ATLANTIC OCEAN (Jan. 16, 2020)
An E-2D Advanced Hawkeye assigned to Air Test and Evaluation Squadron (VX) 20 lands aboard USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) flight deck.
The arrestment marked the first time an E-2D had landed aboard Ford. Ford is currently conducting Aircraft Compatibility Testing to further test its Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch Systems (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG).
(U.S. Navy video by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Connor Loessin)
By Robbin Laird
Recently, I finished a study of the new build offshore patrol vessel and the shaping of a new template for shipbuilding in Australia.
This is the first of three new build ships for the Australian Navy and for the Australian Defence Force.
Next is the ASW frigate in this decade and in the decade after that the new build Australian Attack submarine.
This new build submarine – the Attack Class – has had much more press and public attention than the other two new classes of ships, but what can get overlooked is the context within which the new build attack submarine will enter the force.
By context in this article, I am referring to the evolution of the ADF and of the shipbuilding context.
The broader strategic context has been well treated in a number of articles focused on the nature of the Chinese and Russian air-maritime threats to the Australian forces and interests.
But clearly that operating environment is increasingly congested, contested, and complex.
There are three key elements of change shaping the operational context within which the Attack Class submarine will enter the force.
The first is a significant evolution of theater anti-submarine warfare, with the coming of the P-8/Triton dyad, likely leading to further integration of the Royal Australian Air Force with the Royal Australian Navy.
The second will be the rollout of maritime remotes as part of the kill web within which ASW will evolve, with sensor networks mutating and migrating through the arrival of artificial intelligence systems working networked sensors and with sensors themselves evolving to allow for direct interactivity among the sensor themselves.
The third is migrating the skill sets and innovations generated in this decade from the continued evolution of the Collins Class submarines.
During my visit to HMAS Stirling, I had a chance to discuss with submarine commander Robin Dainty.
“The demand side and the concepts of operations side of innovation affecting the naval forces will be very significant in the decade ahead. This will be a very innovative decade, one which I have characterized as building the distributed integrated force or the integrated distributed force.
“What this means for the submarine side of the house and for ASW is working new ways to cooperate both within national navies and across the air-naval-land enterprise of the allied forces. The decade will see new ways to link up distributed assets to deliver appropriate effects at the point of interest in a crisis. It will involve working new weapon and targeting solution sets; it will see an expansion of the multi-mission responsibilities for platforms working in the distributed force.
“And the Collins class will be participating in this path of innovation and lessons learned as well as technologies evolved both on the ship or the extended battlespace enabling the evolution of an integrated distributed force.”
Recently, I had a chance to talk with the Deputy Chief of the Royal Australian Navy, RADM Mark Hammond.
Our conversation was to have taken place during my visit to Australia in March 2020, but COVID-19 raised its ugly head and that face-to-face conversation did not happen. We were able to talk by phone on April 28, 2020 about the context issue for the new build submarine.
RADM Hammond started by talking about the Australian context of submarine capability in terms of the significant range and endurance challenge posed by the Indo Pacific Theater through which Australia’s lifeblood or maritime trade flows (featured graphic above).
He then highlighted that during WWII the US conducted over 500 submarine operations across this Theater from Australia using S-class, Gato class, and Balao class submarines.
He noted that the Gato and Balao class were able to operate effectively at long distances across the Indo Pacific (as far north as Japan) from ports in Australia, but had to do so largely in surface transit mode for significant parts of the operation and only remaining submerged for short periods.
The smaller S-class lacked the endurance for this mission and were employed largely around the Solomon Islands and in areas close to the equator.
The Gato and Balao “Fleet boats” truly came into their own during the campaign and elements of their design arguably inform the ‘range and endurance’ DNA for successful conventional submarine operations from Australia today.
The Oberon class submarines operated by Australia from the late 1960s until 2000 were of similar but evolutionary capability, designed to transit at relatively high speed on the surface to an operating area, whereupon they would dive for more extended periods to conduct exercises and operations.
In an era predating effective broad area surveillance threats, this could be risk-managed and effective.
But “to emulate that capability today requires a bigger submarine because the entire deployment, including at nighttime, has to be undertaken under water because the environment has changed.
“Today anything on, or above, the surface of the ocean is liable to detection and targeting. And a submarine that has been detected and targeted is not very useful. As simple as that.”
We then discussed the impact of Collins modernization throughout the period of transition to the new build submarine.
“We are taking a continuous learning mindset that views the life cycle extension for Collins as an opportunity.
