Robbin Laird, Author at Second Line of Defense

The Australian Government and the Australian Arafura Class Offshore Patrol Vessel: The Perspective of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG)

Posted on March 31, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

03/31/2020

By Robbin Laird

After my visit to Perth and the Henderson Shipyard, I had a chance in Canberra to discuss the new class of OPVs with the senior leadership team in Navy and the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) within the Australian Department of Defence.

Participating in the discussion were Peter Croser, who is the Canberra based CASG Assistant Secretary Ship Acquisition – Specialist Ships responsible for the projects SEA1654 AOR’s, SEA1180 OPV’s, SEA2048 Phase 4 LHD’s, SEA2048 Phase 3 LLC’s and SEA3035 simulators for the RAN; Commodore Chris Smith (Director General Littoral), and Commander Gavin Baker (Deputy Director Patrol Force.

As I have done with the meetings with Luerssen Australia and CIVMEC, I will highlight takeaways from our discussion rather than directly quoting comments by participants. These takeaways are also based on the past two years of discussions I have had in Sydney, Adelaide, Perth and Canberra about the new continuous shipbuilding approach.

The first takeaway is that clearly the Department is focusing on a new approach in launching this ship, but a new approach which is seen to provide a template for the way ahead.

It is not about simply having a one-off platform innovation process; it is about launching a new way of building this ship and in so doing setting in motion new ways to manage the initial build and the ongoing modernization process.

It is not about having a bespoke platform; it is about shaping an approach that allows leveraging the systems onboard the new platform across the entire fleet and Australian Defence Force modernization process.

In part, it is selecting a platform which physically can allow for the upgrade process envisaged with the new emphasis on a fleet mission systems management model.

The Royal Australian Navy has clearly gone through a process of choosing a ship that has a lot of space, a lot of margins, the ability to adapt to missions by its space on deck, and under the deck for a modular or containerized solutions, extra power to operate for what comes in the future, and the ability to adapt the platform through further evolution of the design to take on different missions into the future.

The platform is important; but the focus is not on what the systems specific to the ship allow it operate organically as an end in of itself but as part of wider operational integratable force.

The second key takeaway is that a core way to do this is to change the governance approach.

The new approach is one in which the platform-build and evolution is managed by one CASG team working interactively with another CASG team addressing the management of the mission systems.

This comes together in an Integrated Project Team with Navy.

The platform-build and design refresh team is focused on building a ship which is capable enough at the outset to accommodate an upgrade process for the mission systems onboard the initial vessel and which is upgradeable over time.

The mission systems team which is working closely with the platform team is focused on shaping a mission systems capability which can be both tailored to the OPV but can be leveraged across the fleet for other platforms in the fleet over the new build and modernization process which the Royal Australian Navy is undergoing.

The approach to the new build OPV is that the ship is becoming the support for the mission systems which need to be rapidly and upgradeable over time. This means that the core capabilities of the ship need to have the physical qualities for adaptability in terms of size, power, and modular space to be able to accommodate mission system dynamics over time as well.

And the digital build process is crucial to ensuring that modifications can be made as well over time. Throughout the modernization process, it is envisaged that mods can be made to the ship which allows for the innovations which missions systems and associated capabilities can be added to the ship over time.

The third key takeaway is that such an approach also requires a new government-industrial working relationship.

Rather than contracting to a prime and establishing a set of requirements with which the prime is to comply in terms of the organic capabilities on that particular platform, the focus is upon an open-ended partnership. The government team working with Team Luerssen have shaped a collaborative environment which provides for a force multiplier of ideas.

The older prime contracting model focuses on setting requirements and ensuring they are met for the organic platform, and in such a setting industry would focus on selling a solution which is narrowly focused on meeting those requirements.

The fourth key takeaway is that what is being established is a shift from a platform specific set of requirements to be enforced through a contracting process to a concept of operations model.

How can the mission systems evolve on the ship working interactively with other platforms deliver the effect desired from the program?

For example, rather than focusing on what the OPV will be able to contribute in terms of its organic systems onboard to deliver counter mine capabilities, the focus is on how the missions systems and maritime remote or autonomous systems onboard can work together with other relevant platforms to deliver an integrative effect to deliver the counter mine capability desired.

This is similar to what I discussed onboard the HMAS Rankin, where the evolution of the Collins class submarine in terms of systems which would then be transferrable to the new build class of submarines was really about reshaping what a wolfpack would be able to deliver in a distributed maritime integratable force.

Clearly, the notion of mission systems and their delivery of effect for the new OPV is not about what the vessel can do itself but how those mission systems can reach out into a combat cloud to deliver a broader effect through integratability with associated assets on other platforms, both air and sea, and land as well.

The fifth key takeaway is that the core focus on sovereignty has shifted from how many bolts can an Australian worker drive into a hull, to having ownership of the digital design and mission systems ongoing mission systems management process.

Clearly, Australia would face a continuous challenge to keep up with technology if the focus was upon every bit of technology needing to be built in Australia.

By focusing on owning the evolving mission management capabilities, this allows the Australians to then be open to leveraging evolving allied technologies as well and working with partners to leverage that technology, but within an integratable Australian solution set.

The new OPV approach is clearly upon an ability to rapidly adapt the mission control systems whether they be underwater or surface autonomous systems without having to go back to change the platform itself in order to do this.

For example, they are looking to adapt the platform to what the mission systems can do in terms of launch and recovery and the ability to have an appropriate flow of information in and out and to have the mission systems adapt very quickly both to technology, but operational experience and the shaping of broader wolfpack concepts of operations.

They don’t want to have the mission systems constrained by the platform itself because they clearly want to be able to move mission systems capabilities where appropriate across the fleet.

They clearly do not want to be constrained by what a single provider offers; they want to be able to work with a diversity of organization to deliver the desired outcome. And this means, that the mission management system is at the center of the new sovereign approach.

In short, we are talking about a significant shift in how the Commonwealth intends to work with industry and to build integrative capabilities across its platforms.

This will be done through the mastery of the mission systems management process and ensuring that any new platforms are capable of both leveraging the achievements of the new build approach but also improving on it, and then having backward upgradeability to the “new” legacy fleet.

This is a major change; and it also is a major challenge.

But without question it is setting the course of shipbuilding in a direction where building out an integrated distributed force, which for me is the meaning of a 6th generation force is feasible.

The featured photo shows Navy personnel with a model of an Arafura class Offshore Patrol Vessel. Photo: Lieutenant Ryan Zerbe

Re-Thinking Military Supply Chain Security in the Post-Pandemic World

Posted on March 30, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

03/30/2020

By David Beaumont

Supply chain security is the concept which encompasses the programs, systems, procedures, technologies and solutions applied to address threats to the supply chain and the consequent threats to economic, social and physical well-being of citizens and organised society. – World Bank, 2009

Deborah Cowen’s book, The deadly life of logistics, describes the intertwined relationship between commercial logistics and security.

“With logistics comes new kinds of crises, new paradigms of security,” Cowen opines, describing how the global logistics enterprise developed from Second World War experience has been employed by government and business to define the modern world.¹

The COVID-19 pandemic threatens to end the fragile order of international supply and industrial production for the short term at least.

This event has direct existential and strategic consequences for Western militaries, but also requires them to be part of national economic responses.

This article is an attempt to consider a few aspects of this ‘new world’.

What are its implications for national security as it pertains to supply and industry?

Supply chain security came upon us in the last decades of the twentieth century.

A confluence of factors started the way the new world did its business. Globalisation was well in train, but economies adjusted to the opening of borders.

During the 1980’s, a wave of deregulation washed over the Western world and national economies were exposed to global forces.

Production shifted to those regions of the world where costs were low, and global supply chains became the veins of a system of wealth generation that stretched across the planet.

A ‘revolution in logistics’, one shared by business but also the military as deployments moved rapidly across the global commons, was accelerated by ‘just in time’ view of supply. More stuff was moving, more quickly and to more destinations.

It was a time of tremendous economic opportunity for those countries that could take advantage.

Supply chain security was not an idea developed by militaries to chart threats; it was an economic concept conceived to describe emerging vulnerabilities to normal patterns of human (Western human, mind you) existence.

It has become militarised over time, a consequence of expeditionary wars in the Middle-east, the blurring of civil and military industry in a number of critical industries resident in certain countries, and in consideration of new challenges to the existing global order. There were numerous ways in which militaries have experienced this problem and concept, two of which I will describe here.

Firstly, like everyone else, governments and their militaries became wedded to lower-cost procurement options which became possible with componentry sourced and products manufactured where labour costs were low.

In classical military parlance, the supply lines of most Western militaries moved from the ‘interior’ to the ‘exterior’; where parts where moved directly through geographic regions that had only years before (and now) been considered potential ‘battlezones’ versus the depots and production facilities within the national support base.

Secondly, and maybe even unwittingly, internationalised production and logistics caused national strategic interests to expand outwards. This was not just a concern for military logisticians who were interested in where sources of ammunition and parts may originate, but for those interested in protecting domestic prosperity.

It is now naïve to think that geoeconomics and commerce is not a national security issue.

It probably is the national security issue of our time, the driving force behind a veneer of ‘hard power’ concerns and other military-strategic problems.

Prosperity is what nations ultimately strive to protect.

While military strategists haven’t been particularly fixed on global economics, the problem of supply chain security has certainly been fixed on them.

Problems crept up on a new generation of Western national security and military planners slowly.

Operations off the ‘horn’ of Africa to protect traffic from Somali pirates gave way to concerns about ‘anti-access, area-denial’ weaponry on significant maritime choke-points, which in turn gave way to the implications of man-made island building in the South China Sea, and cyber-attacks on defence industry. People understood the strategic implications of trade, but now its importance was re-emerging, almost subliminally, in often unrelated discussions.

Sources of production were also becoming a critical part of the conversation. Volcanic eruptions in Iceland in 2010 and the Fukashima nuclear accident created shudders throughout the global economy, and all soon learned how vulnerable the connective tissue of the World truly was. Localised disruption to manufacturing now had global effects.

The economic cataclysm wrought by purposeful government decisions to slow the COVID-19 pandemic has created a new blend of the economic and military.

An alarming lack of resilience in the commercial systems society has created for itself has been revealed.

Military logisticians were already becoming increasingly concerned with the implications of limited sources of supply for the purposes of the armies, navies and air forces they belonged to.

Now this problem has moved beyond a challenge to military supply and into challenges to ‘normal’ human patterns of existence. Although admittedly a guess, it seems a certainty to me that the strategic calculus about supply-chains, along with concerns for national resilience, will change.

This will have considerable implications for what militaries must do for their nations, if not how they create capability in the first place.

Furthermore, the nature of military and industrial / economic relationships in Western countries will necessarily evolve. Militaries receive sizable budgets for the purpose of preparedness for war, and it is evident that governments will turn to the military to deliver some return during a time of national crisis.

Militaries around the world are performing tasks they were patently not expecting to be performing; from supplementing hospitals to producing medical supplies. However, militaries are being seen to offer governments a point of leverage into the national economy. Defence activities such as procurement and capability development can be rushed ahead – albeit inefficiently and with excessive costs – of timelines to stimulate some form of local economic activity.

At one end of the spectrum planned expenses will simply be brought forward. At the other end, it is possible that future capability decisions will be seen to renew, even re-establish, national industries that have withered since globalisation accelerated.

As we are seeing with the recent declaration of the US President Trump to invoke the Defence Production Act (DPA), governments are willing to co-opt existing military systems and processes to deliver economic outcomes.

This is an opportunity that must be taken if the situation demands it.

In the case of the DPA, an Act conceived to support mobilisation, industry is being directed to produce commercial products for national security purposes.

n the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic emergency, and as nations recover, it will be critical that defence planners consider ways in which seemingly natural links between the military and national support base can be appropriately leveraged for highly unusual crisis as is being witnessed right now.

Defence industry policy and other Acts of government can be the bedrock upon which national security responses can be formed.

It may be that at the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, and after the economic recovery erases our memory of the cost of seizing international trade, behaviours and the interests of military and other national security organisations will return to normal.

Now, amid a pandemic, it seems incredulous to suggest life will be so kind. National security is fundamentally about the preservation of normality, and militaries will have an important role in assisting their society assure it.

It is an unwritten rule of military logistics start preparing for the time in which forces will return home just as they arrive on a military operation.

Perhaps it is time to start planning now for ‘what comes next’, and to reconsider the national security implications of the globalised international economy.

Speaking of Western military forces, they will look out on a world that faces great uncertainty as nations strive to quickly regenerate their wealth and ensure prosperity.

They will be viewed as institutions of order and support, and their people as a symbol of assurance.

But they must also start thinking about the next threats to prosperity.

In this environment we shouldn’t forget commerce and military practice in war has always been entangled.

Alternatively, and as this article has sought to do, we shouldn’t forget that this rule applies outside of the fighting as well.

This article was first published March 12, 2020 by David Beaumont on his website.

HMAS Toowoomba undocking at Henderson BAE Dockyard after the completion of it’s Anti-Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) Upgrade.

HMAS Toowoomba, the second to last ANZAC Class FFH to undergo the Anti-Ship Missile Defence (ASMD) Upgrade at Henderson, W.A. is prepared for undocking, with HMAS Stuart, as the final ship in the programme behind form an impressive backdrop to Team ASMD – comprising members of the RAN, Australian Public Service, Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) – ANZAC Systems Project Office (SPO) BAE Systems, Saab Systems, CEA Technologies, Penske Power Systems and a multitude of sub-contractors, demonstrating the scale and level of collaboration required to deliver upgraded capability to the Fleet.

Dassault Plans to Restart Production April 3

Posted on March 30, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Pierre Tran

Paris – Dassault Aviation, builder of the Rafale fighter jet, plans to re-open April 3.

The company is to open nine factories and offices, returning to “minimal” production under strict health conditions in response to the spread of coronavirus across France.

The aircraft company posted on its website a March 27 note to staff setting out the date for a gradual industrial restart, which will follow March 31 and April 1meetings of local works councils to be held at the factories and offices.

“The management at the site will be briefed on the health measures before receiving the (work) teams from Friday April 3,” said the note, signed by executive chairman Eric Trappier.

An extraordinary meeting of the central works council was held March 26 at the company head office at St Cloud. The management presented measures taken to make work places safe in the factory and office, allowing a return to work, even on “on a reduced basis,” the note said

French government authorities have asked for work to restart, the note said.

A return to work is seen as important as Dassault supplies spares to support the Rafale, deployed in in sub-Saharan Africa in the Barkhane mission against Islamist fighters. The company is also building the fighter under export contracts, and also supports the Falcon business jet.

“There was a constructive exchange of views with the social partners, showing that we are working together in this unprecedented crisis,” the note said of the March 26 meeting. A large majority of the labor unions were in favor of returning to work under the plan presented, the note said.

Workers at the Argenteuil factory, in the suburbs of the capital, briefly downed tools March 18 to protest against the lack of safety equipment and measures that met health concerns, local daily Le Parisien reported.

Management has been asked to ensure “scrupulously” the health measures be observed, the note said.

Trappier said in the note he hoped talks with the unions would continue, that the unions would be informed of lessons learnt in the return to work, and further changes would be made if needed.

The health measures “should allow a gradual restart of our priority activities for our clients and the company” in a safe way in all the work sites and for a limited number of workers, the note said. Working from home should allow some sites to cut the number of staff at the work place.

“The crisis we are going through will be long, well after the peak of contagion, and its economic impact carries the risk of great severity,” the note said.

“We should be prepared.”

“The measures taken should allow us to retain a minimal activity while protecting those who go to work, to allow us to restart under better conditions when the time comes,” the note said. Patience, courage and a sense of responsibility were needed.

The March 27 staff note follows the March 22 and 23 notes concerning the virus.

Dassault has seven factories and two offices around the country, with the St Cloud site housing the headquarters and design office. The Istre office is next to the air force flight test center and houses spares and services the aircraft.

Marignane, near Bordeaux in southwest France, is the main factory, where the Rafale and Falcon business jet are built.

Dassault closed production sites March 18. All but essential office workers were ordered to work from home from March 22 in the wake of the national lock down.

That national quarantine has been extended to April 15 since coming into force midday March 17.

Dassault’s share price was down 3.9 percent at €714.50 ($788.1) in afternoon trading, while the French CAC-40 share index was down 0.36 percent in a highly unsettled market. The stock index has fallen 28 percent since the start of the year.

Some 2,606 deaths in hospitals from Covid-19 have been registered, with 292 dying over the weekend, afternoon daily Le Monde reported March 30. There are also deaths in retirement homes but these are not included in the official figures.

Some 40,174 French virus cases have been registered, compared to 37,575 on Saturday, with 19,354 patients admitted to hospital.

Patients severely hit by the virus have been transported by high speed train, coaches, NH90 troop transport helicopter, A400M airlifter and a helicopter carrier.

Shaping a New Build Platform for an Integratable Force: What is the Role Then for Suppliers?

Posted on March 30, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Robbin Laird

I have focused in recent months on the shaping of the integrated distributed force as the core outcome of shaping a sixth-generation force.

At the heart of being able to do so is to have C2/ISR systems operating on platforms which allow for synergy management, or the ability to provide for the connected tissue for platforms operating in an area of interest which can mix or match to work as an integrated force.

This means that if you are building a new platform which is being designed from the outset to be a player in this new world, then the nature of how to build out that capability is crucial.

A clear challenge is to shape the new platform’s integratable capabilities, both in terms of its ability to draw from the wider force and to contribute to it as well.

And for the OPV team working in the Australian Department of Defence, the clear commitment is to work the combat, C2 and mission systems as an ongoing enterprise not just on a particular platform but force wide.

But what does it mean to be a supplier to such an effort in which the prime contractor is tasked to deliver ongoing capabilities and contribute those capabilities across the force, rather than to provide simply capabilities defined solely by a single platform?

Rather than a prime contractor working the integration of systems platform by platform, the Australian Department of Defence is working with a new model, one in which the prime contractor works with suppliers which will reach beyond the platform on which they are operating, for which the prime contractor is primarily responsible.

This is a whole new world, but one designed to achieve what Vice Admiral (Retired) Barrett calls a new approach to prime contracting.

“We see new shipyard capabilities and new industrial partnerships being forged to build a new approach to shipbuilding.

“It is being done with a new approach which is not just focusing on a traditional prime contractor method of building the hull and having the systems targeting that specific platform.

“It is about building a sovereign capability for our combat systems so that we can upgrade our systems onboard this class and all future classes of Australian ships.

“The OPV is providing some concrete manifestations of what we set out to do.

“It should be the marker for what follows in the continuous shipbuilding program.

A new approach provides new challenges and opportunities for the defense industry.

In the second part of this article, I will look at this new approach as being experienced by L3Harris Australia.

USMC Attack Helicopters Demonstrate Core Maritime Capabilities

Posted on March 30, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

In a story by 1st Lt. Zachary Bodner from 3rd Marine Air Wing published on December 11, 2109, the key role which Marine Corps attack helicopters play in operating the Marine Corps at sea was highlighted.

In a powerful demonstration of aviation lethality, 12 AH-1Z Viper attack helicopters proved their worth during a complex training event that combined sea based principles with expeditionary operations and live-fire engagements. The exercise, known as Viper Storm, took place in Southern Calif. Dec 11, 2019. The attack helicopters flew from two separate locations – one on the coast and one inland – and struck simulated enemy targets representing peer and near peer threats capable of denying naval and joint forces the freedom of navigation essential to maritime control and enhancing operational-level flexibility.

Beginning at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, eight Vipers took to the sea to hunt for maritime threats that could negatively impact simulated sea lanes. After being passed new targeting information they rerouted to link up with four additional Vipers and engage multiple land targets before rehearsing rearming at an expeditionary forward arming and refueling point. Once rearmed they again took to the sky to engage targets and support follow-on ground operations.

“Viper Storm was an opportunity to validate the modern maritime capabilities of the AH-1Z Viper to joint commanders within the Department of Defense, United States partners and allies, and potential peer adversaries,” said Col. William Bartolomea, commanding officer, MAG-39. “We were highlighting the maritime component of the Viper, the ability to go from ship-to-shore in a large element and address peer threats.”

Bartolomea’s comments underscore a shift in the Marine Corps’ focus back to the maritime domain. Gen. David H. Gen. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps, released guidance earlier this year directing the Marine Corps be trained and equipped as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and prepared to operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of fleet operations. Viper Storm showcased the AH-1Z’s vital role in supporting Gen. Berger’s directions.

In the fall of 2017, U.S. Pacific Fleet defined sea control as total control of the seas for the free movement of all. It means control of air, surface, and subsurface areas, when and where needed. Sea control is crucial to national strategy and allows the Navy to use the oceans as barriers for defense and as avenues to extend influence and assistance where needed.

The exercise was designed to showcase the AH-1Z Viper’s capabilities and how the aircraft could operate symbiotically and in support of the Navy, flying from the sea and striking simulated threats that the Navy and joint force is likely to face. In the week leading up to the exercise, Gen. Berger published an editorial in “War on the Rocks,” which stated “for the first time in a generation, sea control is no longer the unquestioned prerogative of the United States.” Viper Storm demonstrated that the AH-1Z Viper is a uniquely qualified platform capable of enhancing sea control.

These exercises are essential for MAG-39 to maintain readiness and training standards. The 12 Vipers employed AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground and AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, emphasizing the versatility the Viper provides. With larger stub wings than its AH-1W Super Cobra predecessor, the Viper can carry a combination of up to 2 Sidewinders, 16 Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM) or Hellfires, auxiliary fuel tanks, and up to 76 rockets with various fusing options, including the newest Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) LASER-guided rockets. This allows the platform to be tailored to any mission whether it be sea, land, or air related.

The AH-1Z Viper is more lethal and survivable than its predecessor in large part because of the modernized ordnance, sensory, and communication equipment. For example, it can carry the JAGM, which will replace the Hellfire missile. The JAGM is a multi-sensor, aviation-launched, precision-guided munition for use against high-value land and naval targets. It provides precision point and fire-and-forget targeting day or night, regardless of weather.

The AH-1Z’s glass cockpit provides pilots with superior situational awareness and the upgraded Target Sight System has an incredible range that enables the Viper to detect and engage targets from distances not previously possible for Marine attack helicopters.

Modern technology enables the Viper to cue naval and joint kill-chains, which is a capability Gen. Berger stated was important to complicate an adversary’s decision making calculus. It is because of those technological advancements that Bartolomea, who grew up listening to stories of Cobra missions from his father, stated, “The Viper is not your dad’s Cobra.”

Viper Storm also focused on expeditionary operations to include its ability to refuel and rearm from a temporary location and then conduct assaults deeper inland. The Chief of Naval operations directed the Navy and Marine Corps to master operational concepts in support of fleet-level warfare.

The intent is to provide fleet commanders the option of persistently posturing naval expeditionary forces forward in key areas as a complement to the seagoing elements of the fleet. Viper Storm demonstrated this capability and showed that MAG-39 can conduct distributed operations in austere environments in support of maritime and joint objectives.

“Posturing Vipers forward is what the aircraft was made to do,” said Bartolomea. “We are an attack helicopter, killing enemy forces is what we do for a living. We don’t provide a whole lot of value on the ground unless we are refueling, rearming, and getting back to the air to engage the enemy or facilitate other joint weapons platforms and systems.”

Viper Storm would not have been possible without the diligent efforts of the Marines and Sailors of MAG-39 who “Fix, Fly, and Fight” the AH-1Z every day. It is thanks to their efforts that MAG-39 was seamlessly able to conduct this large-scale strike with AH-1Z Vipers and continues to stand ready to support Marine, naval expeditionary, and joint forces across the globe.

In conducting strikes from the sea and temporary bases inside a simulated peer adversary’s threat ring, MAG-39 demonstrated their commitment to remaining ready to enhance sea control and remain at the forefront of Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations development.

As the Marine Corps shifts its focus from land-locked wars to rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, MAG-39 will continue to train its “Marines and Machines” to fight and win, from the sea.

Bartolomea summed up the event, “We demonstrated the unique 21st Century capabilities of the AH-1Z Viper from a maritime environment.

“As we continue to adapt to near-peer threats in accordance with the National Defense Strategy and the Commandant’s Planning Guidance, we are focused on modernizing the digital interoperability, survivability, and lethality of the ‘Z’. These improvements will help to maintain the operational viability of the Viper in support of naval and joint forces beyond 2030.”

U.S. Marine AH-1Z Vipers depart from Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, California, during exercise Viper Storm Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, I Marine Expeditionary Force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Alison Dostie)

A U.S. Marine AH-1Z Viper prepares for exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, California, Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, I Marine Expeditionary Force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Alison Dostie)

U.S. Marine AH-1Z Vipers prepare for exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, California, Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing, I Marine Expeditionary Force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Alison Dostie)

Three U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Vipers with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), prepare to take flight to participate in exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives MAG-39, the Marine expeditionary force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Victor Mackson)

Six U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Vipers with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), take flight to participate in exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives MAG-39, the Marine expeditionary force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Victor Mackson)

Eight U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Vipers with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), take flight to participate in exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec.11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives MAG-39, the Marine expeditionary force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Victor Mackson)

One U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Viper with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), takes flight to participate in exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives MAG-39, the Marine expeditionary force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Victor Mackson)

Four U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Vipers with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), take flight over a beach to participate in exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives MAG-39, the Marine expeditionary force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Victor Mackson

Four U.S. Marine Corps AH-1Z Vipers with Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 369, Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 39, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW), take flight to participate in exercise Viper Storm at Marine Corps Air Station Camp Pendleton, Calif., Dec. 11, 2019. The AH-1Z Viper gives MAG-39, the Marine expeditionary force and the joint force the ability to deter potential adversaries and provide combat-ready units the capability to engage from the sea and over long distances against a near-peer threat. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Victor Mackson)

Crafting Tron Warfare Capabilities for the Integrated Distributed Force

Posted on March 30, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

By Andrew McLaughlin

When introducing a new capability, a major factor in its success – or otherwise – is its ability to be successfully integrated with other capabilities.

This has become particularly crucial with the plethora of increasingly capable and expensive new generation capabilities coming on board, each of which may have multiple sensors which generate huge amounts of data which cannot possibly be processed, exploited, and disseminated by humans alone.

A small defence force like the ADF can no longer afford to buy multiple systems with overlapping capabilities which cannot integrate with other services, allies, and coalition partners.

And so it will be with the MC-55A which will provide an exponential leap in electronic warfare support capability compared to the AP-3C (EW). So great is the leap that, in our Peregrine feature, RAAF Director of ISREW GPCAPT Jason Lind describes it as a “…a new capability, not an evolution”, and that it “…will be airborne ISR done in a different way”.

The challenge of integrating these and other new electronic and information warfare capabilities into the ADF’s order of battle is a key tasking of the Joint Capabilities Group (JCG) headed by AIRMSHL Warren McDonald, and specifically, JCG’s Director General Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare and Cyber, BRIG Stephen Beaumont.

In the May-June 2019 issue of ADBR our profile on JCG lightly touched on the role its Information Warfare Division (IWD) plays in developing what has been dubbed the ‘fifth domain’ – the other four being air, land, sea, and space. Information Warfare capabilities include cyber; electronic warfare; information operations; space-based systems; command, control, and communications systems; and intelligence – all of which need to be integrated to generate coherent information capabilities for the ADF.

Now that the ADF has multiple platforms and systems equipped with high-end active and passive electronic warfare capabilities – and has more on the way – it is now developing a ‘Force level EW’ concept that describes how these capabilities can ‘plug into’ a useable whole-of-ADF network.

“The way I think about force level EW is – they’re building some exquisitely joint, really usable capabilities which all single service EW capabilities can plug into,” BRIG Beaumont told ADBR.

“This will ensure the networks that they need are there, and the data they need to function properly is available.

“And when it comes to data, I’m strongly of the view that we aim to, ‘build once, use often’,” he added. “That is, we should build data sets that are accessible and are of a format and standard that many different platforms can use.

“We are fast moving away from the days where we had stand-alone, platform specific databases that were invisible and inaccessible to other users. If we think of the contemporary battlespace where characterisation of actors/emitters is critical, access to common, shared, data sets will be important.

“From this we have a chance to build a common understanding of what is occurring in the electromagnetic spectrum, which will help us make choices about how we might wish to manoeuvre in the spectrum – seeking to degrade the adversary’s use of spectrum while enhancing our own.”

BRIG Beaumont says the IWD is responsible for not only providing the Joint ’back-end’ for existing multi-service EW and IW capabilities, but for also working with Capability Managers and their staff to ensure, as far as possible, new capabilities are designed with the need to integrate into the broader Joint EW capability.

“Everyone is working towards this end,” he explained. “And it’s not just JCG. Plainly, everything these days is going to have to plumb into an enterprise network, and when you’re talking enterprise networks you very quickly get into the domain of the CIOG (Chief Information Officer Group). So we work very closely with CIOG’s ICT Delivery Division to ensure platforms are integrated into those networks, so the data can flow and be available for processing and reprogramming as necessary.

“We also have a body of work of our own that we’re progressing through the Joint EW Sub-Program,” BRIG Beaumont added. “This body of work is focussed on building those Joint EW capabilities that will help knit single-service EW capabilities together and enhance the decision making of deployed commanders and EW staff when it comes to spectrum management and the delivery of kinetic and non-kinetic effects. The key capability elements of this program are collaborative geolocation, electromagnetic battle management and EW data management and analytics.

“A key feature of the Joint EW Sub-Program concerns Electromagnetic Battle Management. Our vision is to have a tool – a scalable tool – that allows commanders and staff at all levels to visualise how the spectrum is being used by all actors in a defined area of operations.

“This capability will enable genuine manoeuvre in the Electromagnetic Spectrum and should facilitate best possible decision making around use of the spectrum. We are working very closely with the Growler community, other EW users, and Industry as we try to solve this difficult capability problem.

“This is a hard problem, to have a single tool or interface that allows you to characterise what’s going on in the electromagnetic spectrum. We talk about manoeuvre, JEMSO (joint electromagnetic spectrum operations) and the idea of manoeuvre…I would argue you need a pretty good battle management tool as a first stop capability to allow you to do that.”

Another of JCG’s challenges in working with Capability Managers to knit single-service EW capabilities together into a coherent whole with the high number of stakeholders involved in determining what capabilities are to be acquired.

“Stakeholder engagement is one of the key challenges of being in Joint Capabilities Group,” BRIG Beaumont said. “Making this task easier has been the reforms instituted under the First Principles Review. Defence has appointed VCDF as the Joint Force Authority, stood-up Joint Capabilities Group, and established defined capability programs with clear accountabilities for Program Sponsors and Capability Managers.

“This has provided the organisational framework to allow us to really progress the development of Joint capabilities. Behaviours have also evolved, and I have witnessed a shared purpose when it comes to the progression of Joint capabilities.

“For example, as sponsor of the Joint EW Program, I am invited to attend the Program Steering Groups of other relevant Programs, such as the Land ISREW Steering Group, where there is opportunity to listen and to shape and influence outcomes.

“Equally, my fellow program sponsors are invited to my Joint EW Steering Group. The new structures we’ve got in place, they’re maturing and evolving, but the trend line is very positive, allowing us to collaborate and share routinely.

“It is also worth noting that there is a realisation that a joint approach makes sense from a value for money perspective. This is particularly the case when it comes to data. Data is not a free commodity, so it makes sense to have, as far as possible, a common approach to EW data.”

The First Principles Review also saw the creation of the Investment Committee, and that has allowed the capability managers and other stakeholders to review proposed capabilities with a joint mindset.

“The diligence that goes into preparing those submissions is very thorough and includes detailed collaboration and consultation,” BRIG Beaumont said. “The behaviours and culture that we’re seeing are very positive and I’ve seen a keen eye on achieving value for money and joint capability.

Just as GPCAPT Lind observed in the Peregrine article, BRIG Beaumont agrees that senior leadership and the political decision makers recognise the importance of these ‘back-end’ joint capabilities that aren’t necessarily hardware or platform-related.

“I think everyone appreciates the idea of the contemporary operating environment being ‘contested and congested’,” he said in closing. “This is especially the case when it comes to the electromagnetic spectrum.

“We need to build capabilities that allow us to characterise and understand – as best we can – what is occurring across the spectrum so we can make choices, bringing to reality the idea of electromagnetic spectrum operations and manoeuvre.”

This article appeared in the Nov-Dec 2019 issue of ADBR.

The featured photo: Royal Australian Air Force’s first AP-3C Orion A9-751 taxis in for the last time upon its arrival at RAAF Base Point Cook on 16 November 2017. (Australian Department of Defence.)

U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Year in Review: 2019

Posted on March 30, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) is a scientific and engineering command dedicated to research that drives innovative advances for the Navy and Marine Corps from the seafloor to space and in the information domain.

NRL headquarters is located in Washington, D.C., with major field sites in Stennis Space Center, Mississippi, Key West, Florida, and Monterey, California, and employs approximately 2,500 civilian scientists, engineers and support personnel.

02.14.2020

Video by Jonathan M Sunderman

U.S. Naval Research Laboratory

Aussie Politicians Get to Experience LIfe on Deployment

Posted on March 29, 2020 | by Robbin Laird | Leave a Comment

03/29/2020

By Captain Jarrad Baldwin

Three Australian politicians recently experienced what life is like for deployed Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel in the Middle East region (MER).

Federal Member of Parliament James Stevens and Senators Hollie Hughes and David Van participated in the ADF Parliamentary Program (ADFPP), visiting the main ADF operating base to gain an insight into operations conducted in the MER.

On arrival the participants were immersed in reception, staging and onwards movement (RSO), a process that ADF personnel undertake to prepare them for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

After donning a uniform, helmet and body armour they completed care of the battle casualty and explosive hazard awareness training.

“The practical part of the training really stood out to me – getting in and doing combat first aid with the troops. That was really an experience,” Senator Van said.

“It brought everything into very sharp focus that this is real.”

Since its inauguration in 2001 the ADFPP has performed a valuable role in building mutual understanding between the ADF, senators and members of parliament.

Senator Hughes said it was important to see the preparation Defence personnel undertake.

“RSO gave us a hands-on experience. It also gave us direct access to personnel who were arriving in theatre,” Senator Hughes said.

“It put us alongside those people deploying forward, to share experiences and develop relationships.”

The program also included flying on an air-to-air refuelling mission on board a RAAF KC-30A over Iraq, something Mr Stevens said was a once-in-a-lifetime experience.

“I’m so lucky in my role that Defence has given me the opportunity to experience and see our contribution in the Middle East and the very important roles that are being performed in both Iraq and Afghanistan,” Mr Stevens said.

“We leave as great advocates and very proud of the service that Defence personnel are providing and we will be making sure that we are making the decisions to keep supporting their efforts.”

This article was published on the Australian Department of Defence website on March 20, 2020.