Raven B operators conduct training with the small unmanned aircraft system at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar.
Raven Bs provide real-time aerial intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and enhance the 379th ESFS’s force protection mission capabilities.
QATAR
07.09.2020
Video by Senior Airman Olivia Grooms
379th Air Expeditionary Wing Public Affairs
By Robbin Laird
I first became aware of George Galdorisi when were both working for Dr. Scott Truver at Anteon Corporation in support of the US Navy in the early 1990s.
And even though we have interacted through the years, and most recently, with regard to publishing some of his work on the evolution of maritime unmanned or remote systems, I had not actually met George in person.
That changed on July 10, 2020 when I flew in from Nevada after visiting the Naval Air Warfare Development Center at Fallon Naval Air Station, I was coming to San Diego for meetings to be held at US Navy Air Station North Island in San Diego.
George was my guide for an afternoon meeting pier side with the MANTAS USV team working a counter-mine maritime remote capability for the US Navy.
Currently, Galdorisi is the Director of Strategic Assessments and Technical Futures at the Navy’s Command and Control Center of Excellence in San Diego, California, Naval Information Warfare Center, Pacific. He has an extensive background serving in the Navy and working with the Navy after retirement from the Navy, and his biography can be found at the end of this article.
The day after the Friday afternoon visit with the MANTAS USV team, we sat down to discuss how he looked at the past and the future of maritime remote systems.
We started by looking at the past. He noted that the U.S. Navy has been interested for a long time in having maritime autonomous systems which could support the fleet. The challenge has been that the technology has not been mature enough to do the core missions the Navy has looked for from this class of air and sea vehicles,
He discussed the infamous DASH system which he noted “failed spectacularly because the technology wasn’t robust enough.”
Then as the XO of the USS New Orleans, he had experience with the Pioneer UAV which they launched from the ship.
“We actually put small arresting wires on the deck and our commanding officer, who was a Vietnam-era A7 pilot, had one goal that week. His goal was that we left the pier on Monday morning with three Pioneers and he wanted to come back Friday afternoon with three Pioneers.
“We came back with one.”
But after a decade-and-a-half of widespread use of unmanned systems by U.S. and allied forces in the land wars, this experience has clearly reshaped the U.S. Navy’s approach shaping a way ahead for the use of remote technologies in the fleet.
And for the U.S. Navy, the missions which they envisage for such vehicles are the dull, dirty, and dangerous work where you are putting Sailors or Marines in harm’s way and would wish to outsource these missions to autonomous systems.
The Navy and Marine Corps have been using such systems in a wide range of exercises to shape proof of concept efforts in order to sort through what will most effectively meet their needs.
For example, Galdorisi noted, with regard to the MANTAS system, it has been used by the Navy/Marine Corps team to do “intelligence preparation of the battlefield,” where they have gone into the surf zone to use sonars actually to see obstacles such as mines, as well as other obstacles that could thwart an amphibious landing.
“In Valiant Shield, they used the MANTAS to bring supplies to the beachhead because once the Marines were on the beach they had to fight their way inland.
“As tough as the landing is, the tougher part is resupplying Marines as they work to push off the beach because they use massive amounts of ammunition, fuel, and food.”
“They demonstrated that they could resupply a beachhead with autonomous vehicles and not put Sailors and Marines in harm’s way just to deliver materiel to the beach. What you saw yesterday when you rode on the larger MANTAS vehicle and saw other USVs and UUVs was the next step in having autonomous vehicles do the dull, dirty, and dangerous work that Sailors have had to do in the past to execute the mine countermeasures mission (MCM).
There is an urgency to provide the MCM capability to the Navy. Legacy capabilities now in use employ a 25-30-year-old fleet of Avenger class MCM vessels and equally old MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters.
Littoral Combat Ship MCM Mission Modules currently under development are leaving an unacceptably narrow margin between obsolescence of legacy capability and transition to Full Operational Capability (FOC) of the new Mission Modules.
What industry is proposing is a mine countermeasure system built completely with commercial off the shelf technology. And in this case, they’ve used the 38-foot MANTAS USV. They have used the Kraken side scan sonar. And they’ve used the Pluto ROV mine neutralization system. And they have demonstrated these over the past several weeks in various exercises.
Galdorisi noted: “What industry is proposing is a parallel path solution. They are not saying that the Navy shouldn’t build another minesweeper. They are not saying the Navy shouldn’t have the H-60 helicopter do the AMCM mission. They are saying, ‘The COTS technology is available now. Why don’t we offer a parallel path solution to again take the Sailor out of the minefield and make it a single sortie to engage?’”