“It’s an opportunity to de-risk the future submarine program.
“It’s an opportunity to trial some technologies that will be integral to the future submarine program.
“And it’s certainly a mindset that recognizes that we must maintain lethal operational capability during the transition period.“
We then discussed the context for the new submarine which is being generated by innovations in theater ASW in the decade ahead.
“The Attack Class submarine will be a fully interoperable ADF asset optimized to survive and thrive in the contemporary and future ASW threat environment.
“This means deliberately designing for interoperability with our own forces, our partners and our allies.
“It also means integrating in the design and construction methodologies the options and margins to enable future capability enhancements.“
“In my view, our Future Force must be designed to safely and effectively operate in the ‘environment of relevance’ and fight at the ‘speed of relevance’.
“Neither of these reference frames are static, and both are ambiguous. But failure to consciously consider and mitigate the risks posed by either will lead to inferior capability”
We next discussed the Arafura Class OPV template, its impact on the future submarine program and the integration of maritime remotes into the future combat environment.
“The Arafura OPV has a great deal of inherent design flexibility – especially wrt its capability to employ unmanned and remote sensors.
“With regard to the future submarine program, we’re looking for similar opportunities.
“But future proofing in a submarine design is a different challenge than doing the same in a surface vessel.
“The goal is the same though – to enhance through life relevance, recognizing the environment and speed of relevance are going to continue to change.
“In this context the more flexibility you have to upgrade sensors and weapons through life, the greater your capacity to maintain relative operational effectiveness and to exploit tactical advantages of the platform in the evolving threat environment.”
Obviously, this approach will also reduce the time to modernize and enhance cost effectiveness of the ongoing upgrade cycle as well.
“The design approach for the future submarine fully embraces the evolution of maritime remotes in the maritime combat environment.
“We are working through the role of maritime remotes within the ADF, and as we develop that experience, we will fold that into the operational employment doctrine for the future submarine as well.”
And we concluded by discussing the impact of COVID-19 on perceptions of what Air Vice Marshal (Retired) John Blackburn refers to as Smart Sovereignty.
As RADM Mark Hammond put it: “I think in the age of COVID-19, it is likely the decision made by our island nation to establish an Australian national sovereign shipbuilding program, supported by largely sovereign supply chains, will be recognized as the right approach for Australia.”
Rear Admiral Mark Hammond joined the Royal Australian Navy in 1986 as an electronics technician. He was commissioned as a naval officer in 1988 and is a graduate of the RAN Recruit School (1986); the Australian Defence Force Academy (1990); Australian Command and Staff College (2004); and the Centre for Defence Strategic Studies (2014).
Rear Admiral Hammond completed seamanship and navigation training in various ships then volunteered for submarine service. Qualifying in Oberon Class submarines in 1994, Hammond joined HMAS Collins as Navigating Officer in 1996 (during First of Class Trials), and was selected as Flag Lieutenant to the Chief of Navy.
He subsequently completed the Principal Warfare Officer’s Course and Submarine Warfare Course in 1998, and served as the commissioning Operations Officer in HMAS Waller. In 2001 Rear Admiral Hammond instructed the Submarine Warfare Officer Course and assumed duties as Executive Officer in HMAS Sheean. In 2003 Hammond completed the Netherlands Submarine Command Course (Perisher) and the US Navy’s Prospective Commanding Officer Course.
Rear Admiral Hammond served as Staff Officer Future Concepts at Naval Headquarters in late 2003, and graduated from Command and Staff Course in 2004. Hammond then deployed on operations with the Royal Navy Submarine force, before assuming command of HMAS Farncomb and completing two years of demanding operations in the Indo Pacific region.
Subsequent shore postings included Assistant Naval Attaché – Washington DC, USA; Director Future Submarines – Operational Requirements; Joint Exercise Director (J75) at Joint Operations Command; Director Submarine Sub-Program (Collins and Future Submarines); and Chief of Staff to the Chief of the Defence Force, performing the latter role for General Hurley from November 2012 to December 2013.
In late 2014 Rear Admiral Hammond was appointed as Director General Maritime Operations, exercising OPCON of the Navy’s ships, submarines and detachments, before relocating in 2017 to the United States for duties in the Pentagon as the Chief of Defence Force Liaison Officer to General Joseph Dunford, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Rear Admiral Hammond returned to Australia in March 2018 to assume duties as the Deputy Chief of Navy.
