The CO of the USS Ford showcases the refueling workflow onboard the USS Ford.
09.30.2020
Video by Seaman Anton Wendler
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
The CO of the USS Ford showcases the refueling workflow onboard the USS Ford.
09.30.2020
Video by Seaman Anton Wendler
USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
By Robbin Laird
In the last article on the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), I looked at one key building block which enhances both the ops tempo of the strike package on the USS Gerald R. Ford as well the flexibility of the weapons packages which can be moved to the flight deck and loaded on the strike aircraft.
This is a key input into a significantly redesigned flight deck workflow which allows for a much more rapid turnaround of the launch and recovery of aircraft as well as more flexibility operating and arming the strike packages.
My flight deck visit was facilitated by Ford’s Top Catapult Officer (TOPCAT), Lt. Cmdr. Andy Kirchert and by Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Fuels) 2nd Class Thomas Drew Watson (from Winona, MS).
Insights throughout with regard to the impacts of the workflow on operational tempo and combat impacts were provided by Lt. Christopher Warzinski, CSG-12’s Joint Interface Control Officer, Rear Adm, Craig Clapperton, Commander Carrier Strike Group 12, and by the USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) Commanding Officer, Capt. J.J. Cummings.
A major difference can be seen right away when one steps onto the flight deck. Next to the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) during my visit was the USS John C. Stennis whose flight island can be seen in the rear of this photo.
The island on the USS Gerald R. Ford has been moved 140 feet aft and is 30% smaller. What this allows is significant additional space for aircraft refueling and weapons loading operations, with the area forward of the island able to accommodate more combat aircraft.
During flight operations, Ford’s design increases the amount of usable space forward of the island and reduces the amount unusable space aft.
As the ship’s captain, Capt. J.J. Cummings, put it: “If you think of the ship as a gun, and the strike force as bullets, then we have increased the size of the clip because we can load it with more bullets because of the island being further aft on Ford versus Nimitz.”
The clam shell form factor for the weapons elevator flight deck hatches also open with minimal flight deck interference.
There is more operational space on the USS Gerald R. Ford’s flight deck and the new launch and landing systems as well as a significant redesign of how refueling is done on the flight deck provide key tools for a significant reshaping of the operational tempo for the large deck carrier.
The new launch system allows for a wider range of aircraft to operate from the carrier; the new arresting gear system can recover them. The ability to mix and match the current air fleet and the future one is significantly enhanced with EMALS. The launch system has a larger aircraft weight envelope that exceeds what is available with steam, so EMALS can launch very light aircraft or heavy aircraft which means this system can accommodate future manned or unmanned aircraft.
The same flexibility exists in the Advanced Arresting Gear with larger current operating wind and weight envelopes and the capability to recover future aircraft designs with minimal modifications required.
The refueling system is designed to keep a clear path to the catapult by reducing flight deck obstructions caused by refueling hoses, weapons skids and weapons elevator access points. This highly efficient flight deck flow allows for the FORD to sustain higher launch and recovery rates.
Let me turn to each of these capabilities which add up to a new workflow on the deck which provides for a more rapid pace of ops tempo and more flexibility to mix and match mission packages as well.
Much of the press about USS Gerald R. Ford has been about its launch system, the electromagnetic aircraft launch system or EMALS.
I discussed this system at some length with Lt. Cmdr. Andy Kirchert. There are several advantages of the system over the legacy steam catapult system which he highlighted.
First is the flexibility and adaptability of the system. The EMALS system has more room for growth for future aircraft systems. Steam will not be able to shoot super light aircraft and it can shoot heavy aircraft but that is serious wear and tear on the CAT when it shoots heavy shots. Heavy/light shots not an issue at all with EMALS.
Second, the new system has reduced manning requirements for the launch function. There is reduced manning by 50%.
Third, longer fly days are enabled due to reduction in the pre-flight and post flight procedures. For example, steam catapults require a heat up to be ready for launch
Fourth, the system is easier on aircraft which should led to reduction of stress on the aircraft due to launch. The system delivers very precise endspeeds for the launch process.