“What this means in practice is that one would send the MANTAS USV autonomous vehicle out in an area where mines are suspected. The MANTAS sonar coupled with the Kraken UUV searches for the mines. The Kraken comes back to the MANTAS once it surveys the area, then the Pluto goes out fine tunes exactly where the mine is and then drops an explosive charge next to it.
“The Pluto backs away, it comes back to the MANTAS and can either explode that mine right then, or put explosive charges on several mines and then detonate them at a predetermined time.
“Importantly, you don’t have to blow up every mine in the minefield; you just need a safe path for either the ships or the landing craft to go through.”
We then discussed how the U.S. Navy is looking at the various classes of unmanned surface ships to meet various needs for the fleet.
Galdorisi underscored that “At the high end are the large USVs, which basically are going to be, in my view, a truck. They will bring smaller USVs to the OPAREA.
“The medium USVs will do a lot of the work, whether it’s ISR, or mine countermeasures, or other missions.
“The smaller USVs could do tasks like counter-swarm
“My professional interest is currently on the medium ones, and there are several medium USVs out there that the Navy is experimenting with. One of the better-known ones in this class is the Sea Hunter, and of course MANTAS, which you saw yesterday.
“With these ships you can perform a variety of missions, you saw the counter-mine one yesterday.
“But another mission would be ISR. If you can’t see ahead of your ship and you want to know what’s going on out there, you can send a USV armed with radar, sonar, FLIR and other sensors out ahead of the task force to do scouting in much the same was as we used to do scouting back in World War II with aircraft.”
We then discussed the challenge of bringing together data streams generated by various platforms and their sensor networks and making that data useful to the operators and to the fleet.
Obviously, part of the challenge is working with wave forms that can communicate securely and effectively.
It is crucial to ensure that the data streams come back to a single screen allowing the operators to make correlations among those data streams, aided by autonomous systems, but really allowing the man-in-the-loop to make the intelligent judgments and decisions which allows the operator to not be in a stove-piped data stream situation.
He discussed an historical parallel that in his mind is suggestive of the way ahead,
“The LAMPS MK III was designed with an elegant concept. Think of it as disassembling a P-3, where you cut off the front end and put that up in the air, and took the back end and put it on the ship.
“And why did you do that?
“You put the front end up in the air because it has a radar and an EW system and sonobuoys. And you put the back end on the ship because the ship is more stable and has more computing power and more people and more power onboard the ship to work the data.
“In theory, it was great. And all the pilots were supposed to do in the aircraft was keep the helicopter out of the water. They were just driving the sensors around.
“All the pilots had between them was a small screen about as big as an iPad where they could look at tracks and other information.
“On the ship you had five people just like the back of a P-3 interested in what the helicopter was picking up in terms of data. And onboard the ship, one had the REMRO, the radar guy, the ESMO, the ESM guy, the ASMO, the ASW guy, and then you had the ATACO who was watching the whole picture, all the dots on the screen.
“And then you had the CIC watch officer.
“And they were the bosses. All the pilots were supposed to do in the air was keep the helicopter out of the water.
“But guess who had the best situational awareness?
“The aircrew had all the data displayed on their screen, the radar picture, the ESM picture and the tracks from the sonobuoys. All of those things were on the same screen where they could go, ‘Oh, that one is associated with that one. And that must be the Soviet ship that way, because we’re getting the radar, we’re getting the ESM spike.’
“In contrast, the guys on the ship were stove-piped in their individual roles.
“In many command centers today there many, many individual screens with lots of people doing individual things.
“To me, the art of it is bringing all those things together.
“And that art is what we need to take forward to make best use of the data streams which autonomous systems can provide.
“The data needs to go to a centralized location whether on a ship or in the air where it is correlated and made sense of.”
This is the area where clearly the discipline of human factors engineering and human system integration comes in and plays a key role in shaping how best to do the convergence or correlation effort and capability which is central to the way ahead.
Clearly, artificial intelligence will contribute to providing decision aids, but in Galdorisi’s view, to maximize fully unmanned platforms, we need to move from the current paradigm where many people manage a single unmanned platform, to a new concept of operations where a single operator can manage a force package of maritime USVs with different sensors on each.
This way, we can make the best use of what the sensors or capabilities deployed on tho e systems can do for the fleet.
This is a major challenge, but clearly a key way ahead.
GEORGE GALDORISI is a career naval aviator whose thirty years of active duty service included four command tours and five years as a carrier strike group chief of staff. He began his writing career in 1978 with an article in the U.S. Navy’s professional magazine, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
In addition to his Rick Holden thrillers published by Braveship Books, he has written thirteen other books distributed by mainstream publishers, including several bestselling novels in the rebooted Tom Clancy’s Op-Center series, including Out of the Ashes, Into the Fire, Scorched Earth, and Dark Zone.
