By Robbin Laird

When you are a medium-sized force and not adding a lot of manned platforms in the next five years, how to you enhance combat mass?

Or put another way how does the ADF as a ready force create mass effects with what they must fight with tonight and what they can plus up with in the short to mid-term?

This was the focus of the panel chaired by AIRMSHL (Retd) Darren Goldie with participation from the commander of the Royal Australian Navy, RADM Christopher Smith and the commander of the Royal Australian Air Force, AVM Glen Braz.

In this piece, I will deal with RADM Smith’s remarks and in the next with AVM Braz’s remarks.

Let us start with RADM Smith’s remarks and then unpack them.

Considerations of agility are paramount to our force structure. But how is this achieved framed against the scope and the pace of today’s military challenges, while preserving the flexibility to respond to contingencies of climate change and mass migration>

How do we generate the necessary mass to deliver on this broad remit of diplomatic constabulary and warfighting missions?

Generating mass will continue to challenge us, but I will attempt to articulate specific methods I think can assist. I’ll focus particularly on generating mass by increasing survivability of our forces, generating mass through partnerships, both with industry and in our region, and finally, generating mass by developing multistage force structures that add scalability, resilience and agility relative to our traditional conceptualisation of mass.  Today, the challenge we face pairs near persistent, wide area surveillance capabilities with advanced, long range precision strike.

Moreover, the volume and pace of the PRCs naval program has altered the landscape in which we must conceive of mass. Collectively, these challenges require us to reappraise our methods of confronting that challenge.

The first way in which today’s RAN in is able to build combat mass and depth by incorporating distribution forces operating across the maritime domain aim to defeat our adversary’s ability to find, fix, track, target and engage Australian forces.

This methodology seeks to distribute our forces in less detectable, less targetable means that present no clear center of gravity to the opposition. This approach eschews optimizing defeat of the adversary’s missiles in lieu of defeating their ability to effectively employ them.

Distributed forces are also able to match their firepower across a wider area compared to denser concentrations.

In this way, our forces become more survivable and better able to safeguard our maritime communications and trade. Echoing the wisdom of the classic theorists, distributed maritime operations places emphasis on massing effects vice platforms to generate the necessary depth of lethal force at the decisive point.

Distribution as a core concept of our operations therefore seeks to manage a defensive problem while seizing an offensive opportunity.

But there is tension between greater distribution and effective c2. Distributed forces will need to be supported by scalable and flexible c2, elements able to operate, either ashore or afloat and remain connected by resilient, low signature, redundant data networks that can withstand the contest for spectrum.

To support our survivability and decision advantage, we must dominate the various spectra in which our forces operate, employing techniques of deception and maneuver to install doubt in the mind of our adversaries.

The contest for spectrum will impact the wider contest for decision making advantage critical to our ability to dictate the tempo of conflict.

Together, these concepts will enable the RAN to achieve electromagnetic mass simultaneously flooding the spectrum and manipulating the pace of decision making of our adversaries.  Decision superiority and the ability to dictate the scale and tempo of operations will thus be generated through distribution and manipulation of the perception of mass that we present to our adversary.

This brings me to the second point on how we will deliver mass. The concepts I’ve outlined will require leveraging our critical partnerships across industry and across borders.

The pace and scale of change is perhaps nowhere where more obvious than in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Of particular note is the ability of Ukrainian forces to generate a sea denial capability against the Black Sea Fleet through employment of remote and autonomous systems delivered by industry partners to fill a critical capability gap for Ukraine.

The full impact of what these developments may mean for potential great war conflict in our own region may not be fully known yet it appears there are. Opportunities available for their employment as a complicating feature of the contested physical and informational battle space.

The potential of these systems to raise the noise floor for our opposition may go well beyond their presence in the physical domain to what signatures can be synthetically manipulated and what synergy may be found with loitering munitions and decoys.

The full realization of these capabilities to generate electromagnetic mass will necessitate the type of technology and information sharing with our partners that AUKUS can deliver and will be reliant on our continued engagement with domestic industry partners to push the boundaries of what is viable.

Finally, pairing the two points above, the RAN will seek to generate mass by reshaping its multistage system that leverages the potential of modern, uncrewed systems and spectrum manipulation with the long range understood benefits of distributed forcesin the maritime domain.

A multistage system can be understood as a combat force that maximizes the versatility, adaptability, survivability and controllability of multiple layers of the fleet and maritime forces.

The combat power of a stage system is simultaneously concentrated and distributed to generate mass in the battle space that commanders will leverage to dictate and scale the the tempo of combat.

Importantly, a multistage system requires all components to be defeated in order to negate its combat power. This increases the resilience of the systems, degradation and attrition.

The next evolution in a multistage combat systems will almost certainly involve increased reach, persistence and agility by inclusion of remote and autonomous systems that are able to pair with or operate independently from their associated crew platforms.

Future multistage systems will incorporate adaptability and interchangeability that goes beyond the power of carrier centric forces, as the diminished size and the crewing requirements make this capability available and affordable additions to even frigate and destroyer sized platforms.

But more than just uncrewed systems, future multistage forces will leverage the joint capabilities of distributed land and air assets throughout the maritime environment. The ability of future ground and air forces to contribute essential kinetic, non-kinetic effects to multi domain strike missions in the maritime environment will be essential to improve the economy of effort and generate sufficient precision and firepower at the decisive points.

The conception of mass in modern maritime combat demands clarity in the development of our doctrine and concepts. As past examples have shown us, challenges Australia faces today are not unique, and our thinking around combat, mass and depth should be informed by previous incarnations of this conundrum. We so we must again today, reconceive our thinking around mass.

Our fleet has embarked on this journey, but full clarity around the destination remains ambiguous.

Concepts of distribution and spectrum manipulation will support our requirement for decision superiority. Uncrewed systems will add complexity to the adversary’s situational awareness while simultaneously refining our own.

Pairing these ideas as a network of scalable and adaptable teams to form multistage systems will build necessary depth, versatility and resilience.

Yet the final product remains to be fully conceived, articulated and engineered to success.

Engagement with industry and coalition partners will remain pivotal to delivering this end state.  Along the way, we will require no small amount of innovation and an appetite to deal with the concomitant risk.  

What makes this presentation so interesting is that it combines ways to enhance the current force going forward with the end state which he sees as necessary for the Royal Australian Navy. In the near to mid-term, one needs to enhance the ability of the fleet to be augmented with the additional of uncrewed systems but do so by having significant creativity in creating combat clusters afloat which can leverage ground and air capabilities as well supporting distributed fleet operations.

While not talking directly about ship building his emphasis on mass effect is upon what he calls a multi-stage system or what I would call a maritime kill web. The idea is simply that through ISR, C2 and Counter ISR, the maritime maneuver force is able to mask, and to integrate with joint or coalition forces to deliver the mass effects necessary to confuse, mis-direct and defeat adversary forces.

It is really about building kill web maneuver forces. In a recent interview I did with LtGen (Retired) General Heckl, the recent head of the USCM combat development command underscored that what Force Design for the USMC is really all about was creation of a maneuver force able to operate against a force with better ISR and significant long-range precision strike.

And in that interview, we focused on what I see is a major unsolved problem – the need to use autonomous systems now as part of the maneuver force and how to begin solving the ability of manned and autonomous systems to work effectively in crafting the required capabilities of a successful maneuver force.

One problem he highlighted was the following:

“How we effectively communicate with autonomous systems is the key to using them effectively. We don’t want rogue robots in the battlespace.  And bandwidth is a key challenge. How do I work with multiple autonomous and manned systems? How do I communicate? How do I exercise fire control? And how do I provide the kind of interactive support and guidance with the Ground Combat element as it works the kind of offensive-defensive maneuver required in the conditions of being threatened by adversarial long-range fires and capable surveillance systems?”

This is a key element for working the kind of multistage system Smith is talking about. And this is not a long-range problem. It is part of the challenge in the next 2-5 years and as it is worked, the scope and nature of the future force will change significantly in ways no future force planner can now accurately predict.

This raises what I think is a key conundrum: If the force structure in being is modernized through the digital enablers for an integrated force –- C2, ISR, and Counter-ISR – and autonomous systems which are also software upgradeable payloads, how then do you know what exquisite platforms to buy for the future?

Featured Image: RADM Christopher Smith speaking to the Sir Richard Williams Foundation September 26, 2024

General Kevin Schneider, Commander of U.S. Pacific Air Forces and AVM Mark Flewin, Air Officer Commanding 1 Group Royal Air Force both spoke at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar.

The first presentation was by a video recording and the second was an in person presentation after the long flight from the UK. Together, the two provided insights into USAF and RAF thinking about the way ahead with allied airpower.

General Schneider underscored the close working relationship between the U.S. and Australia over the years and provided several examples of recent collaborative activity.

He focused on the recent Pitch Black exercise which was especially notable because of the expansion of partners in the Pacific region who participated.

Exercises like Pitch Black are not only increasing our interoperability, but they are helping our allied and partner nations rapidly to grow their capabilities. This in turn, helps secure their nations and provide stability to the region.

Your leadership in that exercise was evident, and the work accomplished there reached audiences around the world. You brought in so many firsts, the deployment of the Philippine Air Wing, our partners in Papua, New Guinea, and you worked tirelessly to bring in critical NATO allies from France, Spain, Germany, Italy and the UK.

NATO recognizes the importance of the Indo-Pacific and understands the impact it has on Euro Atlantic security. They also know where to find world class training with allies like you as well.

He then when on to highlight Australian cooperation in Filipino training as well as a key contribution to the common defence in the region.

I found quite interesting his spending time discussing the E-7 as well. When I first came to Australia in 2014 and then subsequently visiting the RAAF Wedgetail squadron, it was clear that the ADF had something special in the Wedgetail. But the United States and the United Kingdom even though looking for AWACS replacements, were slow to embrace the Wedgetail option. But now they have.

He noted:

The RAAF’s significant focus and role in air domain awareness stems from your nation’s early investment in the E-7 Wedgetail. It is a critical asset in our most advanced high-end training. The US Air Force Weapons School hosted the RAAF’s No. 2 Squadron for the first time as part of the weapons school integration phase in May and as part of the modernization of our own fleet.

We are excited to see the expansion of the exchange program, because now No. 2 Squadron is a multinational, integrated unit whose regular participation in global exercises with joint partners is a must, because we are developing and testing E-7 tactics with their air superiority and support for maritime strike forces. We wouldn’t be able to accomplish any of this without the genius of our collective airmen who are doing wonders at the tactical edge.

The General underscored: Australia adds immense value at the cutting edge of our most advanced tactics, techniques and procedures.

Quite obviously, the USAF needs to operate very differently in the evolving contested combat environment. And in this effort, it is working hand in glove with the RAAF.

This is how PACAF put it:

We must reorganize ourselves to tackle the high-end fights in the future, where we must be lethal while surviving in an anti-access area denial environment. We are learning to operate from austere locations, testing critical capabilities like our bomber Task Force and stressing our agile combat employment concept through a series of complex exercises at scope and at scale.

Through tremendous support from you, we’ve increased the rotational presence of U.S. capabilities in Australia across all domains, ensuring our forces work as interchangeable teams who are efficient during peacetime and lethal and survivable during wartime…

We want to find more ways to operate from different locations around the region to drive solutions to logistical challenges and to conduct rehearsals like hot pit refueling events and integrated flying operations to make our footprints even more lean and agile.

The bomber task forces, and our strategic aircraft play a critical role in our collective ability to support counter-maritime missions, something that we must do because the rise of competitors in both the Indo, Pacific and European theaters has brought anti-ship capability back to the forefront of the ASW mission. The bomber fleet is finding innovative ways to integrate modern weapons capabilities to increase survivability in an anti-access area denial environment and to support the joint fight.

He then discussed Agile Combat Employment and immediate ways ahead on training for this capability.

Next summer, we’ll partner with like-minded nations to host a large scale exercise to test agile combat employment at speed and scale in the Pacific that will coincide with the Talisman Sabre exercise, and as we anticipate the exercise will include fifth generation fighters, ISR, C-2, airlift and air fueling, and all the enablers to test our ability to deploy from the continental United States into theater to regional hubs in the first and second island chains.

We will disperse, aggregate, disaggregate, and recover aircraft. It is a highly complex logistical challenge in terms of access, spacing and overflight, maritime domain awareness and maritime strike capabilities, as well as generating and sustaining the force, making it even more challenging, we are adapting this new operational scheme of maneuver under significant fiscal constraints, a challenge that we all face as exciting as all these things are, I will never say that what we are doing is fast enough, that we have integrated enough, that we have prepared enough, or that we are ready enough.

AVM Mark Flewin then provided an RAF perspective on the way ahead.

He conveyed the sense of urgency as the West faces increasing threats and challenges. He looked back at World War II to remind the audience of the cost of the failure of deterrence.

But his presentation underscored the need for the West to get it right in terms of deterrence and although there is clear progress in the West’s capabilities, the tenor of his remarks that as an enterprise, we need to get better in order to ensure that deterrence prevails.

He underscored what he saw as five critical challenges that needed to be met on an urgent basis. The first is the need to generate greater combat mass.

He noted: We need to have the capacity to scale. It doesn’t need to be exquisite in terms of combat systems though it can be. It needs to be on the right side of the cost curve. It can be cheap.

We’ve seen from Ukraine that there’s a heavy mix of exquisite and non-exquisite capability that is ultimately delivering effects. But we need to absolutely partner with industry to be able to do that.

The second is enhancing our ability to fight tonight. The majority of the equipment we will have in 10 years we already have so we need to engage in continuous force improvement and training to ensure our force in readiness is at the level needed for deterrence

He underscored: We need to work together to optimize and get the most out of our platforms.

We’re working that in the Royal Air Force through a program called Optimize. It’s seen significant benefits already. We’ve seen the 20% improvement in availability on some platforms.

With Typhoon, for example, we’ve managed to remove 750,000 maintenance hours from that platform based on some data analysis and a risk aware approach which means we get more availability, and our mechanics are available for other tasks.

And it’s really important that we continue to spiral develop these platforms. They are going to be the baseline of our capability up to 2040 and they need to be ready to deliver.

The third is to ensure that we can adapt rapidly to technological change and to be able to incorporate relevant combat innovations being unveiled in the regional wars we see in front of us.

He put it this way:

My next point is on the criticality of embracing technological change. We talked about the electromagnetic environment today. What we witnessed in eastern Ukraine is that it’s an absolutely denied electromagnetic environment, we need to get around how we work in that environment, how we evolve in that environment. How we can bring operational advantage in that environment. We also need to not be afraid to fail and test and fail fast. It’s something we’ve worked on a lot in the UK. Naturally, we’ve moved away from it because we’ve been risk averse.

The fourth is the challenge of overcoming risk aversion and become more agile and capable of rapid innovation in our tactics and warfighting skills.

AVM Flewin emphasized:

We need to continue to change our mindset and make sure that we’re ready for the fight tomorrow. You might throw back at me that our processes aren’t efficient enough. We procure very slowly, our commercial process isn’t proficient enough.

We’ve learned a lot about that through Ukraine. We’ve adapted our process with industry. And I’d argue now that we are, we are getting after it, but there’s more to do. And we clearly need to transition from risk aversion to risk aware and objective focus.

Note: This is what the RAF has to say about the E-7:

The E-7 Wedgetail AEW Mk1 is the RAF’s successor to the E-3D Sentry and will provide a 5th Generation Airborne Early Warning and Control capability (AEW&C), with a Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA), that is interoperable and interchangeable with key allies.

The Wedgetail is the most technologically advanced AEW&C system available and will provide UK Defence with eyes in the sky, for at least the next 20 years, to see far beyond ground-based systems and fighter aircraft sensors. Capable of generating a 360-degree view of the airspace and as a force multiplier, it will provide advanced warning of approaching threats to enable commanders to fight effectively in complex environments.   

Already in service and proven with the Royal Australian, Republic of South Korean and Turkish Air Forces, the UK’s Wedgetail will serve under No 8 Squadron. It will be located at RAF Lossiemouth alongside the Poseidon Maritime Patrol aircraft, both of which are based upon the widely used Boeing 737 Next Generation airframe, allowing the RAF to take advantage of synergies between the fleets.

CAPABILITY

Capable of fulfilling a wide range of missions, Wedgetail can provide high fidelity and accurate target information utilising its cutting-edge MESA sensor housed in a distinctive fin on the spine of the aircraft. The sensor, combined with an advanced communications suite, enables the crew to provide tactical control to other assets via voice and tactical data link whilst enhancing the situational awareness of Joint Force commanders. 

The mission crew will utilise the ten state-of-the-art workstations to deliver a multi-domain battle management capability: providing situational awareness to other assets, directing offensive and defensive forces whilst maintaining continuous surveillance of an area. The Wedgetail significantly enhances the capability of friendly combat aircraft and warships, enabling their missions and increasing their survivability in a hostile environment.

The featured Photo: AVM Flewin presenting at the September 26, 2024 Sir Richard Williams Foundation Seminar.