Fifth, the system delivers enhanced safety margins. The system will not allow launch of an aircraft if it sees something wrong in the process.
Obviously, there have been challenges with the system, but the Ford team is overcoming those challenges, but according Lt. Cmdr. Kirchert, “We are in the fine-tuning phase.”
One might note that both the French and Indian navies are lining up to procure EMALS which suggests confidence in the system.
The counterpart to the EMALS is the Advanced Arresting Gear system which provides capabilities to recover the current fleet of aircraft in environmental conditions that exceed what is possible with the Nimitz class system
And similar to EMALS, AAG is designed to have the ability to operate with aircraft of varying weights, including future aircraft systems. When one visits the Advanced Arresting Gear system below deck, it is amazing to see how automated it is and how little manpower is required to operate it as well.
The refueling system is a major aspect of the redesign of workflow on the flight deck. My guide to this aspect of the ship was provided by Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Fuels) 2nd Class Thomas Drew Watson. Post flight, aircraft are parked along two isles for refueling – one on the deck edge and the other just outside of the landing area. This parking arrangement allows unobstructed access to the catapults.
The in deck refueling stations which are unique to the Ford keep refueling hoses out of the taxi paths to the catapult. (refueling stations which can refuel two aircraft at the at those stations.
This has a major impact because on the Nimitz the refueling crew has to carry several, lengthy connected fuel hoses which are heavy from the starboard side of the Nimitz class to do mid-deck refueling. On the Ford, the hoses are right there beside the in-deck refueling stations and rather than having to have a crew of 5 people to bring the hoses 150 feet to mid-deck and do refueling, you only need two crew to man the in-deck refueling stations.
Lt. Cmdr. Kirchert emphasized that the sensors that make up the system and the software which manages them have posed development challenges in the past, but that NAVAIR and General Atomics have worked effectively to provide for the software changes necessary to allow the system to function effectively. And many of the software changes are quickly phased into the system between underways.
Also in common with almost all new systems, parts failures have emerged which were not anticipated but those parts are being rebuilt to provide for better performance as well.
My topside visit ended with a discussion with by Rear Adm. Clapperton.
He underscored that the USS Gerald R. Ford was going to be a key enabler for the maritime distributed force which the Navy was envisaging as its way ahead for the fleet.
With an ability to provide flexible strike options to the fleet, and a capability to support new weapons, and new aircraft, the new generation carrier was a key infrastructure to support the way ahead facing the U.S. Navy, the joint and coalition force.
Featured Photo: A T-45C Goshawk, attached to Training Air Wing 2, prepares to launch from USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) flight deck Sept. 11, 2020. Ford is seen underway in the Atlantic Ocean conducting carrier qualifications. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Sarah Mead)
A U.S. Air Force KC-135R aircrew from the 340th Expeditoinary Air Refueling Squadron flies over Israel in support of Exercise Enduring Lightning III, Oct 12, 2020.
The United States and Israeli air forces train to maintain a ready posture to deter against regional aggression while forging strategic partnerships across the U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command areas of responsibility.
(U.S. Air Force video by SrA Roslyn War
10.12.2020
Video by Senior Airman Roslyn Ward
United States Air Forces Central
By Robbin Laird
Two years ago, I published a chapter on the USMC’s recent experience with unmanned air systems in the book edited by John Jackson, entitled, One Nation Under Drones. I focused on the substantial experience they have accumulated with Scan Eagle and then with the Blackjack system.
The primary use has been in terms of ISR in the land wars, but with the return to the sea and now the focus on how the Marines can best help the US Navy in the maritime fight, the focus has shifted to how to best use UASs in the maritime domain.
With the recent decision to cancel its MUX ship-based UAS to pursue a family of systems, the focus will be upon both land-based and sea-based UASs but not to combine these capabilities into a single air vehicle.
