system on day one of a conflict may need to be developed and embedded years in advance.

The classification requirements surrounding cyber operations further complicate their integration into broader military planning. As Bronk observed, “Does the person who’s putting together the campaign plan have the clearances to know that and the compartments to know that that capability exists, let alone the authorities to release it?” Even when cyber capabilities exist, they may not be usable due to legal, operational, or security constraints.

Moreover, cyber effects often lack the predictability of kinetic weapons. A cyber attack may work perfectly in testing but fail in operational use due to software updates, changed configurations, or simply because the target system has been replaced. This uncertainty requires military planners to build redundancy into their operations—something that conflicts with the often one-use nature of sophisticated cyber weapons.

Electromagnetic Spectrum: The Contested Commons

Electronic warfare or the contest for control of the electromagnetic spectrum sits at the intersection of traditional military operations and the new domains of cyber and space. Unlike cyber operations, which may take years to develop, or space operations, which often require complex international coordination, electronic warfare can provide immediate effects across the battlefield.

GPCAPT Steven Thornton, Officer Commanding 82 Wing, RAAF, described the electromagnetic spectrum as fundamental to ensuring “survivability and lethality of the joint coalition force.” His former squadron operates electronic warfare aircraft that can jam enemy radars, disrupt communications, and protect friendly forces from electromagnetic attack.

However, electronic warfare faces its own unique challenges. The effectiveness of jamming depends on signal processing capabilities that are improving rapidly on both sides. As Bronk noted, “over the medium term, the effectiveness of stand-off jamming, where radar range equations are really working against you, is going to get harder and harder to have the effects that you need.”

This evolution is driving military forces toward “stand-in” electronic warfare platforms or systems that can penetrate closer to enemy territory to deliver jamming effects at shorter ranges where they remain effective. This shift parallels broader trends in military operations toward distributed, resilient systems rather than centralized, high-value platforms.

The Challenge of Synchronization

The complexity of integrating effects across these three domains cannot be overstated. Each operates on different timelines, requires different skill sets, and faces different limitations. Synchronizing them effectively requires not just technical integration but fundamental changes in military culture, education, and organizational structure.

One of the most significant barriers to effective synchronization is a basic lack of understanding across the military about what these domains can and cannot do. “There are still people out there that say to me, ‘What do you do in space and cyber? I’ve got no idea,’ and they’ve been in the defence force for decades,” General Coyle observed. “It’s a fail on all of us.”

This knowledge gap isn’t merely about technical details. It’s about fundamental operational concepts. The classification requirements that shroud many of these capabilities mean that even senior officers may lack the clearances or compartmentalized access needed to understand what options are available. As a result, non-kinetic effects are often treated as afterthoughts rather than integral components of military operations.

The solution requires systematic education reform across military institutions. Officers need to understand not just what these capabilities can do, but their limitations, timelines, and integration requirements. This education must extend beyond specialists to include all military personnel who might be involved in planning or executing operations.

Perhaps the most challenging aspect of synchronization is reconciling the vastly different timelines required for different types of effects. Kinetic operations can often be planned and executed within hours or days. Electronic warfare effects can be generated immediately once platforms are in position. But cyber operations may require months or years of preparation, and space operations must account for orbital mechanics that cannot be changed at will.

This creates “the day two problem” or the challenge of maintaining effectiveness after initial operations. As Bronk explained, “It’s one thing to deny their kill chain on day one that might stop them from finding, fixing and striking your targets, but all they have to do is not fire. They’ve then seen your electronic warfare effect, or your cyber attack, your payload has been activated, whatever it is. Day two, they’ll have dug it out and they’ll have worked out a counter signal and whatever.”

The pace of adaptation in modern conflicts has accelerated dramatically. In Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are updating electronic warfare techniques and cyber defences at unprecedented rates, sometimes within hours of encountering new threats. Military forces must be prepared not just to deliver effects, but to sustain them through multiple cycles of adaptation and counter-adaptation.

Beyond technical challenges, effective synchronization requires overcoming deeply embedded military cultures that have evolved around kinetic operations. Traditional military planning processes, organizational structures, and even the language used to describe operations all reflect a kinetic-centric worldview.

“We traditionally just go for a kinetic action or a kinetic effect. We just don’t think about the other options and availability because people aren’t educated enough,” General Coyle noted. This isn’t simply about adding non-kinetic options to existing plans. It requires fundamental rethinking of how military operations are conceived, planned, and executed.

The classification barriers that surround many non-kinetic capabilities exacerbate this problem. Traditional military planning relies on open discussion, war-gaming, and iterative refinement of concepts. When key capabilities cannot be discussed outside of highly restricted environments, it becomes extremely difficult to integrate them effectively into broader operational concepts.

Lessons from Current Conflicts

The ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East provide valuable insights into both the potential and limitations of non-kinetic effects in practice. These conflicts have served as testing grounds for new concepts and capabilities, revealing both successes and failures that inform future military planning.

The conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the critical importance of adapting non-kinetic capabilities at the speed of conflict. Professor Bronk noted the acceleration of iterative pace in the European theatre, where “both the Russians and the Ukrainians have to change waveforms, update mission data as more and more of the UAVs, and also conventional targets like flight control radars and target acquisition radars are digitally defined, regularly updated.”

This conflict has also revealed the limitations of traditional approaches to electronic warfare and cyber operations. Russian forces achieved significant initial success in the first days of the invasion, essentially disabling Ukraine’s air defence network for two and a half days through a combination of cyber attacks and carefully tailored electronic warfare. However, these effects proved temporary as Ukrainian forces adapted by repositioning systems, swapping components, and implementing workarounds.

The conflict has driven both sides toward more distributed, resilient approaches. Rather than relying on large, centralized systems that present attractive targets, military forces are moving toward networks of smaller, more survivable platforms. This trend has implications far beyond Ukraine, suggesting that future conflicts will require non-kinetic capabilities that can operate effectively against distributed, adaptive adversaries.

Interestingly, the lessons from Ukraine may not translate directly to other theatres. Professor Bronk observed an “interesting divergence” between the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. In Europe, the focus has shifted toward distributed tactical-level systems with shorter ranges and faster refresh rates. In the Indo-Pacific, the emphasis remains on longer-range capabilities and third-party weapon handoff systems.

This difference reflects the distinct characteristics of potential conflicts in each theatre. The compressed geography and high density of systems in Europe favors distributed, short-range approaches. The vast distances and sparse basing options in the Indo-Pacific require longer-range capabilities and greater emphasis on disrupting kill chains rather than individual systems.

These differences highlight the importance of tailoring non-kinetic approaches to specific operational environments. There is no one-size-fits-all solution to synchronizing these effects across domains.

Australia’s Unique Position

Australia occupies a unique position in the global landscape of non-kinetic warfare capabilities. Unlike many allied nations, Australia operates significant airborne electronic warfare capabilities through its EA-18G Growler fleet. As Professor Bronk noted, “You’re in a much better position than almost any other medium-sized Air Force and joint force in the world, in that you have a significant integrated existing electronic warfare capability in the airborne sector.”

However, this capability advantage comes with its own challenges. The Australian Defence Force must maintain and modernize these specialized systems while simultaneously developing capabilities in space and cyber domains. This requires not just financial investment but the development of specialized human resources across multiple highly technical fields.

The human dimension of non-kinetic warfare presents particular challenges for a military the size of Australia’s. Unlike kinetic platforms where training pipelines are well-established and career paths clearly defined, the non-kinetic domains require highly specialized skills that are in great demand in the civilian sector.

The Australian Defence Force has responded to this challenge by implementing specialized pay scales for cyber warfare officers and specialists, using the aviation officer pay scale to compete with civilian opportunities. As LTGEN Coyle noted, “We recognize the skills that they bring and how much they could get outside should they choose to leave.”

But compensation alone isn’t sufficient. These fields require long development times. GPCAPT Thornton noted that electronic warfare officers require “three to four years before they become highly proficient in their core trade,” with full proficiency taking up to five years. This creates a significant vulnerability: the loss of experienced personnel can have disproportionate effects on capability.

