Osprey Defensive Weapon System

05/29/2020

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 268, Marine Aircraft Group 24, conduct a GAU-17 minigun weapons test on the MV-22B Osprey off the shore of Oahu, Hawaii, April 23, 2020.

The GAU-17 minigun is a remotely operated defensive weapon system designed to provide suppressive fire.

Proficiency with this weapon system increases readiness for the Marines of VMM-268.

(U.S. Marine Corps video by Cpl. Eric Tso and Cpl. Matthew Kirk)

MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII, HI, UNITED STATES

04.23.2020

Video by Cpl. Eric Tso

III Marine Expeditionary Force

The Strategic Shift and Dynamic Targeting: Meeting the Challenge

05/28/2020

By Robbin Laird

With the strategic shift from the land wars to the more fluid battlespace involving peer competitors engaged in full spectrum crisis management with the United States and its allies, one aspect of the change for military forces is how to use lethal force effectively.

This comes down in part to how to target dynamically in a fluid political and military situation.

And within the dynamics of management of escalation, how do I ensure that I have had the combat effect which provides an effective solution set?

From a strictly military point of view, the strategic shift is from deliberate to dynamic targeting.

As one analyst has put the issue of the shift affecting the maritime domain:

“Perhaps the most acute differences that the maritime theater will present are the target sets.

“Targets that can be categorized as deliberate will now be the exception to the rule. Relatively fixed land targets will yield to highly mobile maritime targets.

“Therefore, targets may be known but not fixed.”1

How significant the shift is can be seen in a USAF explanation of the difference between deliberate and dynamic targeting.

“Dynamic targeting complements the deliberate planning efforts, as part of an overall operation, but also poses some challenges in the execution of targets designated within the dynamic targeting process.

“Dynamic targets are identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting.”2

The assessment adds that:

“Dynamic targeting is a term that applies to all targeting that is prosecuted outside of a given day’s preplanned air tasking order (ATO) targets (i.e., the unplanned and unanticipated targets).”

“It represents the targeting portion of the “execution” phase of effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). It is essential for commanders and air operations center (AOC) personnel to keep effects-based principles and the JFC’s objectives in mind during dynamic targeting and ATO execution.

“It is easy for those caught up in the daily battle rhythm to become too focused on tactical-level details, losing sight of objectives, desired effects, or other aspects of commander’s intent.

“When this happens, execution can devolve into blind target servicing, unguided by strategy, with little or no anticipation of enemy actions.”

But what if dynamic targeting becomes the norm and deliberate targeting the exception?

With specific regard to the Pacific, the strategic shift could well generate a significant targeting shift.

But how to train, plan, and execute a dynamic targeting approach?

That is a challenge being addressed by the NAWDC team, with CDR Joseph Fraser, head of the Information Warfare Directorate, which has been designated the executive agent for targeting for the United States Navy.

I had a chance to discuss the strategic shift and the way ahead for working integrated strike within the maritime kill web with CDR Fraser.

I have a number of takeaways from that conversation, but am not quoting the CDR directly, for those takeaways will include some of my own personal extrapolations.

The first takeaway is simple enough: NAWDC is an integrated warfighting center, not simply the classic Top Gun venue.

With officers from the various elements of Navy warfighting present within NAWDC, as well as enhanced engagement with the other services’ warfighting centers, NAWDC makes perfect sense to work the 360 degree dynamic targeting solutions set for an integrated distributed force.

Obviously, this is both challenging and a work in progress.

But the core point is that Navy has laid the foundation within and at NAWDC to shape such a way ahead.

The second takeaway is that the new combat platforms coming into the force provide the information and data environment to work a dynamic targeting solution set.

Notably, both the F-35 and the Advanced Hawkeye have come to the carrier wing since we were last at Fallon, but it is also the case that the data being generated by these aircraft are being worked across not just the fleet but the joint combat force.

Or put another way, the new platforms coming to the fleet are capable of enabling a kill web maritime force.

Or put yet another way, the quality of the data that’s coming off of these new platforms enables dynamic targeting.

The third takeaway is that with the reliance on a precision weapons stockpile, it is crucial to get best value out of that capability.