With his longtime collaborator, Dick Couch, he coauthored the New York Times best seller, Tom Clancy Presents: Act of Valor the novelization of the Bandito Brothers/Relativity Media film. He is also the author of The Kissing Sailor, which proved the identity of the two principals in Alfred Eisenstaedt’s famous photograph; as well as over three-hundred articles in professional journals and other media.
George has received a number of national and international writing awards, including: The Navy League of the United States Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement, the Surface Navy Association Literary Award, the Navy League of Australia’s Annual Essay Competition, the Naval Helicopter Historical Association Mark Starr Pioneer Literary Award, and the Military Writers Society of America Silver Medal Award, among others. George speaks frequently at writing classes and seminars including: San Diego State University Writers Conference, La Jolla Writers Conference, San Diego Writer’s Ink, Southern California Writers Association, Coronado Writer’s Workshop, and other venues.
George is the Director of Strategic Assessments and Technical Futures at the Navy’s Command and Control Center of Excellence in San Diego, California. He and his wife Becky live in Coronado, California. Other than writing thrillers, he likes nothing more than connecting with readers. You can follow him on Facebook and Twitter, and learn more about his books, blogs and other writing on his website: http://georgegaldorisi.com/ – especially his “Writing Tips,” – which offer useful advice for all writers from established authors to future best-selling writers.
By Robbin Laird
On 1 July 2020.The Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon Scott Morrison, and the Minister for Defence, Senator the Hon Linda Reynolds, launched the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan at the Australian Defence Force Academy
The Defence Strategic Update sets out the Government’s new defence strategy, which has three core objectives: to shape Australia’s strategic environment; deter actions against Australia’s interests; and respond with credible military force, when required.
In his speech announcing the next phase in Australian strategic development, Prime Minister Morrison highlighted the challenges of dealing with the new strategic situation and the importance of enhancing Australia’s ability to defend itself in an alliance context.
As the Prime Minister emphasized in his July 1, 2020 speech launching the new defense strategy:
“Previous assumptions of enduring advantage and technological edge are no longer constants and cannot be relied upon. Coercive activities are rife. Disinformation and foreign interference have been enabled and accelerated by new and emerging technologies. And, of course, terrorism hasn’t gone away and the evil ideologies that underpin it and they remain a tenacious threat.
“State sovereignty is under pressure, as are rules and norms and the stability that these provide.
“Relations between China and the United States are fractious at best, as they compete for political, economic and technological supremacy. But it’s important to acknowledge that they are not the only actors of consequence.
“The rest of the world, and Australia, are not just bystanders to this. It’s not just China and the United States that will determine whether our region stays on path for free and open trade, investment and cooperation that has underpinned stability and prosperity, the people-to-people relationships that bind our region together. Japan, India, the Republic of Korea, the countries of South-East Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and the Pacific all have agency, choices to make, parts to play and of course, so does Australia.
“There is a new dynamic of strategic competition and the largely benign security environment, as I’ve noted, that Australia has enjoyed, basically from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the global financial crisis, that’s gone.
“Since the Government’s 2016 Defence White Paper was released, we have witnessed an acceleration of the strategic trends that were already underway. The pandemic has accelerated and accentuated many of those trends, and that is why today I’m launching the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. It represents a significant pivot. It outlines the shifts and challenges I’ve foreshadowed and mentioned. It makes clear the strategic environment we face and this clarity will guide Australia’s actions. The update sees an evolution of strategic defence objectives in accord with our new strategic environment.
“The objectives outlined in the 2016 Defence White Paper saw an equal weighting across the three areas of Australia and its northern approach, South-East Asia and the Pacific and operations in support of the rules-based global order.
“In this update, the Government has directed Defence to prioritise, to make choices, ADF’s geographical focus on our immediate region, the area ranging from the north-east Indian Ocean through maritime and mainland South-East Asia to Papua New Guinea and the south-west Pacific.
Recently, I discussed with Australian strategist, Brendan Sargeant, who provided his perspective with regard to the new strategy. He underscored that the new strategic was a significant break from the 2016 strategic documents.
“Deterrence has also always been a major element of Australian strategic policy, but this document strengthens it and in a sense is a search of contemporary capabilities that fulfilled the role of the F1 11 in the 80s and 90s. But we haven’t done enough policy thinking on deterrence since the 1990s.
“The operational focus of the Middle East wars has consumed too much policy energy and made us complacent.