As the then Deputy Commandant of Aviation, Lt. General Rudder put it:
“In the next 10 years, the quickest way – the commandant wants to go quick on this – this quickest way will be some sort of land-based high-endurance that can be based and still be able to provide the surface force, the amphibious force the capabilities that we would call ‘quarterback,’ or some sort of node that can provide 24 hours on station time, it will have all the networking and early warning and electronic warfare capabilities that they require for that type of thing,”
But the path to do this is not an easy one. And it is a path which is not just about the technology, but it is about having the skill sets to use whatever system is developed, the connectivity so that the combat effect can be connected to the maneuver force, and to have communication links which have low latency, notably in the maritime fight.
During my visit to MAWTS-1 in early September 2020, I had a chance to talk with Captain Dean, an experienced UAS officer who is a UAS instructor pilot at MAWTS-1. We discussed a wide range of issues with regard to UAS within the USMC, but one comment he made really gets at the heart of the transition challenge: “What capabilities do we need to continue to bring to the future fight that we currently bring to the fight?”
What this question highlights it there is no combat pause for the Marines – they need to be successful in the current range of combat situations, and to re-shape those capabilities for the combat architecture re-design underway?
But what if this is not as significant and overlapping as one might wish?
This is notably true with regard to UAS systems. In general terms, the UAS systems which have been dominant in the Middle East land wars have required significant manning, lift capability to move them around in the battlespace and are not low-latency communications systems. Although referred to as unmanned, they certainly are not so in terms of support, movement of exploitation systems, or how that data gets exploited.
There clearly is a UAS potential for the blue water and littoral engagement force but crafting very low demand support assets, with low latency communications are not here as of yet.
And in the current fights ashore, UASs, like Blackjack provide important ISR enablement to the Ground Combat Element. And as the Marines have done so, they have gained very useful combat experience and shaping of relevant skill sets to the way ahead for the UAS within the future force.
The goal is to have more flexible payloads for the UAS force going forward, but that means bringing into the UAS world, experienced operators in fields broader than ISR, such as electronic warfare.
But there is clearly a tension between funding and fielding of larger UAS’s for the amphibious task force, and between shaping new systems useable by combat teams. And the challenge here clearly is to manage information and to distribute by communications system. Although the phrase about distributing information at the right time and at the right place sounds good, this is very difficult to do, if the data links simply do not expose the combat force to adversary target identification.
This is yet another key area where contested combat space has not much to do with what can do with UASs in uncontested air space.
Captain Dean underscored that since 2015, “we have been able to normalize unmanned aviation with the USMC. We have been able to bring in a lot of experience into the VMUs and with the sundowning of the Prowlers, have brought in Marines experienced with electronic warfare as well. We continue to prioritize our training on the Blackjacks going to the MEUs.”
He highlighted that this posed a challenge for transition. To get full value out of the Blackjacks operating off the amphibious force, changes need to be made on those ships to get full value from operating these UASs. But if the Blackjack is a short term or mid-term solution, the kind of investment which needs to be made is not likely to happen.
What he highlighted was the crucial importance of the infrastructure afloat to make best use of the UASs which the USMC and US Navy will operate. And given the challenge of managing space onboard the ship, sorting out the nature of the infrastructure and how to manage it is a key aspect of the way ahead for UASs.
Another challenge is who wants what within the combat force. If we are looking at the fleet as a whole, the desire is to have fleet wide ISR, or capabilities to deliver combat effect. If one is focused on the battalion, they are focused on having capabilities organic to the battalion itself.
Again this is a development and investment challenges which as well raises questions of what kind of infrastructure can be developed to deal with each of these different operational level requirements. “What does the MAGTF want? What does the battalion want? These are not the same things.”
In short, a key question facing the Marines with regard to UASs: “What capabilities do we need to continue to bring to the future fight that we currently bring to the fight?”
Featured Photo: A U.S. Marines Corps RQ-21 Blackjack UAS is retrieved during Weapons and Tactics Instructors Course (WTI) 1-18 at Yuma, Ariz., on Oct. 13, 2017. WTI is a seven week training event hosted by Marine Aviation and Weapons Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) cadre which emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of Marine Corps Aviation in support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force. MAWTS-1 provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine Aviation Training and Readiness and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Rhita Daniel)
The UK is clearly in a period of significant strategic change.