Rear Admiral Hammond has sea experience in French, British and US nuclear attack submarines, Australian and Dutch conventional submarines, and multiple surface vessels. Academic qualifications include Bachelor of Science (UNSW, ADFA, 1991); Masters in Management (Defence Studies, UCAN, 2004); and Masters in Maritime Studies (UoW, 2005).
The featured graphic was taken from the following report:
Andrew Forbes, Protecting the Ability to Trade in the Indian Ocean Maritime Economy (Sea Power Centre-Australia, 2014)
SPS3_Protecting_Trade_IndianOcean
RAMSTEIN, Germany
NATO aircraft have been busy over the past two days intercepting Russian aircraft flying close to NATO airspace.
On 28 April Polish fighters were scrambled under NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission from Estonia to identify two Russian Tu-160 long range bombers, escorted by several fighters and supported by an Airborne Early Warning aircraft. The formation was later intercepted again by fighters of the Royal Danish Air Force.
On the same day a Russian Airborne Early Warning aircraft as well as two Russian Tu-22 long range bombers with fighter escorts approached NATO airspace off the coast of Norway and were intercepted by Norwegian fighter jets.
On 29 April Norwegian fighters were scrambled twice more against two Russian Maritime Patrol aircraft, approaching NATO airspace close to Norway. After the first intercept by Norwegian F-16 aircraft, the Royal Air Force launched their Quick Reaction Alert Typhoon fighter aircraft from RAF Lossiemouth to meet and escort the Russian planes as they tracked south towards the North Sea. They operated around the North Sea and turned north where Norwegian F-35 fighters met them and escorted them out of NATO’s area of interest.
All intercepts were conducted in a professional manner, demonstrating that NATO fighters across the Alliance remain ready and poised to protect Allied skies 24/7.
NATO
In a further milestone for the Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) program, the two halves of the first of class ship, Arafura, built by Luerssen Australia and its partner ASC have been brought together and welded to form a complete hull.
In what was the largest block move in the history of the Osborne Naval Shipyard and a considerable engineering feat, Australian Naval Infrastructureís (ANI) operations team manoeuvred the two mega-blocks together, with only millimetres between them.
Australian Department of Defence, April 26, 2020.
PHILIPPINE SEA (Mar. 29, 2020)
The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) conducts operations in the Philippine Sea. Barry is underway conducting operations in the Indo-Pacific region while assigned to Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15, the Navy’s largest forward-deployed DESRON and the U.S. 7th Fleet’s principal surface force.
(U.S. Navy Video by Ensign Samuel Hardgrove)
By Robbin Laird
On February 7, 2020, the US Navy officially received its first CMV-22B Osprey, the replacement for its venerable C-2 Greyhound aircraft.
I attended the ceremony held at Amarillo, Texas and had a chance to talk with a number of the participants before and after the ceremony.
Having followed the Osprey since 2007 and observed its impact on the USMC, it was never a simple case of the MV-22 replacing the CH-46 ‘Phrog’ and its mission.
The tiltrotor is not the same in any real sense as a traditional rotorcraft, and the increased range and speed of the Osprey and its unique operating envelope has proven to be a significant capability for the Marine Corps which they have been able to leverage to transform their core operations.
Now the US Navy will be transitioning from a fixed-wing aircraft configured to operate with the cats and traps system onboard an aircraft carrier (the C-2) to an aircraft (the Osprey), which is not limited by that system will not operate in any way like a C-2.
It is undoubtedly going to also be a significant opportunity for the Navy to manage the transition and to understand fully how to make the most of the new aircraft’s capabilities to conduct Airborne Logistics from the Sea Base in new and innovative ways.
There is another major aspect or indeed opportunity, that has nothing to do with the COD (Carrier On-board Delivery) mission.
The Osprey has proven capable of a wide range of operations, from Special Forces transport to performing a Medical Evacuation off of a submarine, but the US Navy is not buying it for those missions.
Yet, given the demanding strategic environment in which the fleet is operating and going to operate, it is difficult to believe that the Navy will not wish broaden the envelope of what the Osprey can do for the fleet.
To do so will lead inevitably to the demand to buy more than a simple COD replacement would dictate.
Because the Osprey is a multi-service, and multi-national asset, there will be opportunities as well to leverage collaborative investment as well.
This has not been possible with the C-2 because it was and is a uniquely Navy plane.
How then might the Navy use the aircraft beyond the classic C-2 ops rhythm?