“The document recognises limits, and in that sense overturns the 2016 White Paper and is quite explicit about that.
“It’s repositioning geographically is something that we drifted away from when we put our faith in the continuation of the rules-based order, which underpinned a lot of the thinking in 2016.”
Recently, I had a chance to talk with Air Marshal (Retired) Geoff Brown, now Chairman of the Williams Foundation with regard to his assessment of what the new strategy signified in terms of shaping the way ahead for Australian defense and security.
He started by reinforcing the core point made by Sargeant.
“There’s a clear recognition that the environment’s changed much more rapidly than anticipated in the 2016 strategy. When we put together that strategy, we were doing it with a clear focus on the Middle East along with our region as the main foci of our strategic efforts. Now we are clearly concentrating more on our area, the Indo-Pacific.
“There is a commitment to enhanced defense spending. An extra $70 billion is committed over and above what the 2016 strategy projected. A lot of that will probably go to the additional costs around the ship building programs, but the additional money, in my mind, guarantees the other programs to go ahead in air and land as well.
“Additionally, I liked the emphasize on the key role for Australia in being able to shape, deter and respond to threats in our region. There is a major emphasis on both the cyber and space domains as part of this effort as well.
“But a major part of the strategy for me is the renewed emphasis on deterrence. There was a clear focus on shaping our changing strategic environment, deterring threats and responding to threats in a kinetic way. Probably the biggest manifestation of the change is on the commitment to developing and deploying long range missiles. I think if you read between the lines and if you have a look at where some of the investments going, there is a desire to have a more independent deterrent capability going forward. To me, that’s a real plus of this new strategy.
“Finally, is the emphasis on national resilience. Certainly COVID-19 has reinforced the need for enhanced national resilience. There is also a need to think through how Australia can respond when facing a zero-based supply chain and the need to build resiliency throughout all our inputs to capability.
It is clear that a key element of the strategic rethink is infrastructure defense, whether it is a cyber challenge, or a communications challenge or physical supply chain support to the ADF or the society in a crisis situation.
And clearly, the role of China in providing the threat calculus in this area is evident.
According to Air Marshal (Retired) Brown; “The Australian population certainly does not see the Chinese Communist Party as a benign force with regard to Australia’s interests. The Prime Minister’s speech announcing the new strategy recalled the environment of the 1930s, and underscored that the assumption that we would have 10 years warning time for a defense buildup is not realistic.”
There is a clear emphasis as well on a new longer-range strike capability. Brown has been quite vocal on the need for such a capability for many years. As a former F-111 pilot, this probably is not surprising, and the need for an F-111 like capability, whether delivered by a bomber of long-range strike generated from the joint force is an open question. This is clearly a work in progress.
With regard to allies, Australia is focusing on how to shape, and contribute more to a Quad capability, namely, Australia working with the United States, Japan, India in shaping collaborative capabilities. “Notably, we need to work on the Indian part of the Quad, which is increasingly important.”
In short, for Brown: “I actually don’t see this as a set-and-forget strategic update. I think this is the first of a series of updates, and will certainly shape more deterrent capabilities going forward.”
Featured photo: The Prime Minister of Australia, the Hon Scott Morrison, at the launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the 2020 Force Structure Plan at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.
U.S. Marines with Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465, 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing conduct external lifts with a M777 155mm howitzer from a CH-53E Super Stallion in support of Exercise Summer Fury 20 at Chocolate Mountain Aerial Gunnery Range, Calif., July 14, 2020.
The exercise focused on long-range strikes from fixed-wing aircraft in a naval environment from expeditionary advanced base operations.
The exercise enhanced the integration capability of the Marines and increased squadron flight crew proficiency in aviation.
CA, UNITED STATES
07.14.2020
Video by Cpl. Leilani Cervantes and Lance Cpl. Victor Mackson
3rd Marine Aircraft Wing
HMA Ships Hobart, Stuart, Arunta and Sirius, which have been part of the Regional Presence Deployment through Southeast Asia and the Pacific, will take part in Exercise Rim of the Pacific 2020 (RIMPAC).
In light of COVID-19 concerns, RIMPAC will be an at-sea-only event, developed to ensure the safety of all participating military forces.
This will be the first RIMPAC an RAN Hobart-class guided missile destroyers has taken part in. Ten nations, 22 surface ships, one submarine, multiple aircraft, and approximately 5,300 personnel will participate.
This year’s exercise includes forces from Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and the United States.
Australian Department of Defence
August 31, 2020
By Robbin Laird
Nuclear deterrence is back on the agenda for NATO and the United States.