Australia’s approach to non-kinetic warfare must also grapple with questions of sovereignty and control over critical infrastructure. Much of Australia’s space-based communications and cyber infrastructure is civilian-owned and operated, creating challenges for military planning and control during crisis or conflict.

LTGEN Coyle acknowledged this challenge: “The vast majority of Australia’s space-based cyber power is civilian in nature and privately owned. How do you manage the challenge of getting that to be ready to fight tonight when you don’t control it?”

The answer lies in developing “dual-use” capabilities that combine military and civilian systems, along with robust relationships with industry partners. This approach offers both advantages in terms of resilience and access to cutting-edge technology, but requires careful management of operational security and control authorities.

The Technology Imperative

Underlying all discussions of non-kinetic effects is the recognition that military advantage increasingly depends on technological superiority. The domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic warfare are inherently technology-intensive, requiring constant innovation and adaptation to maintain effectiveness.

One area where technology offers particular promise is in the application of artificial intelligence and machine learning to non-kinetic operations. Professor Bronk noted that while much discussion of AI in military contexts amounts to “snake oil,” there are specific applications where AI demonstrates clear benefits.

“One of the key areas where AI stuff has huge benefits that you can already demonstrate is actually in the mission data and electronic support measures data analysis, and therefore data package update cycle,” Bronk observed. The ability to rapidly process terabytes of electromagnetic spectrum data to identify new threats or changes in adversary systems could dramatically reduce the time required to update defensive and offensive capabilities.

This capability is particularly important given the acceleration of adaptation cycles in modern conflicts. Traditional human analysis methods that require days or weeks to identify and characterize new threats cannot keep pace with adversaries who may update their systems daily or even hourly.

Maintaining technological superiority in non-kinetic domains requires not just military investment but a robust industrial and research base. Unlike kinetic weapons, where production can be scaled up relatively quickly in crisis, many non-kinetic capabilities require specialized knowledge and infrastructure that cannot be rapidly expanded.

This creates strategic vulnerabilities that extend beyond immediate military capabilities. Nations that lack indigenous capabilities in these domains may find themselves dependent on allies or commercial providers whose systems may not be available during crisis or may not meet military requirements for security and reliability.

Future Implications and Requirements

The panel discussion revealed several critical areas where military forces must continue to develop capabilities and concepts for effective non-kinetic operations.

Perhaps the most important requirement is building resilience and adaptability into military systems and operations. The assumption that any particular capability will work exactly as planned is dangerous in an environment where adversaries are constantly adapting and evolving their approaches.

This requires what military planners call PACE planning or Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency options for every critical capability. As LTGEN Coyle noted, “We expect to lose everything at that point in time. The reality of that is unlikely, because it’s not like you can barrage jam the entire Australian Defence Force and expect it to sustain, but we are prepared to have alternates to everything.”

Building this resilience requires not just technical redundancy but operational flexibility. Military personnel must be trained not just on primary systems but on backup methods, including potentially reverting to older technologies that may be less vulnerable to sophisticated attacks. This might mean training on celestial navigation as backup to GPS, or understanding how to operate with paper maps when digital systems are compromised.

The ultimate goal of non-kinetic effects is not to replace kinetic capabilities but to enhance them through carefully synchronized operations. This requires moving beyond simple coordination to true integration, where the effects of space, cyber, and electromagnetic operations are carefully timed and orchestrated to achieve specific operational objectives.

This integration must occur at multiple levels; from tactical operations where individual platforms coordinate their effects, to strategic operations where national-level capabilities are synchronized across entire theatres of operation. Achieving this level of integration requires not just technical systems but new operational concepts, training programs, and organizational

Effective synchronization of non-kinetic effects requires command and control systems that can operate across multiple classification levels and integrate input from diverse sources. Traditional military command structures, designed around kinetic operations with clear lines of authority and communication, may not be adequate for the more distributed, time-sensitive nature of non-kinetic operations.

