New Appointee Delineates Trump’s Nuclear Arms Control Vision

06/01/2020

By Richard Weitz

In his first public speech on U.S. arms control policy, the newly appointed Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, Marshall Billingslea, offered more details on the administration’s general approach toward the issue, particularly concerns about “unconstrained” warheads and verification.

Billingslea has also been nominated to be the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, with authority to lead all U.S. negotiations on the issue. Before his recent appointment, he had been Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, which included countering money laundering, terrorist financing, and WMD proliferation.

By way of background, Billingslea observed that the United States has been reducing its deployed nuclear warheads while modernizing its delivery systems, whereas both Russia and China were projected to increase their weapons totals. He urged Congress to continue to upgrade U.S. systems since “modernization goes hand-in-hand with arms control’ by providing the United States critical leverage in negotiations.

Although Billingslea did not exclude continuing the extant New START accord, which can be mutually extended by up to five years by both presidents before the accord expires in February 2021, he insisted that “any potential extension of our existing obligations must be tied to progress towards a new era of arms control.” In his view, if properly structured and verified, agreements could provide a means to avert unconstrained arms racing. Though “we know how to win these races…we sure would like to avoid it.”

 Billingslea said that the administration would only accept arms control that was “complete, effective, and verifiable.”

Comprehensiveness means that future arms control must encompass “all nuclear weapons, both those currently constrained by arms control and those unconstrained.” The main category of “unconstrained” weapons consisted of Russia’s novel strategic delivery systems under development as well as Moscow’s large holding of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). Billingslea dismissed the former category of exotic systems as “throw[ing] money down a sinkhole” and focused his remarks on the latter.

The Ambassador insisted that, since the use of “any nuclear weapon would change the nature of a conflict,” it was meaningless to focus only on “strategic” systems while leaving Russia’s increasing arsenal of “tactical” nuclear weapons unconstrained. In this regard, the United States has been especially alarmed that the Russian military was not only improving the quality of its NNSWs—”giving them greater accuracy, longer ranges, lower yields, all to fill various war fighting roles”–but also increasing their quantity.Billingslea also expressed unease how the Russian armed forces “routinely conduct exercises that involve the simulated use of these shorter-range nuclear weapons against NATO” and other countries.

These developments were increasing U.S. alarm that the Russians were pursuing an “escalate-to-win” strategy through a doctrine of early nuclear escalation, using one or more NNSW, of any conventional conflict. To counter this strategy, the administration has been expanding the united States’ own low-yield nuclear options.

As a result, the trump administration insisted on constraining these forces. For instance, it wanted to eliminate all Russian short-range, ground-launched nuclear missile systems, as agreed in the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), a pair of parallel unilateral political commitments by Moscow and Washington to reduce their NNSW holdings after the Cold War.

Interestingly, Billingslea indicated that he was open to discussing missile defense issues with Moscow since Washington had “a lot of questions” regarding Russia’s own BMD systems and intensions.

Regarding the issues of “effectiveness” and “verification,” Billingslea insisted that Washington would demand more effective verification and compliance measures in the future to avert circumvention and violations, provide “timely warning of militarily significant violations,” and “promote real transparency and confidence-building” concerning nuclear plans and intentions.

Billingslea accused Moscow of having “systematically violated nearly every agreement that they’ve made, political or legally binding,” ranging from the INF and Open Skies treaties to the PNIs. He argued that even New START “suffers from some serious verification inadequacies” such as not providing for timely on-site inspections or requiring that Russia transmit its telemetry for new missile systems under development.

Above all, Billingslea indicated that the administration would no longer support nuclear arms control that does not include China since “Beijing, like Moscow, is intent on building up its nuclear forces and using those forces to try to intimidate the United States and our friends and our allies.” We cannot “keep pretending that the two-party construct for nuclear arms control…is able to address satisfactorily the security issues of a multipolar world.”

Billingslea noted that, for the first time in its history, China was about to deploy a triad of nuclear delivery systems—adding strategic bombers and submarines to its robust arsenal of nuclear-armed missiles.

He recalled that, last year, the PLA tested more ballistic missiles than all other states combined. The DIA is projecting that China “will likely at least double the size of its nuclear stockpile” in the next decade.