And how might the Navy take advantage of a broader investment or production set of opportunities posed by multi-service and multinational partners?
What is clear is that the challenging path of transition which the Marine Corps took from CH-46 to MV-22 will not be as difficult for the Navy.
They can already build on the experience of the Marine Corps.
Nonetheless, it is clear that there will be unique aspects of its fleet introduction.
During my visit to Amarillo in February 2020, I had a chance to talk with a retired Navy officer who was involved throughout his career with the C-2 as well as becoming involved in the process of working the C-2 replacement effort.
Currently, CAPT (ret.) Sean McDermott is a commercial airline pilot who served in the US Navy for 26 years. He was involved with the C-2 during the majority of his career, starting as a Greyhound pilot and eventually commanding one of the Navy’s two fleet logistics squadrons.
In the final years of his service, McDermott was involved in working through options for the Navy as they considered C-2 replacements, with an eventual Osprey selection.
In our discussion, McDermott highlighted a key point which logistics pilots are keen to underscore: “You don’t care about logistics until you don’t have the supplies you need at the time you want them.”
He noted that when he became part of the C-2 community, there were two squadrons, based at three locations.
One, VRC-40 ‘Rawhides’ was located on the East Coast at Norfolk, VA, and the second, VRC-30, ‘Providers’, on the West Coast in San Diego California. There is also a permanently forward-deployed detachment of VRC-30 based in Iwakuni Japan.
Both squadrons fall under Airborne Command & Control and Logistics Wing (ACCLW) headquartered in Point Mugu, CA. The wing was traditionally led by officers with an E-2 Hawkeye background.
This meant that there was little opportunity for C-2 pilots to lead the community beyond the possibility of becoming a squadron commander or O-5 (Commander) rank, vice O-6 (Captain/Commodore) rank.
Lacking the upward mobility, post-squadron command has made it more difficult for the C-2 leadership to become involved in future planning and to be able to be in the best position their assets for more robust mission opportunities.
As a story published in 2010 in the Virginian Pilot newspaper noted for the 50th anniversary of VRC-40:
McDermott and the other members of his squadron, known as the Rawhides, aren’t used to being the center of attention. In naval aviation, glory usually goes to the fighter pilots and their jets, not to those who deliver mail, spare parts and passengers.
“We’re a light switch. We’re the Internet.
They expect us to be there all the time,” McDermott said.
“The only time we’re visible is when we’re not there.”
McDermott underscored the challenges facing C-2 leaders getting into a position to shape the future of their mission within the overall world of carrier aviation.
“In general, there is no upward mobility for C-2 COs.
“In general, the preponderance of the leadership of the wing are E-2 Naval Flight Officers.
“This means that you’ve got somebody who’s your boss who’s never flown your plane, never done your mission, doesn’t have a complete understanding of the challenges that are unique to deploying detachments across the planet.
“They had about 140 people in their squadron when they were commanding officers and a C-2 squadron is 400 people.”
McDermott noted that one of the encouraging signs with the CMV-22B transition is that a new Wing, COMVRMWING has been stood up, and its Commodore who is in charge of the Osprey team now being charged to take over the COD mission.
This CMV-22 wing should provide a more dedicated voice to implement new ideas for airborne logistics operations as well as exploring how the aircraft could be used to support other missions for the Navy in a distributed maritime environment.
We discussed at length his experience with the challenges of getting the Osprey engaged with the Navy fleet and eventually on to the carrier for a fleet battle experiment as well as in support of humanitarian assistance missions.
He was also involved in the efforts to deploy Ospreys onto foreign ships, and he worked closely with the Marine experimental squadron VMX-22 and Col. Michael Orr, who we interviewed often during the time frame when the Osprey transition was accelerating, to leverage the Marine’s experience with the aircraft to shepherd Navy interest.
On the cover of our book, Rebuilding American Military Power In The Pacific, we chose a photo of Col. Orr landing on the USS George H.W. Bush.
McDermott was on that carrier during those trials and highlighted how challenging it was to get support to land the Ospreys onboard the large deck carriers.
The Marine aviation leadership created VMX-22 to lead the way forward, first with Ospreys and preparing the way for the next round of aviation innovation.
Because they worked under strong leadership, they could partner with a Navy leader like McDermott to create an opportunity for the Osprey to become a large deck carrier asset.
As McDermott noted about Col. Orr: “I have a lot of respect for Mike, clearly a leader who is willing to support change and innovation.”
But as the trials evolved, there were opportunities to demonstrate how an Osprey could do things a C-2 never could do, given the flexibility of the aircraft and its speed and range.
He provided several examples of this.
One involved when Orr’s group arrived back in Norfolk on an Osprey, and when taxying, out came a chief petty officer blocking their way. They stopped and the chief said that there was an urgent need to get a part to an F/A-18 Hornet so that it can fly off of the carrier prior to getting to port.
The ship was pulling in the next day, and if they did not get the aircraft off of the ship, the aircraft would need to be craned off the ship while in port, not something the Navy likes to do.
The catapults have already been shut down on the ship and were not available.
Obviously, this was not a barrier for the Osprey which flew to the ship, delivered the part and left within 90 seconds from the ship.
McDermott recalled: “The Air Boss on the carrier was an E-2 guy and he underscored, “Let’s see a COD do that!”
We concluded our discussion by focusing upon the potential impact of the multi-mission Osprey to the fleet.
McDermott put it this way: “With the C-2 we did one thing – Carrier On-board Delivery.
“With the Osprey, Combatant Commanders already know the multi-mission capability of the V-22 and will be tempted to utilize them for a variety of other missions.
“This is not something that would happen with a C-2. Carrier leadership will eventually struggle to fence off their logistics assets from outside tasking.”
In other words, there is an anticipated operational demand that they will want to leverage fully the new versatile capabilities of the Osprey.
He noted that with the new platform being introduced to carrier aviation, it will be possible to leverage it to shape a greater range of capabilities for the COD asset.
He noted that as the Marines began to get comfortable with the MV-22, they shaped the unique Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SP-MAGTF), which has become a highly demanded asset.
He argued that such innovation was certainly possible for the Navy as it worked with its new COD aircraft.
One area he noted were forward deployed locations that would benefit like operations in Bahrain.
Ospreys deployed to these locations could not only better support logistics but would also have the flexibility to support other mission sets for combatant commanders.
“With the coming of the new platform into the fleet, one innovation which might be considered is how to use the new Navy Osprey as part of a broader sustainment effort encompassing Marine Corps and Navy Ospreys.
“It also is an area where the multi-mission capabilities of the aircraft for the Navy can be explored as well.
“In other words, where the Marines leveraged their Ospreys to build and equip SP-MAGTF, perhaps the US Navy can leverage the Bahrain anchor from which to build regional sustainment and explore ways to build out the multi-mission capabilities it would want from its CMV-22s.”
This clearly might require the Navy to consider from the outset ways to ramp up the buy and to prepare for ways in which the fleet commanders will employ it to leverage fullythe aircraft capabilities, and, at the very least, utilizing its capability to provide improved logistics to Navy and Maritime Sealift Command ships.
Carrier Air Wing innovations highlighting platforms coming onboard which will shape clusters of innovations driving forward innovation onboard the large deck carrier. Credit: US Navy
Also, see the following:
Shaping a New Capability for the Osprey: Delivering the F-35 Engine to the USS Wasp
And for our special report focused on the coming of the CMV-22B to the fleet, see the following:
According to the top European Union’s diplomat, Josep Borrel, there was “an infodemic accompanying the pandemic”.
According to a story by Andrew Rettman published in the EUOvserver on May 1, 2020:
“His service had recorded 400 fake news items on the virus in recent weeks, he said.
“Some of the Russian ones peddled fake cures which were “putting people’s lives at risk”, he added.
“But the EU’s debunking website had had an 800 percent increase in traffic since the pandemic began, with 10,000 readers a day, Borrell said, indicating the effectiveness of its work.”
Rettman’s story highlighted Chinese attempts to influence the European Union’s report on the “infodemic.”
In an earlier Rettman story published on March 27, 2020, the author highlighted the extensive Russian effort fueling the “infodemic.”
Russia’s top coronavirus fake news stories were about Western plots – a theme also popular in Chinese disinformation.
There was little hope of educating people who believed that type of thing, propaganda experts said.
But some of the lies had “real-world consequences” that were hard to ignore.
“Scientists: coronavirus is weapon of biological warfare” on Russian website sputniknews.com was the top bogus story with 11,210 shares on social media platform Facebook.
“Sergey Glaziev: coronavirus – artificially created biological weapon” (6,567 shares) was second.
“The coronavirus Covid-19 pandemic: the real danger is Agenda ID2020” (2,733) came third.
Five other stories also received 1,000 or more shares:
“Is coronavirus an American weapon of biological warfare as Francis Boyle believes?” (2,250).
