By Robbin Laird

Syria is being controlled by Russia and Turkey, two elements of the rise of 21st century authoritarianism.

While the EU discusses and while the United States retreats or whatever it is doing, Turkey and Russia are shaping the territory from which the migration crisis is holding Europe at risk.

And let us be clear — Erdogan is blackmailing Europe over migration with the clear support of the Russians as well.

Earlier, I have published two pieces which looked at the way ahead for both Turkey and Russia in the region, and are reposting them in this article to highlight that the nature of what 21st century authoritarianism is all about.

While the US, the European Union and the UK go deeper into their constitutional crises, the 21st century authoritarian powers are increasingly collaborating with one another, and leveraging one another’s actions to shape a better national outcome for themselves.

The Turkish Dynamic

Turkey has been a bulwark of NATO’s Southern Flank during the Cold War and a key player afterwards in terms of shaping security and defense capabilities for NATO and the European Union over the past two decades.  This has changed dramatically as President Erdogan came to power and has navigated the Turkish political system to shape a sharp break from the secular Turkey and pro-Western power that was set in motion by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

Erdogan has served as the President of Turkey since 2014 and is a key part of the strategic shift affecting European defense and security in the post-2014 strategic shift. Erdogan has worked to create greater Turkish independence and to do so by leveraging more fundamentalist Islamic forces in what has been for decades a strongly secular society. And he has looked to shape a foreign and defense policy which would expand the flexibility of Turkish partnerships and allies and embracing ways to restore in some 21^stcentury manner a version of what he sees as modern Ottoman state.

The Turks under Erdogan have expanded their military reach into Africa and in the Middle East, and he has pursued a policy of expanded arms industrial autonomy as well.

The Syrian crisis has been a multi-headed forcing function for Erdogan as well. On the one hand, the outpouring of refugees has provided both opportunities and challenges to his increasingly authoritarian rule. On the other hand, after leveraging NATO contributions to defend Turkey against enhanced threats posed by the Russians operating in Syria, he is now pursuing an expanded working relationship with the Russians to enhance Turkey’s arms options to defend itself.

Erdogan has operated under the umbrella neither the European Union nor NATO posing a direct threat to his expanded authoritarian rule. He has leveraged having no threat at his back to focus on the dynamics East and South of Turkey to expand his options.

A “coup attempt” against Erdogan in 2016 has been a very useful event in Erdogan’s efforts to expand his power base. Notably, he used the failed coup attempt to go after the Turkish military, notably the Air Force, and to reduce its political impact and significantly reduced its fighting competence and capabilities as well.

The Turkish leader has been involved in constant conflict with the European leaders about a range of issues, notably those involving migrations. And his shift from Turkish interest in joining the European Union to playing off the Europeans for more global influence is simply the more obvious shift in the President of Turkey’s approach to shape in effect a more Islamic state which can provide for leadership in the Middle East and work with other global powers outside of Europe to enhance his position in the region.

In a period where the global impact of the various strands of Islam are clearly providing significant global impact, the President of Turkey has focused on emphasizing the Islamic side of Turkey, not its secular tradition and its role as a leader in the Middle East shaping a more effective democratic path forward in a troubled region. In place of Ataturk’s vision, we have the Erdogan vision of a partial restoration of the Ottoman Empire with an expanded role of Turkey as a leading Islamic state operating in Africa and the Middle East.  He has also overseen the significant economic decline of Turkey, which means that the focus on the restoration of Turkish “glory” is not going to be funded by a dynamic Turkish economy closely integrated with the West.

In a critical but insightful article by Alon Ben-Meir on Erdogan , the author hihglights the psedo-Ottoaman approach being followed by the President.

“With little or no opposition at home, Erdogan moved to promote his Ottoman penchant to establish military bases in Qatar and Somalia, and military ties with Tunisia. Now he is scheming to build another military installation on the strategically located Sudanese Island of Suakin. Erdogan intends to utilize the island as a military outpost, as it had been during the Ottoman era. Egypt and Saudi Arabia believe that Erdogan’s military adventure will upset the regional balance of power, which is the recipe for instability and incessant violence.”¹

Erdogan has acted if his membership in NATO is a birthright which allows him significant room for maneuver to expand South and East. The time is fast approaching when he needs to learn that he has significantly less room for maneuver if he continues to stab the West in the back.

An excellent example of how Erdogan is operating is his recent exploitation of the horrific slaying of Muslims in New Zealand. During his 2018 electoral campaign, he thought it acceptable to threaten the ANZAC community if they did not do whatever he thought was appropriate.

Ataturk was a brilliant Turkish military leader who defeated the allies in World War I when the attack was made on Turkey; he was respected because of his combat brilliance and because he went on to make Turkey a great nation. Erdogan who has no such pedigree seems to think that standing on the dead bodies of World War I soldiers and threatening their descendants will have no consequences.

In the summer of 2019 a key flashpoint was reached with the U.S. and NATO whereby the Trump Administration decided to terminate the Turkish involvement in the coalition-based global F-35 program.

The Turks are part of the F-16 European community and as such joined F-35. The issue which triggered this U.S. decision was the pursuit of the S-400 air defense system with the Russians.

This would mean that in an era where the U.S. and its allies are looking to shape greater integration of defensive and offensive systems and to enhance their ability to work together, the Turks proceeded down the path of not only not participating in such an approach, but are bringing the Russians directly into the air defense effort within Turkey and thereby NATO itself.

This is a key turning point and raises fundamental questions about the future of Turkey not only in NATO but more generally to how it will operate to defend itself and if whether in pursuing its independent course will leave the Southern Tier of Europe and the Southern Flank of NATO open to increasing conventional and hybrid war threats.

In other words, rather than Turkey being part of a comprehensive solution to sorting through the way ahead with regard to Southern Tier security and Southern Flank defense, Turkey is putting in motion the dynamics of change which could well change for a generation how Europe and the United States approach Mediterranean defense and security, and how to deter a growing range of authoritarian powers, of which clearly Erdogan is on the path to join the global trend.

Whether in NATO or not or whether allied with the European Union or not, Turkey is geographical located as it has always been at the critical juncture between the Middle East and Europe. This means that the European Union has worked and will continue to work with Turkey on the question of migrants as part of a broader security challenge.²

With more than three million Syrian refugees in Turkey, these expats have become important potential supporters of the new authoritarianism and also useful currency to negotiate with European nations and the European Union about as well.

Erdogan has openly embraced an agenda based on the greatness of the Ottoman Empire, a mix of religious and nationalist elements. His agenda has met with less than open enthusiasm by players in the region. As Zvi Mazel put it in an op-ed published in the JerusalemPost on August 1, 2019:

Dubbed neo-Ottomanism, a mix of religious and nationalist elements, this agenda led the president to embark on an aggressive foreign policy to assert Turkish domination in the Middle East on the basis of Islam, the common denominator of the region. It failed dismally. Only Qatar, which supports the Brotherhood, is still on friendly terms with him. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies, as well as Iraq, mistrust him, and Syria sees him as an enemy. Relations with Egypt were cut following the ouster of Muslim Brotherhood’s President Mohamed Morsi.³

The response of Erdogan to his strategic shift has not been to go back to the previous Turkish strategy of siding with the West, but rather seeking new ways to enhance his flexibility and to leverage that flexibility to tighten his grip on Turkey itself. Combining his policy of leveraging the migrant crisis with deepening his military relationships with 21^stcentury authoritarian powers has been his next round of policy innovation.

This approach puts the alliance structures in play in a very significant manner, not just the European Union and NATO but the Gulf Cooperation Council as well. Erdogan is unhinging Turkey to give himself greater strategic flexibility and to find ways to enhance his own control within his own society.

The Russians clearly see an opportunity here. ⁴

And this Russian challenge is the latest one to operate within NATO Europe itself, but also builds off the gains made by militarily engaging in Syria and building out a permanent military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In his significant book on Erdogan, fittingly entitled The New Sultan, Soner Cagaptay provided an overview of the rise of Erdogan and the significance of that rise to power and his shaping of power in driving a fundamental shift within Turkey itself. And because of fundamental shifts in Turkey, clearly the alliances with which Turkey has historically been part and have been important to the domestic evolution of Turkey itself are in the process of significant change as well.

Unlike previous Turkish leaders, such as Ozal, who saw himself as a conservative Muslim and a Westerner, Erdogan views himself as a conservative Muslim but not a Westerner. Accordingly, he no longer regards NATO as central, seeing it not as a club of nations with shared values, but rather as an outlet where he can purchase security through transactional deals. Whether or not the Turkish leader is the partner that the United States and the EU want, he is the ally they have been dealt at a critical juncture.⁵

In blunt terms, this means that alliance relationships are in flux in the most vulnerable region within Europe and which poses the most significant challenges to shaping an effective defense and security approach as the challenges of direct defense return to Europe. And unlike during the Soviet period, Turkey is not a stalwart barrier to Russian advances into the region; but at best an interlocutor with the Russians with regard to what and how effective those advances might be in the coming years.

As Cagaptay adds:

In any case, Erdogan’s transactional view of the NATO alliance will limit US ties with Turkey. Erdogan’s dim view of the EU and its liberal-democratic values will endow the EU with even less influence in Turkey. At best, Turkey’s Western allies can hope that the security they provide to Turkey against ISIS, Russia, and the Assad regime will be enough to keep Erdogan on their side. They can also dream that, in Erdogan’s wake, liberals will run Turkey one day, pivoting the country toward its traditional allies in the West—a long-term vision and hope.⁶

 The Russian Dynamic

With the Western reactions to the seizure of Crimea, Putin was blocked from further incorporation of the “near abroad” directly in the Russian republic.

He certainly has generated continued pressure on the “near abroad” states and is leveraging the turn to the right in new member states in the European Union, like Hungary to position himself for ways to enhance his ability to pressure the European Union states, more generally.

But the major moves after Ukraine in 2014, clearly has been the intervention in the Syrian Civil War. 

Here he has backed a long time Soviet ally, the Syrian government, and used various military means to punish the opponents of Syria having painted the intervention as Russia’s contribution to the war on terrorism.

Given that the Russian intervention in Chechnya was characterized the same way, the Syrian intervention fitted into a long-standing Putin narrative about Russia and its legitimate role in the world.

As part of the payment for the Russian intervention, Russia now has a permanent air and naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean which provides an important access point into the region, and as European dynamics unfold in the Western Mediterranean,

Putin is looking to establish more Russian presence there, with the possibility of Russia becoming a major player in the fate of the Mediterranean region.

We argued at the time of the initial intervention that this was a significant strategic turning point for Putin’s approach to global engagement.

The Russian intervention in Syria crosses a strategic threshold. Russia has used a small but decisive air and naval force to side with Assad to protect his regime and specifically Damascus.

So far the introduction of a relatively small number of combat aircraft in comparison to U.S. and Allied airpower has operationally secured a new air base –Hemeimeem — and equally important bolstered their ability to expand the Syrian naval port of Tartus in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In doing so, they have used airpower decisively in a way the U.S. has not, and have expanded their ability to influence outcomes in the region. While the Russians are delivering a relatively high tempo of air sorties from a small force and delivered weapons against targets, the U.S. tempo of sorties and weapons delivered against targets has been reduced to a trickle.

The Russians are backing a sovereign government, with that government’s approval.

This means that U.S. actions prior to the Russian engagement, whereby aiding “rebels” and inserting special forces was part of the effort takes on a new meaning. U.S. actions now face the threat of Syrian government or Russian attacks protected by international law, custom and practice. In other words, the Russians are in a military partnership with Syria their joint forces have every legal right to direct combat action against all enemies including the U.S. military…..

Significantly under-appreciated Russian diplomatic and political initiative is a new agreement with Israel.  Putin invited the Obama-shunned Israeli leader Prime Minister Netanyahu to Moscow in September to forge a deconfliction agreement between Israel and the Russians. The Israeli diplomatic mission to Moscow included senior Israeli military officials. Consequently, both political and military issues were on the table from the start and the agreement has provided the basis for Israel expanding its capability to defend its interests in Lebanon.

Since then Jordan, America’s closest ally behind Israel has also signed such an agreement.

And during this Russian Israel strategic and military process President Obama pulled Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Power out of the UN Speech being given by Prime Minister Netanyahu.

It appears that the legacy of President Kennedy is long gone “Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate.”

In other words, decisive Russian military actions is more in line with 21st century insertion forces then the ever evolving Counter-Insurgency (COIN) nation building military mantra.  Since the Powell characterization of the “if you break it you fix it doctrine,” the U.S. military has been on the path of operations on the ground to reshape political and economic systems, regardless of the inability of an outside power to do so.

In contrast, regardless of the size it is the intangible of combat decisiveness that forms the basis for the Russians expanding their diplomatic role in the region. Russia is being recognized by the key players in the region as a force to contend with….

Putin clearly has looked at the limited air campaign in Libya, the no-reaction to the Benghazi strikes, and our slow motion air campaign against ISIS and has concluded that a much shorter, decisive and brutal air campaign will get the kind of political diplomatic results he wants.

Put in other terms, while the Obama Administration and the neo-cons remain wedded to the COIN and slow-motion air campaign approaches of the past, the Russians are breaking out a new approach to achieve diplomatic power to reassert Russia’s role in the region.⁷

Of course, the Syrian conflict has led to an outpouring of refugees into the Mediterranean region and into the European Union.

And there is little doubt that the migratory pressures from North Africa and Middle East have been accelerated by the results of Russian action sin Syria, something which provides an indirect contribution to ramping up the direct defense challenge to Europe as well.

In a 2018 published book by the Russian analyst, and head of the Carnegie Center in Moscow, Dmitri Trenin, the author provides an insightful assessment of what Putin is up to in the Middle East with the Syrian intervention.

Trenin underscored the core significance of the Russian military intervention in Syria in terms of what it meant for the Russian military as a tool of Russian foreign and security policy.

“The Russian military operation in Syria is not only the biggest combat employment of Russia’s armed forces abroad since the Afghan war; it represents a very different kind of warfare in comparison to anything Russia had practiced before.

“First, this is an expeditionary war: Russia is fighting in a country with which it has no common border.

“Second, this is predominantly an air war: Russian ground forces are not fighting, though the navy is occasionally engaged.

“Third, this is a coalition war: in order to achieve the war’s aims, Russian airstrikes have to be exploited by the non-Russian forces operating on the ground.

“Fourth, this is a limited war very closely tied to the diplomatic process.”⁸

Put in other words, the intervention places Russia into the diplomatic game in a volatile region where Russian interests are clearly involved, not the least of which in terms of Russia’s energy business.

But it also provides a learning event for sorting through how to interactively use new and older Russian military capabilities to support Russia’s version of crisis management, which is a key element of what direct defense for Europe entails as well.

The political objective of the Russian intervention was clear from the outset. According to Trenin:

“Although the Russian military operation in Syria was billed from the start as “anti-terrorist,” it was mostly directed against Assad’s various armed opponents rather than the Islamic State group. This was fully consistent with the immediate objective of the Russian military operation in Syria: to stabilize the Assad regime, which was besieged by the forces of the opposition, not those of IS.⁹

The intervention has cleaerly placed Putin in a more central position within the region, which has reach outside of the Middle East as well. 

According to Trenin:

“Moscow also emerged from its military engagement in Syria as the player with the most connections in the region. During the war, President Putin stayed in close touch with virtually all regional leaders, including those of Turkey, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and Lebanon.

“Russia managed to avoid the risk of falling into the cracks of Middle Eastern divides: Shia versus Sunni; Saudi versus Iran; Iran versus Israel; Turkey versus the Kurds, and so on.

“It is this ability to promote one’s interest in a conflict-infested environment that is particularly useful for a country aiming to be a global player. It is negotiating those divides that would test Russia’s ability not only to promote its own interests, but also to deliver public goods—a mark of a true great power in the twenty-first century.”¹⁰

Trenin’s interpretation of Putin’s engagement in Syria is in part that the crisis allowed him a chance to breakout from European stalemate to reassert Russian flexibility in political-miiltirary-diploamtic activity through the venue of the Syrian crisis.

As Trenin put it:

“It is not just a return to an important region, but a comeback to the global scene after a twenty-five-year absence. This breakthrough for Russia’s foreign policy has contributed to the ongoing change of the global order—away from U.S. dominance and back to some sort of a balance of power among several major players, including Russia.

“Moscow has demonstrated that a combination of a clear sense of objective, strong political will, area expertise and experience, resourceful diplomacy, a capable military, plus an ability to coordinate one’s actions with partners and situational allies in a very diverse and highly complex region can go a long way to help project power onto the top level. This was exactly what Putin was aiming for.

“His main foreign policy objective has been to bring Russia back to the top level of global politics, and he chose the Middle East as the area for that breakthrough.”¹¹

The featured photo shows Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hosting in Ankara his Iranian and Russian counterparts Hassan Rouhani and Vladimir Putin, April 4, 2018. (Photo: Anadolu Agency)

By Robbin Laird

Recently, I attended the Chief of the Royal Australian Navy’s Seapower conference being held in Sydney from October 8th through the 10th, 2019.

The conference provided insights into two major questions: What is the development trajectory of the Royal Australian Navy over the decade ahead? And what is the evolving strategic context within which those developments will have their meaning and impact?

The first question was addressed largely from the standpoint of the impact of “the continuous shipbuilding approach” on Australia seen as a nation, with infrastructure, and sustainment approaches widening the impact of the navy upon the Australian navy and society.

In my view, this recalled the importance of Vice Admiral Barrett’s book on the Navy and the Nation which was published when he was Chief of Navy. This clearly is more than a whole of government approach; this is a whole of economy and society approach.

For this to succeed, the nation will have to understand why this is being done.

A large part of that answer will come in the national debate about the direct defense of Australia in the changing strategic context.

As Australia engages in shaping its role in the changing global dynamics of the 2020’s, a key challenge is to determine how best to protect its sovereignty with the rise of the 21^st century authoritarianism and how to deal with the end, at least in its current form, of the American generated and sustained order or what the Aussies call the “rules-based order.”

The 21^st century authoritarian powers are clearly focused on changing the rules of the game let alone the rules-based order. Although the United States clearly is a key ally of Australia and the dominant liberal democratic military power, that relationship clearly is not enough to sort through how best to protect Australian sovereignty.

A key part of that change will be the centrality for Australia of their region, and reshaping Australia’s role within the Into-Pacific.

One panel at the conference was asked to address the question of what the Info-Pacific region would look like in five years and what might be the implications of that forecast for Australian defense and security.

I was quite struck by one analyst’s approach to answering the question.

Dr. Stephen Fruehling answered the question by taking us forward to 2024 and asking what questions would the Seapower conference in 2024 be focused upon.

Dr. Fruehling’s presentation follows along with the questions which he posed along this line.

We’re asked to look about 5 years out on strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific, and I’ll focus my remarks on what I think how Australian strategic policy could and should develop over that time, and what this might mean for Navy

I listened with particular interest to the presentations by the minister, the Chief of Navy and his fellow chiefs on Tuesday.

If one compares the debate today to that of just three or four years ago, just before the 2016 White Paper, it is easy to forget how much progress we have made:  The notion that a program of continuous shipbuilding is the basis for Australia’s ability to develop and grow its maritime power for the Indo-Pacific area in the 21st century has become almost uncontested within those short few years.

And the focus on Indo-Pacific Partnerships as a key element of Australia’s defence engagement and policy in general, and the major focus for Navy’s operational forward presence, gives some strong support to the notion that Defence is really becoming a strategy-led organization.

Because of the nature of what they do, it is almost inevitable that Navies respond most visibly and directly to such changes – Army and Air Forces change form Kamarians to Musorians and back again, but few will notice outside and even inside those services.   Navies are different, since the question of where to go once you leave port is kind of hard to avoid, and it is thus not surprising that developing ‘Partnerships’ in the Indo-pacific has become so central to the RAN today.

Moreover, naval platforms also tend to most visibly change, admittedly with a lag, to changes in strategy – the ‘500’ vs ‘600’ ship navy were as shorthand for US maritime strategy debates in the 1980s;  the almost totemic importance of carrier numbers for forward presence US defence debates of the 1990s; or the association of the ‘littoral combat ship’ with Donald Rumpsfeld’s ideas of ‘transformation’.  Even in Australia, the decision not to replace the carrier, and the definition of the original ANZAC capability for Southeast Asian, not Northern hemisphere requirements have little parallel in the other services.

The problem though if we look to the Indo-Pacific for the next five years is what is that Australian strategy that the Navy is supporting and developed for?

This is one of the key questions that Defence will need to confront in the current review, because the answer isn’t in the 2016 White Paper.

Back in the olden days of the 1950s and 1960s, Australia conceived of not one but three related strategies—for Cold War, we might call it competition these days; for limited war; and for global war.

Partnerships are important in all three regards, but the demands that they place on different elements of the Navy, the ADF as a whole, its national support infrastructure and its alliances are quite different.

Ultimately, to govern means to choose.  and in the past Australian governments at times prioritized capabilities for Cold War operations, sometimes for situations of limited war.  We are not alone in this: On Tuesday, Admiral Aquilino spoke of the need to strike a balance between preparing to fight and win, and operating forward to deter.  Admiral Prazuck also spoke of the need to constantly evaluate the balance between presence and intervention, heavy and light forces.  But how to do so is a question that our strategic policy still has to come to terms with.

What would I hope to see in the discussions at Seapower 2024, five years from now, to show that we have done so?

A greater understanding at the defence, industry and political level of how the national shipbuilding system and the RAN’s growing role as a parent Navy enable us to adjust our force structure more rapidly than might otherwise be the case to changing strategic needs in our own part of the Indo-Pacific would be a start; combined with a clearer articulation and discussion of the different roles that different parts of the Navy might play in competition, limited and global war, and the trade-offs between them.

If we prioritize capabilities for global rather than limited war, how can we use this shipbuilding enterprise for battle damage repair, and what parts of it and our wider naval infrastructure on shore do we need to defend against cruise missile and other attack?

If you slap a towed array onto an OPV and use it  as a helicopter lilipad, you may well have all you need to protect the Indian Ocean and Pacific SLOC that we would need for resupply with essential war stocks and fuels during global war.  Could they train to sufficient proficiency though if they’re busy surveying South Pacific EEZs?

How would we make use of industry, capacity building, and shore-based activities to step up partnerships in the maritime domain, if we were to spend more days at sea honing Navy for high-end warfighting—or there are simply not enough ships around for what we think we need to achieve?

Hence, besides greater engagement with the necessary trade-offs, the question of what is the strategic role of forward-presence is a second, major question for the next five years.  Partnerships can help build capacity for a small force, as the Vice Chief said on Tuesday, but that just begs the question of capacity for what?  Where we can use partnerships to help regional countries fulfil their own objectives in the maritime domain they may help us be successful in strategic competition.

In regards to limited war, though, how would we use them to signal political commitment, to deter and reassure when we’ve never really thought about our forward presence in those terms, let alone how we might need to operate forward operationally and in a pol-mil sense as we transition from competition to crisis to conflict and war?

If you go to the European context, for example NATO allies have Standing Naval Forces that can be used for signalling and demonstrating resolve in a crisis, in a way that we and our US allies have never developed in the Indo-Pacific.  This is not to say we need a standing arrangement, but nor can we expect to make up solutions to the political-military challenges of successful signalling as a crisis unfolds.  Euan Graham’s discussion of the new marine corps guidance though highlights, forward presence for actual operations would look very different again from that we might maintain in steady-state competition.

But if we decide that the strategic purpose of our forward presence is to reassure our regional partners that we have their back, does that mean we have to be comfortable with that presence staying there throughout a crisis and into conflict, and perhaps not coming back?

If the discussions at Seapower in five years time will reflect answers to these questions in the way that this years’ discussions have responded to the 2016 White Paper direction, Defence, Navy and Australia as a whole will be well on our way to manage the challenges the region throws at us.

See also, the following:

Australian Strategy at a Turning Point: Implications for the United States

With Exercise Bushido Guardian, the Royal Australian Air Force has conducted its first joint air exercise with the Japanese.

The exercise is part of the expanded working relationship in defense agreed upon in 2017.

The opening of the exercise was highlighted in an article by Corporal Vevornica O’Hara published on  25 September 2019

The Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal  Mel Hupfeld, has greeted participants of Exercise Bushido Guardian 2019 with a confident “konnichiwa” during a hangar ceremony in Chitose, Japan.

The exercise, involving members of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (or Kōkū Jieita) and the Royal Australian Air Force, is being conducted at Chitose Air Base in Hokkaido and Misawa Air Base in Honshu from September 11 to October 8.

During the ceremony, Air Marshal Hupfeld said it was a pleasure to witness the strength of friendship between Australia and Japan and the growing bonds between the two air forces.

“We are here today because of a mutual desire to pursue broader and deeper defence ties, with BG19 achieving that and more,” Air Marshal Hupfeld said.

“Together, we are not only conducting our first bilateral air combat exercise, we also taking a significant step forward in our military relationship and our airmen and airwomen are forging strong personal bonds.”

Air Marshal Hupfeld was confident the new friendships would continue throughout their careers.

“I have no doubt you’ll earn each other’s respect and admiration for your professionalism and skill,” he said.

“Working alongside other air forces allows each of us to gain critical insights and understanding, and unlocks more effective interoperability between friends and allies.

“The realistic and challenging training scenarios will greatly enhance our individual and joint preparedness for operations in support of our national and regional interests.”

Air Marshal Hupfeld thanked everyone for their dedication and hard work and said he looked forward to joining them in the air for an exchange flight in a Kōkū Jieita F-15J.