The buildup of the Russian missile arsenal, short, medium and long range, with clear violations of INF limitations are designed less to create a so-called anti-access and area denial capability than an arsenal designed to make the recovery of classic conventional deterrence seem beyond reach in Europe.
The anti-access and area denial bit is really about defending the Kola Peninsula, the largest concentration of military force in the world as well as the always-vulnerable “European” Russian area.
But with the gaping holes in European defense capabilities and the with the United States working to repair the focus on the land wars, there clearly is a major gap in a credible continental conventional deterrent force.
In this sense, the ability to combine hybrid warfare means, significant offensive strike missiles, and an ability to blend in low-yield nuclear weapons in the mix are designed to give the Russians flexibility in coercing European states.
With such an approach, how can European states, European NATO and the United States enhanced a credible warfighting approach, which can deter the Russians?
I looked at ways the United States might approach answering this question in an article which I published last year. There a dealt with a range of options facing the United States in terms of reinforcing nuclear deterrence within Europe against the Russian nuclear and missile modernization efforts.
But it is not just about the United States; but it is also about the European nuclear powers, Britain and France, and we have dealt with those dynamics of change in our forthcoming book, The Return of Direct Defense in Europe.
For a number of European states, they have participated for some time in a NATO nuclear sharing effort, in which those states arm combat aircraft with a nuclear weapon provided by the United States and have available a core capability which can be used in sync with NATO concepts of operations. The current NATO nuclear sharing policy is built around a policy whereby the United State forward deploys a small number of nuclear warheads which could be operated by non-American NATO assets in time of war. These non-strategic weapons would be deployed by dual capable aircraft (DCA) maintained by certain NATO allies, including Germany.
DCA aircraft are specially configured for a nuclear mission including special radiation “hardening,” to make their electronics more resistant to the electromagnetic pulse and other radiant energies associated with a nuclear explosion. Also involved, is special training for DCA pilots for the nuclear mission as well.
Germany faces a twin transition challenge with the coming retirement of its Tornado aircraft. On the one hand, there is the platform itself; on the other hand, there is the nuclear mission which that aircraft currently delivers for Germany.
Of course, Germany could simply walk out of the nuclear sharing NATO effort, and replace Tornado not as a DCA but with a single conventional only platform.
But as Rafael Oss noted in an article published by the European Council on Foreign Relations on April 30, 2020:
Without dual-capable aircraft in its arsenal Germany could still contribute to the alliance’s SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics) programme by having its non-nuclear Eurofighters escort allied dual-capable aircraft. It could also continue to participate in the high-level Nuclear Planning Group and related forums in which all NATO members apart from France confer on issues associated with nuclear forces.
But its influence on nuclear matters within the alliance, including arms control and disarmament, would diminish considerably.
The “détente” portion of NATO’s basic policy of combining deterrence and détente – traditionally of great interest to Germany’s political left – would lose an important champion.
The loss of Germany’s influence might even extend beyond the nuclear realm: the US, France, and the United Kingdom would be unlikely to continue consulting with Germany in the informal Quad group if it is unwilling to share either the financial or the nuclear burdens of collective defence and deterrence.
Germany abandoning its dual-capable aircraft could even mark the beginning of the end for nuclear burden sharing in NATO.
Public opinion in the three other countries that contribute dual-capable aircraft to the nuclear mission – Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands – is even less enthusiastic about nuclear deterrence than it is in Germany.
If Germany were to quit, such allies may eventually follow suit. In turn, other NATO members with more favourable views of nuclear deterrence, like Poland or Romania, might seek bilateral agreements with the US to satisfy their security needs.
Either way, the alliance’s deterrence and defence posture would become even more beholden to Washington.
Finally, failure to replace the Tornado could affect the future of arms in Europe. Cold war arms control was not driven solely by moral concerns, but also by practical considerations centring around particular weapons. As the international arms control architecture crumbles, Europeans rightly lament the ending of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the less-than-certain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.
But moralistic arguments alone will hardly entice Russia to the negotiation table. Without forward-deployed US nuclear gravity bombs and European dual-capable aircraft to carry them to their targets, NATO would have much less to offer in exchange for Russia’s estimated 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons.
But what then are the options to replace Tornado DCA with another aircraft?
The first and most obvious choice is the F-35.
This is the aircraft which the United States and a number of European allies who participate in the nuclear sharing mission will use moving forward in the decade.
In an article which I wrote in 2017, I laid out the way ahead with regard to the F-35 and nuclear deterrence.
There is much to be said for such an option for Germany, and two former Luftwaffe air chiefs provided a hard-hitting case for acquiring the F-35 in part for this mission set.
But Germany chose for defense industrial base reasons to not go down this path.
Its decision was to pursue the Future Combat Air System program with France which is designed to replace Eurofighter and Rafale by 2040.
This means that either one simply does not replace Tornado, or argues that Eurofighter can subsume Tornado functions and you simply build more of them.
Project Centurion for the RAF does subsume some of the weapons load outs on the Tornado for the modernized Eurofighter. And clearly, Germany can leverage the fruits of Project Centurion.
But the RAF is buying F-35 and not only that is a major stakeholder in the program, and working F-35s with Eurofighters as an air combat dyad.
The second option would be to develop a DCA Eurofighter.
For Germany, if they would remain a nuclear player, they would face the challenge of achieving nuclear certification of the Eurofighter in the United States. This would entail as well significant training for the DCA mission, also to be conducted in the United States.
Airbus made the case that the Eurofighter could be certified by 2025 which would meet the projected deadline for retirement of Tornado.
This was almost certainly an optimistic projection, but there remains a number of questions about the weapon to be carried at what altitude and what mission profile. The altitudes at which Tornados fly a nuclear mission versus the altitude at which Eurofighter would do so are so different the question would not just be one of certification, but of effective combat operations as well.
A third option, which purportedly the one taken, will be to buy Super Hornets for the nuclear mission and Growlers for the EW mission.
Recently, the defense press has asserted that the German government has approved a mixed buy of Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft, and Eurofighter EF-2000 fighters for the Luftwaffe to replace its remaining fleet of 90 Panavia Tornados.
Even though the defense press has announced this, the German government has not. Even more to the point, Germany will see an election, a new Bundestag, a new Defence Committee within the Bundestag, and the ever-challenging budget process to sort through all of this.
Nevertheless, the prospect is an intriguing one and raises a number of key questions.
How will the German government play out its nuclear policy in the years ahead?
How will its new nuclear capable aircraft dovetail with those other members of the nuclear club in Europe who will be flying F-35s?
France is not part of the integrated nuclear club within NATO, but how will the German engagement mesh with any evolving French nuclear policy?
The Growler buy is interesting on many levels.
At the International Fighter Conference 2019, a senior Luftwaffe officer made it very clear that the EW mission was a central one for his Air Force.
At the same conference, Eurofighter made a splashy announcement of their EW build out of their aircraft. Obviously, the Luftwaffe preferred a flying aircraft to a briefing chart version of the Eurofighter.
What made the Luftwaffe go down the Growler route?
Then there is the question of partners.
The only force which flies the Super Hornet and the Growler other than the US Navy is the RAAF.
Might new partnerships emerge from the Luftwaffe operating the Growler, up to and included working on Australian training ranges?
The Eurofighter modernization is also interesting.
Much of the technology envisaged in the “new” version of the Eurofighter already exists on the RAF’s aircraft.
Does this presage a closer working relationship between the Luftwaffe and the RAF in shaping the evolving Eurofighter fleet, up to and including participation in Tempest?
And Germany and project Tempest is interesting to think about, for the project is more about leveraging 4th/5thgeneration aircraft and shaping the way to 6th generation than building a new fighter.
And with SAAB’s as well as the Italian’s participation in the project, this looks more like a renovated Eurofighter coalition than anything else.
And then what are the implications then for FCAS?
At a minimum, the Germans would expand their options and enhance their position vis a vis the French in shaping a way ahead for 21st century air combat.
Other questions are posed by one user of the Super Hornet, namely, the RAAF.
Former Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Brown has highlighted that the shift from the Hornet to the Super Hornet was a significant one as the RAAF was faced with the challenge of handling securely a data rich aircraft.
Working through those security and data managing aspects of the aircraft could provide a useful learning curve for the Luftwaffe going forward.
And Brown provided another interesting aspect of where the learning curve might help the Luftwaffe as well.
“With regard to the Growler, it is not about flying with the F-35 as far as the Growler is concerned, for the F-35 clearly does not need it; but the Growler can be and will be used in many other situations. Also a two-seat aircraft has the advantage of being able to evolve it’s roles to take far more advantage of second seat.
“We do not need pricey UAVs, which look like manned aircraft; we need cheap expendable assets. And the Super Hornet as a two-seat aircraft can evolve into a good asset to launch and control such assets, or to command assets launched by other aircraft as well.”
The projected dual buy of Super Hornets and Growlers could have impacts on other German procurement decisions, notably, the Pegasus versus Global 6000 options. Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor for Pegasus, and also the key provider for the EW systems onboard the Growler. Presumably, there would be synergy between Growler and Pegasus which could be leveraged.