The challenge is compounded by the classification requirements that surround many of these capabilities. Command authorities must have access to information about available capabilities without compromising operational security. This may require new approaches to information sharing and decision-making that balance operational needs with security requirements.

Beyond technical and organizational challenges, effective synchronization of non-kinetic effects requires a fundamental cultural transformation within military organizations. This transformation must address deeply embedded assumptions about warfare, military professionalism, and operational priorities.

The military culture that has evolved around kinetic operations emphasizes visible, measurable effects. The success or failure of a kinetic strike is usually immediately apparent. Non-kinetic effects, by contrast, may be subtle, delayed, or entirely invisible to most observers.

This difference creates challenges for military leadership, training, and assessment systems that are designed around kinetic paradigms.

• How do you evaluate the effectiveness of a cyber operation that prevents an enemy from acting rather than destroying enemy capability?
• How do you train for operations where the most successful outcome may be that nothing visible happens?

These questions require new approaches to military education, training, and professional development. Military personnel must develop comfort with ambiguity, appreciation for subtle effects, and understanding of complex interdependencies that may not be immediately apparent.

The development of non-kinetic capabilities also raises questions about military professional identity and specialization. Traditional military specialties are built around platforms or functions, pilots, infantry, artillery, engineers. Non-kinetic domains require specialists who understand complex technical systems but must also integrate their capabilities with traditional military operations.

This creates challenges for career management, professional development, and military culture more broadly. How do you develop and retain specialists in highly technical fields while maintaining the broader military skills and perspectives necessary for effective integration with traditional operations?

The answer likely requires new models of military professionalism that blend technical expertise with operational understanding. This may mean longer career timelines, more extensive education requirements, and different approaches to leadership development.

Conclusion: Preparing for an Uncertain Future

The discussion of synchronizing non-kinetic effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains reveals both the immense potential and significant challenges facing modern military forces. These capabilities offer the possibility of achieving decisive effects without the destruction and escalation risks associated with kinetic operations. However, realizing this potential requires fundamental changes in how military forces organize, train, and operate.

The stakes could not be higher. As LTGEN Coyle observed, “If you’re zero in one domain, you’re zero in all.” In an interconnected world where military operations depend increasingly on complex technological systems, the ability to operate effectively in all domains, including the invisible domains of space, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum, becomes essential for military effectiveness.

The challenge is not just developing these capabilities but learning to synchronize them effectively with each other and with traditional kinetic operations. This requires not just technical innovation but organizational transformation, cultural change, and new approaches to military education and training.

Perhaps most importantly, it requires recognition that the character of warfare has fundamentally changed. The conflicts of the future may be decided not by the side with the most firepower, but by the side that can see, understand, and act most effectively across all domains of military operation. As Sun Tzu observed, “The acme of skill is to win a war without fighting.” In an age of non-kinetic effects, this ancient wisdom has acquired new and urgent relevance.

The military forces that master the synchronization of effects across space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains will hold decisive advantages in future conflicts. Those that fail to adapt risk finding themselves outmanoeuvred in domains they cannot see by adversaries they cannot effectively counter. The transformation is not optional. It is an imperative for military effectiveness in the 21st century.

The featured image shows the panelists from lett to right: AVM Roberton is current Director, Sir Richard Williams Foundation and was Air Commander Australia in 2017 and then the Head Force Design in VCDF Executive in 2019. Professor Bronk is Senior Research Fellow, Airpower and Technology Military Sciences, RUSI in the UK. GPCAPT Steven Thornton is the Officer Commanding 82 Wing, RAAF. LTGEN Susan Coyle is Chief of Joint Capabilities.

By Robbin Laird

The nature of military transformation has fundamentally changed. Where once armed forces could afford to develop new platforms over decades and then figure out how to use them, today’s security environment demands a completely different approach. This shift represents perhaps the most significant change in military thinking since the advent of combined arms warfare itself.

In a recent discussion with Lt General Simon Stuart, Chief of Staff of the Australian Army, the contours of this transformation became clear. The conversation revealed not just tactical adaptations to new technologies, but a philosophical reorientation of how militaries must think about capability development, acquisition, and employment in an era of rapid technological change.