The Australian and Japanese governments agreed to pursue deeper and broader defence exercise cooperation in 2017.

Postponed due to the Hokkaido earthquake in last September, BG19 is a first-of-its-kind bilateral fighter deployment to Japan.

The RAAF has deployed 140 people, along with six F/A-18A/B Hornets and an air battle management team, supported by the Air Mobility Group and the Combat Support Group elements and linguists.

Japan will have two F-15J squadrons and one F-2A squadron participating in the exercise.

And then in an article by Flight Lieutenant Katrina Trimble published on 27 September 2019 the nature of the exercise was discussed further.

The strength of Japan and Australia’s defence cooperation was evident when the Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Mel Hupfeld, took to the air in a Japanese F-15J during Exercise Bushido Guardian.

Air Marshal Hupfeld and his counterpart, the Chief of Staff Japan Air Self-Defense Force (Koku-Jieitai), General Yoshinari Marumo, visited exercise participants at Chitose Air Base, Japan, on September 25.

During the ceremony, Air Marshal Hupfeld thanked exercise participants for their contribution to the significant step forward in the two nations’ military relationship.

“Working alongside other air forces allows each of us to gain critical insights and understanding and unlocks more effective interoperability between friends and partners,” Air Marshal Hupfeld said.

“Over the coming days we are not only conducting the first bilateral air combat exercise, we are also demonstrating our shared commitment to an enduring partnership.

“I have no doubt that you are already earning each other’s respect and admiration for your professionalism and skill, and that you will continue to build new friendships that will last throughout your careers.”

General Marumo and Air Marshal Hupfeld said the historic exercise was a symbol of Australia and Japan’s special strategic partnership, founded on common strategic interests and shared values.

“We will continue to pursue opportunities to improve bilateral and multilateral air training and exercises, including in new domains,” General Marumo said.

“Australia and Japan are committed to working proactively together to promote and maintain a free, open, stable and prosperous and open Indo-Pacific.

“We will also continue to pursue engagement opportunities that contribute to our two countries’ commitment to our region.”

In a gesture of friendship, Air Marshal Hupfeld and General Marumo took part in exchange flights in both a Koku-Jieitai F-15J and RAAF F/A-18 fighter jet. The jets were piloted by the exercise squadron commanders and gave the chiefs a first-hand insight into the aircraft’s interoperability in the air.

Bushido Guardian, running until October 8, is an important exercise with Australia’s Japanese partners. It provides realistic and challenging training opportunities to guarantee the best quality of air combat support to the militaries during real-world operations.

What does the exercise mean from the Japanese point of view?

According to an article published in The Japan Times, and written by Michael Macarthur Bosack, the exercise was put in a broader Japanese approach to allies in the current period.

On Wednesday, the Air Self-Defense Force concluded Exercise Bushido Guardian with Australian counterparts in Chitose, Hokkaido. Last week, the Maritime Self-Defense Force finished up Exercise Malabar with U.S. and Indian participants out of Atsugi Air Base, Kanagawa Prefecture.

Starting this week, the MSDF will be participating in Exercise Joint Warrior in the United Kingdom and the Ground Self-Defense Force will take part in the amphibious assault exercise Kamandag in the Philippines.

This level of interaction with foreign militaries is not only unprecedented, it would have seemed impossible just a decade ago for the Self-Defense Force. It is becoming increasingly commonplace though, to the point that Japan has been actively negotiating international agreements to allow for more routine operations by foreign forces in Japan and vice versa.

The author provided an assessment of why Japan was doing this.

Beyond simply presenting an alternative to China, Japan has actively taken steps to align itself with the so-called middle powers that support the status quo. That status quo is often referred to as the “rules-based international order,” and Australia, the U.K., France, the Philippines, India, Canada, New Zealand and others are all countries seeking to preserve it.

Japan has deliberately reached out to them, increasing exercise participation with those countries, and in some cases, working toward formalized instruments of alignment, whether in the form of a mutual logistics agreement, military information-sharing agreement or visiting forces agreement.

What does this exercise mean from the Australian point of view?

One could see this exercise and an expanded relationship with Japan as part of the evolving of their strategic approach in the region and beyond. Australia is expanding the working relationship with core allies beyond the United States.

This air exercise and their approach to shipbuilding alliances indicate an expanded working relationships with Britain and France in the defense domain as well.