Hot pit refueling operations for the 435th Contingency Response Group’s exercise, Agile Wolf 20-04.
RAMSTEIN AIR BASE, RP, GERMANY
05.28.2020
Video by Staff Sgt. Devin Boyer
86th Airlift Wing/Public Affairs
Fighting with the Force You Have: Moving Forward with Mobile Expeditionary Basing
06/03/2020
By Robbin Laird
As noted earlier, a key contribution which the USMC can provide for the joint and coalition force is afloat or ashore is mobile and expeditionary basing.
In an earlier article, built around a discussion with Lieutenant Colonel Barron, ADT&E Department Head at MAWTS-1, we focused on what is required to do mobile basing effectively.
In effect, the discussion highlighted what one might refer to as the three Ss. An insertion force operating from a variety of mobile bases needs to be able to be sustainable, survivable, and signature manageable.
It is clear that as the joint and coalition force shapes greater capabilities through C2/ISR innovations and integratability of the sensor-strike kill web, that capabilities will be enhanced to operate distributed expeditionary basing for the insertion forces.
But one fights with the force one has and builds forward from there.
So where are the Marines currently with regard to mobile basing capabilities?
In the discussion with Major Brian Hansell, MAWTS-1 F-35 Division Head, that the coming of the F-35 to the USMC has expanded their ability to operate within a broader kill web and to both empower their expeditionary bases as well as to contribute to the broader kill web approach.
The Marine’s F-35s are part of the broader joint and coalition force of F-35s, and notably in the Pacific this extends the reach significantly of the Marine’s F-35s and brings greater situational awareness as well as reach to other strike platforms to the force operating from an expeditionary base as well as enhancing the kill web reach for the joint or coalition force.
As Major Hansell put it: “By being an expeditionary, forward-based service, we’re effectively extending the bounds of the kill web for the entire joint and coalition force.”
The F-35 brings a unique capability to the Marine Corps as it works mobile basing but reworking the assault force more generally is a work in progress.
The digital interoperability initiative is a crucial one as the assault assets will have integratability they do not currently have, such as the Viper attack helicopter getting Link-16.
And the heavy lift element, which is a bedrock capability for the insertion force, is older, not easily integratable, and is in diminishing numbers.
The CH-53K which is to replace it will provide significant capabilities enhancements for an insertion force operating from afloat or ashore mobile bases, but needs to be ramped up in numbers capable of raising the combat level of the current force.
In a discussion with Major James Everett, head of the Assault Support Department at MAWTS-1, we discussed the force that we have and some ways ahead for enhanced capability in the near to mid-term.
The Assault Support Department includes a number of key divisions: CH-53, MV-22, KC-130, UH-1, and AH-1.
I had a number of takeaways from that conversation, and am not quoting Major Everett directly, as I am highlighting some key elements from our discussion but am also adding my own judgments with regard to what those key elements mean going forward.
The first point is that indeed we need to focus on the force we have now, because we will fight with the force we have now.
The Marines by being in the land wars for the past twenty years, have become part of the joint force, and have relied on elements from the joint force, that they would not necessarily have access to when doing force insertion in the Pacific.
This means that the digital interoperability effort under way within Marine Corps innovation is not just a nice to have effort, but a crucial one to ensure that the insertion force package can work more effectively together and to leverage other key support assets which might be available from the joint or coalition force.
After all, a mobile base is being put on the chessboard for a strategic or tactical objective and survivability is a key requirement.
The second point is about sustainability.
And sustainability is a function of the lift assets which can bring the kit and supplies needed for the duration of the mission.
For the Marines, this is defined by KC-130J, CH-53E, MV-22, and UH-1Y lift support. And it is also defined by air refuellable assets to the assault force as well.
The Marines have limited indigenous assets to provide aerial refueling which, dependent on the mission and the time scale of the force insertion effort, might need to depend on the Navy or Air Force for this capability.
The third point is about C2. With the shift from the land wars, where the Marines were embedded within CENTCOM forces, C2 was very hierarchical.
This clearly is not going to be practicable or efficacious with a distributed insertion force.
Working mission command for a force operating in a degraded environment is a key challenge, but one which will have to be met to deliver the kind of distributed mobile based force which the Marines can provide for the joint and coalition force, and not just only in the Pacific, but would certainly provide a significant capability as well for the fourth battle of the Atlantic.
The fourth point is the clear importance of the coming of the CH-53K to the force.
It is not only a question of a modern lift asset with significantly enhanced capabilities to provide for assault support, it is that it is a digital aircraft which can fully participate in an integrated distributed mission.
The fifth point is that the digital interoperable initiative will not only provide for ways to better integrate assets but will enhance what those assets can do.
A key example is the nature of what a Viper assault asset can do afloat as well ashore when operating with Link-16 and full motion video.
My next interview will highlight this aspect of change in more detail, but the point is that integrability is not simply about connectivity, it is about changing how the force can operate.
The sixth point is that the coming of remotes whether air or maritime can expand the situational awareness of the insertion force, as long as signatures can be managed effectively.
And for the insertion force this can be about remotes transported to a base, operating from an afloat asset, or tapping into various overhead assets, such as Triton.
Or put another way, as digital interoperability is worked there will be expanded effort to find ways to support the insertion force operating from a mobile base.
This will be an interactive process between what C2/ISR assets are available in the kill web, and how the Marines ashore or afloat can best use those resources.
We have seen such a migration with the US Navy as the CSG and fleet is adding MISR or Maritime ISR officers, and this change actually was inspired by the operations of 3rd MEF in Afghanistan.
What we might envisage is simply the next iteration of what was done ashore with now the afloat and insertion forces in the maritime environment.
The seventh point is the key emphasis on timeliness for a mobile basing option.
It is about the insertion force operating within the adversary’s decision cycle and operating to get the desired combat effect prior to that adversary being successful in getting his combat result, namely, eliminating or degrading the insertion force.
This is another way to understand the key significance of how C2/ISR is worked between the insertion force and the wider air-maritime force.
In short, the Marines will fight with the force they have; and as far as near term modernization, ensuring that digital interoperability is built in and accelerated, full use of what an F-35 wolfpack can bring to the insertion force, and the continuing modernization of the assault force staring with the coming of the CH-53K in sufficient numbers, these are all key ways ahead.
And as the C2/ISR kill webs are built out and remotes folded into these kill webs, force insertion via mobile basing will clearly be enhanced as well.
The featured photo: CH-53K, K3, 1st CH-53K Aerial Refueling, NAS Patuxent River, MD 6 Apr 2020
Hulburt Field Traffic Circle
Early morning time-lapse of Voas-Lackey traffic circle at Hurlburt Field, Florida, Oct. 18, 2019.
The traffic circle was dedicated to U.S. Air Force Maj. Randell Voas, an evaluator pilot with the 8th Special Operations Squadron and Senior Master Sgt. James Lackey, an evaluator flight engineer with the 8th SOS, who lost their lives in a CV-22 crash in Afghanistan, April 9, 2010.
(U.S. Air Force video by Senior Airman Edward Coddington)
HURLBURT FIELD, FL, UNITED STATES
10.18.2019
Video by Senior Airman Edward Coddington
1st Special Operations Wing Public Affairs
Williamtown Airbase Operations, 2020
06/02/2020
We have visited Williamtown Airbase in Australia several times in the past and look forward to future visits.
In this posting, we highlight recent flight operations from Williamtown Airbase as seen in the slideshow below.
The base is transitioning from a Hornet to an F-35 base which certainly can be seen in these photos.
The following story published on April 11, 2018 highlighted the transition underway.
During a visit to Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Williamtown in March 2018, Murielle Delaporte and I had the chance to talk with the new commander of the Air Combat Group, Air Commodore Kitcher.
RAAF Williamtown is undergoing significant infrastructure modernization as it prepares for the F-35A and as the RAAF’s Air Combat Group (ACG) spearheads the transition in the air combat force.
They are undergoing a quite rapid transition from a legacy aircraft to a fifth generation force in terms of completely retiring their Hornets in favor of acquiring their F-35As.
ACG is moving from flying a legacy Hornet force along with Super Hornets and the E-7 (Wedgetail) to one in which Growlers, E-7s, Super Hornets and the F-35As are integrated to shape the new generation air combat capability.
This is a unique combat capability and represents a shift to the RAAF working with the USAF alongside their continuing long standing and excellent working relationship with the USN.
From this, the RAAF will shape something a bit different than the US forces will fly themselves.
“We’ve had a long and very fruitful relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force and the US Navy.
“We have flown the P-3 and now the P-8.
“We have operated the Classic Hornet since, since 1986, and more recently, the Super Hornet, and the Growler.
“It’s been a long and enduring relationship, which has proved beneficial to both, and certainly we couldn’t have got where we are with Super Hornet and Growler without the outstanding support the US Navy provided us.
“With the F-35A we’re expanding our relationship with the US Air Force.
“And clearly standing up our squadron at Luke AFB and working with the USAF has been beneficial and a key driver to this evolving relationship.”
Building a 21stCentury Air Combat Infrastructure
During a visit to Williamtown, two years ago, I visited the base with an eye to looking at infrastructure changes.
Those changes were just charging with one of the first F-35A buildings just being built.
Now two years later, infrastructure is being built up significantly and we toured the base to see many of these changes.
Air Commodore Kitcher talked about the changes which are designed to augment the ability of the base to operate with the new aircraft but also to enhance the ability to command the evolving force.
ACG Head Quarters is located in a building that was a former battery shop. Now a modern building to support the command, as well as other Headquarters and commands from RAAF Williamtown is being built.
The base is being wired to handle the advanced data systems being established with a clear eye to efficiency, effectiveness and security.
“We are seeing two basic types of change.
“The first involves the base refreshing itself. This involves base redevelopment with the base infrastructure being renewed and replaced, including runway and taxiway extensions.
“The second involves building the infrastructure and support facilities for the F-35A squadrons which will train and operate from the base.”
The OBISC or On Board Information System Center for the F-35A is built with personnel working in the Centre.
The Number 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU) building is largely complete and will support the training squadron but will also house Number 3 Squadron (3SQN) when they return from the US at the end of 2018.
“3SQN will come back to Australia at the end of the year and work on the Australian Validation and Verification Activities for F-35A.
“By the end of 2020, they will move into their own facilities and the training unit (No 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU)) ) will move into the buildings vacated by 3SQN.
“2OCU will look after all aircrew and maintenance training for the RAAF F-35 capability.”
By the end of 2020, there will be over 30 F-35s at the base “which is initially sufficient aircraft for 3SQN and 2OCU, and that’s our Initial Operating Capability number of aircraft.”
The basic change from Hornet to F-35A at the base is driven by the data rich nature of the aircraft and the security changes associated with handling and processing the data.
From this point of view, working with Super Hornets has been part of the overall transition as well as it introduced the RAAF to the challenge of handling data differently from our legacy aircraft.
“We need to be able to port various security grades of data into and around the facilities on the base.
“AF learnt many lessons when introducing the Super Hornet and we will build on managing those sensitivities for the introduction of the F-35A.”
The Importance of Luke AFB in the F-35 Global Enterprise
The F-35 community has been stood up at Luke AFB with various nations training together at the facility for the initial cadre of pilots and maintainers generated by the Luke AFB training facilities.
“We have been impressed by the approach and attitude of the USAF trainers as we are working closely with them in training 3SQN aircrew and maintainers.
“And we have been extremely impressed by the attitude from USAF leadership which allowed RAAF personnel to fully integrate the with the US folks in the 61stFighter Squadron at Luke.
“It would have been very easy to have two teams just working out of the same squadron, but that’s exactly what the USAF did not do..
“The USAF and RAAF have worked in an integrated manner, which the RAAF is extremely thankful for.
“For example, RAAF personnel have fulfilled key squadron executive positions such as flight commander.”
Transition Dynamics for the RAAF
Air Commodore Kitcher highlighted the strategic goal of ACG with regard to the transition as follows: our challenge is to actually transition to the new capabilities in minimum time whilst ensuring we keep the overall force healthy.”
They have an aggressive schedule with regard to F-35A transition.
They are transitioning from four Hornet to four F-35A squadrons in just four years.
“That is a more rapid change, and a more aggressive schedule than any other F-35 user is on track to do.”
And in that transition, a key objective is establishing a “healthy training system in Australia.”
And this training system will be supporting F-35As at Tindal Airbase in the Northern Territory as well.
That base is undergoing a significant infrastructure rebuild as it will receive F-35As early next decade as well.
Incorporating the F-35A, the Super Hornets, the Wedgetails and the Growlers into an integrated air combat force is the broader transition facing the RAAF.
The challenge, which is a good one to have from the standpoint of Air Commodore Kitcher, is to learn how to fight effectively with a fifth generation enabled force.
“Learning to fly the F-35A is not the hard part.
“Working the mission command piece is a key driver of change for sure.
“And although we are working closely with the USN and the USAF, we will do things differently as we integrate our unique force package and adapt it to Australian conditions.”
Another part of the transition is working the sustainment piece.
“We need to ensure that we have the required number of experienced and capable technicians to generate the number of sorties we need to generate, and the sortie rate is supported by the engineering and logistics systems.”
And we discussed another key aspect of combat transition, namely learning or shaping the C2 piece of the force evolution.
What can be overlooked with regard to the F-35 is that it is many ways part of the transition to distributed C2 rather than being viewed as a classic ISR capability, whose function is to distribute data widely in the battlespace.
Given the challenge of operating in a contested environment, within which adversary’s will seek to disrupt the ISR flows which the US and the allies have been able to generate within previous land centric wars, a key challenge will be to take decisions in a contested environment.
As Air Commodore Kitcher said: “With the fifth generation aircraft, there are key missions they need to perform themselves and just do it, potentially without proliferating information support to the broader force.
“Everyone’s going, “But I need the information that can come off the aircraft.
“We need to be able to say no you don’t, in this particular case, you don’t need that information right now, you may get it later.”
“It is about sorting out and collectively agreeing, from the tactical squadron to the higher HQ’s, what we should choose to do versus what we can do,” Air Commodore Kitcher said.
And that is a good way to end.
Clearly, Air Commodore Kitcher and his team are focusing on what needs to be done to deploy, develop and shape a fifth generation enabled force and prioritizing and executing those needs to get the job done.
A pair of F-35A Lightning II aircraft from No. 3 Squadron taxi for another sortie at RAAF Base Williamtown.
A pair of F-35A Lightning II aircraft from No. 3 Squadron taxi for another sortie out of RAAF Base Williamtown.
An F-35A Lightning II A35-016 from No. 3 Squadron takes off for another sortie from RAAF Base Williamtown.
An F-35A Lightning II A35-011 from No. 3 Squadron takes off for another sortie from RAAF Base Williamtown.
An F-35A Lightning II A35-011 from No. 3 Squadron takes off for another sortie from RAAF Base Williamtown.
An F/A-18A Hornet (A21-52) from No 3 Squadron takes off from RAAF Base Williamtown.
A Hawk 127 (A27-07) from No 76 Squadron takes off from RAAF Base Williamtown.
A Pilatus PC-21 (A54-046) from No 4 Squadron takes off from RAAF Base Williamtown.
A Hawk 127 (A27-18) from No 76 Squadron performs a touch and go at RAAF Base Williamtown.
A Hawk 127 (A27-18) from No 76 Squadron performs a touch and go at RAAF Base Williamtown.
A Hawk 127 (A27-18) from No 76 Squadron performs a touch and go at RAAF Base Williamtown.
A No 3 Squadron F-35A Lightning II (A35-012) takes off from RAAF Base Williamtown.
RAAF F-35A Lightning II aircraft A35-003 from No 3 Squadron takes off for a sortie at RAAF Base Williamtown.
An F-35A Lightning II aircraft (A35-011) from No 3 Squadron takes off for a sortie at RAAF Base Williamtown.
Digital Thread Design, Production and Sustainment: Shaping a 21st Century Build and Modernization Process
06/01/2020Sikorsky is working with NAVAIR and the USMC to deliver a new build heavy lift helicopter, the CH-53K.
This is a digital aircraft, unlike its predecessor the CH-53E which is a mechanical aircraft.
What this means is that the aircraft is digitally designed, manufactured by a digital thread production process, provides operational data for the sustainment process, and enables that operational data to flow back into the upgrade, redesign, and manufacturing process.
Even though the CH-53K has a similar footprint to the CH-53E, which was done precisely to ensure that the new build helicopter could fit into the Navy’s amphibious fleet, that aircraft was built many years ago. A new production line has been set up for the CH-53K and it is designed around digital thread production.
This video was produced by Sikorsky and highlights the digital thread process.
This is process which works interactively from design to prediction to sustainment and shape an innovative and ongoing development and modernization process for deployed aircraft.
For our archive of CH-53K articles, see the following:
https://defense.info/system-type/rotor-and-tiltrotor-systems/ch-53k/
New Appointee Delineates Trump’s Nuclear Arms Control Vision
By Richard Weitz
In his first public speech on U.S. arms control policy, the newly appointed Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, Marshall Billingslea, offered more details on the administration’s general approach toward the issue, particularly concerns about “unconstrained” warheads and verification.
Billingslea has also been nominated to be the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, with authority to lead all U.S. negotiations on the issue. Before his recent appointment, he had been Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, which included countering money laundering, terrorist financing, and WMD proliferation.
By way of background, Billingslea observed that the United States has been reducing its deployed nuclear warheads while modernizing its delivery systems, whereas both Russia and China were projected to increase their weapons totals. He urged Congress to continue to upgrade U.S. systems since “modernization goes hand-in-hand with arms control’ by providing the United States critical leverage in negotiations.
Although Billingslea did not exclude continuing the extant New START accord, which can be mutually extended by up to five years by both presidents before the accord expires in February 2021, he insisted that “any potential extension of our existing obligations must be tied to progress towards a new era of arms control.” In his view, if properly structured and verified, agreements could provide a means to avert unconstrained arms racing. Though “we know how to win these races…we sure would like to avoid it.”
Billingslea said that the administration would only accept arms control that was “complete, effective, and verifiable.”
Comprehensiveness means that future arms control must encompass “all nuclear weapons, both those currently constrained by arms control and those unconstrained.” The main category of “unconstrained” weapons consisted of Russia’s novel strategic delivery systems under development as well as Moscow’s large holding of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Billingslea dismissed the former category of exotic systems as “throw[ing] money down a sinkhole” and focused his remarks on the latter.
The Ambassador insisted that, since the use of “any nuclear weapon would change the nature of a conflict,” it was meaningless to focus only on “strategic” systems while leaving Russia’s increasing arsenal of “tactical” nuclear weapons unconstrained. In this regard, the United States has been especially alarmed that the Russian military was not only improving the quality of its NNSWs—”giving them greater accuracy, longer ranges, lower yields, all to fill various war fighting roles”–but also increasing their quantity.Billingslea also expressed unease how the Russian armed forces “routinely conduct exercises that involve the simulated use of these shorter-range nuclear weapons against NATO” and other countries.
These developments were increasing U.S. alarm that the Russians were pursuing an “escalate-to-win” strategy through a doctrine of early nuclear escalation, using one or more NNSW, of any conventional conflict. To counter this strategy, the administration has been expanding the united States’ own low-yield nuclear options.
As a result, the trump administration insisted on constraining these forces. For instance, it wanted to eliminate all Russian short-range, ground-launched nuclear missile systems, as agreed in the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), a pair of parallel unilateral political commitments by Moscow and Washington to reduce their NNSW holdings after the Cold War.
Interestingly, Billingslea indicated that he was open to discussing missile defense issues with Moscow since Washington had “a lot of questions” regarding Russia’s own BMD systems and intensions.
Regarding the issues of “effectiveness” and “verification,” Billingslea insisted that Washington would demand more effective verification and compliance measures in the future to avert circumvention and violations, provide “timely warning of militarily significant violations,” and “promote real transparency and confidence-building” concerning nuclear plans and intentions.
Billingslea accused Moscow of having “systematically violated nearly every agreement that they’ve made, political or legally binding,” ranging from the INF and Open Skies treaties to the PNIs. He argued that even New START “suffers from some serious verification inadequacies” such as not providing for timely on-site inspections or requiring that Russia transmit its telemetry for new missile systems under development.
Above all, Billingslea indicated that the administration would no longer support nuclear arms control that does not include China since “Beijing, like Moscow, is intent on building up its nuclear forces and using those forces to try to intimidate the United States and our friends and our allies.” We cannot “keep pretending that the two-party construct for nuclear arms control…is able to address satisfactorily the security issues of a multipolar world.”
Billingslea noted that, for the first time in its history, China was about to deploy a triad of nuclear delivery systems—adding strategic bombers and submarines to its robust arsenal of nuclear-armed missiles.
He recalled that, last year, the PLA tested more ballistic missiles than all other states combined. The DIA is projecting that China “will likely at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile” in the next decade.
As a result, Billingslea assessed “that China no longer intends to field a minimal deterrent” but strives for “a form of nuclear parity with the United States and Russia. He also argued that “China’s so-called no first use policy” is “so riddled with caveats” as to be inoperable.
Besides imposing quantitative and qualitative limits on China’s nuclear forces, which Billingslea suggested need not be the same limits as applied to Russia and the United States, the administration wanted to end China’s “great wall of secrecy” regarding its nuclear “plans, its capabilities, [and] its intentions regarding its move to a triad of delivery vehicles, a launch on warning posture, and exploration of low-yield nuclear weapons.”
Billingslea also indicated that the administration both worried about, and wanted to exploit, Chinese-Russian nuclear tensions. In his assessment, the Chinese nuclear buildup was partly aimed at Russia, which meant that Russia as well as the United States would have to grow their own nuclear capabilities to compensate. “They can get into a dynamic between the two of them, which then might precipitate us, necessitate us, having to take certain actions.” The administration seeks an effective trilateral agreement to avoid such “an unnecessary and expensive buildup in a three-way arms racing context.”
Of course, securing Chinese participation will be difficult since Beijing has repeatedly rejected such proposals and Sino-U.S. relations continue to deteriorate. Billingslea publicly appealed to Beijing’s self-image as a “responsible” nuclear-weapons state and “great power.”
He also argued that, as a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it has a legal obligation to negotiate limits on its nuclear forces. Though declining to provide details, Billingslea further indicated that the administration was developing options to employ a combination of direct and indirect pressure to change Beijing’s mind.
Billingslea additionally stated that “Russia must help bring China to the negotiating table.”
Moscow has thus far declined to do so and expressed interest in including NATO members Britain and France in any limits.
Besides repeating previous Russian government proposals for such multinational arms control, the administration also seems prepared to hold New START extension hostage to Moscow’s pressing Beijing to join future negotiations.
“The president has a long and successful career as a negotiator and he’s a master at developing and using leverage. And we’re going to follow his lead in that respect.”
The featured phot shows the Kinzhal air missile system as Vladimir Putin (right) delivers his annual address. Photograph: Tass/Barcroft Images
MAG-36 Rapid Deployment Exercise
Marine Aircraft Group 36 conduct a rapid deployment exercise on Oct. 24, 2019 in Okinawa, Japan and the Indo-Pacific region.
This type of realistic training is used to highlight an active posture of a ready force and is essential to maintaining the readiness needed to uphold our commitments to our allies and surrounding nations.
(U.S. Marine Corps video by Lance Cpl. Ethan M. LeBlanc)
MCAS FUTENMA, OKINAWA, JAPAN
10.25.2019
Video by Lance Cpl. Ethan LeBlanc
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
Working Mobile Basing: Defining the Challenge
05/31/2020
By Robbin Laird
The USMC has mobile basing in its DNA.
With the strategic shift from the Middle Eastern land wars to full spectrum crisis management, an ability to distribute a force but to do so with capabilities which allow it to be integratable is crucial.
For the Marines, this means an ability to operate an integratable force from seabases, forward operating bases (FOBs) or forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).
As the Marines look forward to the decade ahead, they are likely to enhance their capabilities to provide for mobile bases which can empower the joint and coalition force by functioning as a chess piece on the kill web enabled chessboard.
But what is required to do mobile basing?
What are the baseline requirements to be successful?
A very good place to start to shape answers to these questions if the USMC’s center of excellence on warfighting training, MAWTS-1 located at MCAS Yuma. In a recent discussion with Lt. Colonel Barron, ADT&E Department Head at MAWTS-1.
The official USMC presentation about MAWTS-1 provides us with a good sense of what Lt. Colonel Barrons’s Department is tasked with doing.
“Since its commissioning in 1978, MAWTS-1 has conducted two WTI Courses per year, now producing over 300 WTI graduates each year. A separate Aviation Development, Tactics and Evaluation Department (ADT&E) was established in June 1983 to coordinate the MAWTS effort of developing and evaluating tactics and hardware in all functional areas of Marine Corps aviation.”
This means that the ADT&E is focused on the core task of fighting today with the current force but also looking forward to how to enhance that force’s capabilities in the near to mid-term as well.
We had a wide-ranging discussion with regard to the flexible basing dynamic, and I will highlight a number of takeaways from that discussion.
Rather than quoting the Lt. Col. Directly, I am drawing on our discussion and highlighting what from my perspective are key elements for shaping a way ahead with what I call mobile basing,
In a 2018 article which I wrote after a Williams Foundation seminar, I highlighted what the mobile basing challenge meant for U.S. and allied forces:
“When I was in Finland in February, I talked with his predecessor, Lt. General Kim Jäämeri, who is now Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategy for the Finnish Defence Forces and he highlighted the distributed operations aspect of the Finnish approach.
“It is becoming clear to our partners that you cannot run air operations in a legacy manner under the threat of missile barrages of long range weapons.
“The legacy approach to operating from air bases just won’t work in these conditions.
“For many of our partners, this is a revelation; for us it has been a fact of life for a long time, and we have operated with this threat in the forefront of operations for a long time.”
The 11th USAF Commander mentioned working with the RAAF with regard to agile basing and during a visit to Amberley Airbase just before the Williams Foundation seminar in March 2018, we met with the Commander of the RAAF’s Combat Support Group, Air Commodore Ken Robinson at his office at RAAF Amberley.
We discussed mobile basing as an emerging requirement for the Australian forces as well.
“We are having to reacquaint ourselves with some tasks and challenges which we parked to the side a bit while we were in the Middle East for so long. We did not have to worry so much about mobile basing to counter the principal threats in that theatre.
“The mindset is in transition now.”
He underscored that this clearly is an Army and Air Force challenge.
“We are good at supporting maneuver with our tactical transport aircraft and Australia’s Army aviation capability, including the Tiger Reconnaissance Helicopter, but what we need to do is move to the next level of support to maneuver the most lethal part of our air power capability across a range of airfield options.”
Core capabilities such as providing fuel for air systems when operationalized for a mobile airbasing force on Australian territory are clearly different from supporting a fixed airbase.
For example, “expeditionary fuel capabilities is something that’s very much on the forefront of my mind. Lean and agile support packages to operate expeditionary airfields are also key, so that we can offer the best possible maneuver options to the aviators without tying down strategic airlift.”
The mobile basing issue or building greater depth in Australian territorial defense is one of the core choices facing Australia as it continues its force modernization. Either they can emphasize going deeper into the air-maritime domain in the Pacific or augment significantly their mobile defense capabilities leveraging the vast Australian territory. The role of active defenses working with airpower mobility would be a priority in this second case.
Mobile basing is obviously as well an air-maritime-army effort to shape a chessboard of capabilities which can deal with the threats of peer competitors which deploy into the extended battlespace.
The discussions alluded to in the Nordics and in Australia highlight the point that mobile basing is not just a Pacific specific capability facing the force; it is becoming a requirement when dealing with either China or Russia.
The discussion with Lt. Col. Barton highlighted six key takeaways.
The first one is the crucial need for decision makers to determine why a mobile base is being generated and what the tactical or strategic purpose of doing is.
It takes time and effort to create a mobile base, and the mobile base commander will need to operate with mission command with regard to his base to determine how best to operate and for what purpose.
The second one is the importance of determining the projected duration of the particular base.
This will have a significant impact in shaping the question of logistics support. What is needed? How to get it there? And from what supply depot, afloat or ashore in adjacent areas?
The third one is clearly the question of inserting the force into the mobile base and ensuring its optimal capabilities for survivability.
What needs to be at the base to provide for organic survivability? What cross links via C2 and ISR will provide for an extended kill web to support the base and its survivability?
A fourth one is to determine what the base needs to do to contribute to the wider joint or coalition force.
With the evolution of technology, it is possible now to have processing power, and strike capabilities distributed and operated by a smaller logistics footprint force, but how best to configure that base to provide the desired combat effect for the joint or coalition force?
A fifth one is clearly a crucial one for operating in a contested environment. Here the need is for signature control, or an ability to have as small a signature footprint as possible commensurate with achieving the desired combat effect.
Signature management could be seen as a component of survivability. However, the management of signatures down to the small unit level requires a disruptive shift in our mindset.
The sixth one is clearly having an exit strategy in mind.
For how long should the force be at the mobile base? For what purposes? And what needs to be achieved to enable the decision to move from the mobile base?
In effect, the discussion highlighted what one might refer to as the three Ss.
An insertion force operating from a variety of mobile bases needs to be able to be sustainable, survivable, and signature manageable.
With regard to current USMC capabilities, the MV-22, the C-130, the Viper, the Venom, the CH-53E and the F-35 are key platforms which allow the Marines to integrate and move a lethal combat force to a mobile base.
But the C2/ISR enablement is a key part of the requirement and the digital interoperability efforts are a key part of shaping a more effective way ahead.
And in the relatively near term, the Ch-53K replacing the E is a key enabler for an enhanced mobile basing strategy.
It is clear as well as the U.S. services work their way ahead in the evolving strategic environment, that the USMC core skill set with mobile basing will figure more prominently, and become a key part of the Marines working with the joint and coalition force in shaping a more effective way ahead for the integrated distributed force.
For our special report on the CH-53K, see the following:
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conduct a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conducted a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conducted a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conducted a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conducted a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conducted a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conducted a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)
U.S. Marines with Marine Aircraft Group 24, conducted a mass air training mission along the shores of Oahu from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Marine Corps Base Hawaii, May 19, 2020. Utilizing three separate flying platforms, MAG-24 successfully launched seven CH-53E Super Stallions, five MV-22B Ospreys, and two UH-1Y Venoms, conducting the mass air mission to increase proficiency through integrated training to produce readiness and project power. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Eric Tso)