As a result, Billingslea assessed “that China no longer intends to field a minimal deterrent” but strives for “a form of nuclear parity with the United States and Russia. He also argued that “China’s so-called no first use policy” is “so riddled with caveats” as to be inoperable.

Besides imposing quantitative and qualitative limits on China’s nuclear forces, which Billingslea suggested need not be the same limits as applied to Russia and the United States, the administration wanted to end China’s “great wall of secrecy” regarding its nuclear “plans, its capabilities, [and] its intentions regarding its move to a triad of delivery vehicles, a launch on warning posture, and exploration of low-yield nuclear weapons.”

Billingslea also indicated that the administration both worried about, and wanted to exploit, Chinese-Russian nuclear tensions. In his assessment, the Chinese nuclear buildup was partly aimed at Russia, which meant that Russia as well as the United States would have to grow their own nuclear capabilities to compensate. “They can get into a dynamic between the two of them, which then might precipitate us, necessitate us, having to take certain actions.” The administration seeks an effective trilateral agreement to avoid such “an unnecessary and expensive buildup in a three-way arms racing context.”

Of course, securing Chinese participation will be difficult since Beijing has repeatedly rejected such proposals and Sino-U.S. relations continue to deteriorate. Billingslea publicly appealed to Beijing’s self-image as a “responsible” nuclear-weapons state and “great power.”

He also argued that, as a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it has a legal obligation to negotiate limits on its nuclear forces. Though declining to provide details, Billingslea further indicated that the administration was developing options to employ a combination of direct and indirect pressure to change Beijing’s mind.

Billingslea additionally stated that “Russia must help bring China to the negotiating table.”

Moscow has thus far declined to do so and expressed interest in including NATO members Britain and France in any limits.

Besides repeating previous Russian government proposals for such multinational arms control, the administration also seems prepared to hold New START extension hostage to Moscow’s pressing Beijing to join future negotiations.

“The president has a long and successful career as a negotiator and he’s a master at developing and using leverage. And we’re going to follow his lead in that respect.”

The featured phot shows the Kinzhal air missile system as Vladimir Putin (right) delivers his annual address. Photograph: Tass/Barcroft Images

 

MAG-36 Rapid Deployment Exercise

Marine Aircraft Group 36 conduct a rapid deployment exercise on Oct. 24, 2019 in Okinawa, Japan and the Indo-Pacific region.

This type of realistic training is used to highlight an active posture of a ready force and is essential to maintaining the readiness needed to uphold our commitments to our allies and surrounding nations.

(U.S. Marine Corps video by Lance Cpl. Ethan M. LeBlanc)

MCAS FUTENMA, OKINAWA, JAPAN

10.25.2019

Video by Lance Cpl. Ethan LeBlanc

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Working Mobile Basing: Defining the Challenge

05/31/2020

By Robbin Laird

The USMC has mobile basing in its DNA.

With the strategic shift from the Middle Eastern land wars to full spectrum crisis management, an ability to distribute a force but to do so with capabilities which allow it to be integratable is crucial.

For the Marines, this means an ability to operate an integratable force from seabases, forward operating bases (FOBs) or forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).

As the Marines look forward to the decade ahead, they are likely to enhance their capabilities to provide for mobile bases which can empower the joint and coalition force by functioning as a chess piece on the kill web enabled chessboard.

But what is required to do mobile basing?

What are the baseline requirements to be successful?

A very good place to start to shape answers to these questions if the USMC’s center of excellence on warfighting training, MAWTS-1 located at MCAS Yuma. In a recent discussion with Lt. Colonel Barron, ADT&E Department Head at MAWTS-1.

The official USMC presentation about MAWTS-1 provides us with a good sense of what Lt. Colonel Barrons’s Department is tasked with doing.

“Since its commissioning in 1978, MAWTS-1 has conducted two WTI Courses per year, now producing over 300 WTI graduates each year. A separate Aviation Development, Tactics and Evaluation Department (ADT&E) was established in June 1983 to coordinate the MAWTS effort of developing and evaluating tactics and hardware in all functional areas of Marine Corps aviation.”

This means that the ADT&E is focused on the core task of fighting today with the current force but also looking forward to how to enhance that force’s capabilities in the near to mid-term as well.

We had a wide-ranging discussion with regard to the flexible basing dynamic, and I will highlight a number of takeaways from that discussion.

Rather than quoting the Lt. Col. Directly, I am drawing on our discussion and highlighting what from my perspective are key elements for shaping a way ahead with what I call mobile basing,

In a 2018 article which I wrote after a Williams Foundation seminar, I highlighted what the mobile basing challenge meant for U.S. and allied forces:

“When I was in Finland in February, I talked with his predecessor, Lt. General Kim Jäämeri, who is now Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategy for the Finnish Defence Forces and he highlighted the distributed operations aspect of the Finnish approach.

“It is becoming clear to our partners that you cannot run air operations in a legacy manner under the threat of missile barrages of long range weapons.

“The legacy approach to operating from air bases just won’t work in these conditions.

“For many of our partners, this is a revelation; for us it has been a fact of life for a long time, and we have operated with this threat in the forefront of operations for a long time.”

The 11th USAF Commander mentioned working with the RAAF with regard to agile basing and during a visit to Amberley Airbase just before the Williams Foundation seminar in March 2018, we met with the Commander of the RAAF’s Combat Support Group, Air Commodore Ken Robinson at his office at RAAF Amberley.

We discussed mobile basing as an emerging requirement for the Australian forces as well.

“We are having to reacquaint ourselves with some tasks and challenges which we parked to the side a bit while we were in the Middle East for so long. We did not have to worry so much about mobile basing to counter the principal threats in that theatre.

“The mindset is in transition now.”

He underscored that this clearly is an Army and Air Force challenge.

“We are good at supporting maneuver with our tactical transport aircraft and Australia’s Army aviation capability, including the Tiger Reconnaissance Helicopter, but what we need to do is move to the next level of support to maneuver the most lethal part of our air power capability across a range of airfield options.”

Core capabilities such as providing fuel for air systems when operationalized for a mobile airbasing force on Australian territory are clearly different from supporting a fixed airbase.

For example, “expeditionary fuel capabilities is something that’s very much on the forefront of my mind. Lean and agile support packages to operate expeditionary airfields are also key, so that we can offer the best possible maneuver options to the aviators without tying down strategic airlift.”

The mobile basing issue or building greater depth in Australian territorial defense is one of the core choices facing Australia as it continues its force modernization. Either they can emphasize going deeper into the air-maritime domain in the Pacific or augment significantly their mobile defense capabilities leveraging the vast Australian territory. The role of active defenses working with airpower mobility would be a priority in this second case.

Mobile basing is obviously as well an air-maritime-army effort to shape a chessboard of capabilities which can deal with the threats of peer competitors which deploy into the extended battlespace. 

The discussions alluded to in the Nordics and in Australia highlight the point that mobile basing is not just a Pacific specific capability facing the force; it is becoming a requirement when dealing with either China or Russia.

The discussion with Lt. Col. Barton highlighted six key takeaways.

The first one is the crucial need for decision makers to determine why a mobile base is being generated and what the tactical or strategic purpose of doing is.

It takes time and effort to create a mobile base, and the mobile base commander will need to operate with mission command with regard to his base to determine how best to operate and for what purpose.

The second one is the importance of determining the projected duration of the particular base.

This will have a significant impact in shaping the question of logistics support. What is needed? How to get it there? And from what supply depot, afloat or ashore in adjacent areas?

The third one is clearly the question of inserting the force into the mobile base and ensuring its optimal capabilities for survivability.

What needs to be at the base to provide for organic survivability? What cross links via C2 and ISR will provide for an extended kill web to support the base and its survivability?

A fourth one is to determine what the base needs to do to contribute to the wider joint or coalition force.

With the evolution of technology, it is possible now to have processing power, and strike capabilities distributed and operated by a smaller logistics footprint force, but how best to configure that base to provide the desired combat effect for the joint or coalition force?

A fifth one is clearly a crucial one for operating in a contested environment. Here the need is for signature control, or an ability to have as small a signature footprint as possible commensurate with achieving the desired combat effect. 

Signature management could be seen as a component of survivability.  However, the management of signatures down to the small unit level requires a disruptive shift in our mindset.

The sixth one is clearly having an exit strategy in mind.

For how long should the force be at the mobile base? For what purposes? And what needs to be achieved to enable the decision to move from the mobile base?

In effect, the discussion highlighted what one might refer to as the three Ss. 

An insertion force operating from a variety of mobile bases needs to be able to be sustainable, survivable, and signature manageable.

With regard to current USMC capabilities, the MV-22, the C-130, the Viper, the Venom, the CH-53E and the F-35 are key platforms which allow the Marines to integrate and move a lethal combat force to a mobile base.

But the C2/ISR enablement is a key part of the requirement and the digital interoperability efforts are a key part of shaping a more effective way ahead.

And in the relatively near term, the Ch-53K replacing the E is a key enabler for an enhanced mobile basing strategy.

It is clear as well as the U.S. services work their way ahead in the evolving strategic environment, that the USMC core skill set with mobile basing will figure more prominently, and become a key part of the Marines working with the joint and coalition force in shaping a more effective way ahead for the integrated distributed force.

For our special report on the CH-53K, see the following:

The Coming of the Air Warfare Destroyer to Australia: A Key Maritime Kill Web Building Block

By Robbin Laird, Williams Foundation Research Fellow

Recently, the third and final Air Warfare destroyer, appropriately named HMAS Sydney was commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy.

This was a very significant moment on many levels for Australia and for its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

For this is not just about what a single Air Warfare destroyer capable of doing; it is about what it can do when operating as part of the broader maritime kill web, either to defend Australia out to its first island chain, or to contribute to a wider set of defense challenges in the region an beyond.

The Air Warfare destroyer is a key foundation for the new wave of Australian shipbuilding, one in which mission systems and integratable is a key requirement.

It is also about learning from that build process to set in motion a new approach, which I have highlighted in my report on the new build offshore patrol vessel.

In an article which I published in USNI Proceedings in 2012, I highlighted the coming of the kill web in my concept of the long reach of Aegis. The ADF in embracing the fifth-generation revolution and the opportunity to reshape the ADF along the lines of an integratable force, views the coming of the Air Warfare Destroyer not simply in terms of a powerful new platform for the Navy, but as a contribution to the integrated distributed force.

As RAAF Air Vice Marshal Chipman, now the Australian Military Representative to NATO and the European Union put it earlier in an interview:

“We need to have broad enough of a perspective so that we can drive programs towards joint outcomes.

“For example, it will be crucial to bring E-7, with F-35 and air warfare destroyers into a common decision-making space so that we can realise built in capabilities for integrated air and missile defense.”

“And that needs to be informed by shaping a common perspective with the USN and USAF as well.

The commissioning of the final and latest Air Warfare Destroyer was highlighted in a story published on May 19, 2020 by the Australian Department of Defence on May 19, 2020:

The Royal Australian Navy welcomed its newest Air Warfare Destroyer into the fleet yesterday. 

The commissioning ceremony, off the coast of New South Wales, marked the moment the 147-metre-long HMAS Sydney V became one of Her Majesty’s Australian Ships.

It is the first time since World War II that a RAN warship has been commissioned at sea. 

Chief of Navy Vice Admiral Mike Noonan and Commander of the Australian Fleet Rear Admiral Jonathan Mead were aboard the guided missile destroyer to officially welcome her into service.

Vice Admiral Noonan told the commissioning crew that Sydney’s history had a legendary pedigree.

“You will all form part of the HMAS Sydney fabric. You are sailors and officers who will all continue the proud Sydneylegacy,” Vice Admiral Noonan said.

“It is a great responsibility – one I know each and every one of you is capable of honouring and carrying forward in to the future.

“HMAS Sydney, welcome home, welcome back to our fleet. Your name once again takes pride and its rightful place in Her Majesty’s fleet.”

During the ceremony the ship received a blessing and Sydney’s Commanding Officer, Commander Edward Seymour, read the ship’s commissioning order before the Australian white ensign was hoisted, signifying completion of the commissioning. 

She brings an outstanding, Australian-built air warfare capability over an exceptional range and gives Navy a surface combat capability like never before.

The crew also watched video messages of congratulations from Governor-General David Hurley,  Prime Minister Scott Morrison, Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds and the ship’s sponsor, Judy Shalders. 

Commander Seymour said he was proud to lead the ship’s company and carry forward the legacy of previous Australian warships that carried the name.

“It isn’t often in a naval career that you are part of commissioning a brand new warship, but to do so at sea and carrying the significant legacy behind the name Sydney, is a special feeling for the entire ship’s company,” Commander Seymour said.

“A lot of hard teamwork has led us to this moment of bringing a world-class warship into the fleet and we’re eager to now prove what Sydney can do.

“She brings an outstanding, Australian-built air warfare capability over an exceptional range and gives Navy a surface combat capability like never before.”

Sydney is the last of three Hobart-class vessels built for Navy at Osborne in South Australia and is based on the Navantia F100 frigate design.

She is equipped with advanced combat systems, providing the ship with layered offensive and defensive capabilities to counter conventional and asymmetric threats.

Sydney will now undergo her test and evaluation period where she will integrate into the fleet, and Navy personnel will develop their proficiencies with her cutting-edge Aegis combat system.

Sydney’s sister ships, Hobart and Brisbane, commissioned in 2017 and 2018 respectively and all three vessels are home-ported at Fleet Base East in Sydney.

The first RAN vessel to be commissioned at sea was HMAS Matafele. The World War II stores carrier was commissioned on January 1, 1943.

See also, the following:

Visiting HMAS Hobart: A Key Building Block in the Remaking of the Royal Australian Navy

Also, see the ASPI report published in 2018:

ASPI Air warfare destroyer

 

Hot Loading F-35Bs and Distributed STOVL Ops

05/30/2020

U.S. Marines with Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) and U.S. Marines with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA) 211 conducted the first independent Distributed STOVL Operation (DSO) by flying all ordnance, personnel, and fuel in on mission aircraft at Yuma, Ariz., April 13,2017.

Marines employed the manual drive assembly to load all up rounds using a short airfield for tactical support (SATS) loader. WTI is a seven-week training event hosted by MAWTS-1 cadre, which emphasizes operational integration of the six functions of Marine Corps aviation in support of a Marine Air Ground Task Force and provides standardized advanced tactical training and certification of unit instructor qualifications to support Marine Aviation Training and Readiness and assists in developing and employing aviation weapons and tactics.

YUMA, AZ, UNITED STATES

04.13.2017

Video by Lance Cpl. Benjamin Drake

Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One

Working Expeditionary Basing: MAWTS-1 and the F-35

05/29/2020

By Robbin Laird

Over the past few weeks, I have been discussing with USAF and U.S. Navy officers, how the two services are training to shape greater synergy with regard to the integrated distributed force.

The fusing of multiple sensors via a common interactive self-healing web enhances the ability of the entire force, including key partners and allies, to engage cooperatively enemy targets in a time of conflict.

Interactive webs can be used for a wide range of purposes throughout the spectrum of conflict and are a key foundation for full spectrum crisis management.

To play their critical role when it comes to strike, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, this final layer of the web needs to have the highest standards of protection possible.

From the USAF and US Navy perspective, where does the USMC fit into the evolving kill web approach?

Clearly, one answer which has been given several times can be expressed in terms of one of the Marines key competence – bringing an integrated force to a mobile operational setting whether afloat or ashore.

It is important to consider a base afloat or ashore as part of the chessboard from a basing point of view.

Too often when one mentions basing, the mind goes quickly to a fixed air or ground base, but in the evolving strategic environment, an ability to work across a wide variety of basing options is crucial.

And no force in the world is more focused on how to do this than the USMC.

And with the arrival of the USS America class LHA, the amphibious fleet moves out from its greyhound bus role to being able to contribute fully to sea control in transit or in operations, thereby relieving the U.S. Navy large deck carriers from a primary protection role.

To be clear, when one is talking about a combat cloud, the processing power empowering webs comes from cloud processing power.

With a focus on interactive kill webs, the processing power is distributed.

The capability of the F-35s to hunt as a pack and through its CNI system and data fusion capabilities, the pack can work as one.

The integration of the F-35 into the Marine Corps and its ability to work with joint and coalition F-35s provides significant reach to F-35 empowered mobile bases afloat or ashore 

When I last visited MAWTS-1 at MCAS Yuma, I had a chance to discuss the evolving focus on mobile basing and learned that indeed the US Navy and USAF were visitors to Yuma to discuss mobile basing.

Because the approach to mobile basing is being worked in the context of preparing for conflicts against full spectrum capable adversaries, in effect, the mobile basing approach will be about moving pieces on the kill web chessboard.

Recently, I had a chance to talk with Major Brian “Flubes” Hansell, MAWTS-1 F-35 Division Head, with regard to how the Marines are working the F-35 into their approach or better yet approaches to expeditionary basing.

I have a number of takeaways from my conversation with Major Hansell, which include points that he made, but also extrapolations from our conversation as well.

The first takeaway is that following a significant focus on the land wars in the past twenty years combined with the return to the sea, the Marines are shaping new capabilities to operate at sea and in a way that can have significant combat effects on the expanded battlespace.

And they are doing so from expeditionary bases, afloat and ashore.

According to Major Hansell: “The Marine Corps is a force committed to expeditionary operations. When it comes to F-35, we are focused on how best to operate the F-35 in the evolving expeditionary environment, and I think we are pushing the envelope more than other services and other partners in this regard.

“One of the reasons we are able to do this is because of our organizational culture. If you look at the history of the Marine Corps, that’s what we do.

“We are an expeditionary, forward-leaning service that prides itself in flexibility and adaptability.”

The second takeaway is that the coming of the F-35 to the USMC has expanded their ability to operate within a broader kill web and to both empower their expeditionary bases as well as to contribute to the broader kill web approach.

The Marine’s F-35s are part of the broader joint and coalition force of F-35s, and notably in the Pacific this extends the reach significantly of the Marine’s F-35s and brings greater situational awareness as well as reach to other strike platforms to the force operating from an expeditionary base as well as enhancing the kill web reach for the joint or coalition force.

As Major Hansell put it: “By being an expeditionary, forward-based service, we’re effectively extending the bounds of the kill web for the entire joint and coalition force.”

The third takeaway is how the concepts of operations empowers a kill web approach.

The F-35 is not just another combat asset, but at the heart of empowering an expeditionary kill web-enabled and enabling force.

On the one hand, the F-35 leads the wolfpack.

This was a concept which Secretary Wynne highlighted when I worked for him in DoD.

His perspective then is now reality and one which empowers an expeditionary force.

As Major Hansell put it: “During every course, we are lucky to have one of the lead software design engineers for the F-35 come out as a guest lecturer to teach our students the intricacies of data fusion.

“During one of these lectures, a student asked the engineer to compare the design methodology of the F-35 Lightning II to that of the F-22 Raptor.

“I like this anecdote because it is really insightful into how the F-35 fights.

“To paraphrase, this engineer explained that “the F-22 was designed to be the most lethal single-ship air dominance fighter ever designed.  Period.

“The F-35, however, was able to leverage that experience to create a multi-role fighter designed from its very inception to hunt as a pack.”

Simply put, the F-35 does not tactically operate as a single aircraft.

It hunts as a network-enabled, cooperative four-ship fighting a fused picture, and was designed to do so from the very beginning.

“We hunt as a pack.

“Future upgrades may look to expand the size of the pack.”

The hunt concept and the configuration of the wolfpack is important not just in terms of understanding how the wolfpack can empower the ground insertion force with a mobile kill web capability but also in terms of configuration of aircraft on the sea base working both sea control and support to what then becomes a land base insertion force.

The fourth takeaway focuses on the reach not range point about the F-35 global enterprise.

The F-35 wolfpack has reach through its unique C2 and data fusion links into the joint and coalition force F-35s with which it can link and work.

And given the global enterprise, the coalition and joint partners are working seamlessly because of common TTP or Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

As Major Hansell put it: “From the very beginning we write a tactics manual that is distributed to every country that buys the F-35.

“This means that if I need to integrate with a coalition F-35 partner, I know they understand how to employ this aircraft, because they’re studying and practicing and training in the same manner that we are.

“And because we know how to integrate so well, we can distribute well in the extended battlespace as well.

“I’m completely integrated with the allied force into one seamless kill web via the F-35 as a global force enabler.”

The fifth takeaway is the evolving role of the amphibious task force in the sea control mission.

With the changing capabilities of strategic adversaries, sea control cannot be assumed but must be established.

With the coming of the F-35 to the amphibious force, the role of that force in sea control is expanding and when worked with large deck carriers can expand the capabilities of the afloat force’s ability to establish and exercise sea control.

With the coming of the USS America Class LHA, the large deck amphibious ship with its F-35s onboard is no longer a greyhound bus, but a significant contributor to sea control as well.

As Major Hansell noted: “The LHA and LHD can plug and play into the sea control concept. It’s absolutely something you would want if your mission is sea control.

“There is tremendous flexibility to either supplement the traditional Carrier Strike Group capability with that of an Expeditionary Strike Group, or even to combine an ESG alongside a CSG in order to mass combat capability into something like an expeditionary strike force.

“This provides the Navy-Marine Corps team with enhanced flexibility and lethality on the kill web chessboard.”

The sixth takeaway is that MAWTS-1 overall and the F-35 part of MAWTS-1 are clearly focusing on the integrated distributed force and how the Marines can both leverage an overall joint and coalition force able to operate in such a manner as well as how the Marines can maximize their contribution to the integrated distributed force.

Similar to the comments made in my recent interviews at Nellis, Major Hansell highlighted that MAWTS-1 was focusing upon shaping integrated force problem solving as a core aspect of their training.

According to Major Hansell, the CO of MAWTS-1, Colonel Gillette has put a priority on how to integrate as best as we can with the Navy, as well as the joint force.”

And for the F-35 period of instruction during all Weapons Schools, we focus a tremendous amount of effort on integrating with the joint force, more so than I ever did on a legacy platform.

“We really strive to make our graduates joint integrators, as well as naval integrators.

And I give Colonel Gillette (the current CO of MAWtS-1) all the credit in the world for moving us to that mindset and pushing us to learn how to operate in the evolving expeditionary environment.”

In short, the USMC provides a critical piece of the kill web puzzle, as the United States and its allies rework their warfighting and deterrence strategies to deal with peer competitors worldwide.

It is clearly a work in progress but new platforms are coming to the Marines, such as the CH-53K which clearly can support more effectively than the legacy asset, mobile basing, as well as the digital interoperability approach, which I have highlighted in recent interviews, which make the Marines more effectively woven into the kill web approach as well.

Also, see the following:

The Strategic Shift and Dynamic Targeting: Meeting the Challenge

 

Osprey Defensive Weapon System

U.S. Marines with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 268, Marine Aircraft Group 24, conduct a GAU-17 minigun weapons test on the MV-22B Osprey off the shore of Oahu, Hawaii, April 23, 2020.

The GAU-17 minigun is a remotely operated defensive weapon system designed to provide suppressive fire.

Proficiency with this weapon system increases readiness for the Marines of VMM-268.

(U.S. Marine Corps video by Cpl. Eric Tso and Cpl. Matthew Kirk)

MARINE CORPS BASE HAWAII, HI, UNITED STATES

04.23.2020

Video by Cpl. Eric Tso

III Marine Expeditionary Force

The Strategic Shift and Dynamic Targeting: Meeting the Challenge

05/28/2020

By Robbin Laird

With the strategic shift from the land wars to the more fluid battlespace involving peer competitors engaged in full spectrum crisis management with the United States and its allies, one aspect of the change for military forces is how to use lethal force effectively.

This comes down in part to how to target dynamically in a fluid political and military situation.

And within the dynamics of management of escalation, how do I ensure that I have had the combat effect which provides an effective solution set?

From a strictly military point of view, the strategic shift is from deliberate to dynamic targeting.

As one analyst has put the issue of the shift affecting the maritime domain:

“Perhaps the most acute differences that the maritime theater will present are the target sets.

“Targets that can be categorized as deliberate will now be the exception to the rule. Relatively fixed land targets will yield to highly mobile maritime targets.

“Therefore, targets may be known but not fixed.”1

How significant the shift is can be seen in a USAF explanation of the difference between deliberate and dynamic targeting.

“Dynamic targeting complements the deliberate planning efforts, as part of an overall operation, but also poses some challenges in the execution of targets designated within the dynamic targeting process.

“Dynamic targets are identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in deliberate targeting.”2

The assessment adds that:

“Dynamic targeting is a term that applies to all targeting that is prosecuted outside of a given day’s preplanned air tasking order (ATO) targets (i.e., the unplanned and unanticipated targets).”

“It represents the targeting portion of the “execution” phase of effects-based approach to operations (EBAO). It is essential for commanders and air operations center (AOC) personnel to keep effects-based principles and the JFC’s objectives in mind during dynamic targeting and ATO execution.

“It is easy for those caught up in the daily battle rhythm to become too focused on tactical-level details, losing sight of objectives, desired effects, or other aspects of commander’s intent.

“When this happens, execution can devolve into blind target servicing, unguided by strategy, with little or no anticipation of enemy actions.”

But what if dynamic targeting becomes the norm and deliberate targeting the exception?

With specific regard to the Pacific, the strategic shift could well generate a significant targeting shift.

But how to train, plan, and execute a dynamic targeting approach?

That is a challenge being addressed by the NAWDC team, with CDR Joseph Fraser, head of the Information Warfare Directorate, which has been designated the executive agent for targeting for the United States Navy.

I had a chance to discuss the strategic shift and the way ahead for working integrated strike within the maritime kill web with CDR Fraser.

I have a number of takeaways from that conversation, but am not quoting the CDR directly, for those takeaways will include some of my own personal extrapolations.

The first takeaway is simple enough: NAWDC is an integrated warfighting center, not simply the classic Top Gun venue.

With officers from the various elements of Navy warfighting present within NAWDC, as well as enhanced engagement with the other services’ warfighting centers, NAWDC makes perfect sense to work the 360 degree dynamic targeting solutions set for an integrated distributed force.

Obviously, this is both challenging and a work in progress.

But the core point is that Navy has laid the foundation within and at NAWDC to shape such a way ahead.

The second takeaway is that the new combat platforms coming into the force provide the information and data environment to work a dynamic targeting solution set.

Notably, both the F-35 and the Advanced Hawkeye have come to the carrier wing since we were last at Fallon, but it is also the case that the data being generated by these aircraft are being worked across not just the fleet but the joint combat force.

Or put another way, the new platforms coming to the fleet are capable of enabling a kill web maritime force.

Or put yet another way, the quality of the data that’s coming off of these new platforms enables dynamic targeting.

The third takeaway is that with the reliance on a precision weapons stockpile, it is crucial to get best value out of that capability.

It is not World War II weapons stockpiles at work; weapon effectiveness in terms of being able to identify and destroy targets that matter most need to be prioritized and dealt with in a combat situation.

The fourth takeaway is that within a cluttered maritime combat environment, target identification is always challenging, but if one wants to prioritize the most significant targets, clearly effective ISR with time urgent decision making against mobile targets is a key element for mission success.

The fifth takeaway is that by working a new model of dynamic weapons engagement now prior to the coming of directed energy weapons to the fleet, it will be possible to determine how to use these new technologies effectively by which platforms, in which situations and in which combat areas within the fluid and extended battlespace.

This can also be true with regard to future precision weapons as well and can provide a guide for shaping a future weapons inventory.

Which weapons would make a significant difference if added to the fleet to maximize dynamic targeting capabilities against which adversaries and in which situations?

The sixth takeaway is this is an area where expanded work with the other services is clearly crucial.

But if the Pacific is taken as a baseline case, then the question of maritime targets, or targets that operate within that domain become crucial challenges to be dealt with.

And, certainly in my view, these targeting challenges really have little to deal with the legacy targeting solution sets generated in the land wars, and, frankly, the lessons learned will have to be unlearned to some extent.

What this means in blunt terms, is that the Navy plays a key role in this strategic targeting shift.

In short, we are talking about targeting solutions enabled by interactive webs, but not necessarily what passes for joint targeting.

The maritime domain is very different from the land or air-space domain.

While the US Army and USAF can provide key capabilities to provide for dynamic targeting, the domain knowledge of the US Navy will be a central piece of the puzzle.

And much the same could be said with regard to the other domains, and what the role of the US Navy would be in a dynamic targeting solution set.

Much like how words like C2, ISR and training are being changed fundamentally in terms of their meaning with the building of a kill web integrated distributed force, the term joint also is changing, or will need to change if combat effectiveness is to be realized.

There is a tendency to slip into the last twenty years of jointness which has been dominated by the US Army and the land wars.

The Pacific is dramatically different.