Beyond Platform-Centric Thinking

“Our transformation is no longer self-referential,” Lt General Stuart explained, describing how military modernization has historically focused on platforms first, with tactics, techniques, and procedures developed afterward. Under the traditional model, a new aircraft, ship, or vehicle would be delivered, and military personnel would then spend years figuring out optimal employment methods. Doctrine would follow, eventually leading to new ways of fighting.

This sequential approach worked when technological change moved at a measured pace and adversaries faced similar constraints. But today’s reality is starkly different. The pace and scale of technological change, driven by the digital revolution and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, have compressed traditional development timelines..

The Australian Army’s response has been to adopt what Stuart calls a “threat, terrain, and technology referential” approach. Rather than being dictated to by available platforms, this methodology starts with understanding the specific threats forces will face, the terrain they’ll operate in, and the technologies available to address those challenges. Only then are platforms and systems assembled to meet operational requirements.

This represents a return to Clausewitzian fundamentals , acknowledging warfare’s enduring human nature while adapting to its ever-changing character. But the current generation faces something historically unprecedented: the character of warfare is now changing not over decades, but month by month, sometimes week by week.

The New Combined Arms Reality

The implications extend far beyond individual platform decisions to the very nature of combined arms warfare. Modern military operations increasingly involve what might be called “layered combinations” of crewed and uncrewed systems, each optimized for different aspects of the battlespace.

Stuart described a conceptual framework of multiple layers: a forward line of uncrewed ISR systems providing surveillance and reconnaissance while potentially emitting electronic signatures to confuse enemy targeting; a middle layer heavy on uncrewed systems with lighter crewed presence; and more traditional formations with heavy crewed elements supported by uncrewed capabilities.

Critically, nothing is replaced in this evolution  for everything is additive. Drones don’t replace traditional platforms; they create new combinations with them. Electronic warfare doesn’t supersede kinetic capabilities; it enables them. Artificial intelligence doesn’t remove humans from decision-making; it augments human capabilities while raising fundamental questions about the appropriate level of human oversight, particularly regarding lethal force employment.

This additive approach challenges binary thinking about “man versus machine” in military affairs. The question isn’t whether humans or machines will dominate future warfare, but how to preserve human lives while leveraging uniquely human capabilities like creative thinking and moral judgment. As Stuart noted, “the answer, as it ever has been, is both.”

Innovation from the Bottom Up

Perhaps the most significant operational change is the systematic empowerment of tactical-level innovation. Historically, militaries have been hierarchical organizations where innovation flowed from senior leadership and research institutions down to operational units. Today’s environment demands reversing that flow.

The Australian Army has implemented what Stuart describes as “learn by doing” exercises, pairing soldiers directly with industry partners to solve specific mission problems. Units receive defined mission sets, perhaps defeating certain threats in specific terrain under degraded conditions, along with access to various technologies and systems. Their task is to experiment, adapt, and report back on what works, what doesn’t, and how different combinations might be more effective.

This approach taps into the creative potential of soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and junior officers at a scale military organizations haven’t attempted historically. For armies that lack mass , a description that fits most Western militaries, maximizing human potential becomes not just beneficial but essential.

The feedback loop is deliberately rapid. Units don’t spend months writing formal reports; they immediately feed lessons learned back into the system for broader application. This creates what Stuart calls “continual adaptation” or the ability to evolve tactics and procedures as quickly as threats and technologies change.

The Acquisition Imperative

These operational changes create unprecedented challenges for defence acquisition systems designed around platform-centric thinking. Traditional acquisition processes, which can take decades to field new capabilities, are fundamentally out of phase with operational requirements that change monthly.

The mismatch isn’t merely about speed, though that’s certainly part of it. It’s about the entire conceptual framework. Platform-centric acquisition assumes you can define requirements years in advance, design systems to meet those requirements, and then use those systems for decades. But when software can be updated rapidly and electronic warfare techniques evolve dynamically, that assumption breaks down completely.