The twin impacts of COVID-19 and BREXIT are enough to assure that.
With the significant impact of the new aircraft carrier driving significant change with regard to air-sea integration, an evolution we have spent considerable time engaged in with the RAF and the Royal Navy over the past few ears, it is not surprising that the Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter recently highlighted the new defence strategy.
In a speech on the Integrated Operating Concept, the Chief of Defence Staff provided some details.
The Prime Minister I think has set a clear vision for the future of Global Britain. One where the UK is considered an outwardly looking, internationalist country, that acts as a burden-sharing and problem-solving nation, making a tangible contribution to tackling diplomatic and security challenges in our neighbourhood and beyond.
To do this though and particularly from our perspective in Defence, we must first understand that the threats to our national security, our values and our prosperity have evolved and diversified markedly. Our authoritarian rivals see the strategic context as a continuous struggle in which non-military and military instruments are used unconstrained by any distinction between peace and war. These regimes believe that they are already engaged in an intense form of conflict that is predominantly political rather than kinetic. Their strategy of ‘political warfare’ is designed to undermine cohesion, to erode economic, political and social resilience, and to compete for strategic advantage in key regions of the world.
Their goal is to win without going to war: to achieve their objectives by breaking our willpower, using attacks below the threshold that would prompt a war-fighting response. These attacks on our way of life from authoritarian rivals and extremist ideologies are remarkably difficult to defeat without undermining the very freedoms we want to protect. We are exposed through our openness.
The pervasiveness of information and rapid technological development have changed the character of warfare and of politics. We now have new tools, techniques and tactics that can be used to undermine political and social cohesion, and the means to make the connection to an audience ever more rapidly. Information is now democratised. It’s available for everyone.
Our adversaries have studied our ‘Western way of war’, identified our vulnerabilities and modernised their own capabilities to target them. The campaigns of the last 30 years have been played out over global media networks. From the first Gulf War in the early 1990s to the air strikes in Bosnia and Kosovo, the response to the terrorist attacks on embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and of course the campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – all have been watched closely by our rivals.
They saw that air power could penetrate deep into hostile territory and learned that we preferred to fight and strike targets from afar. They saw that this enhanced our natural aversion to putting people in harm’s way. They watched how casualties, financial cost and length of time swayed domestic and public opinion and the effect that had on the legitimacy assuring the use of armed force.
So they learned how to improve their own resilience to absorb strikes; they developed anti access denial systems; they improved their maritime undersea capabilities; they developed long range missile systems; they integrated Electronic Warfare, swarms of drones with multiple fires and used these to defeat armour; they invested in space and cyber, recognising the importance we attach to global positioning and digitisation. And in Ukraine and Syria Russia has created battle laboratories from real life events to develop their tactics and battle harden a new generation of soldiers.
The US Department of Defence’s latest annual report to Congress on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China highlights that the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the People’s Liberation Army. Including growing the largest maritime surface and sub-surface battle force in the world; an armoury of ground launched cruise and ballistic missiles – some of which have ten times the range of conventional ballistic missiles; one of the world’s largest forces of advanced long range surface-to-air systems; and of course expanding the PRC’s overseas military footprint.
They have also harnessed technologies and tactics that have outpaced the evolution of international law to avoid their actions being classified as conflict under the current definitions of international law. Authoritative PLA texts have argued that the ambiguous boundary between peace and war opens up opportunities for the military to achieve its ends, disguising its activities as civilian, and therefore peaceful.
China’s new Strategic Support Force is designed to achieve dominance in the space and cyber domains. It commands satellite information attack and defence forces; electronic assault forces and Internet assault forces; campaign information operations forces, which include conventional electronic warfare forces, anti-radiation assault forces, and battlefield cyber warfare forces. All of this is available in the open domain.
Now, Western states draw legitimacy from respect for the rules, conventions and protocols of war. Where we see morals, ethics and values as a centre of gravity, authoritarian rivals see them as an attractive target. And all of a sudden the idea of ‘lawfare’ becomes a helpful tool in their inventory. The term ‘lawfare’ covers different meanings. In this context though, it entered national security parlance when it appeared in ‘Unrestricted Warfare’ – written on military strategy in the late 1990s by two PLA officers who used the term to refer to a nation’s use of legalized international institutions to achieve strategic ends.