It is not World War II weapons stockpiles at work; weapon effectiveness in terms of being able to identify and destroy targets that matter most need to be prioritized and dealt with in a combat situation.

The fourth takeaway is that within a cluttered maritime combat environment, target identification is always challenging, but if one wants to prioritize the most significant targets, clearly effective ISR with time urgent decision making against mobile targets is a key element for mission success.

The fifth takeaway is that by working a new model of dynamic weapons engagement now prior to the coming of directed energy weapons to the fleet, it will be possible to determine how to use these new technologies effectively by which platforms, in which situations and in which combat areas within the fluid and extended battlespace.

This can also be true with regard to future precision weapons as well and can provide a guide for shaping a future weapons inventory.

Which weapons would make a significant difference if added to the fleet to maximize dynamic targeting capabilities against which adversaries and in which situations?

The sixth takeaway is this is an area where expanded work with the other services is clearly crucial.

But if the Pacific is taken as a baseline case, then the question of maritime targets, or targets that operate within that domain become crucial challenges to be dealt with.

And, certainly in my view, these targeting challenges really have little to deal with the legacy targeting solution sets generated in the land wars, and, frankly, the lessons learned will have to be unlearned to some extent.

What this means in blunt terms, is that the Navy plays a key role in this strategic targeting shift.

In short, we are talking about targeting solutions enabled by interactive webs, but not necessarily what passes for joint targeting.

The maritime domain is very different from the land or air-space domain.

While the US Army and USAF can provide key capabilities to provide for dynamic targeting, the domain knowledge of the US Navy will be a central piece of the puzzle.

And much the same could be said with regard to the other domains, and what the role of the US Navy would be in a dynamic targeting solution set.

Much like how words like C2, ISR and training are being changed fundamentally in terms of their meaning with the building of a kill web integrated distributed force, the term joint also is changing, or will need to change if combat effectiveness is to be realized.

There is a tendency to slip into the last twenty years of jointness which has been dominated by the US Army and the land wars.

The Pacific is dramatically different.

The Return of Direct Defense in Europe and Political Warfare: A Canadian Perspective

05/27/2020

A key part of the direct defense challenge being faced in Europe today is political warfare with the 21st century authoritarian powers.

And a key policy instrument being used by both Russia and China WITHIN European states is disinformation guided by an ability to connect that disinformation with the defense efforts of European allies participating in joint defense efforts.

At the International Fighter Conference 2019, the head of the Lithuanian Air Force highlighted how the Russians were directly intervening within Lithuanian affairs to present disinformation as “facts” about what the allies of the Baltic states were doing to shape a collective defense effort.

As noted in an article we published about the International Fighter Conference:

Col. Dainius Guzas, Lithuanian Air Force Commander, provided a briefing entitled “Developing Capability Against a Peer Opponent.”

The challenge as described by Guzas was both the direct threat posed by Russia against the Baltics and the use of political warfare to undercut the core defense of Lithuania – the engagement of NATO allies in Baltic Air Policing and the delivery of air defense to Lithuania via NATO coalition airpower.

Because of the significant number of NATO air policing participants in the Baltic Air Policing effort, Lithuania was a host nation to a wide variety of NATO forces.

This means that they probably have experienced more first-hand knowledge than most of the challenge of operating the range of NATO fighter aircraft at the tactical edge in NATO defense.

This NATO engagement experienced first-hand by the Lithuanian Air Force provides the ground truth for how to defend the Baltics in a crisis

And the Russians have spent considerable time and effort in generating “fake news” to try to undercut the confidence of Lithuanians in their NATO allies.

This form of political warfare is combined with air space incursions to try to test and pressure the Baltic Republics.

Three slides from Col. Guzas’s briefing can be seen in the slide pack below, which illustrate his discussion of Russian airspace violations, the NATO participants to data in Baltic Air Policing, and an example of Russian “fake news” designed to undercut the confidence of Lithuanians in their NATO allies.

One can go to the article and see all of Col. Guzas’s slides but the one below captures the challenge being posed:

Recently, the well respected Canadian defense journalist, Murray Brewster, highlighted a similar challenge posed for Canadian forces operating in support of Baltic defense.

“The Canadian-led NATO battle group in Latvia was the target of a pandemic-related disinformation campaign that alliance commanders say they believe originated in Russia.

“Reports circulated recently in some Baltic and Eastern European media outlets that suggested the contingent at Camp Adazi in Kadaga, outside the capital of Riga, had “a high number” of cases of the deadly virus.

“That was definitely not true,” said Col. Eric Laforest, commander of Task Force Latvia.

“When the reports first surfaced, ahead of a major exercise late last month, the Latvian defence ministry swung into action to counter the false information.

“The Latvian authorities here were the ones to set the record straight because it was information about troops stationed in their country,” said Laforest. “Rapidly, within a matter of a few hours, they went out and explained what the situation was. It actually happened fairly fast.”

Brewster added:

“The propaganda campaign directed at NATO troops emerged around the time they were engaged in a training exercise which took them just outside their base.

“Known as Exercise Steele Crescendo, the training involved troops and tanks simulating defences against an armoured attack on the Baltic country.”

Also, see the following:

Information Warfare and the Authoritarian States: How Best to Respond?

We deal with this type of political warfare as a key part of the challenge for direct defense of Europe facing the 21st century authoritarians in our forthcoming book.

https://products.abc-clio.com/abc-cliocorporate/product.aspx?pc=A6252C

 

 

Chinooks and Seahawks Train with HMAS Canberra

One of the challenges facing the future use of the HMAS Canberra is the evolving nature of the threat in the region, which undoubtedly see the evolution in the ship’s capability to work with other air and maritime assets to work sea control missions as well as embarkation missions as well.

This is a work in progress for sure.

The USN-USMC team are reworking how amphibious ships fit into the wider range of maritime missions, and with the evolution of the technologies available to the fleet, there are significant options for the ship going forward as well.

We will address those options in later articles.

In the slideshow photos, flight training for the HMAS Canberra is highlighted.

Here the integration with the Seahawk was a major focus of attention.

Also, seen are Chinooks which come on board for transport for embarkation for HADR operations in the region as well.

These photos are credited to the Australian Department of Defence.

The featured photo shows NUSHIP Sydney maneuvering with HMAS Adelaide off the coast of Sydney, NSW.

TACP Employment

Marines with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit coordinate fires with F-35B Lightning II fighter aircraft during a Tactical Air Control Party exercise aboard the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD 1), underway in the Philippine Sea, June 9 and 10, 2019.

The 31st MEU, the Marine Corps` only continuously forward-deployed MEU, provides a flexible and lethal force ready to perform a wide range of military operations as the premier crisis response force in the Indo-Pacific region. (Official U.S. Marine Corps video by Cpl. Isaac Cantrell)

PHILIPPINE SEA

06.10.2019

Video by Cpl. Luis Velez

31st Marine Expeditionary Unit

The “Five Eyes” and Managing Strategic Dependency on China

05/26/2020

Our colleague John Blackburn has highlighted the publication of a new report published by the Henry Jackson Society, based in London.

A new report by a UK Think Tank, the Henry Jackson Society, addresses the supply chain dependence on China by the “Five-Eye” powers.

Of the five powers, Australia is strategically dependent on China for the largest number of imports.

Within goods that service the “Critical 11”, we are strategically dependent on 41 categories and 11 sectors which no other member of the five powers are.

Case studies in the report include pharmaceuticals, energy systems , information technology, as well as food and agriculture.

Andrew Hastie, a contributor to the report, notes that “Our strategic dependency on critical imports makes us vulnerable to not only economic coercion, but also supply chain warfare.

To mitigate this risk, the Australian government should initiate a review of all trade-exposed products, industries and sectors in the economy.”

Our Institute recently suggested to a Joint Parliamentary Committee that we pursue a Smart Sovereignty and Trusted Supply Chain model.

We maintain that this is not just an issue related to our dependencies on China, but rather a need to review all of our supply chain dependencies.

Our supply chain resilience is poor.

The Executive Summary to the report highlights the challenges:

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), Australia, Canada and New Zealand – the five powers commonly known in intelligence circles as the “Five Eyes” – have been among the leading advocates of “hyper-globalisation”, the idea that markets should prevail over almost all other considerations. China has benefited disproportionally from this form of globalisation, leading to a fundamental transformation in its economic and industrial fortunes over the past two decades.

Although already well-established in the US, the idea of “decoupling”, particularly from China’s economy, has gained currency with the COVID-19 crisis. The inability to produce and source Personal Protective Equipment via globalised supply chains has reminded democratic governments and peoples that it is necessary to be able to produce strategic commodities, just as China’s actions and behaviour have reminded them of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, the CCP has already used China’s economic power as a geostrategic weapon to revise the rules-based international system. Now vulnerable to rising domestic and international criticism over its handling of the COVID-19 outbreak, the CCP has adopted a policy of aggressive defence, to the extent that it is exploiting accumulated economic dependencies for political gain. While the rest of the world remains focused on combatting COVID-19, China is pushing forward with strategic campaigns to dominate all major sectors of global trade, and by degrees to take over control of international market standards.

For the full report, see the following:

https://henryjacksonsociety.org/publications/breaking-the-china-supply-chain-how-the-five-eyes-can-decouple-from-strategic-dependency/

 

 

Operation Irini Launched

by defenceWeb

The EU naval operation in the Mediterranean, previously concentrating on migrants is up and running with a new mandate and name since the beginning of this month.

It is now Operation Irini, named after the Greek goddess of peace, and the major objective of the multi-nation naval operation is to stop the flow of illegal arms to Libya.

Officially termed the EU Operation EUNavFor Med Irini, it commenced work on 4 May when the French naval vessel Jean Bart and a maritime patrol aircraft from Luxembourg moved into the operational area.

The first statement issued by the new EU operation has it that Jean Bart, a Cassard Class frigate carrying pennant number D615, is a valuable asset as it monitors communication at sea as well as air traffic. “This double effort is essential for implementation of the operation’s mandate in compliance with the Berlin conference, ensuring impartiality and conflict sensitivity.”

EU foreign affairs and security policy representative Josep Borrell said ahead of Operation Irini going active: “At the Berlin Conference, leaders agreed to work toward a sustainable solution to the crisis in Libya. However, the conflict continues to put the lives of Libyans and the region at risk. Effective enforcement of the UN arms embargo on Libya will help in achieving a sustainable ceasefire and advancing to a political agreement. Operation Irini is an important contribution toward achieving this goal. It shows EU commitment to peace in Libya, even when member states are battling the coronavirus.”

The force generation conference for Irini finished on April 28 with planning for sea operations starting immediately. This saw the first assets deployed with assets from other contributing countries “joining in the coming weeks and months” Rome-based operation commander Admiral Fabio Agostini said.

Initially, the Operation will have three vessels, contributed by France, Greece and Italy); a Maltese boarding team and three patrol aircraft from Germany, Luxembourg and Poland with a similar number of vessels and aircraft in support.

The European Satellite Centre (SatCen) will provide satellite imagery support.

Other special assets for operational tasks, such as submarines, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and airborne early warning aircraft are expected to support the operation. These will be offered by member states on an occasional basis according to the statement.

“Particular attention is paid to COVID-19 countermeasures. The Operation Commander issued guidelines to participating countries to reduce the risk of contagion in headquarters and on board ships and aircraft. Aircraft have to be declared “COVID-19 free” by the flag State before inclusion in Operation Irini,” the statement said.

This article was published by defenceWeb on May 13, 2020.

 

 

Memorial Day, May 25, 2020: A Turkish Colleague’s Perspective

05/25/2020

All over the world, at different tough geographies, there are immortal signatures of U.S. soldiers and their friends to let the democracy, human rights, and justice become sovereign over the countries and the people.

This is the day we all remember of those ones as President Reagan said ” Heroes may not be braver than anyone else.

“They’re just braver 5 minutes longer.”

Our colleague added the memorial message carved into a stone found at the site of the battle of Gallipoli.

Those heroes who shed their blood and lost their lives!

You are now lying in the soil of a friendly country.

Therefore rest in peace.

There is no difference between the Johnnies and Mehmets to us where they lie side by side here in this country to of ours.

You, the mothers, who sent their sons from far away countries wipe away your tears; your sons are now lying in our bosom and are in peace.

After having lost their lives on this land they have become our sons as well.”

Gallipoli, Mustapha Kemal Atatürk, 1934.