As observed in the Ukraine conflict, code writing and counter-code writing have become central to military effectiveness. This suggests militaries may need coding capabilities at surprisingly low organizational levels, perhaps battalion level or below. The ability to rapidly modify software, adapt to enemy countermeasures, and exploit newly discovered vulnerabilities becomes as important as traditional military skills.

The implications extend beyond just adding programmers to military units. It requires rethinking the entire relationship between industry and the military. Traditional defence contractors, optimized for long development cycles and stable requirements, must now work alongside smaller, more agile technology companies that can deliver rapid iterations and continuous updates. This creates new partnership models where innovation happens through collaborative experimentation rather than formal requirements documents.

Moreover, the traditional “valley of death” between research and fielding must be eliminated. When operational environments change weekly, there’s no time for lengthy transition periods between proof-of-concept and operational deployment. Military organizations need the ability to rapidly prototype, test, and field capabilities while maintaining appropriate safety and security standards.

This reality demands what might be called “hybrid acquisition” or maintaining traditional processes for major platforms while developing entirely new mechanisms for rapidly fielding and updating software-intensive capabilities. The challenge isn’t choosing between these approaches but integrating them effectively while ensuring that rapid innovation doesn’t compromise safety, security, or interoperability.

Lessons from Ukraine

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides perhaps the clearest example of these principles in action. Ukraine’s effectiveness results not from any single capability but from the combination of Western-trained forces using Western weapons systems integrated with innovative employment of commercial and military drones, electronic warfare capabilities, and rapidly evolving software.

Crucially, Ukraine’s success demonstrates that focusing solely on new technologies while ignoring traditional capabilities misses the point entirely. Ukrainian forces need Western artillery, air defence systems, and armored vehicles to create the foundation upon which drone warfare and electronic operations could be effective. Conversely, those traditional capabilities would have been insufficient without the innovative integration of new technologies.

This integrated approach extends to something Stuart calls “adaptive reuse” or finding new applications for existing platforms. Vietnam-era M113 armored personnel carriers, for example, can be converted into uncrewed or optionally crewed systems carrying various payloads: sustainment supplies, ISR equipment, electronic warfare systems, or kinetic effectors. The question becomes not whether old platforms are obsolete, but how they can be adapted to contribute to current operational requirements.

Platform Design Evolution

These operational and acquisition changes will inevitably influence future platform design. New systems must be built with modularity and adaptability as core features rather than afterthoughts. The ability to rapidly integrate new sensors, weapons, or electronic systems becomes as important as traditional performance metrics like speed or armor protection.

Consider the example of naval operations in the Red Sea, where sophisticated command and control systems were constrained by having only the weapons physically mounted on individual ships. A more adaptive approach might involve airlift platforms deploying loitering weapons that at sea operational units could employ, dramatically expanding the weapons available to commanders without requiring them to physically carry additional munitions.

This suggests platform design must anticipate not just current requirements but unknown future adaptations. Systems need built-in capacity for upgrades, modifications, and entirely new applications that designers cannot currently envision.

The Human Element

Throughout these technological and organizational changes, the human element remains central. The goal isn’t to remove humans from military operations but to leverage uniquely human capabilities while protecting human lives. This requires careful consideration of where humans remain “in the loop,” “on the loop,” or “out of the loop” for different types of decisions, particularly those involving lethal force.

The questions are both technical and ethical: What degree of confidence do we have in sensor systems? How vulnerable are they to spoofing or deception? Under what circumstances, if any, should machines make autonomous lethal decisions? These aren’t just engineering problems but fundamental questions about the nature of warfare and military responsibility.

The human dimension becomes even more complex when considering the cognitive demands of modern warfare. Operators must now manage not just traditional military tasks but increasingly complex human-machine interfaces. They must understand when to trust automated systems, when to override them, and how to maintain situational awareness in environments where information flows at unprecedented speeds.

Training paradigms must evolve accordingly. Military education can no longer focus primarily on mastering specific platforms or weapons systems. Instead, it must emphasize adaptability, systems thinking, and the ability to rapidly learn and integrate new technologies. This shift from platform-specific training to capability-focused education represents another fundamental departure from traditional military development models.

Furthermore, the psychological aspects of human-machine teaming require serious consideration. How do you maintain unit cohesion when some members are physically present while others are operating remotely? How do you build trust in automated systems while maintaining appropriate skepticism? These human factors challenges are as important as technical specifications in determining operational effectiveness.

Looking Forward

Military transformation in the digital age represents a return to first principles combined with unprecedented technological capability. Success requires understanding that platforms, while still important, are now just one element in complex systems-of-systems that must be continuously adapted to meet evolving threats.

The implications extend beyond military organizations to broader defence ecosystems. Defence industries must restructure to support continuous innovation rather than cyclical platform delivery. Military educational institutions must prepare officers for careers defined by constant adaptation rather than mastery of fixed doctrine. Political leaders must understand that defence budgets can no longer be allocated primarily based on platform acquisition schedules but must account for continuous capability development and rapid response to emerging threats.

International cooperation becomes more complex but also more critical. When capabilities evolve monthly, traditional approaches to standardization and interoperability through formal agreements and lengthy certification processes become inadequate. New models for coalition warfare must accommodate rapid capability sharing and real-time adaptation to combined operations.

The militaries that will succeed in this environment are those that can harness bottom-up innovation while maintaining strategic coherence, that can rapidly field new capabilities while maintaining existing strengths, and that can adapt continuously while preserving essential human judgment and oversight.

Perhaps most importantly, success requires cultural change within military organizations. The new paradigm demands comfort with ambiguity, willingness to experiment and potentially fail, and the intellectual humility to learn from soldiers and junior officers who may better understand emerging technologies than their superiors. This represents a profound shift from military cultures traditionally built around hierarchy, standardization, and proven doctrine.

As Lt General Stuart observed, this isn’t about choosing between humans and machines, platforms and software, or innovation and tradition. It’s about creating new combinations that leverage the strengths of each while compensating for their individual limitations. In an era where the character of warfare changes weekly, the ability to combine and recombine capabilities rapidly may be the most important military skill of all.

The transformation is already underway. The question isn’t whether militaries will adapt to this new reality, but how quickly and effectively they can do so while maintaining the human elements that make military service both effective and ethical. Those organizations that can master this balance will enjoy decisive advantages; those that cannot may find themselves perpetually behind the curve in an environment where falling behind means operational irrelevance.

By Robbin Laird

On September 18, 2025, the Sir Richard Williams Foundation held its 2nd seminar for the year which was entitled: “Fight Tonight: Combat Readiness at the Speed of Relevance.”

I will highlight the presentations at the conference in a series of articles over the next few weeks. I will conclude the series with an article providing my perceptions of what were the major answers suggested by speakers at the seminar for a way ahead.

The Chairman of the Sir Richard Williams Foundation, ACM (Retired) Mark Binskin (pictured in the featured image) opened the seminar by highlighting its key focuse. Let me paraphrase his thoughts which provided a key orientation to the day’s presentations and the subject.

The comfortable certainties of the post-Cold War era are dissolving before our eyes. The global rules-based order that has underpinned international stability and prosperity for decades is under unprecedented strain, leaving like-minded democracies to confront an uncomfortable truth: the luxury of time may no longer be on our side.

For generations, Western nations have operated under the assumption that conflicts would unfold with sufficient warning time and that diplomatic channels would provide opportunities for de-escalation, that international institutions would serve as buffers, and that the sheer complexity of modern warfare would necessitate lengthy preparation periods. This comfortable paradigm is crumbling as rapidly as the geopolitical landscape itself.

In this shifting landscape, the concept of “combat readiness at the speed of relevance” takes on critical importance. It’s not enough to possess advanced military capabilities if they take a decade to develop and deploy. When adversaries can move at the pace of modern warfare, measured in hours and days rather than months and years, our defense industrial base must match that tempo. The question is no longer whether we can build the best equipment, but whether we can build it fast enough to matter.

The challenge extends far beyond traditional military preparedness. Future adversaries will not simply mass forces at borders and declare their intentions through formal diplomatic channels. Instead, they will wage sophisticated campaigns designed to fracture our decision-making processes before the first shot is fired. They will exploit divisions within international organizations, whisper to allied nations that “this is not their fight,” and systematically undermine the social cohesion that democratic societies depend upon for effective governance.

These adversaries understand that modern conflicts are won as much in the information space as on traditional battlefields. They will flood social media platforms with carefully crafted disinformation, orchestrate social unrest through targeted manipulation of grievances, and probe critical infrastructure, not necessarily to destroy it, but to create doubt about a government’s ability to protect its citizens. The goal is to paralyze decision-making through uncertainty and division. By the time political leaders recognize they are already in a conflict, the adversary may have achieved decisive advantages across multiple domains simultaneously.

This reality represents a fundamental asymmetry that democratic societies must address. While authoritarian regimes can pivot quickly from competition to conflict, democratic nations must navigate complex political processes, build public consensus, and maintain alliance cohesion. These are strengths in peacetime but can become vulnerabilities when facing opponents who have already decided on their course of action and are actively working to exploit the deliberative nature of democratic governance.

The answer lies in building “strategic depth” but not just in terms of geography or resources, but in time itself. By accelerating the development of critical capabilities now, by strengthening industrial partnerships today, and by synchronizing efforts across all domains of warfare, democracies can compress the decision-making cycle that adversaries seek to exploit. This requires a departure from traditional procurement timelines and bureaucratic processes that were designed for a more stable world.

Consider the implications for defense industrial capacity. In previous conflicts, nations could rely on their ability to mobilize and scale production during wartime. Modern warfare may not provide that luxury. The industrial base must be prepared to surge immediately, with supply chains that are resilient, diversified, and capable of rapid expansion. This means maintaining production capabilities even during peacetime, accepting higher costs in exchange for reduced vulnerability and increased responsiveness.

The human dimension proves equally critical. Military personnel cannot simply be trained for yesterday’s conflicts; they must be prepared for scenarios that may unfold with unprecedented speed and complexity. This demands not just technical proficiency, but cognitive agility—the ability to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances and make effective decisions under extreme time pressure. Training programs must emphasize not just what to think, but how to think quickly and effectively in chaotic environments.

Alliance structures, too, must evolve to match the speed of modern threats. Traditional consultation processes that unfold over weeks or months become irrelevant when adversaries can achieve fait accompli in days. This doesn’t mean abandoning democratic principles or alliance consultation, but rather pre-positioning decision-making frameworks that can respond rapidly to emerging crises while maintaining legitimacy and coordination.

This transformation requires that defense discussions cannot remain confined to policy circles and academic conferences. The urgency of the moment demands that military leaders, defense contractors, allied partners, and civilian leadership work in unprecedented coordination. Industrial executives must understand operational requirements with the same clarity as battlefield commanders. Political leaders must grasp the technical constraints of modern warfare. Alliance partners must synchronize not just their strategic objectives, but their tactical decision-making processes.

The goal extends beyond merely deterring conflict. Deterrence assumes rational actors making cost-benefit calculations. Some adversaries may not be deterred by traditional means, or may calculate that the benefits of action outweigh the costs, particularly if they believe they can achieve decisive results before effective responses can be mounted. In such scenarios, the ability to respond immediately and effectively becomes paramount.

The speed of relevance is ultimately about preserving choice in an era when adversaries seek to eliminate it. By preparing now, with the urgency the moment demands, democratic nations can ensure they retain the initiative in shaping their own security environment, rather than merely reacting to threats already in motion. This preparation must be comprehensive and able to span technological capabilities, industrial capacity, human resources, and alliance coordination, because future conflicts will test all these dimensions simultaneously.

The alternative is to cede the initiative to adversaries who have already embraced the speed of modern conflict, leaving democratic societies perpetually reactive and vulnerable to opponents who understand that in the modern era, timing isn’t just important — it’s everything.