But ‘lawfare’ also applies to the challenge we have encountered in recent campaigns where we need to update our legal, ethical and moral framework to properly hold our forces to account if they break the law, while ensuring they have appropriate freedom of action to seize fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.
The COVID crisis has highlighted how the use of propaganda, data misuse, disinformation, and strategic influence is presenting complex and rapidly evolving challenges for researchers, civil society, and of course for policymakers. And our autocratic rivals have utilised these techniques most effectively. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute is tracking how a range of actors are manipulating the information environment to exploit the COVID-19 crisis for strategic gain – including pro-Russian vaccine politics whose disinformation narratives are designed to permeate anti-vaccination social media groups.
Russia has used cyber and information attacks against its opponents regularly in the last few years. Notable examples included Ukraine’s financial and energy sectors in 2017 and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2018. Iran and North Korea are following suit. And the online national security forum ‘War on the Rocks’ in their ‘Digital Authoritarianism’ series highlight Russia’s hack-and-leak, ‘kompromat’ operations and the St. Petersburg-based Internet Research Agency troll farm which engages in sowing division abroad.
The WannaCry ransomware attack in May 2017 demonstrated how an attacker could rapidly achieve a global effect by spreading a virus through computers operating Microsoft Windows, holding user’s files hostage, and demanding a Bitcoin ransom in return.
This idea of ‘Digital Authoritarianism’ also explores how the Chinese Communist Party is forging a future of mass surveillance and ‘social credit scores’ and is rapidly exporting these tools to other parts of the world. The recent Netflix documentary – A Social Dilemma – describes the way in which online interaction is subliminally influenced leading to the audience becoming unwittingly controlled.
Proxies, private military and security companies (PMCs) and militias are back in fashion as well. The recent report by the US Center for Strategic and International Studies on the expansion of Russian PMCs into security vacuums in parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia is worth reflecting on.
Using companies, like the Wagner Group, Moscow can support state and non-state partners, extract resources, influence foreign leaders, and do so with plausible denial. Their military skills and capabilities lend a form of limited power projection, strengthening partners, establishing new military footholds, and altering regional balances to achieve strategic advantage. CSIS estimates that operations like these are underway in 30 countries across some four continents.
Our rivals typically tailor their activities to remain below obvious detection and response thresholds, and they often rely on the speed, volume and ubiquity of digital technology that characterizes the present age. And with an increased emphasis on creativity, ambiguity, and amplifying the cognitive elements of war, while dialling down the physical elements. Their way of warfare is strategic, it is synchronized and systematic – and our response must be too.
None of our rivals can afford to go to war as we define it. They want to win below that threshold. However, the stakes are high, the traditional diplomatic instruments that have provided some measure of arms control and counter-proliferation have all but disappeared, with the last arms control treaty, New START potentially ending next February.
The upshot is that the threat of unwarranted escalation and therefore miscalculation between military protagonists is now clear and present. And as the competition for resources, bases and partners intensifies so the risks increase.
The Horn of Africa is a case in point. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute sets out the growth of foreign military bases and a build-up of naval forces in the region since 2001 when the focus was on counterterrorism, counter piracy and of course peace support operations in the wake of 9/11. Currently a wide variety of international security actors operate there — from Europe, the United States, the Middle East, the Gulf, and Asia and international networks of military facilities and naval deployments together link the Horn to security developments in the Middle East and the Gulf, the Indian Ocean and Asia Pacific, as well as in other parts of Africa. The level of military engagement is matched in the Eastern Mediterranean where the potential for misunderstanding is significant.
And, as we look down the barrel of a global recession it’s worth reflecting on how often financial crises lead to security crises.
So, what should be our response to this ever more complex and dynamic strategic context? My view is that more of the same will not be enough. We must fundamentally change our thinking if we are not to be overwhelmed.
Hence we are launching this Integrated Operating Concept. It has several big ideas:
First of all, it makes a distinction between ‘operating’ and ‘war-fighting’. In an era of persistent competition our deterrent posture needs to be more dynamically managed and modulated. This concept therefore introduces a fifth ‘c’ – that of competition – to the traditional deterrence model of comprehension, credibility, capability and communication. This recognises the need to compete below the threshold of war in order to deter war, and to prevent one’s adversaries from achieving their objectives in fait accompli strategies. As we have seen in the Crimea, Ukraine, Libya and further afield.
Competing involves a campaign posture that includes continuous operating on our terms and in places of our choosing. This requires a mindset that thinks in several dimensions to escalate and deescalate up and down multiple ladders – as if it were a spider’s web. One might actively constrain in the cyber domain to protect critical national infrastructure in the maritime Domain.
This campaign posture must be dynamically managed and there must be a preparedness to allocate consistent means over longer term horizons, while adjusting the ways to anticipate a rival’s response. The ways will include actions being communicated in a manner that may well test the traditional limits of statecraft.
This posture will be engaged and forward deployed – armed forces much more in use rather than dedicated solely for contingency – with training and exercising being delivered as operations. It will involve capacity building and engagement in support of countries that need our support. This could include partnered operations against common threats – particularly violent extremism. And this may involve combat operations.
It will also place a premium on building alliances and improving interoperability to make us more ‘allied by design’ and thus able to burden share more productively.
It is important to emphasise that the willingness to commit decisively hard capability with the credibility to war fight is an essential part of the ability to operate and therefore of deterrence.
The second important idea is that we cannot afford any longer to operate in silos – we have to be integrated: with allies as I have described, across Government, as a national enterprise, but particularly across the military instrument. Effective integration of maritime, land, air, space and cyber achieves a multi-Domain effect that adds up to far more than simply the sum of the parts – recognising – to paraphrase Omar Bradley – that the overall effect is only as powerful as the strength of the weakest Domain.
And third we have to modernise. We must chart a direction of travel from an industrial age of platforms to an information age of systems.
Warfare is increasingly about a competition between hiding and finding. It will be enabled at every level by a digital backbone into which all sensors, effectors and deciders will be plugged. This means that some industrial age capabilities will increasingly have to meet their sunset to create the space for capabilities needed for sunrise. The trick is how you find a path through the night. We know this will require us to embrace combinations of information-centric technologies. But predicting these combinations will be challenging.
We will have to take risk, accept some failure and place emphasis on experimentation by allocating resources, force structure, training and exercise activity to stimulate innovation in all lines of development, with a responsive commercial function at the leading edge. This will enable adaptive exploitation as opportunities become clear and allow better financial control.
Throughout we must recognise that the nature of war doesn’t change – it is always visceral, it is always violent, and it always involves interaction between people, in the final analysis one has to go close and personal with one’s enemy. So, while this Integrated Operating Concept places a premium on operating, it also places a premium on adaptability – the ability to adapt to war fight. And this in turn emphasises the importance of our people – who have always been, and always will be, our adaptive edge.
Further details on the new approach was provided by another senior UK official in a discussion with defense specialists. This official noted that
“We must recast defense to focus on integration. Why?
“Well simply put, we remain configured for joint operations in the era of industrial warfare and we haven’t shifted at the pace needed to be an integrated force able to operate and fight in the information age.”
After describing a wide range of threat dynamics, the official focused then on how to navigate the way ahead.
“But we hold a significant advantage. Our ability to work in an integrated joint and fused manner with allies and partners. And that is the case for change.
“Our response must be to pursue integration. Joint is simply no longer enough. We have to be integrated across government with our allies, and across the five operational domains to counter this threat and to protect our interests and national advantage.
“We must focus on delivering an integrated operating concept compatible for structure. One that’s credible to deter above the threshold and more competitive below the threshold with global reach to operate persistently and be prepared to fight when necessary.
“And the other dimension to our response must be to pursue innovation. In order to respond to these threats, we need to match their focus on technology and innovation. We must transform our approach to people, capabilities and procurement to ensure everything we do it’s digital by design. This will drive the integration we need to compete with our adversaries in environments where they may already have the upper hand.”
The question then is how to shape the way ahead.
One key way to do so is to manage the C2/ISR side of force development as a central one. “We must exploit the data we collect and not treat it as effluent like we currently do. This requires a single cloud environment with computing power to handle bulk data and common standards.”
“We must make a quantum shift in our approach to innovation and research and development and pace, creating, if you like, an UK digital defense advanced research project station, so digital DARPA. And agile software development center that it fuses expertise in data analytics, learning and artificial intelligence, autonomy in robotics and aesthetics and digitalization, blockchain, quantum technologies, 5G.
“But improvements in our own cyber resilience are also fundamental. We have to ensure secure digital foundations by building core security technology, designing security into ICT projects from the outset, as well as addressing known gaps and to ensure great clarity in the deployed environment and in the supply chain. All of this underpinning work is geared towards enabling faster and better decision making, rooted in deeper understanding from all sources and aided by data analytics and supporting technologies.
“Industry will have a key part to play in delivering the digital backbone. Above all an enforcing high standards of network security and resilience in IT systems and those are subcontractors and suppliers.
“The extent of network mapping and penetration by hostile states will be higher than many of you think possible and alarms us all. But equally in our approach to collaboration, innovation, and experimentation, we must drive in approach that opens us up to all the benefits that come into living from access to a broad church of military, academia, and industry to deliver the technology and capabilities we need to ensure the UK and our allies’ prosperity and resilience. Innovation and exploitation of the thriving technology industry the UK has to offer can be our competitive advantage in the fight against our adversaries.
The training side of force development is increasingly significant as well.
“The transparent battle space and how we build up our understanding and the use of synthetic and virtual training are all equally high on my list of priorities and with the opportunity for Q&A I’d love to discuss these with you.
“But now I think the case in favor of integration, multi-domain integration is clear. And the digital backbone we need to deliberate is essential, integrating both by instinct and by design or deliver capabilities that can be deployed to, employed in, and exploit multiple domains to deliver temper.
“The greatest value ultimately we’ll offer though is the ability for us to provide our commanders and ministers as many effective capabilities drawn as possible including non-military to apply combinations the adversary does not expect and cannot guard against.”
Airmen from RAAF No.2 Squadron designed and painted ‘nose- art’ on an E-7A Wedgetail whilst deployed on Operation OKRA in the Middle East.
The art commemorates the 50th anniversary of the downing ofthe No. 2 Squadron Canberra bomber, ‘Magpie 91’, on 3 November 1970 in jungle on the Laotian-Vietnamese boarder during the Vietnam War.
The RAAF E-7A Wedgetail aircraft returned to Australia in September 2020, following a successful year long deployment to the Middle East.
The aircraft was operating as part of Australia’s Air Task Group 630, performing airborne command and control in the skies above Iraq as part of Operation Okra.
Operation Okra is the Australian Defence Force’s contribution to the United States led Global Coalition to combat the Daesh terrorist threat in Iraq and Syria.
Australia’s support to Iraq comes at the request of the Iraqi Government and is closely coordinated with a broad coalition of international partners.
According to a press release by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence on October 16, 2020, Norway is increasing its defense spending to strengthen its defense capability and military readiness.
A challenging strategic environment constantly reminds us that cannot take our freedom and security for granted. The Government will continue to invest substantially in defence and security, to ensure that Norway remains a reliable, responsible and capable partner on the Northern flank of the Alliance, says Norwegian Minister of Defence, Mr Frank Bakke-Jensen.
The Government presented a new Long Term plan for Defence to Parliament in April 2020. The deliberations were concluded and debated in early summer in Parliament and the majority in the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence asked the Government to come back to Parliament with a revised plan.
The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence asked for elaboration and detailing on eight specific topics. The revised plan will respond to the requests of the committee, and is based on the ambition of the plan that was presented in April 2020.
The plan details a budget increase in the coming eight years. In 2024 the defence-expenditure will increase to a level of 8,3 billion NOK above the 2020 budget. I In the2021 defence-budget, the Government proposed a spending increase of more than 3 billion NOK.
“We will also continue the work of identifying cost-effective solutions wherever possible, both when conducting daily operations and when acquiring new equipment,” says Mr Bakke-Jensen.
The highly skilled and dedicated military and civilian personnel of the defence-sector are the backbone of the Norwegian Armed forces. The number of personnel will gradually increase in order to strengthen the readiness and availability of the Armed Forces, and gradually generate enhanced combat power, says the Minister of Defence.
The current focus of personnel reforms is on diversifying the personnel structure in order to strengthen the capability and the readiness of the Norwegian Armed Forces, and on the further restructuring of the training and educational system.
Norway will also strengthen the system for innovation in the defence-sector and adapt a comprehensive approach to technology exploitation.
The development of the Armed Forces is an ongoing and long-term undertaking. In 2016, the Government set out the course towards a more capable and sustainable defence-force, better able to face the changing security environment. This new Long Term Plan further builds on that foundation. The Norwegian government continues to strengthen the capability and readiness of the defence of Norway, says Mr Frank Bakke-Jensen, Norwegian Minister of Defence.
The defence of Norway starts outside territorial borders and Norwegian participation in NATO operations and readiness forces is an integral part of the overall defence-effort.
Norway plays an important role in NATO by operating in and monitoring the Arctic region, by providing situational awareness to the transatlantic security community. The strengthening of NATO’s maritime posture is an integral element of the ongoing adaptation of the Alliance and crucial to Norwegian and allied security.
Allied presence, training and exercise in and close to Norway are of fundamental importance. The Norwegian Armed Forces will continue to train and operate with key allies such as the USA, the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, and other units. The government will also continue the development of Norwegian host nation facilities.
Norway will continue to develop the army. Brigade North will be developed with four manoeuvre battalions and with tactical and logistical support. The manoeuvre battalions will be equipped with new main battle tanks, mobile air defence systems and long-range precision fire. Increased firepower, higher readiness and increased sustainability will ensure that the Norwegian Armed Forces remain relevant in the new security environment.
In addition, the modernisation of the Home Guard will continue, including an increased capacity to forward stage weapons, ammunition and other supplies.
Norway will strengthen the Navy with increased personnel volume. The frigates and submarines will undergo necessary upgrades. In addition, three new Coast Guard vessels will be introduced. In order to preserve the maritime operational capability after 2030 the government has started the planning to replace surface vessels. The Government will inform Parliament about the recommended future development of the surface structure in 2022.
– It is our ambition to acquire and implement future Navy capabilities in collaboration with close allies, says the Norwegian Minister of Defence.
The introduction of new aircraft systems will have priority for the Air Force in the years leading up to 2025. The implementation of the F-35 Lightning II continues. P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft will replace the fleet of P-3 Orion.
To improve air defence capability, the NASAMS II air defence system will be upgraded with modern sensors, as well as the introduction of a complementary capacity with shorter range.
This will contribute to countering threats against bases, and protect allied reception areas, says Mr Bakke-Jensen.
In the long term, it will be assessed how long-range air defence systems can be introduced.
The modernisation of the Home Guard will continue, including an increased capacity to forward stage weapons, ammunition and other supplies.
The ability of the Special Forces to contribute to both national and international operations will improve with increased personnel volume and one additional maritime special operations task group. The Bell 412 transport helicopters will be replaced by a new capacity that is better suited for the Special Forces.
Editor’s Note: Our new book on European defense will be published next month.
The Australian Aegis ship returns to homeport after the regional presence deployment 2020.
The Royal Australian Navy is conducting a regional deployment across Southeast Asia from July to October 2020 with HMA Ships Hobart, Stuart, Arunta and Sirius.
The deployment demonstrates Australia’s enduring commitment to the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific and to sustaining strong and positive defence relationships with regional nations.
The slideshow highlights HMAS Hobart returning to her home port of Fleet Base East in Sydney after the successful completion of Regional Presence Deployment 2020.
Australian Department of Defence
October 9. 2020