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In this report, the major presentations and discussions at the Williams Foundation seminar on the requirements for fifth generation manoeuvre held on October 24, 2019 in Canberra, Australia are highlighted along with interviews conducted before, during and after the seminar as well.
What is fifth generation manoeuvre?
The definition by Air Commodore Gordon of the Air Warfare Centre:
“The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.”
The Australians are working through how to generate more effective combat and diplomatic capabilities for crafting, building, shaping and operating an integrated force.
And the need for an integrated force built along the lines discussed at the Williams Foundation over the past six years, was highlighted by Vice Admiral David Johnston, Deputy Chief of the ADF at the recent Chief of the Australian Navy’s Seapower Conference in held in Sydney at the beginning of October:
“It is only by being able to operate an integrated (distributed) force that we can have the kind of mass and scale able to operate with decisive effect in a crisis.”
The need for such capabilities was highlighted by the significant presentation by Brendan Sargeant at the seminar where he addressed the major strategic shift facing Australia and why the kind of force transformation which the Williams Foundation seminars have highlighted are so crucial for Australia facing its future.
In the future there will be times when we need to act alone, or where we will need to exercise leadership.
We have not often had to do this in the past – The INTERFET operation in Timor, and RAMSI in the Solomon Islands are examples.
We are far more comfortable operating as part of a coalition led by others. It is perhaps an uncomfortable truth, but that has been a consistent feature of our strategic culture.
So I think our biggest challenge is not a technical or resource or even capability challenge – it is the enormous psychological step of recognising that in the world that we are entering we cannot assume that we have the support of others or that there will be others willing to lead when there is a crisis. We will need to exercise the leadership, and I think that is what we need to prepare for now.
To return to the title of this talk: if we want assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific, then we need to work towards a world that ensures that that access is useful and relevant to the sorts of crises that are likely to emerge.
I will leave one last proposition with you. Our assured access for the ADF in the Asia Pacific will be determined by our capacity to contribute to regional crisis management.
That contribution will on some occasions require that we lead.
The task now is to understand what this means and build that capacity.
In short, it is not just about the kinetic capabilities, but the ability to generate political, economic and diplomatic capabilities which could weave capabilities to do environment shaping within which the ADF could make its maximum contribution.
The 2019 edition of the International Fighter Conference is now history.
And it was held in the city of Berlin which earlier in the month was remembering the 30 year history of the Fall of the Wall.
That event ushered in the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
But this fighter conference was being held as the challenge of direct defense has returned to Europe.
The Cold War is over but the Russians are back.
And this time they are not alone.
They have core global authoritarian allies in which the 21st century authoritarian powers are challenging the liberal democracies and working to change the rules of the game rather than simply marginally modifying the “rules based” order.
But fighters are not what they once were.
They are now key players in multi-mission and multi-domain operations.
I argued several years ago that the coming of the F-35 would lead to the “renorming of airpower” in which the first generation flying combat system would be a driver of fundamental change in air combat operations.
Indeed, the broader wave of change is clearly upon us in which the United States and its allies are building a new C2 and ISR infrastructure within which fighters both generate, and benefit from in the emerging combat world of “gray zones,” “hybrid warfare,” and contested multi-domain operational space.
If one is looking for a conference which generates a single threat narrative clarifying your thoughts, the International Fighter Conference is not for you.
The strength of this conference is that several lines of thought are put into play, which by themselves may not add up to a single narrative, but spawn several narratives, and several lines of though which requires further examination.
I have come to this year’s fighter conference through a long path, quite literally.
It started in Australia where I attended and have written the report for the latest Williams Foundation seminar, this one entitled, “the requirements for fifth generation maneuver.” Here the ADF has accepted for some time that they are on the path of building a fifth generation force.
“The ability of our forces to dynamically adapt and respond in a contested environment to achieve the desired effect through multiple redundant paths. Remove one vector of attack and we rapidly manoeuvre to bring other capabilities to bear through agile control.”
Next I went to Bahrain, and participated in BIDEC-19, a conference which focused on the new technologies and technological threats affecting the GCC and its allies going forward.
A key part of the conference was to think through ways to adapt to the new context of conflict and how best to prevail against the 21st century authoritarians.
But clearly, the question being addressed: How best to shape an eco-system for defense modernization and transformation which could enable the GCC states to deal with evolving software and digital revolution?
I mention both of these conferences for the simple reason that many of the same topics were discussed at the fighter conference, something you might not expect if you expected a narrow conversation on the current future pointed nosed assets and their near term futures.
Rather, the fighter conference frames a much wider array of discussions on the overall threat and combat environment facing the current and future fighter fleets and discusses how they can contribute or better contribute to the evolving combat environment, and to be more effective in incorporating evolving technologies.
Over the next few weeks, I will write a series of articles highlighting the different presentations and the issues raised.
Given the multiplicity of issues discussed and from a wide variety of angles, I do not believe a single overview can suffice.
But some of the themes which clearly emerged from the conference, include but are not limited to the following:
An update on the Future Combat Air System program of the French, Germans and Spanish?
How the manned-unmanned teaming part of FCAS could enter the market in the next decade?
How convergent are the projected French Rafale and the German Eurofighter modernization programs? Is it more a case of parallel efforts or cross cutting ones?
How has the coming of the F-35 affected rethinking about air combat operations? How to better connect fifth generation concepts and thinking with the overall dynamics of change in what I call the shaping of an integrated distributed force?
How are countries directly threatened by the 21st century authoritarian powers addressing the role of air power in their self-defense?
How best to train a multi-domain fighter pilot?
How does the telescoping of generations of fighter aircraft shape the “next” generation fighter?
How to best address the challenge of affordable capability, remembering Secretary Wynne’s core point: You don’t win anything being the second-best air force?
Is the combat cloud the best way to think about the new C2/ISR infrastructure which is being crafted, created and shaped for the advanced air forces?
These are some of the issues which I will be dealing with in the weeks to come.
And I will connect those discussions with other interviews which I have conducted over the past few months.
In short, the fighter conference is a place to be for those who are thinking about the evolution of the multi-domain combat environment and how best to prepare those flying fighters to prevail in that environment.
U.S. Marine crew masters with Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response-Central Command, prepare cargo for a joint supply drop in an undisclosed location, Oct. 29, 2019.
The SPMAGTF-CR-CC is a multiple force provider designed to employ ground, logistics and air capabilities throughout the Central Command area of responsibility.
(UNDISCLOSED LOCATION)
10.29.2019
Video by Sgt. David Bickel
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response – Central Command
The Australian Minister for Defence, Senator the Honorable Linda Reynolds CSC, spoke to the Hudson Institute in Washington DC on 1 November 2019. The topic of her presentation was The US-Australia Defence Alliance in a Contested World.
Following a reaffirmation of the Australian-US relationship, a reflection on the durability and duration of this relationship, and the shared histories and culture that underpin it, the Minister directed the focus of her presentation to the future.
The discussion about this future was framed by four key themes:
A vision for the Australia-US alliance
The new and different challenges that will be faced together
How to address these challenges leveraging each others respective strengths and differences
How to capitalize on the areas of diversity and difference and balance them with the shared values to deliver regional and global peace and prosperity
While the presentation explored the Australia-US relationship, and these four themes, through the lens of military capability and hard power deterrence, there was an interesting sub-theme that related to economic security and regional stability.
It is this sub-theme that will be the focus of my discussion.
The Minister stated up-front that as a three-ocean nation, ‘Australia has a very clear and engaged view of the Indo-Pacific region…’. This geographic reality is at the heart of Australia’s regional engagement and security and economic policies.
The Minister said that the challenges for Australia ‘go well beyond’ those that could be considered traditionally ‘military’.
Today, ‘economic coercion, foreign interference … and cyber attacks are amongst the sort of tools and measures we have now seen employed to avoid direct conflict and preserve a thin veneer of deniability in pursuing strategic objectives.’
In order to constructively deal with these challenges to protect Australia’s economic sovereignty, the Minister stressed the importance of Australia actively building regional partnerships.
She observed that before the next decade is over, 4 of the world’s 5 largest economies in purchasing power parity terms are likely to be in Asia – China, India, Japan and Indonesia. Australia has benefited to date by the economic growth and prosperity of Asian nations.
And as the Minister said, Australia will continue to benefit as ‘export markets to our north continue to expand and diversify.’
An ongoing discussion in Australia amongst academics, the media and politicians, is the paradox of the Australia-China relationship.
A significant and economically vital trading partner, yet also considered a threat in many ways to Australia’s national security. Minister Reynolds addressed this matter in part by referring to Australia’s world-leading role in legislating counter foreign interference laws and the steps taken to secure critical networks and infrastructure, while at the same time ‘broadening and intensifying our partnerships … because China’s engagement is vital for strengthening institutions that underpin the free flow of trade…’.
The Minister acknowledged that ‘China’s dynamism and our trade complementarities make Australia and China natural economic partners for securing the prosperity of our respective nations.’
However, the management of this relationship required ‘very deft handling’.
While Australia would cooperate with China wherever possible to enhance the security of the region, the Minister stressed that Australia only does so ‘from a very clear position that our values are what define us as a nation and that maintenance of those values is non-negotiable.’
As Australia continues to champion the rules-based order, and work with allies and friends in the Indo-Pacific region to foster economic security and stability, the Minister sees a very real and ongoing role for Australia’s historic ally and friend, the US.
Indeed, she emphasized that the US has been ‘key to the Indo-Pacific success story of both peace but also for prosperity, and the future of both hinge on sustaining and deepening US engagement.’
She went on to say that this engagement ‘is about more than committing military strength, as crucial as this has been and will continue to be … it is also about fostering economic growth and strengthening democratic institutions … US soft power plays a vital role to this end.’
Australia as always, will partner and support US endeavours as necessary and appropriate.
The shared history and values, and past cooperation, make Australia and the US an obvious partnership to address the future challenges of the Indo-Pacific region.
The Minister said that ‘Australia makes no apology for its relentless advocacy of deep, broad-based and ongoing US regional engagement’.
She emphasized this point with the following unambiguous statement about Australia’s expectation from the US:
‘It is squarely in Australia’s interests for our great friend and our closest ally to remain partner of choice in the region, a partner who remains deeply invested in the region and in an open global economy and a rules-based trading system no less than in a security presence with potent deterrent capability.’
Australia’s Minister for Defence has clearly articulated an intersection between economic security and the security of Australia and the nations of the region.
She highlighted that the free flow of trade and an open global economy increases the security of Australians. She has identified that critical Australian networks and infrastructure need legislative protection from foreign interference.
And that military capability in and of itself is but one way in which national security is ensured.
During the Q&A section of her presentation, Minister Reynolds noted that in supporting regional stability and security, Australia has taken a whole-of-government approach, because the challenges in the region cannot be addressed by the Department of Defence alone.
And she makes a very good point with this observation. The world has become more challenging, and the threats to security and sovereignty have become more pervasive and pernicious.
The interconnected global economy is delivering prosperity, but it also makes nations more vulnerable.
Notably, Australia, at the end of a very long global supply chain, is perhaps even more vulnerable than most.
It is therefore unfortunate that the whole-of-government approach taken to assist Australia’s regional allies and friends as they navigate future challenges, has not been adopted in delivering national security for Australia.
How can the Australian government understand and manage the interconnected elements of national security (for example the economy, infrastructure, maritime trade, energy, environment, defence) without a whole-of-government approach?
This whole of government approach should be integrated under a National Security Strategy. Australia does not have one.
The last time Australia had a national security strategy was 2013 but this was lost in the transition to the Abbott Government.
The world has changed, and as Minister Reynolds highlighted in her presentation, the world is continuing to change and the challenges to be faced are mounting.
Australia has stated its expectations of the US in the region – perhaps the time has come for Australia to develop its own national security strategy as well.
Anne Borzycki is Director of the Institute for Integrated Economic Research – Australia and a former Air Force Group Captain.
The concept of a ‘wingman’ is as old as military aviation itself. Providing mutual support within a formation, the purpose of a wingman was established to protect the flight lead and provide him or her with the additional mental capacity to manage the formation, operate the aircraft, and make decisions.
As the role developed, the most important tasks for the wingman were to help avoid an attack by an unseen enemy, contribute to the formation’s situational awareness, and watch out for obvious signs the leader had either missed something or made an error. At the very heart of the idea was an acceptance that the human is fallible and, in the heat of battle, task saturation was likely to result in mistakes and errors in tactical decision-making.
In the early years of aviation, a wingman would be positioned slightly behind the lead aircraft in close visual proximity to the wings of the leader. But as advances in technology introduced new inter and intra-flight data links, such as Link 16, and increased levels of integration with airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems such as the E-7 Wedgetail, formations became invariably separated beyond visual range of each other and able to benefit from the ‘god’s eye view’ of the world and shared situational awareness.
There are, of course, still times when a wingman is required to be in close visual range, but these are becoming more suited to non-tactical reasons such as transits through controlled airspace or through poor weather conditions.
So what started out as a role providing visual lookout support has now been transformed by the introduction of multi-sensor fusion displays and data links, with mutual support by proximity now measured in miles rather than metres. The fundamental purpose of a wingman has changed over the years from supporting and protecting the leader, to one which is focused on the greater concentration of firepower and more effective application and multiplication of force.
GAME CHANGER
Yet perhaps the most transformational aspect of the evolving wingman role is that of the unmanned ‘Loyal Wingman’, a wingman that does as it is told and does not get distracted by the fear and chaos of battle.
This is not to say a human wingman is fundamentally disloyal, nor does it undermine the importance of a human in dealing with the complexities of highly dynamic, multi-dimensional fights in the air. But it does unlock what the incoming Commandant of the US Marine Corps calls, “the game-changing opportunities with manned and unmanned teaming”.
The concept of the Unmanned Air System (UAS), or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is nothing new nor is their use in missions which traditionally challenge human performance, fragility, and endurance. Often described as the dull, dirty, and dangerous missions, unmanned systems have provided the commander with a far broader range of options for the application of force against even the most challenging target sets. However, ongoing operational experience confirms unmanned systems on their own are not the panacea.
When Boeing Defence Australia announced its Loyal Wingman project at Avalon earlier this year it sparked significant discussion and, not least, progressed the argument for greater numbers of unmanned platforms in a far more mature and balanced way than hitherto.
The manned-unmanned narrative is now sensibly shifting towards “and” rather than “or”. Manned and unmanned teaming – the US Army coined the term MUM-T – is a powerful concept which leverages the strengths and mitigates the weakness of each platform and concentrates the mind on the important operational aspects, such as imaginative new roles and the challenges of integration.
It should come as no surprise, then, to see the expansion of the loyal wingman concept in recent times into the other warfighting domains.
The ADF formally recognises five warfighting domains, sometimes referred to as environments: Air (to include Space), Land, Sea, Information and Human. The applications of unmanned systems in the land environment are moving beyond tactical flying drones, with BAE Systems Australia recently awarded a contract to support Australian Army plans to modify two M113AS4 armoured personnel carriers at the company’s Edinburgh Parks facility in Adelaide, using autonomous technologies developed in Australia.
Moreover, reports are now emerging from the US about recent developments in unmanned surface and sub-surface combatants, which are opening new ways of warfighting and creating opportunities to reconceptualise joint operations and move away from the platform-on-platform engagements which have traditionally characterised the battlespace.
Yet these ideas cannot get too far ahead of policy and the dollars, with manned and unmanned teaming driving a wholesale reconsideration of the US Navy budget. Despite an increasingly complex threat and the rapid developments in autonomous technologies, there is still much to be done to build consensus that the future lies in MUM-T.
ORCA
The Boeing Company was recently awarded a US$43m (A$63m) contract for the fabrication, test, and delivery of four Orca Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs) and associated support elements. The Orca XLUUV is described in open sources as a modular, open architecture, reconfigurable UUV with its own guidance and control, navigation, situational awareness, communications, power, propulsion and mission sensors.
Taking a closer look, this project appears to be the proverbial tip of the iceberg, with the US Navy in pursuit of a much broader family of unmanned surface and undersea vehicles based upon three core variants: Large Unmanned Surface Vehicles (LUSVs), Medium Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MUSVs), and Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (XLUUVs) such as the Orca. Reports suggest the USN is seeking to invest over US$600m (A$873m) in near term research and development for these programs and their enabling technologies.
While the platforms themselves are fascinating from a technology perspective, what is more significant is their wider employment in a distributed architecture when teamed with the manned surface and sub-surface fleets containing a greater proportion of smaller, agile platforms.
The new unmanned platforms are expected to carry a range of sensors and weapon systems almost certainly configured for anti-surface warfare and maritime strike. Yet the potential for broader counter-air missions set within the co-operative engagement framework opens up new possibilities and significantly leverages existing manned surface fleet capability as well as providing a means of enabling integrated fire control, with the air layer containing E-2D Hawkeye, F-35C, F/A-18F Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers.
But as ever, the platforms are only half the story.
The distributed architecture alluded to earlier will require a complex web of advanced datalinks and communication systems to make it operate as a combat system. Designing and building this ‘kill web’ so that it can enable the delivery of manned-unmanned firepower across domains will be a huge challenge not least due to the laws of physics.
And then the ability to train, test, evaluate and validate tactics and procedures will add a whole new level of complexity to generate the ‘trusted autonomy’ required for warfighting. And that is exactly why we should do it.
It will be interesting to see whether the Commonwealth’s policy settings and budget profiles for the Australian warship continuous build program allows the headroom for the RAN and the broader ADF to explore the full potential for manned and unmanned teaming in the context of future joint operations alongside the US Navy, and indeed the USAF and US Army.
From its humble origins at the platform level, the opportunities and potential of the wingman concept can now be realised at the enterprise level, which will fundamentally transform Joint and Coalition operations.
According to recent statements by senior representatives of the Japanese military as well as local defence analysts, Japan is steadily continuing along its path of active defence with the development of a new national defence budget for 2020.
According to statements by the official spokesperson for the Japanese Defence Minister Takeshi Iwaya, the new budget will allow Japan to significantly strengthen its military potential over the next several years – to protect its geopolitical interests in the region and to counter potential threats from China and North Korea.
The cost of programs in the defence budget is estimated at 5,5 trillion yen (about US$50 billion), which makes it the largest military budget in the modern history of Japan, since the end of WWII.
In fact, Japanese defence spending has been growing for the second year in a row. In 2019, its defence budget reached 5.3 Trillion yen (US$ 47.4 billion) or about 1% of Japan’s national GDP. Some local analysts believe these figures will continue to grow in the coming years and may reach 3-5% of its GDP within the next decade. That will be comparable to the volume of defence spending that has been recommended by NATO to its members.
One notable aspect of the new program involves resuming the building of aircraft carriers. The use of such ships will mark the first for Japan since the end of World War II. The design of these new aircraft carriers will be based on Izumo-Class multi-purpose destroyers (which were originally ordered as helicopter carriers by the Japanese Defence Ministry) and will serve as a base for F-35B aircraft.
Some Japanese military analysts have noted that Izumo-Class ships may prove useful during potential regional military conflicts, for example, with China over the disputed Senkaku islands.
In the meantime, the plan also provides for gradual replacement of Japan’s Hyūga Class naval helicopter destroyers. The design process for their modern analogues has already begun.
Military Aviation
Japan’s modernization and recapitalization plan included a massive renewal of its fleet of combat aircraft. Since the early 2000s, Japan has held its status as the second largest buyer of U.S. F-35 aircraft (behind the U.S. itself). These aircraft successfully replaced Japan’s F-15J / DJ Eagle models and have resulted in significantly raising the potential of the Japanese Air Force.
As for new purchases, by the end of 2019 at least nine more Lockheed Martin F-35 stealth fighters will be supplied for the needs of the Japanese Air Force. Overall, by 2023, Tokyo plans to purchase up to 20 such aircraft (which are priced at US$130 million each) plus several F-35B short take-off and vertical landing units.
Particular attention will go towards continuing development of the 5th generation fighter. That will take place in cooperation with Lockheed Martin, although Tokyo intends to use its own technologies as much as possible. Some of these technologies will be provided by the Technical Research and Design Institute of the Japanese Ministry of Defense as well as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Corporation, which will also take part in the project.
According to some Japanese media reports, the total cost of the project may exceed 1.5 trillion yen (US$14 billion).
Deliveries of the new aircraft to the Japanese Air Force are scheduled to begin after 2030. They will completely replace the 90 F-2 aircraft currently in the Japanese military aviation fleet. Its armament will include cruise missiles capable of hitting ships with high efficiency.
Most Japanese military analysts consider this project as the most significant advance of Japan’s capabilities in the last several decades.
At the same time, in addition to the new fighter, will be design of specialized Electronic Warfare aircraft that will be capable of suppressing air defence and enemy communications. The use of such aircraft is intended to deter and prevent the launch of enemy missiles on Japanese military targets.
Defending Space Assets
Japan already has a strong civilian space programme and has successfully launched a number of satellites into orbit, and lately, the Prime Minister has been advocating for a special space-defence force to protect its satellites from possible targeting.
To that end, the proposed budget includes funds for a significant strengthening of Japan’s military space assets. The ministry has asked for 52.4 billion yen (US$484 million) to strengthen its outer space capability, including the establishment of a space operations unit within the structure of the Japanese Armed Forces.
Confirming the focus on strengthening defence capabilities in outer space, Prime Minister Abe confirmed on 17 September 2019, that Japan’s existing Air Defence Force may “evolve into the Air and Space SDF” in the future.
As the Japanese Yomiuri business paper recently reported, the space unit will be formed by 2020 and will include a highly sensitive radar, an optical telescope. and a special tracking system. The unit will be located on the Japanese Air Force base in the city of Fuchū, located in the western Tokyo Metropolis.
According to an official spokesman of the Japanese Ministry of Defence, the main task of the newly established military space unit will be to counter possible attacks of Japanese military targets by foreign satellites and to prevent collisions of Japanese spacecrafts with space debris.
The Japanese Ministry of Defence considers strengthening its space assets as one of its most important tasks in the field of defence, particularly given recent efforts by the United States, China, and Russia for more active use of outer space for military intelligence.
Land Forces
The new State Defence Program includes the establishment of a special electronic warfare unit for the land forces – using electromagnetic waves for army purposes. A new unit, consisting of 80 people, will be deployed at the end of 2020 at the Japanese Kangun base in Kumamoto. It will primarily focus on the monitoring of the activities of Chinese troops.
Budget Approval
Japan’s Defence Budget 2020 is expected to be approved by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinz¯o Abe after consultations with the Ministry of Finance.
Eugene Gerden is a FrontLine correspondent who specializes in military and defence.
In the United States, we have tweeting Trump and the impeaching House of Representatives; in Europe they have Macronite.
We have had and continue to have a significant deluge of comments on President Trump and his approach to foreign policy with little that has a positive tinge to it; but what about Macronite?
How positive or significant is this for shaping the second creation of the West?
The first creation was lead by the United States after World War II with the laying down of the rules based order; the Post-Cold War period was more or less acting on the belief that the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed those rules of the game to be extended East.
But in fact, little noticed was the rise of 21st century authoritarian capitalist powers who were key anchors of globalization and have woven themselves into the fabric of the liberal democratic societies.
With the 21st century authoritarian powers working to write the rules of the game going forward rather than reinforcing the rules based order, what should and can the Western liberal democracies do?
In his recent interview with The Economist, the President of the Republic provided his answer and having done so, he deserves a serious examination of whether or not that resets the effort in a manner that can lead the way ahead.
He certainly has provided a wide ranging analysis of the current situation; but does the Macronite approach going forward provide a realistic way ahead to deal with the current crises?
Let us navigate through his interview and highlight some of his core points to get a sense of how he sees the challenge and gauge his approach to guiding the West to its next phase.
Europe was built on this notion that we would pool the things we had been !ghting over: coal and steel.
It then structured itself as a community, which is not merely a market, it’s a political project.
But a series of phenomena have left us on the edge of a precipice…. A market is not a community.
A community is stronger: it has notions of solidarity, of convergence, which we’ve lost, and of political thought.
What he underscores is the importance of Europe thinking of itself as a community and focus on its common destiny, rather than simply thinking of itself as a trading bloc.
But the challenge facing this core point is rather straightforward: is the European Union with the Commission as its driving force for integration really a custodian for the broader sense of community?
Does Europe need to recast even significantly how the nations can work together to shape community, rather than face a bureaucratic machine which is driving bureaucratically mandated commonality?
And notability, with the expansion of the European Union, there is no way that Western Europe with a 50 year period of working together has as much in common with the “new” states who have been under a 50 year domination by Communism.
This is proving to be a mix which may be more oil and water than providing strands for a single community.
Perhaps there is no single community?
Perhaps we are looking at clusters of states which pursue specific interests in common on particular issues; Rather than thinking of Europe as a community of forced unity.
Maronite is generated by a Europe first policy whereby the Americans are looking elsewhere in the world.
And the current American president is seen to be abandoning the European project.
And with the rise of China, and the preoccupation of the United States with the Pacific, America is focused elsewhere. Of course, there is the largely ignored question of how significant Chinese engagement economically with Europe has become, and whether or not Europe, either individually on the national level or collectively on the European Union level is providing a counter balance to what China has been able to do within Europe itself.
He very clearly focuses on the challenge which the 21st century authoritarian powers pose to Europe while the Americans reduce their commitment to the European project.
So, f!rstly, Europe is gradually losing track of its history; secondly, a change in American strategy is taking place; thirdly, the rebalancing of the world goes hand in hand with the rise—over the last 15 years—of China as a power, which creates the risk of bipolarisation and clearly marginalises Europe.
And add to the risk of a United States/China “G2” the re-emergence of authoritarian powers on the fringes of Europe, which also weakens us very signi!cantly.
This re-emergence of authoritarian powers, essentially Turkey and Russia, which are the two main players in our neighbourhood policy, and the consequences of the Arab Spring, creates a kind of turmoil.
It is hard to disagree with much in his analyses of the world but this is where it gets interesting.
Let us apply some Macronite to the challenges.
His first step: regain military sovereignty.
To do this, he argues for the reenforcement of the European project and having a more realistic assessment of dealing with a “brain dead NATO.”
Europe must become autonomous in terms of military strategy and capability. And secondly, we need to reopen a strategic dialogue, without being naive and which will take time, with Russia. Because what all this shows is that we need to reappropriate our neighbourhood policy, we cannot let it be managed by third parties who do not share the same interests
The problem with this can be put simply — it ignores the reality which he has painted earlier.
There is no common European defense because European defense threats are not seen the same way and there is a reverse trend — clusters of states focusing on their specific approaches within an umbrella set of institutions — NATO and the EU.
Does anyone believe that the Nordic states are waiting for France or Germany to defend them?
Hardly.
They have enhanced their own cooperation and have deepened their working relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom and have done so in large part by embracing the latest US military technologies, something which Macron clearly rails against
But as Secretary Wynne once said — “Being the second best air force in a conflict is not where you want to be.”
And the United States still offers the best opportunity to not be a second best air force, for example.
And as for his working relationship with Berlin, given that Germany has no real commitment to its own direct defense, there is a question of whether France and Germany could defend a central front if challenged by the Russians.
NATO is only as strong as its member states.
This is certainly true and why Article III of the NATO Treaty is the bedrock for any Article V commitments.
But then we are back to a key question: how convergent is French defense policy with other European states to contribute and to manage the common defense?
Is it actually more convergent than is the United States itself?
He notes: I think that the interoperability of NATO works well.
But we now need to clarify what the strategic goals we want to pursue within NATO are.
But the first may be what the European alliances can provide; whereas the second is really left up to the cluster of nations willing to work on specific strategic lines.
Take the case of cyber offense, where France has nothing at all in common with Germany.
Indeed, as a leading French analyst put it to me when I asked him the question: Who are France’s allies in cyber offense?
“The Dutch lead the pack because they recognize that the Russians declared war on them with the shoot-down of the Malaysian airliner. Also crucial are the UK, Sweden and the Baltic states.”
He then goes on to mischaracterize what the Trump Administration is actually doing for European defense.
Even though the current Administration has significantly stepped up its operational commitments to deal with the Russians, this is what Macron has to say.
In the eyes of President Trump, and I completely respect that, NATO is seen as a commercial project. He sees it as a project in which the United States acts as a sort of geopolitical umbrella, but the trade-o$ is that there has to be commercial exclusivity, it’s an arrangement for buying American products. France didn’t sign up for that.
This is an indirect comment getting at the “F-35 threat” to Europe which is treated as strategic as the seizure of Crimea by many French analysts.
And hence we see the brith of the Future Combat System and the coming fighter in 2040.
But as one German analyst put it: “I hope we have agreement with the Russians for avoiding conflict until 2040.”
In my opinion some elements must only be European.
This is where the Macronite impact could be signifiant, if Europe follows the Finnish approach.
Notably with regard to infrastructure, Europe has allowed the 21st century authoritarian powers to own significant infrastructure elements in Europe.
They are not alone.
This can lead to what John Blackburn, the Australian analyst, to a condition where “we are losing without fighting.”
How to control our supply chains and infrastructure to the point whereby the authoritarian powers can not disrupt our capabilities in a conflict is a clear challenge.
And significant focus within Europe on this problem could follow from the Macronite impulse.
Of course, the Finns lead the way on this and not the French.
The underlying idea is that if we’re all linked by business, all will be !ne, we won’t hurt each other. In a way, that the inde!nite opening of world trade is an element of making peace.
Except that, within a few years, it became clear that the world was breaking up again, that tragedy had come back on stage, that the alliances we believed to be unbreakable could be upended, that people could decide to turn their backs, that we could have diverging interests.
And that at a time of globalisation, the ultimate guarantor of world trade could become protectionist.
Major players in world trade could have an agenda that was more an agenda of political sovereignty, or of adjusting the domestic to the international, than of trade.
The question of the future of globalization is clearly a key one to sort through at the second creation.
And here Macron talks both European values and national sovereignty and assumes that the two blend together — but that is precisely the nexus of the challenge — they do not.
To re design globalization to work with trusted partners, to reshape manufacturing, to shorten supply chains, to deal with the political challenge of the 21st century authoritarian states, certainly starts with national solutions, but ones which recognize the semi-sovereign situation in which the modern democratic state finds itself.
Maron highlights the challenge in his interview, but the question is how best to deal with national sovereignty in a semi sovereign world in which 21st century authoritarian powers are on the ascendancy?
And this is his trajectory with regard to one of the key authoritarian powers, Russia.
If we want to build peace in Europe, to rebuild European strategic autonomy, we need to reconsider our position with Russia. That the United States is really tough with Russia, it’s their administrative, political and historic superego. But there’s a sea between the two of them.
It’s our neighbourhood, we have the right to autonomy, not just to follow American sanctions, to rethink the strategic relationship with Russia, without being the slightest bit naive and remaining just as tough on the Minsk process and on what’s going on in Ukraine.
It’s clear that we need to rethink the strategic relationship. We have plenty of reasons to get angry with each other. There are frozen conflicts, energy issues, technology issues, cyber, defence, etc.
What I’ve proposed is an exercise that consists of stating how we see the world, the risks we share, the common interests we could have, and how we rebuild what I’ve called an architecture of trust and security.
And when asked how the Poles and Balts feel about this approach, he highlights that indeed there are “European” differences.
Having a strategic vision of Europe means thinking about its neighbourhood and its partnerships. Which is something we haven’t yet done. During the debate over enlargement, it was clear that we are thinking about our neighbourhood above all in terms of access to the European Union, which is absurd.
Macronite is about driving European solutions to its common neighborhood, but the challenge for France is that the Europe envisaged by the French president may not be the realistic project or outcome.
As former Admiral James Stavridis commented after the release of The Economist interview:
NATO is far from brain dead, but it is suffering from the fallout of centrifugal forces pulling Europe apart. NATO has key missions in deterring Russia, the Arctic, cyber, and the Med — all directly affecting USA.
For the full Economist interview, see the following:
