The test team of the 846th Test Squadron, 704th Test Group, Holloman Air Force Base conduct a test simulation at the Holloman High Speed Test Track April 23, 2020.
The test was to evaluate key hypersonic braking technologies and enhanced workforce readiness for future hypersonic weapons tests.
04.23.2020
Video by Jason Austin
Arnold Engineering Development Complex Public Affairs
Flag Day for the Finnish Armed Forces is held on June 4th.
Before we got too far away from the 4th, we wanted to highlight the event.
Celebrated since 1950, the 4 June is an official flag day of the Finnish Defence Forces.
It is the birthday of C.G.E. Mannerheim, Marshal of Finland, who was quite an historical figure.
In an article by Timo Vihavainen, a Finnish historian and professor emeritus of Russian Studies at the University of Helsinki, first published in February 2005, updated June 2017, the career of Mannerheim was reviewed.
C.G.E. Mannerheim (1867–1951) charted the course of Finnish history and was voted greatest Finn of all time.
He served in the Russian Imperial Army for decades, and later became a war hero in his home country of Finland. He was the symbol of the Finnish struggle against Soviet Russia during the Winter War of 1939–1940. He was hailed as a champion of liberty throughout the Western world during those 105 days of stubborn resistance against a vastly superior enemy.
This was not the first time that the stately representative of Finland’s Swedish-speaking aristocracy had been supreme commander in a war against Russia.
The War of Liberation in 1918 – later also called the Civil War – had been fought against Soviet Russia and against its allies, the Finnish “Reds.” And the Winter War was not the last war Mannerheim fought against Russia, either.
The period of combat known as the Continuation War, 1941 to 1944, during which German forces fought alongside the Finnish army, exacted a much heavier toll on Finland and Russia than the Winter War had.
Moreover, during the Continuation War, Finnish forces even advanced into Russian territory with the intention of annexing Eastern Karelia, a region which had never belonged to Finland.
Admittedly, Finnish policy towards the Russians and Finland’s methods of warfare substantially differed from those of the Germans. Finland declined to launch a ground attack or a bombing attack on Leningrad, despite German pressure to do so.
Mannerheim spent no less than 30 years in Russia, mostly in Saint Petersburg, serving in the Russian Imperial Army.
During this period he not only reached the rank of lieutenant general and was appointed commander of the Cavalry Corps of the Imperial Army, he was also known personally to the emperor and became a member of his suit
Mannerheim’s record as a soldier was impressive. He fought for Russia on the battle front in both the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 and in the First World War between 1914 and 1917. General Mannerheim was decorated with the St George’s Cross for gallantry and was famous for his military skill and efficacy.
Mannerheim was also an able sportsman whose horsemanship won prizes. This was evidently one of the reasons why he was chosen for the formidable task of undertaking a reconnaissance mission, on horseback through Asia, that lasted two years.
You could add courteous manners to the list of Mannerheim’s merits. This contributed to the progress of the young cavalry officer in high society and at the imperial court itself.
A non-Russian officer in the Imperial Army was no rarity. In fact, there were thousands of them. Many of these inorodtsy or “non-orthodox” subjects of the emperor serving in the Russian army came from the Baltic provinces, spoke German as their mother tongue and were Lutheran by religion, as was Mannerheim.
However, Mannerheim’s background differed from that of his Baltic brother officers. He came from the Grand Duchy of Finland, which sent more than 4,000 officers to serve in the Russian army between 1809 and 1917. Almost 400 of them reached the rank of general or admiral.
Most of the officers from Finland spoke Swedish as their mother tongue, Finnish being used mainly as a second language, if they knew it at all. Mannerheim’s Finnish before 1917 was far from fluent.
However, in common with the Baltic German officers, the Finnish officers served the emperor impeccably. In fact, there are no records of disloyalty among the Finns, even during the period from 1899 to 1917 when Russia began to pressure Finland by undermining its juridical status. In lieu of disloyalty, some of the officers chose to retire from active service.
Mannerheim did not retire. He remained a faithful soldier even though he privately deplored the emperor’s policies, which he regarded as unwise. Even when his own brother was exiled to Sweden, Mannerheim’s loyalty to the emperor remained unshaken. His relatives understood his position.
