By Robbin Laird and Ed Timperlake

We visited the USAF Warfare Center in 2015, when Major General Jay Silveria, was the commanding officer. A visit last month was postponed due to the COVID-19 impacts, but, hopefully, we can return later this year.

But we did have the opportunity to have a round table via teleconference on May 12, 2020 with the following officers: Colonel Jack Arthaud, Commandant of the USAF Weapons School (USAFWS), Lt. Col. Ethan Sabin, Commander of the 6^th Weapons Squadron, and Lt. Col. James Combs, Commander of the 8th Weapons Squadron, Major Peter Mattes, Director of Operations, 19th Weapons Squadron.

We started by asking Col. Arthaud how the training approach being pursued currently differed from his earlier experiences.

“In a word, I would say integration. Clearly, what has evolved is a much more challenging and complex air warfare environment.  We have shifted from a primary focus on training to execute de-conflicted operations or parallel operations, to higher levels of teaming, higher levels of group coherency and integration, because that’s what the threat demands.

“When I was a student in 2006, the 22-week course spent 20 and half weeks on individual weapon systems expertise with the remainder on collaboration. Our way of war then was focused on de-conflicted air warfare or sequential air operations, As an F-15C operator we would focus on doing our air sweep and then there would be follow up strike packages and then a wide variety of support assets in the air operation.

“We were not an integrated weapons school but we added a number of elements, such as the Mobility Weapons School, and a full complement of air, space, cyber and special operations platforms, all resident in the Weapons School today which facilitate training for integrated force packaging.

“And with the shift to deepen integration, our integration phase of training is now six of the 22 weeks versus to the week and a half I went through as a student 15 years ago.

“With this has come a shift in the skill-sets we prioritize and develop. What it means to be credible has changed over the last 15 years.

“At that time, being credible really meant being the best fighter pilot in your aircraft or being the best tactical C2 controller, as examples. And now what we’ve seen is that there’s a need for leadership of the integrated force.

“There’s an increased need for critical thinking and problem solving. There’s a need to understand the capabilities of your platform in depth —   not only so you can optimize the employment of your own platform, but so you can understand how best to combine your platform with others, to best to accomplish the functions and tasks that are necessary to solve the tactical problems facing the integrated force.”

The Colonel provided a very clear differentiation between then and now, and in the discussion which followed we discussed a number of key aspects of the approach being shaped now in close interaction with the other warfare centers which are operating in relative close proximity, namely, USN NAWDC, and the USMC MAWTS-1.

In fact, officers are embedded from each of these centers within each other’s centers as well.

What we will do for the rest of this article is to highlight some key takeaways from the discussion, with some extrapolations from those takeaways along the way as well,

The first takeaway is that clearly the services are working dynamic problem-solving approaches.

They are dealing with evolving adversary capabilities and approaches, and the services clearly are not assuming that they “know” in advance what will be experienced the battlespace.

The warfighting centers are cross-learning with regard to anticipated threats, tactics and challenges rather than coming up with single service solution sets.

A very different training regimen is required for force integration to shape a force designed almost on the fly to operate against an evolving threat environment.

At Nellis, they are focusing on effects-based training where the focus is upon problem solving to achieve a specific effect required for specific tactical operational settings.

As one officer put it: “We’re trying to train our weapons officers, our instructors, and our operational Air Force officers to be able to adapt effectively in a period of uncertainty or in a fight with more uncertain terms.

“I think that we need to be prepared for some technological surprises that might occur and we need to train to that reality.”

The officer added: “We don’t know for sure exactly what we might see, but let’s go ahead and make some reasonable guesses about what a difficult task or problem might be, and then let’s allow our instructors and our students to innovate and try to go solve that forward-looking tactical problem.”

The second takeaway is that the USAF is clearly leveraging what fifth generation capabilities can provide for the joint force.

During our 2015 visit, the first F-35 for the Weapons School had just arrived and Major General Silveria had recently become the first USAF general officer to complete qualification training in the F-35.

Now with the three services each operating the jet, they are working the significant integration opportunities which flying the same aircraft provides across the force, but remembering that the USAF has forty years of experience in flying low observable aircraft, a legacy experience which provides certainly a leg up on global adversaries, if leveraged properly in the training and operational arenas.

The third takeaway is clearly that the team is thinking in kill web terms, or in terms of an integrated, distributed force. 