“Coronavirus, a weapon that fell from the sky for the United States in its fight against China?” (2,236).
“The plague gods: the geopolitics of epidemic and the bubbles of nothing” (1,815).
“Jackie Chan quarantined with suspected coronavirus – media” (1,149).
“Coronavirus was created in a laboratory: military expert” (1,051).
The Facebook engagement was calculated using Buzzsumo, an online tracking tool.
The numbers reflected Facebook activity between January and mid-March on a set of 110 bogus Russian stories which the EU foreign service recorded in its counter-propaganda database.
China also got in on the act, EU officials noted.
The highlighted photo shows Russian president Vladimir Putin (c) at a coronavirus situation centre in Moscow (Photo: Kremlin.ru)
You may remember that President Sarkozy made a decision to build Mistral amphibious ships for Putin’s Russia.
But after some serious rethinking, that sale was voided and a new customer sought.
Eventually, the customer for the two ships which had been built was Egypt.
And if you fast forward to 2019, you find the Egyptians exercising their new ship in a Mediterranean friendship exercise which had Turkey in mind.
According to a December 20, 2019 article by Hagar Hosny and published by AL-Monitor:
Egyptian naval forces conducted military drills Dec. 11 against the backdrop of the Nov. 28 maritime border and security agreementsigned by Turkey and the internationally recognized Tripoli-based Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj.
The agreement providesfor the expansion of security and military cooperation between the two sides and was condemned by Greece and Egypt.
In a Dec. 11 statement, the Egyptian army said these military exercises come in implementation of an Egyptian military strategy aimed at developing its capabilities in the face of the challenges and risks witnessed in the region. The statement added that the military activities included the launch of a submarine anti-ship Harpoon missile with a range of more than 130 kilometers (81 miles). This is in addition to the combat activities of the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship, a helicopter carrier, in the Mediterranean.
During the exercise, the Egyptian forces conducted “Friendship Bridge 2019” in the Mediterranean Sea using a task force which included the ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser (L1010), a Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) of the French Mistral class, as well as Perry-class frigates, missile boats (Soliman Ezzat), Class-209 submarine, a number of anti-submarine units and special forces.
According to a January 7, 2020, Naval Recognition article:
This naval military exercise also included different scenarios of amphibious operations showcasing the capabilities of Egypt’s general command in supervising, commanding and controlling this type of complex maneuvers.
For the first time, Egyptian Naval Forces used modern attack helicopters including the Russian-made Kamov Ka-52 and the American-made AH-64D/E Apache that took off from the Mistral-class amphibious assault ship Gamal Abdel Nasser (L1010).
ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser (L1010) is an Egyptian Navy amphibious assault ship of the French-designed Mistral-class which is also used as a helicopter carrier by the Egyptian Navy. Egypt is the first and only country in Africa and the Middle East to have that type of combat ship.
The exercise highlighted the evolving role of amphibious ships away from simply being Greyhound buses moving troops from port to embarkation point, to being part of sea control and expeditionary strike operations.
The Egyptians understand this point and have been working with the Russians to purchase Kamov Ka-52K naval attack helicopters for Anwar el-Sadat, and they see the AH-64D as a gap filler until they get a marinized helicopter.
The helicopters onboard the Egyptian Mistral class are land-based operating helicopters flying from the ship rather than marinized helicopters part of the work flow of the ship. In the first case, helicopters optimized for land operations certainly can fly to and from an amphibious ship operating as an offshore operating base; they are not optimized for at sea operations with the ship as part of a fast moving task force.
In an article by Tyler Rogoway written at the time of the initial acquisition by Egypt of the French ships, the author highlights why Egypt was buying the ships.
“Egypt has been engaged in a deepening counter-terror fight against extremist elements, namely those aligned with ISIS. Geographically speaking, threats are emanating primarily from around the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt worries could one day endanger the Suez Canal, and from the western border with Libya, which is embroiled in a full-on civil war and teaming with Islamic militants…..
“These powerful ships could be used as seabases of sorts, parking them off the coast of trouble spots on the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Arabian Sea, but that would signal a massive expeditionary shift in Egypt’s foreign policy.”
The vides below highlight the exercise:
The featured photo shows Russian-made Kamov Ka-52K and American-made AH-64E Apache helicopters prepare to take off from ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser Mistral-class amphibious assault ship during naval exercise Friendship Bridge 2019 (Picture source: Egyptian MoD).