It was only when the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 crushed the old order that Mannerheim realised his ties of loyalty to Russia had been cut. After the revolution he became a champion of the White Finnish cause.
His loyalty towards his native land was now total and he always respected its democratic institutions even though he was hardly a true democrat by conviction.
Mannerheim’s career in the service of two states is an intriguing story that excites curiosity. To Russians, Mannerheim is above all the cultivated young officer of the Chevalier Guards who stood by Nicholas II during coronation procession.
In Finnish eyes Mannerheim stands tall as the elderly marshal, a man of honour and a fatherly figure whose moral integrity and intelligence could always be trusted
And in an article we published prior to the Trump/Putin meeting in Helsinki, we looked back at Finnish history and what lessons these two leaders might take away from that history.
Presidents Putin and Trump will meet soon in Helsinki. At a time of uncertainty in the US-Russia relationship, the meeting is an important step forward in clarifying that relationship, one that should be not reduced to a Trump tweet or a Putin chess move.
Where it is being held is significant. Helsinki was part of the Russian empire for a century. It is now a century since the Finns have been independent, but always in the context of East-West realities. During the Cold War, “Finlandization” became a term of art for how smaller country could retain its independence on internal matters by bowing to a larger neighbor on international affairs.
Finland become independent as a result of World War I and the Russian revolution. If one visits Helsinki, the similarities to Saint Petersburg — just five hours away by car (or tank) — are obvious. And in the wake of the Russian revolution, Finland had its own civil war, its own clash of “Whites” against the “Reds,” with legendary Finnish leader Carl Mannerheimcommanding the German-backed Whites.
After withdrawing from Finnish politics, General Mannerheim would return to lead the fight in the famous “Winter War” against the invading Russians, who poured in more forces than the Western allies later did on D-Day. Amazingly, the Finns not only resisted but destroyed the initial forces which invaded Finland. As the Western Alliance would fail to stop the Nazis, however, they would fail Finland as well.
And when the Nazis took Western Europe, including Norway, the Finns bowed to realpolitik and worked with them to do a dangerous dance with them to keep the Russians at bay. What Finns call the Continuation War followed the Winter War, and the core ally of Finland in the Continuation War was Nazi Germany.
But the American leaders, working behind the scenes with Mannerheim and the Finnish leadership, de facto cut a deal with the Finns to not attack the supply lines coming through the North into Russia. While the UK declared war on Finland, the US did not. This was an enlightened move which provided flexibility for both the United States and Finland going forward.
The letter which Mannerheim sent to Adolf Hitler when leaving the war in fall 1944 highlights a core principle important to Finns and to any nation worthy of calling itself a nation – emphasized the absolute imperative to preserve the Finnish people and the Finnish nation. It read in part:
“In this hour of hard decisions, I’m impelled to inform you that I’ve arrived at the conviction that the salvation of my nation makes it my duty to find a means of ending the war…
“The Russian’s great assaults in June exhausted our reserves. We cannot expose ourselves to another such bloodletting without the whole future of the small Finnish nation being jeopardized.
“I wish specially to emphasize that Germany will live on even if fate should not crown your arms with victory. Nobody could give such assurance regarding Finland. If that nation of barely four million were militarily defeated, there can be little doubt that will be driven into exile or exterminated. I cannot expose my people to such a fate.”
It is clear that the Finns have not forgotten their history and are seeking today to protect themselves against the Russian actions in Europe. To do so, they are pursuing a strong relationship with Europe through the European Union, which it joined in 1995, adopting the common currency in 1999; enhanced regional cooperation with their Nordic neighbors, as we’ve covered in depth before; increased cooperation with NATO, contributing to operations in the Balkans and Afghanistan; and strong relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom, even as both countries faced significant domestic change.
What might President Putin learn from the Finns?
Above all, stop threatening the Baltic States for all that does is drive the Finns and the Nordics into a closer relationship both with each other and with NATO. The Russians complain about Finnish and Nordic action, but they have only themselves to thank.
President Putin might stand in front of the famous statue to Alexander II in the center of Helsinki and remember the Finns erected it, not simply to remember an important reformer, but to protest the reactionary policies of his successor Alexander III. The Russians cast a long shadow, and Putin may be trying to make Russia Great Again through old-fashioned hardball tactics, but it is at the expense of fundamental interests which could be better served by Russian reform and reworking his relationship with the West.
For his part, President Trump might reflect on his meeting with the Finnish President when he butchered his name, while the Finns did not care in their happiness that that their President met the US President. He might learn from the Finns that European security is not simply Germany and defense spending percentages; it is about the professional working relationship among the militaries and how Western solidarity has been built despite political differences. He might learn as well that for smaller countries, organizations like the European Union play an important role alongside NATO.
As the Finns consider how to augment their defense capabilities, it is important for President Trump to consider how a smaller nation looks at their strategic position. He would do well to learn from the subtler approach followed by Secretary Hall and President Roosevelt during World War II.
As I stood in front of the Finnish defense ministry this past February, I know what I learned looking at the very powerful statue honoring the Finnish people for their resistance to Stalin and his dictatorship: The Finns love their nation and will risk their lives to defend it. Both Putin and Trump need to remember that.
This article was published by Breaking Defense on July 11, 2018.
And for those who understand Finnish or can read Swedish, Minister of Defence Antti Kaikkonen had a coffee with conscripts while reminiscing his time as a conscript in the Helsinki Anti-Aircraft Regiment and has a message for you!
And the Finns have been busy working in their neighborhood to ensure that their security can be maintained in a challenging period of history.
For example, in this May 20, 2020 article on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website:
On Wednesday 20 May 2020, Minister of Defence Antti Kaikkonen will attend a ministerial meeting of the Northern Group. The meeting will be hosted by Latvia. The ministers will be meeting in a video conference.
They will discuss the impacts of Covid-19 on the defence forces, Military Mobility, strategic communications and cooperation in exercises.
Apart from the Nordic countries and the Baltic States, the Northern Group consists of the Netherlands, Great Britain, Poland and Germany.
Or in this May 19, 2020 article on the Finnish Ministry of Defence website:
On Wednesday 20 May 2020, Minister of Defence Antti Kaikkonen will hold a bilateral meeting with Sweden’s Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist as well as an additional meeting with Norway’s Minister of Defence Frank Bakke-Jensen and Minister Hultqvist. The meetings will be organised via video connection.
The ministers are to discuss Nordic defence cooperation and other related issues.
Or in this May 7, 2020 article not he Finnish Ministry of Defence website:
Minister of Defence Antti Kaikkonen will hold a bilateral meeting with Sweden’s Minister for Defence Peter Hultqvist on Friday 8 May 2020. Due to the coronavirus situation, the meeting will be organised via video connection.
The ministers are to discuss the COVID19 situation from the perspective of the defence administrations of the two countries and the defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden.
In short, the Finns are not sitting on their hands waiting for someone else to take care of their security.
According to a June 4, 2020 article published by the UK Ministry of Defence, a new Cyber Regiment has been launched to protect frontline operations from digital attack.
The Ministry of Defence has launched 13th Signal Regiment, a dedicated Cyber Regiment, which will protect vital defence networks at home and on operations overseas.
The unit was formally stood up on Monday, June 1, at a ceremony at Blandford, home of the Royal Signals.
As the character of warfare evolves, and the weapons used to fight those wars shift from the industrial to the information age, digital and cyber capabilities are increasingly relied upon to ensure the nation’s security and the safety of our personnel overseas.
Our adversaries and hostile actors are operating in cyberspace right now, creating a new cyber frontline – alongside the traditional domains of Land, Sea and Air – without physical borders but also needing to be defended,
Secure communications are the foundation for any successful operation and 13th Signal Regiment will provide ‘digital armour’ around personnel operating overseas, giving commanders and their soldiers the ability to operate with confidence in their communications systems, often while working in challenging conditions.
Defence Secretary Ben Wallace said:
“This is a step-change in the modernisation of the UK Armed Forces for information warfare. Cyber-attacks are every bit as deadly as those faced on the physical battlefield, so we must prepare to defend ourselves from all those who would do us harm and 13th Signal Regiment is a vital addition to that defence”
The 13th Signal Regiment is a regiment of the British Army within 1st (UK) Signal Brigade, under the command of 6th (UK) Division, responsible for conducting information manoeuvre and unconventional warfare, in support of the whole Armed Forces.
The specialist unit will provide the basis of the new Army Cyber Information Security Operations Centre, focusing on the protection of Defence’s cyber domain, and it will work with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to provide secure networks for all military communications.
And ensuring that UK defensive cyber capabilities remain ahead of adversaries and aggressors, 13th Signal Regiment will also provide specialist technical support for a hub to test and implement next generation information capabilities.
Based at multiple key locations around a Headquarters in Blandford, Dorset, 13th Signal Regiment will be built around a core of 250 specialist servicemen and women who possess relevant high-end technical skills.
A number of existing cyber functions are being brought together from across the Army to establish the regiment, with personnel from 15 different cap badges represented in the first intake, plus specialist Royal Navy and RAF personnel.
The regiment will consist of several Cyber Protection Teams as well as technical staff who will secure the cyber domain for troops deployed on military operations.
Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith said:
“13th Signal Regiment is the British Army’s brand new cyber regiment – matching cutting edge technology with cyber-fit soldiers to compete and win in the Information Age.”
13th Signal Regiment previously existed during WW2 as 1st Special Wireless Group, and helped to pioneer the use of wireless technology and high frequency wireless radios.
Renamed 13th (Radio) Signal Regiment in 1959, it had operators stationed in Berlin throughout the Cold War. The unit was disbanded in 1994, when its role in Germany was no longer required.
The new Cyber Regiment will take on the 13th Signal Regiment name and build on its predecessor’s proud legacy of innovation and operational excellence.
Brigadier John Collyer, Commander 1st (UK) Signal Brigade, said:
“The re-formation of 13th Signal Regiment is an exciting step forward as the Royal Signals, Army and wider Defence rapidly drives up their potency and resilience in the information environment and cyber domain.
“The stakes are high and our success is increasingly and critically reliant on focusing our brightest men and women onto the opportunities and risks that underpin our operations – both home and away.”
The featured photo shows a UK soldier holding a patch of the 13th Signal Regiment.
The photo is credited to an article by Alistair Bunkall in which he noted that “13th Signal Regiment previously existed during World War Two as 1st Special Wireless Group, and helped to pioneer the use of wireless technology and high frequency wireless radios.
“Renamed 13th (Radio) Signal Regiment in 1959, it had operators stationed in Berlin throughout the Cold War.
“The unit was disbanded in 1994, when its role in Germany was no longer required.”
The unit will work with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force to secure communications networks on the battlefield.
Every year, U.S. European Command Components and historic-lineage military units from the U.S. participate in D-Day commemoration ceremonies in the Normandy region of France.
Due to COVID-19, most D-Day 76 events/ceremonies are cancelled this year.
While coronavirus has interrupted life around the world to an unprecedented degree, the D-Day tradition continues virtually with a joint video message from the five U.S. European Command Component Commanders.
WIESBADEN, GERMANY
06.06.2020
Video by Robert Sekula
The strategic shift from the land wars to full spectrum crisis management is a very significant change.
Operating against adversary forces who have full spectrum capability requires building and training a force which can prevail in a wide variety of contested environments.
We have argued that shaping interactive kill webs which allow for flexible task forces to be assembled to prevail in such conditions is a key way ahead.
But this does not mean that what has been learned during the land wars is being jettisoned.
Several key ingredients of what was learned is being harvested and taken forward into the full spectrum crisis management settings.
One key element is earning how to provide C2 and ISR support to small insertion forces and to provide support from a full spectrum force.
A second is to learn how having an ISR manager based with the ground forces provides a key capability to shape the knowledge management side of informing the ground scheme for maneuver.
A third was to highlight the importance of tron warfare for the ground scheme of maneuver as well and to introduce new capabilities, such as the Growler into the battle space. From this standpoint, the introduction of the Growler is part of the reshaping of the tron warfare strand of the kill web moving forward.
The photos in the slideshow highlight the coming of the Growler to Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, Oct. 30, 2018.
The US Navy and USAF are clearly building a way ahead from this experience to incorporate tron warfare capabilities into the kill web.
As a recent discussion with the senior officer at NAWDC responsible for EW highlighted: “It is about full spectrum of warfare, not just the high-end fight.
“Being able to operate within and to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum is not a nice to have capability but is becoming a core requirement for effective engagement in conflict scenarios across the spectrum of warfare.
“HAVOC is not focused on the management of a single exquisite platform per se, but upon how that platform operates in the joint force with other joint or coalition force assets to deliver the broad non-kinetic effect required.
“In a core mission area, suppression of enemy air defenses, HAVOC is working closely with the USAF Weapons School at Nellis in shaping a variety of capabilities, including but not limited to F-35, Compass Call, space-based assets and cyber-war assets to deliver the best air suppression capability possible. They along with the USAF are looking holistically at the integrated air defense system.
“Within their domain, they are working a kill web approach to generate a synergy of effects enabling the force to take down air defense systems in a much more effective and efficient manner than if it was all about the Growler.
“In this case, it is about sensors and shooters working together through a non-kinetic kill web. When the CNO put out his FY21 Unfunded Priorities List (which includes Next Generation Jammer), it is interesting to note is that he equated NGJ and EW with increased lethality for the force.
“Integrating such capability into the overall strike mission is a virtual redefinition of what lethal strike actually means in a kill web approach.”
Harvest the best, leave the rest, and build on relevant combat experience to shape capabilities for the next generation fight.
When dealing with a peer competitor like China, which is not in a position to havest the best and leave the rest, the U.S. and its allies gain a significant advantage be being able to do so.
U.S. Marines with Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron (VMGR) 352, assigned to the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Central Command (SPMAGTF-CR-CC) 19.2, conduct a Forward Aerial Refueling Point (FARP) operation in the US Central Command area of responsibility, April 30, 2020.
The SPMAGTF-CR-CC is a crisis response force, prepared to deploy a variety of capabilities across the region. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Kyle C. Talbot) 04.30.2020
Video by Sgt. Kyle Talbot
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response – Central Command
There is much uncertainty in life. COVID-19 proves that.
When it comes to forecasting, it would great if all the seers of the future would pause to answer this question: How well did we do in forecasting 2020 from the perspective of 2019?
But one certainty is that the press about the return to sea of CVN-71 will not receive anywhere near the amount of press coverage or inside the Beltway chatter as the aircraft carrier becoming the center of the COVID-19 story at sea.
Nonetheless, the US Nayy and its contractors have worked hard and the result can be seen in the Pacific: the USS Theodore Roosevelt is back at sea.
In this story published on May 21, 2020, a DoD story highlighted CVN-71s return.
PHILIPPINE SEA (May 21, 2020) – USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) is underway for the first time since arriving in Guam March 27.
The ship left Naval Base Guam and entered the Philippine Sea May 21 to conduct carrier qualification flights for the embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 11.
“It feels great to be back at sea,” said Rear Adm. Stu Baker, commander, Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 9. “Getting Theodore Roosevelt and Carrier Air Wing 11 one step closer to returning to their mission in the Indo-Pacific is a great achievement for the crew.”
Theodore Roosevelt is on a scheduled deployment to the U.S. 7th Fleet area of operations. It moored in Guam after some members of the crew displayed symptoms and later tested positive for COVID-19.
After moving nearly 4,000 crewmembers off ship and cleaning the entire ship from bow to stern, the appropriate number of crewmembers to operate the ship underway have returned from quarantine after passing rigorous return-to-work criteria.
Scaled manning allows the ship to bring on board the right makeup of personnel required to safely operate and complete a particular mission requirement.
“We are scaling our manning on board based on our mission requirement,” said Capt. Carlos Sardiello, Theodore Roosevelt’s commanding officer. “Carrier qualification requires fewer personnel than other missions, and bringing fewer Sailors on board will enable enhanced social distancing while underway.”
In addition to social distancing, Theodore Roosevelt Sailors will execute Navy COVID prevention and mitigation policies, including all required lessons learned from a safety stand down last week and a simulated underway earlier this week. During the simulated underway, the crew walked through routine and emergency procedures while executing COVID-19 mitigation measures, including wearing masks, medical surveillance of 100% of the crew, adjusted meal hours, minimizing in-person meetings, sanitizing spaces and a simulated medevac.
“It was an unprecedented challenge to get to this point and I’m proud of the Rough Rider Team’s tenacity and resiliency in the face of uncertainty,” said Sardiello.
“We are extremely thankful for the dedicated support and hospitality of Gov. Leon Guerrero, her staff and the people Guam. They have been steadfast and proactive partners throughout. We are also thankful for the efforts of our fellow service members on Guam for their resolute support. We owe them all a debt of gratitude that words cannot express.”
Theodore Roosevelt is the nation’s fourth Nimitz-class aircraft carrier with a crew of nearly 5,000 Sailors who support and conduct air operations at sea.
Theodore Roosevelt departed San Diego for a scheduled Indo-Pacific deployment January 17.
And in a story by Sam LaGrone published on June 3, 2020 by USNI News, the return was highlighted as follows:
USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) and its embarked air wing are ready to go back on deployment after completing carrier qualifications, following a two-month fight against a COVID-19 outbreak on the carrier, U.S. 7th Fleet announced.
Theodore Roosevelt is now pier-side in Guam to pick up the remainder of its crew before rejoining its escorts and resuming the deployment that was interrupted by the outbreak, a Navy official confirmed to USNI News on Wednesday. Last month, the carrier left for the qualifications with a partial crew while the remainder was still dealing with the aftermath of the quarantine…..
While Theodore Roosevelt was at the pier, escorts from the strike group were re-tasked and sent to different missions across the Pacific. Some of the guided-missile destroyers took on Coast Guard law enforcement detachments for anti-drug trafficking missions. The guided-missile cruiser, USS Bunker Hill (CG-52), was part of the operations in the South China Sea.
By Robbin Laird
With the return to the sea on which the USMC has been working with the US Navy over the past few years, the role of “amphibiosity” has been in evolution as well.
The Bold Alligator Exercises started in 2011 and re-focused on the importance of the return to the sea,.
The Second Line of Defense team attended Bold Alligator exercises and we have written several articles about those exercises.
In effect, the evolution was crafted around the coming of the Osprey and under the influence of the coming of the F-35.
Put in blunt terms, it was about the Marines moving from a significant focus on the land wars to a “return to the sea.” It is one in which the force would change from a primary role of providing a greyhound bus to insert force to an engagement force able to operate from sea.
It has involved shaping and understanding what an air-mobile force could do when able to operate at greater reach into littoral regions with a rapid insertion force.
And one empowered by the Ospreys coupled with fifth generation capability.
Under the twin influence of these two assets, the new LHA Class the USS America was introduced and with it, significantly different capabilities for the amphibious force itself.
As the US Navy reworks how it is operating as a distributed maritime force, which is being reshaped around the capability to operate a kill web force, the question of how best to leverage and evolve the amphibious force is a key part of that transition itself.
This is a work in progress, and one in which a determination of various paths to the future are in evolution and will be subject to debate as well.
Part of that evolution are changes in other elements of the amphibious task force which can over time play roles different from how various “legacy” platforms can be reworked to provide for new or expanded capabilities for the US Navy overall.
A case in point is how the Viper attack aircraft can evolve its roles AT SEA with the addition of key elements being generated by the digital interoperability effort, as well as adding a new weapons capability to the Viper, namely, the replacement for the Hellfire missile by the JAGM.
What this means is that the Viper can be a key part of the defense of the fleet while embarked on a variety of ships operating either independently, or as part of an amphibious task force.
Because the Viper can land on and operate from of a wide range of ships, thus enabling operational and logistical flexibility, and with integration of Link 16 and full motion wave forms as part of digital interoperability improvements, the Viper can become a key member of the kill web force at sea.
In discussions with Major Thomas Duff and Mr. Michael Manifor, HQMC Aviation, APW-53, Attack and Utility Helicopter Coordinators, I learned of the evolving mission sets which Viper was capable of performing with the digital interoperability upgrades.
“With the upgrades coming soon via the digital interoperability initiative, the Viper through its Link 16 upgrade along with its Full-Motion video access upgrade, can have access to a much wider situational awareness capability which obviously enhances both its organic targeting capability and its ability to work with a larger swath of integrated combat space.
“This means that the Viper can broaden its ability to support other air platforms for an air-to-air mission set, or the ground combat commander, or in the maritime space….
“Because it is fully marinized, it can land and refuel with virtually any ship operating in the fleet, which means it can contribute to sea control, which in my view, is a mission which the amphibious task force will engage in with the expanded reach of adversarial navies.”
Recently, I had a chance to discuss with Major “IKE” White the AH-1Z Division Head at MAWTS-1, the evolution of Viper enabled by upgrades for fleet operations as well as its well-established role in supporting the ground maneuver force.
In that conversation, there were a number of takeaways which highlighted potential ways ahead.
The first takeaway is that the Marine Corps’ utility and attack helicopters have been part of integrated operations and escort tasks throughout the land wars and can bring that experience to bear in the return to the sea.
The Viper and the Venom have provided airborne escorts for numerous Amphibious Ready Groups over the last decade, partnering with destroyers, MH-60 Sierra and MH-60 Romeo to protect amphibious warships as they transited contested waterways.
The second takeaway is the coming of the JAGM, which will provide a significant strike capability for the maritime force in providing for both sea control and sea denial.
This missile provides increased lethality through a dedicated maritime mode, enhanced moving target capability, and selectable fuzing; providing capability against both fast attack craft and small surface combatants. Millimeter wave (MMW) guidance increases survivability by providing a true fire-and-forget capability, removing the requirement for a terminal laser.
Coupled with the AIM-9 sidewinder, the Viper will be able to engage most threats to naval vessels. The Viper’s flexibility will provide even the most lightly defended vessels with a complete air and surface defense capability.
The third takeaway is that by working integration of the MH-60 Romeo helicopter with Viper, the fleet would gain a significant defense at sea capability.
Integration of the two helicopters within the amphibious task force would allow them to provide an integrated capability to screen and defend the flanks of the afloat force.
The MH-60 crews are optimized to integrate into the Navy’s command and control architecture, and with onboard sensors can help detect potential targets and direct Vipers to engage threats.
The integration of Link-16 will make this effort even more seemless.
My interviews with NAWDC have underscored how the Navy is working through the question of how the integratable air wing will change when the MQ-25 joins the fleet, and working ways for the Romeo to work with MQ-25 and Advanced Hawkeye will inform Romeo as part of its fleet defense function.
“The Romeo community is already looking at how having sensors onboard the MQ-25 can expand the reach and range of what the Romeo’s onboard sensors can accomplish for the maritime distributed force.
“It is also the case that as sensor demands currently made on the Romeo can be shifted elsewhere.
“The Romeo can refocus its task priorities and enhance its contributions to broader mission sets such as ASW and to focus on contributing capabilities that other platforms within the strike group are not prioritized to perform.”
Clearly, integrating Romeos which fly onboard the amphibious class ships with the Viper would provide a significant enhancement of the flank defense capabilities for the amphibious task force.
And working a Romeo/Viper package would affect as well the evolution of the Romeos that would fly off of the L class ships as well.
And all of this, frees up other surface elements to support other missions at sea, rather than having to focus on defending the amphibs as greyhound buses.
The fourth takeaway is that clearly this new role would have to be accepted and trained for, but I would argue, that in general, the US Navy needs to rethink how amphibious ships can operate in sea control and sea denial functions in any case.
I would argue as well that the enhanced efforts at digital interoperability within the USMC aviation force needs to be accompanied by upgrades of the elements of the amphibious task force with regard to C2/ISR capabilities as well.
We are seeing MISR or Maritime ISR officers placed within the Carrier Strike Groups but they could be proliferated more broadly within the fleet.
And in an interview which I did in 2015, with the Commander of Expeditionary Strike Group Two Rear Adm. Cindy Thebaud, and Capt. Michael M. McMillan then the Commander of Amphibious Squadron Eight ho had just returned from command of the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group off of the waters of Yemen, the importance of C2 upgrades was highlighted.
In short, the evolution of the Viper with digital interoperability and with a new weapons package can clearly contribute to the evolution of the amphibious task force as it embraces sea control and sea denial missions and these missions will be crucial to supporting insertion forces moving to ashore expeditionary bases as well.