They are working closely with the US Navy in terms of shaping how distributed maritime operations can come together most effectively with the USAF’s evolving airpower distributed operations capabilities as well.

And with the USMC able to shape a very flexible mobile basing capability on the kill web chessboard, shaping ways to maximize the capabilities the individual services bring to the fight but to do so through interactive sensor webs to shape effective distributed strike is an evolving focus for force integration.

And for distributed operations to work effectively, one of the challenges is finding ways to enhance C2 capabilities at the tactical edge and resident in mobile bases to support the overall integrated force.

The fourth takeaway is that the objective is clearly to have greater capability to operate through what is be labelled the advanced battle management system.

But in many ways, the force is already doing so through the capabilities already fielded and being shaped on the training ranges. One officer referred to ABMS as the available battle management systems which is a good way to differentiate between the training for the fight, we are in now versus a world in 2030.

“The best way I would characterize how C2 has changed in the last decade is less vertical orientation and more horizontal feeders out there in order to create our own web of information sharing with what I term the current ABMS, which is the available battle management system.”

The fifth takeaway is how training for distributed integrated operations is yielding innovative ways to operate which have strategic consequences.

Too often it is assumed inside the beltway that operations and tactics are on a level distinctly different from the strategic level, thereby easily missing the kinds of innovations going on at Nellis and its sister warfighting training centers.

The kind of kill web integration which is being shaped now and with the addition of new capabilities in the near and midterm has a strategic consequence.

For example, the challenges China presents to the United States and our allies in the Pacific requires that air and maritime domains partner well.

Working to shape how to partner effectively at the tactical level in a kill web approach allows the United States and its Allies to keep the Chinese off balance and not allow them to prepare for a one attack vector.

They have to be prepared for a much wider variety of potential dilemmas that we could throw at them.

For example, the US Navy and USAF are working closely together in the electronic warfare domain. The approach is to leverage the relevant platforms to provide for a variety of capabilities which can be used to degrade the enemy’s C2 or air defenses.

Training to integrate the platforms to achieve a wider range of attack envelopes to complicate the adversary’s calculations is tactical training with a strategic impact.

And this area is clearly a growth area given the enhanced importance of digital systems to the combat force, both Blue and Red.

The sixth takeaway which is clearly kill web related is the significant change over the past decade with regard not just to sensors but the ability to move sensor data around more rapidly in the battlespace to allow for more effective decision making at the tactical edge.

Obviously, this is a key driver changing both the capabilities to integrate platforms, but also how to command task forces operating in integrated rather than sequential manner.

The shift from hierarchical C2 to empowering tactical decision making at the edge is clearly a significant part of the change as well for the training world.

How best to empower rapid decision making at the tactical edge but ensure more effective strategic decision making with regard to how to manage the battle, and how to best determine which targets are prioritized?

Notably, in the Pacific there are three nuclear powers.

Nuclear deterrence is woven throughout any considerations of conventional operations, so there is a clear need to add a strategic overlay of the battlespace, which considers potential consequences and focuses on making the right target decisions in a fluid battlespace.

In short, what we heard from the USAF officers was, not surprisingly, highly congruent from what was learned from discussions at Norfolk, Virginia earlier this year in a discuss with three senior admirals with regard to the shift in training.

“The synergy across the training enterprise is at the heart of being able to deliver the integrated distributed force as a core warfighting capability to deal with evolving 21^st century threats.

“There are a number of key drivers of change as well which we discussed.

“One key driver is the evolution of technology to allow for better capabilities to make decisions at the tactical edge.

“A second is the challenge of speed, or the need to operate effectively in a combat environment in which combat speed is a key aspect, as opposed to slo mo war evidenced in the land wars.

“How to shape con-ops that master C2 at the tactical edge, and rapid decision making in a fluid but high-speed combat environment?

“In a way, what we were discussing is a shift from training preparing for the next fight with relatively high confidence that the next one was symmetric with what we know to be a shift to proactive training.

“How to shape the skill sets for the fight which is evolving in terms of technologies and concepts of operations for both Red and Blue?

By Robbin Laird

The US Navy has deployed Triton to Guam and has begun its operational history.

According to an article on USNI News by Gidget Fuentes published on May 12, 2020, a pair of MQ-4C Tritons operating from Guam has been integrated into fleet operations and provide reach across the Indo-Pacific.

“The Navy is counting on the Triton, which can operate at greater than 50,000-foot altitudes and at the 2,000-mile-plus range, to provide an unmanned platform for persistent, maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities and work alongside its manned fleet of reconnaissance and surveillance patrol aircraft.

“The Tritons with Unmanned Patrol Squadron 19 – the Navy’s first unmanned aircraft squadron – arrived in Guam in late January to support CTF-72, which oversees the patrol, reconnaissance and surveillance force in the U.S. 7th Fleet region.”

But what exactly does the Triton provide for the interactive kill webs which shape evolving maritime combat capability?

One answer was provided in the Fuentes article:

“The Triton can fly for more than 24-hours at a time, at altitudes higher than 10 miles, with an operational range of 8,200 nautical miles, according to manufacturer North Grumman. The Navy’s program of record would field 68 aircraft.”

An additional answer focuses on what the sensors onboard the aircraft can provide.

According to an article by Andrew McLaughlin published by Australian Defence Business Review:

“The high-flying Triton can stay aloft for 28 hours and features advanced optical, radar and electronic sensors.

“It will complement the manned P-8A Poseidon, and replace the EP-3E electronic intelligence (ELINT) aircraft in US service. On Guam, the aircraft are currently under the command of the Commander of Task Force (CTF) 72.”

These qualities of the platform are obviously important contributions but because the US Navy along with its sister services have moved beyond the platform centric kill chain to shaping interactive webs to guide the strike force, the key question then becomes somewhat different.

What capabilities does the Triton bring to the crisis management and combat environments, and how does it work interactively within the spider webs which make up the kill web enabled force?

A significant part of the answer rests in the recent interview which I did with Rear Admiral Peter Garvin, head of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Patrol enterprise.

From the outset, the US Navy’s work with industry has focused on building, operating and supporting a dyad to deliver the common operational picture driving the next round of anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness.

This P-8 dyad with Triton delivers a new capability for the fleet.

This is manned-unmanned teaming being put into practice today, not in some distant combat future.

According to Rear Admiral Garvin: “We are taking full advantage of the leap forward in many sensors and communications technology to interoperate in ways that were previously impossible.

“Faced with a resurgent and challenging ASW threat, we have not given up on the old tool sets, but we are adding to them and weaving them into a new approach.

“We are clearly shifting from linear or sequential operational thinking into a broader understanding and implementation of a web of capabilities.

“In the past, when operating a P-3, you operated alone, you had to be the sensor and the shooter. To be clear, it remains necessary that every P-8 aircraft and crew be ready and able to complete the kill chain organically, but the fact of the matter is that is not the way it always has to be, nor is it the way that we’re planning for it to have to be going forward.

“On any given mission, the P-8 could be the sensor and perhaps the allied submarine is the shooter. Or vice versa. Or maybe the destroyer is the one that happens to get the targeting solution and the helicopter is the one that actually drops the weapon.

“Sensor, shooter, communications node, or perhaps several at once, but each platform is all part of a kill web.”

Another part of the answer comes from the follow-on interview which I had with Rear Admiral Garvin where we discussed how the dyad interacting with allies was a game changer in terms of building out a much larger canvas upon which the interactive kill webs could operate.

“We started with a discussion of the reach of the maritime patrol enterprise by focusing on a way to conceptualize the way ahead for shaping an integrated distributed force. If one conceptualizes the battlespace as layers of visuals placed one on the other, it becomes clear what is different in terms of leveraging the combat force within an interactive web.

“The first layer would be the operational geography of the battlespace.

“The second layer would be the threat elements most relevant to the blue force.

“The third layer in the case of a maritime patrol enterprise would be commercial maritime shipping traffic.  Unlike air traffic, maritime traffic is very diverse, very large, and provides a key masking function for any adversary.

“The fourth layer would be the laydown of blue assets, including the geographic distribution of allied forces in the region or area of interest. The fifth layer would then be where the P-8 / Triton dyad operates.

“With such a schematic, it is quickly evident that if the U.S. Navy’s P-8 / Triton dyad is integratable with allied maritime patrol capabilities the reach of both the U.S. and allied interactive web capabilities is substantially enhanced.”

If we focus on what I referred to as the third layer, namely, the commercial maritime traffic, the Triton makes a unique contribution here.

With the height at which it operates, and with the sensors onboard, including the AIS tracking system, it provides a significant capability to prioritize those aspects of the maritime domain which need to be prioritized.

This is a major contribution even before we get to the question of what various specialized sensors can provide for other aspects of the maritime battlespace is enhanced by the connectivity built into the platform as well, in terms of an ability to deliver data over various wave forms.

As one Naval officer put it, the way to think about the maritime battlespace as the U.S. Navy evolves its capabilities is an ability to deliver a variety of kill webs which interactively can deliver domain situational awareness dominance.

This means in effect that C2 is moving in an interactive fashion in two directions – C2 at the tactical edge and C2 at the numbered fleet level to dynamically structure and task evolving task forces.

Another way to understand how the Triton contributes uniquely to the evolving kill web approach is an aspect of its unique networking capabilities.

According to Rob Zmarzlak, chief engineer, Triton program, Northrop Grumman: “The platform with its wave forms can reach back to the intelligence community and to the tactical users independently. We can send information to both the fleet and to the intelligence community.”

In the discussion with Zmarzlak, he highlighted the importance of focus on how the Triton operates as well as a key way to understand its contribution to the maritime kill web.

This part of the discussion then got at the most overlooked impact of Triton on the evolution of air-maritime forces (do not forget how important Triton will become to targeting in the Pacific for the USAF as it engages in maritime strike operations as well).

For full value to be derived from the Triton fleet, a kill web mentality will have to replace what has been a sortie generation mentality for the carrier fleet.

It is about building in an orbit-enabled concept of operations, rather than thinking of the aircraft in sortie-generation concepts of operations.

What this means is that for the Navy to get full value out of its Triton force it needs to think significantly beyond a dyad approach.

It means embracing what a high altitude remotely piloted vehicle with a sensor package which can help build a common operational picture generated by orbits can provide for a kill web strike force, which may well operate within a sortie-generated concept of operations, which the orbiting high altitude asset will provide.

With a four ship 24/7 coverage of the area where you will operate or wish to operate, the Triton can provide domain knowledge crucial to informing both the threat and opportunity calculus in an area of operations.

And because the orbit is not about sorting into a specific area, one can sort through where the best advantages might lie for the projection of force without tipping your hand by having to fly to a specific tactical area.

This is a work in progress, but it is a new capability which if fully embraced provides significant warfighting advantages to the United States and its allies.

But for those advantages to be realized, appropriate training, and operational approaches need to be shaped, executed and evolved over time.

In an article by Sam LaGrone of USNI News published on April 10, 2018, “the pair of 131-ft wingspan UAVs built by Northrop Grumman for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions will deploy with an early set of capabilities designed for maritime ISR and will grow to include a signals intelligence function in 2021, Triton program manager Capt. Dan Mackin said in a briefing at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space 2018 exposition.”

“Part of the IOC process will include adding a top secret “multi-intelligence” function to1 Triton that will eventually replace the Navy’s Lockheed Martin EP-3E Aries II manned signals intelligence platforms. Congress mandated the Navy retire the EP-3E Aries II only after it had found a way to field a similar capability.

“Eventually, the Triton program will consist of five four-aircraft orbits around the world. The operators will reside in the two main bases at Mayport and Whidbey Island.

“The system is made up of an aircraft and a main operating base where the warfighter starts taking that data over wideband SATCOM link you start assimilating that data, put that data together to understand the [maritime picture],” Mackin said.

“The Navy will have five operating bases where the aircraft will be maintained, launched and recovered. The forward bases will be at Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy; an unspecified location in the Middle East; Naval Air Station Guam; Mayport; and Point Mugu.”

In that article, there was a snapshot of a NAVAIR representation of the envisaged Orbit engagement of the Triton.

In short, one cannot describe Triton simply in platform terms, which would miss a lot because it was designed from the ground up to be part of a wider force construct.

It can be described in terms of how it works interactively with its brother, the P-8, to empower ASW operations. It can also be described in terms of its transformational qualities by grasping how orbit CONOPS contribute to shaping the maritime kill web.

Bottom-line: Triton provides a key way ahead for enhanced crisis management and combat capabilities for the joint and coalition force.

Featured Image: Navy MQ-4C Triton taxis at Andersen Air Force Base on April 29, 2020. US Navy Photo