And historically, Luftwaffe EW operators have trained with the US Navy at NAWDC. In my recent interview with CDR Brett Stevenson, the Commander of HAVOC, we discussed the potential German acquisition of the Growler as well. I would like to say, the CDR reminded me, but if you do not know a fact, you can be reminded of it, that the Germans are long standing partners with the US Navy as well in EW. The CDR noted that there is a long-standing exchange officer program with the Luftwaffe at VAQ-129, the Growler training squadron. This means that UK and German legacy EW training via Tornado plus the Australians would add up to an EW coalition being trained in the evolving and developing 21st century approach to EW.
Given that both Triton, and Growler are key stakeholders in the way ahead for fleet ISR and tron warfare, German operators of Pegasus and Growler could almost certainly be part of the US Navy reworking its EW/ISR/CR concepts of operations.
In the increasingly focused effort on integratability, no platform fights alone.
This why ANY platform decision must be considered from its impact on the evolving capabilities for the future fight; and not just on a stove-piped short-term solution.
Featured Photo: A German air force Tornado from the Tactical Air Force Squadron 51, Schleswig Air Base, Germany, breaks away from a KC-135 Stratotanker from the 100th Air Refueling Wing, RAF Mildenhall, England, after receiving fuel over Germany, April 29, 2020.
RAF MILDENHALL, SFK, UNITED KINGDOM
04.29.2020
Photo by Tech. Sgt. Emerson Nuñez
100th Air Refueling Wing Public Affairs
The Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf (WMSL 750) participates in a Western Pacific deployment under the tactical control of the U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet, March – July 2019.
Bertholf’s crew engaged in joint exercises with partner coast guard and navies while patrolling the region.
Bertholf made international port calls to Yokosuka, Japan, Jeju, South Korea, Busan, South Korea, Manila, Philippines, Sasebo, Japan, and Singapore during their deployment. U.S. Coast Guard video by Chief Petty Officer Matt Masaschi and Chief Petty Officer John Masson.
PACIFIC OCEAN
03.28.2019
Video by Chief Petty Officer Matthew Masaschi
U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Area
By Robbin Laird
In my last article focused on CH-53K sustainment, I highlighted how the next generation digital aircraft reshape how sustainment is managed and executed. I concluded that “the CH-53K is a smart aircraft birthed in a digital age that is doing support and manufacturing differently. In other words, it’s symmetrical with a significant strategic change, rather than being a legacy system struggling to adapt to the new age.”
Even though the digital nature of the aircraft allows for significant innovation in maintenance and sustainment of the fleet, for its full effects to be realized, the process whereby maintenance is managed is crucial in providing a framework for shaping a more effective way ahead.
In the interview with Pierre Garant, we discussed the performance-based logistics (PBL) experience with Sikorsky helicopters and how this experience shaped a core process within which new digital aircraft would be able to leverage and in turn improve the performance of the process itself.
Currently, Garant is the Director of Sustainment for Marine Corps Helicopter Programs – which includes delivering support to the current fleet of Presidential/Executive Transport (“Marine One” aircraft fleet, VH-3D and VH-60N as well as introduction of the VH-92A) and the USMC/USN Heavy Lift Aircraft fleet (CH-53E and MH-53E and introduction of the CH-53K).
Pierre has 38 years of leadership experience in the field of aviation. He held a number of leadership positions in the U.S. Marine Corps, highlighted by his tenure as the Director of the Aviation Logistics at Headquarters (Pentagon) Marine Corps Aviation as a Marine Colonel.
Following his 26-year career in the Marine Corps, he was the Director of Support at Bell-Boeing for the V-22 (Osprey) Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Program before joining Sikorsky in 2013. He holds a BA from Cornell University, an MS from University of Southern California and an MS from the National Defense University. Along with his academic degrees, Pierre holds many military decorations and professional certifications.
Continuing with what I learned in the interview with Garant, we discussed how Sikorsky has taken its experience working with the government in the PBL for Seahawk and with the new PBL contract to support CH-53E to expand the scope of PBL support.
According to Garant: “We’re rapidly maturing the PBL model to not just do material availability with supply material deliveries, but now expanding the focus on aircraft availability metrics and incentives.”
According to Garant, the Seahawk PBL set the industry standard in terms of being able to cover a full “tip to tail” approach to support for the aircraft, and “through the years, the Seahawk PBL team continue to drive process and product improvements into the value stream. And clearly the contract is driving cost savings for the customer and enhanced aircraft availability.” Of note, the Seahawk PBL was awarded the DOD best PBL in 2019.1
In an interview with Garant conducted two years ago, we first discussed the then new PBL contract with NAVAIR to support the CH-53E. Sikorsky – working with NAVAIR at Pax River Maryland – have established a Fleet Common Operating Environment (or “FCOE”) database and analytics toolset to support CH-53E operations.
“It is our government version of the Sikorsky proven Customer Care Center we employ to support our commercial helicopter fleet.
“The goal is the same, namely to rapidly and reliably understand the performance of the aircraft in the real world in order to proactively create readiness and cost reduction solutions for the global fleet within a ‘total mission assurance (PBL-like)’commercial customer business model. ”
The establishment and operation of the FCOE capability has paved the way for the creation of an expanded performance-based logistics (PBL) business model and contract between Sikorsky and the government to support the H-53E.
“Traditional PBLs focus on parts availability: the contractor delivers the part within a certain timeframe and is measured by success in terms of a ‘Supply Response Time’ metric.
“The traditional PBL is focused on the supply chain performance.
“The new approach expands performance to aircraft availability.
“With the new PBL, the contractor is also incentivized to contribute to an ‘aircraft availability’ metric.”
“With the opportunity to use an agreed-upon database and proven data analytics toolset – the FCOE – we have the ability to measure the discreet level of how we can create aircraft availability.
“For example, when we change the logistics posture, maintenance procedures, and supply response time for a gear box, we will also be able to demonstrate to the government that we generated a measurable amount of aircraft availability because we improved one part’s value stream.
“Once we do that, we earn increased incentive on the contract in addition to meeting supply response times.”
In this interview, Garant provided an update on the how the CH-53E PBL works and how the relationship with the government is evolving in aircraft support. Garant highlighted that the public-private partnership between Sikorsky and the Fleet Readiness Center East Cherry Point is at the heart of the PBL’s evolution and success.
According to Garant:
“The Fleet Readiness Center East Cherry Point does half of the repairs, and the other half of the repairs are done at our overhaul and repair facility in Connecticut.
“There are two sources of repair, and we can fully leverage lessons learned and capacity from both.
“A clear measure of progress can be seen in the case of the main rotor head repairs where we have already demonstrated an improved repair turnaround time from over 1,100 days down to 270 days in the first year of performance.
This enhanced velocity will increase material availability, get ahead of fleet needs and drive down costs.
“The PBL contract is being expanded to include ninety parts by early 2021.
“We are seeing more parts added while we are performing ahead of metric ‘ramp-up.’ We are already performing two years ahead of supply response time improvement thresholds.”
A key challenge is to manage a cold supply chain for a legacy platform like the CH-53E.
With PBL, one can generate a more realistic demand side projection and then reach out to the supply chain and provide more stable projections of demand.
With a five-year PBL contract, and by bringing in “big-data” analytics to bear, Sikorsky can work with the suppliers to come up with a realistic forecast and long-term approach to deliver the parts likely to be needed.
This is obviously important always, but in a situation like COVID-19 having stable demand projections is crucial for industry to determine how best to meet demand.
According to Garant, “we are also pursuing smarter repairs.
“We are focusing on subcomponent performances and based on those judgments informed by data analytics can determine how better manage the repair schedules for the major parts.”
By shaping the PBL process, the new digital aircraft is able to expand and accelerate the envelope of effective logistics support and management.
As Garant put it: “The digital capabilities become a greater opportunity within the PBL process. We’re going to leverage the digital aircraft throughout the value stream right from the moment when the signal is more accurately captured and diagnosed on the aircraft, and it helps shape smarter maintenance packages for the Marines.
“The whole maintenance department will have much improved tools with a connected and digital maintenance work-space which will help with improved troubleshooting and maintenance with the data coming off the aircraft.”
“The data coming off the K is an order of magnitude more actionable information and quicker than it is on the E – by at least tenfold. In effect, the digital flows are enabling a better PBL by empowering a rapid journey from reactive to planned and predictive maintenance.”
Garant concluded: “We are taking the lessons learned from the legacy aircraft and shaping a way ahead with regard to the next support structure.
“But clearly, you don’t want to take a legacy program and try to force a model on it that they never were designed for nor grew up with.
“What you’re going to do on the K is, it’s going to be born right out of the gate with a better process and the opportunity to leverage the digital systems of the new smart aircraft to reduce life-cycle costs while ensuring operational availability and mission reliability for all CH-53K customers.”
A Next Generation Helicopter and Sustainability: The Case of the CH-53K
For my assessment of why a 21st century designed and built digital aircraft with the kind maintainability which Garant discussed affects procurement choices, see my article on the German options in picking a medium left, legacy helicopter of the CH-53K heavy lift helicopter for their modernization strategy: